ObservationandTheoryladenness

Inthephilosophyofscience,observationsaresaidtobetheoryladenwhentheyareaffectedbythe
theoreticalpresuppositionsheldbytheinvestigator.Thethesisoftheoryladennessismoststrongly
associatedwiththelate1950sandearly1960sworkofN.R.Hanson,T.S.Kuhn,andP.Feyerabend,andwas
probablyfirstputforth(atleastimplicitly)byP.Duhemabout50yearsearlier.Althoughoftenruntogether,
atleasttwoformsoftheoryladennessshouldbekeptseparate:(i)themeaningofobservationaltermsis
partiallydeterminedbytheoreticalpresuppositions;(ii)thetheoriesheldbytheinvestigator,ataverybasic
cognitivelevel,impingeontheperceptionsoftheinvestigator.Theformermaybereferredtoassemantic
andthelatterasperceptualtheoryladenness.Thethesisoftheoryladenness,iftrue,hastroublesome
consequencesfortheorytesting.Iftherearenotheoryneutralobservations,thenthisraisesdoubtsabout
whetherempiricaltestscantrulydecidebetweencompetingtheories.So,iftheoriespartiallydetermine
themeaningofobservationterms,twoinvestigatorsholdingincompatibletheorieswillmeandifferent
thingswhentheyusethesameobservationalvocabulary,and,iftheoriespartiallydeterminewhatwesee,
twoinvestigatorsholdingincompatibletheorieswillseetheobjectsrelevantfordiscriminatingbetween
theirtheoriesdifferently.
Athesisthatalsogoesundertheheadingoftheoryladennessmaybe(moreappropriately)
referredtotheorydependenceofinstruments,onwhichmuchdiscussionhasfocusedon:theinvestigators
confidenceinthetruthfulnessoftheresultsobtainedwithcertaininstrumentsdependsonherhaving
soundtheoriesofhowtheseinstrumentswork.Suchtheoriesarealsoreferredtoasbackgroundtheories.
Thetheorydependenceofinstrumentsisparticularlyproblematicwhenthebackgroundtheoriesarethe
verytheoriesthattheinvestigatorseekstotest,forinthosescenariosthetestingprocedureisrendered
circular.
Theoryladennessshouldnotbeconfusedwithcertainotherideas.Theoryladennessdoesnot
implythatourperceptionsarefullydeterminedbyourtheories;itdoesnotimplythatweseewhateverwe
wanttosee.Nophilosopherofscienceofsomestandinghasdefendedsuchanextremeposition.We
cannotseeflyingpigsevenifwehadtheoriesthattoldusthatthereweresuchthings.Ontheotherhand
theoryladennessdoesnotsimplyamounttoperceptionsbeinginterpreteddifferentlybydifferentpeople.
Noristheoryladennessthemeretheoreticalguidanceofempiricalinquiries,i.e.,thedecisiontoperform
certainexperimentsratherthanothersortoinvestigateacertainaspectoftheworld.Bothoftheseideas
areplatitudesandphilosophicallynotparticularlyinteresting.Agreyareaisthephenomenonofnegative
theoreticalbias,i.e.theideathatempiricalresultsnotamenabletocertaintheoreticalpresuppositionsare
(wilfullyorsubconsciously)ignoredbytheinvestigator.Clearly,alsoincasesoftheoreticalbiastheoretical
presuppositionsimpingeonthedatainwaysthatarecomparabletothethesisoftheoryladenness.Yet
negativetheoreticalbiasisnormallytakentobeeasilyrevealedthroughvariouscontrolmechanismsin
scientificpractice(e.g.peerreview).Sincetheoreticalbiasasaformoftheoryladennesshasreceived
ratherlittleattentionbyphilosophersofscience,itwillnotbediscussedhere.
Semantictheoryladenness
Oneofthebestknownexamplesforsemantictheoryladennessconcernsthe(observational)termmass
whichhasadifferentmeaninginNewtonianphysicsthanitdoesinEinsteinstheoryofrelativity.Whereas
intheformertheory,massisaconstant,inthelatteritdependsonthevelocityoftheobjectinquestion.
Ortakethetermplanet.InthePtolemaicsystemthe(observational)termplanetreferredtoaclassof
astronomicalobjectsthatincludedtheSunandthemoonbutnotEarth.Incontrast,intheCopernican
systemthetermplanetincludedEarthbutneithertheSunnorthemoon.Kuhnusedexampleslikethese
toargueforhis(perhapsmost)controversialideaoftheincommensurabilityofparadigms.Kuhnsviewhas
beenrejectedbymanyphilosophersonthegroundsthatheemploysaparticulartheoryofreference
(descriptivism/holism)thatmostphilosopherstaketobeinadequate.Still,largelyduetoKuhn,Hanson,and
Feyerabendthevastmajorityofphilosophershaveacceptedthattherearehardlyanyobservationalterms
relevanttoscientificpracticethatarenottheoryladen.Indeed,thiswasoneofthemajorreasonsthatled
tothedemiseoflogicalpositivism/empiricism,whichhadpostulatedastrictdistinctionbetween
observationalandtheoreticalvocabulary,wherebyanytheoreticaltermshadtoberelatableto
observationaltermsinorderfortheformertobedeemedmeaningful.ModerndayempiricistssuchasB.
vanFraassen,however,doacceptsemantictheoryladenness,thevaguenessoftheobservation/theoretical
distinction,andthattheoreticaltermsaremeaningfulwithoutbeingrelatabletoobservationalterms,but
doinsistonscepticismabouttheunobservablereferentsoftheoreticalterms(suchaselectron).
Perceptualtheoryladenness
Aninstructiveexampleforperceptualtheoryladennessisapsychologicalexperiment,famouslyusedby
T.S.KuhninhisStructureofScientificRevolutions.Inthisexperimentthesubjectswerepresentedwithaset
ofplayingcards(onebyone)whichcontainedanomalouscards,suchastheblackfourofhearts.
Interestingly,withasufficientlyshortamountofexposure,thesubjectsperceptuallyassimilatedthe
anomalousplayingcardstothenormalones,i.e.,theywouldreportablackfourofspadeswhenbeing
presentedwithablackfourofhearts.Apparentlytheirbeliefthatplayingcardsfallintocertaincategories
primedtheirperceptualsystemaccordingly.Otherexamplesillustratingthesecondformoftheory
ladennessincludeGestaltfiguresliketheduck/rabbitortheNeckerCube,whicharedrawingsthatcanbe
perceivedintwodifferentwayswithouttheobjectofperceptionchanging.Theseexamplesareofcourse
merelyillustrative.AnexamplefromscientificpracticeallegedlyexhibitingGestaltlikefeatures,givenby
HansonandKuhn,isthedifferencebetweenaCopernican,i.e.,abelieverinthesuncentreduniverse,and
aPtolemaian,i.e.,abelieverintheearthcentreduniverse,seeingdifferentthingswhenlookingatasun
set.WhereasthePtolemaicanseesthesunfallingbehindthehorizon(becauseinherview,thesunis
moving,nottheearth),theCopernicanseesafixedsunandarisinghorizon.Likewise,anAristotelian,who
believesthatallobjectshavethenaturaltendencytofalltotheearth,seestheconstrainedfallofan
objectwhenwatchingapendulum,whereasaGalilean,havingdevelopedanearlyformoftheconceptof
inertia,seesdampedinertialmotion.
Astraightforwardcriticismthatcanbelevelledagainstthoselatterexamplesinparticularisthat
theyarebasedonaconfusionbetweenseeingandseeingthat,i.e.apropositionalattitudethatrequires
judgment.VanFraasseninhisinfluentialTheScientificImageillustratesthispointwithanaboriginaltribe
seeingatennisballforthefirsttime:althoughtheydo,aswewould,seethetennisball(i.e.ayellowfluffy
thingthatbounces)theydontseethatthisisatennisball,forthiswouldrequiresomebasicfamiliarity
withthegameoftennis,immersioninWesternculture,etc.Likewise,LavoisierandPriestly,asmuchas
AristotleandGalileo,bothdoseethesameobjectsbutmakedifferent(theoreticallyinformed)judgments
aboutthem.Howeverthereareexampleswherethisinterpretationseemslessplausible.Anativespeaker
ofChinese,forinstance,justhears(withoutneedingtointerpretorconsciouslyjudge)meaningful
utteranceswhenhearingChineseratherthanjustawkwardsounds,asaspeakerwithoutanyknowledgeof
theChineselanguagewould.Inexampleslikethese,theoryladenobservationhasacharacterofimmediacy
andinevitabilitythatisnotreflectedbytheseeingvs.seeingthatdistinction.
AnotherrelatedcritiqueofperceptualtheoryladennesswasgivenbyJ.Fodorinthe1980s.Based
onexamplessuchastheMllerLyerillusion,inwhichtwolinesofequallengthappeartobeofdifferent
length,Fodorarguedthatperceptionsarecognitivelyimpenetrable.Thatis,evenifwearemadeawareof
thetwolinesbeingofequallength,westillperceivethemasbeingofunequallength.Fodorsattackon
perceptualtheoryladennesshasbeentakenupbyothersinmorerecentworks.Twothingsshouldbe
notedaboutFodorsdefense.First,appealtoexamplessuchastheMllerLyerillusioncanonlyshowthat
someperceptionsarecognitivelyimpenetrable.Second,asindicatedabove,defendersofperceptual
theoryladennessdonotclaimthatallofourperceptualexperienceissubjecttocognitivepenetration.If
thatwereso,itwouldindeedbepossiblethatweseewhatwewishtosee.Again,nophilosopherofscience
hasdefendedsuchaview.Onthecontrary,theKuhnianaccountofscience,forinstance,presupposesthat
thereareobservationsthatresisttheoreticalassimilation(anomalies).
StillanotherinfluentialwayofcounteringperceptualtheoryladennesswasmadebyJ.BogenandJ.
Woodward(alsointhe1980s).BogenandWoodwardadvancetheviewthatscientifictheoriesexplainand
predictunobservablephenomenaratherthanobservabledata.Phenomenaareinferredfromdata(usually
bystatisticalmethods).Butifthisissoneitherphenomenanordatacanbetheoryladen:phenomenaare
notperceptuallytheoryladenbecausetheyareunobservable,anddataarenottheoryladenbecausethey
donotformthebasisagainstwhichwetesttheories.BogenandWoodwardssimplestexampleforan
unobservablephenomenonisthemeltingpointoflead,at327.5C,whichisinferredfromindividualdata
points,noneofwhichmightexhibitthisexactvalue.Amoreadvancedexampleforaphenomenonisthe
weakneutralcurrent,whichwasinferredfrombubblechamberpictures(thedata).TheGlashowSalam
Weinbergmodelexplainsandpredictstheneutralcurrent,butnotthebubblechamberpictures.
Theorydependenceofinstruments
P.Feyerabend,inhisAgainstMethod,pointedoutthatGalileo,whengatheringtelescopicobservationsin
supportofthesuncentreduniverseintheearly17
th
century,hadnoknowledgeoftheworkingofthe
telescope.Amongstotherthings,FeyerabendreasonsthatGalileowouldhaveneededsuchatheoryto
providegoodgroundstoconvincehisscepticalcontemporariesofthetruthofheliocentrism.Pointingthe
telescopetoterrestrialobjectsinordertodemonstrateitsmagnifyingeffectwouldnothavesufficedsince
hiscontemporariesthoughtthatthephysicsonearthwascompletelydifferentformthephysicsofthe
heavens.Infact,FeyerabendaccusesGalileoofcircularreasoning:inorderforGalileostelescopic
observationstobeacceptableevidenceforhiscontemporaries,Galileohadtoshowtheinadequacyofthe
Aristoteliantwophysicsworldpicture.Butinordertoshowthis,hereliedonhistelescopicobservations,
which,again,presupposedthatthephysicsonearthandthephysicsoftheheavenswerethesame.
Severalstrategieshavebeenproposedtocountertheallegedtheorydependenceofinstruments
leadingtothecircularityoftestingprocedures.Somephilosophershaveacceptedthetheorydependence
ofinstrumentsandhavedemandedthatthetestedtheorybeindependentfromthetheoriesthatare
presupposedwheninstrumentsareused(P.Kosso).Othershavesimplydeniedthatoneneedsknowledge
ofhowaninstrumentworksinordertousethatinstrumentinsuchawaythatitproducesreliabledata.I.
HackingsRepresentingandInterveninghasbeeninfluentialinthisrespect.Hepointsoutthatobservations
madewithmicroscopesinthe19
th
centuryweretrusteddespitenoaccuratetheoryofthemicroscope
beingavailable.Hackingalsoarguesthattheobservationsmadebybiologistswhenusingmicroscopesare
notunderminedbythefactthatbiologistsregularlyknowratherlittleofthephysicsthatunderliesthese
microscopes.Andyetsomeoneknowsaboutit.Butevenifreliabilityofexperimentalresultsdependedon
backgroundtheories,Hackingargues,scientistshaveapowerfulstrategyforaddressingthisproblem.This
isHackingsfamousargumentfromcoincidence,whichisalsoknownastherobustnessargument.Itsays
thatitwouldbeapreposterouscoincidenceiftheobservationsmadewithseveralinstrumentseach
presupposingdifferentbackgroundtheoriesweretoconvergeandtheobservationswerenotreliable.
Hackingsexampleisthepresenceofredbloodplateletsinthesamelocations(ofagrid)whenviewedwith
theopticalandtheelectronmicroscope.Therobustnessargumenthasbeencomplementedwithvarious
otherepistemologicalstrategiesintheworkofA.Franklin.Stillotherphilosophershavenotbeen
convincedthattheorydependenceofinstrumentsofthecircularvarietyshouldbetakenseriously.H.
ChanginhisInventingTemperatureconsiderstheexampleofestablishingthatmercuryexpandsuniformly
witharaiseintemperatureintheproductionofreliablethermometersinthe19
th
century.Inordertodo
this,onehadtoplotvolumeofmercuryvs.temperature.Butforthatoneofcourseneedsareliable
thermometerwhichwaswhatscientistshadsetouttodiscoverinthefirstplace.ButChangarguesthatthis
kindofcircularityisinnocuous:evenifthetheoryassumedwhenusingaparticularinstrumentisthesame
astheoneatstake,theactualexperimentalresultisstillcontingent.Inotherwords,therelianceon
assumptionswhichwewishtoestablishwhenusingacertaininstrumentdoesnotimplythatresultsgained
withthoseinstrumentsareguaranteedtobeofaparticularform.
Furtherreading
Bogen,J.,andJ.Woodward.1988.Savingthephenomena.ThePhilosophicalReview97(3):303352.
Chang,H.2004.Inventingtemperature:Measurementandscientificprogress:OxfordUniversityPress,USA.
Feyerabend,P.1975.Againstmethod.Verso:London.
Fodor,J.1984.Observationreconsidered.Philosophyofscience:2343.
Franklin,A.2008.Experimentinphysics.StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Spring2010Edition),Edward
N.Zalta(ed.),URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/physicsexperiment/>.
Hacking,I.1983.Representingandintervening:Introductorytopicsinthephilosophyofnaturalscience.Vol.
355:CambridgeUnivPress.
Hanson,N.R.1958.PatternsofDiscovery:AnInquiryIntotheConceptualFoundationsofScience:University
Press.
Kosso,P.1989.Scienceandobjectivity.TheJournalofphilosophy86(5):245257.
Kuhn,T.S.1996.Thestructureofscientificrevolutions:UniversityofChicagopress.
Machamer,P.K.(1973).FeyerabendandGalileo:theInteractionofTheories,andtheReinterpretationof
Experience.StudiesinHistoryandPhilosophyofScience4:146.
Raftopoulos,A.2009.Cognitionandperception:howdopsychologyandneuralscienceinformphilosophy?
Cambridge(Mass.):MITPress.
Schindler,S.forthcoming,Theorydrivendatareliabilityjudgments:theoryladennessintheexperimetnal
context?
Stegenga,J.2009.Robustness,discordance,andrelevance.PhilosophyofScience76(5):650661.
Suppe,F.1977.Thestructureofscientifictheories:UniversityofIllinoisPress.
Seealso
Empiricism,RelativisminScientificTheories,KuhnonScientificRevolutionsandIncommensurability,Holism
(PhilosophyofLanguage)
AuthorAffiliation
Dr.SamuelSchindler,CenterforScienceStudies,DepartmentofPhysicsandAstronomy,AarhusUniversity,
Denmark