Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C. June 29, 2001

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR
SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.

VITUG, J.:

The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal
charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live television and live radio
broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing
duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter
requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to
assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still
later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition,
submitting the following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land,
members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution
thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire
citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
"4. There is no gain saying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio
and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose
of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of
the supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the
part of the present dispensation, to railroad the instant criminal cases against the Former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada."
Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to
vital information affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case
for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras
in the courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the question
squarely.
"While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the
United States prohibits the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or
radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a
matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment.
To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and
serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated.
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or
televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television
or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or
printing press into the courtroom.
"In Estes vs. Texas. the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4,
the Court through Mr. Justice Clark identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise
from the impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in
part pertinently stated:
"Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might
be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of court
influences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own performance.
Judges are human beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as laymen. For the
defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure
and distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense.
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused
and his case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court
to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's constitutional rights are no
greater than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news
media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and
decorum that the requirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant
and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and
photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and
orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of
the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial
means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of
court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial
officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No
video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
" Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court
resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court
hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an
important instrument in the quest for truth. 5 Recent history exemplifies media's invigorating presence,
and its contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of
the enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial
and partly political exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times,
that would soon culminate in EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.
When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be
preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it
behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just
and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence
testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in
proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts
free from improper influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running
emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial
that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention9 and where the
conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate,
with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded
that "television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."
Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them
directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so
many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have
on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be
said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. It might be farcical to build
around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion.
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to
justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice
can create. The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for
it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it now.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where
his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with
and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must
be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness
negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall
then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process
in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right
of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in
carrying out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process."
This Court, in the instance already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court
holding the television coverage of judicial proceedings as an inherent denial of due process rights of an
accused, also identified the following as being likely prejudices:
"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the greatest significance. x x x. From the
moment the trial judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause celebre. The whole
community, x x x becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial
immediately assumes an important status in the public press and the accused is highly publicized along
with the offense with which he is charged. Every juror carries with him into the jury box these solemn
facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present in every criminal case. x x x.
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a witness of
the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is Simply incalculable. Some may be
demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with
anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. x x x. Indeed, the
mere fact that the trial is to be televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby
impede the trial as well as the discovery of the truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television places on
the trial judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This most difficult task
requires his undivided attention. x x x
"4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is a form
of mental if not physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable
close-up of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal
sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the proceedings before him -sometimes the
difference between life and death -dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of wide public
surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a
city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will
inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live television and radio coverage could
have mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere that should always
surround the judicial process.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 Apri1 2001, expressed its own concern on
the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television
and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure
a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very
credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial
could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the
accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and
radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for
publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see protracted delays in the
prosecution of cases before trial courts brought about by petitions seeking a declaration of mistrial on
account of undue publicity and assailing a court a quo's action either allowing or disallowing live media
coverage of the court proceedings because of supposed abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having modified the case law on the matter. Just to
the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October 1991. Until 1991, the
Court had yet to establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in its 23rd October resolution, it
confirmed, in disallowing live television and radio coverage of court proceedings, that "the records of
the Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the
courtroom" and that "Philippine courts (had) not (therefore) had the opportunity to rule on the question
squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority opinion really in point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs, Stewart, the Nebraska State trial judge issued an order restraining
news media from publishing accounts of confession or admissions made by the accused or facts strongly
implicating him. The order was struck down. In Richmond Newspaper; Inc., vs, Virginia, the trial judge
closed the courtroom to the public and all participants except witnesses when they testify. The judge
was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that criminal trials were historically open. In Globe
Newspaper vs. Superior Court, the US Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law that required trial
judges to exclude the press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of
certain sexual offenses.
Justice Steward, in Chandler vs. Florida, where two police officers charged with burglary sought to
overturn their conviction before the US Supreme Court upon the ground that the television coverage
had infringed their right to fair trial, explained that "the constitutional violation perceived by the Estes
Court did not stem from the physical disruption that might one day disappear with technological
advances in the television equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that the mere presence of
cameras and recording devices might have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the accused."
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live television
and radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as they
do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's
focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events
has left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited anew and risk the relative stability that has
thus far been achieved? The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to turn a blind eye to
yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the
business of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the
standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be
propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in any sense
which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis of what alone is
submitted before them. A trial is not a free trade of ideas, Nor is a competing market of thoughts the
known test of truth in a courtroom.
The Court is not all that umnindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance
forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety
nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. I join in the dissent of J. Puno.
Melo, J. I join the dissents.
Puno, J. Please see dissenting opinion.
Kapunan, J. See concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J. I concur in the majority opinion of Vitug, I. and join the separate opinion of Kapunan, J.
Panganiban, J. See dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, J. I join in the dissent of J. Puno.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. I concur. See my concurring opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J. On leave.