The Implications of Political Dynasties in the Philippine Political Arena

Hannah Georgia F. Plopinio

In the Philippines, the family is an institution that has been a vital factor in shaping the
history of the country. According to Jean Grossholtz (as cited in McCoy), the Filipino family is
the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest loyalties of the individual and coloring all
social activity with its own set of demands.
However, over the years, Filipino and foreign historians have continually avoided the
facet of political dynasties and their implications on the countrys performance, politically and
economically. As opposed to Latin American literature, Filipino biographies are more a
hagiography, as described by McCoy. Whereas Latin America offers literature that delves into
the deeper studies of elite families and their history, Filipino biographies are written with
veneration for late family members, sugarcoated with kowtowing testimonials, leaning towards
the more important: the celebration of their overflowing contribution to the Filipino community,
hiding under the carpet their murky intentions and corruption.
This paper aims to highlight certain points that historians seem to dismiss with regard to
political dynasties, its advantagesor lack thereof, disadvantages, and its implications on the
countrys past and the future.
Article XV Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution states that: The State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development. Moreover, Article 216 of the Philippine Civil Code
states that, The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
For years the Filipino family has survivedoffering jobs, educating the youth, providing
medical care, taking care of the elderly and the disabled, transcending from one generation to the
next (McCoy).
The 1987 Constitution, however, also states that: The State shall guarantee equal access
to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. As
a political democracy, equal opportunities to voice out public opinion are of great importance. A
healthy democracy has the potential to engender wide-ranging growth in terms of economic and
human development. Yet, in contrast to the theory, a majority of seats in both national and local
levels revolve only around a few family names. It seems to be that elite clans have ventured into
a whole new enterprise that involves even the outermost branch of the family tree.
For years, political dynasties have been a feature of the Philippine government. As coined
by McCoy, a kinship network is capable of maximizing coordination and influence through
creating an informal political team with members that are assigned specific roles. Political
dynasties can exist in any form of government, however, they are often viewed as determinants
of fragile and feeble democratic structures with weak political participation and underdeveloped
institutions.
The relationship of the countrys elites and the Philippine state is characterized by the
strength of the former and the weakness of the latter. For the reason that the rise of rent-seeking
has continued to grow, the strength of the government has also continued to attenuate. As
explained in McCoys article, privatization of public resources strengthens a few fortunate
families while weakening the states resources and its bureaucratic apparatus. Henceforth,
factors such as wealth and popularity greatly contribute to the formation of dynasties. Philippine
politics is costlythe competition mostly veers in favor of the elite who are capable of
producing campaigns that reach a bigger portion of the masses through polishing a respectable
public image by ads that appear in every local television and radio station, with funds allotted to
vote buying and coercion on the side (Sidel, as cited in Mendoza).
Aside from financial capability and popularity, Coronel argues that a political dynasty is
also founded on a network that is capable of transforming wealth and influence into votes.
Indeed, it is through the impersonal, inductive and coercive mechanisms of the
political machinery that wealth is translated into political support and votes
prospective dynasties therefore need to draw upon established formal and
informal organizations at the local or national level to mobilize resources,
manpower, and votes. (p. 14)
Aligning themselves with already existent and prominent families and maintaining influential
affiliations provides grounds for building a dynasty. Alliances with more powerful families
become strategies to challenge or overthrow a rival, and/or to discourage probable competitors.
Alongside factors such as wealth, fame and political machinery is the history of violence
in the Philippine political arena. The notion of violence has continually reduced the chances of
rivals from challenging established dynasties due to the lack of concrete and stricter policies that
cater to such cases, especially in the rural areas.
Political dynasties may entail a monopoly of power, catering only to those in position and
deterring any more chances of change. Ronald Mendoza, the executive director of the Asian
Institute of Managements Policy Center, conducted a research regarding the socio-economic
outcomes that are linked to dynasties, and the implications of political dynasties towards the
growth of the country. According to Mendoza, the success of policy-making is riding on the
strength of good governance. Furthermore, dynasties could either be an avenue towards a
lengthier time for politicians to pursue reforms, or could pave the way towards a domination of
both political and economic power.
In the study, research has shown that dynasties cover all of major political parties, and
that the 15
th
Philippine Congress is 70% dynastic. In addition, dynasties are more prominent in
regions with higher poverty and lower human development. According to Mendoza, districts
with dynastic legislators have a higher poverty incidence, poverty gap, and poverty severity as
opposed to those that are non-dynastic. The average income of these districts are also lower than
areas with non-dynastic representatives. Such results imply two possible conclusions: first is that
dynasties are not inclined to pursuing decisions that increase average incomes, second is that
voters that have lower average incomes are more prone to supporting political dynasties. Results
also show that either areas that lack services providing health care, education and income
opportunities tend to elect dynasties, or dynastic representatives implement policies that do not
supply services improving health, income, and education. Even worse, the erroneous expenditure
of funds and corruption suppresses the development necessary in the rural areas.
Regions that have increased poverty rate are also associated to political patronage, where
ballots are mere commodities available to the candidate with the highest bid. A good platform
and a plan of action is no longer necessary for candidates that carry a renowned surname; a
catchy campaign jingle and his sponsorship to local basketball teams and weddings will do.
In order to illustrate an example, the controversial Priority Development Assistance
Fund, better known as the pork barrel, has become an indication of patronage politics. The pork
barrel, besides its main purpose of assisting a legislator to pursue his proposed projects and
platforms, has become a probable tool for a legislator to prolong his position, acquire wider
support, and invest in services that serve private interests.
The clientelistic nature of local Filipino politics and the propensity of politicians
to label public goods with their names almost always guarantee that Filipinos will
view infrastructure, livelihood projects, and welfare assistance as private goods
accorded to them by legislators and local government officials. (p. 18)
This relates to the utang na loob mindset of Filipinos, taken advantage by politicians, with the
hope that citizens would return the favor by providing political support and loyalty. In such
manner, a political dynasty is strengthened and sustained. However, now that the PDAF has been
abolished, perhaps it could beget implications on the survivability of prominent political
dynasties.
In the long-run, political dynasties could engender more negative than positive
consequences. The dominance of political dynasties could mean the neglect of the actual needs
of the public, rendering the government incapable of retorting social, economic and political
crises. In addition, incumbents become more inclined to serving private interests, more prone to
pursuing decisions that have little to no effect towards the betterment of the masses.
rent-seeking dynastic politicians, upon recognizing the pecuniary benefits of
adopting growth-oriented policies and strategies, might also be motivated towards
enacting reforms that would result in considerable and sustainable economic
growth in their own jurisdictions. (p. 3)
Lastly, victory over a position of power that favors those with a network of connections
and a stronger influence inhibit the chances of people who are more capable and are better
equipped to serve the majority.
One of the important features of a political democracy is the strength of political
participation. In a country where the majority is comprised of people below the poverty line, it
important that the needs of the citizens be addressed, bringing about an increased level of human
capital investments. However, in the case of a developing country such as the Philippines, elite
families are often inclined to taking advantage of coercive and economic resources, perpetuating
a culture of dependency, a patron-client relationshipa dominant and influential patron and a
disenfranchised client with no choice (Curato, 2012).
Otherwise, political dynasties have the potential to bring about sustained reforms. A
longer tenure can be a leeway towards positive growth in terms of accomplishing inclusive
development: an opportunity to cater to necessary reforms that are oftentimes ignored or
neglected. Incumbentsdespite having come from the same alliancesthat sincerely aim to
represent the less fortunate could improve provisions of public health and education, reducing
undying corruption (Mendoza). Still, such is not the case in the Philippines. In sum, in spite of
the fact that legislators under dynastic rule have the capability to deliver credible performances
that cater to the political and economic stability of the country, political dynasties are also
determinants of a weak representative democracy.
The state, as it evolved out of the colonial context, remains a weak apparatus for
economic development Enjoying little autonomy from dominant social classes
and entrenched particularistic groups, the state is captured by competing social
interests.
Perhaps there is still hope for the Filipino people to pursue more productive reforms in
the long-run. Ronald Mendoza has recommended a few steps that could boost the performance of
the country in terms of human capital investments. According to him, the Filipino people must
continue to construct an inclusive social protection system in order to attenuate the reliance of
the poor towards those in power, weakening political patronage. The promotion of an
empowered citizenry, providing incentive and engaging directly with people in providing public
services. Lastly, pushing for more ambitious reforms that better the economy in terms of
producing more job opportunities in foreign and domestic investments.