Krizan 1

1. Severance the alternative text rejects action as such. Severance is a voting issue it
destroys all negative ground by making links to disads and Ks impossible and makes no
counterplan competitive.
2. Action guts the perm our McWhorter alternative evidence indicates that acting makes
thought impossible because it presupposes a world upon which to act, obscuring other
modes of being.
3. Nazism disad combining the K with state action recreates the exclusionary blind spot
that caused Heidegger to be unable to take his own advice the end result is genocide.
Dillon 96 (Michael, Professor of Politics, Lancaster University, 1996, The Politics of Security, p. 131-2)
Here, with his very political fallibility, arises a particular reason why it does so. There is a pressing need to
recover the question of the political as much from Heidegger-the-Nazi, who seems to corrupt it,
as from Heidegger the philosopher who appears to elide it. A refurbished interrogation and
understanding if the political is consequently one of the prizes to be prised-out of an engagement
with Heidegger. The preface for such and engagement, which is all I have been attempting here, must, I have
been arguing, proceed through security by way of the tragic. We cannot, therefore, go the route which
Heidegger himself took and against which his subsequent thinking was quite clearly and critically devoted.
That is precisely the technological nemesis to which his own thought alerts us and from which
the recovery of the political will always be required. The matter of Heideggers silence that is to say,
his refusal to repudiate the Nazi period publicly, to atone for his membership of the Nazi Party, and his silence
concerning the fate of the European Jewry is particularly relevant here. I could say that I do not have the space to
give it all the thought and close attention it deserves, but in fact I do not know precisely what amount of space it
would require. For this conventional genuflection to seriousness implies that somehow I do know, or could know.
But I do not. And yet it is not a matter of me not knowing. I simply think it is not knowable. The question will never
be answered and so it will never be settled. This is in fact what allows me to go on about it, and with it. Given the
importance attached to silence in all of Heideggers thought, this silence cannot be mere omission. In his lectures
on Parmenides, for examples, he says, to keep silence is not merely to say nothing. Without something essential
to say, one cannot keep silent. Only within essential speech, and by means of it alone, can there prevail essential
silence, having nothing in common with secrecy, concealment, or mental reservations. Manifestly, it is not a
simple oversight either, because silence always resounds for Heidegger and so perhaps it is also something even
more than a radical failure of thought. For, in his thinking, Heidegger systematically and consistently elevated
reticence and comportment even above thought. Or, rather, consonant with his radical hermeneutical
phenomenology, and with this history of Being and its preoccupation with the hidden and the inconspicuous,
Heidegger made of thought something which was fundamentally related to dwelling in a pious attentiveness to the
mystery of being. Hence, one might suspect that his association with the Nazis was no mere deficiency of thought,
but a consequence of his own disposition or comportment. And it is precisely this, though worked through his
thought in detailed ways, which John Caputo concludes is Heideggers scandal. Somehow Heidegger, here on
this site and with respect to the site-ing of the political, seemed unwilling to think through the
fundamental belonging together of dwelling and displacement: that we are all strangers native
born, and so always already dwelling en route; that routes and roots are ineradicably intertwined; hence,
that to found and be a people (even, in his terms, with the assignment of the word) is an exclusionary
practice; that indignity, however useful it may be as a device to protect some from the violence
of Modernity and its modernisers, is a certain sort of violent claim; and that to circumscribe and inhabit
a place simultaneously also poses the question of the one who is thereby estranged from that place, or comes to
that place as a stranger.

Krizan 2

4. Management obliterates the perm the first piece of McWhorter evidence indicates that
managing the environment involves revealing and ordering the world, causing us to forget
alternate ontologies. We must withdraw from the urge to manage and inside meditatively
think the world.
5. Permutations are incoherent the perm asks you to IMAGINE doing the plan and part
of the alt; we ACTUALLY criticize the 1AC for this argument to function theyd have to
re-read our shell.
6. Thought fails when done from within the existing frame of technological reference we
must step back and not act for contemplation to be successful.
Ijselling 88 (Samuel, Professor of Philosophy, Catholic University of Louvain, 1988, The End of Philosophy as
the Commencement of Thinking: Critical Heidegger, p. 196-7)
To metaphysical thinking, Heidegger counterposes another kind of thinking which he calls
precollective (andenkende) thinking. Under Holderlins influence, it is also associated with celebrating,
greeting, remembering, thanking. It is an abiding-with, a wonderful tarrying, a holding out, an
ability to wait indeed for a lifetime a stepping back, an abode. It reminds us perhaps of Far Eastern
wisdom which was not alien to Heideggger or of a probing of reality of the kind to be found in Paul Klee, a man
who astonished Heidegger and whose theoretical and pedagogical writings the latter perused thoroughly. In my
opinion, it can also be understood as the realization and the radicalization of the original idea of phenomenology.
Thinking as the enduring of being, as an abiding with beings in their being, an abiding with thinking and precisely in
view of the fact that we really do think in this way and finally, as an abiding with what determines our thinking,
what calls us to think, what commands our thinking and points the way. One question which keeps on arising is: is
such a thinking (still) possible? Does it once again and necessarily amount to a metaphysico-technical thinking?
If we are dominated by metaphysico-technical thinking and, in the end, are solely directed by the key concepts of
computer science, is another kind of thinking then still possible? One should not underestimate this and Heidegger
is himself fully aware of the seriousness of this problem. He will contend that this other thinking
can only be prepared, that it is essentially, and indeed remains untimely and can always only be a
task. It requires quite specific strategies to guard it and protect it against the danger which
threatens it to an ever-increasing degree from the side of the sciences and their cybernetic
organization within a self-regulating world civilization. Heidegger knows that this other thinking can
never be a purely university or academic affair because these organizations, with their indigenous
research operations, their conferences and their literary devices are carried along by the metaphysico-
technical thinking and themselves belong to world civilization. Still less can it subsist outside of a
specific historical, technico-economic, politico-scientific, institutional and linguistic frame of reference. For this
reason, the greatest possible care has to be taken to prevent it from being the victim of the attempt to interpret it and
to integrate it within the existing frame of reference. Much of Heideggers rhetoric must be viewed in this light.






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Krizan 4