Rhetoric Is A Counterpart of Dialectic

Rhetoric is a Counterpart of Dialectic ([inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.
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McAdon, Brad.
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Volume 34, Number 2, 2001, pp. 113-150 (Article)
Published by Penn State University Press
DOI: 10.1353/par.2001.0007
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Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2001. Copyright 2001 The Pennsylvania State
University, University Park, PA.
113
Rhetoric is a Counterpart of Dialectic
(H tc.- .
,
ct.| c
,
|t. ctcc, t o.c`.-t.- )
Brad McAdon
Greek philosophers who preceded Aristotle, especially Gorgias, Plato, and
Isocrates, developed their respective views on persuasive discourse (or
rhetoric) based upon their larger philosophical projects. Similarly, I will
argue in this essay, Aristotle developed his understanding of rhetoric as a
part of his larger philosophical project. He not only equates rhetoric, in
many respects, to dialectic, but also treats it separately in the Rhetoric,
perhaps as thoroughly as he treats dialectic in the Topics. In addition to
these two works, Aristotle addresses rhetorical issues in the Prior and Pos-
terior Analytics, the Sophistical Refutation, the Politics, and the
Nichomachean Ethics, perhaps in a similar manner as he addresses dialec-
tic in the Prior Analytics (24a2225, 68b814, 46a310), the Sophistical
Refutation (165b14), the Posterior Analytics (81b1823), and the Meta-
physics (995b2125). Moreover, the parts that comprise both rhetoric and
dialecticsyllogism/enthymeme; induction/example; the respective audi-
ences; and the purposes: to inquire, to argue, to persuadeall receive con-
siderable discussion throughout his logical and nonlogical works. The
similarities of the ways in which Aristotle discusses both rhetoric and dia-
lectic and his repeated claims that rhetoric is a counterpart to or out-
growth of dialectic suggest that, for Aristotle, rhetoric is very closely
related to dialectic, that his understanding that rhetoric may be just as much
a part of his larger project as is his dialecticunderstood within the pur-
poses and intended audiences of eachand further suggest that in order to
understand his view of rhetoric, it is first necessary to understand his view
of dialectic.
1
I will attempt in this essay to develop an understanding of Aristotles
rhetoric in relation to his dialectic. I will then attempt to situate both into
their respective places within Aristotles expressed purposes for different
forms of discourse, and in respect to appropriate discourses for appropri-
114 BRAD MCADON
ate audiences. Other writers have certainly related aspects of Aristotles
rhetoric (and Rhetoric) to aspects of his philosophy,
2
and this discussion
will draw upon some of these writers works, but what seems to be lacking
is a relatively short discussion that presents a somewhat specific overview
of Aristotles demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric in a way that clearly
illustrates his Rhetorics relationship to his logical works, and that also
delineates and intentionally draws attention to Aristotles understanding of
the intended audiences for each of his discourses. This essay is such an
attempt.
After initially setting the stage for the discussion of Aristotles view
of rhetoric in respect to his views of demonstration and dialectic (those
other forms of discourse that he carefully developed for expressing his
understanding of reality) by briefly discussing how Gorgiass, Platos, and
Isocrates views of persuasive discourse are inherently related to their larger
understandings of what is, I will present Aristotles views on demonstra-
tion and dialectic and their respective parts. I will then discuss the rela-
tionship between Aristotles dialectic and his rhetoric. My discussion will
include a look at the term c
,
|t. ctcc,, an analysis of the similarities and
differences between dialectic and rhetoric, and a consideration of how
Aristotles enthymeme fits into his rhetorical scheme; in this consideration,
I will engage others who, I will argue, have given some but not enough
consideration or no consideration at all to the intended audience of the
rhetorical discourse in developing their understanding of the enthymeme.
After these aspects have been considered, I will summarize the discussion
up to that point and then offer a conclusion in which I will assert that
Aristotle intended his Rhetoric to be an important discussion that attempts
to contribute to the relatively new discipline of rhetoric a theory of persua-
sion that is derived, in part, from his theory of proofs; that he understands
rhetoric to be an important part of his understanding of discourse, perhaps
as important a part as his dialectic, each understood within their intended
purposes and intended participants and/or audiences; and that his rhetori-
cal theory must be understood, as he seems to suggest, in respect to his
concept of dialectic.
P. Albert Duhamel suggested fifty years ago that the content of the
idea of rhetoric is dependent upon the epistemology, psychology, and
metaphysic of the system in which it occurs. The rhetorical, he claimed, is
determined by the epistemological. The rhetoricians conception of the value
of argument, the process of invention by which arguments are to be dis-
covered, the extent to which the devices of elocution are to be employed, is
115 RHETORIC IS A COUNTERPART OF DIALECTIC
the result of his evaluation of the reliability of the intellect, the nature and
availability of truth, and the existence of certitude (1949, 345). Comment-
ing upon the classical rhetoricians, Duhamel based his claim upon the no-
tion that all ancient rhetoricians or theorists of rhetoric have had only one
objectthe teaching of effective expressionand that an authors terms
and purposes are meaningful only within the context of the authors sys-
tem taken as a whole (344). Adopting Duhamels claim as a (but not the
only) guiding principle, I believe a good place to begin the discussion of
the importance of understanding Aristotles rhetoric within his larger project
is to briefly summarize the philosophical context of rhetoric with which
Aristotle would have been acquaintedas represented by Gorgias, Plato,
and Isocrates.
Aristotle attests in the Sophistical Refutationswhich, it has been
argued, was appended to the Topics by later editors and understood by many
to have been meant as an appendix to it by Aristotle himselfthat he was
acutely aware of the continuous discoveries in respect to rhetorical prac-
tices that preceded him. After pointing out that those who discovered the
rhetorical art advanced it only a little way, he continues that the contem-
porary celebrities are the heirs of a long succession of men who have ad-
vanced it bit by bit, and so have developed it to its present form (183b2533).
Aristotle employs the term rhetorical arts (tcu , tc.-cu ,) here in a
sense that would suggest that the use of the term was itself already well
established.
3
We know that Plato uses the term early in his Gorgias, wherein
he, through Socrates, complains that Gorgias, as a rhetorician, was more
concerned with probability than with truth, and that, through the power of
words, he was able to make great things seem small, new things old, old
things new, and who invented conciseness of speech and measureless
length on all subjects (Gorgias 167ab). Another example of Platos criti-
cism of Gorgiass antithesis between truth and probability is advanced by
Socrates a little further along in the dialoguehe who is to be a compe-
tent rhetorician need have nothing at all to do, they say, with truth in con-
sidering things which are just or good, or men who are so, whether by
nature or by education. For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for truth
about these matters, but that which is convincing; and that is probability,
so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon prob-
ability (272d). The problem here, however, is that Platos criticism fails
to recognize that Gorgiass view of rhetoric is predicated on diametrically
opposed concepts. Whereas Plato, at times, represented the view that ideas
and knowledge had an immutable nature
4
and that those natures could be
116 BRAD MCADON
determined and accurately understood by the language used to explain them,
Gorgias espoused the view that concepts were best understood when their
antithetical natures were explored, comprehended, and appreciated.
An example of Gorgiass antithetical approach is evident in his open-
ing lines from The Encomium of Helen
For a city, the finest adornment is a good citizenry, for a body beauty, for a
soul wisdom, for an action arete, and for a speech truth; and the opposites of
these are indecorous. A man, woman, speech, deed, city or action that is wor-
thy of praise should be honored with acclaim, but the unworthy should be
branded with blame. For it is equally error and ignorance to blame the praise-
worthy and praise the blameworthy. (Gagarin and Woodruff 1995, 191)
His use of the termsa good citizen, beauty, wisdom, arete, truth (and the
inference to their opposites), and acclaim/blame, and praiseworthy/blame-
worthyillustrates his practice of comparing terms antithetically. Simi-
larly, his understanding of speech demonstrates the same diametric
characteristicsSpeech is a powerful master that achieves the most di-
vine feats with the smallest and least evident body. It can stop fear, relieve
pain, create joy, and increase pity (192). It is this diametrically opposed
emphasis between joy and fear, grief and pity, that, for Gorgias, describes
the power of speech. There is no attempt, on his part, to understand the
essence or nature of the thing, speech; he seeks only to provide a descrip-
tion of it by way of opposing characteristics. Plato, however, seems to have
in mind Gorgias, or at least the school of thought with which Gorgias is
associated, when, in the Phaedrus, he has Socrates query his interlocutor
as to how effectively one can truthfully demonstrate an idea by discussing
the similarity and dissimilarity of something without knowing the truth
about that which he is discussing. He concludes that those whose opin-
ions are at variance with facts and who are deceived, this error evidently
slips in through some resemblances, and, thus, the speaker and the audi-
ence both become deceived (272bc).
While Gorgias developed a nonformal, epistemological system based
upon what can be reductively called a kind of relativism from which his
view of rhetoric necessarily followed, Plato assailed against what he con-
sidered to be Gorgiass incorrect use of language (his rhetoric) as opposed
to what he considered to be his more correct understanding of languages
use through a primitive and constructed dialectic. The Republic offers ex-
amples of Platos dialectic and those who practiced it, and he claims therein
that all the other arts have opinions and desires of men as their object, but
those who are to determine in all cases what each thing really is are to
rely upon nothing else than tcu o.c`. ,.c-c. ou |c., (the power of
dialecting), that the dialectician is the one who is able to exact an account
of the essence (cu c. c,) of each thing (534B ff.), and that the students of
the ideal state will give special heed to the discipline that will enable
them to ask and answer questions in the most scientific (..ctc|.ctctc)
manner (534DE). Moreover, it is the dialectical method that allows Platos
philosopher to deduce either up to or down from first principles (c |)
and, in the ideal state, it is (c. .. tc, ,...t. c, t. -c. `c,.ccu ,
-c. tc tc.cu tc c,ct.uc .|c.) those who are laboring concerning
geometry and reasoning and other such things who work from initial pos-
tulates that are obvious to everyone and, after taking their starting point
from these, pursue the inquiry from this point on consistently and con-
clude with that for the investigation of which they set out (510CD). As
Plato represents it, these dialecticians are the philosophers who have been
enamored with a certain knowledge that reveals to them something of that
essence (cu c. c,) which is eternal, and they are the ones who pursue that
particular science (. .ct ) which attempts to understand the tc c | (be-
ing), rather than to concern themselves with those matters based upon oc c
(opinion) (485B87A, 50111, 477B78A). This dialectic of Platos, as
presented in the dialogues, however, must be considered cautiously, for
rather than functioning as a valid form of dialectic, of valid questioning
and answering on the part of two independent thinkers, Plato clearly con-
structed the characters of the interlocutors and their arguments to promote
his own point of view, and he did so through a more formal system of
language and its use that adhered to his more formally construed notion of
the eternal and absolute forms. Thus, Platos and Gorgiass basic concept
of knowledge (epistemology) differ as radically as their different approaches
to expressing these concepts, but both writers views of rhetoric are deeply
embedded within their larger philosophical projects.
As a student of Gorgias and in competition with Plato for students
who would attend his school rather than Platos Academy, Isocrates also
grounded his view of persuasive discourse within his philosophical sys-
tem. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish his conception of oratory from his
conception of philosophy; according to Isocrates, rather than wasting time
tracking down the first principles, which he thought to be a fruitless en-
deavor,
5
the purpose of philosophy is to train the young to become elo-
quent in speech because it is speech that distinguishes mankind from the
animals and it is the proper use of speech that contributes most to the prac-
tical and beneficial needs of society.
118 BRAD MCADON
The practical nature of Isocrates philosophical project is especially
clear in his introductory thoughts in the Panathenaicus, which he began
composing in his ninety-fourth year in defense of his educational philoso-
phy and civic actions. After excluding those who study the arts (t. -|c,),
sciences (. .ct c,), and specialties (ou|c ..,), he explains that those
he considers to be educated are those who manage well the circumstances
that they encounter daily, those who demonstrate sound judgment in the
same, those who are decent and honorable in their daily intercourse and
endeavors, those who are reasonable, those who control their pleasures,
those who are not unduly overcome by their misfortunes, and, most impor-
tant of all, those who are not overcome by their success (3032). The means
of achieving this end, for Isocrates, is through the acquisition of speech,
for he argued that people can become better and worthier if they conceive
an ambition to speak well, if they become possessed of the desire to be
able to persuade their hearers, and, finally, if they set their hearts on seiz-
ing their advantage, and advantage is understood by Isocrates as those
actions that stem from a love of wisdom (.`ccc .,) and the love of honor
(.`ct. .,) (Antidosis 27678). Moreover, the ability to speak well also
reflects the ability to think well, and Isocrates understands that these two
capacitiesgood thinking and good speakingare the basis of a success-
ful society, for by them the ignorant can be educated, the laws can be laid,
and the character of those who compose society can be enhanced because
the discourse that is true and lawful and just, that these citizens will ac-
quire from his system, will lead to the outward image of a good and faith-
ful soul. Thus, like Gorgiass and Platos, Isocrates view of persuasive
discourse is inextricably linked to his philosophical enterprise.
It is within this context of earlier writers that the development of
Aristotles rhetoric must be considered. As was mentioned above, Aristotle
claimed that practitioners and theoreticians of rhetoric preceded him. In
the same passage in the Sophistical Refutations in which he makes this
claim (183b2533), he also boasts that the case was different in respect to
dialectic and that he, himself, was the first to theorize dialectical prac-
ticewhich he later claims to be the counterpart (c|t. ctcc|) to rheto-
ric. So, what Aristotle probably means in Sophistical Refutations is that he
developed dialectic, or deduction, into its current form with its accompa-
nying terms as he spells them out in the Prior Analytics, the Posterior
Analytics, and the Topics. Therefore, the following discussion of Aristotles
dialectic will begin from the premise that he did develop his dialectical
theory from a preexisting context that was already practicing dialectic in
some kind of a systematic way.
The Posterior Analytics opens with Aristotles claim that all teach-
ing and intellectual learning come about from already existing knowledge.
This includes the fields of mathematics, each of the other arts, and deduc-
tive, inductive, and rhetorical arguments (71a111). In addition, he argues
that it is necessary to already be aware of things in two ways. First, we
must believe that some things already are (belief through perception or
intuition), and, second, of some other things, we must grasp what the thing
said is (comprehend through demonstration). After explaining that we think
we understand a thing simpliciterthat the explanation of which the ob-
ject is is its explanation and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise
he explains that there is a type of understanding through which we can
know, demonstration, and he then more carefully defines demonstration as
a scientific deduction (71b1719). Since Aristotle does not define what a
deduction (cu``c,.cc ,) is in the context of the Posterior Analytics, we
turn to the first chapter of the Topics, where he attributes a fourfold defini-
tion (or sorts) to the term. A deduction (cu``c,.cc ,) is
6
an argument (`c ,c,) in which, certain things being laid down, something
other than these necessarily comes about through them,
a demonstration when the premisses from which the deduction starts are
true and primitive,
a dialectical deduction if it reasons from reputable opinions,
a contentious deduction. (100a2527)
Thus, from the Posterior Analytics and the Topics, Aristotle specifies de-
monstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, and contentious arguments, all of which
share some aspect(s) of his views on argumentative, demonstrative, per-
suasive, or fallacious discourse, and all of which seem to be important
terms in understanding his philosophical method and project, for in the
first chapter of the Topics, he proposes to find a line of inquiry that will
provide the ability to reason about any subject, and the first step in this
direction is to briefly discuss the term cu``c,.cc , (deduction). In ex-
plaining the meaning of this term, Robin Smith suggests that syllogism is a
traditional but poor translation of cu``c,.cc ,, for it seems to limit or
more narrowly define the term than Aristotle meant for it to be. Rather,
Smith argues that the definition of cu``c,.cc , is clearly intended to
apply to a wide range of arguments: Aristotle does not regard sullogismoi
as merely one species of valid argument. The exact range of the term is
120 BRAD MCADON
less certain, but it is surely less wide than valid argument (Prior Analytics
110). Smith also points out that terms cognate verb, sullogizesthai, means
reckon up or compute, and that, thus, sullogismos can be understood as a
computation (106). Moreover, he also draws attention to the fact that
the thing which results (the conclusion) must be distinct from any of the
things taken (the premises) and that the plural certain things being sup-
posed implies that there must be more than one premise (110). Thus, it
would seem that we could cautiously define Aristotles sullogismos (de-
duction) as a valid argument (computing or reckoning) in which premises
(plural) are posited and a conclusion follows, where the conclusion must
be distinct from the premises.
Since sullogismos (deduction) is inherent to demonstrative, dialecti-
cal, rhetorical, and contentious argumentation, it follows that these four
aspects of Aristotles discoursedemonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, and
fallaciousare useful for intellectual training, casual encounters, and philo-
sophical sciences (Topics 100a2527). Since, however, fallacious arguments
will have little to do with the ensuing discussion, which seeks to under-
stand Aristotles rhetoric in view of his dialectic (which is not to say, how-
ever, that it is not an important consideration), only demonstrative,
dialectical, and rhetorical arguments will be considered below. Moreover,
since it is necessary to grasp the distinction between Aristotles demon-
stration and dialectic, I will begin the ensuing discussion by examining
Aristotles concept of demonstration and then contrast his dialectic to that;
only then will I compare his rhetoric to his dialectic.
Aristotles demonstration is that in virtue of which, by having it,
we understand something (Posterior Analytics 71b1819). The difficulty
of understanding this opaque passage has been briefly discussed by Smith
(Aristotle, Topics 1619), and this consideration of Aristotles view of dem-
onstration will limit itself to a discussion of the meaning of the term, citing
passages in which Aristotle refers to the term, drawing a general conclu-
sion from these, and, finally, briefly recognizing the problem with this view.
The term itself, c c o...,, can have a meaning of showing forth, setting
forth, exhibiting, publication, an exposition, or proof (Liddell and Scott
1996). Isocrates employs the term in the latter sense to refer to Melissus,
who made it his task to find proofs (c co.. ..,) that the whole is one
(Helen 3), and Plato has Socrates admonish his young interlocutor
Theaetetus for being swayed by popular oratory and for not advancing
any cogent proof [c c o...|] whatsoever, but for accepting an argument
from probability (Theaetetus 162E). A final reference to the term is in the
Rhetorictc t. , .ct.u c.| c `.ctc c tc| c co.o.. -c.
u c`c .u.| [for we believe most when we suppose [or take up by getting
under] [a thing] to have been proven] (1355a6). This subordinate clause
is interesting in that it suggests, by its main verbsuppose, or take up by
getting underthe extent to which proof is embraced by the taking hold of
that which is offered as proof. This is the sense, it seems, in which Aristotle
employs the term, for, as noted above, he understands demonstrative un-
derstanding to be scientific, and because it is scientific, its principles or
starting points, for deductive demonstration, must necessarily depend upon
two thingsthey must be true and they must be primitive (71b2021).
Hence, the starting point of an Aristotelian demonstrative deduction
(sullogismos) is the principle (c ), or immediate proposition (or, premise)
and according to the Posterior Analytics, all demonstrative first principles
must initially be true and primitive (or, immediate)they must be not only
true and without any prior principle, but also more familiar than, prior to,
and explanatory of the conclusion. Before addressing the first four aspects
of an Aristotelian demonstrative deduction, I want to note that the final
aspectexplanatory of the conclusioncan be explained by the fact that,
for Aristotle, there is a distinction between understanding a fact and under-
standing why it is a fact (78a22 ff.). Aristotle is concerned that one can
establish something, through demonstration, as so, without being able to
explain why it is so. His astronomical example in Posterior Analytics 78a35
38 illustrates this distinction through two syllogisms:
Every planet is a non-twinkler
Every non-twinkler is near.
Therefore, every planet is near.
Every planet is near.
Everything near is a non-twinkler.
Therefore, every planet is a non-twinkler.
In the first syllogism, where non-twinkler is the middle term, the syllogism
proves that the planets are near, but it does not explain why they are near.
Aristotle explains that this deduction is not of the reason why, but of the
fact; for it is not because they do not twinkle that they are near, but because
they are near they do not twinkle (78a3638). Yet, by simply changing
the middle term, the syllogism becomes an explanatory deduction of the
reason why for the primitive explanation has been assumed (78b2). Thus,
the middle term is the key for first principles to be explanatory.
c
122 BRAD MCADON
Returning to the other four characteristics of the first principles
true, primary, better known, and prior, we are confronted with the problem
of understanding how first principles are true, primary, better known, and
prior. The most serious problems here are that if all knowledge is deter-
mined by demonstration, and if demonstration is dependent upon first prin-
ciples, which are primary, then we would end up with an infinite regress in
respect to determining these primary first principles. Second, if all knowl-
edge comes from demonstration, then first principles, too, would need to
be determined from demonstration, and this would result in circular rea-
soning. Aristotle considers and rejects both of these considerations in Pos-
terior Analytics 1.3. He disregards the first claim, of those who contend
that all things need to be demonstrated, by arguing that not all things need
to be demonstrated, and he infers that there is a stopping pointfirst prin-
ciples, which do not need to be demonstrated (72b814)and in Meta-
physics G he is more articulate about the problem: [F]or it is impossible
that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything; there would
be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration
(1006a89). The second argument that Aristotle rejects is that held by those
who claimed that every scientific proposition could be demonstrated by
reciprocal or circular proofthat A is B because B is A, for demonstration
must depend on what is prior and more familiar; for it is impossible for the
same things at the same time to be prior and posterior to the same things
(72b2528). If, then, first principles cannot be demonstrated circularly and,
in fact, do not even need to be demonstrated, the problem becomes deter-
mining how we arrive at first principles.
Aristotle proffers a solution, of sorts, to this dilemma. Posterior
Analytics 2.19 (99b15 ff.) seems to offer a process by which these first
principles can be known. He begins his discussion by rejecting the notion
that we would have an innate understanding of them as absurd, but then
explains that we all possess some capacity that will be more valuable than
either innate knowledge or developing them [the first principles] from ig-
norance. This capacity is sense perception, and the process he outlines is,
in a very truncated form, this: I perceive something, and I remember the
perception, and this will lead to experience from which a principle of skill
(if it deals with how things come about) and a principle of understanding
(if it deals with what is the case) will follow. Marc Cohen summarizes this
process:
There is nothing rationalistic about II.19s account of the acquisition of first
principles. Our knowledge of first principles is not demonstrative (i.e., it is
not deduced from other knowledge), but it is not innate either. Nor is it gained
by a direct mental grasping of something that is self-evident. Rather, we move
from individual cases, beginning with perception, to a grasp of the universal,
by means of a process Aristotle calls epagoge. This is usually translated as
induction, although not every interpreter thinks that what he has in mind is
what we understand as inductive inference. (1998, 16)
By this process, Aristotle seems satisfied that knowledge of first principles
can be attained (perhaps through induction). Accordingly, Aristotle is con-
tent that first principles, which are known through this process, will meet
his four requirements of true, primitive, prior, and better known. Exactly
how this works is not at all clear, but what seems to be more clear is that
Aristotle understood from this that first principles for the scientific fields
of study could be determined, and these were to be understood to be true,
primitive, prior, and better known, and that it was from these principles
that demonstration was to begin.
In addition to the fact that demonstration attempts to prove and ex-
plain from first principles, which are true and primary, in a certain formu-
laic structure that will achieve the desired conclusion, they also are confined
to their particular sciencesone first principle for one genus cannot also
be the first principle for another genus (88b2021, 76a31 ff., and 77a20
ff.). Also, demonstrative propositions deduce from (possibly) inductively
determined first principles, which are known and accepted within their re-
spective science and attempt to prove a conclusion, in a monological, di-
dactic manner from that principle rather than to engage in other aspects of
the issue at hand, and those who engage in demonstrative deduction would
seem to be those within these respective sciences.
The essential problem with the preceding view, which suggests that
Aristotle proposes that first principles are understood through some kind
of sense-perception, is that there also seems to be a more scientific or tech-
nical element to Aristotles discussion within the Posterior Analytics that
would argue against such an empirical approach to understanding first prin-
ciples. Since this more scientific approach would require something other
than sense perception as the means of determining first principles, some
have suggested that Aristotles dialectic is the means toward a more theo-
retical or systematic understanding of the first principles. Terence Irwin is
the principle spokesperson of this particular view and his position will be
briefly considered.
124 BRAD MCADON
Irwin begins from Topics 101a35. Earlier in this second chapter of
book 1 of the Topics, Aristotle argued that the treatise (Topics) is useful
for intellectual training, casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences,
and at 101a35 he expands upon why the treatise is useful for the philo-
sophical sciences because the ability to puzzle on both sides of a subject
will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points
that arise. Irwin understands from this that Aristotle cites the dialecticians
capacity to examine the puzzles as the primary reason for thinking he can
contribute to the discovery of first principles (1988, 40). Irwin relates this
passage to Metaphysics B (995a2764) and argues that this problem of de-
termining first principles by sense perception is an c c. c (difficulty or
puzzle) and it is the dialecticians responsibility to resolve these c c. c.;
hence, by using dialectic to solve these c c. c. of the first principles,
dialectic is a path to the principles of all inquiries (101b3; Irwin 1988,
67). If dialectic is the means of understanding first principles, then it seems
dialectic would be the key to Aristotles philosophical method. An exami-
nation of what Aristotle says about dialectic should help to determine its
role within his philosophical methodology.
As was noted above, in Posterior Analytics 1 (71a111), Aristotle
distinguished between demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical deductions.
If, as Irwin suggests, Aristotles dialectic is a path toward first principles,
his dialectical deductions should exhibit those characteristics that would
lead one to first principles. Primarily, this would entail that the principles
with which dialectic concerns itself should in some way be true and primi-
tive. A method of determining this is by examining what Aristotle has said
in respect to dialectical deductions.
Whereas Aristotle claims that demonstration deduces from first prin-
ciples that are true and primitive, he seems also to clearly assert that dia-
lectic does not, in fact, work from such first principles. Rather, dialectical
deductions begin from . |occ|. Though this is another term that is diffi-
cult to define, the general understanding seems to be that an . |occ| is a
commonly held belief. Yet, lexically, it seems to carry more a connotation
of held in esteem, of high repute, and of things notable (Liddell and
Scott 1996, 561) than its cognate oc c, which carries the meaning of no-
tion, opinion, or judgment (444). Aristotle distinguishes between a
deduction from demonstration and a deduction from dialectic early in the
Topics. After asserting that a deduction is an argument in which, certain
things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about
through them, he continues that it is a demonstration when the premises
from which the deduction starts are true and primitive, or are such that our
knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primi-
tive and true; and it is a dialectical deduction, if it reasons from reputable
opinions (endoxa) (100a2529). Likewise, in Posterior Analytics 1.19,
he claims that those who are deducing with regard to opinion and only
dialectically clearly need only inquire whether their deduction comes about
from the most reputable propositions possible; so that even if there is not,
in truth, any middle term for AB but there seems to be, anyone who de-
duces through this has deduced dialectically (81b1821; cf. 995b2125).
Another indication that dialectical deductions are derived from . |occ
rather than from true or primary principles is the fact that the dialectician
must draw his arguments from the opinions held by the answerer or oppo-
nent of the dialectical exchange, whereas for the demonstrator/philosopher
[d]idactic [demonstrative] arguments are those that deduce from the prin-
ciples appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions held by the
answerer (for the learner must be convinced); dialectical arguments are
those that deduce from reputable premisses (Sophistical Refutations
165b24).
This discussion of . |occ would be insufficient if it were not to
address the problem of whose views are to be considered . |occ|, repu-
table. Aristotle has much to say about reputable opinions and those who
hold them, but I will begin with what is commonly understood as his de-
finitive passage: [T]hose opinions are reputable which are accepted by
everyone, or by the wisei.e., by all, or by the majority, or by the most
notable and reputable of them (100b2022). Irwin and others define
. |occ, as used here, as to suggest that something is widely held and that
it is also respectable, with something to be said for it (1988, 494 n. 42). If
this is the sense of . |occ in this passage, then, as Smith notes, this would,
indeed, create a jumble of meanings, for it would be difficult to distin-
guish what . |occ is to be held. In response to this confused reading, Smith
suggests that what Aristotle is doing here is not defining . |occ, but clari-
fying what varieties of . |occ there are: [O]ne kind is the opinions of
everyone, one kind the opinions of the majority of people, one kind the
opinions of the wise, etc. Collecting these various groups of . |occ would
be useful to a dialectician who needed to put forward premises likely to be
accepted by various respondents (1993, 346). Smith contends that the
purpose of developing premises, the immediate context of the passage, is
to have premises that the opponents will concede, and the best way to de-
126 BRAD MCADON
velop these is to know the wide range of possible groups with whom one
would argue in dialectical competition (346).
While Smiths interpretation seems sound for the passage under con-
sideration, other passages in which Aristotle discusses (reputable) opin-
ions seem to suggest that there are views from some that are worthier than
others. One such passage comes early in the Eudemian Ethics:
To examine then all the views held about happiness is superfluous, for chil-
dren, sick people, and the insane all have views, but no sane person would
dispute over them; for such persons need not argument but years in which
they may change, or else medical or political correctionfor medicine, no
less than whipping, is a correction. Similarly, we have not to consider the
views of the multitude (for they talk without consideration about almost ev-
erything, and most about happiness); for it is absurd to apply argument to
those who need not argument but experience. But since every study has its
special problems, evidently there are such relating to the best life and best
existence; it is well to examine these opinions. (1214b2915a5)
A similar passage is found in Metaphysics G (1006a 1415): It is absurd
to attempt to reason with one who will not reason about anything, in so far
as he refuses to reason. For such a man, as such, is seen already to be no
better than a mere plant (see also 105a27, 170b68, and 1145b15). Thus,
in addition to the different varieties of . |occ to be considered by the
dialectician, it seems clear that Aristotle also distinguishes hierarchies of
opinions, and he seems pretty clear that not all opinions comprise this as-
pect of . |occ.
Another difference between dialectical and demonstrative deduction
is that, whereas in demonstration the demonstrator (didactician) should not
ask questions, but should make things clear for himself, the dialectician
should merely ask questions (171a38bb2). Again, Aristotle is very clear
that no art that is a method of proving the nature of anything proceeds by
asking questions, but dialectic does proceed by asking questions (172a
1520; my emphasis; see also 77a3235 and esp. 171b3 ff.). This relation-
ship of the dialectician to questioning and answering seems to stem natu-
rally from the nature of dialectic as proposed in the Topics. After spending
considerable time in the early books of the Topics explaining aspects of the
categories, and of deduction, and of places (topoi) from which arguments
stem, Aristotle, in book 8, clearly writes within a context in which the prac-
tice of dialectical questioning and answering is already understood, and he
further instructs his audience, very specifically, on how to conduct them-
selves in a dialectical exercise, as the opening lines suggest:
Next, there fall to be discussed the problems of arrangement and method in
putting questions. Any one who intends to frame questions must, first of all,
select the ground from which he should make his attack; secondly, he must
frame them and arrange them one by one to himself; thirdly, and lastly, he
must proceed actually to put them to the other party. Now, so far as the selec-
tion of his ground is concerned, the problem is one alike for the philosopher
and the dialectician; but how to go on to arrange his points and frame his
questions concerns the dialectician only; for in every problem of that kind a
reference to another party is involved. Not so with the philosopher, and the
man who is investigating by himself: the premisses of his reasoning, although
true and familiar, may be refused by the answerer because they lie too near
the original statement and so he foresees what will follow if he grants them;
but for this the philosopher does not care. (155a40b13)
This passage illustrates many aspects of dialectic. Initially, it is clear that
the dialectician is in the business of asking questions, rather than stating
propositions (as the philosopher/demonstrator does). Second, this is an in-
ternal process, which the dialectician is to conduct before he confronts his
opponent. Third, he must present his questions to another party. There is
no indication here that the other party is at all required to accept these
questions as presented (165b1), whereas the philosopher/demonstrator is
not at all required to present his propositions to anyone in any fashion in
which he would need to be concerned with this. Also, a little further along
in this passage, Aristotle instructs his blossoming dialectician in how to be
able to obstruct the adversary in the dialectical exchange from determining
to what conclusion the deduction is headed, by altering the sequence/mat-
ter of the premises/questions of the deduction.
Closely related to the questioning and answering aspect of dialectic
is the propositional aspect of both dialectic and demonstration. Aristotle
defines a proposition as a statement affirming or denying something of
something (24a16), and he further distinguishes between a demonstrative
and dialectical proposition. A demonstrative proposition is the assump-
tion of one [the true and primary] of two contradictory statements (the
demonstrator does not ask for his premiss, but lays it down), whereas a
dialectical proposition chooses between two contradictories (24a2125).
Thus, the demonstrator begins from a true and primitive first principle of a
specific field, without the luxury of deciding which side of an issue to
pursue as is available to the dialectician, who is encouraged to argue from
both sides of the issue. Moreover, Aristotle seems to be very clear that the
demonstrator (didactician) should not ask questions when demonstrating,
but, rather, should make himself very clear (171a 38b2, and, especially,
128 BRAD MCADON
77a3235) because no art that is a method of proving the nature of any-
thing proceeds by asking questions (172a1520), whereas the dialecti-
cian should merely ask questions, after the primary premise is stated (171a
38b2).
A final consideration of the distinction between dialectic and dem-
onstration is the respective realms with which the two methods of discourse
concern themselves. As was pointed out above, demonstration is restricted
to specific, scientific areas, and the demonstrator is limited to deducing
from the first principles or axioms of that specific field, and not permitted
to transfer first principles from one field to another. The dialectician, in
contrast, has no such limitations; rather, dialectic and its practitioner are
not concerned with any determined set of things, nor with any one genus
(77a3235), but are universal in their application.
In summary, through demonstration, the solitary philosopher/dem-
onstrator within his specific scientific field concerns himself with deduc-
ing proofs from first principles from his specific field, which are true and
primitive, and is not at all concerned with what a respondent may say, but
proceeds by laying down propositions unobstructed by any respondent, and
is concerned to demonstrate as clearly and cogently as possible to deter-
mine the truth of the matter in question. Conversely, the dialectician is
engaged within an eristic context with no boundariesall fields of inquiry
are open to him. His premises are based (to the best of his ability) upon the
commonly held beliefs of his particular opponentrather than true and
primitive first principlesand then various classes of subject matter (top-
ics) that will lead to the desired conclusion, and he proceeds in a question-
and-answer manner and is prepared to conceal his approach if he thinks
that an opponent may not concede the desired conclusion, which is the
primary purpose of the dialectical exercise.
Based upon the foregoing discussion of dialectic and demonstration,
it does not appear as though dialectic is a means of determining first prin-
ciples. Dialectic deals with arguing and discussing, questions and answers;
proving exact knowledge and truth is, for Aristotle, the realm of demon-
stration and philosophy, and whereas the dialectician takes on the sem-
blance of a philosopher in that he is able to investigate things in all realms,
dialectic, for Aristotle, is merely critical, where philosophy claims to
know (1004b25).
Having, then, briefly considered how views of rhetoric or persuasive
discourse have stemmed from the philosophies of Gorgias, Plato, and
Isocrates, and having briefly considered Aristotles demonstration and dia-
lectic, we are now poised to analyze how Aristotles view of rhetoric is
related to his views of demonstration and dialectic, the latter of which he
tells us is rhetorics counterpart, and it is with this term that this discussion
will begin.
The first line of RhetoricRhetoric is a counterpart (c |t. ctcc,)
of dialectichas received a considerable amount of attention,
7
and this is
due primarily to the term that is typically rendered counterpart. This term,
c |t.ctc- , -c,, -c|, has a variety of possible meanings. In the femi-
nine form, within a choral or dancing context, it can refer to a turning
about, or the feminine can also, more commonly, be used to refer to a
repetition of closing words in successive members, or it can be used to
convey the idea of inversion or conversion of terms of a proposition.
Aristotle uses it in this sense as a retortion of an argument (Prior Analytics
61a22) and as a change of a proposition into its opposite (Prior Analytics
38a3, 39a28). In its masculine form, the term seems to connote a different
shade of meaning. While it can suggest converse like the feminine form, it
also connotes the idea of turning so as to face one another, from which is
derived correlative, coordinate, and counterpart (Liddell and Scott 1996,
163). Plato has Theaetetus respond to Socrates that sleeping and dreaming
could not be distinguished, that they were an exact correspondence
(c |t. ctcc|)as between the strophe and antistrophe of a choral song
(158C). Aristotle uses it in this sense, too, when, in Politics, he claims that
the fourth kind of oligarchy is c |t. ctcc| to the last kind of democracy
that he had explained (1293a34), and H. Rackman, the translator of the
Loeb edition, translates the term analogous.
Plato uses the term in a more immediate sense to the context of
Aristotles Rhetoric in the Gorgias, where he has Socrates confront Gorgias
as to the nature of his (Gorgiass) craft, rhetoric. In a discussion stemming
from Socrates assertion that rhetoric is a semblance (.. o.`c|) of a branch
of politics, Socrates, so he is informing Gorgias, is not about to bestow the
name of t. -|| upon that thing of consequence (,c) that is irratio-
nal (`c,c|) (464D). Moreover, Socrates goes on to develop his represen-
tation of the two different arts that affect the body (gymnastic and medicine)
and the soul, which he calls politics (legislation and justice). As flattery,
through cookery, can come to have more influence on the body than medi-
cine and as self adornment can be more deceivingly persuasive than gym-
nastic, so his image goes, flattery in the form of rhetoric does to justice
what cookery does to the bodyprovides the impression of health, but, in
fact, is detrimental to health. This, Plato has Socrates claim, is why rheto-
130 BRAD MCADON
ric is the counterpart (c |t. ctcc|) of cookeryit is detrimental to the
soul of the state (politics) (465).
It is to this conception of rhetoric in Platos Gorgias, at least in part
it seems, that Aristotle is responding in his Rhetoric.
8
In the Gorgias, Plato
detrimentally labels rhetoric as a semblance of a branch of politics, claims
that rhetoric is irrational, and argues that rhetoric is an c |t. ctcc| of
cookery. It is surely not by coincidence alone that Aristotle, in the early
chapters of the Rhetoric, addresses these claims. As mentioned above, it is
possible that the concept of rhetoric as a discipline was relatively new, and
as Aristotle seems to have been in the practice of beginning his discussions
of issues by initially considering what others have said about them
9
(.|occ)
(although he does not directly refer to Plato as he refers to others in other
discussions), it is reasonable, it seems, to suggest that, much as in the Top-
ics, he was writing to an audience who was already familiar, to some de-
gree at least, with the issues to be discussed, and, by making reference to
rhetoric as a counterpart to dialectic, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that
rhetoric is something other than what Plato, who earlier considered rheto-
ric a counterpart to cookery, deemed it to be. Moreover, as Jonathan Barnes
indicates, the question of whether rhetoric was an art or a technical subject
was a question which was not yet settled prior to Aristotle (Rhetoric 259
60), and, as will be seen, Aristotle seems to attempt to address this ques-
tion as well.
To what extent Aristotle considered rhetoric to be a counterpart to
dialectic is the next issue to consider. In the first chapter of the Rhetoric,
Aristotle claims that both rhetoric and dialectic are concerned with matters
that come from the general doings of men and do not belong to any par-
ticular science (1354a3, 1355b89), as demonstration does. He also asserts
that rhetoric is an offshoot (ccu. ,), a branch (c .c |) of, and similar
(c c. .c) to dialectic (1356a3034). This first term, ccu. ,, is a bio-
logical term of sorts, for it indicates the sucker or offshoot of a plant, or the
branch of a vein in an animal. Aristotle uses it in the History of Animals in
his discussion of a lobster in explaining the delicate appendages
(ccu.c.|) that are near the lobsters mouth (526a29). Similarly, c.c|
conveys a sense of close relationship, since it is defined as a constituent
part, member, or members or parts of the body. Aristotle uses the
term in his discussion of what parts areThe elements into which the
kind might be divided apart from the quantity, are also called parts of it
(c .c) (Metaphysics 1023b18), and c c. .c connotes the idea of make
like, correspond, likeness, and image. Plato employs the term in
this last sense in referring to the likenesses of the things of the other
world (Phaedrus 250A). Thus, Aristotle seems to be saying that rhetoric,
at least in some respects, has a very close, perhaps biologically linked,
affinity to dialectic.
One of these semblances is that, as a mode of persuasion, rhetoric is
a sort of demonstration, for Aristotle claims, It is clear, then, that the tech-
nical study of rhetoric is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Proof [
. ct.,] is a sort of demonstration [c c o... , t.,] (since we are most
fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated)
(1355a46). It is of preliminary importance here to notice the distinction
that Aristotle is making between rhetorical proof (. ct.,) and demonstra-
tive proof (c c o...,), for whereas the demonstrative proof is appli-
cable to the discussion of certain scientific [. .ct ] fields, for rhetoric,
Aristotle applies the term . ct.,, which connotes, rather than a sense of
proof, as was demonstrated above for c c o...,, a sense of confidence,
trust, assurance, and in a weaker sense argument or proof. (This will be
further discussed below when c -c, and -c, are considered.)
Aristotle continues, in the Rhetoric, to say that the orators demon-
stration is the enthymeme, and this term now demands consideration, but
before considering Aristotles use of the term, it seems helpful to review
its confirmed, prior, and contemporaneous use. Sophocles (496406/5
B.C.E.), in Oedipus at Colonus, which was not performed until several years
after his death (in 401), has Oedipus, the now-exiled king of Thebes, present
an argument to the Chorus at Colonus in an effort to save himself from
exile from Athens. Oedipus argues that the former crime he committed was
in self defense, that he ought not to be rejected, and that the people ought
not to be unjust (25892). To this, the Chorus responds: There is every
necessity, aged man, to regard with awe the thoughts [tc |-u ctc] that
come from you, for they have been expressed in no light words; and I am
content that the rulers of this land should decide this matter (29395).
Notice here that the enthumemata refers to the preceding argument, to
Oedipuss appeal to reasons why he should not be exiled. Also, it is note-
worthy that the term is used in a context in which a decision needs to be
made and for which there is no decisive proof.
10
Isocrates (436338 B.C.E.) use of the term provides a similar denota-
tion. In his preparation to eulogize Evagoras, king of Cyprus, he mentions
that the poets are allowed to embellish language by representing gods con-
versing with men and gods engaging in battles, but that this is not the case
for the philosopher/rhetor. On the contrary, he claims,
132 BRAD MCADON
Orators are not permitted the use of such devices; they must use with preci-
sion only words in current use and only such ideas (. |-u cc.|) as bear
upon the actual facts. Besides, the poets compose all their works with meter
and rhythm, while the orators do not share in any of these advantages; and
these lend such charm that even though the poets may be deficient in style
(t `. ..) and thoughts (. |-u cc.|), yet, by the very spell of their rhythm
and harmony, they bewitch their listeners. (190d91a)
In his Panathenaicus, published in 339, he not only employs the term to
distinguish between thought and style, but also seems to use it with a sense
of proof, for he says that he left aside all the stylistic flares and devoted
himself to giving advice to the true interests of Athens and to extolling
upon the virtues and qualities of the Hellenes by writing in a style rich in
many enthumemasin (c``. | . |-uc t.|)a style rich in many
thoughts (233a). The context of the Panathenaicus conveys that these many
thoughts were aspects of Hellenic culture that Isocrates thought served as
proofs of the Hellenes superiority over other cultures. This same idea is
echoed in the Antidosis, where he claims that his speeches praising Hel-
lenic culture not only set forth facts in a style (`. ..) more imaginative
and more ornate, but also employ thoughts (. |-u c.|) that are more
lofty and more original (49). In these examples from Isocrates (see also
Against the Sophists 294d), there is a distinction between thought and style;
these are either uses of the term that denote thought, proof, or, as in the
case of Sophocles, as M. F. Burnyeat points out, a consideration whereby
one is swayed by reflection on an issue where conclusive argument is not
to be had and these examples of the enthymeme do not invite one to
supply material the speaker left out, but on the contrary to attend seriously
to what the speaker said (1994, 12).
Xenophon, a contemporary of Isocrates (born c. 430), uses the term
enthumema at least twice in his Anabsis (date uncertain), and one example
will convey the denotation of both of its uses. In 3.5, Xenophon relates that
after troops returned from burning the enemys provisions, the general and
leaders were gathered in great despondency, for they were facing the
dilemma of steep mountains on one side and a river too deep to cross on
the other. In the midst of their perplexity, one came forward who claimed
to be able to advance them across the river if they would meet his de-
mands. This plan included binding the skins of sheep, goats, and cattle
together with the girths from the beasts of burden and constructing an
apparatus by which the men could float across the river. Upon hearing the
mans plan, the generals thought that while the idea [. |-u c] was a
clever one, the execution of it was impossible, and they decided to march
out in the reverse direction (3.5.12).
11
While discussing contemporary uses of enthymeme, it should be
pointed out that, although William M. A. Grimaldi, in Studies in the Phi-
losophy of Aristotles Rhetoric (1972) suggests that if we are to discover
what Aristotle intended by the word [enthymeme] we must do so primarily
in his own writings (69), he goes on to claim (without any evidence) that
Anaximenes was the author of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, to date the
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum as contemporaneous or even prior to Aristotles
Rhetoric, and then goes on to suggest that Aristotle would also agree in
general with Anaximenes . . . that the enthymeme is the source of probable
knowledge (7980). This seems to assume far too much, for, apart from
the problem of whether or not Aristotle would agree with the writer of
Rhetorica ad Alexandrums understanding of the enthymeme, we do not
even know for sure who wrote Rhetorica ad Alexandrum or when it was
writtenbefore or after Aristotles text. Without such confirmation, it seems
dubious, at best, to attribute such importance to the text as Grimaldi does
in determining Aristotles use of the enthymeme, and I do not think it is
necessary, for, as will now be considered, I think that Aristotles under-
standing of the enthymeme can be understood by his use alone and that his
use of the term will coincide with those earlier confirmed denotations of
the term as expressed by Sophocles, Isocrates, and Xenophon.
Aristotles enthymeme, it should first be noted, comprises only one
of his logical proofs, for as Aristotle constructs his rhetorical method-
ology, he understands that proofs can take two formst.|c, and |t.-
|c,. The former, nonartistic, are not provided by the speaker, but are
preexisting (witnesses, testimony, and contracts), whereas the latter, artis-
tic, are provided by the speaker, can be prepared by method and by subject,
and must be invented by the speaker. Aristotle understands these proofs
(. ct..,) to be of three artistic categories -c,, c -c,, and `c ,c,: The
first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on
putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on proof, or
apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself (1356a23).
Moreover, the latter rhetorical proof, logos, is comprised of two partsthe
enthymeme and the exampleand these are what Aristotle equates to his
sullogismos and epagoge (induction).
Like the sullogismos, perhaps the first question to be asked is whether
Aristotle defines enthymeme or whether he speaks of its qualities.
12
Many
commentators, it seems, are willing to accept that when Aristotle talks about
134 BRAD MCADON
the enthymeme he is defining its essence. George A. Kennedy, for example,
provides this definition in his Glossary: enthymeme; a rhetorical syl-
logism, i.e., a statement with a supporting reason introduced by for, be-
cause, or since or an if . . . then statement. In contrast to a logical syllogism,
the premises and conclusion are ordinarily probable, not necessarily logi-
cally valid. A premise may be omitted if it will be easily assumed by the
audience (1991, 315). It seems equally possible, however, if not more
probable, that what Aristotle is doing when he speaks of the enthymeme is
similar to what he does when he speaks of the sullogismoshe is speaking
to its different characteristics, its qualities. For example, at Topics 101b38,
Aristotle defines definition (cc,) as a phrase signifying a things essence
(Pickard-Cambridge in Aristotle, Complete Works 169). Smiths transla-
tion conveys this sense more clearly: A definition is a phrase which signi-
fies the what-it-is-to-be (Aristotle, Topics 4). His commentary on this
passage illustrates the problem of anachronistically attributing our com-
mon or contemporary notion of definition upon Aristotle:
Defining, for Aristotle, is not lexicography but an activity of greater philo-
sophical and scientific importance. He does acknowledge definitions that serve
simply to explain what a word means (cf. An. Post. II. 10, 93b301), but for
him a true definition defines, not a word, but the reality behind the word. It is
less easy to say what the reality is that is defined. Generally, Aristotle associ-
ates definitions with universals rather than particulars. (60)
For example, when Aristotle says that a horse is a four legged animal, he
is not defining that horses essence, but only attributing a quality to that
horse. The same would be true if we were to say the dog is brown; we are
not saying that the essence of the dog is brownness, but only that one of the
qualities that the dog has is that it is brown in color. The following discus-
sion, then, of the enthymeme will briefly concern itself with describing the
qualities that Aristotle attributes to the term, rather than with attempting to
define it.
Aristotle employs the term enthymeme over ninety times throughout
the Rhetoric, the first of which is at 1354a14, wherein he notes that the
previous writers of handbooks of rhetoric say nothing about enthymemes,
which are the substance [c. c, or body, or crux] of persuasion. Thus,
the first quality of the enthymeme for Aristotle is that it is the most impor-
tant part of persuasion. Accordingly, it is also the orators demonstration
(. ct. o c c o..., tc.- . |-u c, 1355a5), and in this sense
Aristotle also equates the enthymeme with his sullogismosthe enthymeme
is a sullogismos (tc o . |-u c cu``c,.cc ,, 1356b2; cf. 1357a15,
1359a9, 1394a25 ff., 1395b22, 1355a8, and 1400b36, which add t., [kind
of sullogismos]). Aristotles enthymeme is also to include a plurality of
premises or propositions (1357a16 and 1359a10), but these are to be fewer
than a sullogismos (1357a16) and spoken in a more compact language
(1401a5). Maxims are also part of an enthymeme (1392a2425), for they
can make up either the premises or the conclusion (1394a30), and the
enthymeme is also a process of demonstration (1395b2224) that is bet-
ter suited for forensic suits (1368a2932 and 1418a1). These are the es-
sential qualities of Aristotles enthymemethat is, when Aristotle attributes
a quality to the enthymeme in the form the enthymeme is ________, these
are those qualities. So, to summarize the qualities of an Aristotelian
enthymeme, it seems cautiously safe to say that Aristotles enthymeme in-
cludes those qualities that make it the substance of persuasion, a process of
demonstrationthe orators demonstrationand in this sense it is identi-
cal to his sullogismos, which, as noted above, can be said to be a valid
argument that can take different forms. Moreover, Aristotles enthymeme,
although it has a plurality of premises, has fewer premises than a
sullogismos, is to be condensed and with more compact language, and is
best suited for forensic suits. Thus, Sophocles, Isocrates, and Xeonophons,
senses of the termthought, consideration, or argumentwould seem
to mirror Aristotlesan argument of sorts, a reasoning process.
Of course, Aristotle had much more to say about the enthymeme than
to attribute qualities to it. He also spoke of different kinds of enthymemes
enthymemes that are apparent, that prove either negative or positive
affirmations (demonstrative or refutative) (1396b), and genuine or
nongenuine (1400b341401a5). He also spoke of the various uses of the
enthymeme in constructing arguments (1368a30; 1377b20; 1393a28;
1394a10, 15) and the materials of the enthymemesome are necessary;
some hold for the most part (1357a2736). The propositions of rhetoric
(or, the materials of rhetoric) and its enthymeme are the ordinary opinions
of men (1402a3334)evidences, probabilities, and signs (as opposed to
the . |occ of dialectic and the true and primary propositions of demon-
stration). Although Aristotle considers these other uses, kinds, and materi-
als of the enthymeme, his primary concern, it seems, is to stress its similarity
to the sullogismos, for he clearly states that whoever is best skilled in
sullogismos will be best skilled in enthumema (1355a10).
That the enthymeme, for Aristotle, is so closely related to the de-
monstrative or dialectical sullogismos is illustrated by the fact that his char-
136 BRAD MCADON
acterization (instead of definition) of a syllogism is the same as that by
which he characterizes the enthymeme
[C]ertain propositions
being true,a further and
quite distinct proposi-
tion must also be true in
consequence, whether
universally or for the
most part, this is called
deduction in dialectic,
enthymeme in rhetoric.
(Rhetoric 1356b20)
A sullogismos, then, is
an argument in which,
cert ai n t hi ngs bei ng
supposed, something
different from the sup-
positions results of ne-
cessity through them.
(Topics 100a2527)
A sullogismos is a dis-
course in which, certain
things having been sup-
posed, something differ-
ent from t he t hi ngs
supposed results of ne-
cessity because these
t hi ngs are so. (Pr.
Analytics 24b1820)
In spite of this seemingly synonymous relationship that Aristotle develops
between the enthymeme and the sullogismos, some commentators have sug-
gested that Aristotles enthymeme is either less or more than a logical de-
vice. Lloyd F. Bitzers familiar example, for instance, builds upon E. M.
Copes understanding of the incomplete syllogism and attributes a spe-
cial sense to the incomplete syllogism; Bitzer understands the term in
this sense: To say that the enthymeme is an incomplete syllogismthat
is, a syllogism having one or more suppressed premisesmeans that the
speaker does not lay down his premises, but lets his audience supply them
out of its stock of opinion and knowledge (1998, 187). He goes on to say
that, in addition to being a syllogism based on probabilities, signs, and
examples, whose function is a rhetorical persuasion, the enthymemes suc-
cessful construction is accomplished through the joint efforts of speaker
and audience, and this is its essential character (189).
In response to Bitzers understanding of the enthymeme, we need to
address two problems. Initially, his building upon Copes incomplete
notion of the enthymemethat one or more of the premises or the conclu-
sion is missing (or suppressed) is addressed by Burnyeat (1994, 58), who
suggests that Copes understanding of the incomplete notion of the
enthymeme is derived from Prior Analytics 70a10: . |-c . | cu |
. ct. cu``c,.cc , c t.` , . .. -c t.| c. .| [the enthymeme is an
incomplete (c t.` ,) sullogismos from likelihoods or signs]. The key term
here is c t.` ,, which Burnyeat argues should be deleted from the text
based upon the manuscript history. He argues that, although the term has
the support of the first hand in one manuscript (C), it not only was later
erased from that manuscript, but also is absent from all other significant
manuscripts, which, in fact, all read in such a way that the sentence should
read: An enthymeme is a sullogismos from likelihoods or signs. Smiths
rendering of the passage in his translation of the Prior Analytics also sup-
ports this reading, for he neither translates c t.` , nor offers any discus-
sion of the manuscript evidence. Thus, according to Burnyeats contention,
the idea of an incomplete syllogism traces back not to Aristotle, but rather
to scribal or editorial interpolations between Aristotles writing of the text
and the later commentators exegesis of it, and, for Burnyeat, this makes
perfect sense, for he suggests that [t]here is no more logical interest or
utility in grouping together arguments that are incompletely expressed than
there would be in grouping together arguments that are overelaborately
expressed, or arguments that are obscurely or wittily expressed. A logic of
incompletely expressed reasoning is as redundant as a logic of indignant
reasoning (1994, 5).
Addressing the problem with Burnyeats contention will also pro-
vide for a background for discussing the second aspect of Bitzers charac-
terization of the enthymeme, which needs to be addressed. Burnyeats
contention that a logic of incompletely expressed reasoning is as redun-
dant as a logic of indignant reasoning is problematized by Aristotles pas-
sage in Rhetoric 1357a1721 (1.2.13), which seems also to be the basis
upon which Bitzer claims that the enthymeme is essentially constructed
successfully through the joint efforts of speaker and audience. The pas-
sage reads (and it is translated similarly by Kennedy, Roberts, and Freese):
Thus, it is necessary for an enthymeme and a paradigm to be concerned with
things that are for the most part capable of being other than they arethe
paradigm inductively, the enthymeme syllogisticallyand drawn from few
premises and often less than those of the primary syllogism; for if one of
these is known, it does not have to be stated, since the hearer supplies it: for
example, [to show] that Dorieus has won a contest with a crown it is enough
to have said that he has won the Olympic games, and there is no need to add
that the Olympic games have a crown as the prize; for everybody knows that.
(Kennedy 1991, 42)
13
Here, Aristotle seems to be pretty clear that, contrary to Burnyeats con-
tention, incomplete logicthe completeness of which is added by the
audiencecan, in fact, be understood to be a characteristic of the
enthymeme. The problem here, though, is that of the over ninety uses of
enthymeme in the Rhetoric (or elsewhere in Aristotles writings) this is the
only passage, of which I am aware, in which Aristotle claims that the audi-
138 BRAD MCADON
ence contributes at all to either the propositions or the conclusions of the
enthymeme. This single, possibly incompatible, reference to the audiences
participation in the construction of the enthymeme is very similar to the
earlier commentators interpolations of incompleteness upon the
enthymeme. According to Burnyeats argument, both Alexander of
Aphrodisias (early second century C.E.) and Philoponus (b. 490 C.E.) un-
derstood the enthymeme to be deprived of a premise, for, according to
Philoponus, it leaves one premise for the mind to think (Bunyeat 1994,
7). If, however, this notion was developed upon the false assumption that
c t.` , was part of the text, and if Copes, and hence, Bitzers, views were
developed upon this tradition, then it would seem that the position, as ar-
ticulated by Bitzer, is weak at best. Moreover, I am in no position here to
advance an argument that suggests that the above-cited passage in the Rheto-
ric (1357a1721) is an emendation to the text. It does seem, however, not
only that the passagebecause of its very close approximation with the
traditional view of the enthymeme as advanced by Cope and Bitzer, which
may have rested upon a false assumption of ateles, and because of its sin-
gularity in thought in comparison to the other ninety passages that mention
something about the enthymeme, but nothing about this possible aspect of
itdemands more consideration, but also that it, and Bitzers claims about
the enthymeme based upon it, has had more emphasis and influence upon
our understanding of the enthymeme than it deserves.
While Aristotle is pretty clear on the similarities between the dialec-
tical sullogismos and the rhetorical enthymeme, he is also clear regarding
the distinction between the two, for he claims that what makes the
enthymeme different than a dialectical sullogismos is that the conclusion
must neither be drawn from too far back, nor should it include all the steps
of the argument (1395b2224), and he provides examples of enthymemes
that illustrate this difference. At 1394a28 ff., Aristotle compares enthymemes
to maxims (the latter of which makes up a portion of the former) by first
providing a maxim:
Never should any man whose wits are sound
Have his sons taught more wisdom than their fellows.
Then, he continues, if a reason or explanation is added, the whole thing is
an enthymeme:
It makes them idle; and therewith they earn
Ill-will and jealousy throughout the city.
Another, he says, is this maxim: There is no man among us all is free;
and, once again, if the reason is added, for all are slaves of money or of
chance, then an enthymeme is formed. It is worth noting the similarity
between the concept of adding an explanation and his earlier discussed
explanatory syllogism:
There is no man among us free,
for all are slaves of money or of chance
Every planet is near.
Everything near is a non-twinkler.
Therefore, every planet is a non-
twinkler. (78A30 ff.)
As was mentioned above, Aristotle was careful to distinguish between a
syllogism that would prove something and one that would explain the why
in his demonstrative arguments. Similarly, at least in some respects,
Aristotles enthymeme seems to be intended to provide the why for his max-
ims in rhetorical argument. If, however, we compare either one of these
examples of enthymemes to the complexity of the dialectical encounter as
described in the Topics wherein the questioner and answerer construct se-
ries of arguments and resort to and manipulate hundreds of possible topical
arguments in an attempt to lead one to concede to the predetermined thesis
of the other, it becomes very evident that the only difference, but a signifi-
cant difference, between the two is that, as Aristotle claims, the rhetorical
sullogismos (the enthymeme) does not draw its conclusions from too far
back (1395b25).
Another example of the difference between enthymematic and syllo-
gistic forms of argument can be illustrated by comparing Kennedys under-
standing of enthymematic argument with an example of Aristotles
syllogistic form of argument. In his translation in On Rhetoric, Kennedy
claims that the first sentence of the RhetoricRhetoric is an antistrophos
to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain
extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately de-
fined scienceis an enthymeme. In a footnote to the sentence, Kennedy
states that this sentence with its proposition and supporting reason, is an
example of what Aristotle will call an enthymeme. Moreover, he admon-
ishes the reader to become sensitive to the constant use of enthymemes
throughout the text (1991, 29 n. 3). There are, however, at least three prob-
lems with this claim. First, it should be noted that Kennedy punctuates this
passage much sooner than the OCT punctuates it, for the OCT provides
only a semi-colon where Kennedy places a period, and if the period were
140 BRAD MCADON
not placed where Kennedy places it, then Aristotles argument is extended
with more support. Second, by comparing this first passage of the Rheto-
ric, especially within its larger context, to a passage, say, from Metaphys-
ics (though countless passages could also be cited), the similarities of
Aristotles argumentative method become apparent:
And in general those who use this argument do away with substance and es-
sence. For they must say that all attributes are accidents, and that there is no
such thing as being essentially man or animal. For if there is to be any such
thing as being essentially man this will not be being not-man or not being man
(yet these are negations of it); for there was some one thing which it meant,
and this was the substance of something. And denoting the substance of a
thing means that the essence of the thing is nothing else. But if its being es-
sentially man is to be the same as either being essentially not-man or essen-
tially not being man, then its essence will be something else. Therefore, our
opponent must say that there cannot be such a definition of anything, but. . . .
(1007a2130)
The passage goes on with more fors, ands, and buts, but his argumentative
method is clear, and this is the method that he also uses in the Rhetoric,
which leads to the third problem with Kennedys claim. If Aristotles
enthymeme is intended for a forensic or deliberative audience whom
Aristotle understands to be unable to understand complex argument, then
it simply makes no sense at all that he would write his arguments in the
Rhetoric in enthymematic form. Although we do not have a clear under-
standing of how, or if, Aristotles Rhetoric was influential in his immediate
community, we can probably safely assume that its immediate audience,
whether it be an oral or textual audience and whether it be the Academy or
the Lyceum, was in fact able to understand, follow, and develop very long
and complex reasoning. Therefore, Aristotle would not address them in
enthymemes, as Kennedy claims; rather, Kennedys claim, along with the
passage from the Metaphysics, illustrates the distinction between Aristotles
enthymematic and syllogistic argumentative method. This distinction is
clearly determined by the audience for whom Aristotles rhetoric is intended,
and while some commentators recognize this audience (Grimaldi 1972, 82;
Burnyeat 1994, 2122; Kennedy 1991, 42), but only briefly, others seem to
refer to it in such general terms that the significance is lost (Bitzer 1998;
Garver 1994).
14
This is a point that needs further consideration.
It was mentioned above that those who concern themselves with de-
monstrative deductions would be those within their own scientific fields
(i.e., the philosopher engaged with the study of tc |being). Similarly,
those who would be concerned with dialectical deductions would be on
either end of the complexities of the Aristotelian dialectical exchange (mas-
ter or student, or student and student) within some kind of academic or
educational contextthose who partake of these Aristotelian intellectual,
dialectical, or demonstrative exercises would be those who are, according
to Aristotle, intellectually capable of participating in them. According to
Aristotle, the rhetorical audience, in contrast, is not capable of the com-
plexities of thought that comprise demonstrative or dialectical deduction:
The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such persons who cannot take in at a
glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning.
(1357a23)
For we assume an audience of untrained thinkers. . . . (1357a12)
We have noted the difference between it [enthymeme] and the deduction of
dialectic. Thus, we must not carry its reasoning too far back, or the length
of our argument will cause obscurity; nor must we put in all the steps that
lead to our conclusion, or we shall waste words in saying what is mani-
fest. It is this simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than
the educated when addressing popular audiencesmakes them, as the poets
tell us, charm the crowds ears more finely [Euripides, Hippolytus 989].
Educated men lay down broad general principles; uneducated men argue
from common knowledge and draw obvious conclusions. (1395b2431)
One great advantage of maxims to a speaker is due to the want of intelli-
gence in his hearers, who love to hear him succeed in expressing as a
universal truth the opinions which they hold themselves about particular
cases. (1395b1)
All this [introductory techniques for speeches] has nothing to do with the
speech itself. It merely has to do with the weak-minded tendency of the
hearer to listen to what is beside the point. (1415b57)
You cannot ask a series of questions owing to the incapacity of the audi-
ence to follow them; and for this reason, you should also make your
enthymemes as compact as possible. (1419a1819)
Thus, it seems that the reason Aristotle maintained that the enthymeme
should comprise less propositions than the dialectical deductionand the
seemingly only significant distinction between the twois due to the au-
dience to whom the rhetorical discourse is addressed. The dialectical
sullogismos (deduction) is what it is, complete in its entirety. Whatever
this is, the rhetorical enthymeme, though similar in all other respects, com-
prises fewer propositions than the dialectical deduction, and the reason for
this seems to be that the rhetorical audience is not capable of grasping a
dialectically derived deduction.
142 BRAD MCADON
The discussion of the rhetorical induction, example, seems to further
support this conclusion. Though Aristotle does not provide any thorough
discussion of inductive argument (Smith 1995, 33), the general notion seems
to be that induction argues from particulars to universal. By this, it in-
fers a general claim from a number of its instances. For example, lets say
that on the first day of classes at Texas A & M University, I notice that Bill
walks into my class wearing a Texas A & M ball cap. Next, comes Lewis,
and he is wearing a similar cap. Then, comes in Geoff, Carlos, and Henry,
and all of them are wearing Texas A & M ball caps. Let us say further that
these five comprise the male students in my course. Without any further
knowledge on my part, I could infer that perhaps all the male students at
Texas A & M wear Texas A & M ball caps. This would be a form of induc-
tion. Example, however, rather than concluding inductively from the part
to the whole, concludes from the particular to the particular, and does
not draw its conclusion from a wide range of samples, but only from a
particular example. Aristotles illustrations in the Rhetoric, which speak of
only one example to prove the point (1393a26b3) are very clear on this,
and are obviously not dialectical inductions, and for the same reason that
the enthymeme is not the sameconsideration for the audience to whom it
is addressed.
It seems also to be the consideration of the audience that leads
Aristotle to include -c, and c-c, in his theoretical development of rheto-
ric, as the final two forms of artistic proofs (. ct..,). In contrast to the
direct quasi-logical proofs of the enthymeme and the example, these are
usually considered to be the indirect moral proofs by which -c, stems
from the moral, trustworthy character of the speaker and c -c, appeals to
the pathetic senses of the particular audience. It is interesting, but not sur-
prising, that neither one of these terms are employed (or important at least)
in Aristotles development of either demonstration or dialectic. The dem-
onstrator will be concerned with proving from acknowledged first prin-
ciples that are true and primitive and the projection of a trustworthy
character on the part of the demonstrator is not a consideration, but the
ascertaining of truth. Also, the demonstrator is not attempting to prove truth
by way of appeals to the emotional makeup of his opponent, for no oppo-
nent is involved, as such, in demonstration. Similarly, the dialectician, in
his attempt to have his opponent concede a predetermined conclusion, is
concerned not with how his character is perceived or with the emotional
sensibilities of his opponent, but only with presenting his questions in such
a way that the opponent will concede to the necessary conclusions. Also, it
is highly doubtful that either of the participants in these practicesthe dem-
onstrator, the questioner, or the answererall of whom seem to be already
educated or in the process thereof, would be in any way influenced by
such appeals. Yet, Aristotles rhetorical theory, the purpose of which is to
provide the available means for persuasion, to earn the trust or confidence
(. ct.,) of those persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated
argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning (1357a34), relies, in part,
upon these two appealsthe one to the emotional sensibilities of the audi-
ence and the other upon the projected character of the speakerto achieve
the means of persuasion.
One last consideration surrounding the different participants or au-
diences of these three different forms of discourse that may help us to un-
derstand the distinction between Aristotles understanding of demonstration,
dialectic, and rhetoric is Aristotles understanding of the thoroughness of
investigations or the thoroughness of knowledge required for each respec-
tive field of discourse. At the beginning of Metaphysics B, Aristotle sets
out to explain the thoroughness with which the philosopher is to under-
stand the problems related to his field of inquiry (in this case, substance).
The passage is lengthy, but necessary to convey his meaning:
We must, with a view to the science which we are seeking, first recount the
subjects that should be discussed. These include both the other opinions that
some have held on certain points, and any points besides these that happen to
have been overlooked. For those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is
advantageous to state the difficulties well; for the subsequent free play of
thought implies the solution of the previous difficulties, and it is not possible
to untie a knot which one does not know. But the difficulty of our thinking
points to a knot in the object; for in so far as our thought is in difficulties, it is
in like case with those who are tied up; for in either case it is impossible to go
forward. Therefore, one should have surveyed all the difficulties beforehand,
both for the reasons we have stated and because people who inquire without
first stating the difficulties are like those who do not know where they have to
go; besides a man does not otherwise know even whether he has found what
he is looking for or not; for the end is not clear to such a man, while to him
who has first discussed the difficulties it is clear. Further, he who has heard
all the contending arguments, as if they were the parties to a case, must be in
a better position for judging. (995a24b4)
Aristotle makes it fairly clear here that his philosopher/demonstrator is to
understand the problems related to his issue as thoroughly as possible, and
in the succeeding discussion he specifically outlines all the aspects that are
144 BRAD MCADON
to be carefully considered. Conversely, in the opening paragraphs of the
Topics, he continues to say that the dialectical method is useful to the philo-
sophical sciences because the ability to puzzle on both sides of a subject
will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points
that arise and that it is the task of dialectic to discuss the reputable opin-
ions concerning these issues, for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein
lies the path to the principles of all inquiries (100a35b4). In the
Nicomachean Ethics, before launching into a consideration of the moral
states of vice, incontinence, and brutishness, his explication of his method
is more succinctly articulated: We must, as in all other cases, set the phe-
nomena before us and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove,
if possible, the truth of all the opinions about these affections or, failing
this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both re-
solve the difficulties and leave the reputable opinions undisturbed, we shall
have proved the case sufficiently (1145b17). In sharp contrast to exhor-
tations to thoroughness in the Metaphysics, the Topics, and the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, makes explicitly clear not only that the
audience is not able to follow a long train of reasoning (1357a23) and
is a group of untrained thinkers (1357a12), but also that the forms of ar-
gument are to be much shorter than that for either the demonstrative or
dialectical inquiry or pursuit; rather than encourage the audience of the
rhetorical discourse to delve into the difficulties of the problems behind an
issuea characteristically Aristotelian theme that is noticeably absent from
the Rhetoriche, as Grimaldi notes, is concerned that the audience ac-
quire knowledge, but knowledge which he qualifies as c -c., tc.. c:
a quick comprehensive grasp of the problem (1972, 88; see 1400b1012,
2021, 2526, 3134). Thus, the consideration of the audience seems to be
the deciding factor that leads Aristotle to distinguish between his demon-
strative, dialectical, and rhetorical forms of discourse. As such, the rhe-
torical enthymeme seems to be a type of argument that is reduced from the
demonstrative or dialectical sullogismos to accommodate an audience who
is not capable of following a long train of reasoning. This, it seems, should
be an important consideration, even though it has rarely, and perhaps never
thoroughly, been addressed.
To summarize, just as Gorgiass, Platos, and Isocrates views of per-
suasive discourse stemmed from their broader projects, so, too, did
Aristotles. Although the former thinkers did not seem to have developed
theories of persuasive discourse in the sense that Aristotle did, it seems
clear that their understanding of the persuasive use of discourse derived
from their respective epistemological points of view. Since the concept of
rhetoric as a discipline developed prior to Aristotle, it seems only natural
that Aristotle, who left his developmental mark on numerous developing
disciplines, would have addressed a field of knowledge that others had
previously addressed and would have further developed that discipline
in a scientific way. He did this, he tells us, with deduction (cu``c,.cc ,)
by developing its three different aspects of demonstrative, dialectical, and
rhetorical. These three different forms of discourse, it seems, were devel-
oped by Aristotle for three very different purposesdemonstration for the
scientific investigation from first principles, dialectic for questioning and
answering within some kind of a preexisting format, and rhetoric for sup-
plying a means of persuasion (see Appendix 1). Aristotle makes it very
clear that the participants of the demonstrative method are the scientifi-
cally trained (the philosopher), that the participants of dialectic are master
and student or student and student, and that those to be persuaded are those
who cannot maintain complex thoughts. Similarly, he derives the logical
method for each of these three aspects of discourse. The solitary philoso-
pher, within his particular scientific field, after carefully investigating what
others have said about his chosen issue, induces to and deduces from first
principles that are true and primitive to determine truth. The dialectician,
too, in addition to using his tekne to unravel puzzles, incorporates deduc-
tion and induction, but begins from those propositions, from any field of
inquiry, that, rather than being true, are probable, potential, or commonly
accepted (endoxa), and he seeks the concession of his opponent. The rheto-
rician, who deals with the affairs of men, also considers those propositions
of a probable or potential nature, but, through the enthymeme and the ex-
ample, to a lesser extent than the dialectician because of the lower intellec-
tual capacity of his audience, and it is for this reason that he incorporates
appeals to emotional sensibilities, that he attempts to project his own self-
credulity as means to persuasion, and that he expects from the audience
only a quick grasp of the problems.
The parallels between Aristotles theoretical development of the dif-
ferent uses of discoursedemonstration, dialectic, and rhetoricfor his
different purposesto prove, to argue, to persuadeare striking. It seems
that Aristotle determined to develop these three modes of expression as
appropriate means to convey the concepts that he understood to be appro-
priate to each arena within which these forms of expression would be ef-
fective, and, furthermore, it seems evident that these concepts of expression
stemmed from his broader project. Moreover, it seems equally evident that,
146 BRAD MCADON
even though Aristotles terminology for demonstration and dialectic could
be understood apart from his rhetoric, his rhetorical theory cannot be con-
textually understood apart from his theories of demonstration and dialec-
tic.
15
A final thought, but one that pecks away at me as I consider its pos-
sibilities: If the preceding discussion seems viable as an understanding of
Aristotles Rhetoric, then attempts to connect his Rhetoric (or rhetoric)
with contemporary views on civic or political rhetoric, or with contempo-
rary composition theory, may need to be reconsidered. Aristotle thought
his rhetorical audiencethe civic body of fourth century B.C.E. Greeceto
be untrained or unable to follow long reasoning. Although Ive cer-
tainly had experiences that have proven his view to be true today, I have
found that, for the most part, civic authoritiesespecially judges and people
in authoritative positionsare able to follow long processes of reasoning,
and Ive witnessed occasions for which enthymematic arguments (based
upon maxims) are not very productive when presented to those who are
able to soundly refute them in a more demonstrative or dialectical fashion.
In respect to the composition classroom, I am perplexed by the thought of
teaching my students how to persuade those who are not capable of fol-
lowing long reasoning. Is this our purpose in a composition classroom? Or,
would we better serve our students if we taught them how to proceed through
an issue, and argue about an issue [as we all probably do, in practice] as
Aristotle suggests in his Metaphysics, Topics, and Nicomachean Ethics?
Moreover, it seems that we should want to promote the pursuit of under-
standing as Aristotle advocates in his other works (and as Garver rightly
suggests) and understand Aristotelian persuasion as Aristotle understood it
himself. This is not to say that the Rhetoric is not an important text; history
tells us otherwise. However, it is a text, I have attempted to argue, that
needs to be considered within the larger Aristotelian corpus and contempo-
rary Athenian contexta project that will expand the canon and the breadth
of ancient rhetorical studies.
Department of English
Texas A & M University
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank C. Jan Swearingen and Robin Smith (both of Texas A&M University,
College Station), Carol Poster (Montana State University), and an anonymous referee for
reading through earlier drafts of this essay and for their very helpful suggestions. The re-
maining errors are my own.
Notes
1. This is not to say that other considerations are not also important and necessary for a
better understanding of Aristotles Rhetoric. These would include the chronological devel-
opment of Aristotles thought, an understanding of the Athenian court system and those who
comprised it (i.e., the ekklesia, dikasterion, and the rhetors), an understanding of the Athe-
nian citizens who are the Athenian court system, and Aristotles view of them and their
democracy. These will be considered in a later essay, but the focus of the present discussion
is the relationship between Aristotles rhetoric and his larger philosophical project.
2. See Garvers Aristotles Rhetoric (1994), which he immodestly claims to be the
first book-length philosophic treatment of the Rhetoric; Grimaldis Studies in the Philoso-
phy of Aristotles Rhetoric (1972); Burnyeats Enthymeme (1994); Brunschwigs
Aristotles Rhetoric as a Counterpart to Dialectic (1996); Crems The Definition of
Rhetoric According to Aristotle (1956 and 1974); Prices Some Antistrophes to the Rheto-
ric (1974); and Roberts Rhetoric and Dialectic (1974).
3. Schiappa has repeatedly argued that the first use of the term appears in Greek litera-
ture in Platos Gorgias. Moreover, a key term search, conducted by Katherin Welch in 1990,
suggests that no equivalent concept of what the term tc.- denotes appears in the lit-
erature of the fifth century (Schiappa 1992, 4). These findings have led Schiappa to claim
that the term was coined by Plato early in the fourth century in an attempt to disciplinize
or subjectivize aspects of speech that were not yet formulated into any disciplinarian form,
but existed as more ambiguous, more formless, or more unsystematic practices of expres-
sion than what we usually understand practices or techniques of tc.- to convey. The
most recent criticism of Schiappas view is Pendricks Platon and Dialectic (1998).
4. His closing thoughts in the Cratylus, in which he questions the possibility of whether
or not knowledge can change or remains fixed, is a good example of this (440be).
5. After explaining that he would not apply the term philosophy to those who are training
in those disciplines that do not help us in the present either in our speech or in our actions,
Isocrates advises the young men to go ahead and spend some time on these disciplines
those that search for first principlesbut not too much, for I think that such curiosities of
thought are on a par with jugglers tricks which, though they do not profit anyone, yet attract
great crowds of the empty-minded, and I hold that men who want to do some good in the
world must banish utterly from their interests all vain speculations and all activities which
have no bearing on our lives (Antidosis 26169).
6. The essentially same definition of a sullogismos is also in Prior Analytics 24b1822;
cf. Sophistical Refutations 164b2765a2, Rhetoric 1356b1618.
7. See note 1, above.
8. It is also possible that Aristotle wrote the early portions of his Rhetoric while still a
student at the Academy, and thus his views of rhetoric would have offered others at the
Academy a contrast to Platos view of rhetoric. Yet, it is possible, too, that Plato would not
have allowed the expression of views contrary to his own within the Academy, but would
have asked those who differed with him to leave the school. These ideas will be given fur-
ther consideration in forthcoming essays.
9. It seems to have been a habit of Aristotle to begin discussions of issues by initially
considering what others had previously said about them. This is made especially evident by
Owens (1986).
10. Fagless translation of the same passage reflects a similar idea:
You fill me with awe, you must, old man
you express your arguments with such force.
But Ill be more at ease
if the lords of the realm decide these matters for me. (300)
The following three paragraphs are an expansion of Burnyeats discussion (1994, 1013).
11. Xenophons other example of enthymemas denotation is at 6.1.1922.
12. Burnyeat acutely brings up this idea (1994, 5), but more consideration of it may help
to clarify certain ambiguities surrounding the term enthymeme.
148 BRAD MCADON
13. In a footnote to this passage, Kennedy states: Later writers often regard an enthymeme
as an abbreviated syllogism in which one premise, usually the major, is not expressed but is
assumed, e.g., Socrates is mortal, for he is a man, assuming all men are mortal. Aristotle
notes that this is often the case, but it is not a necessary feature of the enthymeme (1991, n.
60). It would have been helpful if Kennedy would have cited the passages where Aristotle
often notes this, for Im not so sure that he does.
14. Burnyeat (1994), Grimaldi (1972), and Kennedy (1991) all recognize and briefly com-
ment upon Aristotles recognition that the rhetorical audience is not able to follow a long
argument. Bitzers reference to Aristotles audience is very vague (1998), and Garvers whole
thesis centers around Aristotles picture of practical reasoning and rhetoric that bears inti-
mate and complicated relations to character (1994, 12), and does not even cite these other
passages from the Rhetoric that speak to the audiences inability to reason according to
Aristotles concept of reasoning.
15. Again, though, it should be emphasized that an understanding of the nature of the
Athenian court system, the rhetors who spoke within these courts, the audience who com-
prised the courts, Aristotles relationship (for he was a metic) to these Athenians, and the
Rhetorics place within the development of Aristotles thought are also necessary to better
understand the text and its relationship to and place within the rhetorical tradition.
Works cited
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. Topics: Books I and VIII with excerpts and related texts. Trans. Robin Smith. Ox-
ford: Clarendon, 1997.
Barnes, Jonathan. 1995. Rhetoric and Poetics. In The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle,
ed. Jonathan Barnes, 25986. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP.
Bitzer, Lloyd F. 1998. Aristotles Enthymeme Revisited. In Landmark Essays on Aristote-
lian Rhetoric, ed. Richard Leo Enos and Lois Peters Agnew, 17992. Mahwah, NJ:
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Brunswig, Jacques. 1996. Aristotles Rhetoric as a Counterpart to Dialectic. In Essays
on Aristotles Rhetoric, ed. Amlie Rorty, 3455. Berkeley: U of California P.
Burnyeat, M. F. 1994. Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion. In Aristotles
Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays, ed. David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas, 356.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
Cohen, Marc. 1998. Posterior Analytics: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.
<http://weber.u.washington.edu/~smcohen/anpost.htm>. 26 November.
Crem, Theresa M. 1974. The Definition of Rhetoric According to Aristotle. In Aristotle:
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crow P.
Duhamel, P. Albert. 1949. The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression. Journal of
the History of Ideas 10: 34456.
Gagarin, Michael, and Woodruff, Paul, Eds. 1995. Early Greek Political Thought from Homer
to the Sophists. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP.
Garver, Eugene. 1994. Aristotles Rhetoric: An Art of Character. Chicago: U of Chicago P.
Grimaldi, William M. A. 1972. Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotles Rhetoric. Hermes
25: 1151.
Irwin, Terence. 1988. Aristotles First Principles. Oxford: Clarendon.
Isocrates. Isocrates. Trans. George Norlin. 3 vols. London: William Heinemann, 1939. Rpt.
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Oxford: Clarendon.
Owens, G. E. L. 1986. Tithenai ta phainonmena. In Logic, Science, and Dialectic, ed.
Martha Nussbaum. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP.
Pendrick, Gerald. 1998. Platon and Dialectic. Rheinisches Museum: 1024.
Plato. Cratylus. Trans. H. N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992.
. Gorgias. Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991.
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. Republic. Trans. Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1994.
. Theaeteteus. Trans. H. N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1987.
Price, Robert. 1974. Some Antistrophes to the Rhetoric. In Aristotle: The Classical Heri-
tage of Rhetoric, ed. Keith V. Erickson, 7289. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow P.
Robert. 1974. Rhetoric and Dialectic: According to the First Latin Commentary on the
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Schiappa, Edward. 1992. RHETORIKE: Whats in a Name? Toward a Revised History of
Early Greek Rhetorical Theory. Quarterly Journal of Speech 78: 115.
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UP, 1980.
150 BRAD MCADON
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Rhetoric is a Counterpart of Dialectic ([inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.

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