1

TORN BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: A CASE

STUDY OF THE CHINESE INDONESIANS AND
HOW AN IDENTITY IS MOULDED
EXTERNALLY AND INTERNALLY
For a lot of Chinese Indonesians such as the writers parents, the Chinese Indonesian
story is over. This statement might or might not be true. Whether or not it has already
ended, the Chinese Indonesian story continues to be relevant, not just to the Chinese
Indonesian community, or even to the rest of Indonesia, but also to other non-
homogenous societies for the lessons it has to offer.
This paper will tell the Chinese Indonesian story while attempting to keep the
spotlight on both the Chinese Indonesian community and the other Indonesians. It
hopes to show how a cultural identity--Chinese Indonesian--is created: it is both
imposed and self-determined. The Chinese Indonesian story is important because of
the strong assimilationist approach the Indonesian government had towards
minorities like the Chinese community. For about thirty years, the government
enacted laws that aim to erode their cultural identity to assimilate them as
completely as possible into mainstream Indonesian culture, but ironically it marked
them--permanently or not--as an Other community and created the Chinese
Indonesian identity which a lot of Chinese Indonesians identify as today.

2

THE OTHERIFICATION OF THE CHINESE
Many racial and ethnic studies in post-colonial societies have focused on the
treatment of race under the colonial powers to explain the present racial/ethnic
dynamics of the societies. While it is widely accepted that Western colonial powers
racist policies played a big part in defining race and ethnic groups, we cannot discount
the local forces that play as big a part in shaping race and ethnic groups as they are
today. Hence, this paper will only briefly focus on the Dutchs racial policies insofar
they provided the frameworks for further racial policies established by a young
independent Indonesia.
The Chinese are easy to single out as an Other in Indonesia despite the hundreds of
tribes and cultures present in it. These tribes and cultures vary from each other in
terms of belief systems, languages, diet, nomad/sedentary lifestyle and many more.
But the Chinese look different. That is all that has ever been needed to carve divisions
in a society, and the same is true in the case of Chinese Indonesians. Kahn (2005)
demonstrates the synergy of colonial racial policies with local racial discourse,
especially in the context of nationalism in the making of a Malay race in Malaysia
1
. To
create a group of us, a group of others must be created and excluded. This is what
happened in Indonesia: the criterion for us is that of nativism (ironic, given that
there are many native cultures and ethnic groups, and the high frequency with which
they inter-migrate). This narrative can be seen more than a few times in the Chinese
Indonesian history, and it is often accompanied with economic-based accusations and
may end with bursts of violence.

1
Kahn, J. S. (2005). The Making and Unmaking of the Malay Race. Social Analysis, 49(2), 164-
172.
3

We also cannot discount the actions of the people in the others group, ie the
Chinese Indonesians. Those who have been labelled as outsiders are the ones who
are most aware of the differences and similarities between their group and the us
group. The individuals will struggle between acceptance by the us group, but also
the preservation of the differences that characterise them as outsiders but have
become internalised as part of their identity. In the group, this struggle will translate
into the debate between assimilation and integration (or as it is known today,
multiculturalism).
The external moulding comes in the form of social actions such as racism and
prejudice which identify the group as a group to be oppressed. Some of these may be
legalised, some of them may be social-level behaviours which are either condoned or
ignored by the government.
These two effects--the internal and the external moulding--do not occur unto a group
independently. They interact with each other and it is hard to disentangle their
effects from each other. All these--the framework lied down by the Dutch, Indonesian
nationalism and nativism, and the Chinese Indonesians internal debate on
assimilation and integration--have shaped, and with regards to the latter two, will
continue to shape the creation, and possibly, the undoing, of Chinese Indonesian as
an ethnicity.
This paper will walk through the history of the Chinese Indonesians from the Dutch
colonial times to the present. This paper will divide the history into several periods for
accessibility and readability. Both external and internal moulding will be discussed
in the same section to emphasise their co-existence and their combined effects on
4

the Chinese Indonesian community. This paper will also discuss concepts such as the
creation of national identity on top of racial identities and hierarchies when it is
opportune to do so.
THE CHINESE IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES
The Chinese have been settling in South-East Asia, and what would be Indonesia,
prior to the Dutchs arrivals. When the famous Chinese naval explorer Zheng He
arrived at Malacca in the fifteenth century, he found that there was already a sizeable
Chinese community there
2
. A large number of the Chinese community was almost
completely assimilated into the local culture, inter-breeding with local women, and
even taking up Islam. These assimilated Chinese were known as Peranakan
(descendant; this paper will refer to the Peranakans in the plural even though there
is no plural form in the Malay language). They were differentiated from the ethnic
Chinese immigrants who formed settlements along the trade hubs, and who kept
their culture relatively separate from those of the locals.
The Dutch arrived to find a substantial Chinese immigrant populations along the
Javanese coastlines. The Dutchs development of Jayakarta, which was renamed as
Batavia, into a major port attracted even more Chinese immigrants, some of whom
were traders, and some of whom became labourers and artisans. The Chinese traders
became indispensable to the economy: they were the intermediaries between the
west and the east, between the indigenous and the European communities
3
.During
this time, the Dutch East Indies governors in Batavia encouraged the growth of the

2
Ma, H. (1433). Yingyai Shenglan (The Overall Survey of the Ocean's Shores).
3
Phoa, L. G. (1992). The Changing Economic Position of the Chinese. In M. Fernando & D.
Bulbeck (Eds.), Chinese Economic Activity in Netherlands India: Selected Translations from the
Dutch Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian, page 7.
5

Chinese community, and the Chinese traders prosperity (The Governor-General JP
Coen wrote that there is no other group of people in the world better than the
Chinese while his successor Pieter D Carpenter said that as many Chinese men,
women, and children as possible should be sent to populate Batavia, Amboina, and
Banda
4
.
This, however, did not mean that the Dutch were interested in integrating the ethnic
Chinese immigrants into the local population. The Chinese had to carry registration
papers with them all the time, lest they would face deportation. The local population,
too, viewed the Chinese population with suspicion as the wealth gap between them
and Chinese traders grew visibly.
At this point of time, it is worth noting that the ethnic Chinese immigrants were not
homogenous--the Chinese would have seen themselves divided among clans, dialects,
places of origins, education level, occupations, economic status, and the period for
which they, or their ancestors had spent in Indonesia. These differences would have
been lost on both the Dutch and the local population, who saw them as a
homogenous group. This would be one of the external factors that not only might
have shaped the formation of the Chinese identity in Indonesia, but it would have
inevitably shaped the mindset of the Chinese themselves.
It is also worth noting how uniquely isolated Chinese immigrants were at this point of
time. Not only were they alienated by the colonizers and the native population, they
had also lost much of their connection to mainland China because emigration was a
crime until 1894.

44
ibid
6

In 1740, the world sugar price had dropped and this affected not just the Dutch
colony, but also disproportionately the Chinese immigrant population: the wealthy
Chinese owned many of the sugar mills the poor Chinese worked in. At that time, the
Dutch had a harsh policy of deportations of Chinese immigrants found without their
papers, making the Chinese population vulnerable to blackmail by Dutch officials. The
colony had also just weathered a malaria outbreak which both the local population
and the Dutch blamed on the Chinese population. The tension and the unrest finally
exploded in what would be known as the 1740 Batavian Massacre, or Chinezenmoord,
in which at least 10, 000 Chinese were killed.
The lasting legacy of Chinezenmoord was the Dutch distrust of the Chinese. This was
especially compounded by the 1741 Java War where the surviving Chinese worked
together with the Sultanate of Mataram and almost endangering the Dutch East
Indies government.
Despite the Batavian Massacre, Phoa (supra) considered the days under the Dutch
East Indies government to be the heyday of the ethnic Chinese
5
. The Dutch East Indies,
as a corporation, established a system of leasing and selling of land which the ethnic
Chinese overwhelmingly took part in, giving them economic and political power in the
colony. Prior to Chinezenmoord, (what remained of the Chinese population were
confined in a Chinatown (in present day Glodok)) there had been no laws restricting
their travels or where they could live. When the kingdom of Netherlands nationalised
the Dutch East Indies in 1799 and established the Batavian Republic, the new
government subsequently introduced legal restrictions on the Chineses freedom,

5
Ibid,page 9-10
7

such as forbidding them to live in certain areas or to work in certain industries, and
making it hard for them to travel by imposing upon them the burden of passes. The
government also abolished the old land system, and established a monopoly on salt,
on which the Chinese population were dependent economically. Most importantly,
the government banned the amalgation of foreign Asians such as Malays, Buginese
and Chinese with the native population, ordering for them to live in quarters of their
own nationals (Staatsblad 1835 no 37).
In short, the Dutch at best had no interest in assimilating or integrating the Chinese
population, and at worst, was interested in legalising their otherness.
We shall now shift the focus away from the colonisers and onto the colonised instead.
We have already touched upon the bitterness the native population felt towards the
Chinese because of the perceived wealth gap between them and the foreigners. This
is also a good place to remind the reader that the Chinese population, although
characterised as a group by the Dutch and the native population, is in fact incredibly
heterogenous in terms of language, religion, class, political beliefs, and willingness to
assimilate. We have already used the term Peranakan previously--it refers to
assimilated Chinese, usually second generation immigrations and above, who may or
may not have native blood and prefer to speak the local language or practice local
customs. In contrast to the Peranakans there are the Totoks, who are recent
immigrants and/or those who choose to remain as culturally distinct from the native
population as possible.
The otherness of the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies proved very dangerous for
them. The Dutch werent solely responsible for the death toll during Chinezenmoord.
8

Many of the native population joined in the open season on the Chinese. Bouts of
native violence on the Chinese population were not unique; as we trace Indonesias
history we will see that it is in fact a feature of turbulent times. Indeed, an entire book
has been dedicated to this topic
6
.
The start of the twentieth century saw the rise of nationalism, not just in the Dutch
East Indies, but also in mainland China. To understand the rise of Indonesian
nationalism in the first half of the 1900s (Kebangkitan Nasional Indonesia, hereafter
KNI, literally Indonesian National Awakening) and how it includes and excludes
groups of people, such as the Chinese, it is worth elaborating a little bit more on
Indonesian history.
Historically, there is no such thing as Indonesia. The archipelago that had mostly
fallen under Dutch control had been ruled by patches of kingdoms, and populated by
different nations and tribes. One of the biggest kingdoms to have territory that
approximated that of Indonesias today was the Majapahit Kingdom, the biggest
kingdom to have ever existed in South East Asia. The KNI evoked a lot of Majapahit
imagery to weave together a national consciousness spanning [from] Sabang [to]
Merauke
7
: the red and white of the Indonesian flag came from the Majapahit royal
colours; General Sukarnos Konfrontasi (Confrontation) with Malaysia in 1963-66
was based on the denial of the nationalist vision of a modern Majapahit nation
uniting modern Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines.

6
M. Dieleman, J. Koning & P. Post (Eds.), Chinese Indonesians and Regime Change (Chinese
Overseas) (2010) Brill Academic Publishers.
7
(Dari Sabang sampai Merauke; Sabang is a city at the tip of the island of Sumatra in West
Indonesia, while Merauke is one of Indonesias easternmost cities at Papua
9

One of the earliest popular nationalist movements was Sarekat Islam, which used
religion (ie Islam, the most popular religion among the native population in the Dutch
East Indies) and Javanese identity as a unifying force. Sarekat Islam was not as anti-
Dutch as it was anti-Chinese; it started out as a batik trading organisation and was
against the usurpation of the trade by Chinese traders. Sarekat Islam became to
symbolise something more than just trade protectionism: it awakened nativist anti-
Chinese sentiments and led to racially-charged riots in which the Chinese population
were disproportionately targeted.
The history of the KNI and Indonesian nationalism in itself are very interesting, but
much ink has been spilled on them by better scholars elsewhere. We will touch upon
a more developed Indonesian nationalism again in the next section when we talk
about post-independence Indonesia, but for the purposes of this paper it is suffice to
note that Indonesia is an idea, a construction brought about to bring together more
than 300 ethnic groups/tribes/nations who speak more than 700 languages spanning
18, 000 islands into a nation.
The early twentieth century also saw the rise of Sino-nationalism. Some of this
sentiment did spread to the Chinese diaspora overseas, but it would be an
exaggeration to say it affected a substantial number of the Dutch East Indies Chinese
population. It cannot be emphasised enough how heterogenous the Chinese
population was. Some of the Chinese population were sympathetic, if not supportive,
of the Indonesian nationalist movement. Nobuto Yamamoto showed how peranakan
10

journalists were instrumental in the KNI by helping to craft the Indonesian identity
8
.
Mass media plays an important role in crafting a group identity
9
, and in the early
twentieth century the peranakans were involved in the nascent but quickly growing
newspaper industry. Some of them produced Chinese-language newspapers or Sino-
centric newspapers, but others produced anti-colonial or nationalist papers. One of
these was the Sin Jit Po in Surabaya, which was published in the Malay language
10
and
had a readership that extended beyond the Chinese population and had both Chinese
and indigenous journalists in its employ.
It was also in the pages of these Chinese Indonesian newspapers that the internal
debate on the Chinese Indonesian community played out. Were they sons of China
or were they sons of Indonesia? Should they assimilate? Should they remain
separate and foreign from the indigenous population who had rapidly embraced the
Indonesian label? While this was a hot topic for the Chinese population, it did not
occur in vacuum from the rest of society. Indigenous Indonesian journalists and
figures too commented and debated on it. Some applauded the assimilationists; on
the other hand, some poured scorn on the idea of even assimilating the Chinese,
noting that they would always be sons of China and would never by definition be
sons of Indonesia.

8
Yamamoto, N. (2010). The Chinese Connection: Rewriting Journalism and Social Categories in
Indonesian History. In M. Dieleman, J. Koning & P. Post (Eds.), Chinese Indonesians and Regime
Change (Chinese Overseas) Brill Academic Publishers.
9
Anderson, B. (1984). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. (2006 Edition ed.). Verso.
10
Indonesias current lingua franca Bahasa Indonesia would only come to official existence in
the late 1920s; it existed previously as Pasar Malay, literally marketplace Malay, a popular
version of the Malay language that originated from Malacca and had spread throughout the
archipelago during the Dutch colonial times
11

The diversity of the Chinese population can be seen in the various political groups
they found such as the Sin Po, the Chung Hwa Hui and the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia
(PTI). The Sin Po tend to be aligned with the totoks and China-looking Sino-
nationalists; those affiliated with the Chung Hwa Hui were more pro-Dutch; the PTI
was assimilationist and pro-Indonesian.
The relative freedom the Chinese population had in expressing their heterogeneity in
civil society came to halt during the Japanese Occupation (1942-1945). The Japanese
lumped the Chinese population together separate from the Europeans and the
indigenous population, closed Chinese organizations and groups, and imprisoned
Chinese leaders and activists.
The Japaneses imprisonment and separation of the Chinese resulted in the lack of
visibility of Chinese freedom fighters and activists during the Indonesian fight for
independence
11
. This erased Chinese Indonesians who did risk or sacrifice their lives
for Indonesia and added on to the idea that the Chinese were foreigners who had
played no part in fighting or building the nation and were only interested in exploiting
the real sons of Indonesia economically.
The Japanese also required the Chinese to pledge their allegiance to the Japanese
army, hence not only cementing their Otherness among the native population but
also adding the idea that they were the enemy. Indonesian freedom fighters did
target the Chinese population during the war for independence; in 1946, 653 ethnic
Chinese were killed in one attack by the native fighters.

11
Hoon, C. (2011). Chinese Identity in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Culture, Politics and Media.
Sussex Academic Press, page 33
12

THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD
Indonesia became independent on August 17 1945. The period immediately following
independence saw a relatively free civil society. During this time, the internal
moulding of the Chinese Indonesian ethnicity flourished, and this would be the main
discussion for this section. Certainly, external moulding resulting from nativism (the
pribumi movement), anti-Chinese sentiments and laws reflecting these also affected
the Chinese population, and they would be discussed afterwards.
Before continuing with the history, it is necessary for this paper to touch upon
theories of nationalism and identity-building, and as this section deals with the newly-
birthed Indonesian nation it is the best place for this discussion.
As stated previously, Indonesia is a messy collection of incredibly diverse people.
Indonesia is an idea, a fiction, but it is a strong and powerful idea indeed. We had
talked previously of KNI--the Indonesian National Awakening. The one idea around
which Indonesian nationalists rallied is that of nativism--of having had roots to the
Indonesian soils before the arrival of the White Men. The different kingdoms and
tribes that had previously been independent of one another or even one anothers
rivals have suddenly become a common resource from which nationalist sentiments
can be mined. Anthony D Smith talked of the purification of culture as a step in
crafting a national or an ethnic identity. First, there is rediscovery of past glories of
the old kingdoms, of the natural wonders and fauna and flora. Then there
authentication, which is determining what is and what is not distinctive, what is and
what is not indigenous, and what therefore can be deemed to be truly ours
12
. After

12
Smith, A. D. (1996). Culture, community and territory: The politics of ethnicity and
nationalism. International Affairs, 72(3), 445-458, page 451
13

this comes reappropriation, such as how the marketplace Malay spoken by traders
throughout the Dutch East Indies became Bahasa Indonesia, and how the Majapahit
Empire, which was based on the island of Java, became a precursor for Indonesian
achievements and glory. There would be a value system that supposedly every
Indonesian shares--the Pancasila
13
. Being Indonesian meant having a connection to
the land, to the territory that was Indonesia. This identity manifests itself as pribumi,
literally sons of the soil.
Joel S Kahn illustrated this process with the Malays in Malaysia; the Malay identity in
Malaysia is analogous to the pribumi in Indonesia
14
. The Malays use the term
bumiputera (also sons of the soil) to identify themselves as distinct from the
Chinese Malaysians and the Indian Malaysians. Malaysia has official and
constitutional racial classifications, which is not the case in Indonesia. Malay is a race.
It is a fictional group that include people of different tribes and cultures (and similarly,
the Chinese and Indian races in Malaysia are massively heterogenous too). The
creation of different racial groups is accompanied by the stratification of these groups.
In Malaysia, privilege attaches itself to the Malay group by virtue of their being sons
of the soil. Kahn explained this in the context of a post-colonial society elegantly
using Peter Wagners theory of organized modernity: colonialism and independence
liberated people from the existing social structures, but they would be re-embedded

13
The Pancasila consists of the following five fundamental beliefs:
1. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa: Belief in a Supreme Creator (a God)
2. Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab: A civilised, just and humane society
3. Persatuan Indonesia: The unity of Indonesia
4. Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, Dalam Permusyawaratan dan
Perwakilan: Representative democracy
5. Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia: Social justice for all of Indonesian
citizens

14
Supra n1
14

in new social structures which are reminiscent of the old ones. In Malaysias case, the
old racial hierarchy of white people and non-white people during the British
colonial times, with the privilege attaching to the white people class, has been
restructured to be that of Malay or bumiputera and non-Malays.
The same thing happened in Indonesia. The formation of the pribumi identity
solidified the idea of Indonesia because it created a more privileged Us group (the
pribumi) and an other Them (the ethnic Chinese and other Orients and Eurasians).
It created a social hierarchy and division of power that could be exploited politically in
a young nation full of very passionate and ambitious people. Ironically, the
independence and unification of Indonesia could only happen by creating crack lines
in its new society.
We shall now shift the focus onto the Chinese community. There is no main
consensus among the Chinese community as to their roles in the new Indonesia.
Some of them formed new groups, such as Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganeraan
Indonesia (Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body), or Baperki for short, and
Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (The Institute of National Unity Cultivation), or
LPKB for short. Baperkis goal was equality for all Indonesian citizens regardless of
ethnicities or cultural backgrounds and also to advocate for the Chineses cultural
rights. In short, they were for integration. The LPKB was backed by the military and
advocated for the complete assimilation of the Chinese into the Indonesian majority.
As their names imply, these groups did not limit themselves to the Chinese question--
they actively took part in the wider Indonesian politics. The Baperki aligned
15

themselves with President Sukarno and Partai Kommunis Indonesia, PKI for short
(Indonesian Communist Party) while the LPKB was more right-wing.
The Chinese population at this point of time was incredibly heterogenous. Their
political leanings differed from complete apathy, to communist leanings or non-
communist sentiments. Those who feel like the Chinese community should be closer
to China were also split between those who supported the Kuomintang in Taiwan and
the Communist party in mainland China. Some Chinese sent their children to Chinese
schools and built or funded temples; some Chinese wanted their children to blend in
among their pribumi contemporaries. Some of them harboured nationalist feelings
towards Indonesia; some of them did not care. In short, there was no Chinese
community apart from an artificial one vaguely defined by the outsiders according to
their appearance and by the insiders mostly according to their similar cultural
practices.
The question of the Chinese identity was literally manifested in public with the issue
of the citizenship status of the Chinese in Indonesia. The Qing dynasty in its dying
days in 1909 had enacted a jus sanguinis citizenship for all child of a Chinese father or
mother overseas, and this was reaffirmed by Chiang Kai Seks Republic of China in
1929. Meanwhile, the Dutch had followed the principle of jus soli in granting Dutch
citizenship in the colonies. This means that many of the Chinese who were living in
the Dutch East Indies had dual citizenship.
Until the Citizenship Act of 1958, the dual citizenship meant freedom for the Chinese-
-they could express their identity, their patriotism, nationalism, pragmatism or sheer
16

apathy to the entire issue through choosing to embrace one or both of the
nationalities.
To the pribumis though, the dual citizenship emphasized the Otherness of the Chinese.
It reinforced the image of the Chinese as opportunists who were exploiting Indonesia
for their own selfish economic gains in the expense of the real sons of Indonesia.
In 1958, the Citizenship Act was passed. This Act made it compulsory for the Chinese
holding dual citizenship to declare which citizenship they were going to let go. The
ramification of this Act was that it intensified the distrust of the Chinese in Indonesia.
In 1959, Presidential Decree No 10 which prohibited trading by non-Indonesian
citizens also included the Chinese by definition because of uncertainty over their
citizenship status. This shows how the default for the Chinese was still the Other, the
Foreign. The main drive behind this law was nativist in nature--nationalists wanted to
take back the economy from the foreigners, especially the Chinese who in popular
imageries seem to be disproportionately in control of the economy
Despite all of these, life for the Chinese community in Indonesia was relatively more
peaceful and stable, especially when compared to what was going to come. They
might be discriminated from time to time, and there were still anti-Chinese attacks
during this time, but they had the agency and the political space and power for self-
determination, as well as to express themselves culturally.
NEW ORDER REGIME
In 1965, General Suharto took advantage of a failed military coup known as the 30
September Movement (Kudeta) which he and the military blamed on the PKI. The
17

resulting anti-communist purge killed an estimated 500,000 people. The Chinese
population was especially targeted due to the perception that they harboured
communist sympathies (because China is a communist country). Certainly, anti-
Chinese racism fuelled this violence against them. Not only had the Chinese
population been labelled as Others and Foreigners, they were now characterised as
national threats, which only fuelled anti-Chinese sentiments even more. The
increasing frequency of anti-Chinese riots led to the press labelling the violence as the
Chinese Problem (Masalah Cina). The phrase suggests victim blaming--that the blame
is instead put on the Chinese who were the victims of the anti-Chinese riots for
somehow provoking the violence by being different culturally instead of the
perpetrators.
The New Order Regime under Suhartos thirty-year presidency was known for its
centralised and authoritarian grip on the nation. Wary of the violence that brought
him to power, Suharto sought to control political and social life in the country. In a
country as big and diverse as Indonesia, the ethnic and religious fault lines of its many
different cultures are powder kegs waiting to blow. No matter how strong Suhartos
government tries, it will not be strong enough to hold the country together. It has to
invent a glue that can smooth over the fault lines. Nationalism is such a glue.
The idea was to strengthen the concept of Indonesian to pepper over regional,
ethnic and religious differences. The government was quick to ban any form of
extremism. It accelerated the transmigration program to dilute regional identities
outside of Java. It also relied even heavier on the pribumi rhetorics--ironic,
considering the governments transmigration policy. The transmigrants were
18

characterised as indigenous settlers, that is, more authentic compared to immigrant
foreign settlers such as the Chinese population who also participated in the
transmigration problem or migrated to these areas as more economic opportunities
there blossomed.
It was during Suhartos reign that most of the external moulding of the Chinese
Indonesian identity as it exists now happened. It is also during this time that the
paradox concerning the Chinese Indonesian identity could be felt most acutely by
Chinese Indonesians: while legislations which would be described below sought to
assimilate them, these legislations themselves marked them as different from the
pribumi and as ripe-pickings for civilian-level racism and prejudice.
This paper will briefly list out the laws legislated during Suhartos era. The goals of
these laws are: 1) to erase cultural expressions of the Chinese identity in public; 2) to
prevent the transmission of said cultural expressions to the next generation of
Chinese in Indonesia; 3) to take away their political power as Chinese Indonesians.
Keputusan Presidium Kabinet Nomor 127
Tahun 1966, 127/U/Kep/12/1966;
Keputusan Presiden Nomor 240 Tahun
1967, Keppres No. 240/1867
(Decision of the Presidential Cabinet No
127 of the year 1966)
This regulation aimed to accelerate the
assimilation of the Chinese into
mainstream Indonesian culture and
required Chinese to adopt Indonesian
names
Keputusan Presiden Nomor 240 Tahun
1967, Keppres No. 240/1867 (Presidential
Mandated the assimilation of
foreigners into mainstream Indonesian
19

Decision No 240 of 1967) culture and reiterated support for the
previous regulation that required the
adoption of Indonesian-sounding names.
Instruksi Presiden No. 14/1967 (Inpres No.
14/196) (President Instruction No 14 of
1967)
Effectively banned public displays of
Chinese culture (ie celebration of
Chinese New Year, religious activities,
Chinese letters, Chinese newspapers and
other media)
Surat Edaran Presidium Kabinet Ampera
Nomor SE-06/Pres.Kab/6/1967
(Presidential Cabinet Circular No SE-06 of
1967)
The adoption of the term Cina to
officially describe those of Chinese
descent, instead of using the term
Tionghoa. Cina is considered
derogatory to the Chinese Indonesians,
who prefer to use the term Tionghoa to
identify themselves.
Surat Edaran Menteri Dalam Negeri No.
477/74054/ BA.01.2/ 4683/95, November
18, 1978 (Ministry of Home Affairs
Directive No 477 of 1978)
The Minister stated that there were only
five official religions in Indonesia,
effectively revoking Confucianism
15
of its
official religion status
16
.
There were other laws and regulations but the above were the most important and
self-explanatory.

15
Confucianism is a minority religion even among the Chinese population, but it is very much
exclusively Chinese as opposed to other religions like Christianity and Buddhism which might
have a higher proportion of Chinese adherents but also attract a lot of pribumi faithfuls.
16
Losing official religion status means losing the constitutional right to religious freedom since
it only applies to official religions.
20

Stripped of their names, language, education and religion, the Chinese Indonesians
lost their Chinese-ness. But they couldnt be just Indonesians, unhyphenated,
authentic Indonesians, because they werent pribumi. The laws tried their best to
erase the Chinese from Chinese Indonesians, but it was also the existence of these
laws that foiled that attempt. The Chinese Indonesians lost control of their Chinese
label, it becoming something that they couldnt use for themselves, but rather
something imposed upon them, usually derogatorily, by others.
Of note is the governments choice of words when referring to the Chinese
Indonesians. Government statements and documents used the slur [orang] Cina
(Chinese; the word itself isnt inherently negative, although it does emphasise on the
foreign-ness of the Chinese Indonesians. It however was--and still is--used
derogatorily by non-Chinese Indonesians) instead of Tionghoa, which was (and still is)
used by the Chinese Indonesians to refer to themselves. This only emphasised how
the very laws meant to assimilate the Chinese Indonesians by erasing their Chinese-
ness also formalised their Otherness, and institutionalised racism and prejudice
against them.
Suharto, however, allowed the Chinese Indonesians economic freedom. Some
Chinese Indonesians took advantage of their relationships with the Chinese diaspora
especially in neighbouring South East Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia
to exploit Indonesias cheap raw materials. Some of them became incredibly wealthy.
Suhartos government even brokered many deals with these businessmen. Some of
these deals, in time, would be revealed to be corrupt. The Chinese Indonesians,
therefore, were in a peculiar situation where they as a group had economic power,
21

were perceived by the public to be in consort with the political elite, but in reality had
no political voice as a group.
The perceived wealth and power gap between the Chinese Indonesians and the
pribumi only added to the simmering anti-Chinese racism. The government did
nothing to stop this. The press, which was tightly regulated by the government, would
be averse to publishing anything that highlighted regional, ethnic or religious
differences, but they did not shy away from playing into the anti-Chinese sentiments
with provocative articles about the Chinese Problem: these Others who controlled the
economy, who were getting fatter on the backs of the labouring pribumis who
worked for them, who were storing the money for themselves or sending them
overseas instead of spending it locally. They were easy targets, given that they had no
public channel to address the charges levelled against them.
The Chinese Indonesians also lost not just self-determination as a group, but also as
individuals with regards to their identity. As written at the beginning of this paper,
todays Chinese Indonesians are free to identify with whatever labels they are most
comfortable with. They are free to determine for themselves their identity. Under
Suhartos regime, however, it would not have been up to them to determine if they
were Chinese Indonesians or just Indonesians or whatever indigenous culture or tribe
they might have also descended from. There was no official or legal way to classify a
Chinese Indonesian. It would have been up to the pribumis to decide if such a person
is Chinese Indonesian--or better yet, not Chinese Indonesian, and therefore deserving
of pribumi privileges. Suhartos racist laws made sure that culturally there would have
been no way to distinguish a Chinese Indonesian from a pribumi of the same region
22

and religion. The pribumi observer, therefore, would have to rely on phenotypical
features or any information on the persons family tree. A person who may personally
identify as Chinese Indonesian but has indigenous blood and may therefore pass as a
pribumi would be granted pribumi privileges. A person who has lost any sense of
Chinese-ness and therefore does not identify as Chinese at all would still be classified
as Chinese Indonesian by the rest of Indonesian society. In this sense, Chinese
Indonesian as an identity might have crossed the line between an ethnic group and a
race, since during this period of time this identity might have been imposed externally
according to a persons phenotypical features and their family tree, and not as a
result of self-determination.
It is worth taking a moment to compare the racism perpetuated here with the North
American concept of racism. At first glance it seems like it is ill-suited to compare the
two together, seeing that the Chinese Indonesians were not brought to Indonesian
shores by force as slaves. Neither were they the native populations from whom lands
and resources were stolen by an invading group. But the racism as a system should be
examined closer. In both societies, the oppressed groups (the African-Americans and
Native Americans in the US; the Chinese Indonesians in this case) had no say in how
they were categorised. Its true that in the US there were extensive legal definitions
as to who could be White. But those definitions were concerned with superficial
categories such as the proportion of black blood, nothing that actually could
determine the person for what he was.
23

Suhartos New Order Regime came to a violent end in 1998. As with the previous
violent transition periods covered previously, this one also resulted in the explosion
of anti-Chinese sentiments and inspired attacks on the Chinese community.
THE MAY 1998 RIOTS (KERUSUHAN MEI 1998)
The author had just turned 6 years old when the riots broke out. The story in the
media was one of disgruntled anarchist students or the new fighters for democracy.
Only those in the Chinese Indonesian community knew of the whispers of the
violence being wrecked against them. As always, they were the silent victims of the
revolution.
The roots of the riots could be distilled into two main categories: political, and
economic. Accusations of vote-rigging and displeasure towards Suhartos repressive
regime and the ruling party Golkar had resulted in public outcry, protests and even
rioting since 1996. At this time, the Indonesian economy was doing unprecedentedly
well, but by the second-half of 1997, however, Indonesia had been gripped by the
Asian Financial Crisis. Protests and unrests began to grow even more rampant,
leading the government to ban street protests and political activities. Meanwhile, the
Parliament, (the same one plagued by accusations of vote-rigging) elected Suharto to
his seventh five-year term as President. Suharto nominated many family members
and political cronies in his Cabinet, which did nothing to appease a public already
distrustful of the government and the regime. The 1998 Riots started in Medan, one
of Indonesias biggest cities, and also with one of Indonesias largest Chinese
Indonesian population, when a series of student protests turned violent. The
properties looted and destroyed were overwhelmingly those of Chinese Indonesians.
24

Some of them were painted with the words milik pribumi (this is property of the
pribumis).
It is important to understand how the Chinese Indonesians figured into the riots. As
mentioned previously, tension had been simmering between the Chinese Indonesians
and the pribumis at the perceived wealth gap and inequality between them. When
the Indonesian economy crashed as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis, the media
and public opinion turned the Chinese Indonesians into scapegoats.
There is no reason as to why Chinese Indonesians were disproportionately targeted
and victimised in the Riots except for racism. Chinese Indonesians were not active in
politics, and they certainly did not engineer the Asian Financial Crisis and Indonesias
economic crash. But years of Other-ing in the name of nationalism and
institutionalised racism made them the best kind of scapegoat. There were many
historical precedents of anti-Chinese violence, and these were not condemned of in
schools. Everyday aggression against Chinese Indonesians on the streets and in the
media was a fact of life. And most importantly, they had no political power as a group
to either protect themselves or stop the atrocities that were being committed.
The aftermath of the Riots only underscored the virulence of the anti-Chinese
sentiments. The first to condemn the riots as anti-Chinese were the international
community, led by the Chinese diaspora. It took a while for report of the widespread
raping of Chinese-Indonesian women to surface in Indonesia, and there were
accusations that the police and the military were complicit in covering them up. The
reaction back home was that of anger--towards the Chinese. The only phrase that
could adequately describe the backlash the Chinese Indonesian community received
25

is victim-blaming. Not only were they blamed for what had happened to them, they
were also blamed for bringing down Indonesias international image by
sensationalising the rumours of the attacks.
The 98 riots, thankfully, marked the lowest point of violent anti-Chinese sentiments in
Indonesia. The sheer atrocity of what was done and the international scrutiny forced
Indonesians to look at their treatment of Chinese Indonesians and perhaps, minorities
in general, especially as they, as a nation, aspire to the higher ideals of democracy
and freedom after Suhartos downfall.
POST 98 - TODAY
Democratization came quick after the end of Suhartos reign. The Chinese
Indonesians, still shaken by the spectre of the 98 riots, suddenly found themselves
with more options in the civil society and the political sphere than they had had in the
last thirty odd years.
Many Chinese Indonesians formed new political organisations and groups post 98.
Some of these groups are assimilationists, some are more business-minded, while
some are integrationists. Most of them are led by the ethnic Chinese from different
religious, political and class backgrounds. Some of them accept pribumi members.
Much ink has been spilt elsewhere analysing the different groups that sprouted up
since 1998
17
, but for our purposes the thing worth noting is the sudden influx of
Chinese Indonesian participation in politics, keen to not only make their voices heard

17
For example: Suryadinata, L. (2001). Chinese Politics in Post-Suharto's Indonesia. Asian
Survey, 41(3), 502-524.
26

but also to gain enough political currency to stop making the Chinese Indonesian
community the punching bag of the country.
Of interest is also how the rest of the society responded. An editorial in Kompas,
Indonesias largest newspaper, questioned the appropriateness of ethnic-based
parties even though it applauded increasing political participation by Chinese
Indonesians
18
. The wariness towards an ethnic-based approach was mirrored by other
pribumi political figures. Therefore, even though after Suhartos departure and as
Indonesia was entering a new phase of democracy, the majority of the society still
could not shake off the old view that non-pribumis should just assimilate completely
into society, and talking about ethnicities is still an awkward conversation to have.
The civil society also sees the flourishing of Chinese Indonesian NGOs which aim to
improve relations between the Chinese Indonesians and the pribumis, as well as
advocate for their rights, such as the Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia
(Chinese Indonesian Social Group, PSMTI for short), and the Perhimpunan Indonesia
Keturunan Tionghoa (Association of Indonesians of Chinese descent, INTI for short).
The choice of emphasizing that they are first and foremost Indonesians but that they
just happen to be of Chinese descent, and therefore should be treated just like the
other pribumi ethnicities, like Batak, Sundanese or Javanese
19
.
The NGO Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa (Solidarity for the Nation, SNB for short) sued the
government to be held responsible for what was done to the Chinese community
during the 1998 riots. They also organised discussions and debates to raise public

18
Editorial, Kompas, June 10, 1998
19
Editorial, Suara Baru, 1:3 (April 2000), p. 3
27

awareness as to what really happened during the 98 riots, shattering the myths and
victim-blaming that were prevalent in the period immediately after the riots.
In the successive governments after the 98 riots, the racist legislations passed during
Suharto era were overturned. Confucianism is now the sixth official religion of
Indonesia, and Chinese New Year is celebrated as an official holiday. Many
Indonesians, and not just Chinese Indonesians, are eagerly learning Mandarin and
also consuming Chinese pop culture exported from mainland China or Taiwan. In the
most recent Jakarta mayor election, Joko Widodo, the eventual winner, selected
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, an ethnic Chinese publicly known with his Chinese name
Ahok, as his running mate. Chinese Indonesians could be seen in popular culture--one
of the most famous stars in Indonesia, Agnes Monica, is Chinese Indonesian.
Where does this leave the Chinese Indonesians? Is the Chinese Indonesian story over?
The writer would think not; it seems like the Chinese Indonesians are at a new
chapter in their story, a messy anthology in which there are so many differing
narratives and viewpoints
20
.
Indonesian nationalism is strong today. It no longer needs an Other against which
to define itself. Its strong enough to be stretched to include traditional Others like
the Chinese Indonesian. Unlike in Malaysia where the bumiputera privilege is
entrenched in law in the form of affirmative action, the pribumi privilege in Indonesia
is only a social construct after the repeal of Suhartos racist laws. It is readily chipped
away at by activists and by time itself.

20
See, for example, Wibowo, I. (2001). Exit,voice, and loyalty: Indonesian Chinese After the
Fall of Soeharto. Sojourn, 16(1), 125-146 and Hoon, C. (2006). Assimilation, Multiculturalism,
Hybridity: The Dilemmas of the Ethnic Chinese in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Asian Ethnicity, 7(2),
149-166.
28

With the repeal of the Suharto legislations and a freer, more democratic society, it is
up for every Chinese Indonesian to choose how they want to identify, and what the
label--Chinese Indonesian, Indonesian Chinese, or just Chinese or plain Indonesian--
means to them. Some of the Chinese Indonesians, like the writers parents, might feel
like it is not worth discussing the Chinese Indonesian story anymore. This is a valid
response; the chaos and violence Chinese Indonesians have faced throughout the
years may render them seemingly apathetic to Chinese Indonesian issue, which may
have stemmed from a I dont want any trouble self-defense mechanism during the
oppressive years. While the years under Suharto have created a template of being
Chinese Indonesian which might have been forced upon the community, the Chinese
Indonesians have now taken back the identity for themselves.
The writer also feels that the Chinese Indonesian story is especially important for the
Chinese Indonesians to own. The Chinese Indonesian story should not be moulded by
the government into a happily-ever-after story for a Model Minority in an incredibly
diverse country which is increasingly feeling ethnic and religious strains. The
assimilationist approach is still being taken to ethnic and religious minorities such as
the Ahmadis, who are today persecuted by fundamentalist Muslims while the
government either turns a blind eye or covertly supports them.
If the Chinese Indonesian story stands for anything, it should stand for the paradox of
forceful assimilation and denial of an identity in the service of the majority. It should
be a cautionary tale, not a fairy tale. And this tale is still being written, thankfully, by
Chinese Indonesians themselves.