CHAPTER ONE: Statutes

IN GENERAL
Laws, generally
A whole body or system of law
Rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by
legitimate power of the state
Includes RA, PD, EO (president in the e of legislati!e
power", Presidential issuances (ordinance power"
#urisprudence, ordinances passed by sanggunians of
local go!ernment units$
%tatutes, generally
An act of legislature (Philippine &ommission, Phil$
Legislature, 'atasang Pambansa, &ongress"
PD(s of )arcos during the period of martial law *+,-
&onstitution
EO of A.uino re!olutionary period /reedom
&onstitution
Public 0 affects the public at large
general 0 applies to the whole state and
operates throughout the state ali1e upon all
people or all of a class$
%pecial 0 relates to particular person or things
of a class or to a particular community,
indi!idual or thing$
Local Law 0 operation is confined to a
specific place or locality (e$g municipal
ordinance"
Pri!ate 0 applies only to a specific person or
sub2ect$
Permanent and temporary statutes
Permanent 3 one whose operation is not limited in
duration but continues until repealed$
4emporary 3 duration is for a limited period of time
fied in the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the
happening of an e!ent$
o E$g$ statute answering to an emergency
Other classes of statutes
Prospecti!e or retroacti!e 0 accdg$ to application
Declaratory, curati!e, mandatory, directory,
substanti!e, remedial, penal 0 accdg$ to operation
According to form
o Affirmati!e
o 5egati!e
)anner of referring to statutes
Public Acts 0 Phil &ommission and Phil Legislature
*+6*3 *+-7
&ommonwealth Acts 0 *+-83 *+98
Republic Acts 0 &ongress *+983 *+,:, *+;, <
'atas Pambansa 0 'atasang Pambansa
Identification of laws 0 serial number and=or title
ENACTMENT OF STATUTES
Legislati!e power, generally
Power to ma1e, alter and repeal laws
>ested in congress 0 *+;, &onstitution
President 0 *+,- ? /reedom (PD and EO
respecti!ely"
%angguniang barangay, bayan, panglungsod,
panlalawigan 0 only within respecti!e 2urisdiction 0
ordinances
Administrati!e or eecuti!e officer
Delegated power
Issue rules and regulations to implement a
specific law
&ongress legislati!e power
4he determination of the legislati!e policy and its
formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding
rule of conduct$
Legislati!e power 3 plenary ecept only to such
limitations as are found in the constitution
Procedural re.uirements, generally
Pro!ided in the constitution (for 'ills, RA"
Pro!ided by congress 0 enactment of laws
Rules of both houses of congress (pro!ided also
by the &onstitution"
Passage of bill
Proposed legislati!e measure introduced by a member
of congress for enactment into law
%hall embrace only one sub2ect which shall be
epressed in the title
%inged by authors
/ile with the %ecretary of the @ouse
'ills may originate from either lower or upper @ouse
Eclusi!e to lower house
Appropriation
Re!enue= tariff bills
'ills authoriAing increase of public debt
'ills of local application
Pri!ate bills
After - readings, appro!al of either house (see Art 8
%ec :8 (*""
%ecretary reports the bill for first reading
/irst reading 0 reading the number and title, referral to
the appropriate committee for study and
recommendation
&ommittee 0 hold public hearings and
submits report and recommendation for
calendar for second reading
%econd reading 0 bill is read in full (with amendments
proposed by the committee" 0 unless copies are
distributed and such reading is dispensed with
o 'ill will be sub2ect to debates, motions and
amendments
o 'ill will be !oted on
o A bill appro!ed shall be included in the
calendar of bills for -
rd
reading
4hird reading 0 bill appro!ed on :
nd
reading will be
submitted for final !ote by yeas and nays,
'ill appro!ed on the -
rd
reading will be transmitted to
the BOther @ouseC for concurrence (same process as
the first passage"
o If the BOther @ouseC appro!es without
amendment it is passed to the President
o If the BOther @ouseC introduces amendments,
and disagreement arises, differences will be
settled by the &onference &ommittees of both
houses
o Report and recommendation of the :
&onference &ommittees will ha!e to be
appro!ed by both houses in order to be
considered pass
President
o Appro!es and signs
o >etoes (within -6 days after receipt"
o Inaction
If the President !etoes 0 send bac1 to the @ouse where
it originated with recommendation
o :=- of all members appro!es, it will be sent to
the other house for appro!al
o :=- of the other house appro!es 0 it shall
become a law
o If president did not act on the bill with in -6
days after receipt, bill becomes a law
%ummary D - ways of how a bill becomes a law$
President signs
inaction of president with in -6 days after receipt
!etoed bill is repassed by congress by :=- !otes of
all its members, each house !oting separately$
Appropriations and re!enue bills
%ame as procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills
Only difference is that they can only originate from the
Lower @ouse but the %enate may propose= concur with
the amendments
Limitations of passage (as per &onstitution" Art 8 %ec$
:, (:"
o congress may not increase the appropriation
recommended by the President EEE
o particular appropriation limited
o procedure for &ongress is the same to all
other department= agencies (procedure for
appro!ing appropriations "
o special appropriations 0 national treasurer=
re!enue proposal
o no transfer of appropriations authority to
augment
o discretionary funds 0 for public purposes
o general appropriations bills 0 when re3enacted
o President my !eto any particular item=s in an
appropriation re!enue, or tariff bill$
Authentication of bills
'efore passed to the President
Indispensable
'y signing of %pea1er and %enate President

Fnimpeachability of legislati!e 2ournals

#ournal of proceedings
&onclusi!e with respect to other matters that are
re.uired by the &onstitution
Disputable with respect to all other matters
'y reason of public policy, authenticity of laws should
rest upon public memorials of the most permanent
character
%hould be public
Enrolled bill
'ills passed by congress authenticated by the %pea1er
and the %enate President and appro!ed by the
President
Importing absolute !erity and is binding on the courts
o It carries on its face a solemn assurance that it
was passed by the assembly by the legislati!e
and eecuti!e departments$
&ourts cannot go behind the enrolled act to disco!er
what really happened
o If only for respect to the legislati!e and
eecuti!e departments
4hus, if there has been any mista1e in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by the officer of the
assembly and appro!ed by the &hief Eecuti!e, the
remedy is by amendment by enacting a curati!e
legislation not by 2udicial decree$
Enrolled bill and legislati!e 2ournals 3 &onclusi!e upon
the courts
If there is discrepancy between enrolled bill and
2ournal, enrolled bill pre!ails$
Githdrawal of authentication, effect of
%pea1er and %enate President may withdraw if there is
discrepancy between the tet of the bill as deliberated
and the enrolled bill$
EffectD
o 5ullifies the bill as enrolled
o Losses absolute !erity
o &ourts may consult 2ournals
PARTS OF STATUTES
4itle of statute
)andatory law 3 E!ery bill passed by &ongress shall
embrace only one sub2ect which shall be epressed in
the title thereof (Art 8, %ec :8 (*" *+;, &onstitution"
: limitations upon legislation
o 4o refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous sub2ects
o 4itle of the bill should be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators
and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single sub2ect$
Purposes of re.uirement (on * sub2ect"
Principal purposeD to apprise the legislators of the
ob2ect, nature, and scope of the pro!ision of the bill
and to pre!ent the enactment into law of matters which
ha!e not recei!ed the notice, action and study of the
legislators$
o 4o prohibit duplicity in legislation
In sum of the purpose
o 4o pre!ent hodgepodge= log3rolling
legislation
o 4o pre!ent surprise or fraud upon the
legislature
o 4o fairly apprise the people, through
publication of the sub2ects of the legislation
o Fsed as a guide in ascertaining legislati!e
intent when the language of the act does not
clearly epress its purposeH may clarify doubt
or ambiguity$
@ow re.uirement construed
Liberally construed
If there is doubt, it should be resol!ed against the
doubt and in fa!or of the constitutionality of the statute
Ghen there is compliance with re.uirement
&omprehensi!e enough 3 Include general ob2ect
If all parts of the law are related, and are germane to
the sub2ect matter epressed in the title
4itle is !alid where it indicates in broad but clear
terms, the nature, scope and conse.uences of the law
and its operations
4itle should not be a catalogue or inde of the bill
Principles apply to titles of amendatory acts$
o Enough if it states Ban act to amend a specific
statuteC
5eed not state the precise nature of the
amendatory act$
F% Legislators ha!e titles ending with the words Band
for other purposesC ( F% is not sub2ect to the same
&onstitutional restriction as that embodied in the
Philippine &onstitution"
Ghen re.uirement not applicable
Apply only to bills which may thereafter be enacted
into law
Does not apply to laws in force and eisting at the time
the *+-7 &onstitution too1 effect$
5o application to municipal or city ordinances$
Effect of insufficiency of title
%tatute is null and !oid
Ghere, the sub2ect matter of a statute is not
sufficiently epressed in its title, only so much of the
sub2ect matter as is not epressed therein is !oid,
lea!ing the rest in force, unless the in!alid pro!isions
are inseparable from the others, in which case the
nullity the former !itiates the latter
Enacting clause
Gritten immediately after the title
%tates the authority by which the act is enacted

I* 3 Phil &ommission 0 B 'y authority of the President

of the F%, be it enacted by the F% Philippine
&ommissionC
I: 3 Philippine Legislature3 B by authority of the F%,
be it enacted by the Philippine LegislatureC
I- 3 Ghen I: became bicameralD B'e it enacted by the
%enate and @ouse of Representati!es of the Philippines
in legislature assembled and by authority of the sameC
I9 3 &ommonwealth3 B'e it enacted by the 5ational
Assembly of the Philippines
I7 0 when I9 became bicameralD Bbe it enacted by the
%enate and @ouse of Representati!es in congress
assembledC 0 same *+983*+,:=*+;,3present$
I8 0 'atasang PambansaD B'e it enacted by the
'atasang Pambansa in session assembledC
I, 0 PD B 5OG 4@ERE/ORE, I JJJJJJ President of
the Philippines, by the powers !ested in me by the
&onstitution do hereby decree as followsC
I; 0 EO B5ow, therefore, I, JJJJ hereby orderC
Preamble
Defined 0 prefatory statement or eplanation or a
finding of facts, reciting the purpose, reason, or
occasion for ma1ing the law to which it is prefiedC
/ound after enacting clause and before the body of the
law$
Fsually not used by legislations because content of the
preamble is written in the eplanatory note$
'ut PDs and EOs ha!e preambles$
Pur!iew of statute
that part which tells what the law is about
body of statute should embrace only one sub2ect
should only one sub2ect matter, e!en there pro!isions
should be allied and germane to the sub2ect and
purpose of the bill$
%tatue is usually di!ided into section$ w=c contains a
single proposition$
Parts
o short title
o policy section
o definition section
o administrati!e section
o sections prescribing standards of conduct
o sections imposing sanctions for !iolation of
its pro!isions
o transitory pro!ision
o separability clause
o effecti!ity clause
%eparability clause
it states that if any pro!ision of the act is declared
in!alid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby$
It is not controlling and the courts may in!alidate the
whole statute where what is left, after the !oid part, is
not complete and wor1able
Presumption 0 statute is effecti!e as a whole
its effectD to create in the place of such presumption
the opposite of separability$
PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES AND
ORDINANCES
Presidential issuances
are those which the president issues in the eercise of
ordinance power$
i$e$ EO, AO (administrati!e orders", proclamations,
)O (memorandum orders", )& (memorandum
circulars", and general or special orders$
@a!e force and effect of laws$
EO
o acts of the President pro!iding for rules of a
general or permanent character in the
implementation or eecution of
constitutional= statutory powers$
o do not ha!e the force and effect of laws
enacted by congress
o different from EO issued by the President in
the e of her legislati!e power during the
re!olution Presidential decree under the
freedom constitution
AO
o acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of go!ernmental operations in
pursuance of his duties as administrati!e head
Proclamations
o acts of the President fiing a date or declaring
a statute or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the eistence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to depend
)O
o acts of the President on matters of
administrati!e details or of subordinate or
temporary interest which only concern a
particular officer or office of go!ernment
)&
o acts of the president on matters relating to
internal administration which the President
desires to bring to the attention of all or some
of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or
offices of the go!ernment, for information of
compliance
Keneral or %pecific Order
o Acts and commands of the President in his
capacity as &ommander3in3&hief of the A/P
%upreme &ourt circularsH rules and regulations
%ee Art ;, %ec$ 7(7" *+;, &onstitution
%ee Art$ 8, %ec$ -6 *+;, &onstitution
It has been held that a law which pro!ides that a
decision of a .uasi32udicial body be appealable directly
to the %&, if enacted without the ad!ice and
concurrence of the %&, ineffecti!e
o Remedy or applicable procedure 0 go to &A
Rules of &ourt 0 product of the rule3ma1ing power of
the %&
o Power to repeal procedural rules
o 5o power to promulgate rules substanti!e in
nature (unli1e the legislati!e department"
%ubstanti!e rules 0 if it affects or ta1es away !ested
rightsH right to appeal
Procedural rules 0 means of implementing eisting
rightH where to file an appeal for transferring the !enue
Rules and regulations issued by the administrati!e or
eecuti!e officers in accordance with and authoriAed
by law, ha!e the force and effect of law
o Re.uisites for !alidity
Rules should be germane to the
ob2ects and purposes of the law
Regulations be not in contradiction
with, but conform to, the standards
that the law prescribes
4he be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect the general
pro!isions of the law
o Law cannot be restricted or etended
o Law pre!ails o!er regulations, if there are
discrepancies
Rule3ma1ing power of public administrati!e agency is
a delegated legislati!e power 0 if it enlarges or restricts
such statute is in!alid
Re.uisites for delegating a statute by legislati!e
branch to another branch of go!ernment to fill in
details, eecution, enforcement, or administration of
lawL$ the law must beD
o &omplete in itself
o /i a standard which may be epress or
implied
Eample of BstandardC 0 simplicity
and dignityH public interestH public
welfareH interest of law and orderH
2ustice and e.uity and substantial
merit of the caseH ade.uate and
efficient instruction
EampleD
o &hange of Band=orC to BorC 0 in!alid
o &hange of BmayC(permissi!e" to BshallC
(mandatory" 0 in!alid (Krego ! &O)ELE&
pp ::"
Administrati!e rule and interpretation distinguished
Rule 0 Bma1esC new law with the force and effect of a
!alid lawH binding on the courts e!en if they are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or with its
innate wisdom
Interpretation 0 merely ad!isory for it is the courts that
finally determine what the law means
Administrati!e construction is not necessarily binding
upon the courtsH it may be set aside by 2udicial
department (if there is an error of law, or abuse of
power or lac1 of 2urisdiction or KAD 0 gra!e abuse of
discretion"
'arangay ordinance
%angguniang barangay 0 smallest legislati!e bodyH
may pass an ordinance by ma2ority of all its membersH
sub2ect to re!iew by %angguniang bayan= panglungsod
%angguniang bayan= panglungsod 0 ta1e action on the
ordinance within -6 days from submissionH if there(s
inaction, it is presumed to be consistent with the
municipal or city ordinanceH if inconsistency is found,
it will remand to the %angguniang barangay
)unicipal ordinance
Lodged in the %angguniang bayan
)a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is passed
Ordinance sent to )ayor within *6 days for appro!al
or !etoH if there(s mayor(s inaction, ordinance is
presumed appro!edH if !etoed and o!erridden by :=- of
all members, ordinance is appro!ed
Appro!ed ordinance is passed to %angguniang
panlalawigan for re!iew
o Githin -6 days may in!alidate in whole or in
part and its action is finalH if there(s inaction
within -6 days, it is deemed !alid
&ity ordinance
>ested in %angguniang panglungsod
)a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is passed
%ubmitted to )ayor within *6 days
o Appro!e
o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed
o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed
If city or component city 0 submit to %angguniang
panlalawigan for re!iew which shall ta1e action within
-6 days, otherwise, it will be deemed !alid
Pro!incial ordinance
%angguniang panlalawigan 0 ma2ority of .uorum
!oting, passage of ordinance
/orwarded to the Ko!ernor who within *7 days from
receipt shall
o Appro!e
o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed
o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed
VALIDITY
Presumption of constitutionality
E!ery statute is presumed !alid
o Lies on how a law is enacted
o Due respect to the legislati!e who passed and
eecuti!e who appro!ed
o Responsibility of upholding the constitution
rests not on the courts alone but on the
legislati!e and eecuti!e branches as well
&ourts cannot in.uire into the wisdom or propriety of
laws
4o declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of
the law to the constitution must be clear and
une.ui!ocal
All reasonable doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of
the constitutionality of lawH to doubt is to sustain
/inal arbiter of unconstitutionality of law is the
%upreme &ourt E5 'A5& (ma2ority who too1 part
and !oted thereon"
5onetheless, trial courts ha!e 2urisdiction to initially
decide the issue of constitutionality of a law in
appropriate cases
Re.uisites for eercise of 2udicial power
4he eistence of an appropriate case
Interest personal and substantial by the party raising
the constitutional .uestion
Plea that the function be eercised at the earliest
opportunity
5ecessity that the constitutional .uestion be passed
upon in order to decide the case
Appropriate case
'ona fide case 0 one which raises a 2usticiable
contro!ersy
#udicial power is limited only to real, actual, earnest,
and !ital contro!ersy
&ontro!ersy is 2usticiable when it refers to matter
which is appropriate for court re!iewH pertains to
issues which are inherently susceptible of being
decided on grounds recogniAed by law
&ourts cannot rule on Bpolitical .uestionsC 0 .uestions
which are concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom (!$ legality" of a particular act or measure
being assailed
o Bseparation of powersC
o @owe!er, &onstitution epands the concept
of 2udicial re!iew 0 2udicial power includes
the duty of the courts of 2ustice to settle actual
contro!ersies in!ol!ing rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been KAD
amounting to lac1 or ecess of 2urisdiction on
the branch or the part of any branch=
instrumentality of the Ko!ernment
%tanding to sue
Legal standing or locus standi 0 personal= substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct in2ury as a result of go!ernmental
act that is being challenged
BinterestC 0 an interest in issue affected by the decree
&itiAen 0 ac.uires standing only if he can establish that
he has suffered some actual or threatened concrete
in2ury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
go!ernment
o E$g$ tapayer 0 when it is shown that public
funds ha!e been illegally disbursed
)ember of the %enate or of the @ouse has legal
standing to .uestion the !alidity of the Presidential
!eto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriations bills
%& may, in its discretion, ta1e cogniAance of a suit
which does not satisfy the re.uirement of legal
standing
o E$g$ calling by the President for the
deployment of the Philippine )arines to 2oin
the P5P in !isibility patrols around the metro
Ghen to raise constitutionality
at the earliest possible opportunity 0 i$e$ in the
pleading
it may be raised in a motion for reconsideration = new
trial in the lower courtH or
in criminal cases 0 at any stage of the proceedings or
on appeal
in ci!il cases, where it appears clearly that a
determination of the .uestion is necessary to a
decision, and in cases where it in!ol!es the 2urisdiction
of the court below
5ecessity of deciding constitutionality
where the constitutional .uestion is of paramount
public interest and time is of the essence in the
resolution of such .uestion, adherence to the strict
procedural standard may be relaed and the court, in
its discretion, may s.uarely decide the case
where the .uestion of !alidity, though apparently has
become moot, has become of paramount interest and
there is undeniable necessity for a ruling, strong
reasons of public policy may demand that its
constitutionality be resol!ed
4est of constitutionality
L is what the &onstitution pro!ides in relation to what
can or may be done under the statute, and not by what
it has been done under it$
o If not within the legislati!e power to enact
o If !ague 0 unconstitutional in : respects
>iolates due process
Lea!es law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its
pro!isions
o Ghere there(s a change of circumstances 0
i$e$ emergency laws
Ordinances (test of !alidity are"D
o It must not contra!ene the &onstitution or any
statute
o It must not be unfair or oppressi!e
o It must not be partial or discriminatory
o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
o It must be general and consistent with public
policy
o It must not be unreasonable
Effects of unconstitutionality
It confers no rights
Imposes no duties
Affords no protection
&reates no office
In general, inoperati!e as if it had ne!er been passed
: !iewsD
o Orthodo !iew 0 unconstitutional act is not a
lawH decision affect ALL
o )odern !iew 0 less stringentH the court in
passing upon the .uestion of
unconstitutionality does not annul or repeal
the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
&onstitutionH decisions affects parties O5LM
and no 2udgment against the statuteH opinion
of court may operate as a precedentH it does
not repeal, supersede, re!o1e, or annul the
statute
In!alidity due to change of conditions
Emergency laws
It is deemed !alid at the time of its enactment as an
eercise of police power
It becomes in!alid only because the change of
conditions ma1es its continued operation !iolati!e of
the &onstitution, and accordingly, the declaration of its
nullity should only affect the parties in!ol!ed in the
case and its effects applied prospecti!ely
Partial in!alidity
Keneral ruleD that where part of a statute is !oid as
repugnant to the &onstitution, while another part is
!alid, the !alid portion, if separable from the in!alid,
may stand and be enforced
Eception 0 that when parts of a statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for
each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will
!itiate the rest 0 such as in the case of Tatad v Sec of
Department of Energy and Antonio v. COMELEC
EFFECT AND OPERATION
Ghen laws ta1e effect
Art : && 3 B laws to be effecti!e must be published
either in the Official KaAette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the countryC
o 4he effecti!ity pro!ision refers to all statutes,
including those local and pri!ate, unless there
are special laws pro!iding a different
effecti!ity mechanism for particular statutes
%ec *; &hapter 7 'oo1 * of Administrati!e &ode
Effecti!ity of laws
o default rule 0 *73day period
o must be published either in the OK or
newspaper of general circulation in the
countryH publication must be full
4he clause Bunless it is otherwise pro!idedC 0 solely
refers to the *73day period and not to the re.uirement
of publication
Ghen Presidential issuances, rules and regulations ta1e effect
4he President(s ordinance power includes the authority
to issue EO, AO, Proclamations, )O, )& and general
or specific orders
Re.uirement of publication applies ecept if it is
merely interpretati!e or internal in nature not
concerning the public
: typesD
o 4hose whose purpose is to enforce or
implement eisting law pursuant to a !alid
delegation or to fill in the details of a statuteH
re.uires publication
o 4hose which are merely interpretati!e in
nature or internalH does not re.uire
publication
Re.uirements of filing (*+;, Administrati!e &ode"D
o E!ery agency shall file with the FP Law
&enter - certified copies of e!ery rule
adopted by it$ Rules in force on the date of
effecti!ity of this &ode which are not filed
within - months from that date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against
any party= persons
Ghen local ordinance ta1es effect
Fnless otherwise stated, the same shall ta1e effect *6
days from the date a copy is posted in a bulletin board
at the entrance of the pro!incial capitol or city,
municipality or barangay hall, A5D in at least : other
conspicuous places in the local go!ernment unit
concerned
4he secretary to the %angguinian concerned shall cause
the posting not later than 7 days after appro!alH tet
will be disseminated in English or 4agalogH the
secretary to the %angguinian concerned shall record
such fact in a boo1 1ept for that purpose, stating the
dates of appro!al and posting
Kist of ordinance with penal sanctions shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation within
the respecti!e pro!ince concernedH if 5O newspaper of
general circulation in the pro!ince, PO%4I5K shall be
made in all municipalities and cities of the pro!ince
where the %anggunian of origin is situated
/or highly urbaniAed and independent component
cities, main features of the ordinance, in addition to the
posting re.uirement shall be published once in a local
newspaper$ In the absence of local newspaper, in any
newspaper of general circulation
o @ighly urbaniAed city 0 minimum population
of :66,666 and with latest annual income of
at least 76) Php
%tatutes continue in force until repealed
Permanent= indefinite 0 law once established continues
until changed by competent legislati!e power$ It is not
changed by the change of so!ereignty, ecept that of
political nature
4emporary 0 in force only for a limited period, and
they terminate upon epiration of the term stated or
upon occurrence of certain e!entsH no repealing statute
is needed
4erritorial and personal effect of statutes
All people within the 2urisdiction of the Philippines
)anner of computing time
%ee Art$ *- &&
Ghere a statute re.uires the doing of an act within a
specified number of days, such as ten days from
notice, it means ten calendar days and 5O4 ten
wor1ing days
E$g$ * year from Oct$ 9, *+98 is Oct$ 9, *+9,
If last day falls on a %unday or holiday, the act can still
be done the following day
Principle of Beclude the first, include the lastC DOE%
5O4 APPLM to the computation of the period of
prescription of a crime, in which rule, is that if the last
day in the period of prescription of a felony falls on a
%unday or legal holiday, the information concerning
said felony cannot be filed on the net wor1ing day, as
the offense has by then already prescribed
CHAPTER TWO: Construt!on an" Inter#retat!on
NATURE AND PURPOSE
&onstruction defined
&onstruction is the art or process of disco!ering and
epounding the meaning and intention of the authors
of the law, where that intention rendered doubtfully
reason of ambiguity in its language or of the fact that
the gi!en case is not eplicitly pro!ided for in the law$
&onstruction is drawing of warranted conclusions
beyond direct epression of the tet epressions which
are in spirit though not within the tet$
ine!itably, there enters into the construction of
statutes the play of #FDI&IAL #FDK)E54 within
the limits of the rele!ant legislati!e materials
it in!ol!es the EEER&I%E O/ &@OI&E 'M 4@E
#FDI&IARM
&onstruction and interpretation distinguished
4hey are so ali1e in practical results and so are used
interchangeablyH synonymous$
&onstruction Interpretation
3 process of drawing
warranted conclusions not
always included in direct
epressions, or determining
the application of words to
facts in litigation
3 art of finding the true
meaning and sense of any
form of words
Rules of construction, generally
Rules of statutory construction are tools used to
ascertain legislati!e intent$
5O4 rules of law but mere aioms of eperience
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to
1now the rules of statutory construction, in case of
doubt, be construed in accordance with the settled
principles of interpretation$
Legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory
construction as part of the pro!isions of the statuteD 3
see eamples page 9+376
Legislature also defines to ascertain the meaning of
!ague, broad words= terms
Purpose of ob2ect of construction
4he purpose is to ascertain and gi!e effect to the intent
of the law$
4he ob2ect of all 2udicial interpretation of a statute is to
determine legislati!e intent, either epressly or
impliedly, by the language usedH to determine the
meaning and will of the law ma1ing body and disco!er
its true interpretations of law$
Legislati!e intent, generally
L is the essence of the law
Intent is the spirit which gi!es life to legislati!e
enactment$ It must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter
of the statute$ It has been held, howe!er, that that the
ascertainment of legislati!e intent depend more on a
determination of the purpose and ob2ect of the law$
Intent is sometimes e.uated with the word Bspirit$C
Ghile the terms purpose, meaning, intent, and spirit
are oftentimes interchangeably used by the courts, not
entirely synonymous
Legislati!e purpose
A legislati!e purpose is the reason why a particular
statute was enacted by legislature$
Legislation Bis an acti!e instrument and go!ernment
which, for the purpose of interpretation means that
laws ha!e ends to be achie!edC
Legislati!e meaning
Legislati!e meaning is what the law, by its language,
means$
Ghat it comprehendsH
Ghat it co!ers or embracesH
Ghat its limits or confines are$
Intent and )eaning 0 synonymous
If there is ambiguity in the language used in a statute,
its purpose may indicate the meaning of the language
and lead to what the legislati!e intent is
Kraphical illustration 0
Federation of Free Farmers v CA.
RA 5o$ ;6+ %ec$ * 0 BIn absence of a written milling
agreements between the ma2ority of the planters and
the millers, the unrefined sugar as well as all by3
products shall be di!ided between themC
RA ;6+ %ec$ + 0 B4he proceeds of any increase in
participation granted by the planters under this act and
abo!e their present share shall be di!ided between the
planter and his laborer in the proportion of 86N
laborer and 96N planterC
4o gi!e literal import in interpreting the two section
will defeat the purpose of the Act
4he purposeD
o &ontinuous production of sugar
o 4o grant the laborers a share in the increased
participation of planters in the sugar produce
4he legislati!e intent is, thus to ma1e the act operati!e
irrespecti!e of whether there eists a milling
agreement between central and the sugar planters$
)atters in.uired into in construing a statute
BIt is not enough to ascertain the intention of the
statuteH it is also necessary to see whether the intention
or meaning has been epressed in such a way as to
gi!e it legal effect or !alidityC
4husD 4he ob2ect of in.uiry is not only to 1now what
the legislature used sufficiently epresses that
meaning$ 4he legal act is made up of : elementsD
o internal 0 intention
o eternal3 epression
/ailure of the latter may defeat the former
Ghere legislati!e intent is ascertained
4he primary source of legislati!e intent is the statute
itself$
If the statute as a whole fails to indicate the legislati!e
intent because of ambiguity, the court may loo1
beyond the statute such asD
o Legislati!e history 0 what was in the
legislati!e mind at the time the statute was
enactedH what the circumstances wereH what
e!il was meant to be redressed
o Purpose of the statute 0 the reason or cause
which induced the enactment of the law, the
mischief to be suppressed, and the policy
which dictated its passage
o when all these means fail, loo1 into the effect
of the law$
If the -
rd
means (effect of the law" is
first used, it will be 2udicial
legislation
POWER TO CONSTRUE
&onstruction is a 2udicial function
It is the court that has the final word as to what the law
means$
It construes laws as it decide cases based on fact and
the law in!ol!ed
Laws are interpreted in the contet of a peculiar factual
situation of each case
&ircumstances of time, place, e!ent, person and
particularly attendant circumstances and actions
before, during and after the operati!e fact ha!e ta1en
their totality so that 2ustice can be rationally and fairly
dispensed$
)oot and academic 0
o Purpose has become stale
o 5o practical relief can be granted
o Relief has no practical effect
Keneral rule (on mootness" 0 dismiss the case
o EceptionD
If capable of repetition, yet e!ading
re!iew
Public interest re.uires its resolution
Rendering decision on the merits
would be of practical !alue
Legislati!e cannot o!errule 2udicial construction
It cannot preclude the courts from gi!ing the statute
different interpretation
Legislati!e 0 enact laws
Eecuti!e3 to eecute laws
#udicial3 interpretation and application
If the legislature may declare what a law means 0 it
will cause confusionLit will be !iolati!e of the
fundamental principles of the constitution of
separation powers$
Legislati!e construction is called resolution or
declaratory act
Endencia v David
Eplains why legislati!e cannot o!errule %upreme
&ourt(s decision
Perfecto v. Meer
Art$ ; %ec$ + *+-7 &onstitution 0 %&(s interpretationD
Bshall recei!e such compensation as may be fied by
law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in officeC 0 eempt from income ta
Legislati!e passed RA 7+6 %ec$ *- 0 Bno salary
whene!er recei!ed by any public officer of the
Republic shall be considered eempt from the income
ta, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fied by the
&onstitution or by lawC
%ource of confusion
>iolati!e of principle on separation of powers
RA 7+6 %ec *- 0 unconstitutional
Art ; %ec$ + *+-7 0 repealed by Art$ *7 %ec$ 8 *+,-
&onstitution 0 Bno salary or any form of emolument of
any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, shall be eempt from payment
of income taC
4hus, 2udiciary is not eempt from payment of ta
anymore
Ghen 2udicial interpretation may be set aside
BInterpretations may be set aside$C 4he interpretation
of a statute or a constitutional pro!ision by the courts
is not so sacrosanct as to be beyond modification or
nullification$
4he %upreme &ourt itself may, in an appropriate case
change or o!errule its pre!ious construction$
4he rule that the %upreme &ourt has the final word in
the interpretation or construction of a stature merely
means that the legislature cannot, by law or resolution,
modify or annul the 2udicial construction without
modifying or repealing the !ery statute which has been
the sub2ect of construction$ It can, and it has done so,
by amending or repealing the statute, the conse.uence
of which is that the pre!ious 2udicial construction of
the statute is modified or set aside accordingly$
Ghen court may construe statute
B4he court may construe or interpret a statute under
the condition that 4@ERE I% DOF'4 OR
A)'IKFI4MC
Ambiguity 0 a condition of admitting : or more
meanings$ %usceptible of more than one interpretation$
Only when the law is ambiguous or doubtful of
meaning may the court interpret or construe its intent$
&ourt may not construe where statute is clear
A statute that is clear and unambiguous is not
susceptible of interpretations$
/irst and fundamental duty of court 0 to apply the law
&onstruction 0 !ery last function which the court
should eercise
Law is clear 0 no room for interpretation, only room
for application
&ourts cannot enlarge or limit the law if it is clear and
free from ambiguity (e!en if law is harsh or onerous
A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or
reflected in the !ery language of the statute cannot be
placed therein by construction
Manikan v. Tanodbayan
%ec$ , PD *,*83A 0 Bsole police authorityC of EPOA
officials may not be construed as an eception to, or
limitation on, the authority of the 4anodbayan to
in!estigate complaints for !iolation of the anti3graft
law committed by the EPOA officials
EPOA(s power 0 not eclusi!eH BsoleC refers to police
authority not emplyed to describe other power
Lapid v. CA
IssueD whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman
imposing a penalty of suspension of one year without
pay is immediately eecutory
Administrati!e &ode and LK& 0 not suppletory to
Ombudsman Act
4hese three laws are related or deal with public
officers, but are totally different statutes
An administrati!e agency tas1ed to implement a
statute may not construe it by epanding its meaning
where its pro!isions are clear and unambiguous
Land ank v. CA
DAR interpreted BdepositsC to include trust accountsC
%& held that BdepositsC is limited only to cash and
L'P bonds
Libanan v. !"ET
IssueD whether ballots not signed at the bac1 by the
chairman of the 'oard of Election Inspectors ('EI" are
spurious, since it !iolated %ec$ :9 RA ,*88
@eldD not spuriousH only renders the 'EI accountable
Rulings of %upreme &ourt part of legal system
Art$ ; && 0 B#udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the &onstitution shall form part
of the legal system of the PhilippinesC
Legis interpretato #egis vim obtinet 0 authoritati!e
interpretation of the %& of a statute ac.uires the force
of law by becoming a part thereof as of the date of its
enactment , since the court(s interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislati!e intent that
the statute thus construed intends to effectuate
Stare decisis et non $%ieta novere & when the %& has
once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future casese where the facts are
substantially the same
o /or stability and certainty
%upreme &ourt becomes, to the etent applicable, the
criteria that must control the actuations not only of
those called upon to abide thereby but also of those
duty3bound to enforce obedience thereto$
%& rulings are binding on inferior courts
#udicial rulings ha!e no retroacti!e effect
Le prospicit not respicit 3 the law loo1s forward, not
bac1ward
RationaleD Retroacti!e application of a law usually
di!est rights that ha!e already become !ested or
impairs he obligations of contract and hence is
unconstitutional$
Peo !$ #abinal
Peo ! )acarandang 0 peace officer eempted from
issuance of license of firearms 0 included a secret
agent hired by a go!ernor
Peo$ !$ )apa 0 abandoned doctrine of )acarandang in
*+8,
4he present case, #abinal was arraigned while the
)acarandang Doctrine was still pre!ailing, howe!er,
the decision was promulgated when the )apa doctrine
was in place
4he &ourt held that #abinal is ac.uitted using stare
decisis doctrine and retroacti!ity doctrine
Co. v. CA
On 'P ::, &o is ac.uitted in relying on the &ircular
issuedH Pue doctrine, which con!icted Pue under 'P
::, was not gi!en retroacti!e application
"oa v. Co##ector of C%stoms
Fsed 2us soli (place of birth"
%& fa!ored 2us sanguinis (by blood"
@owe!er, the abandonment of the principle of 2us soli
did not di!est the citiAenship of those who, by !irtue of
the principle before its re2ection, became of were
declared citiAens of the Philippines
en'onan v. CA
IssueD when to count the 73year period to repurchase
land granted &A *9*
)onge ! Angeles (*+7," and 4upas ! Damaso (*+;9"
0 from the date of con!eyance or foreclosure sale
'elisario !$ IA& (*+;;" 0 from the period after the
epiration of the *3year period of repurchase
4he %& held that the doctrine that should apply is that
which was enunciated in )onge and 4upas because
the transactions in!ol!ed too1 place prior to 'elisario
and not that which was laid down in the latter case
which should be applied prospecti!ely
&ourt may issue guidelines in construing statute
In construing a statute, the enforcement of which may
tread on sensiti!e areas of constitutional rights, the
court may issue guidelines in applying the statute, not
to enlarge or restrict it but to clearly delineate what the
law is$
Peo. v. Ferrer
Ghat acts that may be considered liable under the
Anti3%ub!ersion Act
Mora#es v. Enri#e
Rights of a person under custodial in!estigation
"P v. CA( Mo#ina
Kuidelines for ascertaining psychological incapacity of
an erring spouse in a !oid marriage under Art$ -8 /&
LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE
&ourts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes
&ourts are not authoriAed to insert into the law what
they thin1 should be in it or to supply what they the
legislature would ha!e supplied if its intention had
been called to the omission$
4hey should not by construction, re!ise e!en the most
arbitrary or unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite
the law to conform to what they thin1 should be the
law$
5either should the courts construe statutes which are
perfectly !ague for it !iolates due process
o /ailure to accord persons fair notice of the
conduct to a!oid
o Lea!e law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its pro!isions
: leading stars on 2udicial construction
o Kood faith
o commonsense
an utterly !ague act on its face cannot be clarified by
either a sa!ing clause or by construction
&ourts not to be influenced by .uestions of wisdom
&ourts do not sit to resol!e the merit of conflicting
theories
&ourts do not pass upon .uestion of wisdom, 2ustice or
epediency of legislation, for it(s not within their
pro!ince to super!ise legislation and 1eep it within the
bounds of common sense$
4he court merely interpret regardless of whether or not
they wise or salutary$
CHAPTER THREE: A!"s to Construt!on
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
Ghere the meaning of a statue is ambiguous, the court
is warranted in a!ailing itself of all illegitimate aids to
construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent
of the statute$
4he aids to construction are those found in the printed
page of the statute itselfH 1now as the intrinsic aids,
and those etraneous facts and circumstances outside
the printed page, called e)trinsic aids$
4itle
It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its language to
its construction and to ascertaining legislati!e will$
If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts may
resort to the title to clear the obscurity$
4he title may indicate the legislati!e intent to etend or
restrict the scope of law, and a statute couched in a
language of doubtful import will be constructed to
conform to the legislati!e intent as disclosed in its title$
Resorted as an aid where there is doubt as to the
meaning of the law or as to the intention of the
legislature in enacting it, and not otherwise$
%er!e as a guide to ascertaining legislati!e intent
carries more weight in this 2urisdiction because of the
constitutional re.uirement that Be!ery bill shall
embrace only one sub2ect who shall be epressed in
the title thereof$
4he constitutional in2unction ma1es the title an
indispensable part of a statute$
ag%io v. Marcos
4he .uestion raised is when to count the 96 yr period
to file a petition for reopening of cadastral proceedings
(to settle and ad2udicate the titles to the !arious lots
embraced in the sur!ey" as authoriAed by RA +-*
co!ering the lands that ha!e been or about to be
declared land of public domain, by !irtue of 2udicial
proceedings instituted w=in the 96 years net preceding
the appro!al of this act$
4he .uestion is as1ed if the proceeding be reopened
originally instituted in court April *:, *+*: or
5o!ember :7, *+::, the counted date form which the
decision therein rendered became final$ Petition was
filed on #uly :7, *+8*
4itle of the Law BAn Act to authoriAe the filing in the
proper court under certain conditions of certain claims
of title to parcels of land that ha!e been declared
public land, by !irtue of the appro!al of this act$C
4here was an apparent inconsistency between the title
and body of the law$
It ruled that the starting date to count the period is the
date the final decision was rendered$
It recites that it authoriAes court proceedings of claims
to parcels of land declared public by !irtue of 2udicial
decisions rendered within forty years net preceding
the appro!al of this act$
4hat title written in capital letters by &ongress itselfH
such 1ind of title then is not to be classed with words
or titles used by compilers of statues because it is the
legislature spea1ing$
Gords by !irtue of 2udicial decisions rendered in the
title of the law stand in e.ual importance to the phrase
in %ections * thereof by !irtue of 2udicial proceedings
instituted$
4he court ruled that eamining Act no$ :;,9 in detail
was intended to apply to public lands only for the title
of the act, always indicati!e of legislati!e intent$
5o bill shall embrace more than one sub2ect, which
sub2ect shall be epressed in the title of the bill, the
words and for other purposes( when found in the title
ha!e been held to be without force or effect
whatsoe!er and ha!e been altogether discarded in
construing the Act$
Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito
4he issue is raised whether Eecuti!e order no$ :89
entitled B Outlining the procedure by which complaints
charging go!ernment officials and employees with
commission of irregularities should be guidedC applies
to criminal actions, to the end that no preliminary
in!estigation thereof can be underta1en or information
file in court unless there is pre!ious compliance with
the eecuti!e order$
EO only applies to administrati!e and not to criminal
complaints$
4he !ery title spea1s of commission of irregularities$
Ghen resort to title not authoriAed
4he tet of the statute is clear and free from doubt, it is
improper to resort to its title to ma1e it obscure$
4he title may be resorted to in order to remo!e, but not
to create doubt$
Preamble
It is a part of the statute written immediately after its
title, which states the purpose, reason for the
enactment of the law$
Fsually epress in whereas clauses$
Kenerally omitted in statutes passed byD
Phil$ &ommission
Phil$ Legislature
5ational Assembly
&ongress of the Phil
'atasang Pambansa
4hese legislati!e bodies used the eplanatory note to
eplain the reasons for the enactment of statutes$
Etensi!ely used if Presidential decrees issued by the
President in the eercise of his legislati!e power$
Ghen the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither epand nor
restrict its operation, much less pre!ail o!er its tet$
5or can be used as basis for gi!ing a statute a
meaning$
Ghen the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be
resorted to clarify the ambiguity$
Preamble is the 1ey of the statute, to open the minds of
the lawma1ers as to the purpose is achie!ed, the
mischief to be remedied, and the ob2ect to be
accomplished, by the pro!isions of the legislature$
)ay decide the proper construction to be gi!en to the
statute$
)ay restrict to what otherwise appears to be a broad
scope of law$
It may epress the legislati!e intent to ma1e the law
apply retroacti!ely in which case the law has to be
gi!en retroacti!e effect$
Illustration of rule
Peop#e v. P%risima
A person was charged w= !iolation of PD + which
penaliAes, among others, the carrying outside of one(s
residence any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not
used as a necessary tool or implement for li!elihood,
with imprisonment ranging from fi!e to ten years$
Puestion rose whether the carrying of such weapon
should be in relation to sub!ersion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless !iolence, criminality, chaos or
public disorder as a necessary element of the crime$
4he mere carrying of such weapon outside one(s
residence is sufficient to constitute a !iolation of the
law
Pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the e!ents
that led to the enactment of the decree the clear intent
and spirit of the decree is to re.uire the moti!ation
mentioned in the preamble as in indispensable element
of the crime$
4he se!erity of the penalty for the !iolation of the
decree suggests that it is a serious offense, which may
only be 2ustified by associating the carrying out of
such bladed of blunt weapon with any of the purposes
stated in its preamble$
Peo v. Ec*ave'
IssueD whether a person who s.uatted on a pastoral
land could be held criminally liable for the !iolation of
PD ,,: Bany person who, with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or ta1ing ad!antage of the
absence or tolerance of the land owner, succeeds in
occupying or possessing the property of the latter
against his will for residential, commercial or any
other purposes$
4he decree was promulgated to sol!e the s.uatting
problem which according to its preamble is still a
ma2or problem in urban communities all o!er the
country and because many persons and entities found
to ha!e been unlawfully occupying public and pri!ate
lands belong to the affluent class$
4he court said that crime may only be committed in
urban communities and not in agricultural and pastural
lands because the preamble of the decree shows that it
was intended to apply for s.uatting in urban lands,
more particularly to illegal constructions$
&ontet of whole tet
4o ascertain legislati!e intent is the statute itself ta1en
as a whole and in relation to one another considering
the whole contet of the statute and not from an
isolated part of the pro!ision$
4he meaning dictated by the contet pre!ails$
E!ery section, pro!ision, or clause of the statute must
be epounded by reference to each other in order to
arri!e at the effect contemplated by the legislature$
Punctuation mar1s
%emi3 colon 0 used to indicate a separation in the
relation of the thought, what follows must ha!e a
relation to the same matter it precedes it$
&omma and semi3 colon are use for the same purpose
to di!ide sentences, but the semi 0 colon ma1es the
di!ision a little more pronounce$ 'oth are not used to
introduce a new idea$
Punctuation mar1s are aids of low degree and can
ne!er control against the intelligible meaning of
written words$
An ambiguity of a statute which may be partially or
wholly sol!ed by a punctuation mar1 may be
considered in the construction of a statute$
4he .ualifying effect of a word or phrase may be
confined to its last antecedent if the latter is separated
by a comma from the other antecedents$
An argument based on punctuation is not persuasi!e$
Illustrati!e eamples
F#orentino v. P+
Bwho may be willing to accept the same for such
settlementC 0 this implies discretion
%& heldD only the last antecedent 0 Bany citiAen of the
Philippines or any association or corporation organiAed
under the laws of the PhilippinesC
pursuant to which bac1pay certificate3holders can
compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said
certificates for payment of their obligations subsisting
at the time of the amendatory act was appro!ed
+era v. ,arcia
Bif the charge against such subordinate or employee
in!ol!es dishonesty, oppression, or gra!e misconduct
or neglect in the performance of his dutyC
BdishonestyC and BoppressionC 0 need not be
committed in the course of the performance of duty by
the person charges
Peo. v. S%bido
%ubsidiary imprisonment in case of insol!ency
.ualifies both non3payment of indemnity and non3
payment of fine
&apitaliAation of letters
An aid of low degree in the construction of statute$
@eadnotes or epigraphs
%econdary aids
4hey are prefied to sections, or chapters of a statute
for ready reference or classification$
5ot entitled too much weight, and inferences drawn
there from are of little !alue and they can ne!er control
the plain terms of the enacting clauses, for they are not
part of the law$
4he pro!isions of each article are controlling upon the
sub2ect thereof and operate as a general rule for
settling such .uestions as are embraced therein$
Ghen the tet of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
there is neither necessity nor propriety to resort to the
headings or epigraphs of a section for interpretation of
the tet, especially when they are mere reference aids
indicating the general nature of the tet that follows$
Lingual tet
Rule is that, unless pro!ided, where a statute is
promulgated in English and %panish, English shall
go!ern but in case of ambiguity, %panish may be
consulted to eplain the English tet$
A statute is officially promulgated in %panish or in
English, or in /ilipino
BIn the interpretation of a law or administrati!e
issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the
English tet shall control, unless otherwise pro!ided$
Intent or spirit of law
It is the law itself$
&ontrolling factor, leading star and guiding light in the
application and interpretation of a statute$
A statute must be according to its spirit or intent$
4he courts cannot assume an intent in no way
epressed and then construe the statute to accomplish
the supposed intentionH otherwise they would pass
beyond the bounds of 2udicial power to usurp
legislati!e power$
Policy of law
%hould be gi!en effect by the 2udiciary$
One way to accomplish this mandate is to gi!e a
statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will
promote public policy$
Tinio v. Francis
Policy of the law 0 to conser!e the land of the
homesteader
not be sub2ect to encumbrance= alienation from the
date of the appro!al of the application and for a term
of 7 years from and after the date of the issuance of the
patent or grant
o from the ORDER for the issuance of patent
o if literal interpretation is to be used, policy
will be defeated
Ca-i%at v. Mat*ay
policy 0 against double pensions for the same ser!ices
a law which grants retirable employees certain gratuity
Bin addition to other benefits which they are entitled
under eisting lawsC &A55O4 be construed as to
authoriAe the grant of double gratuity
Bother benefitsC may be
o Refund of contributions
o Payment of the money !alue of accumulated
!acation and sic1 lea!es
Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed
Intended to be remo!ed or suppressed and the causes
which induced the enactment of the law are important
factors to be considered in this construction$
o Purpose or ob2ect of the law
o )ischief intended to be remo!ed
o &auses which induced the enactment of the
law
)ust be read in such a way as to gi!e effect to the
purpose pro2ected in the statute$
4he purpose of the general rule is not determinati!e of
the proper construction to be gi!en to the eceptions$
Purpose of statute is more important than the rules of
grammar and logic in ascertaining the meaning
Dictionaries
A statute does not define word or phrases used$
Kenerally define words in their natural plain and
ordinary acceptance and significance$
&onse.uences of !arious constructions
In.uired as an additional aid to interpretation$
A construction of a statute should be re2ected that will
cause in2ustice and hardship, result in absurdity, defeat
legislati!e intent or spirit, preclude accomplishment of
legislati!e purpose or ob2ect, render certain words or
phrases a surplusage, nullify the statute or ma1e any of
its pro!isions nugatory$
Presumptions
'ased on logic, eperience, and common sense, and in
the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary,
doubts as to the proper and correct construction of a
statute will be resol!ed in fa!or of that construction
which is in accord with the presumption on the matter$
o &onstitutionality of a statute
o &ompleteness
o Prospecti!e operation
o Right and 2ustice
o Effecti!e, sensible, beneficial and reasonable
operation as a whole
o Against inconsistency and implied repeal
unnecessary changes in law
impossibility
absurdity
in2ustice and hardship
incon!enience
ineffecti!eness$
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Kenerally
A statute is susceptible of se!eral interpretations or
where there is ambiguity in the language, there is no
better means of ascertaining the will and intention of
the legislature than that which is afforded by the
history of the statute$
Ghat constitutes legislati!e history
@istory of a statute refers to all its antecedents from its
inception until its enactment into law$
Its history proper co!ers the period and the steps done
from the time the bill is introduced until it is finally
passed by the legislature$
Ghat it includesD
o President(s message if the bill is enacted in
response thereto,
o 4he eplanatory note accompanying the bill
o &ommittee reports of legislati!e
in!estigations
o Public hearings on the sub2ect of the bill
o %ponsorship speech
o Debates and deliberations concerning the bill
o Amendments and changes in phraseology in
which it undergoes before final appro!al
thereof$
o If the statute is based from a re!ision, a prior
statute, the latter(s practical application and
2udicial construction,
o >arious amendments it underwent
o &ontemporary e!ents at the
President(s message to legislature
4he president shall address the congress at the opening
of its regular session or appear before it at any other
time$
Fsually contains proposed legal measures$
Indicates his thin1ing on the proposed legislation,
when enacted into law, follows his line of thin1ing on
the matter$
Eplanatory note
A short eposition of eplanation accompanying a
proposed legislation by its author or proponent$
Ghere there is ambiguity in a statute or where a statute
is susceptible of more than one interpretation, courts
may resort to the eplanatory note to clarify the
ambiguity and ascertain the purpose or intent of the
statute$
Fsed to gi!e effect to the purpose or intent as
disclosed in its eplanatory note$
A statute affected or changed an eisting law and the
eplanatory note to the bill which has e!entually
enacted into a law states that the purpose is too simply
to secure the prompt action on a certain matter by the
officer concerned and not to change the eisting lawH
the statute should be construed to carry out such
purpose$
It may be used as a basis for gi!ing a statute a meaning
that is inconsistent with what is epressed in the tet of
the statute$
Legislati!e debates, !iews and deliberations
&ourts may a!ail to themsel!es the actual proceedings
of the legislati!e body to assist in determining the
construction of a statute of doubtful meaning$
4here is doubt to what a pro!ision of a statute means,
that meaning which was put to the pro!ision during the
legislati!e deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted$
>iews epressed are as to the bill(s purpose, meaning
or effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the
law$
It is impossible to determine with authority what
construction was put upon an act by the members of
the legislati!e body that passed the bill$
4he opinions epressed by legislators in the course of
debates concerning the application of eisting laws are
not also gi!en decisi!e weight, especially where the
legislator was not a member of the assembly that
enacted the said laws$
Ghen a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, courts
will not in.uire into the moti!es which influence the
legislature or indi!idual members, in !oting for its
passageH no indeed as to the intention of the draftsman,
or the legislators, so far as it has not been epressed
into the act$
Reports of commissions
&ommissions are usually formed to compile and
collate all laws on a particular sub2ect and to prepare
the draft of the proposed code$
Prior laws from which statute is based
&ourts are permitted to prior laws on the same sub2ect
and to in!estigate the antecedents of the statute
in!ol!ed$
4his is applicable in the interpretation of codes,
re!ised or compiled statutes, for the prior law which
ha!e been codified, compiled or re!ised will show the
legislati!e history that will clarify the intent of the law
or shed light on the meaning and scope of the codified
or re!ised statute$
Peo. v. Manantan
IssueD whether or not 2ustice of peace is included
&ontention of )anantan, who is a 2ustice of peace, is
that the omission of B2ustice of peaceC re!ealed the
intention of the legislature to eclude such from its
operation
@eldD contention denied$ In holding that the word
B2udgeC includes B2ustice of peaceC, the &ourt said that
Ba re!iew of the history of the Re!ised Election &ode
will help 2ustify and clarify the abo!e conclusionC
Director of Lands v. Abaya
Ghen to count the *63year period, either from the date
the decision was rendered or from the date 2udicial
proceedings instituted in cadastral cases
@eldD court resol!ed the issue by referring to 9 older
laws which ha!e in common that counting of the
period starts from the date of the institution of the
2udicial proceeding and not from the date the 2udgment
is rendered
Sa#aysay v. Castro
BActually holdingC < Blastly electedC
4hus, a !ice mayor acting as mayor is not included in
the pro!ision
&hange in phraseology by amendments
Intents to change the meaning of the pro!ision$
A statute has undergone se!eral amendments, each
amendment using different phraseology, the deliberate
selection of language differing from that of the earlier
act on the sub2ect indicates that a change in meaning of
the law was intended and courts should so construe
that statute as to reflect such change in meaning$
Commissioner of C%stoms v. CTA
Bnational portC (new law" not the same as Bany portC
(old law"H otherwise, BnationalC will be a surplusage
Amendment by deletion
Deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute
indicates that the legislature intended to change the
meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the
legislation would not ha!e made the deletion had the
intention been not effect a change in its meaning$
A statute containing a pro!ision prohibiting the doing
of a certain thing is amended by deleting such
pro!ision$
,#oria v. CA
IssueD whether a public officer or employee, who has
been pre!enti!ely suspended pending in!estigation of
the administrati!e charges against him, is entitled to
his salary and other benefits during such pre!enti!e
suspension
@eldD &ourt answered in the negati!e because such
pro!ision with regard to payment of salaries during
suspension was deleted in the new law
%enaseda v. F#avier
Ombusman and his deputy can only pre!enti!ely
suspend respondents in administrati!e cases who are
employed in his office, and not those who are
employees in other department or offices of the
go!ernment
Eceptions to the rule (of amendment by deletion"
An amendment of the statue indicates a change in
meaning from that which the statute originally had
applies only when the intention is clear to change the
pre!ious meaning of the old law$
Rules don(t apply when the intent is clear that the
amendment is precisely to plainly epress the
construction of the act prior to its amendment because
its language is not sufficiently epressi!e of such
construction$
/re.uently, words do not materially affect the sense
will be omitted from the statute as incorporated in the
code or re!ised statute, or that some general idea will
be epressed in brief phrases$
Adopted statutes
/oreign statutes are adopted in this country or from
local laws are patterned form parts of the legislati!e
history of the latter$
Local statutes are patterned after or copied from those
of another country, the decision of the courts in such
country construing those laws are entitled to great
weight in the interpretation of such local statutes$
Limitations of rule
A statute which has been adopted from that of a
foreign country should be construed in accordance
with the construction gi!en it in the country of origin
is not without limitations$
Principles of common law
Qnown as Anglo3American 2urisprudence which is no
in force in this country, sa!e only insofar as it is
founded on sound principles applicable to local
conditions and is not in conflict with eisting law,
ne!ertheless, many of the principles of the common
law ha!e been imported into this 2urisdiction as a result
of the enactment of laws and establishment of
institutions similar to those of the F%$
&onditions at time of enactment
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to
ha!e ta1en into account the eisting conditions of
things at the time of its enactment$
In the interpretations of a statute, consider the physical
conditions of the country and the circumstances then
obtain understanding as to the intent of the legislature
or as to the meaning of the statute$
@istory of the times
A court may loo1 to the history of the times,
eamining the state of things eisting when the statute
was enacted$
A statute should not be construed in a spirit as if it
were a protoplasm floating around in space$
In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a
law or constitutional pro!ision, the history of the times
of which I grew and to which it may be rationally
supposed to bear some direct relationship, the e!ils
intended to be remedied and the good to be
accomplished are proper sub2ects of in.uiry$
Law being a manifestation of social culture and
progress must be interpreted ta1ing into consideration
the stage of such culture and progress including all the
concomitant circumstances$
Law is not a watertight compartment sealed or shut off
from the contact with the drama of life which unfolds
before our eyes$
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
Kenerally
Are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time
of, or after their enactment by the eecuti!e, legislati!e
or 2udicial authorities, as well as by those who in!ol!e
in the process of legislation are 1nowledgeable of the
intent and purpose of the law$
&ontemporary construction is strongest in law$
Eecuti!e construction, generallyH 1inds of
Is the construction placed upon the statute by an
eecuti!e or administrati!e officer$
4hree types of interpretation
o &onstruction by an eecuti!e or
administrati!e officer directly called to
implement the law$
o &onstruction by the secretary of 2ustice in his
capacity as the chief legal ad!iser of the
go!ernment$
o @anded down in an ad!ersary proceeding in
the form of a ruling by an eecuti!e officer
eercising .uasi32udicial power$
Geight accorded to contemporaneous construction
Ghere there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of
a statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by
the eecuti!e or administrati!e officer charged with its
enforcement will be adopted if necessary to resol!e the
doubt$
4rue epression of the legislati!e purpose, especially if
the construction is followed for a considerable period
of time$
+est#e P*i#ippines. /nc. v. CA
Reasons for why interpretation of an administrati!e
agency is generally accorded great respect
o Emergence of multifarious needs of a
moderniAing society
o Also relates to eperience and growth of
specialiAed capabilities by the administrati!e
agency
o 4hey ha!e the competence, epertness,
eperience and informed 2udgment, and the
fact that they fre.uently are the drafters of the
law they interpret
P*i#ippine S%gar Centra# v. Co##ector of C%stoms
IssueD whether the go!ernment can legally collect
duties Bas a charge for wharfageC re.uired by a statute
upon all articles eported through pri!ately3owned
whar!es
@eldD the court reasoned in the affirmati!e by saying
Bthe language of the Act could ha!e been made more
specific and certain, but in !iew of its history, its long
continuous construction, and what has been done and
accomplished by and under it, we are clearly of the
opinion that the go!ernment is entitled to ha!e and
recei!e the money in .uestion, e!en though the sugar
was shipped from a pri!ate wharf
Geight accorded to usage and practice
&ommon usage and practice under the statute, or a
course of conduct indicating a particular underta1ing
of it, especially where the usage has been ac.uiesced
in by all the parties concerned and has etended o!er a
long period of time$
Optim%s interpres rer%m %s%s & the best interpretation
of the law is usage$
&onstruction of rules and regulations
4his rule3ma1ing power, authorities sustain the
principle that the interpretation by those charged with
their enforcement is entitled to great weight by the
court in the latter(s construction of such rules and
regulations$
Reasons why contemporaneous construction is gi!en much
weight
It is entitled to great weight because it comes from the
particular branch of go!ernment called upon to
implement the law thus construed$
Are presumed to ha!e familiariAed themsel!es with all
the considerations pertinent to the meaning and
purpose of the law, and to ha!e formed an
independent, conscientious and competent epert
opinion thereon
Ghen contemporaneous construction disregarded
Ghen there is no ambiguity in the law$
If it is clearly erroneous, the same must be declared
null and !oid$
Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not preclude
correction nor create rightsH eceptions
4he doctrine of estoppel does not preclude correction
of the erroneous construction by the officer himself by
his successor or by the court in an appropriate case$
An erroneous contemporeaneous construction creates
no !ested right on the part of those relied upon, and
followed such construction$
Legislati!e interpretation
4a1e form of an implied ac.uiescence to, or appro!al
of, an eecuti!e or 2udicial construction of a statute$
4he legislature cannot limit or restrict the power
granted to the courts by the constitution$
Legislati!e appro!al
Legislati!e is presumed to ha!e full 1nowledge of a
contemporaneous or practical construction of a statute
by an administrati!e or eecuti!e officer charged with
its enforcement$
4he legislature may appro!e or ratify such
contemporaneous construction$
)ay also be showmen by the legislature appropriating
money for the officer designated to perform a tas1
pursuant to interpretation of a statute$
Legislati!e ratification is e.ui!alent to a mandate$
Reenactment
)ost common act of appro!al$
4he re3enactment of a statute, pre!iously gi!en a
contemporaneous construction is persuasi!e indication
of the adoption by the legislature of the prior
construction$
Re3enactment if accorded greater weight and respect
than the contemporaneous construction of the statute
before its ratification$
%tare decisis
#udicial interpretation of a statute and is of greater
weight than that of an eecuti!e or administrati!e
officer in the construction of other statutes of similar
import$
It is an in!aluable aid in the construction or
interpretation of statutes of doubtful meaning$
%tare decisis et non .uieta mo!ere 0 one should follow
past precedents and should not disturb what has been
settled$
%upreme &ourt has the constitutional duty not only of
interpreting and applying the law in accordance with
prior doctrines but also of protecting society from the
impro!idence and wantonness wrought by needless
uphea!als in such interpretations and applications
In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare
decisis, must be categorically stated on an issue
epressly raised by the partiesH it must be a direct
ruling, not merely an obiter dictum
Obiter dictum 0 opinion epressed by a court upon
some .uestion of law which is not necessary to the
decision of the case before itH not binding as a
precedent
4he principle presupposes that the facts of the
precedent and the case to which it is applied are
substantially the same$
Ghere the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of
stare decisis does not apply$
4he rule of stare decisis is not absolute$ It does not
apply when there is a conflict between the precedent
and the law$
4he duty of the court is to forsa1e and abandon any
doctrine or rule found to be in !iolation of law in force
Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot
abandon a precedent enunciated by the %& ecept by
way of repeal or amendment of the law itself
CHAPTER FOUR: A"$erene to, or "e#arture %ro&,
'an(ua(e o% statute
LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Literal meaning or plain3meaning rule
Keneral ruleD if statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be gi!en its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation
o >erba legis
o Inde animi sermo 0 speech is the inde of
intention
o Gords employed by the legislature in a
statute correctly epress its intent or will
o >erba legis non est recedendum 0 from the
words of a statute there should be no
departure
o 4hus, what is not clearly pro!ided in the law
cannot be etended to those matters outside
its scope
#udicial legislation 0 an encroachment upon legislati!e
prerogati!e to define the wisdom of the law
o &ourts must administer the law as they find it
without regard to conse.uences
+ationa# Federation of Labor v. +L"C
Employees were claiming separation pay on the basis
of Art$ :;- Labor &ode which states that Bemployer
)AM also terminate the employment of an employeeC
for reasons therein by ser!ing notice thereof and
paying separation pay to affected employees
4here was compulsory ac.uisition by the go!ernment
of the employer(s land (Patalon &oconut Estate" for
purposes of agrarian reform which forced the employer
to cease his operation
IssueD whether or not employer is liable for separation
payR
@eldD 5O, employer is not liable for separation payS
o It is a unilateral and !oluntary act by the
employer if he wants to gi!e separation pay
o 4his is gleaned from the wording B)AMC in
the statute
o B)AMC denotes that it is directory in nature
and generally permissi!e only
o Plain3meaning rule is applicable
o Ano yun, ipapasara ng go!ernment tapos
magbabayad pa ang employer ng separation
payRSR Ang daya3dayaS Lugi na nga si
employer, 1i1ita pa si employeeRSR FnfairS
&annot beS 5oS 5oS
o 4o depart from the meaning epressed by the
words is to alter the statute, to legislate and
not interpret
o )aledicta est eposition .uae corrumpit
tetum 0 dangerous construction which is
against the tet
Dura le sed le
Dura le sed le 0 the law may be harsh but it is still
the law
Absoluta sentential epositore non indigent 0 when the
language of the law is clear, no eplanation of it is
re.uired
Ghen the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
interpretation$ It must be applied regardless of who
may be affected, e!en if it may be harsh or onerous
@oc .uidem per.uam durum est, sed ital e scripta est
0 it is eceedingly hard but so the law is written
A decent regard to the legislati!e will shoud inhibit the
court from engaging in 2udicial legislation to change
what it thin1s are unrealistic statutes that do not
conform with ordinary eperience or practice (respeto
nalang sa ating mga mambabatasS Ghate!erRSR @aha
2o1e only"
If there is a need to change the law, amend or repeal it,
remedy may be done through a legislati!e process, not
by 2udicial decree
Ghere the law is clear, appeals to 2ustice and e.uity as
2ustification to construe it differently are una!ailing 0
Philippines is go!erned by &I>IL LAG or PO%I4I>E
LAG, not common law
E.uity is a!ailable only in the absence of law and not
its replacement 0 (so, pag may law, walang e.uity
e.uityS Pero pag walang law, pwedeng mag3e.uity,
getsRSR$$$ important toS"
Ae.uitas nun.uam contra!enit legis 0 e.uity ne!er
acts in contra!ention of the law
DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION
%tatute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperati!e
If no 2udicial certainty can be had as to its meaning,
the court is not at liberty to supply nor to ma1e one
Santiago v. COMELEC
In this case, the &ourt adopted a literal meaning thus,
concluded that RA 8,-7 is inade.uate to implement
the power of the people to amend the &onstitution
(initiati!e on amendments" for the following reasonsD
o Does not suggest an initiati!e on amendments
on to the &onstitution because it is silent as to
amendments on the &onstitution and the word
B&onstitutionC is neither germane nor rele!ant
to said section
o Does not pro!ide for the contents of a petition
for initiati!e on the &onstitution
o Does not pro!ide for subtitles for initiati!e on
the &onstitution
o RA is incomplete and does not pro!ide a
sufficient standard
#ustice Puno (anoRSR #ustice 4reeRS" dissentsD
o Legislati!e intent is also shown by the
deliberations on the bill that became RA
8,-7L (there are 9 more reasons 0 see page
*-63*-*, which are not so important"
Interpretation of RA 8,-7 was not in 1eeping with the
maim interpretation fienda est ut res magis !aleat
.uam pereat 0 that interpretation as will gi!e the thing
efficacy is to be adopted
Ghat is within the spirit is within the law
Don(t literally construe the law if it will render it
meaningless, lead to ambiguity, in2ustice or
contradiction
4he spirit of the law controls its letter
Ratio legis 0 interpretation according to the spirit or
reason of the law
%pirit or intention of a statute pre!ails o!er the letter
A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in
accordance with, and not repugnant to, the spirit of the
law
PresumptionD undesirable conse.uences were ne!er
intended by a legislati!e measure
Literal import must yield to intent
>erba intentioni, non e contra, debent inser!ire 0
words ought to be more subser!ient to the intent and
not the intent to the words (ahhh parang intent is to
woman as word is to man 0 so man is subser!ient to
womanL logicalS"
Kuide in ascertaining intent 0 conscience and e.uity
%o it is possible that a statute may be etended to cases
not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent
Limitation of rule
&onstrue (intent o!er letter" only if there is ambiguityS
&onstruction to accomplish purpose
PFRPO%E or REA%O5 which induced the enactment
of the statute 0 1ey to open the brain of the legislature=
legislati!e intentS
%tatutes should be construed in the light of the ob2ect
to be achie!ed and the e!il or mischief to be
suppressed
As between two statutory interpretations, that which
better ser!es the purpose of the law should pre!ail
Sarcos v. Casti##o
4his case eplains why legislati!e purpose to
determine legislati!e intent
/ran1furter
o Legislati!e words are not inert but deri!ed
!itality from the ob!ious purposes at which
they are aimed
o Legislation 0 wor1ing instrument of
go!ernment and not merely as a collection of
English words
'en2amin 5atham &ardoAo
o Legislation is more than a composition
o It is an acti!e instrument of go!ernment
which means that laws ha!e ends to be
achie!ed
@olmes
o Gords are fleible
o 4he general purpose is a more important aid
to the meaning than any rule which grammar
or formal logic may lay down
o &ourts are apt to err by stic1ing too closely to
the words of law where those words import a
policy that goes beyond them
Soriano v. Offs*ore S*ipping and Manning Corp
A literal interpretation is to be re2ected if it would be
un2ust or lead to absurd results
Illustration of rule
0ing v. !ernande'
IssueD whether or not a &hinese (parang si RA and
%erge" may be employed in a non3control position in a
retail establishment, a wholly nationaliAed business
under RA **;6 Retail 4rade Law (btw, wala na tong
law na Tto$ It has been repealed by the Retail 4rade
LiberaliAation Act 0 my thesisS "
@eldD 5oS (1asi duduraan 1a lang ng mga intsi1S #o1e
onlyS" the law has to be construed with the Anti3
Dummy Law 0 prohibiting an alien from inter!ening
in the management, operation, administration or
control thereof
Ghen the law says you cannot employ such alien, you
cannot employ an alienS 4he unscrupulous alien may
resort to flout the law or defeat its purposeS
(maggulang daw mga intsi1L ultimo tubig sa pasig
ri!er, which is supposed to be free, bottles it and then
sells itS @uwatRSR"
It is imperati!e that the law be interpreted in a manner
that would sta!e off any attempt at circum!ention of
the legislati!e purpose
%stamante v. +L"C
IssueD how to compute for bac1wages to which an
illegally dismissed employee would be entitled until
his actual reinstatement (ta1e note of this case$$ it(s a
labor caseL 1iliti ni Kolangco"
- waysD
o *
st
0 before Labor &ode 0 to be deducted from
the amount of bac1wages is the earnings
elsewhere during the period of illegal
dismissal
o :
nd
0 Labor &ode Art$ :,+ 0 the amount of
bac1wages is fied without deductions or
.ualifications but limited to not more than -
years
o -
rd
0 amended Art$ :,+ 0 full bac1wages or
without deductions from the time the
laborer(s compensation was withheld until his
actual reinstatement
4he clear legislati!e intent of the amendment in RA
8,*7 (Labor &ode" is to gi!e more benefits to wor1ers
than was pre!iously gi!en them under the )ercury
Drug rule or the *
st
way
1S v. Toribio
4he prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural wor1= draft purposes was a Breasonable
necessary limitationC on pri!ate ownership
Purpose or ob2ect of the law 0 to protect large cattle
against theft and to ma1e easy reco!ery and return of
such cattle to their owners, when lost, strayed or stolen
IssueD whether the slaughter of large cattle outside the
municipal slaughterhouse without a permit by the
municipal treasurer is prohibitedR
@eldD ME%S Outside or inside without permit is
prohibited
ocobo v. Estanis#ao
IssueD whether the &/I and a municipal court in the
capital of a pro!ince ha!e concurrent 2urisdiction o!er
the crime of libel
RP& 0 grants 2urisdiction with &/I
#udiciary Act grants 2urisdiction with the municipal
court in the capital of a pro!ince in offenses where the
penalty is not more than prission correctional or fine
not eceeding 8,666Php (penalty for libel"
%o ano naRSR
,odines v. CA
Patent Law 0 grants the patentee the eclusi!e right to
ma1e, use, and sell his patented machine, article or
product
Doctrine of e.ui!alents 0 when a de!ice appropriates a
prior in!ention by incorporating its inno!ati!e concept,
and albeit with some modification and change,
performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to achie!e substantially the
same result (ano ba TtoRSR Puro substantiallyR"
P#anters Association of So%t*ern +egros. /nc. v. Ponferrada
: apparently conflicting pro!isions should be
construed as to realiAe the purpose of the law
4he purpose of the law is to I5&REA%E the wor1er(s
benefits
'enefits under RA 8+;: shall be I5 ADDI4IO5 to the
benefits under RA ;6+ and PD 8:*
B%ubstitutedC cannot be gi!en literal interpretation
Ghen reason of law ceases, law itself ceases
4he reason which induced the legislature to enact a
law is the heart of the law
&essante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa le 0 when the
reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases
Ratio legis est anima 0 reason of the law is its soul
Peo v. A#m%ete
Agricultural 4enancy Act is repealed by the
Agricultural Land Reform &ode
Agricultural 4enancy Act 0 punishes prereaping or
prethreshing of palay on a date other than that
pre!iously set without the mutual consent of the
landlord and tenant
o %hare tenancy relationship
Agricultural Land Reform &ode 0 abolished share
tenancy relationship, thus does not punish prereaping
or prethreshing of palay on a date other than that
pre!iously set without the mutual consent of the
landlord and tenant anymore
o Leasehold system
Commendador v. De 2i##a
IssueD whether PD -+, which withdrew the right to
peremptorily challenge members of a military tribunal,
had been rendered inoperati!e by PD :697
proclaiming the termination of a state of martial law
@eldD ME%S 4he termination of the martial law and the
dissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the
reason for the eistence of PD -+ ceased automatically
and the decree itself ceased
2as$%e' v. ,iap
Ghere the mischief sought to be remedied by a statute
has already been remo!ed in a gi!en situation, the
statute may no longer apply in such case
4he law bans aliens from ac.uiring and owning lands,
the purpose is to preser!e the nation(s lands for future
generations of /ilipinos
A sale of land in fa!or of an alien, in !iolation of the
said law, no longer be .uestioned after the alien
becomes a /ilipino citiAen
%upplying legislati!e omission
if it is clearly ascertainable from the &O54EE4S
)ay supply legislati!e omission to ma1e the statute
conform to ob!ious intent of the legislature or to
pre!ent the act from being absurd
5oteD differentiate from 2udicial legislation
&orrecting clerical errors
As long as the meaning intended is apparent on the
face of the whole enactment and no specific pro!ision
is abrogated
4his is not 2udicial legislation
Illustration rule
"%fino Lope' 3 Sons. /nc. v. CTA
&ourt change the phrase Bcollector of customsC to
Bcommissioner of customsC to correct an ob!ious
mista1e in law
%ec , 0 Bcommissioner of customsC 0 grants the &4A
2urisdiction to re!iew decisions of the &ommissioner
of &ustoms
%ec ** 0 Bcollector of customsC 0 refers to the decision
of the &ollector of &ustoms that may be appealed to
the ta court
B&ommissionerC pre!ails 0 &ommissioner of &ustoms
has super!ision and control o!er &ollectors of
&ustoms and the decisions of the latter are re!iewable
by the &ommissioner of &ustoms
Lamp v. P*ipps
BOrdinary &OFR4% of lawC to BOrdinary &OFR%E of
lawC
Farinas v. arba
IssueD who is the appointing power to fill a !acancy
created by the sanggunian member who did not belong
to any political party, under the pro!ision of the Local
Ko!ernment &ode
Blocal chief eecuti!eC 0 a misnomer
It should be Bauthorities concernedC
'ecause the President is not a Blocal chief eecuti!eC
but under %ec$ 76 of the Local Ko!ernment &ode, the
BPresident, Ko!ernor, )ayor ha!e the eecuti!e power
to appoint in order to fill !acancies in local councils or
to suspend local officials
Pualification of rule (of correcting clerical errors"
Only those which are clearly clerical errors or ob!ious
mista1es, omissions, and misprintsH otherwise, is to
rewrite the law and in!ade the domain of the
legislature, it is 2udicial legislation in the guise of
interpretation
&onstruction to a!oid absurdity
ReasonD it is always presumed that the legislature
intended eceptions to its language which would a!oid
conse.uences of this character
4hus, statutes may be etended to co!er cases not
within the literal meaning of the terms if their eact
and literal import would lead to absurd or mischie!ous
results
Interpretation talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut
e!itetur incon!eniens et absurdum 0 where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will a!oid
incon!enience and absurdity is to be adopted
&ourts test the law by its results 0 if law appears to be
arbitrary, courts are not bound to apply it in sla!ish
disobedience to its language
&ourts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not
to defeat, its pro!isionsH nor render compliance with its
pro!isions impossible to perform
Peo v. D%$%e
%urplusageSSS
%ec$ : of Act 5o$ --:8 0 prescription of offenses
o Prescription shall begin to run from
4he day of the commission of the
!iolation
/rom the time of disco!ery A5D
institution of 2udicial proceedings for
in!estigation and punishment
'ut the pre!ailing rule is that prescripti!e period is
tolled upon the institution of 2udicial proceedings 0 an
act of grace by the %tate
&ourt held that the phrase Binstitution of 2udicial
proceedings for its in!estigation and punishmentC may
be either disregarded as surplusage or should be
deemed preceded by the word BuntilC
O#iveros v. 2i##a#%'
IssueD whether or not the suspension order against an
electi!e official following an information for !iolation
of the Anti3Kraft law filed against him, applies not
only to the current term of office but also to another
term if the accused run for reelection and won
%ec *- of the Anti3Kraft Law 0 suspension unless
ac.uitted, reinstatedS
@eldD only refers to the current term of the suspended
officer (and not to a future un1nown and uncertain new
term unless supplemented by a new suspension order
in the e!ent of reelection" for if his term shall ha!e
epired at the time of ac.uittal, he would ob!iously be
no longer entitled to reinstatementH otherwise it will
lead to absurdities
Peo v. 4% !ai
IssueD when does a crime punishable by arresto menor
prescribeR
%tate says *6 years as pro!ided for in Art +6 RP&
o Art$ :8 (correctional offenses" 0 ma fine of
:66Php 0 correctional penalty 0 prescribes in
*6 years (Art$ +6"
&ourt held that this is not rightSSSS It is wrongS
o Art$ + (light offenses" 0 not more than :66Php
0 light felonies 0 : months
o *Php ma1es a difference of + years and *6
monthsS (huwatRSR"
o Arresto mayor (correctional penalty"
prescribes in 7 years
o Less gra!e 0 prescribe e!en shorter
o Also, prescripti!e period cannot be
ascertained not until the court decides which
of the alternati!e penalties should be imposed
0 imprisonment ba or fine langL yun lang
poS
Peo v. "eyes
Dangerous Drugs Act
RA ,87+
o E U :66 grams 0 ma penalty is reclusion
perpetua
o E V :66 grams 0 min penalty is reclusion
perpetua
&ourt ruled thatD
o E U :66 grams 0 penalty ranging from prision
correctional to reclusion temporal
*-93*++grams 0 reclusion temporal
883*-- 0 prison mayor
Less than 88 grams 0 prision
correcional
%tat&on 0 duty of the court to harmoniAe conflicting
pro!isions to gi!e effect to the whole lawH to effectuate
the intention of legislature
Ma#on'o v. 5amora
&ontentionD the &ity &ounsel of &aloocan cannot
!alidly pass an ordinance appropriating a supplemental
budget for the purpose of epropriating a certain parcel
of land, without first adopting or updating its house
rules of procedure within the first +6 days following
the election of its members, as re.uired by %ecs$ 76
and 7: of the LK&
&ourt said this is absurdSSSS &ontention is re2ectedS
o Adoption or updating of house rules would
necessarily entail wor1L local council(s
hands were tied and could not act on any
other matter if we hold the absurd contentionS
o %o much incon!enienceS %hioS And this
could not ha!e been intended by the law
&onstruction to a!oid in2ustice
Presumption 0 legislature did not intend to wor1 a
hardship or an oppressi!e result, a possible abuse of
authority or act of oppression, arming one person with
a weapon to impose hardship on the other
Ea est accipienda interpretation .uae !itio caret 0 that
interpretation is to be adopted which is free from e!il
or in2ustice
Amatan v. A%-ero
Rodrigo Fmpad was charged with homicide
Pursuant to some pro!ision in criminal procedure, he
entered into a plea bargaining agreement, which the
2udge appro!ed of, downgrading the offense charge of
homicide to attempted homicide to which Fmpad
pleaded guilty thereto$
@elloRSR 5amatay na nga tapos attempted langRSR
)ababaliw a1o sayo, 2udge, whoe!er you areSSS
/iat 2usticia, ruat coelum 0 let the right be done,
though the hea!ens fall (ano dawRSR"
%tated differently, when a pro!ision of the law is silent
or ambiguougs, 2udges ought to in!o1e a solution
responsi!e to the !ehement urge of conscience
(ahhhL ano daw ulitRSR"
Peo v. P%risima
It was contended that PD +(-" 0 is a malum
prohibitumH thus intent to use such prohibited weapons
is immaterial by reason of public policy
&ourt said that use the preamble to construe such act
whether penaliAed or not
)oreo!er the court said that legislature did not intend
in2ustice, absurdity and contradiction
&ourt ga!e an eampleL
o %o if I borrowed a bolo then I return this to
my lender, then in the course or my 2ourney
I(m caught, I(m penaliAed under the Decree
for 73*6 years imprisonmentS (ang labo
namanS"
1rs%a v. CA
IssueD whether or not the isolated use, at one instance,
of a name other than a person(s true name to secure a
copy of a document from a go!ernment agency,
constitutes !iolation of &A *9: 0 Anti3alias Law
@eldD 5OS (isang beses lang naman eh$$ hehehe 2o1e
langS"
o 4he purpose of the Anti3alias Law is to
pre!ent confusion and fraud in business
transactions
o %uch isolated use of a different name is not
prohibited by the lawH otherwise, in2ustice,
absurdity and contradiction will result
&onstruction to a!oid danger to public interest
Co 0im C*am v. 2a#de' Tan 0e*
%a &onsti Tto ahS La langL hehe (yihee, %ergeS"
BprocessesC in the proclamation that Ball laws
regulations and processesC of the so3called RP during
the #apanese occupation of the country Bare null and
!oid and without legal effectC )AM 5O4 be
construed to embrace #FDI&IAL PRO&E%%E% as this
would lead to great incon!enience and public hardship
and public interest would be endangered
o &riminals freed
o >ested right, impaired
&onstruction in fa!or of right and 2ustice
Art$ *6 &&D In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the law3ma1ing
body intended right and 2ustice to pre!ail
Art$ + &&D 4he fact that a statute is silent, obscure, or
insufficient with respect to a .uestion before the court
will not 2ustify the latter from declining to render
2udgment thereon
In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is
percei!ed to tip the scales which the court belie!es will
best promote the public welfare is its probable
operation as a general rule or principle
Sa#vacion v. SP
Kreg 'artelli raped his alleged niece *6 times and
detained her in his apartment for 9 days
&ourt ga!e a fa!orable 2udgment of more than *)Php
'%P re2ected the writ of attachment alleging %ec **-
of the &entral 'an1 &ircular 5o$ +86 (applicable to
transient foreigners"
IssueD whether the dollar ban1 deposit in a Philippine
ban1 of a foreign tourist can be attached to satisfy the
moral damages awarded in fa!or of the latter(s *:3
year3old rape !ictim
'%P did not honor the writ of attachment pursuant to
RA89:8 %ec ; 0 Bforeign currency deposits shall be
eempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislati!e body,
go!ernment agency or any administrati!e body
whatsoe!erC
&ourt held thatD A5O 'ARSR 5a3rape na nga ayaw
pang magbayad ng moral damages dahil lang sa isang
silly lawRSR (hehe$$ 2o1e lang$$ I(m so bored na ehS"
o &ourt applied the principles of right and
2ustice to pre!ail o!er the strict and literal
words of the statute
o 4he purpose of RA 89:8 to eempt such
assets from attachmentD at the time the said
law was enacted, the country(s economy was
in a shambles$ 'ut in the present time it is
still in shambles$$$ hehe 2o1e langL but in the
present time, the country has reco!ered
economically$ 5o reason why such assets
cannot be attached especially if it would
satisfy a 2udgment to award moral damages to
a *:3year3old rape !ictimS
%urplusage and superfluity disregarded
Ghere a word, phrase or clause in a statute is de!oid
of meaning in relation to the contet or intent of the
statute, or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies
the statute or renders it without sense, the word, phrase
or clause may be re2ected as surplusage and entirely
ignored
%urplusagium non noceat 0 surplusage does not !itiate
a statute
Ftile per inutile non !itiatur 0 nor is the useful !itated
by the non3useful
Demafi#es v. COMELEC
IssueD whether a pre3proclamation election case has
become moot because the proclaimed winner had
immediately ta1en his oath pursuant to %ec : RA 9;,6
which pro!ides that the Bfirst mayor, !ice3mayor and
councilors of the municipality of %ebaste shall be
elected in the net general elections for local officials
and shall ha!e .ualifiedC
It was contended that Bshall ha!e .ualifiedC begins
immediately after their proclamationS
&ourt held that this is wrongS
o 4he said phrase is a 2argon and does not
warrant the respondent(s reading that the term
of office of the first municipal officials of
%ebaste begins immediately after their
proclamation
o 4he Qing in TAlice in Gonderland(D if there is
no meaning in it, that sa!es a world of
trouble, you 1now, as we need not try to find
any
o Apply the general rule when such term begin
0 the term of municipal officials shall begin
on the *
st
day of #anuary following their
election
Redundant words may be re2ected
%elf3eplanatory, ano buAAAARSR
Obscure or missing word or false description may not preclude
construction
/alsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat
0 false description does not preclude construction nor
!itiate the meaning of the statute which is otherwise
clear
Eemption from rigid application of law
Ibi .uid generaliter conceditur 0 e!ery rule is not
without an eception
Inest haec eception, si non ali.uid sit contras 2us
bas.ue 0 where anything is granted generally, this
eception is implied
&ompelling reasons may 2ustify reading an eception
to a rule e!en where the latter does not pro!ide anyH
otherwise the rigor of the law would become the
highest in2ustice 0 summum 2us, summa in2uria
Law does not re.uire the impossible
5emo tenetur ad impossible 0 the law obliges no one
to perform an impossibility
Impossibilium nulla obligation est 0 no obligation to
do an impossible thing
Impossible compliance !ersus %ubstantial compliance
(as re.uired by law"
Lim co C*%i v Posadas
Publication in the Official KaAette wee1ly, for three
times and consecuti!ely, to ac.uire 2urisdiction o!er
naturaliAation case
It was an impossibility to fulfill such re.uirement as
the OK was not, at the time, published wee1ly
4hus, &ourt held that compliance with the other :
re.uirements would be deemed sufficient to ac.uire
2urisdiction o!er the naturaliAation case
Akbayan v. COMELEC
4his case is about the statutory grant of stand3by
power to the &O)ELE& as pro!ided for in %ec$ :;
RA ;9-8
Petitioners were as1ing the respondent to eercise such
power so as to accommodate potential !oters who
were not able to register for the upcoming election
&O)ELE& denied the petition alleging the
impossibility of late registration to accommodate
potential !oters
&ourt ruled that the pro!ision must be gi!en such
interpretation that is in accordance with logic, common
sense, reasonableness and practicality
Ghere time constraint and the surrounding
circumstances ma1e it impossible or the &O)ELE& to
conduct special registration of !oters, the &O)ELE&
cannot be faulted for refusing to do so, for the law
does not re.uire the impossible to be doneH there is no
obligation to ho the impossible thing
&O)ELE&(s decision is sustained
5umber and gender of words
Ghen the contet of a statute so indicates, words in
plural include the singular, and !ice !ersa$
A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular
person or thing, 2ust as a singular word may embrace
two or more persons or things
Art$ ++8 && 0 (law on succession" such article also
applies to a situation where there is only one child
because BchildrenC includes BchildC
Election &ode 0 BcandidateC comprehends Bsome
candidatesC or Ball candidatesC
On gender 0 the masculine, but not the feminine,
includes all genders, unless the contet in which the
word is used in the statute indicates otherwise
IMPLICATIONS
Doctrine of necessary implication
%o3called gaps in the law de!elop as the law is
enforced
%tat&on ruleD to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication
Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as
much a part thereof as that which is epressed
E necessitate legis 0 from the necessity of the law
E!ery statutory grant of power, right or pri!ilege is
deemed to include all incidental power, right or
pri!ilege
In eo .uod plus sit, simper inest et minus 0 greater
includes the lesser
5ecessity 0
o includes such inferences as may be logically
be drawn from the purpose or ob2ect of the
statute, from what the legislature must be
presumed to ha!e intended, and from the
necessity of ma1ing the statute effecti!e and
operati!e
o ecludes what is merely plausible, beneficial,
or desirable
must be consistent with the &onstitution or to eisting
laws
an implication which is !iolati!e of the law is
un2ustified or unwarranted
C*%a v. Civi# Service Commission
IssueD whether a coterminous employee, or one whose
appointment is co3eistent with the duration of a
go!ernment pro2ect, who has been employed as such
for more than : years, is entitled to early retirement
benefits under %ec : RA 88;-
&ourt held that ME%, &hua is entitledS
o A coterminous employee is no different from
a casual or temporary employee, and by
necessary implication, the inclusion of the
latter in the class of go!ernment employees
entitled to the benefits of the law necessarily
implies that the former should also be entitled
to such benefits
o Grong application of the maim Bepresio
uniusest eclusion alteriusC
Remedy implied from a right
Fbi 2us, ibi remedium 3 where there is a right, there is
a remedy for !iolation thereof
Right 3V Obligation 3V Remedy
4he fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does
not preclude him from !indicating his right, for such
remedy is implied from such right
Once a right is established, the way must be cleared for
its enforcement, and technicalities in procedure,
2udicial as well as administrati!e, must gi!e way
Ghere there is Bwrong,C (depri!ation or !iolation of a
right" there is a remedy
If there(s no right, principle does not apply
at%ngbaka# v +ationa# Deve#opment Co
Petitioner was suspended and remo!ed from office
which pro!ed to be illegal and !iolati!e not only of the
Administrati!e &ode but of the &onstitution itself
&ourt ruled that to remedy the e!il and wrong
committed, there should be reinstatement and payment
of bac1wages, among other things
@owe!er, there was a legal problem as to his
reinstatement, for when he was suspended and
e!entually dismissed, somebody was appointed to his
position
IssueD whether remedy is denied petitioner
@eldD position was ne!er B!acantC$ %ince there is no
!acancy, the present incumbent cannot be appointed
permanently$ 4he incumbent is only holding a
temporary position$ )oreo!er, the incumbent(s being
made to lea!e the post to gi!e way to the employee(s
superior right may be considered as remo!al for cause
Krant of 2urisdiction
&onferred only by the &onstitution or by statute
&annot be conferred by the Rules of &ourt
&annot be implied from the language of a statute, in
the absence of clear legislati!e intent to that effect
Pimente# v. COMELEC
&O)ELE& has appellate 2urisdiction o!er election
cases filed with and decided by the R4& in!ol!ing
municipal electi!e officials DOE% 5O4 I)PLM the
grant of authority upon the &O)ELE& to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus concerning said
election cases
Peo v. Pa#ana
%tatute grants a special court 2urisdiction o!er criminal
cases in!ol!ing offenders under *8 at the time of the
filing of the action, a subse.uent statute defining a
youthful offender as one who is o!er + but below :*
years of age may not be so construed as to confer by
implication upon said special court the authority to try
cases in!ol!ing offenders *8 but below :* years of age
Ghat may be implied from grant of 2urisdiction
4he grant of 2urisdiction to try actions carries with it
all necessary and incidental powers to employ all
writs, processes and other means essential to ma1e its
2urisdiction effecti!e
Ghere a court has 2urisdiction o!er the main cause of
action, it can grant reliefs incidental thereto, e!en if
they would otherwise be outside its 2urisdiction
o E$g$ forcible entry and detainer is cogniAable
in )4&L )4& can order payment of rentals
e!en though the amount eceeds the
2urisdictional amount cogniAable by them, the
same merely incidental to the principal action
%tatutes conferring 2urisdiction to an administrati!e
agency must be liberally construed to enable the
agency to discharge its assigned duties in accordance
with the legislati!e purpose
o E$g$ the power granted the 5@A to hear and
decide claims in!ol!ing refund and any other
claims filed , include attorney(s fees and
other damages
Krant of power includes incidental power
Ghere a general power is conferred or duty en2oined,
e!ery particular power necessary for the eercise of
one or the performance of the other is also conferred
4he incidental powers are those which are necessarily
included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the
power granted
o Eamples
Power to establish an office includes
authority to abolish it, unless
Garrant issued shall be made upon
probable cause determined by the
2udge implies the grant of power
to the 2udge to conduct preliminary
in!estigations
Power to appro!e a license includes
by implication the power to re!o1e it
Power to re!o1e is limited
by the authority to grant
license, from which it is
deri!ed
Power to deport includes the power
to arrest undesirable aliens after
in!estigation
Power to appoint !ested in the
President includes the power to
ma1e temporary appointments ,
unless
Power to appropriate money
includes power to withdraw
unepended money already
appropriated
EtcL see page *,*3*,:
Krant of power ecludes greater power
4he principle that the grant of power includes all
incidental powers necessary to ma1e the eercise
thereof effecti!e implies the eclusion of those which
are greater than that conferred
o Power of super!ision DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE
power to suspend or remo!al
o Power to reorganiAe DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE
the authority to depri!e the courts certain
2urisdiction and to transfer it to a .uasi3
2udicial tribunal
o Power to regulate business DOE% 5O4
I5&LFDE power to prohibit
Ghat is implied should not be against the law
Power to appoint includes power to suspend or remo!e
0
o &onstitutional restriction of &I>IL %ER>I&E
E)PLOMEE%, that it must be a cause
pro!ided for by law precludes such
implication (unless the appointment was
made outside the ci!il ser!ice law
Power to appoint a public officer by the President
includes power to remo!e
o Pro!ided that such remo!al is made with 2ust
cause
o Ecept is such statute pro!ides that term of
office to be at the pleasure of the appointing
officer, power to appoint carries with it power
to remo!e anytime
Power to in!estigate officials DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE
the power to delegate the authority to ta1e testimony of
witnesses whose appearance may be re.uired by the
compulsory process of subpoena$ 5or does such
power to in!estigate include the power to delegate the
authority to administer oath
Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied
It is well3settled that unless a statute epressly so
authoriAes, no claim against public funds may be
allowed
o %tatute grants lea!e pri!ileges to
APPOI54I>E officials, this cannot be
construed to include ELE&4I>E officials
o BemployerC to pay *-
th
month pay, does not
imply that it includes Bgo!ernment
Illegality of act implied from prohibition
In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis 3 where a
statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done in
!iolation thereof is by implication null and !oid
Prohibited act cannot ser!e as foundation of a cause of
action for relief
E dolo malo non oritur actio 0 no man can be allowed
to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing or ine.uity
5ullus coomodum capere potest de in2uria sua propria
0 no man should be allowed to ta1e ad!antage of his
own wrong
Public policy re.uires that parties to an act prohibited
by statute be left where they are, to ma1e the statute
effecti!e and to accomplish its ob2ect
o Party to an illegal contract cannot come to
court of law and as1 that his illegal ob2ect be
carried out
o A citiAen who sold his land to an alien in
!iolation of the constitutional restriction
cannot annul the same and reco!er the land,
for both seller and buyer are guilty of ha!ing
!iolated the &onstitution
4wo (:" Eceptions to the rule
Pari delicto doctrine will not apply when its
enforcement or application will !iolate an a!owed
%un"a&enta' #o'!) or #u*'! !nterest
De#os Santos v. "oman Cat*o#ic C*%rc*
@omestead Law 0 to gi!e and preser!e in the
homesteader and his family a piece of land for his
house and culti!ation
4he law prohibits the alienation of a homestead within
7 years following the issuance of the patent and
pro!ides that any contract of a con!eyance in
contra!ention thereof shall be null and !oid
4he seller or his heirs, although in pari delicto, may
reco!er the land sub2ect of such illegal sale
arsobia v. C%enco
Another eception is that when the transat!on !s not
!''e(a' #er se *ut &ere') #ro$!*!te" and the
prohibition by law is designed for protection of one
party, the court may grant relief in fa!or of the latter
Ghat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly
Puando ali.uid prohibetur e directo, prohibetur et per
obli.uum 0 what cannot, by law, be done directly
cannot be done indirectly
Peo v. Concepcion
Ghere a corporation is forbidden from doing an act,
the prohibition etends to the board of directors and to
each director separately and indi!idually
Ghere the board of directors is prohibited from
granting loans to its director, a loan to a partnership of
which the wife of a director is a partner falls within the
prohibition
Peop#es ank and Tr%st Co. v. P+
Ghere a statute prohibits the payment of the principal
obligation during a fied period, the interest thereon
during the eistence of the restriction is not
demandable
Cr%' v. Tant%ico
Law eempts retirement benefits of a public officer or
employee from attachment, garnishment etc
Earlier law authoriAes the go!ernment to withhold an
amount due such officer or employee to pay his
indebtedness to the go!ernment %@OFLD 5O4 'E
&O5%4RFED to withhold so much of his retirement
benefits as this amount to attachment garnishment etc$
Tant%ico. 6r. v Domingo
Law eempts retirement benefits of a public officer or
employee from attachment, garnishment etc
Ko!ernment cannot withhold payment of retirement
benefits of a public officer until his accountabilities
with the go!ernment shall ha!e been cleared, as such
action is doing indirectly what the go!ernment is
prohibited from doing directly
4here should be no penalty from compliance with law
A person who complies with what a statute re.uires
cannot, by implication, be penaliAed thereby
/or Bsimple logic and fairness and reason cannot
countenance an eaction or a penalty for an act
faithfully done in compliance with the lawC
CHAPTER FIVE: Inter#retat!on o% +or"s an" #$rases
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
A word or phrase used in a statute may ha!e an
ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal,
commercial or trading meaning
)ay be defined in the statute 0 if this is done, use such
definition because this is what the legislature intended
4as1D
o ascertain intent from statute
o ascertain intent from etraneous ? rele!ant
circumstance
o construe word or phrase to effectuate such
intent
Keneral rule in interpreting the meaning and scope of a
term used in the lawD
o Re!iew of the G@OLE law in!ol!ed as well
as the I54E5D)E54 of law (not of an
isolated part or a particular pro!ision alone"
%tatutory definition
Ghen statute defines words ? phrase3 legislati!e
definition controls the meaning of statutory word,
irrespecti!e of any other meaning word ha!e in
ordinary usual sense$
Ghere a statute defines a word or phrase, the word or
phrase, should not by construction, be gi!en a different
meaning$
Legislature restricted meaning as it adopted specific
definition, thus, this should be used
4erm or phrase specifically defined in particular law,
definition must be adopted$
5o usurpation of court function in interpreting but it
merely legislates what should form part of the law
itself
2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. Socia# Sec%rity Commission
7compensation8 RA **8*, %ec$ ;(f"V
9compensation: to inc#%de a## ren%merations. e)cept
bon%ses. a##o;ances 3 overtime pay
Definition was amendedD deleted BeceptionsC
Legislati!e IntentD the amendment shows legislati!e
intent that bonuses ? o!ertime pay now included in
employee(s renumeration$
PrincipleD by !irtue of epress substantial change in
phraseology, whate!er prior 2udicial or eecuti!e
construction should gi!e way to mandate of new law$
Peo. v. 2envia-e 7 C*iropractic<
IssueD Ghether person who practiced chiropractic
without ha!ing been duly licensed, may be criminally
liable for !iolation of medical law$
@eldD 4hough term Bpractice of medicine,C
chiropractic may in ordinary sense fall within its
meaningH statutorily defined 3 includes manipulations
employed in chiropracticH thus, one who practices
chiropractic without license is criminally liable$
C*ang 4%ng Fa v. ,ian'on7 a#ien<
IssueD whether alien who comes into country as
temporary !isitor is an BimmigrantRC
@eldD while BimmigrantC in ordinary definition3 Ban
alien who comes to the Philippines for permanent
residenceCH 4he Immigration Act ma1es own
definition of term, which is Bany alien departing from
any place outside the Philippines destined for the
Philippines, other than a non3immigrant$
(so 1elangan part siya nung Bother than a non3
immigrantC$" 3V yep yep, %ergeS 'ut more importantly,
the definition emphasiAes an immigrant, who is an
alien, who comes to the Philippines either to reside
4E)PORARILM or PER)A5E54LM 0 no
distinction
definition of terms gi!en weight in construction
terms ? phrases, being part ? parcel of whole statute,
gi!en effect in their E54IR4M, as harmonious,
coordinated, and integrated unit
words ? phrases construed in light of contet of
G@OLE statute$
Pualification of rule
%tatutory definition of word or term controlling only as
used in the ActH
not conclusi!e as to the meaning of same word or term
in other statutes
Especially to transactions that too1 place prior to
enactment of act$
%tatutory definition controlling statutory words does
not apply whenD
o application creates incongruities
o destroy its ma2or purposes
o becomes illogical as result of change in its
factual basis$
Ernest v. CA 7 RA 9*88 ? EO +66, +6*V
Bsugarcane planterC is defined as a planter3owner of
sugarcane plantation w=in particular sugar mill district,
who has been allocated eport and=or domestic ?
reser!e sugar .uotas$
%tatutory definition ecludes emergency, non3.uota,
non3district and accommodation planters, they ha!ing
no sugar .uota$ @owe!er, in *+77, .uota system
abolished
Gith change in situation, illogical to continue adhering
to pre!ious definition that had lost their legal effect$
Amadora v. CA
@owe!er, where statute remains unchanged,
interpreted according to its clear and original mandateH
until legislature ta1ing into account changes sub2ected
to be regulated, sees fit to enact necessary amendment$
Gords construed in their ordinary sense
Keneral ruleD In the absence of legislati!e intent, words
and phrases should be gi!en their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning$
%hould be read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly accepted, and most ob!ious
signification, according to good and appro!ed usage
and without resulting to forced or subtle construction$
Centra# A'%carera Don Pedro v. Centra# ank
A statute Beempts certain importations from ta and
foreign echange, which are actually used in the
manufacture or preparation of local products, forming
part thereof$C
B/orming part thereofC not to mean that the imported
products ha!e to be mied mechanically, chemically,
materially into the local product ? lose its identity$
)eans that the imported article is needed to
accomplish the locally manufactured product for
eport$
C/" v. Mani#a %siness Lodge =>?
BbusinessC (if un.ualified" in ta statuteD plain and
ordinary meaning to embrace acti!ity or affair where
profit is the purpose ? li!elihood is the moti!e$
In this case, a fraternal social club selling li.uor at its
clubhouse in a limited scale only to its members,
without intention to obtain profit
5ot engaged in business$
P*iippine# Association of ,overnment "etirees v. ,S/S
7 9present va#%e:<
%tatuteD Bfor those who are at least 87 yrs of age, lump
sum payment of present !alue of annuity for the first 7
years, and future annuity to be paid monthly$ Provided
*o;ever. that there shall be no discount from annuity
for the first 7 yrs$ of those who are 87 yrs or o!er, on
the day the law too1 effect$C
>ocabularyD
o lump sum 3 amount of money gi!en in single
payment
o annuity 3 amount of money paid to somebody
yearly or at some other regular inter!al
%hould there be discount from the present !alue of his
annuityR
5O$ Fsed in ordinary sense as said law grants to the
retired employee substantial sum for his sustenance
considering his age$ Any doubt in this law should be
ruled in his fa!or$
Mat%g%ina /ntegrated @ood Prod%cts /nc. v. CA
Ghether transferee of a forest concession is liable for
obligations arising from transferor(s illegal
encroachment into another forest concessionaire,
which was committed prior to the transfer
%ec$ 8* of PD ,67 Bthe transferee shall assume all the
obligations of the transferor$C
&ourt held that the transferee is 5O4 liable and
eplainedD BObligationsC construed to mean
obligations incurred by transferor in the ordinary
course of business$ 5ot those as a result of
transgressions of the law, as these are personal
obligations of transferor$
PrincipleD &onstrue using ordinary meaning ? a!oid
absurdity$
M%stang L%mber. /nc. v CA
%tatuteD %ec$ 8; PD ,67 3 penaliAes the cutting,
gathering ? or collecting timber or other forest
products without a license$
Is BlumberC included in BtimberC
Re!ersing *
st
ruling, %& says lumber is included in
timber$
B4he Re!ised /orestry &ode contains no definition of
timber or lumber$ 4imber is included in definition of
forestry prod%cts par (." %ec$-$ Lumber 3 same
definitions as Bprocessing plantsC
Processing plant is any mechanical set3up, machine or
combination of machine used for processing of logs ?
other forest raw materials into #%mber !eneer, plywood
etcL p$ *;-$
%imply means, #%mber is a processed log or forest raw
material$ 4he &ode uses lumber in ordinary common
usage$ In *++- ed$ of Gebster(s International
Dictionary, #%mber is defined as timber or logs after
being prepared for the mar1et$ 4herefore, lumber is a
processed log or timber$ %ec 8; of PD ,67 ma1es no
distinction between raw ? processed timber$
Keneral words construed generally
,enera#ia verba s%nt genera#iter inte##igenda A what is
generally spo1en shall be generally understoodH
general words shall be understood in a general sense$
,enera#e dict%m genera#iter est interpretand%m A a
general statement is understood in a general sense
In case word in statute has both restricted and general
meaning, KE5ERAL must pre!ailH Fnless nature of
the sub2ect matter ? contet in which it is employed
clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended$
Keneral words should not be gi!en a restricted
meaning when no restriction is indicated$
RationaleD if the legislature intended to limit the
meaning of a word, it would ha!e been easy for it
to ha!e done so$
Application of rule
,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC
BforeignerC3 in Election &ode, prohibiting any
foreigner from contributing campaign funds includes
2uridical person
BpersonC3 comprehends pri!ate 2uridical person
BpersonC3 in penal statute, must be a Bperson in law,C
an artificial or natural person
2argas v. "i##aro'a
B2udgeC without any modifying word or phrase
accompanying it is to be construed in generic sense to
comprehend all 1inds of 2udgesH inferior courts or
2ustices of %&$
C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +A@ASA
Bgo!ernmentC 3 without .ualification should be
understood in implied or generic sense including
KO&&s$

Centra# ank v. CA
B5ational Ko!ernmentC 3 refers only to central
go!ernment, consisting of eecuti!e, legislati!e and
2udiciary, as well as constitutional bodies ( as
distinguished from local go!ernment ? other
go!ernmental entities" 2ers%sA<
94he Ko!ernment of the Republic of the PhilippinesC
or BPhilippine Ko!ernmentC 0 including central
go!ernments as well as local go!ernment ? KO&&s$
"ep%b#ic F#o%r Mi##s v. Commissioner of C%stoms
Bproduct of the PhilippinesC 0 any product produced in
the country, e$g$ bran (ipa" ? pollard (dara1" produced
from wheat imported into the country are Bproducts of
the PhilippinesC
Keneric term includes things that arise thereafter
Progressi!e interpretation 3 A word of general
signification employed in a statute, in absence of
legislati!e intent, to comprehend not only peculiar
conditions obtaining at its time of enactment but those
that may normally arise after its appro!al as well
Progressi!e interpretation etends to the application of
statute to all sub2ects or conditions within its general
purpose or scope that come into eistence subse.uent
from its passage
RationaleD to 1eep statute from becoming ephemeral
(short3li!ed" and transitory (not permanent or lasting"$
%tatutes framed in general terms apply to new cases
and sub2ects that arise$
Keneral rule in %tat&onD Legislati!e enactments in
general comprehensi!e operation, apply to persons,
sub2ects and businesses within their general pur!iew
and scope coming into eistence subse.uent to their
passage$
,eotina v. CA
Barticles of prohibited importationC 3 used in 4ariff and
&ustoms &ode embrace not only those declared
prohibited at time of adoption, but also goods and
articles sub2ect of acti!ities underta1en in subse.uent
laws$
,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC
Bany electionC 3 not only the election pro!ided by law
at that time, but also to future elections including
election of delegates to &onstitutional &on!ention
Gords with commercial or trade meaning
Gords or phrases common among merchants and traders,
ac.uire commercial meanings$
Ghen any of words used in statute, should be gi!en such
trade or commercial meaning as has been generally
understood among merchants$
Fsed in the followingD tariff laws, laws of commerce, laws
for the go!ernment of the importer$
4he law to be applicable to his class, should be construed
as uni!ersally understood by importer or trader$
Asiatic Petro#e%m Co. v. C/"
5o ta shall be collected on articles which, before its
ta1ing effect, shall ha!e been Bdisposed ofC
LayD parting away w= something
)erchantD to sell (this must be used"
San Mig%e# Corp. v. M%nicipa# Co%nci# of Manda%e
Bgross !alue of moneyC
)erchantD Bgross selling priceC which is the total amount
of money or its e.ui!alent which purchaser pays to the
!endor to recei!e the goods$
Gords with technical or legal meaning
Keneral ruleD words that ha!e, or ha!e been used in, a
technical sense or those that ha!e been 2udicially
construed to ha!e a certain meaning should be
interpreted according to the sense in which they ha!e
been PRE>IOF%LM used, although the sense may
!ary from the strict or literal meaning of the words
PresumptionD language used in a statute, which has a
technical or well31nown meaning, is used in that sense
by the legislature
Mani#a !era#d P%b#is*ing Co. v. "amos
%ec *9 of Rule 7+ of Rules of &ourt which prescribes the
steps to be ta1en when property attached is claimed by
a person other than the defendant or his agent
%tatuteD Bnothing herein contained shall pre!ent such
third person from !indicating his claim to the property
by any proper action.C
IssueD Bproper actionC limits the -
rd
party(s remedy to
inter!ene in the action in which the writ of attachment
is issued
@eldD BactionC has ac.uired a well3defined meaning as an
Bordinary suit in a court of 2ustice by which one party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of
a right or pre!ent redress or wrongL
GhileL
%ec : Rule : of Rules of &ourtH B&ommencement of
ActionC
%tatuteD B&i!il action may be commenced by filing a
complaint with the proper courtC
GordD commencement 3 indicates the origination of entire
proceeding
It was appropriate to use proper action (in *
st
statute"
than inter!ention, since asserted right of -
rd
party
claimant necessarily flows out of pending suitH if the
word Tinter!ention( is used, it becomes strange$
Ma#anyaon v. Lising
%ec$ *- of Anti3Kraft Law
%tatuteD B if a public officer is ac.uitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to his salaries and
benefits which he failed to recei!e during the
suspensionC
IssueD Gill a public officer whose case has been
dismissed not Bac.uittedC be entitled to benefits in
%ec$ *-R
@eldD 5o$ Ac.uittal B#ega# meaningC A finding of not
guilty based on the merit$
Dismissal does not amount to ac.uittal ecept when,
the dismissal comes after the prosecution has
presented all its e!idence and is based on
insufficiency of such e!idence$
"%ra v. Lopena
Probation law 3 Dis.ualified from probation thoseD Bwho
ha!e been pre!iously con!icted by final 2udgment of
an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than *
month ? a fine of no less than Php :66$C
IssueD Bpre!iously con!ictedC
@eldD it refers to date of con!iction, not date of
commission of crimeH thus a person con!icted on same
date of se!eral offenses committed in different dates is
not dis.ualified$
@ow identical terms in the statute construed
Keneral ruleD a word or phrase repeatedly used in a
statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statuteH
unless a different intention is clearly epressed$
RationaleD word used in statute in a gi!en sense
presumed to be used in same sense throughout the law$
4hough rigid and peremptory, this is applicable where in
the statute the words appear so near each other physically,
particularly where the word has a technical meaning and
that meaning has been defined in the statute$
De #a Pa' v. Co%rt of Agrarian "e#ations UBRicelandCV
share tenancy 3 a!erage produce per hectare for the -
agricultural years net preceding the current har!est
leasehold 3 according to normal a!erage har!est of the
- preceding yrs
BMearC3 agricultural year not calendar year
BAgricultural yearC 3 represents * cropH if in * calendar
yr : crops are raised that(s : agricultural years$
0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds
%tatuteD In %ec$* , Art$ EIII of *+-7 &onstitution 3
Bpublic agricultural lands shall not be alienatedC
ecept in fa!or of /ilipinos, %A)E as %ec$ 7 Bno
pri!ate agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned$C
both ha!e same meaning being based on same policy
of nationaliAation and ha!ing same sub2ect$

)eaning of word .ualified by purpose of statute
Purpose may indicate whether to gi!e word, phrase,
ordinary, technical, commercial restricted or epansi!e
meaning$
In construing, court adopts interpretation that accords
best with the manifest purpose of statuteH e!en
disregard technical or legal meaning in fa!or of
construction which will effectuate intent or purpose$
Gord or phrase construed in relation to other pro!isions
Keneral ruleD word, phrase, pro!ision, should not be
construed in isolation but must be interpreted in
relation to other pro!isions of the law$
4his is a >ARIA4IO5 of the rule that, statute should
be construed as a whole, and each of its pro!ision must
be gi!en effect$
C#a%dio v. COMELEC
%tatute (LK&"D B5o recall shall ta1e place within * yr
from the date of the official(s assumption of office or *
year immediately preceding a regular electionC
IssueD Does the *
st
limitation embraces the entire recall
proceedings (e$g$ preparatory recall assemblies" or
only the recall electionR
@eldD the &ourt construed BrecallC in relation to %ec$8+
which states that, Bthe power of recallL shall be
eercised by the registered !oters of an LKF to which
the local electi!e official belongs$C
@ence, not apply to all recall proceedings since power
!ested in electorate is power to elect an official to
office and not power to initiate recall proceedings$
Gord or pro!ision should not be construed in isolation
form but should be interpreted in relation to other
pro!isions of a statute, or other statutes dealing on
same sub2ect in order to effectuate what has been
intended$
,arcia v. COMELEC
@istory of statuteD
o In the &onstitution, it re.uires that legislature
shall pro!ide a system of initiati!e and
referendum whereby people can directly
appro!e or re2ect any act or law or part
thereof passed by &ongress or local
legislati!e body$
o Local Ko!t$ &ode, a later law, defines #oca#
initiative as Bprocess whereby registered
!oters of an LKF may directly propose,
enact, or amend any ordinance$C
It is claimed by respondents that
since resolution is not included in
this definition, then the same cannot
be sub2ect of an initiati!e$
IssueD whether a local resolution of a municipal
council can be sub2ect to an initiati!e and referendumR
@eldD Ge re2ect respondent(s narrow and literal
reading of abo!e pro!ision for it will collide with the
&onstitution and will sub!ert the intent of the
lawma1ers in enacting the pro!isions of the Local
Ko!ernment &ode (LK&" of *++* on initiati!e ?
referendum
4he subse.uent enactment of the LK& did not change
the scope of its co!erage$ In %ec$ *:9 of the same
code$ It statesD (b" /nitiative s*a## e)tend on#y to
s%b-ects or matters ;*ic* are ;it*in t*e #ega# po;ers
of t*e Sangg%nians to enact.:
4his pro!ision clearly does not limit the application of
local initiati!e to ordinances, but to all Bsub2ects or
matters which are within the legal powers of the
Sangg%nians to enact, which undoubtedly includes
resolutions$C
,e#ano v. C.A.
In &orporation Law, authoriAes a dissol!ed corporation
to continue as a body corporate for - yrs$ for the
purpose of defending and prosecuting suits by or
against it, and during said period to con!ey all its
properties to a BtrusteeC for benefits of its members,
stoc1holders, creditors and other interested persons,
the transfer of the properties to the trustee being for the
protection of its creditors and stoc1holders$
Gord BtrusteeC 3 not to be understood in legal or
technical sense, but in KE5ERAL concept which
would include a lawyer to whom was entrusted the
prosecution of the cases for reco!ery of sums of
money against corporation(s debtors$
"ep%b#ic v. As%ncion
IssueD Ghether the Sandiganbayan is a regular court
within the meaning of R$A$ 8+,7R
%tatuteD RA 8+,7 which ma1es criminal actions
in!ol!ing members of the P5P come Bwithin the
eclusi!e 2urisdiction of the reg%#ar co%rts.
Fsed Bregular courtsC ? Bci!il courtsC interchangeably
&ourt martial 3 not courts within the Philippine
#udicial %ystemH they pertain to the eecuti!e
department and simply instrumentalities of the
eecuti!e power$
Regular courts 3 those within the 2udicial department
of the go!ernment namely the %& and lower courts
which includes the Sandiganbayan.
@eldD &ourts considered the purpose of the law which
is to remo!e from the court martial, the 2urisdiction
o!er criminal cases in!ol!ing members of the P5P and
to !est it in the courts within the 2udicial system$
Mo#ina v. "afferty
IssueD Ghether BAgricultural productsC includes
domesticated animals and fish grown in ponds$
%tatuteD Phrase used in ta statute which eempts such
products from payment of taes, purpose is to
encourage the de!elopment of such resources$
@eldD phrase not only includes !egetable substances
but also domestic and domesticated animals, animal
products, and fish or bangus grown in ponds$ &ourt
ga!e epansi!e meaning to promote ob2ect of law$
M%no' 3 Co. v. !ord
IssueD B&onsumptionC limited or broad meaning
%tatuteD word is used in statute which pro!ides that
Becept as herein specifically eempted, there shall be
paid by each merchant and manufacturer a ta at the
rate of *=- of *N on gross !alue of money in all goods,
wares and merchandise sold, bartered, or echanged
for domestic consumption$
@eldD &onsidering the purpose of the law, which is to
ta all merchants ecept those epressly eempted, it
is reasonable and fair to conclude that legislature used
in commercial use and not in limited sense of total
destruction of thing sold$
Mottom%# v. de #a Pa'
IssueD Ghether the word BcourtC refers to the &ourt of
Appeals or the trial courtR
%tatuteD RA 7-9- Effect of Appea#A Appeal shall not
stay the award, order, ruling, decision or 2udgment
unless the officer or body rendering the same or t*e
co%rt, on motion, after hearing ? on such terms as it
may deem 2ust should pro!ide otherwise$
@eldD It refers to the 4RIAL &OFR4$ If the ad!erse
party intends to appeal from a decision of the %E& and
pending appeal desires to stay the eecution of the
decision, then the motion must be filed with and be
heard by the %E& before the ad!erse party perfects its
appeal to the &ourt of Appeals$
Purpose of the lawD the need for immediacy of
eecution of decisions arri!ed at by said bodies was
imperati!e$
)eaning of term dictated by contet
4he contet in which the word or term is employed
may dictate a different sense
2erba accipienda s%nt sec%nd%m materiamA a word is
to be understood in the contet in which it is used$
Peop#e v. C*ave'
%tatuteD /amily home etra2udicially formed shall be
eempt from eecution, forced sale or attachment,
ecept for Bnon payment of debtsC
Gord BdebtsC 0 means obligations in general$
0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds
%tatuteD lands were classified into timber, mineral and
agricultural
Gord BagriculturalC 0 used in broad sense to include
all lands that are neither timber, nor mineral, such
being the contet in which the term is used$
Sant%#an v. E)ec%tive. Secretary.
%tatuteD A riparian owner of the property ad2oining
foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands co!ered with
water bordering upon shores of ban1s of na!igable
la1es shall ha!e preference to apply for such lands
ad2oining his property$
/actD Riparian 3 one who owns land situated on the
ban1s of ri!er$
@eldD Fsed in a more broader sense referring to a
property ha!ing a water frontage, when it mentioned
Bforeshore lands,C Bmarshy lands,C or Blands co!ered
with water$C
Peo. v. Ferrer
Bcase ;*ere conte)t may #imit t*e meaningC
GordD BO!erthrowC
%tatuteD Anti3%ub!ersion Act B1nowingly ? willfully
and by o!ert acts$C
Re2ects the metaphorical BpeacefulC sense ? limits its
meaning to Bo!erthrowC by force or !iolence$
Peo. v. +a'ario
%tatuteD )unicipal ta ordinance pro!ides Bany owner
or manager of fishpondsC shall pay an annual ta of a
fied amount per hectare and it appears that the owner
of the fishponds is the go!ernment which leased them
to a pri!ate person who operates them
GordD BOwnerC 0 does not include go!ernment as the
ancient principle that go!ernment is immune from
taes$
Ghere the law does not distinguish
1bi #e) non disting%it. nec nos disting%ere debem%s A
where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish$
&orollary principleD Keneral words or phrases in a
statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and
general significance
Keneral term or phrase should not be reduced into
parts and one part distinguished from the other to
2ustify its eclusion from operation$
&orollary principleD where the law does not ma1e any
eception, courts may not ecept something therefrom,
unless there a compelling reason to 2ustify it$
ApplicationD when legislature laid down a rule for one
class, no difference to other class$
PresumptionD that the legislature made no .ualification in
the general use of a term$
"ob#es v. 5amba#es C*romite Co.
%tatuteD grants a person against whom the possession
of Bany landC is unlawfully withheld the right to bring
an action for unlawful detainer$
@eldD any land not eclusi!e to pri!ate or not
eclusi!ely to publicH hence, includes all 1inds of land$
Director of Lands v. ,on'a#es
%tatuteD authoriAes the director of lands to file petitions
for cancellation of patents co!ering public lands on the
ground therein pro!ided$
@eldD not distinguished whether lands belong to
national or local go!ernment
SSS v. City of aco#od
IssueD eempts the payment of realty taes to
Bproperties owned by RPC
@eldD no distinction between properties held in
so!ereign, go!ernmental, or political capacity and
those possessed in proprietary or patrimonial character$
2e#asco v. Lope'
%tatuteD certain BformalitiesC be followed in order that
act may be considered !alid$
@eldD no distinction between essential or non3essential
formalities
Co#gateAPa#mo#ive P*i#s v. ,imene'
%tatuteD does not distinguish between BstabiliAer and
fla!orsC used in the preparation of food and those used
in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream
O#iva v. Lamadrid
%tatuteD allows the redemption or repurchase of a
homestead property w=in 7 years from its con!eyance
@eldD Bcon!eyanceC not distinguished 3 !oluntary or
in!oluntary$
Escos%ra v. San Mig%e# re;ery /nc.
%tatuteD grants employee Blea!es of absence with payC
@eldD Bwith payC refers to full pay and not to half or
less than full payH to all lea!es of absence and not
merely to sic1 or !acation lea!es$
O#fato v. COMELEC
%tatuteD ma1es &O)ELE& the sole 2udge of Ball pre3
proclamation contro!ersiesC
@eld D BallC 0 co!ers national, pro!incial, city or
municipal
P*i#. ritis* Ass%rance Co. v. /ntermediate Ape##ate Co%rt
%tatuteD A counterbond is to secure the payment of
Bany 2udgment,C when eecution is returned
unsatisfied
@eldD Bany 2udgmentC includes not only final and
eecutory but also 2udgment pending appeal whose
eecution ordered is returned unsatisfied$
"amire' v. CA
%tatuteD BAct to Prohibit ? PenaliAe Gire 4apping and
Other related >iolations of Pri!ate &ommunications
and Other PurposesC
BIt shall be unlawful, not being authoriAed by all the
parties to any pri!ate communication or spo1en word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other de!ice
or arrangementLC
IssueD Ghether !iolation thereof refers to the taping of
a communication ot*er t*an a participant to the
communication or e!en to the taping by a participant
who did not secure the consent of the party to the
con!ersations$
@eldD Law did not distinguish whether the party sought
to be penaliAed ought to be party other than or
different from those in!ol!ed in the pri!ate
communication$ 4he intent is to penaliAe all persons
unauthoriAed to ma1e any such recording, underscored
by BanyC
Ligget 3 Myers Tobacco Co. v. C/"
%tatuteD imposes a Bspecific taC on cigarettes
containing >irginia tobacco L$ Pro!ided that of the
length eceeds ,* millimeters or the weight per
thousand eceeds *W 1ilos, the ta shall be increased
by *66N$
IssueD whether measuring length or weight of cigars,
filters should be ecluded therefrom, so that ta would
come under the general pro!ision and not under the
pro!isoR
@eldD 5ot ha!ing distinguished between filter and non3
filter cigars, court should not distinguish$
Ti% San v. "ep%b#ic
IssueD whether the con!iction of an applicant for
naturaliAation for !iolation of a municipal ordinance
would dis.ualify him from ta1ing his oath as a citiAen$
%tatuteD An applicant may be allowed to ta1e his oath
as a citiAen after : years from the promulgation of the
decision granting his petition for naturaliAation if he
can show that during the inter!ening period Bhe has
not been con!icted of any offense or !iolation of
go!ernment rulesC
@eldD law did not ma1e any distinction between ma#a
in se and ma#a pro*ibita. &on!iction of the applicant
from !iolation of municipal ordinance is
comprehended within the statute and precludes
applicant from ta1ing his oath$
Pera#ta v. CSC
IssueD whether pro!ision of RA :8:7, that go!ernment
employees are entitled to *7 days !acation lea!es of
absence with full pay and *7 days sic1 lea!es with full
pay, eclusi!es of %aturday, %undays or holidays in
both cases, applies only to those who ha!e lea!e
credits and not to those who ha!e none$
@eldD Law spea1s of granting of a right and does not
distinguish between those who ha!e accumulated and
those who ha!e none$
Pi#ar v. COMELEC
%tatuteD RA ,*88 pro!ides that BE!ery candidate shall,
within -6 days after the day of the election file
true and itemiAed statement of all contributions and
ependitures in connection with the election$
@eldD Law did not distinguish between a candidate
who pushed through and one who withdrew it$
BE!ery candidateC refers to one who pursued and e!en
to those who withdrew his candidacy$
Sanciagco v. "ono
B;*ere t*e distinction appears from t*e stat%te. t*e
co%rts s*o%#d make t*e distinctionC
%tatuteD %ec *- of 'P 'lg$ 8+, which pro!ides thatD
9Any person holding public appointi!e or position
shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the
time he filed his certificate of candidacyC
Ko!ernors, mayors, members of !arious sangg%nians
or barangay officia#s shall upon the filing of
candidacy, be considered on forced lea!e of absence
from office
/actsD an electi!e 'arangay$ &aptain was elected
President of Association of 'arangay &ouncils and
pursuant thereto appointed by the President as member
of the Sangg%nian Pan#%ngsod. @e ran for &ongress
but lost$
IssueD @e then wants to resume his duties as member
of sangg%iniang pan#%ngsod. @e was merely forced
on lea!e when he ran for &ongress$
@eldD the %ecretary of Local Ko!ernment denied his
re.uestH being an appointi!e sangg%nian member, he
was deemed automatically resigned when he filed his
certificate of candidacy$
,arvida v. Sa#es. 6r.
IssueD whether petitioner who was o!er :* but below
:: was .ualified to be an electi!e %Q member
%tatuteD %ec$9:9 of the LK& pro!ides that a member of
the 0atip%nan ng 0abataan must not be :* yrs old$
%ec$ 9:; as additional re.uirement pro!ides that
electi!e official of Sangg%niang 0abataan must not
be more than :* yrs$ Bon the day of electionC
@eldD the distinction is apparentD the member may be
more than :* years of age on election day or on the
day he registers as member of 0atip%nan ng
0abataan. 'ut the electi!e official, must not be more
than :* years of age on the day of election$
Dis2uncti!e and con2uncti!e words
Gord BorC is a dis2uncti!e term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from
each other$
Peo v. Martin
%tatuteD %ec$ 96 of &ommonwealth Act 8*, punishes
Bany indi!idual who shall bring into or land in the
Philippines or conceals or harbors any alien not duly
admitted by any immigration officerL
does not 2ustify gi!ing the word a dis2uncti!e meaning ,
since the words Bbring intoC BlandC, BconcealsC and
BharborsC being four separate acts each possessing its
distincti!e, different and disparate meaning$
C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b
%tatuteD imposes amusement taes on gross receipts of
Bproprietor, lessee, or operator of amusement placeC
@eldD BorC implies that ta should be paid by either
proprietor, lessee, or operator, as the case may be,
single ? not by all at the same time$
Fse of BorC between : phrases connotes that either
phrase ser!es as .ualifying phrase$
BorC means BandC, G@E5 4@E %PIRI4 OR
&O54EE4 O/ 4@E LAG %O GARRA54%
Trinidad v. erm%de' (e$g$ of BorC to mean BandC"
%tatuteD %ec$ :, Rule **: of Rules of &ourt authoriAing
municipal 2udges to conduct Bpreliminary eamination
or in!estigationC
BorC e.ui!alent of Bthat is to sayC
SMC v. M%nicipa#ity of Manda%e (e$g$ of BorC e.ui!alent of
Bthat is to sayC"
OrdinanceD imposes graduated .uarterly fied ta
Bbased on the gross !alue in money or actual mar1et
!alueC of articlesH phrase Bor actual mar1et !alueC
intended to eplain Bgross !alue in money$C
BorC means successi!ely
%tatuteD Art$ -99 of the Re!ised Penal &ode 3 Bthe
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasci!iousness, shall not be prosecuted ecept upon a
complaint by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents or guardianL$C
Although these persons are mentioned dis2uncti!ely,
pro!ision must be construed as meaning that the right
to institute a criminal proceeding is eclusi!ely and
successi!ely reposed in said persons in the order
mentioned, no one shall proceed if there is any person
pre!iously mentioned therein with legal capacity to
institute the action$
BAndC is a con2unction pertinently defined as meaning
Btogether with,C B2oined with,C Balong with,C Badded to
or lin1ed toC
o 5e!er to mean BorC
o Fsed to denote 2oinder or union
Band=orC 3 means that effect should be gi!e to both
con2uncti!e and dis2uncti!e term
o term used to a!oid construction which by use
of dis2uncti!e BorC alone will eclude the
combination of se!eral of the alternati!es or
by the use of con2uncti!e BandC will eclude
the efficacy of any one of the alternati!es
standing alone$
ASSOCIATED WORDS
5oscitur a sociis
where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or e.ually susceptible of !arious meanings, its
correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is found
or with which it is associated$
to remo!e doubt refer to the meaning of associated or
companion words
%enaseda v. F#avier
%tatuteD %ec$ *-(-", Art EI of the &onstitution grants
Ombudsman power to BDirect the officer concerned to
ta1e appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his remo!al,
suspension, demotion, fine censure or prosecution$
BsuspensionC 0 is a penalty or puniti!e measure not
pre!enti!e
Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp.
%tatD %ec$ 97; of LK& authoriAed local go!ernment
units to pre!ent or suppress BKambling ? other
prohibited games of chance$C
BKamblingC 0 refers only to illegal gambling, li1e
other prohibited games of chance, must be pre!ented
or suppressed ? not to gambling authoriAed by
specific statutes$
Carandang v. Santiago
IssueD Ghether an offended party can file a separate
and independent ci!il action for damages arising from
physical in2uries during pendency of criminal action
for frustrated homicide$
%tatuteD Art$ -- of &i!il &ode Bin case of defamation,
fraud, ? physical in2uriesLC
@eldD &ourt ruled that Bphysical in2uriesC not as one
defined in RP&, but to mean bodily harm or in2ury
such as physical in2uries, frustrate homicide, or e!en
death$
Co 0im C*an v. 2a#de' Tan 0e*
IssueD Ghether proceedings in ci!il cases pending in
court under the so called Republic of the Philippines
established during the #apanese military occupation
are affected by the proclamation of Ken$ )cArthur
issued on October :-, *+99 that Ball laws, regulations
and processes of any other go!ernment in the
Philippines than that of the said &ommonwealth are
null and !oid and without legal effect$C
BProcessesC does not refer to 2udicial processes but to
the eecuti!e orders of the &hairman of the
Philippine Eecuti!e &ommittee, ordinances
promulgated by the President of so3called RP, and
others that are of the same class as the laws and
regulations with which the word BprocessesC is
associated$
Commissioner of C%stoms v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co.
%tatuteD %ec$ 8 of RA *-+9 pro!ides that Bta
pro!ided for in %ec$ * of this Act shall not be imposed
against the importation into the Philippines of
machinery or raw materials to be used by new and
necessary industry H machinery e.uipment, spare
parts, for use of industriesLC
IssueD Is the word BindustriesC used in ordinary,
generic sense, which means enterprises employing
relati!ely large amounts of capital and=or laborR
@eldD %ince BindustriesC used in the law for the :
nd
time Bis classified togetherC with the terms miners,
mining industries, planters and farmers, ob!ious
legislati!e intent is to confine the meaning of the term
to acti!ities that tend to produce or create or
manufacture such as those miners, mining enterprises,
planters and farmers$
If used in ordinary sense, it becomes inconsistent and
illogical
Peo. v. Santiago
IssueD Ghether defamatory statements through the
medium of an amplifier system constitutes slander or
libelR
LibelD committed by means of Bwriting, printing,
lithography, engra!ing, radio, cinematographic
ehibiton$C
It is argued that BamplifierC similar to radio
@eldD 5o$ Radio should be considered as same terms
with writing and printing whose common
characteristic is the Bpermanent means of
publication$C
San Mig%e# Corp. v. +L"C
IssueD Ghether claim of an employee against his
employer for cash reward or submitting process to
eliminate defects in .uality ? taste of %an )iguel
product falls within 2urisdiction of the labor arbiter of
5LR&R
@eldD 5o$ Outside of 2urisdiction$ 5ot necessary that
entire uni!erse of money claims under 2urisdiction of
labor arbiter but only those to *$" unfair labor
practices, :$" claims concerning terms ? conditions of
employment 9$" claims relating to household ser!ices
7$" acti!ities prohibited to employers ? employees$
%tatuteD B2urisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
5LR&, as last amended by 'P 'lg$ ::, including
paragraph - Ball money claims of wor1ers, including
hose based on nonpayment or underpayment of
wages, o!ertime compensation, separation pay, and
other benefits pro!ided by law or appropriate
agreement, ecept claims for employees
compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits$C
Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito
%tatuteD EO :87 outlines the procedure which
complainants charging go!ernment officials and
employees with commission of irregularities should be
guided, applies to criminal actions or complaints$
EO :87 0 Bcomplaints against public officials and
employees shall be promptly acted upon and disposed
of by the officials or authorities concerned in
accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that
the erring officials and employees can be soonest
remo!ed or otherwise disciplines and the innocent,
eonerated or !indicated in li1e manner, and to the end
also that other remedies, including court action, may
be pursued forthwith by the interested parties, after
administrati!e remedies shall ha!e been ehaustedC
@eldD eecuti!e order does not apply to criminal
actions$ 4he term is closely o!ershadowed by the
.ualification 3 9After administrative remedies s*a##
*ave been e)*a%sted.: which suggest ci!il suits
sub2ect to pre!ious administrati!e actions$
Mottom%# v. de#a Pa'
IssueD Ghether the word Tcourt( in %ec 7, Art 79-9D
Appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling,
decision or 2udgment unless the officer or body
rendering the same or the court, on motion after
hearing, and on such terms as it may deem 2ust should
pro!ide otherwise$ 4he propriety of a stay granted by
the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling,
decision or 2udgment may be raised only by motion in
the main case,C refers to the &A or to the &ourt of
Agrarian RelationsR
@eldD &orrect construction made clear with reference
to %ec$ * of RA 79-9, where the court, officers or
bodies whose decision, award are appealable to the
&ourt of Appeals, enumerated as followsD &ourt of
Agrarian Relations, %ec$ of Labor, %ocial %ecurity
&ommission etcLH /rom grouping, the enumeration
in %ec$ 7 means &ourt of Agrarian Relations not &A$
E2usdem generis (or the same 1ind or species"
Keneral ruleD where a general word or phrase follows
an enumeration of particular and specific words of the
same class or where the latter follow the former, the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include,
or to be restricted to, persons, things or cases a1in to,
resembling, or of the same 1ind or class as those
specifically mentioned$
PurposeD gi!e effect to both particular or general
words, by treating the particular words as indicating
the class and the general words as indicating all that
is embraced in said class, although not specifically
named by the particular words$
PrincipleD based on proposition that had the
legislature intended the general words to be used in
their generic and unrestricted sense, it would ha!e not
enumerated the specific words$
PresumptionD legislators addressed specifically to the
particulariAation
Illustration
M%t%c v. COMELEC
%tatuteD Act ma1es unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans,
flashlights, athletic goods, materials and t*e #ike:
@eldD and the li1e, does not embrace taped 2ingles for
campaign purposes
M%rp*y. Morris 3 Co. v. Co##ector of C%stoms
%tatuteD Dynamos, generators, eciters, and other
machinery for the generation of electricity for lighting
or for powerH
@eldD phrase Bother machineryC would not include
steam turbines, pumps, condensers, because not same
1ind of machinery with dynamos, generators and
eciters$
2era v. C%evas
%tatuteD all condensed s1immed mil1 and all mil1 in
whate!er form shall be clearly and legibly mar1ed on
its immediate containers with wordsD B4his mil1 is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than * year of
ageC
@eldD restricts the phrase Ball mil1 in whate!er form,C
ecluded filled mil1$
,rap*i#on v. M%nicipa# Co%rt of Cigara
%tatuteD the !ice3mayor shall be entitled to assume the
office of the mayor during the absence, suspension or
other temporary disability
@eldD anything which disables the mayor from
eercising the power and prerogati!es of his office,
since Btheir temporary disabilityC follows the words
BabsenceC and BsuspensionC
Peo. v. Maga##anes
Ghere a law grants a court eclusi!e 2urisdiction to
hear and decide Boffenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their
office,C the phrase BI5 RELA4IO5 4O 4@EIR
O//I&EC .ualifies or restricts the offense to one
which cannot eist without the office, or the office is a
constituent element of the crime defined in the statute
or one perpetuated in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions
C% 1n-ieng Sons. /nc. v. ord of Ta) Appea#s
IssueD whether losses due to the war were to be
deductible from gross income of *+97 when they were
sustained, or in *+76 when Philippine Gar Damage
&ommission ad!ised that no payment would be made
for said lossesR
%tatuteD BIn the case of a corporation, all losses
actually sustained and not charged off within the
taable year and not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise$C
&ontentionD the assurances of responsible public
officials before the end of *+97 that property owners
would be compensated for their losses as a result of the
war sufficed to place the losses within the phrase
Bcompensated otherwiseC than by insurance
@eldD Re2ectedS BOtherwiseC in the clause
9compensated for by ins%rance or ot*er;ise: refers to
compensation due under a title analogous or similar to
insurance$ Inasmuch as the latter is a contract
establishing a legal obligation, it follows that in order
to be deemed Bcompensated for Totherwise,( the
losses sustained by a tapayer must be co!ered by a
2udicially enforceable right, springing from any of the
2uridical sources of obligations, namely, law, contract,
.uasi3contract, torts, or crimes,C and not mere
pronouncement of public officials
Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e
IssueD Ghether teachers hired on contract basis are
entitled to ser!ice incenti!e lea!e benefits as against
the claim that they are not soR
%tatuteD Rule > of IRR of Labor &odeD B4his rule (on
ser!ice incenti!e lea!es" shall apply to all employees,
ecept Bfiled personnel and other employees whose
performance is unsuper!ised by the employer
including those who are engaged on tas1 or contract
basis$C
@eldD Bthose who were employed on tas1 or contract
basisC should be related with Bfield personnel,C apply
the principle, clearly teachers are not field personnel
and therefore entitled to ser!ice incenti!e lea!e
benefits$
Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises v. CA
IssueD whether the phrase Bother lawful be!eragesC
which gi!es protection to manufacturer with the Phil$
Patent Office its duly stamped or mar1ed bottles used
for Bsoda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, mil1,
cream or other lawful be!erages,C includes hard
li.uorR
%tatute titleD BAn Act to regulate the use of stamped or
mar1ed bottles, boes, cas1s, 1egs, barrels, ? other
similar containers$C
@eldD 4he title clearly shows intent to gi!e protection
to all mar1ed bottles of all lawful be!erages regardless
of nature of contents$
+ationa# Po;er Corp. v. Angas
IssueD whether the term 2udgment, refers to any
2udgment directing the payment of legal interest$
%tatuteD &entral 'an1 &ircular I 9*8 0 Bby !irtue of
the authority granted to it under %ec$ * of Act 5umber
:877, as amended, otherwise 1nown as Fsury Law, the
)onetary 'oard in a resolution prescribed that the rate
of interest for loan or forbearance of any money, good
or credit ? the rate allowed in 2udgment in the absence
of epress contract shall be *:N per annum$
@eldD #udgments should mean only 2udgments
in!ol!ing loans or forbearance money, goods or credit,
these later specific terms ha!ing restricted the meaning
B2udgmentsC to those same class or the same nature as
those specifically enumerated$
"ep%b#ic v. Migrino
/actsD retired military officer was in!estigated by the
P&KK for !iolation of Anti3Kraft Act in relation to EO
I * ? : authoriAing the P&KK to reco!er ill3gotten
wealth from the former President(s Bsubordinates and
close associatesC
IssueD Does P&KK ha!e 2urisdiction to in!estigate
such military officer for being in ser!ice during the
administration of the former PresidentR
@eldD B%ubordinatesC refers only to one who en2oys
close association or relation to the former President
and his wifeH term Bclose associatesC restricted the
meaning of BsubordinatesC
Limitations of e2usdem generis
Re.uisitesD
o %tatute contains an enumeration of particular
? specific words, followed by general word
or phrase
o Particular and specific words constitute a
class or are the same 1ind
o Enumeration of the particular ? specific
words is not ehausti!e or is not merely by
eamples
o 4here is no indication of legislati!e intent to
gi!e the general words or phrases a broader
meaning
Rule of e-%sdem generis. is not of uni!ersal
applicationH it should use to carry out, not defeat the
intent of the law$
1S v. Santo +ino
%tatuteD It shall be unlawful to for any person to carry
concealed about his person any bowie, 1nife, dagger,
1ris or other deadly weapon$ Provided prohibition
shall not apply to firearms who ha!e secured a license
or who are entitled to carry the same under the
pro!isions of this Act$C
IssueD does Bthe deadly weaponC include an unlicensed
re!ol!erR
@eldD MesS &arrying such would be in !iolation of
statute$ 'y the pro!iso, it manifested its intention to
include in the prohibition weapons other than armas
blancas therein specified$
Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises. /nc. v. CA & previo%s page. sa
1abilang column
"oman Cat*o#ic Arc*bis*op of Mani#a v. Socia# Sec%rity
Commission
IssueD a religious institution in!o1ing e-%sdem generi
whether TemployerC be limited to underta1ing an
acti!ity which has an element of profit or gainR
%tatuteD Bany person, natural or 2uridical, domestic or
foreign, who carried in the Philippines any trade,
business, industryL$ and uses the ser!ices of another
person, who under his orders as regard the
employment, ecept the Ko!ernment, and any of its
political subdi!isions branches or instrumentalities and
KO&&sC$
@eldD 5o$ the rule of e-%sdem generis applies only
when there is uncertainty$ 4he definition is sufficiently
comprehensi!e to include charitable institutions and
charities not for profitH it contained eceptions which
said institutions and entities are not included$
Epressio unius est eclusion alterius
4he epress mention of one person, thing or
conse.uence implies the eclusion of all others$
Rule may be epressed in a number of waysD
o E)press%m facit cessare tacit%m A what is
epressed puts an end to that which is implied
where a statute, by its terms, is epressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be etended to
other matters$
o E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s non
e)ceptis 3 A thing not being ecepted must be
regarded as coming within the pur!iew of the
general rule
o E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s 3 4he
epression of one or more things of a class
implies the eclusion of all not epressed,
e!en though all would ha!e been implied had
none been epressedH opposite the doctrine of
necessary implication
5egati!e3opposite doctrine
Arg%ment%m a contrarioA what is epressed puts an
end to what is implied$
C*%ng Fook v. @*ite
%tatuteD case eempts the wife of a naturaliAed
American from detention, for treatment in a hospital,
who is afflicted with a contagious disease$
@eldD &ourt denied petition for writ of habeas corpus
(filed by the nati!e3born American citiAen on behalf of
wife detained in hospital", court resorted to negati!e3
opposite doctrine, stating that statute plainly relates to
wife of a naturaliAed citiAen ? cannot interpolate
Bnati!e3bornC citiAen$
AnalysisD court(s application results to in2ustice (as
should not discriminate against nati!e3born citiAens",
which is not intent of law, should ha!e used doctrine
of necessary implication$
Application of e)pression %ni%s rule
Kenerally used in construction of statutes granting
powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting
common rights, imposing rights ? forfeitures, as well
as statutes strictly construed$
Acosta v. F#or
%tatuteD specifically designates the persons who may
bring actions for $%o ;arranto. ecludes others from
bringing such actions$
Escribano v. Avi#a
%tatuteD for libel, Bpreliminary in!estigations of
criminal actions for written defamation shall be
conducted by the city fiscal of pro!ince or city or by
municipal court of city or capital of the pro!ince where
such actions may be instituted precludes all other
municipal courts from conducting such preliminary
in!estigations
Peo. v. Lantin
%tatuteD crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, rape or acts
of lasci!iousnessH crimes such as slander can be
prosecuted de oficio.
)ore short eamples on p$ ::7
Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA
Santos v. CA
Ler%m v. Cr%'
Centra# arrio v. City Treas%rer of Davao
2era v. Fernande'
%tatuteD All claims for money against the decedent,
arising from contracts, epress or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral epenses and epenses for the last sic1ness of
the decedent, and 2udgment for money against
decedent, must be filled within the time limit of the
notice, otherwise barred fore!er$
@eldD 4he taes due to the go!ernment, not being
mentioned in the rule are ecluded from the operation
of the rule$
Mendeni##a v. Omandia
%tatuteD changed the form of go!ernment of a
municipality into a city pro!ides that the incumbent
mayor, !ice3mayor and members of the municipal
board shall continue in office until the epiration of
their terms$
@eldD all other municipal offices are abolished$
%tte v. Man%e# 1y 3 Sons. /nc.
%tatuteD Legislature deliberately selected a particular
method of gi!ing notice, as when a co3owner is gi!en
the right of legal redemption within -6 days from
notice in writing by the !endor in case the other co3
owner sells his share is the co3owned property,
@eldD the method of gi!ing notice must be deemed
ecusi!e ? a notice sent by !endee is ineffecti!e$
2i##an%eva v. City of /#oi#o
%tatuteD Local Autonomy Act, local go!ernments are
gi!en broad powers to ta e!erything, ecept those
which are specifically mentioned therein$ If a sub2ect
matter does not come within the eceptions, an
ordinance imposing a ta on such sub2ect matter is
deemed to come within the broad taing power,
e)ception firmat reg%#am in casib%s non e)ceptis.
Samson v. Co%rt of Appea#s
Ghere the law pro!ides that positions in the
go!ernment belong to the competiti!e ser!ice, ecept
those declared by law to be in the noncompetiti!e
ser!ice and those which are policy3determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical in nature and
enumerates those in the noncompetiti!e as including
%E&RE4ARIE% O/ KO>ER5OR% A5D )AMOR%,
the clear intent is that assistant secretaries of go!ernors
and mayors fall under the competiti!e ser!ice, for by
ma1ing an enumeration, the legislature is presumed to
ha!e intended to eclude those not enumerated, for
otherwise it would ha!e included them in the
enumeration
Firman ,enera# /ns%rance Corp. v. CA
4he insurance company disclaimed liability since
death resulting from murder was impliedly ecluded in
the insurance policy as the cause of death is not
accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act,
ecluded by the !ery nature of a personal accident
insurance$
@eldD the principle Bepresssio unius est eclusio 3 the
mention of one thing implies the eclusion of the other
thing 3 not ha!ing been epressly included in the
enumeration of circumstances that would negate
liability in said insurance policy cannot be considered
by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance
company to include death resulting from murder or
assault among the prohibited ris1s lead ine!itably to
the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or eempt
itself from liability for such death
Insurance company still liable for the in2ury, disability
and loss suffered by the insured$ (sobra Tto, I swearS
)inurder na nga, ayaw pang bayaranS %obraS @indi
daw accidentalL eh di mas lalo ng 1ailangang bayaran
dahil murderS %usS %usS"
Centeno v. 2i##a#onAPorni##os
IssueD whether the solicitation for religious purposes,
i$e$, reno!ation of church without securing permit fro
Department of %ocial %er!ices, is a !iolation of PD
*789, ma1ing it a criminal offense for a person to
solicit or recei!e contributions for charitable or public
welfare purposes$
@eldD 5o$ &haritable and religious specifically
enumerated only goes to show that the framers of the
law in .uestion ne!er intended to include solicitations
for religious purposes within its co!erage$
Limitations of the rule
*$ It is not a rule of law, but merely a tool in statutory
construction
2. E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s. no more than
auiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where
other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was
not intended to be eclusi!e$
-$ Does not apply where enumeration is by way of
eample or to remo!e doubts only$
,ome' v. 2ent%ra
IssueD whether the prescription by a physician of
opium for a patient whose physical condition did not
re.uire the use of such drug constitutes
Bunprofessional conductC as to 2ustify re!ocation of
physician(s license to practice
@eldD %till liableS Rule of e)pressio %ni%s not
applicable
&ourt said, I cannot be seriously contended that aside
from the fi!e eamples specified, there can be no other
conduct of a physician deemed Tunprofessional$( 5or
can it be con!incingly argued that the legislature
intended to wipe out all other forms of
Tunprofessional( conduct therefore deemed grounds for
re!ocation of licenses
9$ Does not apply when in case a statute appears upon its
face to limit the operation of its pro!ision to particular
persons or things enumerating them, but no reason
eists why other persons or things not so enumerated
should not ha!e been included and manifest in2ustice
will follow by not including them$
7$ If it will result in incongruities or a !iolation of the
e.ual protection clause of the &onstitution$
8$ If adherence thereto would cause incon!enience,
hardship and in2ury to the public interest$
Doctrine of casus omissus
A person, ob2ect or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to ha!e been omitted intentionally$
4he maim operates only if and when the omission has
been clearly established, and in such a case what is
omitted in the enumeration may not, by construction,
be included therein$
EceptionD where legislature did not intend to eclude
the person, thing or ob2ect from the enumeration$ If
such legislati!e intent is clearly indicated, the court
may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the
clear intent of the legislature and will not do !iolence
to its language
Doctrine of last antecedent
Pualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated not
those which are distantly or remotely located$
Ad pro)im%m antecedens fiat re#atio nisi impediat%r
sententia & relati!e words refer to the nearest
antecedents, unless the contet otherwise re.uires
RuleD use of a comma to separate an antecedent from
the rest eerts a dominant influence in the application
of the doctrine of last antecedent$
Illustration of rule
Pangi#inan v. A#vendia
)embers of the family of the tenant includes the
tenant(s son, son3in3law, or grandson, e!en though
they are not dependent upon him for support and li!ing
separately from him 'E&AF%E the .ualifying phrase
Bwho are dependent upon him for supportC refers
solely to its last antecedent, namely, Bsuch other
person or persons, whether related to the tenant or notC
F#orentino v. P+
IssueD whether holders of bac1pay certificates can
compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said
certificates in payment of the holder(s obligations to
the ban1$
%tatuteD Bobligations subsisting at the time of the
appro!al of this amendatory act for which the
applicant may directly be liable to the go!ernment or
to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or to
corporations owned or controlled by the go!ernment,
or to any citiAens of the Philippines or to any
association or corporation organiAed under the laws of
the Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the same
for such settlementC
@eldD the court, in!o1ing the doctrine of last
antecedent, ruled that the phrase .ualify only to its last
antecedent namely Bany citiAen of the Philippines or
association or corporation organiAed under the laws of
the PhilippinesC
4he court held that bac1pay certificate holders can
compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said
certificates for payment of their obligations with the
ban1$
Pualifications of the doctrine$
*$ %ub2ect to the eception that where the intention of the
law is to apply the phrase to all antecedents embraced
in the pro!ision, the same should be made etensi!e to
the whole$
:$ Doctrine does not apply where the intention is not to
.ualify the antecedent at all$
Reddendo singular singuilis
>ariation of the doctrine of last antecedent
Referring each to eachH
Referring each phrase or epression to its appropriate
ob2ect, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the
word should be ta1en distributi!ely$
Peo. v Tamani
IssueD when to count the *73day period within which to
appeal a 2udgment of con!iction of criminal actionX
date of promulgation of 2udgment or date of receipt of
notice of 2udgment$
%tatuteD %ec$ 8, Rule *:: of the Rules of &ourt
@eldD %hould be from Tpromulgation( should be
referring to T2udgment,( while notice refer to order$
0ing v. !ernande'
IssueD Ghether a &hinese holding a noncontrol
position in a retail establishment, comes within the
prohibition against aliens inter!ening Bin the
management, operation, administration or controlC
followed by the phrase Bwhether as an officer,
employee or laborerL
@eldD /ollowing the principle, the entire scope of
personnel acti!ity, including that of laborers, is
co!ered by the prohibition against the employment of
aliens$
Amadora v. CA
IssueD whether Art :*;6 of &i!il &ode, which states
that Blastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trade shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices so long as they
remain in their custodyC applies to all schools,
academic as well as non3academic
@eldD teachers pupils and studentsH heads of
establishments of arts and trades to apprentices
Keneral ruleD responsibility for the tort committed by
the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student (where school is academic"
EceptionD responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the head, and only he, (who"
shall be held liable (in case of the establishments of
arts and tradesH technical or !ocational in nature"
PROVISOS, E,CEPTIONS AND CLAUSES
Pro!isos, generally
to limit the application of the enacting clause, section
or pro!ision of a statute, or ecept something, or to
.ualify or restrain its generality, or eclude some
possible ground of misinterpretation of it, as etending
to cases not intended by legislature to be brought
within its pur!iew$
RuleD restrain or .ualify the generality of the enacting
clause or section which it refers$
PurposeD limit or restrict the general language or
operation of the statute, not to enlarge it$
LocationD commonly found at the end of a statute, or
pro!ision ? introduced, as a rule, by the word
BPro!idedC$
Determined byD Ghat determines whether a clause is a
pro!iso is its substance rather than its form$ If it
performs any of the functions of a pro!iso, then it will
be regarded as such, irrespecti!e of what word or
phrase is used to introduce it$
Pro!iso may enlarge scope of law
It is still the duty of the courts to ascertain the
legislati!e intention and it pre!ails o!er pro!iso$
4hus it may enlarge, than restrict
1.S. v. Santo +ino
%tatuteD it shall be unlawful for any person to carry
concealed about his person any bowie, 1nife, dagger,
1ris or any other deadly weaponD Provided. that this
pro!ision shall not apply to firearms in the possession
of persons who ha!e secured a license therefore or
who are entitled to same under pro!isions of this Act$
@eldD through the Pro!iso it manifested the intention to
include in the prohibition weapons other than armas
b#ancas as specified$
Pro!iso as additional legislation
Epressed in the opening statement of a section of a
statute
Gould mean eactly the re!erse of what is necessarily
implied when read in connection with the limitation
PurposeD
o 4o limit generalities
o Eclude from the scope of the statute that
which otherwise would be within its terms
Ghat pro!iso .ualifies
Keneral ruleD .ualifies or modifies only the phrase
immediately preceding itH or restrains or limits the
generality of the clause that it immediately follows$
EceptionD unless it clearly appears that the legislature
intended to ha!e a wider scope
C*inese F#o%r /mporters Assn v. Price Stabi#i'ation oard
%tatuteD %ec$ *7 RA 9:8 3 Any eisting law, eecuti!e
order or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, no
go!ernment agency ecept the Import &ontrol
&ommission shall allocate the import .uota among the
!arious importers$ Provided. 4hat the Philippine
Rehabilitation and 4rade Administration shall ha!e
eclusi!e power and authority to determine and
regulate the allocation of wheat flour among
importers$C
IssueD whether or not the pro!iso ecluded wheat flour
from the scope of act itself$
@eldD 5OS Pro!iso refer to the clause immediately
preceding it and can ha!e no other meaning than that
the function of allocating the wheat flour instead of
assigning to Import &ontrol &ommission was assigned
to PR4A$
If wheat flour is eempted from the pro!isions of the
Act, the pro!iso would ha!e been placed in the section
containing the repealing clause
Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e v. Ange#es
Ghen an earlier section of statute contains pro!iso, not
embodied in later section, the pro!iso, not embodied in
a later section thereof, in the absence of legislati!e
intent, be confined to .ualify only the section to which
it has been appended$
F#ores v. Miranda
IssueD Petitioner that appro!al of the Public %er!ice
&ommission of the sale of public ser!ice !ehicle was
not necessary because of pro!iso in %ec$ :6 of
&ommonwealth Act 5o$ *98
%tatuteD It shall be unlawful for any public ser!ice
!ehicle or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof,
without the pre!ious appro!al and authority of the
&ommission pre!iously had to sell, alienate
its property, franchiseH Provided. *o;ever. that nothing
herein contained shall be construed to pre!ent the
transaction from being negotiated or completed before
its appro!al or to pre!ent the sale, alienation, or lease
by any public ser!ice of any of its property in the
ordinary course of businessC
@eldD
o the pro!iso means only that the sale
without the re.uired appro!al is still !alid and
binding between the partiesH also
o the phrase Bin the ordinary course of business
could not ha!e been intended to include
sale of !ehicle itself, but at most may refer
only to such property that may be concei!ably
disposed of by the carrier in the ordinary
course of its business, li1e 2un1ed e.uipment$
Mercado Sr. v. +L"C
@eldD the pro!iso in par : of Art :;6 relates only to
casual employeesH not to pro2ect employees$
Applying rule that pro!iso to be construed with
reference to immediately preceding part of the
pro!ision which it is attached and not to other sections
thereof, unless legislati!e intent was to restrict or
.ualify$
Eception to the rule
Pro!iso construed to .ualify only the immediately
preceding part of the section to which it is attachedH if
no contrary legislati!e intent is indicated$
Ghere intent is to .ualify or restrict the phrase
preceding it or the earlier pro!isions of the statute or
e!en the statute itself as a whole, then the pro!iso will
be construed in that manner, in order that the intent of
the law may be carried out
Repugnancy between pro!iso and main pro!ision
Ghere there is a conflict between the pro!iso and the
main pro!ision, that which is located in a later portion
of the statute pre!ails, unless there is legislati!e intent
to the contrary$
Latter pro!ision, whether pro!ision or not, is gi!en
preference for it is the latest epression of the intent of
the legislation$
Eceptions, generally
Eception consists of that which would otherwise be
included in the pro!ision from which it is ecepted$
It is a clause which eempts something from the
operation of a statute by epress words$
Becept,C Bunless otherwise,C and Bshall not applyC
)ay not be introduced by words mentioned abo!e, as
long as if such remo!es something from the operation
of a pro!ision of law$
/unctionD to confirm the general ruleH .ualify the
words or phrases constituting the general rule$
E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s e)ceptis A A thing
not being ecepted, must be regarded as coming within
the pur!iew of the general rule$
DoubtsD resol!ed in fa!or of general rule
Eception and Pro!iso distinguished
EceptionD
Eempts something absolutely from the operation of
statute
4a1es out of the statute something that otherwise
would be a part of the sub2ect matter of it$
Part of the enactment itself, absolutely ecluding from
its operation some sub2ect or thing that would
otherwise fall within the scope$
Pro!isoD
Defeats its operation conditionally$
A!oids by way of defeasance or ecuse
If the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a
new pro!ision, by way of amendment, pro!iding
conditionally for a new case3 this is the nature of
pro!iso$
%imilarD in a way since one of the functions of pro!iso is to
ecept something from an enacting clause$
Illustration of eception

ME"ALCO v. P%b#ic 1ti#ities Emp#oyeesD Association
%tatuteD 5o person, firm, or corporation, business
establishment or place shall compel an employee or
laborer to wor1 on %undays? legal holidays, unless
paid an additional sum of at least :7N of his
renumerationD Provided. that this prohibition shall not
apply to public utilities performing public ser!ice, e$g$
supplying gas, electricity, power, water etcL
IssueD Is )ERAL&O liable to pay the :7N for
employees who wor1 during holidays and %undaysR
@eldD 5egati!e$ :
nd
part is an eception although
introduced by BPro!ided$C As appellant is a public
utility that supplies electricity ? pro!ides means of
transportation, it is e!ident that appellant is eempt
from .ualified prohibition established in the enactment
clause$
To#entino v. Secretary of Finance
%tatuteD 5o bill shall be passed by either @ouse shall
become a law unless it has passed - readings on
separate days, ? printed copies thereof in its final form
ha!e been distributed to its )embers - days before its
passage, e)cept when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency$
@eldD it .ualifies only its nearest antecedent, which is
the distribution of the printed bill in its final form -
days from its final passage$? not the - readings on
separate days$
Pendon v. Diasnes
IssueD whether a person con!icted of a crime against
property, who was granted absolute pardon by the
President, is entitled to !oteR
%tatuteD A person shall not be .ualified to !ote Bwho
has been sentenced by final 2udgment to suffer one
year or more from imprisonment, such disability not
ha!ing been remo!ed any plenary pardonC or Bwho has
been declared by final 2udgment guilty of any crime
against property$C
*
st
clause3 : ecpetions 0 (a" Person penaliAed by less
than * yr$H and (:" Person granted an absolute pardon
:
nd
clause 3 creates eception to *
st
but not to :
nd
that a
person con!icted of crime against property cannot !ote
unless there(s pardon$
@eldD absolute pardon for any crime for which one
year of imprisonment or more was meted out restores
the prisoner to his political rights$
If penalty less * yr, dis.ualification not apply, ecept
when against property3 needs pardon$
4he :
nd
clause creates the eception to the *
st

,orospe v. CA Be)ception need not be introd%ced by 9e)cept:
or 9%n#ess:C
%tatuteD Rule :, of Rules of &ourt, Bser!ice by
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the
addresseeH but if fail to claim his mail from the post
office within 7 days from ate of first notice of the
postmaster, ser!ice shall ta1e effect at the epiration of
such time$C
IssueD Ghether actual receipt the date of a registered
mail after 7 day period, is the date from which to count
the prescripti!e period to comply with certain
re.uirements$
@eldD %er!ice is completed on the 7
th
day after the *
st
notice, e!en if he actually recei!ed the mail months
later$
:
nd
part is separated by semicolon, and begins with
Tbut( which indicates eception$
%a!ing clause
Pro!ision of law which operates to ecept from the
effect of the law what the clause pro!ides, or sa!e
something which would otherwise be lost$
Fsed to sa!e something from effect of repeal of statute
Legislature, in repealing a statute, may preser!e in the
form of a sa!ing clause, the right of the state to
prosecute and punish offenses committed in !iolation
of the repealed law$
Ghere eisting procedure is altered or substituted by
another, usual to sa!e proceedings under the old law
at the time the new law ta1es effect, by means of
sa!ing clause
&onstruedD in light of intent by legislature
Ki!en strict or liberal meaning depending on nature of
statute$
CHAPTER SI,: Statute Construe" as W$o'e an" !n
Re'at!on to ot$er Statutes
STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
Kenerally
%tatute is passed as a whole
o It should ha!e one purpose and one intent
o &onstrue its parts and section in connection
with other parts
o GhyR 4o BproduceC a harmonious whole
5e!erD
o Di!ide by process of etymological
dissertation (whyR 'ecause there are
instances when the intention of the legislati!e
body is different from that of the definition in
its original sense"
o %eparate the words (remember that the whole
point of this chapter is to construe it as a
whole"
o %eparate contet
o 'ase definitions on leicographer (what is a
leicographerR A person who studies
leicography$ Ghat is leicography thenR
AnalyAes semantic relationships between
leicon and language 0 not important$ 5e!er
mind " 0 ang 1ulitS
4he whole point of this part is to construe the whole
statute and its part together (actually 1ahit ito nalang
tandaan hanggang matapos 1asi ito lang yung sinasabi
ng boo1"
Intent ascertained from statute as whole
Legislati!e meaning and intent should be
etracted=ascertained from statutes as a whole (hence
the titleL"
o GhyR 'ecause the law is the best epositor of
itself
Optima Statuti Interpretatio est ipsum statutum 3 the
best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself
o Yremember t*is story to memori'e t*e ma)imD
Optima at %tatuti /rutti where interpreting as
to why when coc1roaches(IPI%" when added
results to %F) (ipsum" a stadium (statutum"Z
0 sorry bloc1mates, weird si cherryS
Do not in.uire too much into the moti!es which
influenced the legislati!e body unless the moti!e is
stated or disclosed in the statute themsel!es$
Aisporna v. CA
pointed out that words, clauses, phrases should not be
studied as detached=isolated epressions
o &onsider e!ery part in understanding the
meaning of its part to produce a harmonious
whole
o )eaning of the law is borne in mind and not
to be etracted from a single word
o )ost importantD E!ery part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the contet
Aboiti' S*ipping Corp v. City of Ceb%
Described that if the words or phrases of statute be
ta1en indi!idually it might con!ey a meaning different
form the one intended by the author$
Interpreting words or phrases separately may limit the
etent of the application of the pro!ision
,aanan v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt
&ase of wire tapping
4here is a pro!ision which states that B it shall be
unlawful for any person, not being authoriAed by all
the parties to any pri!ate communication or spo1en
word to tap any wire or cable or by using any other
de!ice or arrangement, to secretly o!erhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spo1en word by
using such de!ice commonly 1nown as dictagraphLC
IssueD whether the phrase de!ice or arrangement
includes party line and etension
%tatconD it should not be construed in isolation$ Rather
it should be interpreted in relation to the other words
(tap, to o!erhear" thus party line or telephone
etension is not included because the words in the
pro!ision limit it to those that ha!e a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of de!ice to o!erhear$ (Remember the
maim noscitus a sociis because in here they applied
an association with other words in construing the
intention or limitation of the statute"
+ationa# Tobacco Administration v. COA
IssueD whether educational assistance gi!en to
indi!iduals prior to the enactment of RA 8,7; should
be continued to be recei!edR
@eldD Mes$ Proper interpretation of section*: RA 8,7;
depends on the combination of first and second
paragraph
/irst sentence states that Bsuch other additional
compensation not otherwise specified as may be
determined by the D') shall be deemed included in
the standardiAed salary rates herein prescribed$C 4he
second sentence states Bsuch other additional
compensation, whether in cash or in 1ind, being
recei!ed by incumbents only as of #uly *, *+;+ not
integrated into the standard shall continue to be
authoriAed$C (you can as1 cheery na lang to eplain it,
ang haba ng nasa boo1 "
statconD do not isolate or detach the parts$ &onstruing a
statute as a whole includes reconciling and
harmoniAing conflicting pro!isions
Purpose or contet as controlling guide
construe whole statute and ascertain the meaning of
the words or phrases base on its contet, the nature of
the sub2ect, and purpose or intention of the legislati!e
body who enacted the statute
gi!e it a reasonable construction
Leeway are accepted on grammatical construction,
letters of the statutes, rhetorical framewor1 if it can
pro!ide a clear and definite purpose of the whole
statute ( as long as it can produce a clear and definite
statutes, it is sometimes affected to be la on the
construction of grammar"
@armoniAe the parts of each other and it should be
consistent with its scope and ob2ect
Ki!ing effect to statute as a whole
Ghy construe a statute as a wholeR 3 'ecause it
implies that one part is as important as the other
Ghat if the pro!ision=section is unclear by itselfR 3
One can ma1e it clear by reading and construing it in
relation to the whole statute
@ow do you properly and intelligently construe a
pro!ision=statuteR 3 - waysD (*" Fnderstand its
meaning and scopeH (:" apply to an actual caseH (-"
courts should consider the whole act itself
Ghy should e!ery part of the statute be gi!en effectR 3
'ecause it is enacted as an integrated measure not a
hodgepodge of conflicting pro!isions
Gays on how the courts should construe a statute
(according to "ep%b#ic v. "eyes"D
o Interpret the thought con!eyed by the statute
as whole
o &onstrue constituent parts together
o Ascertain legislati!e intent form whole part
o &onsider each and e!ery pro!ision in light of
the general purpose
o )a1e e!ery part effecti!e, harmonious and
sensible (adopt a construction which would
gi!e effect to e!ery part of the of the statute"
Ft res magis !aleat .uam pereat 3 the
construction is to be sought which
gi!es effect to the whole of the
statute 3 of its e!ery word$
Apparently conflicting pro!isions reconciled
included in the rule of construing statute as a whole, is
the reconciling and harmoniAing conflicting pro!isions
because it is by this that the statute will be gi!en effect
as a whole$
Ghy is it a must for courts to harmoniAe conflicting
pro!isionR 3 'ecause they are e.ually the handiwor1 of
the same legislature
"P v. CA
IssueD whether or not an appeal of cases in!ol!ing 2ust
compensation should be made first by DARA' before
R4& under %ec$ 7,
@eldD %& said that the contention of the Republic and
the Land 'an1 in the affirmati!e side has no merit
because although DARA' is granted a 2urisdiction
o!er agrarian reform matters, it does not ha!e
2urisdiction o!er criminal cases$
Sa-onas v. CA
IssueD what period an ad!erse claim annotated at the
bac1 of a transfer certificate effecti!eR
@eldD In construing the law %ec$ ,6 of PD *7:+
(ad!erse claim shall be effecti!e for a period of -6
days from the date of the registrationL" care should be
ta1en to ma1e e!ery part effecti!e
%pecial and general pro!isions in same statute
special would o!errule the general
special must be operati!eH general affect only those it
applies
ecept to general pro!ision
&onstruction as not to render pro!ision nugatory
another conse.uence of the ruleD pro!ision of a statute
should not be construed as to nullify or render another
nugatory in the same statute
Interpretatio fienda est et res magis !aleat .uam pereat
3 a law should be interpreted with a !iew to upholding
rather than destroying
o Do not construe a statute wherein one portion
will destroy the other
o A!oid a construction which will render to
pro!ision inoperati!e
Reason for the rule
because of the presumption that the legislature has
enacted a statute whose pro!isions are in harmony and
consistent with each other and that conflicting
intentions is the same statute are ne!er supported or
regarded
Pualification of rule
Ghat if the parts cannot be harmoniAed or reconciled
without nullifying the otherR 3 Rule is for the court to
re2ect the one which is least in accord with the general
plan of the whole statute
Ghat if there is no choiceR 3 the latter pro!ision must
!acate the formerH last in order is fre.uently held to
pre!ail unless intent is otherwise
Ghat if the conflict cannot be harmoniAed and made to
stand togetherR 3 one must in.uire into the
circumstances of their passage
&onstruction as to gi!e life to law
pro!ide sensible interpretation to promote the ends of
which they were enacted
construct them in a reasonable and practical way to
gi!e life to them
Interpretatio fienda es ut res magis !aleat .uam pereat
3 interpretation will gi!e the efficacy that is to be
adopted$
&onstruction to a!oid surplusage
construe the statute to ma1e no part or pro!ision
thereof as surplasage
each and e!ery part should be gi!en due effect and
meaning
do not construe a legal pro!ision to be a useless
surplusage and meaningless
eert all efforts to pro!ide the meaning$ GhyR 'ecause
of the presumption that the legislature used the word or
phrase for a purpose
Application of rule
Me-ia v.a#a#ong
IssueD how to constru Bnet general electionC in %ec$
;; of the &ity &harter of Dagupan &ityR
@eldD the phrase refers to the net general election
after the city came into being and not the one after its
organiAation by Presidential Proclamation$
+iere v. CF/ of +egros Occidenta#
IssueD does the city mayor ha!e the power to appoint a
city engineer pursuant to %ec$ * of the &ity &harter of
La &arlote
@eldD no, the city mayor does not ha!e such power$
4he phrase Band other heads and other employees of
such departments as may be createdC whom the mayor
can appoint, refers to the heads of city departments
that may be created after the law too1 effect, and does
not embrace the city engineer$ 4o rule otherwise is to
render the first con2unction BandC before the words
Bfire departmentC a superfluity and without meaning at
all
1ytengs% v "ep%b#ic
IssueD whether the re.uirement the re.uirement for
naturaliAation that the applicant Bwill reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citiAenshipC refers to actual residence or
merely to legal residence or domicile
@eldD such re.uirement refers to actual or physical
residence because to construe it otherwise is to render
the clause a surplusage$
An applicant for naturaliAation must be actually
residing in the Philippines from the filing of the
petition for naturaliAation to its determination by the
court
Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA
IssueD whether the reclaimed land is patrimonial or
public dominionR
@eldD to say that the land is patrimonial will render
nugatory and a surplusage the phrase of the law to the
effect that the &ity of )anila Bis hereby authoriAed to
lease or sellC
A sale of public dominion needs a legislati!e
authoriAation, while a patrimonial land does not$
%tatute and its amendments construed together
rule applies to the construction and its amendments
Ghate!er changes the legislature made it should be
gi!en effect together with the other parts$
A#meda v. F#orentino
Law 0 Bthe municipal board shall ha!e a secretary who
shall be appointed by it to ser!e during the term of
office of the members thereofC
Amendment 0 Bthe !ice3mayor shall appoint all
employees of the board who may be suspended or
remo!ed in accordance with lawC
&onstruction of both Law and Amendment 0 the
power of the !ice3mayor to ma1e appointment
pursuant to the amendatory act is limited to the
appointment of all employees of the board other than
the board secretary who is to be appointed by the
board itself
STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO
CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES
%tatute construed in harmony with the &onstitution
&onstitution3 the fundamental law to which all laws
are subser!ient
Keneral RuleD Do not interpret a statute independent
from the constitution
&onstrue the statute in harmony with the fundamental
lawD GhyR 'ecause it is always presumed that the
legislature adhered to the constitutional limitations
when they enacted the statute
It is also important to understand a statute in light of
the constitution and to a!oid interpreting the former in
conflict with the latter
Ghat if the statute is susceptible to two constructions,
one is constitutional and the other is unconstitutionalR
AD 4he construction that should be adopted should be
the one that is constitutional and the one that will
render it in!alid should be re2ected$
4he &ourt should fa!or the construction that gi!es a
statute of sur!i!ing the test of constitutionality
4he &ourt cannot in order to bring a statute within the
fundamental law, amend it by construction
TaEada v. T%vera
this is the case regarding Art$ : of the &i!il &ode
especially the phrase Bunless otherwise pro!idedC$
%tatconD one should understand that if the phrase refers
to the publication itself it would !iolate the
constitution (since all laws should be made public" Yif
malabo, !ague, ehR huhR 0 cherry will eplain it na
lang Z
%tatutes in Pari Materia
pari materia 3 refers to any the followingD
o same person or thing
o same purpose of ob2ect
o same specific sub2ect matter
Later statutes may refer to prior laws$
Ghat if the later law ha!e no reference to the prior
law, does that mean they are not in pari materiaR 3 5o$
It is sufficient that they ha!e the same sub2ect matter$
Ghen is a statute not in pari materiaR 3 4he conditions
abo!e are the determinants of ascertaining if a statute
is in pari materia, thus e!en if two statutes are under
the same broad sub2ect as along as their specific
sub2ects are not the same, they are 5O4 in pari
material
@ow statutes in Pari Materia construed
Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus
interpretandi modus 0 e!ery statute must be so
construed and harmoniAed with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of 2urisprudence (parang ganun
din nung first part, construe it as a whole$ 'ut also bear
in mind that it should also be in harmony with other
eisting laws"
&onstrue statutes in pari materia together to attain the
purpose of an epress national policy
Ghy should they be construed togetherR 3 'ecause of
the assumption that when the legislature enacted the
statutes they were thin1ing of the prior statute$ Prior
statutes relating to the same sub2ect matter are to be
compared with the new pro!isions$
Again it is important to harmoniAe the statutes$ &ourts
should not render them in!alid without ta1ing the
necessary steps in reconciling them
2da de 1rbano v. ,S/S
there were no facts gi!en in the boo1 ecept that it was
in this case that in pari materia was eplained well$
4he eplanation are the same in the aforementioned
Other things to consider in constructing statutes which
are in pari materia
o @istory of the legislation on the sub2ect
o Ascertain the uniform purpose of the
legislature
o Disco!er the policy related to the sub2ect
matter has been changed or modified
o &onsider acts passed at prior sessions e!en
those that ha!e been repealed
Distingue tempora et concordabis 2ura 0 distinguish
times and you will harmoniAe laws
In cases of two or more laws with the same sub2ect
matterD
o Puestion is usually whether the later act
impliedly repealed the prior act$
o RuleD the only time a later act will be repealed
or amended is when the act itself states so
(that it supersedes all the prior acts" or when
there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between
the two$
o In the case of BimpliedC the doubt will be
resol!ed against the repeal or amendment and
in fa!or of the harmoniAation of the laws on
the sub2ect (later will ser!e as a modification"
Reasons why laws on same sub2ect are reconciled
: main reasonsD
o 4he presumption that the legislature too1 into
account prior laws when they enacted the new
one$
Borbiter dict%m ni c*erryF t*is c*apter keeps pointing o%t t*at
t*e #egis#at%re are kno;#edgeab#e on t*e #a;. b%t / ;onder *o;
t*e actors fitG /m not discriminating b%t *o; did Lito Lapid.
Loi E-ercito. etc kne; t*e prior #a;sG / *eard t*ey *ave
researc*ers ;*o do it for t*em. @*y donDt ;e vote t*ose
researc*ers insteadG 4%n #ang. / *ave been reading t*e ;*o#e
pres%mption t*at t*e #egis#at%re is kno;#edgeab#e. Madaming
namamatay sa aka#a. /s agpa#o sti## a#iveG*a*a*a "
o 'ecause enactments of the same legislature
on the same sub2ect are supposed to form part
of one uniform system (GhyR 'ecause later
statutes are supplementary to the earlier
enactments"
If possible construe the two statutes
wherein the pro!isions of both are
gi!en effect
Ghere harmoniAation is impossible
Earlier law should gi!e way to the later law because it
is the BcurrentC or later epression of the legislati!e
will
Illustration of the rule (in pari materia"
Lacson v. "o$%e
IssueD the phrase unless sooner remo!ed of a statute
that states Bthe mayor shall hold office for four years
unless sooner remo!edC
statconD the court held that the phrase should be
construed in relation to remo!al statutes$ 4hus the
phrase meant that although the mayor cannot be
remo!ed during his term of office, once he !iolates
those that are stated in remo!al statutes$
C*in O* Foo v. Concepcion
criminal case Article *:(*" eempting circumstance
(imbecile or insane"
%tatconD the phrase Bshall not be permitted to lea!e
without first obtaining permission of the same courtC
should be reconciled with another statute that states
Bany patient confined in a mental institution may be
released by the Director of @ealth once he is cured$
4he Director shall inform the 2udge that appro!ed the
confinementC$ 4hese two statutes refers to a person
who was criminally charged but was pro!en to be an
imbecile or insane, thus they should be construed
together$ 4heir construction would mean that in order
for the patient to be release there should be an
appro!al of both the court and the Director of @ealth$
0ing v. !ernae'
%tatconD relation of RA **;6 (Retail 4rade
5ationaliAation Act" to &ommonwealth Act *6; (Anti
Dummy Law"
Dia#das v. Percides
/actsD a alien who operated a retail store in &ebu
decided to close his &ebu store and transfer it to
Dumaguete$ R4L (retail trade law" and 4a &ode %ec$
*++ were the statutes ta1en into consideration in this
case$ 4he former authoriAes any alien who on )ay *7,
*+79 is actually engaged in retail, to continue to
engage therein until his !oluntary retirement from such
business, but not to establish or open additional stores
for retail business$ 4he latter pro!ides that any
business for which the pri!ilege ta has been paid may
be remo!ed and continued in any other place without
payment of additional ta$
IssueD whether the transfer by the alien from &ebu to
Dumaguete can be considered as a !oluntary
retirement from business$
@eldD 5o$ Although the trial court affirmed the
.uestion, the %& ruled otherwise stating that R4&
o!erloo1ed the clear pro!ision of %ec$ *++$
C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +ationa# @ater;orks and
Se;erage A%t*ority
/actsD R$A$ +*: (:" states that in construction or repair
wor1 underta1en by the Ko!ernment, Philippine made
materials and products, whene!er a!ailable shall be
used in construction or repair wor1$
/lag Law (&ommonwealth Act *-;" gi!es nati!e
products preference in the purchase of articles by
Ko!ernment, including go!ernment owned or
controlled corporations$
IssueD interpretation of two statutes re.uiring that
preference be made in the purchase and use of Phil$
)ade materials and products
@eldD 4he %& relates the two statutes as in pari materia
and they should be construed to attain the same
ob2ecti!e that is to gi!e preference to locally produced
materials$
Cabada v. A#%nan ///
IssueD whether or not an appeal lies from the decision
of regional appellate board (RA'" imposing
disciplinary action against a member of the P5P under
%ec$ 97 of RA 8+,7 regarding finality of disciplinary
action
4he court held that the BgapC in the law which is silent
on filing appeals from decisions of the RA' rendered
within the reglementary period should be construed
and harmoniAed with other statutes, i$e$ %ec :(*",
Article IE3' of the *+;, &onstitution because the P5P
is part, as a bureau, of the reorganiAed DILK, as to
form a unified system of 2urisprudence
%tatconD if RA' fails to decide an appealed case within
86 days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the
appealed decision is deemed final and eecutory, and
the aggrie!ed party may forthwith appeal therefrom to
the %ecretary of DILK$ Li1ewise, if the RA' has
decided the appeal within 863day reglementary period,
its decision may still be appealed to the %ecretary of
DILK
Mani#a 6ockey C#%b /nc. v. CA
IssueD who was entitled to brea1ages (*6N di!idend of
winning horse race tic1ets"
%tatconD 4here are two statutes that should be
considered$ RA -6+ (amended by 88-* ?88-:" is
silent on the matter but the practice is to use brea1ages
for anti boo1ie dri!e and other sale promotions$ E$O$
;; ? ;+ which allocated brea1ages therein specified$
4hese two should be construed in pari materia, thus all
brea1ages deri!ed from all races should be distributed
and allocated in accordance with Eecuti!e Orders
because no law should be !iewed in isolation$
(supplementary"
Keneral and special statutes
Keneral statutes3 applies to all of the people of the
state or to a particular class of persons in the state with
e.ual force$
o Fni!ersal in application
%pecial statutes3 relates to particular persons or things
of a class or to particular portion or section of the state
only
&onsidered as statutes in pari materia thus they should
be read together and harmoniAed (and gi!en effect"
Ghat if there are two acts which contain one general
and one specialR
o If it produces conflict, the special shall
pre!ail since the legislati!e intent is more
clear thus it must be ta1en as intended to
constitute an eception$
o 4hin1 of it as one general law of the land
while the other applies only to a particular
case
Ghat if the special law is passed before the general
lawR It doesn(t matter because the special law will still
be considered as an eception unless epressly
repealed$
So#id !omes /nc. v. Paya;a#
/irst statute pro!ides that 5ational @ousing Authority
shall ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear and decide
cases in!ol!ing unsound real estate (P$D$ 5o$ +7+"$
%econd statute grants R4& general 2urisdiction o!er
such cases$
IssueD Ghich one will pre!ailR
@eldD 4he first statute will pre!ail because it is a
special law, as compared to the latter which is general
law, thus it is an eception to the Bgeneral 2urisdictionC
of the R4&
Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp
/actsD P$D$ 5o$ *;8+ authoriAed PAK&OR to
centraliAe and regulate all games of chance$
LK& of *++*, a later law, empowers all go!ernment
units to enact ordinances to pre!ent and suppress
gambling and other games of chance$
%taconD 4hese two should be harmoniAed rather than
annulling one and upholding the other$ &ourt said that
the solution to this problem is for the go!ernment units
to suppress and pre!ent all 1inds of gambling ecept
those that are allowed under the pre!ious law
Leveri'a v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt
RA ,,8 empowers the general manager of the &i!il
Aeronautics Administration to lease real property
under its administration$
Administrati!e &ode authoriAes the President to
eecute a lease contract relating to real property
belonging to the republic
@ow do you apply the ruleR 3 In this case, the prior
(special" law should pre!ail
Reason for the rule
the special law is considered an eception to the
general law (as long as same sub2ect"
Pualification of the rule
4he rule aforementioned is not absolute$
EceptionsD
o If the legislature clearly intended the general
enactment to co!er the whole sub2ect and to
repeal all prior laws inconsistent therewith
o Ghen the principle is that the special law
merely establishes a general rule while the
general law creates a specific and special rule
Reference statutes
a statute which refers to other statutes and ma1es them
applicable to the sub2ect of legislation
used to a!oid encumbering the statute boo1s of
unnecessary repetition
should be construed to harmoniAe and gi!e effect to
the adopted statute$
%upplemental statutes
Intended to supply deficiencies in eisting statutes
%upplemental statutes should be read with the original
statute and construed together
Reenacted statutes
statute which reenacts a pre!ious statute or pro!ision$
Reproducing an earlier statute with the same or
substantially the same words$
Monte#ibano v. Ferrer
IssueD application of %ec$ - fo the &ity &harter of
)anila is !alid in the criminal complaint directly file
by an offended party in the city court of 'acolodR
@eldD 4he court ruled that the criminal complaint filed
directly by the offended party is in!alid and it ordered
the city court to dismiss it$
4he pro!isions of the &ity &harter of )anila 'acolod
on the same sub2ect are identically worded, hence they
should recei!e the same construction$
RFLED two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and
terminology should each in its own field, ha!e a li1e
interpretation
Adoption of contemporaneous construction
in construing the reenacted statute, the court should
ta1e into account prior contemporaneous construction
and gi!e due weight and respect to it$
Pualification of the rule
rule that is aforementioned is applicable only when the
statute is capable of the construction gi!en to it and
when that construction has become a settled rule of
conduct
Adopted statutes
a statute patterned after a statute of a foreign country$
&ourt should ta1e into consideration how the courts of
other country construe the law and its practices
CHAPTER SEVEN: Str!t or L!*era' Construt!on
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
Ghether a statute is to be gi!en a strict or liberal
construction will depend upon the followingD
4he nature of the statute
4he purpose to be subser!ed
4he mischief to be remedied
PurposeD to gi!e the statute the interpretation that will
best accomplish the end desired and effectuate
legislati!e intent
%trict construction, generally
&onstruction according to the letter of the statute,
which recogniAes nothing that is not epressed, ta1es
the language used in its eact meaning, and admits no
e.uitable consideration
5ot to mean that statutes are construed in its narrowest
meaning
It simply means that the scope of the statute shall not
be etended or enlarged by implication, intendment, or
e.uitable consideration beyond the literal meaning of
its terms
It is a close and conser!ati!e adherence to the literal or
tetual interpretation
4he antithesis of liberal construction
Liberal construction, defined
E.uitable construction as will enlarge the letter of a
statute to accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its
intent, or promote 2ustice
5ot to mean enlargement of a pro!ision which is clear,
unambiguous and free from doubt
It simply means that the words should recei!e a fair
and reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent,
spirit and purpose of the law
Liberal construction applied, generally
Ghere a statute is ambiguous, the literal meaning of
the words used may be re2ected if the result of
adopting said meaning would be to defeat the purpose
of the law
1t res magis va#eat $%am pereat & that construction is
to be sought which gi!es effect to the whole of the
statute 0 its e!ery word
Liberal &onstruction #udicial Interpretation
E.uitable construction as
will enlarge the letter of a
statute to accomplish its
intended purpose, carry out
its intent, or promote 2ustice
Act of the court in
engrafting upon a law
something which it belie!es
ought to ha!e been
embraced therein
Legitimate eercise of
2udicial power
/orbidden by the tripartite
di!ision of powers among
the - departments of
go!ernment
A statute may not be liberally construed to read into it
something which its clear and plain language re2ects
&onstruction to promote social 2ustice
%ocial 2ustice must be ta1en into account in the
interpretation and application of laws
%ocial 2ustice mandate is addressed or meant for the
three departmentsD the legislati!e, eecuti!e, and the
2udicial
%ocial 2ustice (included in the &onstitution" was meant
to be a !ital, articulate, compelling principle of public
policy
It should be obser!ed in the interpretation not only of
future legislations, but also of laws already eisting on
5o!ember *7, *+-7$
It was intended to change the spirit of our laws, present
and future$
&onstruction ta1ing into consideration general welfare or
growth ci!iliAation
&onstrue to attain the general welfare
Sa#%s pop%#i est s%prema #e) & the !oice of the people
is the supreme law
Stat%ta pro p%b#ico commodo #ate interpretant%r &
statutes enacted for the public good are to be construed
liberally
4he reason of the law is the life of the lawH the reason
lies in the soil of the common welfare
4he 2udge must go out in the open spaces of actuality
and dig down deep into his common soil, if not, he
becomes subser!ient to formalism
&onstrue in the light of the growth of ci!iliAation and
!arying conditions
o 4he interpretation that Bif the man is too long
for the bed, his head should be chopped off
rather than enlarge the old bed or purchase a
new oneC should 5O4 be gi!en to statutes
STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED
Penal statutes, generally
Penal statutes are those that define crimes, treat of
their nature and pro!ide for their punishment
o Acts of legislature which prohibit certain acts
and establish penalties for their !iolation
4hose which impose punishment for an offense
committed against the state, and which the chief
eecuti!e has the power to pardon
A statute which decrees the forfeiture in fa!or of the
state of uneplained wealth ac.uired by a public
official while in office is criminal in nature
Penal statutes, strictly construed
Penal statutes are strictly construed against the %tate
and liberally construed in fa!or of the accused
o Penal statutes cannot be enlarged or etended
by intendment, implication, or any e.uitable
consideration
o 5o person should be brought within its terms
if he is not clearly made so by the statute
o 5o act should be pronounces criminal which
is not clearly made so
Peo v. Atop
%ec$ ** of RA ,87+, which amended Art$ --7 of the
RP&, pro!ides that the death penalty for rape may be
imposed if the Boffender is a parent, ascendant, step3
parent, guardian, relati!e by consanguinity or affinity
within the -
rd
ci!il degree, or the common3law spouse
of the parent of the !ictimC
Is the common3law husband of the girl(s grandmother
includedR
5oS &ourts must not bring cases within the pro!isions
of the law which are not clearly embraced by it$
o 5o act can be pronounced criminal which is
not clearly within the terms of a statute can be
brought within them$
o Any reasonable doubt must be resol!ed in
fa!or of the accused
%trict construction but not as to nullify or destroy the
ob!ious purpose of the legislature
o If penal statute is !ague, it must be construed
with such strictness as to carefully
%A/EKFARD the RIK@4% of the defendant
and at the same time preser!e the ob!ious
intention of the legislature
o &ourts must endea!or to effect substantial
2ustice
Centeno v. 2i##a#onAPorni##os
PD *789, which punishes a person who solicits or
recei!es contribution for Bcharitable or public welfare
purposesC without any permit first secured from the
Department of %ocial %er!ices, DID 5O4 include
Breligious purposesCC in the acts punishable, the law
&A55O4 be construed to punish the solicitation of
contributions for religious purposes, such as repair or
reno!ation of the church
Reason why penal statutes are strictly construedg
4he law is tender in fa!or of the rights of the
indi!idualH
4he ob2ect is to establish a certain rule by conformity
to which man1ind would be safe, and the discretion of
the court limited
Purpose of strict construction is 5O4 to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through technicality but
to pro!ide a precise definition of forbidden acts
Acts ma#a in se and ma#a pro*ibita
Keneral ruleD to constitute a crime, e!il intent must
combine with an act
Act%s non facit re%m nisi mens sit rea & the act itself
does not ma1e a man guilty unless his intention were
so
Act%s me invite fact%s non est me%s act%s & an act done
by me against my will is not my act
)ala in se )ala prohibita
&riminal intent, apart from
the act itself is re.uired
4he only in.uiry is, has the
law been !iolated
RP& %pecial penal laws
@owe!er, if special penal laws use such words as
Bwillfully, !oluntarily, and 1nowinglyC intent must be
pro!edH thus good faith or bad faith is essential before
con!iction
Application of rule
Peo v. 4adao
A statute which penaliAes a Bperson assisting a
claimantC in connection with the latter(s claim for
!eterans benefit, does not penaliAe Bone who O//ER%
to assistC
S%y v. Peop#e
Ghere a statute penaliAes a store owner who sells
commodities beyond the retail ceiling price fied by
law, the ambiguity in the EO classifying the same
commodity into : classes and fiing different ceiling
prices for each class, should be resol!ed in fa!or of the
accused
Peo v. Terreda
%horter prescripti!e period is more fa!orable to the
accused
Peo v. Manantan
4he rule that penal statutes are gi!en a strict
construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws
Instead, the rule merely ser!es as an additional single
factor to be considered as an aid in detrmining the
meaning of penal laws
Peo v. P%risima
4he language of the a statute which penaliAes the mere
carrying outside of residence of bladed weapons, i$e$, a
1nife or bolo, not in connection with one(s wor1 or
occupation, with a !ery hea!y penalty ranging from 73
*6 years of imprisonment, has been narrowed and
strictly construed as to include, as an additional
element of the crime, the carrying of the weapon in
furtherance of rebellion, insurrection or sub!ersion,
such being the e!il sought to be remedied or pre!ented
by the statute as disclosed in its preamble
A'arcon v. Sandiganbayan
IssueD whether a pri!ate person can be considered a
public officer by reason if his being designated by the
'IR as a depository of distrained property, so as to
ma1e the con!ersion thereof the crime of mal!ersation
@eldD 5OS the 'IR(s power authoriAing a pri!ate
indi!idual to act as a depository cannot include the
power to appoint him as public officer
A pri!ate indi!idual who has in his charge any of the
public funds or property enumerated in Art ::: RP&
and commits any of the acts defined in any of the
pro!isions of &hapter 9, 4itle , of the RP&, should
li1ewise be penaliAed with the same penalty meted to
erring public officers$ 5owhere in this pro!ision is it
epressed or implied that a pri!ate indi!idual falling
under said Art ::: is to be deemed a public officer
Limitation of rule
Limitation I* 0 Ghere a penal statute is capable of :
interpretations, one which will operate to eempt an
accused from liability for !iolation thereof and another
which will gi!e effect to the manifest intent of the
statute and promote its ob2ect, the latter interpretation
should be adopted
1S v. ,o C*ico
A law punishes the display of flags Bused duringC the
insurrection against the F% may not be so construed as
to eempt from criminal liability a person who
displays a replica of said flag because said replica is
not the one BusedC during the rebellion, for to so
construe it is to nullify the statute together
Ko &hico is liable though flags displayed were 2ust
replica of the flags Bused duringC insurrection against
F%
Limitation I: 0 strict construction of penal laws
applies only where the law is ambiguous and there is
doubt as to its meaning
Peo v. ,atc*a#ian
A statute re.uires that an employer shall pay a
minimum wage of not less than a specified amount and
punishes any person who willfully !iolates any of its
pro!isions
4he fact that the nonpayment of the minimum wage is
not specifically declared unlawful, does not mean that
an employer who pays his employees less than the
prescribed minimum wage is not criminally liable, for
the nonpayment of minimum wage is the !ery act
sought to be en2oined by the law
%tatutes in derogation of rights
Rights are not absolute, and the state, in the eercise of
police power, may enact legislations curtailing or
restricting their en2oyment
As these statutes are in derogation of common or
general rights, they are generally strictly construed and
rigidly confined to cases clearly within their scope and
purpose
EamplesD
o %tatutes authoriAing the epropriation of
pri!ate land or property
o Allowing the ta1ing of deposition
o /iing the ceiling of the price of commodities
o Limiting the eercise of proprietary rights by
indi!idual citiAens
o %uspending the period of prescription of
actions
Ghen : reasonably possible constructions, one which
would diminish or restrict fundamental right of the
people and the other if which would not do so, the
latter construction must be adopted so as to allow full
en2oyment of such fundamental right
%tatutes authoriAing epropriations
Power of eminent domain is essentially legislati!e in
nature
)ay be delegated to the President, LKFs, or public
utility company
Epropriation plus 2ust compensation
A derogation of pri!ate rights, thus strict construction
is applied
%tatutes epropriating or authoriAing the epropriation
of property are strictly construed against the
epropriating authority and liberally in fa!or of
property owners
%tatutes granting pri!ileges
%tatutes granting ad!antages to pri!ate persons or
entities ha!e in many instances created special
pri!ileges or monopolies for the grantees and ha!e
thus been !iewed with suspicion and strictly construed
Privi#egia recipient #argam interpretationem vo#%ntati
consonam concedentis & pri!ileges are to be
interpreted in accordance with the will of him who
grants them
And he who fails to strictly comply with the will of the
grantor loses such pri!ileges
%t%an Sa;mi##. /nc. v. ayvie; T*eater. /nc
Ghere an entity is granted a legislati!e franchise to
operate electric light and power, on condition that it
should start operation within a specified period, its
failure to start operation within the period resulted in
the forfeiture of the franchise
Legislati!e grants to local go!ernment units
Krants of power to local go!ernment are to be
construed strictly, and doubts in the interpretation
should be resol!ed in fa!or of the national go!ernment
and against the political subdi!isions concerned
ReasonD there is in such a grant a gratuitous donation
of public money or property which results in an unfair
ad!antage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant
should be narrowly restricted in fa!or of the public
%tatutory grounds for remo!al of officials
%tatutes relating to suspension or remo!al of public
officials are strictly construed
ReasonD the remedy of remo!al is a drastic one and
penal in nature$ In2ustice and harm to the public
interest would li1ely emerge should such laws be not
strictly interpreted against the power of suspension or
remo!al
Oc*ate v. De#ing
Krounds for remo!al 0 Bneglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other forms of maladministration in
officeC
o Bin officeC 0 a .ualifier of all acts$
o )ust be in relation to the official as an officer
and not as a pri!ate person
!ebron v "eyes
Procedure for remo!al or suspension should be strictly
construed
%tatuteD local electi!e officials are to be remo!ed or
suspended, after in!estigation, by the pro!incial board,
sub2ect to appeal to the President
President has no authority on his own to conduct the
in!estigation and to suspend such electi!e official
5aturaliAation laws
5aturaliAation laws are strictly construed against the
applicant and rigidly followed and enforced
5aturaliAation is statutory than a natural right
%tatutes imposing taes and customs duties
4a statutes must be construed strictly against the
go!ernment and liberally in fa!or of the tapayer
Power to ta in!ol!es power to destroy
4aing act are not to be etended by implication
4a statutes should be clearly, epressly, and
unambiguously imposed
Reason for strict constructionD taation is a destructi!e
power which interferes with the personal property
rights of the people and ta1es from them a portion of
their property for the support of the go!ernment
%tatutes granting ta eemptions
Law frowns against eemption from taation because
taes are the lifeblood of the nation
Laws granting ta eemptions are thus construed
strictissimi -%ris against the tapayer and liberally in
fa!or of the taing authority
'urden of proof 0 on the tapayer claiming to be
eempted
'asis for strict construction 0 to minimiAe the different
treatment and foster impartiality, fairness, and e.uality
of treatment among tapayers
4a eemptions are not fa!ored in law, nor are they
presumed$
C/" v. CA
IssueD whether containers and pac1aging materials can
be credited against the miller(s deficiency ta
'IR claimed that there should be no ta credit
@eldD pro!iso should be strictly construed to apply
only to raw materials and not to containers and
pac1ing materials which are not raw materialsH hence,
the miller is entitled to ta credit
Restriction in the pro!iso is limited only to sales,
miller(s ecise taes paid Ton raw materials used in the
milling process(
eng%et Corporation v. Cenrtra# oard of Assessment Appea#s
PD *+77 withdrew all ta eemptions, ecept those
embodied in the Real Property &ode, a law which
grants certain industries real estate ta eemptions
under the Real Estate &ode
&ourts cannot epand eemptiom
Esso Standard Eastern. /nc. v Acting Commissioner of C%stoms
Ghere a statute eempts from special import ta,
e.uipment Bfor use of industries,C the eemption does
not etend to those used in dispensing gasoline at retail
in gasoline stations
C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b. /nc.
%tatuteD Bracing club holding these races shall be
eempt from the payment of any municipal or national
taC
&annot be construed to eempt the racing club from
paying income ta on rentals paid to it for use of the
race trac1s and other paraphernalia, for what the law
eempts refers only to those to be paid in connection
with said races
L#adoc v. C/"
%tatuteD eemption from taation charitable
institutions, churches, parsonages or co!enants
appurtenant thereto, mos.ues, and non3profit
cemeteries, and all lands buildings, and impro!ements
actually, directly, and eclusi!ely used for religious or
charitable purposes
Eemption only refer to property taes and not from
all 1inds of taes
La Car#ota S%gar Centra# v. 6imene'
%tatuteD ta pro!ided shall not be collected on foreign
echange used for the payment of BfertiliAers when
imported by planters or farmers directly or through
their cooperati!esC
4he importation of fertiliAers by an entity which is
neither a planter nor a farmer nor a cooperati!e of
planters or farmers is not eempt from payment of the
ta, e!en though said entity merely acted as agent of
planter or farmer as a sort of accommodation without
ma1ing any profit from the transaction, for the law
uses the word BdirectlyC which means without anyone
inter!ening in the importation and the phrase Bthrough
their cooperati!esC as the only eemption
C/" v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co.
%ee page -67
Power of taation if a high prerogati!e of so!ereignty,
its relin.uishment is ne!er presumed and any reduction
or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its
rate must be strictly construed
P*i#. Te#egrap* and Te#ep*one Corp. v. COA
On Bmost fa!ored treatment clauseC
: franchisee are not competitors
4he first franchisee is will not en2oy a reduced rate of
ta on gross receipts
Pualification of rule
%trict construction does not apply in the case of ta
eemptions in fa!or of the go!ernment itself or its
agencies
Pro!isions granting eemptions to go!ernment
agencies may be construed liberally in fa!or of non3ta
liability of such agencies
4he epress eemption should not be construed with
the same degree of strictness that applies to
eemptions contrary to policy of the state, since as to
such property eemption is the rule and the taation is
the eemption
E$g$ ta eemption in fa!or of 5APO&OR 0 whether
direct or indirect taes, eempted
%tatutes concerning the so!ereign
Restricti!e statutes which impose burdens on the
public treasury or which diminish rights and interests
are strictly construed$
Fnless so specified, the go!ernment does not fall
within the terms of any legislation
A##iance of ,overnment @orkers v. Minister of Labor and
Emp#oyment
PD ;7* 0 re.uires BemployersC to pay a *-
th
month
pay to their employees
BemployersC does not embrace the RP, the law not
ha!ing epressly included it within its scope
%tatutes authoriAing suits against the go!ernment
Art$ E>I, %ec$ -, *+;, &onstitution 0 B4he %tate may
not be sued without its consentC
o Keneral ruleD so!ereign is eempt from suit
o EceptionD in the form of statute, state may
gi!e its consent to be sued
%tatute is to be strictly construed and
wai!er from immunity from suit will
not be lightly inferred
+%##%m temp%s occ%rrit regi & there can be no legal
right as against the authority that ma1es the law on
which the right depends
Reason for non3suability 0 not to sub2ect the state to
incon!enience and loss of go!ernmental efficiency
Mobi# P*i#. E)p#oration. /nc. v. C%stoms Arrastre Services
4he law authoriAing the 'ureau of &ustoms to lease
arrastre operations, a proprietary function necessarily
incident to its go!ernmental function, may 5O4 be
construed to mean that the state has consented to be
sued, when it underta1es to conduct arrastre ser!ices
itself, for damage to cargo
%tate3immunity may not be circum!ented by directing
the action against the officer of the state instead of the
state itself
o 4he state(s immunity may be !alidly in!o1ed
against the action A% LO5K A% I4 &A5 'E
%@OG5 that the suit really affects the
property, rights, or interests of the state and
not merely those of the officer nominally
made party defendant
E!en if the state consents, law should 5O4 be
interpreted to authoriAe garnishment of public funds to
satisfy a 2udgment against go!ernment property
o ReasonD
Public policy forbids it
Disbursement of public funds must
be co!ered by a corresponding
appropriation as re.uired by law
/unctions and ser!ice cannot be
allowed to be paralyAed or disrupted
by the di!ersion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific
ob2ects, as appropriated by law
%tatutes prescribing formalities of the will
%trictly construed, which means, wills must be
eecuted in accordance with the statutory
re.uirements, otherwise, it is entirely !oid
4he court is see1ing to ascertain and apply the intent
of the legislators and not that of the testator, and the
latter(s intention is fre.uently defeated by the non3
obser!ance of what the statute re.uires
Eceptions and pro!isos
%hould be strictly but reasonably construed
All doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the general
pro!ision rather than the eceptions
o @owe!er, always loo1 at the intent of
legislators if it will accord reason and 2ustice
not to apply the rule that Ban epress
eception ecludes all othersC
4he rule on eecution pending appeal must be strictly
construed being an eception to the general rule
%ituations which allows eceptions to the re.uirement
of warrant of arrest or search warrant must be strictly
construedH to do so would infringe upon personal
liberty and set bac1 a basic right
A preference is an eception to the general rule
A pro!iso should be interpreted strictly with the
legislati!e intent
o %hould be strictly construed
o Only those epressly eempted by the pro!iso
should be freed from the operation of the
statute
STATUTES LI-ERALLY CONSTRUED
Keneral social legislation
Keneral welfare legislations
o 4o implement the social 2ustice and
protection3to3labor pro!isions of the
&onstitution
o &onstrued liberally
o Resol!e any doubt in fa!or of the persons
whom the law intended to benefit
o Includes the following 0 labor laws, tenancy
laws, land reform laws, and social security
laws
Tamayo v. Mani#a !ote#
Law grants employees the benefits of holiday pay
ecept those therein enumerated
%tatcon 0 all employees, whether monthly paid or not,
who are not among those ecepted are entitled to the
holiday pay
Labor laws construed 0 the wor1ingman(s welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration
o Article 9 5ew Labor &ode 0 Ball doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the
pro!isions of the Labor &ode including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be
resol!ed in fa!or of laborC
Liberal construction applies only if statute is !ague,
otherwise, apply the law as it is stated
Keneral welfare clause
: branches
o One branch attaches to the main trun1 of
municipal authority 0 relates to such
ordinances and regulations as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred upon local
legislati!e bodies by law
o Other branch is much more independent of
the specific functions enumerated by law 0
authoriAes such ordinances as shall seem
necessary and proper to pro!ide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, impro!e
the morals, peace, good order of the LKF
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of the property therein
&onstrued in fa!or of the LKFs
4o gi!e more powers to local go!ernments in
promoting the economic condition, social welfare, and
material progress of the people in the community
&onstrued with proprietary aspects, otherwise would
cripple LKFs
)ust be elastic and responsi!e to !arious social
conditions
)ust follow legal progress of a democratic way of life
Krant of power to local go!ernments
Old ruleD municipal corporations, being mere creatures
of law, ha!e only such powers as are epressly granted
to them and those which are necessarily implied or
incidental to the eercise thereof
5ew ruleD RA ::89 BLocal Autonomy ActC
o %ec *: 0 Bimplied power of a pro!ince, a city,
or a municipality shall be liberally construed
in its fa!or$ Any fair and reasonable doubt as
to the eistence of the power should be
interpreted in fa!or of the local go!ernment
and it shall be presumed to eistC
%tatutes granting taing power (on municipal corporations"
'efore *+,- &onstitution 0 inferences, implications,
and deductions ha!e no place in the interpretation of
the taing power of a municipal corporation
5ew &onstitution 0 Art$ E, %ec 7 *+;, &onstitution 0
Beach local go!ernment unit shall ha!e the power to
create its own sources of re!enue and to le!y taes,
fees, and charges sub2ect to such guidelines and
limitations as the &ongress may pro!ide, consistent
with the basic policy of local autonomyC
o %tatutes prescribing limitations on the taing
power of LKFs must be strictly construed
against the national go!ernment and liberally
in fa!or of the LKFs, and any doubt as to the
eistence of the taing power will be resol!ed
in fa!or of the local go!ernment
%tatutes prescribing prescripti!e period to collect taes
'eneficial for both go!ernment and tapayer
o 4o the go!ernment 0 ta officers are obliged
to act promptly in the ma1ing of the
assessments
o 4o the tapayer 0 would ha!e a feeling of
security against unscrupulous ta agents who
will always find an ecuse to inspect the
boo1s of tapayers
Laws on prescription 0 remedial measure 0 interpreted
liberally affording protection to the tapayers
%tatutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of ta
liberally construed in fa!or of go!ernment and strictly
construed against the tapayer
intention to hasten ta payments or to punish e!asions
or neglect of duty in respect thereto
liberal construction would render penalties for
delin.uents nugatory
Election laws
Election laws should be reasonably and liberally
construed to achie!e their purpose
Purpose 0 to effectuate and safeguard the will of the
electorate in the choice of their representati!es
- parts
o Pro!isions for the conduct of elections which
election officials are re.uired to follow
o Pro!isions which candidates for office are
re.uired to perform
o Procedural rules which are designed to
ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner
in the elections
Different rules and canons or statutory construction go!ern
such pro!isions of the election law
Part *D
o Rules and regulations for the conduct of
elections
'efore election 0 mandatory (part *"
After election 0 directory (part -"
o Kenerally 0 the pro!isions of a statute as to
the manner of conducting the details of an
election are 5O4 mandatoryH and
irregularities in conducting an election and
counting the !otes, not preceding from any
wrongful intent and which depri!es no legal
!oter of his !otes, will not !itiate an election
or 2ustify the re2ection of the entire !otes of a
precinct
Against disenfranchisement
Remedy against election official
who did not do his duty 0 criminal
action against them
Part :D
o Pro!isions which candidates for office are
re.uired to perform are mandatory
o 5on3compliance is fatal
Part -D
o Procedural rules which are designed to
ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner
in the elections are liberally construed
o 4echnical and procedural barriers should not
be allowed to stand if they constitute an
obstacle in the choice of their electi!e
officials
/or where a candidate has recei!ed popular mandate,
o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed, all possible
doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the candidates
eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of
the electorate
Amnesty proclamations
Amnesty proclamations should be liberally construed
as to carry out their purpose
Purpose 0 to encourage to return to the fold of the law
of those who ha!e !eered from the law
E$g$ in case of doubt as to whether certain persons
come within the amnesty proclamation, the doubt
should be resol!ed in their fa!or and against the state
%ame rule applies to pardon since pardon and amnesty
is synonymous
%tatutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes
Liberally construed in fa!or of the accused
Reason 0 time wears off proof and innocence
%ame as amnesty and pardon
Peo v. "eyes
Art$ +* RP& 0 Bperiod of prescription shall commence
to run from the day the crime is disco!ered by the
offended, authorities, C
Ghen does the period of prescription start 0 day of
disco!ery or registration in the Register of DeedsR
@eldD /rom the time of registration
5otice need not be actual for prescription to runH
constructi!e notice is enough
)ore fa!orable to the accused if prescripti!e period is
counted from the time of registration
Adoption statutes
Adoption statutes are liberally construed in fa!or of
the child to be adopted
Paramount consideration 0 child and not the adopters
>eteran and pension laws
>eteran and pension laws are enacted to compensate a
class of men who suffered in the ser!ice for the
hardships they endured and the dangers they
encountered in line of duty
o Epression of gratitude to and recognition of
those who rendered ser!ice to the country by
etending to them regular monetary benefit
>eteran and pension laws are liberally construed in
fa!or of grantee
De# Mar v. P*i#. 2eterans Admin
Ghere a statute grants pension benefits to war
!eterans, ecept those who are actually recei!ing a
similar pension from other go!ernment funds
%tatcon 0 Bgo!ernment fundsC refer to funds of the
same go!ernment and does not preclude war !eterans
recei!ing similar pensions from the F% Ko!ernment
from en2oying the benefits therein pro!ided
oard of Administrators 2eterans Admin v. a%tista
>eteran pension law is silent as to the effecti!ity of
pension awards, it shall be construed to ta1e effect
from the date it becomes due and 5O4 from the date
the application for pension is appro!ed, so as to grant
the pensioner more benefits and to discourage inaction
on the part of the officials who administer the laws
C*ave' v. Mat*ay
Ghile !eteran or pension laws are to be construed
liberally, they should be so construed as to pre!ent a
person from recei!ing double pension or
compensation, unless the law pro!ides otherwise
Santiago v. COA
Eplained liberal construction or retirement laws
Intention is to pro!ide for sustenance, and hopefully
e!en comfort when he no longer has the stamina to
continue earning his li!elihood
@e deser!es the appreciation of a grateful go!ernment
at best concretely epressed in a generous retirement
gratuity commensurate with the !alue and length of his
ser!ice
Orti' v. COMELEC
IssueD whether a commissioner of &O)ELE& is
deemed to ha!e completed his term and entitled to full
retirement benefits under the law which grants him 73
year lump3sum gratuity and thereafter lifetime pension,
who Bretires from the ser!ice after ha!ing completed
his term of office,C when his courtesy resignation
submitted in response to the call of the President
following ED%A Re!olution is accepted
@eldD MesS Entitled to gratuity
Liberal construction
&ourtesy resignation 0 not his own will but a mere
manifestation of submission to the will of the political
authority and appointing power
/n "e App#ication for ,rat%ity enefits of Associate 6%stice
Efren / P#ana
IssueD whether #ustice Plana is entitled to gratuity and
retirement pay when, at the time of his courtesy
resignation was accepted following ED%A Re!olution
and establishment of a re!olutionary go!ernment
under the /reedom &onstitution, he lac1ed a few
months to meet the age re.uirement for retirement
under the law but had accumulated a number of lea!e
of credits which, if added to his age at the time, would
eceed the age re.uirement
@eldD yes, entitled to gratuityS Liberal construction
applied
/n "e Pineda
Eplained doctrine laid down in the pre!ious case
4he crediting of accumulated lea!es to ma1e up for
lac1 of re.uired age or length of ser!ice is not done
discriminately
only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was
mar1ed by competence, integrity, and dedication to the
public ser!ice
/n "e Martin
IssueD whether a 2ustice of the %&, who a!ailed of the
disability retirement benefits pursuant to the pro!ision
that Bif the reason for the retirement be any permanent
disability contracted during his incumbency in office
and prior to the date of retirement he shall recei!e only
a gratuity e.ui!alent to *6 years salary and allowances
aforementioned with no further annuity payable
monthly during the rest of the retiree(s natural lifeC is
entitled to a monthly lifetime pension after the *63year
period
@eldD MesS *63year lump sum payment is intended to
assist the stric1en retiree meeting his hospital and
doctor(s bills and epenses for his support
4he retirement law aims to assist the retiree in his old
age, not to punish him for ha!ing sur!i!ed
Cena v. CSC
IssueD whether or not a go!ernment employee who has
reached the compulsory retirement age of 87 years, but
who has rendered less than *7 years of go!ernment
ser!ice, may be allowed to continue in the ser!ice to
complete the *73year ser!ice re.uirement to enable
him to retire with benefits of an old3age pension under
%ec **(b" PD **98
@owe!er, &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o :, pro!ides
that Bany re.uest for etension of compulsory retirees
to complete the *73years ser!ice re.uirement for
retirement shall be allowed only to permanent
appointees in the career ser!ice who are regular
members of the K%I% and shall be granted for a period
not eceeding * year
@eldD &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o :,
unconstitutionalS It is an administrati!e regulation
which should be in harmony with the lawH liberal
construction of retirement benefits
Rules of &ourt
R& are procedural 0 to be construed liberally
Purpose of R& 0 the proper and 2ust determination of a
litigation
Procedural laws are no other than technicalities, they
are adopted not as ends in themsel!es but as means
conduci!e to the realiAation of the administration of
law and 2ustice
R& should not be interpreted to sacrifice substantial
rights at the epense of technicalities
Case v. 6%go
Lapses in the literal obser!ance of a rule of procedure
will be o!erloo1ed when they do not in!ol!e public
policyH when they arose from an honest mista1e or
unforeseen accidentH when they ha!e not pre2udiced
the ad!erse party and ha!e not depri!ed the court of its
authority
Literal stricture ha!e been relaed in fa!or of liberal
construction
o Ghere a rigid application will result in
manifest failure or miscarriage of 2ustice
o Ghere the interest of substantial 2ustice will
be ser!ed
o Ghere the resolution of the emotion is
addressed solely to the sound and 2udicious
discretion of the court
o Ghere the in2ustice to the ad!erse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure
Liberal construction of R& does not mean they may be
ignoredH they are re.uired to be followed ecept only
for the most persuasi!e reasons
Other statutes
&urati!e statutes 0 to cure defects in prior law or to
!alidate legal proceedings which would otherwise be
!oid for want of conformity with certain legal
re.uirementsH retroacti!e
Redemption laws 0 remedial in nature 0 construed
liberally to carry out purpose, which is to enable the
debtor to ha!e his property applied to pay as many
debtor(s liability as possible
%tatutes pro!iding eemptions from eecution are
interpreted liberally in order to gi!e effect to their
beneficial and humane purpose
Laws on attachment 0 liberally construed to promote
their ob2ects and assist the parties obtaining speedy
2ustice
Garehouse receipts 0 instrument of credit 0 liberally
construed in fa!or of a bona fide holders of such
receipts
Probation laws 0 liberally construed
o PurposeD to gi!e first3hand offenders a second
chance to maintain his place in society
through the process of reformation
%tatute granting powers to an agency created by the
&onstitution should be liberally construed for the
ad!ancement of the purposes and ob2ecti!es for which
it was created
CHAPTER EIGHT: Man"ator) an" D!retor) Statutes
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
)andatory and directory classification of statutes 0
importanceD what effect should be gi!en to the
mandate of a statute
)andatory and directory statutes, generally
)andatory statute 0 commands either positi!ely that
something be done in a particular way, or negati!ely
that something be not doneH it re.uires O'EDIE5&E,
otherwise !oid
Directory statute 0 permissi!e or discretionary in
nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a
way that no in2ury can result from ignoring it or that its
purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than
that prescribed and substantially the same result
obtainedH confer direction upon a personH non3
performance of what it prescribes will not !itiate the
proceedings therein ta1en
Ghen statute is mandatory or directory
5o absolute test to determine whether a statute is
directory or mandatory
/inal arbiter 0 legislati!e intent
Legislati!e intent does not depend on the form of the
statuteH must be gi!en to the entire statute, its ob2ect,
purpose, legislati!e history, and to other related
statutes
)andatory in form but directory in nature 0 possible
Ghether a statute is mandatory or directory depends
on whether the thing directed to be done is of the
essence of the thing re.uired, or is a mere matter of
form, what is a matter of essence can often be
determined only by 2udicial construction
o &onsidered directory 0 compliance is a matter
of con!enienceH where the directions of a
statute are gi!en merely with a !iew to the
proper, orderly and prompt conduct of
businessH no substantial rights depend on it
o &onsidered mandatory 0 a pro!ision relating
to the essence of the thing to be done, that is,
to matters of substanceH interpretation shows
that the legislature intended a compliance
with such pro!ision to be essential to the
!alidity of the act or proceeding, or when
some antecedent and prere.uisite conditions
must eist prior to the eercise of the power,
or must be performed before certain other
powers can be eercised
4est to determine nature of statute
4est is to ascertain the conse.uences that will follow in
case what the statute re.uires is not done or what it
forbids is performed
Does the law gi!e a person no alternati!e choiceR 0 if
yes, then it is mandatory
Depends on the effects of compliance
o If substantial rights depend on it and in2ury
can result from ignoring itH intended for the
protection of the citiAens and by a disregard
of which their rights are in2uriously affected
0 mandatory
o Purpose is accomplished in a manner other
than that prescribed and substantially the
same results obtained 3 directory
%tatutes couched in mandatory form but compliance is
merely directory in nature
o If strict compliance will cause hardship or
in2ustice on the part of the public who is not
at fault
o If it will lead to absurd, impossible, or
mischie!ous conse.uences
If an officer is re.uired to do a
positi!e act but fails because such
actions will lead to the
aforementioned, he will only be
sub2ect to administrati!e sanction for
his failure to do what the law
re.uires
Language used
Kenerally mandatory 0 command words
o %hall or %hall not
o )ust or )ust not
o Ought or Ought not
o %hould or %hould not
o &an or &annot
Kenerally directory 0 permissi!e words
o )ay or )ay not
Fse of BshallC or BmustC
Kenerally, BshallC and BmustC is mandatory in nature
If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest upon
something in the character of the legislation or in the
contet which will 2ustify a different meaning
4he import of the word ultimately depends upon a
consideration of the entire pro!ision, its nature, ob2ect
and the conse.uences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other
Loyo#a ,rand 2i##a !omeo;ners BSo%t*C Assn.. /nc. v. CA
BmustC construed as directory
&orporation &ode %ec 98 reads B e!ery corporation
formed under this &ode )F%4 within one month after
receipt of official notice of the issuance of its
certification of incorporation with the %E&, adopt a
code of by3laws for its go!ernment not inconsistent
with this &odeC
PD +6:3A which is in pari materia# with the
&orporation &ode states that the non3filing of the by3
laws does not imply the BdemiseC of the corporationH
that there should be a notice and hearing before the
certificate of registration may be cancelled by the
failure to file the by3laws
One test whether mandatory or directory compliance
must be made 0 whether non3compliance with what is
re.uired will result in the nullity of the actH if it results
in the nullity, it is mandatory
Director of Land v. CA
Law re.uires in petitions for land registration that
Bupon receipt of the order of the court setting the time
for initial hearing to be published in the OK and once
in a newspaper of general circulation in the
PhilippinesC
Law epressly re.uires that the initial hearing be
published in the OK A5D in the newspaper of general
circulation 0 reasonD OK is not as widely read of the
newspaper of general circulation
BshallC is imperati!e= mandatory
Githout initial hearing being published in a newspaper
of general circulation is a nullity
Fse of BmayC
An auiliary !erb showing opportunity or possibility
Kenerally, directory in nature
Fsed in procedural or ad2ecti!e lawsH liberally
construed
EampleD %ec 8- of the corporation &ode 0 Bshares of
stoc1 so issued are personal property and )AM be
transferred by deli!ery of the certificate or certificated
endorsed by the owner
o BmayC is merely directory and that the
transfer of the shares may be effected in a
manner different from that pro!ided for in
law
Ghen BshallC is construed as BmayC and !ice !ersa
RuleD BmayC should be read BshallC
o where such construction is necessary to gi!e
effect to the apparent intention of the
legislature
o where a statute pro!ides for the doing os
some act which is re.uired by 2ustice r public
duty
o where it !ests a public body or officer with
power and authority to ta1e such action which
concerns for the public interest or rights of
indi!iduals
RuleD BshallC should be read BmayC
o Ghen so re.uired by the contet or by the
intention of the legislature
o Ghen no public benefit or pri!ate right
re.uires that it be gi!en an imperati!e
meaning
Diokno v. "e*abi#itiation Finance Corp
%ec$ : RA -69 reads Bban1s or other financial
institutions owned or controlled by the Ko!ernment
%@ALL, sub2ect to a!ailability of funds accept at a
discount at not more than :6N for *6 years of such
bac1pay certificateC
B%hallC implies discretion because of the phrase
Bsub2ect to a!ailability of fundsC
,overmnent v. E# !ogar Fi#ipino
&orporation &odes reads B%@ALL, upon such
!iolation being pro!ed, be dissol!ed by $%o ;arranto
proceedingsC
B%hallC construed as BmayC
erces. Sr. v. ,%ingona
%ec$ 8; Ra ,*86 (LK&" pro!ides that an appeal from
an ad!erse decision against a local electi!e official to
the President B%@ALL not pre!ent a decision from
becoming final and eecutorC
B%hallC is not mandatory because there is room to
construe said pro!ision as gi!ing discretion to the
re!iewing officials to stay the eecution of the
appealed decision
Fse of negati!e, prohibitory or eclusi!e terms
A negati!e statute is mandatoryH epressed in negati!e
words or in a form of an affirmati!e proposition
.ualified by the word BonlyC
BonlyC eclusionary negation
Prohibiti!e or negati!e words can rarely, if e!er, be
discretionary
MANDATORY STATUTES
%tatutes conferring power
Kenerally regarded as mandatory although couched in
a permissi!e form
%hould construe as imposing absolute and positi!e
duty rather than conferring pri!ileges
Power is gi!en for the benefit of third persons, not for
the public official
Kranted to meet the demands of rights, and to pre!ent
a failure of 2ustice
Ki!en as a remedy to those entitled to in!o1e its aid
%tatutes granting benefits
&onsidered mandatory
/ailure of the person to ta1e the re.uired steps or to
meet the conditions will ordinarily preclude him from
a!ailing of the statutory benefits
2igi#antib%s et non dormientib%s -%ra s%bveni%nt & the
laws aid the !igilant, not those who slumber on their
rights
Potior est in tempoe. potior est in -%re 0 he who is first
in time is preferred in right
%tatutes prescribing 2urisdictional re.uirements
&onsidered mandatory
Eamples
o Re.uirement of publication
o Pro!ision in the 4a &ode to the effect that
before an action for refund of ta is filed in
court, a written claim therefore shall be
presented with the &IR within the prescribed
period is mandatory and failure to comply
with such re.uirement is fatal to the action
%tatutes prescribing time to ta1e action or to appeal
Kenerally mandatory
@eld as absolutely indispensable to the pre!ention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
discharge or business, and are necessary incident to the
proper, efficient, and orderly discharge of 2udicial
functions
%trict not substantial compliance
5ot wai!able, nor can they be the sub2ect of
agreements or stipulation of litigants
"eyes v. COA
%ec$ *;, RA ,*86 0 process of appeal of dissatisfied
tapayer on the legality of ta ordinance
o Appeal to the %ec of #ustice within -6 days of
effecti!ity of the ta ordinance
o If %ec of #ustice decides the appeal, a period
of -6 days is allowed for an aggrie!ed party
to go to court
o If the %ec of #ustice does not act thereon, after
the lapse of 86 days, a party could already
proceed to see1 relief in court
Purpose of mandatory complianceD to pre!ent delays
and enhance the speedy and orderly discharge of
2udicial functions
Fnless the re.uirements of law are complied with, the
decision of the lower court will become final and
preclude the appellate court from ac.uiring 2urisdiction
to re!iew it
/nterest reipiciae %t sit finis #iti%m & public interest
re.uires that by the !ery nature of things there must be
an end to a legal contro!ersy
,ac*on v. Devera. 6r
IssueD whether %ec 8 of the Rule on %ummary
Procedure, which reads B should the defendant fail to
answer the complaint within the period abo!e
pro!ided, the &ourt, mot% proprio, or on motion of the
plaintiff, %@ALL render 2udgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein,C is mandatory or
directory, such that an answer filed out of time may be
accepted
@eldD mandatory
o )ust file the answer within the reglementary
period
o Reglementary period shall be Tnon3
etendible(
o Otherwise, it would defeat the ob2ecti!e of
epediting the ad2udication of suits
%tatutes prescribing procedural re.uirements
&onstrued mandatory
Procedure relating to 2urisdictional, or of the essence
of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection
or benefit of the party affected
Ghere failure to comply with certain procedural
re.uirements will ha!e the effect of rendering the act
done in connection therewith !oid, the statute
prescribing such re.uirements is regarded as
mandatory e!en though the language is used therein is
permissi!e in nature
De Mesa v. Mencias
%ec *,, Rule - R& 0 Bafter a party dies and the claim is
not thereby etinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representati!e of the deceased
to appear and to be substituted $ If legal
representati!e fails to appear , the court )AM
order the opposing party to produce the appointment of
a legal representati!e C
Although )AM was used, pro!ision is mandatory
Procedural re.uirement goes to the !ery 2urisdiction of
the court, for Bunless and until a legal representati!e is
for him is duly named and within the 2urisdiction of
the trial court, no ad2udication in the cause could ha!e
been accorded any !alidity or the binding effect upon
any party, in representation of the deceased, without
trenching upon the fundamental right to a day in court
which is the !ery essence of the constitutionally
enshrined guarantee of due process
Election laws on conduct of election
&onstrued as mandatory
'efore election 0 mandatory
After election 0 directory, in support of the result
unless of a character to affect an obstruction to the free
and intelligent casting of the !otes, or to the
ascertainment of the result, or unless it is epressly
declared by the statute that the particular act is
essential to the !alidity of an election, or that its
omission shall render it !oid (whew, and habaS"
Ghen the !oters ha!e honestly cast their ballots, the
same should not be nullified simply because the
officers appointed under the law to direct the elections
and guard the purity of the ballot ha!e not done their
duty
/or where a candidate has recei!ed popular mandate,
o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed, all possible
doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the candidates
eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of
the electorate
De#os "eyes v. "odrig%e'
4he circumstance that the coupon bearing the number
of the ballot is not detached at the time the ballot is
!oted, as re.uired by law, does not 2ustify the court in
re2ecting the ballot
Election laws on .ualification and dis.ualification
4he rule of Bbefore3mandatory and after3directoryC in
election laws only applies to procedural statutesH
5ot applicable to pro!isions of the election laws
prescribing the time limit to file certificate of
candidacy and the .ualifications and dis.ualifications
of electi!e office 0 considered mandatory e!en after
election
%tatutes prescribing .ualifications for office
Eligibility to a public office is of a continuing nature
and must eist at the commencement of the term and
during the occupancy of the office
%tatutes prescribing the eligibility or .ualifications of
persons to a public office are regarded as mandatory
Eample in the boo1 0 lawyer32udgeH 2udge3disbarment
as lawyer
%tatutes relating to assessment of taes
Intended for the security of the citiAens, or to insure
the e.uality of taation, or for certainty as to the nature
and amount of each other(s ta 0 )A5DA4ORM
o E$g$ %tatutes re.uiring the assessor to notify
the tapayer of the assessment of his property
within a prescribed period
4hose designed merely for the information or direction
of officers or to secure methodical and systematic
modes of proceedings 3 DIRE&4ORM
%tatutes concerning public auction sale
&onstrued mandatory
Procedural steps must be strictly followed
Otherwise, !oid
DIRECTORY STATUTES
%tatutes prescribing guidance for officers
Regulation designed to secure order, system, and
dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which
the rights of parties interested may not be in2uriously
affected 0 directory
o Eception 0 unless accompanied by negati!e
words importing that the acts re.uired shall
not be done in any other manner or time than
that designated
%tatutes prescribing manner of 2udicial action
&onstrued directory
Procedure is secondary in importance to substanti!e
right
Kenerally, non3compliance therewith is not necessary
to the !alidity of the proceedings
%tatutes re.uiring rendition of decision within prescribed period
%ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+;, &onstitution 0 the maimum
period within which a case or matter shall be decided
or resol!ed from the date of its submission shall be
o :9 months 0 %&
o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts
o - months 0 all other lower courts
%ec , Art$ IE3A, *+;, &onstitution 0
o 86 days from the date of its submission for
resolution 0 for all &onstitutional
&ommissions
'efore the &onstitution too1 effect 3 %tatutes re.uiring
rendition of decision within prescribed period 0
Directory
o Ecept
intention to the contrary is manifest
time is of the essence of the thing to
be done
language of the statute contains
negati!e words
designation of the time was intended
as a limitation of power, authority or
right
always loo1 at intent to ascertain whether to gi!e the
statute a mandatory or directory construction
o basisD EEPEDIE5&M 0 less in2ury results to
the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the little of the law and that 2udges
would otherwise abstain from rendering
decisions after the period to render them had
lapsed because they lac1ed 2urisdiction tot do
so
H%er%bin v. CA
%tatuteD appeals in election cases Bshall be decided
within - months after the filing of the case in the office
of the cler1 of courtC
IssueD whether or not &A has 2urisdiction in deciding
the election case although the re.uired period to
resol!e it has epired
@eldD yes, otherwise is to defeat the administration of
2ustice upon factors beyond the control of the partiesH
would defeat the purpose of due processH dismissal
will constitute miscarriage of 2usticeH speedy trial
would be turned into denial of 2ustice
o /ailure of 2udge to ta1e action within the said
period merely depri!es him of their right to
collect their salaries or to apply for lea!es, but
does not depri!e them of the 2urisdiction to
act on the cases pending before them
&onstitutional time pro!ision directory
Marce#ino v. Cr%'
%ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+;, &onstitution 0 the maimum
period within which a case or matter shall be decided
or resol!ed from the date of its submission shall be
o :9 months 0 %&
o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts
o - months 0 all other lower courts
%ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+;, &onstitution 0 directory
ReasonsD
o %tatutory pro!isions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without
affecting the !alidity of statutory proceedings,
are usually those which relate to the mode or
time of doing that which is essential to effect
the aim and purpose of the legislature or some
incident of the essential act 0 thus directory
o Liberal construction 0 departure from strict
compliance would result in less in2ury to the
general public than would its strict
application
o &ourts are not di!ested of their 2urisdiction
for failure to decide a case within the +63day
period
o Only for the guidance of the 2udges manning
our courts
o /ailure to obser!e said rule constitutes a
ground for administrati!e sanction against the
defaulting 2udge
A certification to this effect is
re.uired before 2udges are allowed to
draw their salaries
CHAPTER NINE: Pros#et!.e an" Retroat!.e Statutes
IN GENERAL
Prospecti!e and retroacti!e statutes, defined
Prospecti!e 0
o operates upon facts or transactions that occur
after the statute ta1es effect
o loo1s and applies to the future$
Retroacti!e 0
o Law which creates a new obligation, imposes
a new duty or attaches a new disability in
respect to a transaction already past$
o A statute is not made retroacti!e because it
draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or
part of the re.uirements for its action and
application is drawn from a time antedating
its passage$
1ma#i vs. Estanis#ao
A law may be made operati!e partly on facts that
occurred prior to the effecti!ity of such law without
being retroacti!e$
%tatuteD RA ,*8,3 granting increased personal
eemptions from income ta to be a!ailable
thenceforth, that is, after said Act became effecti!e and
on or before the deadline for filing income ta returns,
with respect to compensation income earned or
recei!ed during the calendar year prior to the date the
law too1 effect$
Castro v. Saga#es
A retroacti!e law (in a legal sense"
o one which ta1es away or impairs !ested rights
ac.uired under eisting laws
o creates a new obligation and imposes a new
duty
o attaches a new disability in respect of
transactions or considerations already past
Laws operate prospecti!ely, generally
It is a settled rule in statutory construction that statutes
are to be construed as ha!ing only prospecti!e
operation, unless the intendment of the legislature is to
gi!e them a retroacti!e effect, epressly declare or
necessarily implied from the language used$
5o court will hold a statute to be retroacti!e when the
legislature has not said so$
Art$ 9 of the &i!il &ode which pro!ides that BLaws
shall ha!e no retroacti!e effect, unless the contrary is
pro!ided$C
Le) prospicit. non respicit & the law loo1s forward, not
bac1ward
Le) de f%t%re. -%de) de praeterito & the law pro!ides
for the future, the 2udge for the past$
If the law is silent as to the date of its application and
that it is couched in the past tense does not necessarily
imply that it should ha!e retroacti!e effect$
,rego v. Come#ec
A statute despite the generality of its language, must
not be so construed as to o!erreach acts, e!ents, or
matters which transpired before its passage
%tatuteD %ec$96 of the LK& dis.ualifying those
remo!ed from office as a result of an administrati!e
case from running for local electi!e positions cannot
be applied retroacti!ely$
@eldD It cannot dis.ualify a person who was
administrati!ely remo!ed from his position prior to the
effecti!ity of said &ode from running for an electi!e
position$
RationaleD a law is a rule established to guide actions
with no binding effect until it is enacted$
+ova constit%tion f%t%ris formam imponere debet non
praeteretis & A new statute should affect the future,
not the past$
Prospecti!ity applies toD
o %tatutes
o Administrati!e rulings and circulars
o #udicial decisions
4he principle of prospecti!ity of statutes, original or
amendatory, has been applied in many cases$ 4hese
includeD
%yco v. P+
%tatuteD RA *7,8 which di!ested the P5' of authority
to accept bac1 pay certificates in payment of loans
@eldD does not apply to an offer of payment made
before effecti!ity of the act$
Lagardo v. Masaganda
@eldD RA :8*-, as amended by RA -6+6 O5 #une
*++*, granting inferior courts 2urisdiction o!er
guardianship cases, could not be gi!en retroacti!e
effect in the absence of a sa!ing clause$
Larga v. "anada 6r.
@eldD %ec$ + ? *6 of E$O$ +6 amending %ec 9 of P$D$
*,7: could ha!e no retroacti!e application$
Peo v. H%e Po Lay
@eldD a person cannot be con!icted of !iolating
&ircular :6 of the &entral 'an1, when the alleged
!iolation occurred before publication of the &ircular
on the Official KaAette$
a#ta'ar v. CA
@eldD It denied retroacti!e application to PD :,
decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil, ? PD -*8, prohibiting e2ectment
of tenants from rice ? corn farmholdings pending
promulgation of rules ? regulations implementing PD
:,
+i#o v CA
@eldD remo!ed Tpersonal culti!ation( as the ground for
e2ectment of a tenant can(t be gi!en retroacti!e effect
in absence of statutory statement for retroacti!ity$
Applied to administrati!e rulings ? circularsD
ASAC+ roadcasting v. CTA
@eldD a circular or ruling of the &IR cannot be gi!en
retroacti!e effect ad!ersely to a tapayer$
Sanc*e' v. COMELEC
@eldD the holding of recall proceedings had no
retroacti!e application
"om%a#de' v. CSC
@eldD &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o$ :+ cannot be
gi!en retrospecti!e effect so as to entitle to permanent
appointment an employee whose temporary
appointment had epired before the &ircular was
issued$
Applied to 2udicial decisions for e!en though not laws,
are e!idence of what the laws mean and is the basis of
Art$; of the &i!il &ode wherein laws of the
&onstitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines$
Presumption against retroacti!ity
Presumption is that all laws operate prospecti!ely,
unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly
and une.ui!ocally epressed or necessarily implied$
In case of doubtD resol!ed against the retroacti!e
operation of laws
If statute is susceptible of construction other than that
of retroacti!ity or will render it unconstitutional3 the
statute will be gi!en prospecti!e effect and operation$
Presumption is strong against substanti!e laws
affecting pending actions or proceedings$ 5o
substanti!e statute shall be so construed retroacti!ely
as to affect pending litigations$
Gords or phrases indicating prospecti!ity
Indicating prospecti!e operationD
o A statute is to apply BhereafterC or
BthereafterC
o Bfrom and after the passing of this ActC
o Bshall ha!e been madeC
o Bfrom and afterC a designated date
B%hallC implies that the law ma1es intend the
enactment to be effecti!e only in f%t%re.
%tatutes ha!e no retroacti!e but prospecti!e effectD
o BIt shall ta1e effect upon its appro!alC
o %hall ta1e effect on the date the President
shall ha!e issued a proclamation or E$O$, as
pro!ided in the statute
Retroacti!e statutes, generally
4he &onstitution does not prohibit the enactment of
retroacti!e statutes which do not impair the obligation
of contract, depri!e persons of property without due
process of law, or di!est rights which ha!e become
!ested, or which are not in the nature of e) post facto
laws$
%tatutes by nature which are retroacti!eD
o Remedial or curati!e statutes
o %tatutes which create new rights
o %tatute epressly pro!ides that it shall apply
retroacti!ely
o Ghere it uses words which clearly indicate its
intent
Problem in construction is when it is applied
retroacti!ely, to a!oid frontal clash with the
&onstitution and sa!e the law from being declared
unconstitutional$
STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT
Penal statutes, generally
Penal laws operate prospecti!ely$
Art$ :* of the RP& pro!ides that Bno felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior
to its commission$
Pro!ision is recognition to the uni!ersally accepted
principle that no penal law can ha!e a retroacti!e
effect, no act or omission shall be held to be a crime,
nor its author punished, ecept by !irtue of a law in
force at the time the act was committed$
+%##%m crimen sine poena. n%##a poena sine #egis &
there is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty
without a law$
E) post facto law
&onstitution pro!ides that no e) post facto law shall be
enacted$ It also prohibits the retroacti!e application of
penal laws which are in the nature of e) post facto
laws$
E) post facto laws are any of the followingD
o Law ma1es criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such act
o Law which aggra!ates a crime, ma1es it
greater than it was, when committed
o Law which changes the punishment ? inflicts
a greater punishment than that anneed to the
crime when committed
o Law which alters the legal rules of e!idence,
authoriAes con!iction upon less or different
testimony than the law re.uired at the time of
the commission of the offense
o Law which assumes to regulate ci!il rights
and remedies only, but in effect imposes
penalty or depri!ation of a right for
something which when done was lawful
o Law which depri!es a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled, such as protection of a
former con!iction or ac.uittal, or
proclamation of amnesty$
4est if e) post facto clause is !iolatedD Does the law
sought to be applied retroacti!ely ta1e from an accused
any right !ital for protection of life and libertyR
%copeD applies only to criminal or penal matters
It does 5O4 apply to laws concerning ci!il
proceedings generally, or which affect or regulate ci!il
or pri!ate rights or political pri!ilege
A#via v. Sandiganbayan
LawD as of the date of the effecti!ity of this decree, any
case cogniAable by the Sandiganbayan is not an e)
post facto law because it is not a penal statute nor
dilutes the right of appeal of the accused$
'ill of attainder
&onstitution pro!ides that no bill of attainder shall be
enacted$
'ill of attainder 0 legislati!e act which inflicts
punishment without 2udicial trial
EssenceD substitution of a legislati!e for a 2udicial
determination of guilt
%er!es to implement the principle of separation of
powers by confining the legislature to rule3ma1ing ?
thereby forestalling legislati!e usurpation of 2udicial
functions$
@istoryD 'ill of Attainder was employed to suppress
unpopular causes ? political minorities, and this is the
e!il sought to be suppressed by the &onstitution$
@ow to spot a 'ill of AttainderD
o %ingling out of a definite minority
o Imposition of a burden on it
o A legislati!e intent
o retroacti!e application to past conduct suffice
to stigmatiAe
'ill of Attainder is ob2ectionable because of its e) post
facto features$
Accordingly, if a statute is a 'ill of Attainder, it is also
an e) post facto law$
Ghen penal laws applied retroacti!ely
Penal laws cannot be gi!en retroacti!e effect, ecept
when they are fa!orable to the accused$
Art$:: of RP& Bpenal laws shall ha!e a retroacti!e
effect insofar as they fa!or the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 7 Art 8: of the &ode , although at the
time of the application of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the con!ict is ser!ing the
same$
4his is not an e) post facto law$
Eception to the general rule that all laws operate
prospecti!ely$
Rule is founded on the principle thatD the right of the
state to punish and impose penalty is based on the
principles of 2ustice$
Favorabi#ia s%nt amp#ianda. adiiosa restrigenda &
&onscience and good law 2ustify this eception$
Eception was inspired by sentiments of humanity and
accepted by science$
: laws affecting the liability of accusedD
o In force at the time of the commission of the
crime 0 during the pendency of the criminal
action, a statute is passed
reducing the degree of penalty
eliminating the offense itself
remo!ing subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insol!ency to pay the ci!il
liability
prescription of the offense
such statute will be applied
retroacti!ely and the trial
court before the finality of
2udgment or the appellate
court on appeal from such
2udgment should ta1e such
statute in consideration$
o Enacted during or after the trial of the
criminal action
Director v. Director of Prisons
Ghen there is already a final 2udgment ? accused is
ser!ing sentence, remedy is to file petition of *abeas
corp%s. alleging that his continued imprisonment is
illegal pursuant to said statute ? praying that he be
forthwith released$
Eceptions to the ruleD
o Ghen accused is habitual delin.uent
o Ghen statute pro!ides that it shall not apply
to eisting actions or pending cases
o Ghere accused disregards the later law ?
in!o1es the prior statute under which he was
prosecuted$
Keneral ruleD An amendatory statute rendering an
illegal act prior to its enactment no longer illegal is
gi!en retroacti!e effect does not apply when
amendatory act specifically pro!ides that it shall only
apply prospecti!ely$
%tatutes substanti!e in nature
%ubstanti!e law
o creates, defines or regulates rights concerning
life, liberty or property, or the powers of
agencies or instrumentalities for
administration of public affairs$
o that part of law which creates, defines ?
regulates rights, or which regulates rights or
duties which gi!e rise to a cause of action
o that part of law which courts are established
to administer
o when applied to criminal lawD that which
declares which acts are crimes and prescribe
the punishment for committing them
o &annot be construed retroacti!ely as it might
affect pre!ious or past rights or obligations
%ubstanti!e rights
o One which includes those rights which one
en2oys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations$
&ases with substanti!e statutesD
To#entino v. A'a#te
In the absence of a contrary intent, statutes which lays
down certain re.uirements to be complied with be fore
a case can be brought to court$
Espirit% v. Cipriano
/reeAes the amount of monthly rentals for residential
houses during a fied period
Spo%ses Tirona v. A#e-o
LawD &omprehensi!e Land Reform Law granting
complainants tenancy rights to fishponds and pursuant
to which they filed actions to assert rights which
subse.uently amended to eempt fishponds from
co!erage of statute
@eldD Amendatory law is substanti!e in nature as it
eempts fishponds from its co!erage$
4est for procedural lawsD
o if rule really regulates procedure, the 2udicial
process for enforcing rights and duties
recogniAed by substanti!e law ? for 2ustly
administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them
o If it operates as a means of implementing an
eisting right
4est for substanti!e lawsD
o If it ta1es away a !ested right
o If rule creates a right such as right to appeal
Fabian v. Desierto
Ghere to prosecute an appeal or transferring the !enue
of appeal is procedural
EampleD
o Decreeing that appeals from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrati!e actions be
made to the &ourt of Appeals
o Re.uiring that appeals from decisions of the
5LR& be filed with the &ourt of Appeals
Kenerally, procedural rules are retroacti!e and are
applicable to actions pending and undermined at the
time of the passage of the procedural law, while
substanti!e laws are prospecti!e
Effects on pending actions
%tatutes affecting substanti!e rights may not be gi!en
retroacti!e operation so as to go!ern pending
proceedings$
/b%ran v. Labes
Ghere court originally obtains and eercises
2urisdiction, a later statute restricting such 2urisdiction
or transferring it to another tribunal will not affect
pending action, unless statute pro!ides ? unless
prohibitory words are used$
Lagardo v. Masagana
Ghere court has no 2urisdiction o!er a certain case but
ne!ertheless decides it, from which appeal is ta1en, a
statute enacted during the pendency of the appeal
!esting 2urisdiction upon such trial court o!er the
sub2ect matter or such case may not be gi!en
retroacti!e effect so as to !alidate the 2udgment of the
court a $%o, in the absence of a sa!ing clause$
"ep%b#ic v. Prieto
Ghere a complaint pending in court is defecti!e
because it did not allege sufficient action, it may not be
!alidated by a subse.uent law which affects
substanti!e rights and not merely procedural matters$
Rule against the retroacti!e operation of statutes in
general applies more strongly with respect to
substanti!e laws that affect pending actions or
proceedings$
Pualification of rule
A substanti!e law will be construed as applicable to
pending actions if such is the clear intent of the law$
4o promote social 2ustice or in the eercise of police
power, is intended to apply to pending actions
As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of the law
as it eists at the time of the decision of the appellate
court, where the statute changing the law is intended to
be retroacti!e and to apply to pending litigations or is
retroacti!e in effect
4his rule is true though it may result in the re!ersal of
a 2udgment which as correct at the time it was rendered
by the trial court$ 4he rule is sub2ect to the limitation
concerning constitutional restrictions against
impairment of !ested rights
%tatutes affecting !ested rights
A !ested right or interest may be said to mean some
right or interest in property that has become fied or
established and is no longer open to doubt or
contro!ersy
Rights are !ested when the right to en2oyment, present
or prospecti!e, has become the property of some
particular person or persons, as a present interest
4he right must be absolute, complete and
unconditional, independent of a contingency
A mere epectancy of future benefit or a contingent
interest in property founded on anticipated continuance
of eisting laws does not constitute a !ested right
Inchoate rights which ha!e not been acted on are not
!ested
A statute may not be construed and applied
retroacti!ely under the following circumstancesD
o if it impairs substanti!e right that has become
!estedH
o as disturbing or destroying eisting right
embodied in a 2udgmentH
o creating new substanti!e right to fundamental
cause of action where none eisted before and
ma1ing such right retroacti!eH
o by arbitrarily creating a new right or liability
already etinguished by operation of law
Law creating a new right in fa!or of a class of persons
may not be so applied if the new right collides with or
impairs any !ested right ac.uired before the
establishment of the new right nor, by the terms of
which is retroacti!e, be so applied ifD
o it ad!ersely affects !ested rights
o unsettles matter already done as re.uired by
eisting law
o wor1s in2ustice to those affected thereby
eng%et Conso#idated Mining Co v. Pineda
Ghile a person has no !ested right in any rule of law
entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged
for his benefit, nor has he a !ested right in the
continued eistence of a statute which precludes its
change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a
particular matter, a subse.uent statute cannot be so
applied retroacti!ely as to impair his right that accrued
under the old law$
%tatutes must be so construed as to sustain its
constitutionality, and prospecti!e operation will be
presumed where a retroacti!e application will produce
in!alidity$
Peo v. Pata#in
4he abolition of the death penalty and its subse.uent
re3imposition$ 4hose accused of crimes prior to the re3
imposition of the death penalty ha!e ac.uired !ested
rights under the law abolishing it$
&ourts ha!e thus gi!en statutes strict constriction to
pre!ent their retroacti!e operation in order that the
statutes would not impair or interfere with !ested or
eisting rights$ Accused3appellant Ts rights to be
benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued
or attached by !irtue of Article :: of the Re!ised Penal
&ode$ 4his benefit cannot be ta1en away from them$
%tatutes affecting obligations of contract
Any contract entered into must be in accordance with,
and not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of
eecution$ %uch law forms part of, and is read into, the
contract e!en without the parties epressly saying so$
Laws eisting at the time of the eecution of contracts
are the ones applicable to such transactions and not
later statutes, unless the latter pro!ide that they shall
ha!e retroacti!e effect$
Later statutes will not, howe!er, be gi!en retroacti!e
effect if to do so will impair the obligation of
contracts, for the &onstitution prohibits the enactment
of a law impairing the obligations of contracts$
Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
changes the intention of the parties necessarily impairs
the contract itself
A statute which authoriAes any de!iation from the
terms of the contract by postponing or accelerating the
period of performance which it prescribes, imposing
conditions not epressed in the contract, or dispensing
with those which are howe!er minute or apparently
immaterial in their effect upon the contract, impairs the
obligation, and such statute should not therefore be
applied retroacti!ely$
As between two feasible interpretations of a statute,
the court should adopt that which will a!oid the
impairment of the contract$
If the contract is legal at it inception, it cannot be
rendered illegal by a subse.uent legislation$
A law by the terms of which a transaction or
agreement would be illegal cannot be gi!en retroacti!e
effect so as to nullify such transactions or agreement
eecuted before said law too1 effect$
1.S. Tobacco Corp. v. Lina
4he importation of certain goods without import
license which was legal under the law eisting at the
time of shipment is not rendered illegal by the fact that
when the goods arri!ed there was already another law
prohibiting importation without import license$ 4o rule
otherwise in any of these instances is to impair the
obligations of contract$
Illustration of rule
Peop#e v. 5eta
Eisting lawD authoriAing a lawyer to charge not more
than 7N of the amount in!ol!ed as attorney(s fees in
the prosecution of certain !eteran(s claim$
/actsD A lawyer entered into a contract for
professional ser!ices on contingent basis and actually
rendered ser!ice to its successful conclusion$ 'efore
the claim was collected, a statute was enacted$
5ew statuteD Prohibiting the collection of attorney(s
fees for ser!ices rendered in prosecuting !eteran(s
claims$
IssueD /or collecting his fees pursuant to the contract
for professional ser!ices, the lawyer was prosecuted
for !iolation of the statute$
@eldD In eonerating the lawyer, the court saidD the
statute prohibiting the collection of attorney(s fees
cannot be applied retroacti!ely so as to ad!ersely
affect the contract for professional ser!ices and the
fees themsel!es$
4he 7N fee was contingent and did not become
absolute and unconditional until the !eteran(s claim
had been collected by the claimant when the statute
was already in force did no alter the situation$
/or the Bdistinction between !ested and absolute rights
is not helpful and a better !iew to handle the problem
is to declare those statutes attempting to affect rights
which the courts find to be unalterable, in!alid as
arbitrary and unreasonable, thus lac1ing in due
process$C
4he 7N fee allowed by the old law is Bnot
unreasonable$ %er!ices were rendered thereunder to
claimant(s benefits$ 4he right to fees accrued upon
such rendition$ Only the payment of the fee was
contingent upon the appro!al of the claimH therefore,
the right was contingent$ /or a right to accrue is one
thingH enforcement thereof by actual payment is
another$ 4he subse.uent law enacted after the
rendition of the ser!ices should not as a matter of
simple 2ustice affect the agreement, which was entered
into !oluntarily by the parties as epressly directed in
the pre!ious law$ 4o apply the new law to the case of
defendant3appellant s as to depri!e him of the agreed
fee would be arbitrary and unreasonable as destructi!e
of the in!iolability of contracts, and therefore in!alid
as lac1ing in due processH to penaliAe him for
collecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of 2ustice$C
Repealing and amendatory acts
%tatutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate
prospecti!ely, unless the legislati!e intent to gi!e them
retroacti!e effect clearly appears$
Although a repealing state is intended to be retroacti!e,
it will not be so construed if it will impair !ested rights
or the obligations of contracts, or unsettle matters that
had been legally done under the old law$
Repealing statutes which are penal in nature are
generally applied retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the
accused, unless the contrary appears or the accused is
otherwise not entitled to the benefits of the repealing
act$
Ghile an amendment is generally construed as
becoming a part of the original act as if it had always
been contained therein , it may not be gi!en a
retroacti!e effect unless it is so pro!ided epressly or
by necessary implication and no !ested right or
obligations of contract are thereby impaired$
4he general rule on the prospecti!e operation of
statutes also applies to amendatory acts
San 6ose v. "e*abi#itation Finance Corp
RA 96* which condoned the interest on pre3war debts
from #anuary *, *+9: to December -*, *+97 amended
by RA 8,* on #une *8, *+7* by !irtually reenacting
the old law and pro!iding that 9if t*e debtor. *o;ever.
makes vo#%ntary payment of t*e entire preA;ar %npaid
principa# ob#igation on or before December I?. ?JKL.
t*e interest on s%c* principa# ob#igation
corresponding from 6an%ary ?. ?JM> to day of
payment are #ike;ise condonedC
@eldD a debtor who paid his pre3war obligation
together with the interests on )arch *9, *+7* or before
the amendment was appro!ed into law, is not entitled
to a refund of the interest paid from #anuary *, *+98 to
)arch *9, *+7* the date the debtor paid the obligation$
ReasonD
o Bma1es !oluntary paymentC 0 denotes a
present or future actH thereby not retroacti!ely
o Bunpaid principal obligationC and BcondoneC
0 imply that amendment does not co!er
refund of interests paid after its appro!al$
C/" v. La Tondena
%tatuteD imposes ta on certain business acti!ities is
amended by eliminating the clause pro!iding a ta on
some of such acti!ities, and the amended act is further
amended, after the lapse of length of time, by restoring
the clause pre!iously eliminated, which re.uires that
the last amendment should not be gi!en retroacti!e
effect so as to co!er the whole period$
/mperia# v. C/"
An amendment which imposes a ta on a certain
business which the statute prior to its amendment does
not ta, may not be applied retroacti!ely so as to
re.uire payment of the ta on such business for the
period prior to the amendment
%yco v. P*i#ippine +ationa# ank
IssueD can 'uyco compel the P5' to accept his
bac1pay certificate in payment of his indebtedness to
the ban1
April :9, *+783 RA ;+, ga!e 'uyco the right to ha!e
said certificate applied in payment of is obligation thus
at that time he offered to pay with his bac1pay
certificate$
#une *8, *+78, RA *7,8 was enacted amending the
charter of the P5' and pro!ided that the ban1 shall
ha!e no authority to accept bac1pay certificate in
payment of indebtedness to the ban1$
@eldD 4he &ourt fa!ored 'uyco$ All statutes are
construed as ha!ing prospecti!e operation, unless the
purpose of the legislature is to gi!e them retroacti!e
effect$
4his principle also applies to amendments$ RA *7,8
does not contain any pro!ision regarding its retroacti!e
effect$ It simply states its effecti!ity upon appro!al$
4he amendment therefore, has no retroacti!e effect,
and the present case should be go!erned by the law at
the time the offer in .uestion was made
4he rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the
original act continues to be in force with regard to all
rights that had accrued prior to such amendment$
/ns%#ar ,overnment v. Frank
Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on the
basis of the law then pre!ailing, the amendment of said
law will not affect the terms of said contract$
4he rule applies e!en if one of the contracting parties
is the go!ernment

STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
Procedural laws
4he general law is that the law has no retroacti!e
effect$
EceptionsD
o procedural laws
o curati!e laws, which are gi!en retroacti!e
operation
Procedural laws
o ad2ecti!e laws which prescribe rules and
forms of procedure of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their in!asion
o they refer to rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all 1inds can properly
administer in2ustice
o they include rules of pleadings, practice and
e!idence
o Applied to criminal law, they pro!ide or
regulate the steps by which one who commits
a crime is to be punished$
o Remedial statutes or statutes relating to
modes of procedure3 which do not create new
or ta1e away !ested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
the rights already eisting, do not come
within the legal conception of a retroacti!e
law, or the general rule against the retroacti!e
operation of statutes$
o A new statute which deals with procedure
only is presumpti!ely applicable to all actions
0 those which ha!e accrued or are pending$
o %tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage$
4he retroacti!e application of procedural laws is notD
o !iolati!e of any right of a person who may
feel that he is ad!ersely affectedH
o nor constitutionally ob2ectionable$
"ationa#eF no !ested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws$
A person has no !ested right in any particular remedy,
and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether ci!il or criminal, of any other
than the eisting rules of procedure
A#day v. Cami##on
Pro!isionD 'P *:+3 Bnor record or appeal shall be
re.uired to ta1e an appeal$C (procedural in nature and
should be applied retroacti!ely"
IssueD Ghether an appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment
should be dismissed for failure of appellant to file a
record on appeal within -6 days as re.uired under the
old rules$
%uch .uestion is pending resolution at the time the 'P
'lg too1 effect, became academic upon effecti!ity of
said law because the law no longer re.uires the filing a
of a record on appeal and its retroacti!e application
remo!ed the legal obstacle to gi!ing due course to the
appeal$
Castro v. Saga#es
A statute which transfers the 2urisdiction to try certain
cases from a court to a .uasi32udicial tribunal is a
remedial statute that is applicable to claims that
accrued before its enactment but formulated and filed
after it too1 effect$
@eldD 4he court that has 2urisdiction o!er a claim at the
time it accrued cannot !alidly try to claim where at the
time the claim is formulated and filed, the 2urisdiction
to try it has been transferred by law to a .uasi32udicial
tribunal$
"ationa#eF for e!en actions pending in one court may
be !alidly be ta1en away and transferred to another
and no litigant can ac.uire a !ested right to be heard
by one particular court$
An administrati!e rule D which is interpretati!e of a pre3
eisting statue and not declarati!e of certain rights
with obligations thereunder is gi!en retroacti!e effect
as of the date of the effecti!ity of the statute$
At#as Conso#idated Mining 3 Deve#opment Corp. v. CA
IssueD whether a trial court has been di!ested of
2urisdiction to hear and decide a pending case
in!ol!ing a mining contro!ersy upon the promulgation
of PD *:;* which !ests upon the 'ureau of )ines
Original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear and decide
mining contro!ersies$
@eldD Mes$ PD *:;* is a remedial statute$
It does not create new rights nor ta1e away rights that
are already !ested$ It only operates in furtherance of a
remedy or confirmation of rights already in eistence$
It does not come within the legal pur!iew of a
prospecti!e law$ As such, it can be gi!en retrospecti!e
application of statutes$
'eing procedural in nature, it shall apply to all actions
pending at the time of its enactment ecept only with
respect to those cases which had already attained h
character of a final and eecutor 2udgment$
Gere it not so, the purpose of the Decree, which is to
facilitate the immediate resolution of mining
contro!ersies by granting 2urisdiction to a body or
agency more adept to the technical compleities of
mining operations, would be thwarted and rendered
meaningless$
Litigants in a mining contro!ersy cannot be permitted
to choose a forum of con!enience$
#urisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the
parties to such proceedings$
/urthermore, PD *:;* is a special law and under a
well3accepted principle in stat con, the special law will
pre!ail o!er a stature or law of general application$
S%bido. 6r. v. Sandiganbayan
&ourt ruled that RA ,+,7, in further amending PD
*868 as regards the %andiganbayan(s 2urisdiction,
mode of appeal, and other procedural matters, is
clearly a procedural law, i.e. one which prescribes
rules and forms of procedure enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their in!asion, or those which
refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying
laws of all 1inds can properly administer 2ustice$
4he petitioners suggest that it is li1ewise curati!e or
remedial statute, which cures defects and adds to the
means of enforcing eisting obligations$
As a procedural and curati!e statute, RA ,+,7 may
!alidly be gi!en retroacti!e effect, there being no
impairment of contractual or !ested rights$
Martine' v. Peop#e
%tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undermined at the time of their passage$
Ghere at the time the action was filed, the Rules of
&ourtD Ba petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper
shall not be entertained by the appellate courtC
4he subse.uent amendment thereto deleting the
sentence implies that the appellate court is no longer
prohibited from entertaining petitions to appear as
pauper litigants, and may grant the petition then
pending action, so long as its re.uirements are
complied with$
Eceptions to the rule
4he rule does not apply whereD
o the statute itself epressly or by necessary
implication pro!ides that pending actions are
ecepted from it operation, or where to apply
it to pending proceedings would impair
!ested rights
o &ourts may deny the retroacti!e application
of procedural laws in the e!ent that to do so
would not be feasible or would wor1
in2ustice$
o 5or may procedural laws be applied
retroacti!ely to pending actions if to do so
would in!ol!e intricate problems of due
process or impair the independence of the
courts$
Tayag v. CA
IssueD whether an action for recognition filed by an
illegitimate minor after the death of his alleged parent
when Art :;7 of the &i!il &ode was still in effect and
has remained pending Art *,7 of the /amily &ode too1
effect can still be prosecuted considering that Art *,7,
which is claimed to be procedural in nature and
retroacti!e in application, does not allow filing of the
action after the death of the alleged parent$
@eldD 4he rule that a statutory change in matters of
procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings,
unless the language of the act ecludes them from its
operation, is not so per!asi!e that it may be used to
!alidate or in!alidate proceedings ta1en before it goes
into effect, since procedure must be go!erned by the
law regulating it at the time the .uestion of procedure
arises especially where !ested rights maybe
pre2udiced$
Accordingly, Art *,7 of the /amily &ode finds no
proper application to the instant case since it will
ineluctably affect ad!ersely a right of pri!ate
respondent and, conse.uentially, of the minor child she
represents, both of which ha!e been !ested with the
filing of the complaint in court$ 4he trial court is,
therefore, correct in applying the pro!isions of Art :;7
of the &i!il &ode and in holding that pri!ate
respondent(s cause of action has not yet prescribed$C
&urati!e statutes
curati!e remedial statutes are healing acts
they are remedial by curing defects and adding to the
means of enforcing eisting obligations
the rule to curati!e statutes is that if the thing omitted
or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect
sought to be remo!ed or made harmless, is something
which the legislature might ha!e dispensed with by a
pre!ious statute, it may do so by a subse.uent one
curati!e statutes are intended to supply defects,
abridge superfluities in eisting laws, and curb certain
e!ils$ 4hey are designed and intended, but has failed
of epected legal conse.uence by reason of some
statutory disability or irregularity in their own action$
4hey ma1e !alid that which, before the enactment of
the statute, was in!alid$
4heir purpose is to gi!e !alidity to acts done that
would ha!e been in!alid under eisting laws, as if
eisting laws ha!e been complied with
Friva#do v. COMELEC
(rested the definition of curati!e statutes"
4olentino
o those which underta1e to cure errors?
irregularities, thereby !alidating 2udicial
2udicial or administrati!e proceedings, acts of
public officers, or pri!ate deeds or contracts
which otherwise would not produce their
intended conse.uences by reason of some
statutory disability or failure to comply with
some technical re.uirement
Agpalo
o curati!e statutes are healing acts curing
defects and adding to the means of enforcing
eisting obligations
o and are intended to supply defects abridge
superfluities in eisting laws? curb certain
e!ils
o by their !ery nature, curati!e statutes are
retroacti!e and reach bac1 to the past e!ents
to correct errors or irregularities ? to render
!alid ? effecti!e attempted acts which would
be otherwise ineffecti!e for the purpose the
parties intended
&urati!e statutes are forms of retroacti!e legislations
which reach bac1 on past e!ents to correct errors or
irregularities ? to render !alid ? effecti!e attempted
acts which would be otherwise ineffecti!e for the
purpose the parties intended$
Erectors. /nc. v. +L"C (hahhha for the petitioner"
%tatuteD EO ***, amended Art :*, of the Labor &ode
to widen the wor1ers, access to the go!ernment for
redress of grie!ances by gi!ing the Regional Directors
? the Labor Arbiters concurrent 2urisdiction o!er cases
in!ol!ing money claims
IssueD Amendment created a situation where the
2urisdiction of the RDs and LAs o!erlapped$
RemedyD RA 8,*7further amended Art :*, by
delineating their respecti!e 2urisdictions$ Fnder RA
8,*7, the RD has eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er cases
in!ol!ing claims, pro!idedD
o the claim is presented by an employer or
person employed in domestic or household
ser!ices or household help under the &ode$
o the claimant no longer being employed does
not see1 reinstatement
o the aggregate money claim of the employee
or househelper doesn(t eceed P7,666$
All other cases are within the eclusi!e 2urisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter$
@eldD EO *** ? RA 8,*7 are therefore curati!e
statutes$
A curati!e statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior
law or to !alidate legal proceedings, instruments or
acts of public authorities which would otherwise be
!oid for want of conformity with certain eisting legal
re.uirements
Adong v. C*eong Seng ,ee
%tatutes intended to !alidate what otherwise !oid or
in!alid marriages, being curati!e, will be gi!en
retroacti!e effect$
Santos v. D%ata
%tatute which pro!ides that a contract shall presumed
an e.uitable mortgage in any of the cases therein
enumerated, and designed primarily to curtail e!ils
brought about by contracts of sale with right of
repurchase, is remedial in nature ? will be applied
retroacti!ely to cases arising prior to the effecti!ity of
the statute$

Abad v. P*i# American ,enera# /nc.

Ghere at the time action is filed in court the latter has
no 2urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter but a subse.uent
statute clothes it with 2urisdiction before the matter is
decided$
4he statute is in the nature of a curati!e law with
retroacti!e operation to pending proceedings and cures
the defect of lac1 of 2urisdiction of the court at the
commencement of the action$
Legarda v. Masaganda
Ghere a curati!e statute is enacted after the court has
rendered 2udgment, which 2udgment is naturally !oid
as the court has at the time no 2urisdiction o!er the
sub2ect of the action, the enactment of the statute
conferring 2urisdiction to the court does not !alidate
the !oid 2udgment for the legislature has no power to
ma1e a 2udgment rendered without 2urisdiction of a
!alid 2udgment$
Friva#do v. COMELEC
(an eample considered curati!e ? remedial as well as
one which creates new rights ? new remedies,
generally held to e retroacti!e in nature3 PD ,:7,
which liberaliAes the procedure of repatriation"
@eldD PD ,:7 ? the re3ac.uisition of the /ilipino
citiAenship by administrati!e repatriation pursuant to
said decree is retroacti!e$
De Castro v. Tan
@eldD what has been gi!en retroacti!e effect in
Friva#do is not only the law itself but also Phil$
&itiAenship re3ac.uired pursuant to said law to the date
of application for repatriation, which meant that his
lac1 of /ilipino citiAenship at the time he registered as
a !oter, one of the .ualification is as a go!ernor, or at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for
go!ernorship, one of the .ualification is as a go!ernor,
was cured by the retroacti!e application of his
repatriation$
"ep%b#ic v. Atencio
&urati!e statuteD one which confirms, refines and
!alidate the sale or transfer of a public land awarded to
a grantee, which a prior law prohibits its sale within a
certain period ? otherwise in!alid transaction under
the old law$
M%nicipa#ity of San +arciso. H%e'on v. Mende'
%tatuteD %ec$ 99:(d" of the Local Ko!ernment &ode of
*++*, pro!ides that municipal districts organiAed
pursuant to presidential issuances or eecuti!e orders
? which ha!e their respecti!e sets of electi!e
municipal officials holding at the time of the
effecti!ity of the code shall henceforth be considered
as a regular municipalities
4his is a curati!e statute as it !alidates the creation of
municipalities by EO which had been held to be an
in!alid usurpation of legislati!e power$
Tatad v. ,arcia 6r.
IssueD Ghere there is doubt as to whether go!ernment
agency under the then eisting law, has the authority to
enter intoa negotiated contract for the construction of a
go!ernment pro2ect under the build3lease3and transfer
scheme
@eldD 4he subse.uent enactment of a statute which
recogniAes direct negotiation of contracts under such
arrangement is a curati!e statute$
As all doubts and procedural lapses that might ha!e
attended the negotiated contract ha!e been cured by
the subse.uent statute
Limitations of rule
remedial statutes will not be gi!en retroacti!e effect if
to do so would impair the obligations of contract or
disturb !ested rights
only administrati!e or curati!e features of the statute
as will not ad!ersely affect eisting rights will be
gi!en retroacti!e operation
the eception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is
a remedial or curati!e statute which is enacted as a
police power measure
%tatutes of this type may be gi!en retroacti!e effect
e!en though they impair !ested rights or the
obligations of contract, if the legislati!e intent is to
gi!e them retrospecti!e operation
"ationa#eF 4he constitutional restriction against
impairment against obligations of contract or !ested
rights does not preclude the legislature from enacting
statutes in the eercise of its police power
Police power legislations
as a rule, statutes which are enacted in the eercise of
police power to regulate certain acti!ities, are
applicable not only to those acti!ities or transactions
coming into being after their passage, but also to those
already in eistence
"ationa#eF the non3impairment of the obligations of
contract or of !ested rights must yield to the legitimate
eercise of power, by the legislature, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people
Any right ac.uired under a statute or under a contract
is sub2ect to the condition that it may be impaired by
the state in the legitimate eercise of its police power,
since the reser!ation of the essential attributes of
so!ereign power is deemed read into e!ery statute or
contract as a postulate of the legal order
%tatutes relating to prescription
Keneral ruleD a statute relating to prescription of
action, being procedural in nature, applies to all
actions filed after its effecti!ity$ In other words, such a
statute is bothD
o prospecti!e in the sense that it applies to
causes that accrued and will accrue after it
too1 effect, and
o retroacti!e in the sense that it applies to
causes that accrued before its passage
@owe!er, a statute of limitations will not be gi!en
retroacti!e operation to causes of action that accrued
prior to its enactment if to do so will remo!e a bar of
limitation which has become complete or disturb
eisting claims without allowing a reasonable time to
bring actions thereon
+agrampa v. +agrampa
%tatuteD Art$ ***8 of the &i!il &odeD Bprescription
already running before the effecti!ity of this &ode
shall be go!erned by laws pre!iously in forceH but if
since the time this &ode too1 effect the entire period
herein re.uired for prescription should elapse, the
present &ode shall be applicable e!en though by the
former laws a longer period might be re.uired$C
@eldD 4he pro!ision is retroacti!e since it applied to a
cause that accrued prior to its effecti!ity which when
filed has prescribed under the new &i!il &ode e!en
though the period of prescription prescribed under the
old law has not ended at the time the action is filed in
court
4he fact that the legislature has indicated that the
statute relating to prescription should be gi!en
retroacti!e effect will not warrant gi!ing it if it will
impair !ested rights
%tatute of limitations prescribing a longer period to file
an action than that specified under the law may not be
construed as ha!ing retroacti!e application if it will
re!i!e the cause that already prescribed under the old
statute for it will impair !ested rights against whom the
cause is asserted$
%tatute which shorten the period of prescription ?
re.uires that causes which accrued prior to its
effecti!ity be prosecuted or filed not later than a
specific date may not be construed to apply to eisting
causes which pursuant to the old law under which they
accrued, will not prescribe until a much longer period
than that specified in the later enactment because the
right to bring an action is founded on law which has
become !ested before the passage of the new statute of
limitations
Apparently conflicting decisions on prescription
i##ones v. C/"
IssueD whether %ec$ ,A of &ommon wealth Act *99,
amended by RA *++-, to the effect that Bany action to
enforce an cause (i.e. non payment of ;ages or
overtime compensationC under this Act shall be
commenced within - years after such cause of action
accrued, otherwise it shall be fore!er barred$ Provided.
*o;ever. that actions already commenced before the
effecti!e day of this Act shall not be affected by the
period herein prescribed$
As statute shortened the period of prescription from 8
to - yrs$ from the date the cause of action accrued, it
was contended that to gi!e retroacti!e effect would
impair !ested rights since it would operate to preclude
the prosecution of claims that accrued more than - but
less than 8 yrs$
@eldD a statute of limitations is procedural in nature
and no !ested right can attach thereto or arise
therefrom$
Ghen the legislature pro!ided that Bactions already
commenced before the effecti!ity of this Act shall not
be affected by the period herein prescribed,C it
intended to apply the statute to all eisting actions filed
after the effecti!ity of the law$
'ecause the statute shortened the period within which
to bring an action ? in order to !iolate the
constitutional mandate, claimants are in2uriously
affected should ha!e a reasonable period of * yr$ from
time new statute too1 effect within which to sue on
such claims$
Cora#es v. Emp#oyeeDs Compensation Commission
%ame issue on 'illones but &ourt arri!ed at a different
conclusion$
IssueD Ghether a claim for wor1men(s compensation
which accrued under the old Gor1men(s
&ompensation Act (G&A" but filed under after )arch
-*, *+,7 is barred by the pro!ision of the 5ew Labor
&ode which repealed the G&A$
G&A re.uires that Bwor1men(s compensation claims
accruing prior to the effecti!ity of this &ode shall be
filed with the appropriate regional offices of the
Department of Labor not later than )arch -*, *+,7,
otherwise shall be barred fore!er$C
@eldD Pro!ision doesn(t apply to wor1men(s
compensation that accrued before Labor &ode too1
effect, e!en if claims were not filed not later than
)arch -*, *+,7$
"ationa#eF prescripti!e period for claims which
accrued under G&A as amended *6 yrs$ which is Ba
right found on statuteC ? hence a !ested right, that
cannot be impaired by the retroacti!e application of
the Labor &ode$
&omparison of 'illones and &orales
'illones
Ghile &ourt said that such
right to bring an action
accrued under the old law is
not !ested right, it did not say
that the right is one protected
by the due process clause of
the &onstitution$
/or 'O4@ casesD In sol!ing
how to safeguard the right to
bring action whose
prescripti!e period to institute
it has been shortened by lawR
Ka!e the claimants whose
rights ha!e been affected, one
year from the date the law
too1 effect within which to
sue their claims$
&orales
&ourt considered the right to
prosecute the action that
accrued under the old law as
one founded on law ? a
!ested right$
&ourt construed the statute of
limitations as inapplicable to
the action that accrued before
the law too1 effect$
(It is generally held that the
court has no power to read
into the law something which
the law itself did not pro!ide
epressly or impliedly$
Cora#es case seems to be on
firmer grounds$
Prescription in criminal and ci!il cases
Keneral ruleD laws on prescription of actions apply as
well to crimes committed before the enactment as
afterwards$ 4here is, howe!er, a distinction between a
statute of limitations in criminal actions and that of
limitations in ci!il suits, as regards their construction$
In &I>IL %FI43 statute is enacted by the legislature as
an impartial arbiter, between two contending parties$
In the construction of such statute, there is no
intendment to be made in fa!or of either party$ 5either
grants right to the otherH there is therefore no grantor
against whom no ordinary presumptions of
construction are to be made$
&RI)I5AL &A%E%D the state is the grantor,
surrendering by act of grace its right to prosecute or
declare that the offense is no longer sub2ect of
prosecution after the prescripti!e period$ %uch statutes
are not only liberally construed but are applied
retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the accused$
%tatutes relating to appeals
4he right to appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment, other
than that which the &onstitution grants, is statutory and
may be restricted or ta1en away
A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural
in nature and applies to pending actions in which no
2udgment has yet been promulgated at the time the
statute too1 effect$
%uch statute, li1e other statutes, may not howe!er be
construed retroacti!ely so as to impair !ested rights$
@ence, a statute which eliminates the right to appeal
and considers the 2udgment rendered in a case final
and unappealable, destroys the right to appeal a
decision rendered after the statute went into effect, but
5O4 the right to prosecute an appeal that has been
perfected before the passage of the law, for in the latter
case, the right of the appellant to appeal has become
!ested under the old law and may not therefore be
impaired$
%tature shortening the period for ta1ing appeals is to be
gi!en prospecti!e effect and may not be applies to
pending proceedings in which 2udgment has already
been rendered at the time of its enactment ecept if
there(s clear legislati!e intent$
er#iner v. "oberts
Ghere a statute shortened the period for ta1ing appeals
form thirty days to fifteen days from notice of
2udgment, an appeal ta1en within thirty days but
beyond fifteen days from notice of 2udgment
promulgated before the statute too1 effect is deemed
seasonably perfected$
CHAPTER TEN: A&en"&ent, Re.!s!on, Co"!%!at!on an"
Re#ea'
AMENDMENT
Power to Amend
4he legislature has the authority to amend, sub2ect to
constitutional re.uirements, any eisting law$
Authority to amend is part of the legislati!e power to
enact, alter and repeal laws$
4he %& in the eercise of its rule3ma1ing power or of
its power to interpret the law, has no authority to
amend or change the law, such authority being the
eclusi!e to the legislature$
@ow amendment effected
Amendment 0 the change or modification, by deletion,
alteration, of a statute which sur!i!es in its amended
form$
4he amendment of a statute is effected by the
enactment of an amendatory act modifying or altering
some pro!isions of a statute either epressly or
impliedly$
Epress amendment 0 done by pro!iding in the
amendatory act that specific sections or pro!isions of a
statute be amended as recited therein or as common
indicated, Bto read as follows$C
Amendment by implication
E!ery statute should be harmoniAed with other laws on
the same sub2ect, in the absence of a clear
inconsistency$
Legislati!e intent to amend a prior law on the same
sub2ect is shown by a statement in the later act that any
pro!ision of law that is inconsistent therewith is
modified accordingly$
Implied Amendment3 when a part of a prior statute
embracing the same sub2ect as the later may not be
enforced without nullifying the pertinent pro!ision of
the latter in which e!ent, the prior act is deemed
amended or modified to the etent of repugnancy$
H%impo v. Mendo'a
Ghere a statute which re.uires that the annual
realty ta on lands or buildings be paid on or
before the specified date, sub2ect to penalty of a
percentage of the whole amount of ta in case of
delayed payment, is amended by authoriAing
payment of the ta in four e.ual installments to
become due on or before specified dates$
4he penalty pro!ision of the earlier statute is
modified by implication that the penalty for late
payment of an installment under the later law will
be collected and computed only on the installment
that became due and unpaid, and not on the whole
amount of annual ta as pro!ided in the old
statute$
Legislati!e intent to change the basis is clear when
the later law allowed payment in four installments$
Peop#e v. Macatanda
A statute punishing an act which is also a crime
under the RP& pro!ides a penalty as prescribed in
the said &ode, such statute is not a special law but
an amendment by implication$
Ghen amendment ta1es effect
*7 days following its publication in the Official
KaAette or newspaper of general circulation, unless a
date is specified therein after such publication$
@ow amendment is construed, generally
%tatute and amendment 0 read as a whole
Amendment act is ordinarily construed as if the
original statute has been repealed and a new
independent act in the amended form had been
adopted$
Amended act is regarded as if the statute has been
originally enacted in it amended form$
Read in a connection with other sections as if all had
been enacted in the same statute$
Ghere an amendment lea!es certain portions of an act
unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with
the same meaning and effect they ha!e before the
amendment$
Ghere an amendatory act pro!ides that an eisting
statute shall be amended to read as recited in the
amendatory act, such portions of the eisting law as
are retained either literally or substantially
Estrada v. Caseda
Ghere a statute which pro!ides that it shall be in
force for a period of four years after its appro!al,
the four years is to be counted from the date the
original statute was appro!ed and not from the
date the amendatory act was amended$
)eaning of law changed by amendment
An amended act should be gi!en a construction
different from the law prior to its amendment, for its is
presumed that the legislature would not ha!e amended
it had not it not wanted to change its meaning$
Prior to the introduction of the amendment, the statute
had a different meaning which the amendment
changed in all the particulars touching which a
material change in the language of the later act eists$
Deliberate selection of language in the amendatory act
different from that of the original act indicates that the
legislature intended a change in the law or in its
meaning$
2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. SSS
A statutory definition of term containing a general
rule and an eception thereto is amended by
eliminating the eception, the legislati!e intent is
clear that the term should now include the
eception within the scope of the general rule$
Parras v. Land "egistration Commissions
%ection of a statute re.uiring the eact payment of
publication fees in land registration proceedings,
ecept in cases where the !alue of the land does
not eceed P76,666 is amended by deleting the
ecepting clause, it means that the statute as
amended now re.uires payment of the publication
fees regardless of the !alue of the land in!ol!ed
%uppression of the ecepting clause amount to the
withdrawal of the eemption allowed under the
original act$
Amendment Operates Prospecti!ely
An amendment will not be construed as ha!ing a
retroacti!e effect, unless the contrary is pro!ided or the
legislati!e intent to gi!e it a retroacti!e effect is
necessarily implied from the language used and only if
no !ested right is impaired$
/mperia# v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e
A statute amending a ta law is silent as to
whether it operates retroacti!ely, the amendment
will not be gi!ing retroacti!e effect so as to
sub2ect to ta past transactions not sub2ect to ta
under the original act$
Di% v. Co%rt of Appea#s
%tatutes relating to procedure in courts are
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage$
Effect of Amendment on >ested Rights
After a statute is amended, the original act continues to
be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued
prior to the amendment or to obligations that were
contracted under the prior act and such rights and
obligations will continue to be go!erned by the law
before its amendment$
5ot applied retroacti!ely so as to nullify such rights$
Effect of amendment on 2urisdiction
#urisdiction of a court to try cases is determined by the
law in force at the time the action is instituted$
#urisdiction remains with the court until the case is
finally decided therein$
"i##aro'a v. Arciaga
Absence of a clear legislati!e intent to the
contrary, a subse.uent statute amending a prior act
with the effect of di!esting the court of
2urisdiction may not be construed to operate but to
oust 2urisdiction that has already attached under
the prior law$
/b%raan v. Labes
Ghere a court originally obtains and eercises
2urisdiction pursuant to an eisting law, such
2urisdiction will not be o!erturned and impaired
by the subse.uent amendment of the law, unless
epress prohibitory words or words of similar
import are used$
Applies to .uasi32udicial bodies
Erectors. /nc v. +L"C
PD *8+* and *-+* !ested Labor Arbiters with
original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er all cases
in!ol!ing employer3employee relations, including
money claims arising out of any law or contract
in!ol!ing /ilipino wor1ers for o!erseas
employment
/actsD An o!erseas wor1er filed a money claim
against his recruiter, and while the case is
pending, EO ,+, was enacted, which !ested
POEA with original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction
o!er all cases, including money claims, arising out
of law or contract in!ol!ing /ilipino wor1ers for
o!erseas employment$
IssueD whether the decision of the labor arbiter in
fa!or of the o!erseas wor1er was in!alid
@eldD the court sustained the !alidity of the
decision and ruled that the labor arbiter still had
the authority to decide the cease because EO ,+,b
did not di!est the labor arbiter his authority to
hear and decide the case filed by the o!erseas
wor1er prior to its effecti!ity$
#urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter is determined
by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the actionH laws should only be
applied prospecti!ely unless the legislati!e intent
to gi!e them retroacti!e effect is epressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used$
Effect of nullity of prior or amendatory act
Ghere a statute which has been amended is in!alid,
nothing in effect has been amended
4he amendatory act, complete by itself, will be
considered as an original or independent act$
,overnment v. Agonci##o
Ghere the amendatory act is declared
unconstitutional, it is as if the amendment did not
eist, and the original statute before the attempted
amend remains unaffected and in force$
REVISION AND CODIFICATION
Kenerally
PurposeD to restate the eisting laws into one statute
and simply complicated pro!isions, and ma1e the laws
on the sub2ect easily found$
&onstruction to harmoniAe different pro!isions
PresumptionD author has maintained a consisted
philosophy or position$
4he different pro!isions of a re!ised statute or code
should be read and construed together$
RuleD a code enacted as a single, comprehensi!e
statute, and is to be considered as such and not as a
series of disconnected articles or pro!isions$
Lic*a%co 3 Co. v. Aposto#
A irreconcilable conflict between parts of a
re!ised statute or a code, that which is best in
accord with the general plan or, in the absence of
circumstances upon which to base a choice, that
which is later in physical position, being the latest
epression of legislati!e will, will pre!ail$
Ghat is omitted is deemed repealed
all laws and pro!isions of the old laws that are omitted
in the re!ised statute or code are deemed repealed,
unless the statute or code pro!ides otherwise
ReasonD re!ision or codification is, by its !ery nature
and purpose, intended to be a complete enactment on
the sub2ect and an epression of the whole law
thereon, which thereby indicates intent on the part of
the legislature to abrogate those pro!isions of the old
laws that are not reproduced in the re!ised statute or
code$
Possible only if the re!ised statute or code was
intended to co!er the whole sub2ect to is a complete
and perfect system in itself$
RuleD a subse.uent statute is deemed to repeal a prior
law if the former re!ises the whole sub2ect matter of
the former statute$
Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the idea of
a repeal, then all parts and pro!ision of the prior act
that are omitted from the re!ised act are deemed
repealed$
Mecano v. Commission on A%dit
&laim for reimbursement by a go!ernment official
of medical and hospitaliAation epenses pursuant
to %ection 8++ of the Re!ised Administration
&ode of *+*,, which authoriAes the head of office
to case a reimbursement of payment of medical
and hospital epenses of a go!ernment official in
case of sic1ness or in2ury caused by or connected
directly with the performance of his official duty$
&oA denied the claim on the ground that A& of
*+;, which re!ised the old A&, repealed %ec$ 8++
because it was omitted the re!ised code$
%& ruled that the legislature did not intend, in
enacting the new &ode, to repeal %ec$ 8++ of the
old code$
BAll laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this &ode are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly$C
5ew code did not epressly repeal the old as the
new &ode fails to identify or designate the act to
be repealed$
4wo categories of repeal by implication
Pro!isions in the two acts on the same sub2ect
matter that are in irreconcilable conflict$
[ Later act to the etent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier
If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a statute, it
will operate to repeal the earlier law$
4here is no irreconcilable conflict between the two
codes on the matter of sic1ness benefits because the
pro!ision has not been restated in the 5ew &ode$
4he whereas clause is the intent to co!er only those
aspects of go!ernment that pertain to administration,
organiAation and procedure, and understandably
because of the many changes that transpired in the
go!ernment structure since the enactment of the old
code$
&hange in phraseology
It is a well settled rule that in the re!ision or
codification of statutes, neither an alteration in
phraseology nor the admission or addition of words in
the later statute shall be held necessarily to alter the
construction of the former acts$
Gords which do not materially affect the sense will be
omitted from the statute as incorporated in the re!ise
statute or code, or that some general idea will be
epressed in brief phrases$
If there has been a material change or omission, which
clearly indicates an intent to depart from the pre!ious
construction of the old laws, then such construction as
will effectuate such intent will be adopted$
&ontinuation of eisting laws$
A codification should be construed as the continuation
of the eisting statutes$
4he codifiers did not intend to change the law as it
formerly eisted$
4he rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, or
the placing of portions of what formerly was a single
section in seprate sections, does not operate to change
the operation, effect of meaning of the statute, unless
the changes are of such nature as to manifest clearly
and unmista1ably a legislati!e intent to change the
former laws$
REPEAL
Power to repeal
Power to repeal a law is as complete as the power to
enact one$
4he legislature cannot in and of itself enact
irrepealable laws or limit its future legislati!e acts$
Repeal, generally
RepealD total or partial, epress or implied
4otal repeal 0 re!o1ed completely
Partial repeal 0 lea!es the unaffected portions of the
statute in force$
A particular or specific law, identified by its number of
title, is repealed is an epress repeal$
All other repeals are implied repeals$
/ailure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that
the intent was not to repeal any eisting law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy eist in
the terms of the new and old laws, latter situation falls
under the category of an implied repeal$
Repealed only by the enactment of subse.uent laws$
4he change in the condition and circumstances after
the passage of a law which is necessitated the
enactment of a statute to o!ercome the difficulties
brought about by such change does not operate to
repeal the prior law, nor ma1e the later statute so
inconsistent with the prior act as to repeal it$
Repeal by implication
Ghere a statute of later date clearly re!eals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a
prior act on the sub2ect, that intention must be gi!en
effect$
4here must be a sufficient re!elation of the legislati!e
intent to repeal$
Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest
Keneral ruleD the latter act is to be construed as a
continuation not a substitute for the first act so far as
the two acts are the same, from the time of the first
enactment$
4wo categories of repeals by implication
Ghere pro!isions in the two acts on the same
sub2ect matter are in an irreconcilable conflict and
the later act to the etent of the conflict constitutes
an implied repeal of the earlier$
If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute,
it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier
act$
Irreconcilable inconsistency
Implied repeal brought about by irreconcilable
repugnancy between two laws ta1es place when the
two statutes co!er the same sub2ect matterH they are so
clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other
that they cannot be reconciled or harmoniAed and both
cannot be gi!en effect, once cannot be enforced
without nullifying the other$
Implied repeal 0 earlier and later statutes should
embrace the same sub2ect and ha!e the same ob2ect$
In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later
statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and
repugnant with the eisting law that they cannot be
made to reconcile and stand together$
It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to eist
that is be shown that the statutes or statutory
pro!isions deal with the same sub2ect matter and that
the latter be inconsistent with the former$
the fact that the terms of an earlier and later pro!isions
of law differ is not sufficient to create repugnance as to
constitute the later an implied repeal of the former$
Ag%-etas v. Co%rt of Appea#s
/act that %ec :; of RA ,*88 pertaining to
can!assing by boards of can!assers is silent as to
how the board of can!assers shall prepare the
certificate of can!ass and as to what will be its
basis, w=c details are pro!ided in the second
paragraph of %ec:-* of the Omnibus Election
&ode, an earlier statute, Brespecti!e boards of
can!assers shall prepare a certificate of can!ass
duly signed and affied with the imprint of the
thumb of the right hand of each member,
supported by a statement of the !otes and recei!ed
by each candidate in each polling place and on the
basis thereof shall proclaim as elected the
candidates who obtained the highest number of
!otes coast in the pro!inces, city, municipality or
barangay, and failure to comply with this
re.uirement shall constitute an election offenseC
Did not impliedly repeal the second paragraph of
%ec :-* of OE& and render the failure to comply
with the re.uirement no longer an election
offense$
Irreconcilable inconsistency between to laws
embracing the same sub2ect may also eist when the
later law nullifies the reason or purpose of the earlier
act, so that the latter law loses all meaning and
function$
Smit*. e## 3 Co. v. Estate of Maroni##a
A prior law is impliedly repealed by a later act
where the reason for the earlier act is beyond
perad!enture remo!ed$
Repeal by implication 0 based on the cardinal rule that
in the science of 2urisprudence, two inconsistent laws
on the same sub2ect cannot co3eist in one 2urisdiction$
4here cannot be two conflicting law on the same
sub2ect$ Either reconciled or later repeals prior law$
Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (a later
law repeals the prior law on the sub2ect which is
repugnant thereto"
Mecano v. Commission on A%dit
IssueD whether %ec$ 8++ of the Re!ised
Administrati!e &ode has been repealed by the
*+;, Administrati!e &ode$
*+;, Administration &ode pro!ides thatD BAll
laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly
&ourt ruled that the new &ode did not repeal %ec
8++D
[ Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency
ta1es place when two statutes co!er the same
sub2ect matter, they are so clearly inconsistent
and incompatible with each other that they
cannot be reconciled or harmoniAed, and both
cannot be gi!en effect, that one law cannot be
enforced without nullifying the other$
[ 4he new &ode does not co!er not attempt to
the co!er the entire sub2ect matter of the old
&ode$
[ 4here are se!eral matters treated in the old
&ode that are not found in the new &ode$
(pro!isions on notary publicH lea!e law,
public bonding law, military reser!ations,
claims for sic1ness benefits under section 8++
and others"
[ &oA failed to demonstrate that the pro!isions
of the two &odes on the matter of the sub2ect
claim are in an irreconcilable conflict$
[ 4here can no conflict because the pro!ision
on sic1ness benefits of the nature being
claimed by petitioner has not been restated in
old &ode$
[ 4he contention is untenable$
[ 4he fact that a later enactment may relate to
the same sub2ect matter as that of an earlier
statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an
implied repeal of the prior act new statute
may merely be cumulati!e or a continuation
of the old one$
[ %econd &ategoryD possible only if the re!ised
statute or code was intended to co!er the
whole sub2ect to be a complete and perfect
system in itself$
RuleD a subse.uent is deemed to repeal a
prior law if the former re!ises the whole
sub2ect matter of the former statute$
[ Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the
idea of a repeal, then all parts and pro!isions
of the prior act that are omitted from the
re!ised act are deemed repealed$
[ 'efore there can be an implied repeal under
this category, it must be the clear intent of the
legislature that later act be the substitute of
the prior act$
[ Opinion ,- s$*++* of the %ecretary of #usticeD
what appears clear is the intent to co!er only
those aspects of go!ernment that pertain to
administration, organiAation and procedure,
understandably because of the many changes
that transpired in the go!ernment structure
since the enactment of RA&$
[ Repeals of statutes by implication are not
fa!ored$ Presumption is against the
inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting
laws on the sub2ect and not to ha!e enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes$
Ty v. Trampe
IssueD whether PD +:* on real estate taes has
been repealed impliedly by RA ,*86, otherwise
1now as the Local Ko!ernment &ode of *++* on
the same sub2ect$
@eldD that there has been no implied repeal
&ourtD it is clear that the two law are not
coetensi!e and mutually inclusi!e in their scope
and purpose$
[ RA ,*86 co!ers almost all go!ernmental
functions delegated to local go!ernment units
all o!er the country$
[ PD +:* embraces only )etropolitan )anila
Area and is limited to the administration of
financial ser!ices therein$
[ %ec$+ PD+:* re.uires that the schedule of
!alues of real properties in the )etropolitan
)anila Area shall be prepared 2ointly by the
city assessors states that the schedules shall
be prepared by the pro!incial, city and
municipal assessors of the municipalities
within )etropolitan )anila Area for the
different classes of real property situated in
their respecti!e local go!ernment units for
enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian
concerned$
!agad v. ,o'oADado#e
%ec$*+ RA 88,6, the Ombudsman Act grants
disciplinary authority to the Ombudsman to
discipline electi!e and appointi!e officials, ecept
those impeachable officers, has been repealed, RA
,*86, the Local Ko!ernment &ode, insofar as
local electi!e officials in the !arious officials
therein named$
@eldD both laws should be gi!en effect because
there is nothing in the Local Ko!ernment &ode to
indicate that it has repealed, whether epressly or
impliedly$
[ 4he two statutes on the specific matter in
.uestion are not so inconsistent, let alone
irreconcilable, as to compel us to uphold one
and stri1e down the other$
[ 4wo laws must be incompatible, and a clear
finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn$
[ /nterpretare et concordare #eges #egib%s. est
optim%s interpretandi mod%s. i. e (e!ery
statute must be so construed and harmoniAed
with other statutes as to form uniform system
of 2urisprudence$
[ the legislature should be presumed to ha!e
1nown the eisting laws on the sub2ect and
not to ha!e enacted conflicting statutes$
/nitia. 6r v. CoA
implied repeal will not be decreed unless there is
an irreconcilable inconsistency between two
pro!isions or laws is RA ,-79 in relation to PD
*7+,$
[ RA ,-79 0 in part of the Postmaster Keneral,
sub2ect to the appro!al of the 'oard of
Directors of the Philippines Postal
&orporation, shall ha!e the power to
Bdetermine the staffing pattern and the
number of personnel, define their duties and
responsibilities, and fi their salaries and
emoluments in accordance with the appro!ed
compensation structure of the &orporation$C
[ %ec$8 PD *7+, 0 B eemptions
notwithstanding, agencies shall report to the
President, through the 'udget &ommission,
on their position classification and
compensation plans, policies, rates and other
related details following such specifications
as may be prescribed by the President$C
IssueD whether %ec8 of PD*7+,, the two laws
being reconcilable$
Ghile the Philippine Postal &orporation is
allowed to fi its own personnel compensation
structure through its board of directors, the latter
is re.uired to follow certain standards in
formulating said compensation system, and the
role of D') is merely to ensure that the action
ta1en by the board of directors complies the
re.uirements of the law$
Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e
%ec$ -(a" PD 97* and %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: illustrates
repeal by implication$
[ %ec -(a" pro!idesD Bno increase in tuition or
other school fees or charges shall be appro!ed
unless 86N of the proceed is allocated to
increase in salaries or wages of the member
of the faculty$C
[ 'P :-:D Beach pri!ate school shall determine
its rate of tuition and other school fees or
charges$ 4he rates or charges adopted by
schools pursuant to this pro!ision shall be
collectible, and their application or use
authoriAed, sub2ect to rules and regulations
promulgated by the )inistry of Education,
&ulture and %ports$C
IssueD whether %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: impliedly
repealed %ec$ -(a" of PD 97*
@eldD there was implied repeal because there are
irreconcilable differences between the two laws$
Implied repeal by re!ision or codification
Re!ised statute is in effect a legislati!e declaration that
whate!er is embraced in the new statute shall pre!ail
and whate!er is ecluded there from shall be
discarded$
)ust be intended to co!er the whole sub2ect to be a
complete and perfect system in itself in order that the
prior statutes or part thereof which are not repeated in
the new statute will be deemed impliedly repealed$
Peop#e v. en%ya
Ghere a statute is re!ised or a series of legislati!e
acts on the same sub2ect are re!ised or
consolidated into one, co!ering the entire field of
sub2ect matter, all parts and pro!isions of the
former act or acts
[ that are omitted from the re!ised act are
deemed repealed$
6oa$%in v. +avarro
Ghere a new statute is intended to furnish the
eclusi!e rule on a certain sub2ect, it repeals by
implication the old law on the same sub2ect,
Ghere a new statute co!ers the whole sub2ect
matter of an old law and adds new pro!isions and
ma1es changes, and where such law, whether it be
in the form of an amendment or otherwise, is
e!idently intended to be a re!ision of the old act,
it repeals the old act by implication$
Peop#e v. A#m%ete
Re!ision of the Agricultural 4enancy Act by the
Agricultural Land Reform &ode$
%ec -+ of A4& (RA **++" Bit shall be unlawful
for either the tenant or landlord without mutual
consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at
any time pre!ious to the date set, for its
threshing$C
An action for !iolation of this penal pro!ision is
pending in court, the Agricultural Land Reform
&ode superseded the Agricultural 4enancy Act,
abolished share tenancy, was not reproduced in
the Agricultural Land Reform &ode$
4he effect of such non3reenactment is a repeal of
%ection -+$
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that an act which
purports to set out in full all that it intends to
contain, operates as a repeal of anything omitted
which was contained in the old act and not
included in the act as re!ised$
A substitute statute, and e!idently intended as the
substitute for it, operates to repeal the former
statute$
T%ng C*in !%i v. "odrig%e'
IssueD whether %ec$*; Rule 9* of the pre3*66,
Rules of &ourt, which pro!ided the appeal in
habeas corpus cases to be ta1en within 9; hours
from notice of 2udgment, has been replaced by the
*++, Rules of &i!il Procedure, which pro!ides in
%ec$ - Rule 9* thereof, that appeal from 2udgment
or final order shall be ta1en within *7 days from
receipt thereof, in !iew of the fact that the %ec$ *;
was repealed, in accordance with the well3settled
rule of statutory construction that pro!isions of an
old law that were not reproduced in the re!ision
thereof co!ering the same sub2ect are deemed
repealed and discarded
@eldD %& in this case to abrogate those pro!isions
of the old laws that are not reproduced in the
re!ised statute or &ode$
Repeal by reenactment
Ghere a statute is a reenactment of the whole sub2ect
in substitution of the pre!ious laws on the matter, the
latter disappears entirely and what is omitted in the
reenacted law is deemed repealed$
Parras v. Land "egistration Commission
Ghere a law amends a specific section of a prior
act by pro!iding that the same is amended so as to
read as follows, which then .uotes the amended
pro!ision, what is not included in the reenactment
is deemed repealed$
4he new statute is a substitute for the original
section and all matters in the section that are
omitted in the amendment are considered
repealed$
Other forms of implied repeal
4he most powerful implication of repeal is that which
arises when the later of two laws is epressed in the
form of a uni!ersal negati!e$
4here is a clear distinction between affirmati!e and
negati!e statutes in regard to their repealing effects
upon prior legislation$
Affirmati!e statute does not impliedly repeal the
prior law unless an intention to effect a repeal is
manifest,
A negati!e statute repeals all conflicting
pro!isions unless the contrary intention is
disclosed$
Legislati!e intent to repeal is also shown where it
enacts something in general term and afterwards it
passes another on the same sub2ect, which though
epressed in affirmati!e language introduces special
conditions or restrictions
4he subse.uent statute will usually be considered
as repealing by implication the former regarding
the matter co!ered by the subse.uent act$
4he epress repeal of a pro!ision of law from which
an eecuti!e official deri!es his authority to enforce
another pro!ision of the same law operates to repeal by
implication the latter and to depri!e the official of the
authority to enforce it$
4he enactment of a statute on a sub2ect, whose purpose
or ob2ect is diametrically opposed to that of an earlier
law on the same sub2ect which thereby depri!es it of
its reason for being, operates to repeal by implication
the prior law, e!en though the pro!isions of both laws
are not inconsistent$
BAll laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly,C
construed$
5ature of repealing clause
5ot epress repealing clauses because it fails to
identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed$
A clause, which predicates the intended repeal
upon the condition that a substantial conflict must
be found on eisting and prior acts of the same
sub2ect matter$
4he presumption against implied repeal and the
rule on strict construction regarding implied repeal
apply e proprio !igore$
Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting law
so that if repeal of particular or specific law or
laws is intended, the proper step is to so epress it$
2a#de' v. T%ason
Bsuch a clause repeals nothing that would not be
e.ually repealed without it$
Either with or without it, the real .uestion to be
determined is whether the new statute is in
fundamental and irreconcilable conflict with the
prior statute on the sub2ect$
%ignificance of the repealing clauseD the presence of
such general repealing clause in a later statute clearly
indicates the legislati!e intent to repeal all prior
inconsistent laws on the sub2ect matter whether or not
the prior law is a special law$
A later general law will ordinarily not repeal a
prior special law on the same sub2ect, as the latter
is generally regarded as an eception to the
former$
Gith such clause contained in the subse.uent
general law, the prior special law will be deemed
repealed, as the clause is a clear legislati!e intent
to bring about that result$
Repeal by implication not fa!ored
Presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy
and, accordingly, against implied repeal
Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting laws on
the sub2ect and not to ha!e enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes$
A construction which in effect will repeal a statute
altogether should, if possible, be re2ected$
In case of doubt as to whether a later statute has
impliedly repealed a prior law on the same sub2ect, the
doubt should be resol!ed against implied repeal$
1S v. Pa#acio
Repeals by implication are not fa!ored, and will
not be decreed unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended$
As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and with full 1nowledge of all
eisting ones on the sub2ect
It is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a
statute it was not intended to interfere with or
abrogate any former law relating to some matter
Fnless the repugnancy between the two is not
only irreconcilable, but also clear and con!incing,
and flowing necessarily form the language used,
the later act fully embraces the sub2ect matter of
the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act
is beyond perad!enture remo!ed$
E!ery effort must be used to ma1e all acts stand
and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be
reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal
of the earlier$
+APOCO" v. Angas
Illustrates the application of the principle that
repeal or amendment by implication is not
fa!ored$
IssueD whether &entral 'an1 &ircular 9*8 has
impliedly repealed or amended Art ::6+ of the
&i!il &ode
@eldD in answering the issue in the negati!e, the
court ruled that repeals or e!en amendments by
implication are not fa!ored if two laws can be
fairly reconciled$ 4he statutes contemplate
different situations and apply to different
transactions in!ol!ing loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits, as well as 2udgments
relating to such load or forbearance of money,
goods, or credits, the &entral 'an1 &ircular
applies$
In cases re.uiring the payment of indemnities as
damages, in connection with any delay in the
performance of an obligation other than those
in!ol!ing loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits, Art ::6+ of the && applies
&ourts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed
another by implication and they will not ma1e such
ad2udication if they can refrain from doing so, or if
they can arri!e at another result by any construction
which is 2ust and reasonable$
&ourts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in order
to decide that is repeals another by implication, nor
will they adopt an interpretation leading to an
ad2udication of repeal by implication unless it is
ine!itable and a clear and eplicit reason thereof can
be adduced$
As between two laws, one passed later pre!ails
Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (later
statute repeals prior ones which are not repugnant
thereto$"
Applies e!en if the later act is made to ta1e effect
ahead of the earlier law$
As between two acts, the one passed later and going
into effect earlier will pre!ail o!er one passed earlier
and going into effect later$
Mani#a Trading 3 S%pp#y Co. v. P*i#. Labor 1nion
an act passed April *8
th
and in force April :*
st
was
held to pre!ail o!er an act passed April +
th
and in
effect #uly 9
th
of the same year$
And an act going into effect immediately has been
held to pre!ail o!er an act passed before but going
into effect later$
Ghene!er two statutes of different dates and of
contrary tenor are of e.ual theoretical application to a
particular case, the statute of later date must pre!ail,
being a later epression of legislati!e will$
P*i#ippine +ationa# ank v. Cr%'
As between the order of preference of credit set
forth in Articles ::9* to ::97 of the && and that
of Article **6 of the Labor &ode, gi!ing first
preference to unpaid wages and other monetary
claims of labor, the former must yield to the
latter, being the law of the later enactment$
4he later law repeals an earlier one because it is the
later legislati!e will$
PresumptionD the lawma1ers 1new the older law
and intended to change it$
In enacting the older law, the legislators could not
ha!e 1nown the newer one and could not ha!e
intended to change what they did not 1now$
&&D laws are repealed only by subse.uent ones,
not the other way around$
David v. COMELEC
%ec$ * of RA 88,+ pro!ides that the term of
barangay officials who were to be elected on the
second )onday of )ay *++9 is 7 years
4he later act RA ,*86 %ec 9- (c" states that the
term of office of barangay officials who were to
be elected also on the :
nd
)onday of )ay *++9 is
- years$
4here being a clear inconsistency between the two
laws, the later law fiing the term barangay
officials at - years shall pre!ail$
Keneral law does not repeal special law, generally
A general law on a sub2ect does not operate to repeal a
prior special law on the same sub2ect, unless it clearly
appears that the legislature has intended by the later
general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law$
Presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of
two laws, one is special and the other general and this
applies e!en though the terms of the general act are
broad enough to include the matter co!ered by the
special statute$
,enera#ia specia#ib%s non derogant & a general law
does not nullify a specific or special law
4he legislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for all
the circumstances of the particular case$
Reason why a special law pre!ails o!er a general lawD
the legislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for all
the circumstances of the particular case$
Keneral and special laws are read and construed
together, and that repugnancy between them is
reconciled by constituting the special law as an
eception to the general law$
Keneral law yields to the special law in the specific
law in the specific and particular sub2ect embraced in
the latter$
Applies irrespecti!e of the date of passage of the
special law$
Application of rule
Sto. Domingo v. De #os Ange#es
4he court in!ariably ruled that the special law is
not impliedly repealed and constitutes an
eception to the general law whene!er the
legislature failed to indicate in unmista1able terms
its intent to repeal or modify the prior special act$
+APOCO" v. Arca
IssueD whether %ec$ : of &om$ Act *:6 creating
the 5APO&OR, a go!ernment3owned corporation,
and empowering it Bto sell electric power and to
fi the rates and pro!ide for the collection of the
charges for any ser!ices renderedD Pro!ided, the
rates of charges shall not be sub2ect to re!ision by
the Public %er!ice Act has been repealed by RA
:8,, amending the Public %er!ice Act and
granting the Public %er!ice &ommission the
2urisdiction to fi the rate of charges of public
utilities owned or operated by the go!ernment or
go!ernment3owned corporations$
@eldD a special law, li1e &om$ Act *:6, pro!iding
for a particular case or class of cases, is not
repealed by a subse.uent statute, general in its
terms, li1e RA :8,,, although the general statute
are broad enough to include the cases embraced in
the special law, in the absence of a clear intent to
repeal$
4here appears no such legislati!e intent to repeal
or abrogate the pro!isions of the earlier law$
4he eplanatory note to @ouse 'ill 96-6 the later
became RA :8,,, it was eplicit that the
2urisdiction conferred upon the Republic %er!ice
&ommission o!er the public utilities operated by
go!ernment3owned or controlled corporations is
to be confined to the fiing of rates of such public
ser!ices
4he harnessing and then distribution and sale of
electric power to the consuming public, the
contingency intended to be met by the legal
pro!ision under consideration would not eist$
4he authority of the Public %er!ice &ommission
under RA :8,, o!er the fiing of rate of charges
of public utilities owned or operated by KO&&(s
can only be eercised where the charter of the
go!ernment corporation concerned does not
contain any pro!ision to the contrary$
P*i#ippine "ai#;ay Co. v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e
PR& was granted a legislati!e franchise to operate
a railway line pursuant to Act 5o$ *9+, %ec$ *-
which readD BIn consideration of the premises and
of the operation of this concession or franchise,
there shall be paid by the grantee to the Philippine
Ko!ernment, annually, an amount e.ual to
one3half of one per centum of the gross earnings
of the grantee $C
%ec :7+ of Internal Re!enue &ode, as amended by
RA -+, pro!ides that Bthere shall be collected in
respect to all eisting and future franchises, upon
the gross earnings or receipts from the business
co!ered by the law granting a franchise ta of 7N
of such taes, charges, and percentages as are
specified in the special charters of the corporation
upon whom suc franchises are conferred,
whiche!er is higher, unless the pro!isions hereof
preclude the imposition of a higher ta $
IssueD whether %ection :7+ of the 4a &ode has
repealed %ection *- of Act *9+,, stand upon a
different footing from general laws$
Once granted, a charter becomes a pri!ate contract
and cannot be altered nor amended ecept by
consent of all concerned, unless the right to alter
or repeal is epressly reser!ed$
ReasonD the legislature, in passing a special
charter, has its attention directed to the special
facts and circumstances in the particular case in
granting a special charter, for it will not be
considered that the legislature, by adopting a
general law containing the pro!isions repugnant to
the pro!isions of the charter, and without any
mention of its intention to amend or modify the
charter, intended to amend, repeal or modify the
special act$
4he purpose of respecting the ta rates
incorporated in the charters, as shown by the
clause$
LLDA v. CA
IssueD which agency of the go!ernment, LLDA or
the towns and municipalities compromising the
region should eercise 2urisdiction o!er the
Laguna La1e and its en!irons insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishery pri!ileges is
concerned$
4he LLDA statute specifically pro!ides that the
LLDA shall ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to issue
permits for the use of all surface water for any
pro2ects in or affecting the said region, including
the operation of fish pens$
RA ,*86 the LK& of *++* grants the
municipalities the eclusi!e authority to grant
fishery pri!ileges in municipal waters$
@eldD two laws should be harmoniAed, and that the
LLA statute, being a special law, must be ta1en as
an eception to RA ,*86 a general law,
,arcia v. Pasc%a#
&ler1s of courts municipal courts shall be
appointed by the municipal 2udge at the epense
of the municipality and where a later law was
enacted pro!iding that employees whose salaries
are paid out of the municipal funds shall be
appointed by the municipal mayor, the later law
cannot be said to ha!e repealed the prior law as to
!est in the municipal mayor the power to appoint
municipal clec1 of court, as the subse.uent law
should be construed to comprehend only
subordinate officials of the municipality and not
those of the 2udiciary$
,ordon v. CA
A city charter gi!ing real estate owner a period of
one year within which to redeem a property sold
by the city for nonpayment of realty ta from the
date of such auction sale, being a special law,
pre!ails o!er a general law granting landowners a
period of two years to ma1e the redemption$
Sto. Domingo v. De#os Ange#es
4he &i!il %er!ice law on the procedure for the
suspension or remo!al of ci!il ser!ice employees
does not apply with respect to the suspension or
remo!al of members of the local police force$
Ghen special or general law repeals the other$
4here is always a partial repeal where the later act is a
special law$
2a#era v. T%ason
A subse.uent general law on a sub2ect has
repealed or amended a prior special act on the
same sub2ect by implication is a .uestion of
legislati!e intent$
Intent to repeal may be shown in the act itself the
eplanatory note to the bill before its passage into
law, the discussions on the floor of the legislature,
Intent to repeal the earlier special law where the later
general act pro!ides that all laws or parts thereof
which are inconsistent therewith are repealed or
modified accordingly
If the intention to repeal the special law is clear, then
the rule that the special law will be considered as an
eception to the general law does not applyH what
applies is the rule that the special law is deemed
impliedly repealed$
A general law cannot be construed to ha!e repealed a
special law by mere implication admits of eception$
City ,overnment of San Pab#o v. "eyes
%ec$ * PD 77* pro!ides that any pro!ision of law
or local ordinance to the contrary, the franchise
ta payable by all grantees of franchise to
generate, distribute, and sell electric current for
light, heat, and power shall be :7 of their gross
receipts$
%ec$ *-, of the LK& statesD 5otwithstanding any
eemption granted by any law or other special
law, the pro!ince may impose a ta on business
en2oying a franchise at a rate not eceeding 76N
of *N of the gross annul receipts$
@eldD the phrase is all3encompassing and clear
that the legislature intended to withdraw all ta
eemptions en2oyed by franchise holders and this
intent is made more manifest by %ec$ *+- of the
&ode, when it pro!ides that unless otherwise
pro!ided in this code ta eemptions or incenti!es
granted to or presently en2oyed by all persons,
ecept local water districts, cooperati!es, and non3
stoc1 and non3profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are withdrawn upon the effecti!ity of
the &ode$
,aer#an v. Cat%big
IssueD whether %ec$ *: of RA *,6 as amended, the
&ity &harter of Dagupan &ity, which fied the
minimum age .ualification for members of the
city council at :- years has been repealed by %ec$8
of RA ::7+
@eldD there was an implied repeal of %ec$ *: of the
charter of Dagupan &ity because the legislati!e
intent to repeal the charter pro!ision is clear from
the fact that Dagupan &ity, unli1e some cities, is
not one of those cities epressly ecluded by the
law from its operation and from the circumstance
that it pro!ides that all acts or parts thereof which
are inconsistent therewith are repealed$
4he last statute is so broad in its terms and so
clear and eplicit in its words so as to show that it
was intended to co!er the whole sub2ect and
therefore to displace the prior statute$
agatsing v. "amire'
A charter of a city, which is a special law, may be
impliedly modified or superseded by a later
statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must
be read into the charter, notwithstanding any of its
particular pro!isions$
A subse.uent general law similarly applicable to
all cities pre!ails o!er any conflicting charter
pro!ision, for the reason that a charter must not be
inconsistent with the general laws and public
policy of the state$
%tatute remains supreme in all matters not purely
local$
A charter must yield to the constitution and
general laws of the state$
P*i#ippine /nternationa# Trading Corp v. CoA
&oA contended that the PI4& charter had been
impliedly repealed by the %ec$ *8 RA 8,7;
@eldD that there was implied repeal, the legislati!e
intent to do so being manifest$
PI4& should now be considered as co!ered by
laws prescribing a compensation and position
classification system in the go!ernment including
RA 8,7;$
Effects of repeal, generally
Appeal of a statute renders it inoperati!e as of the date
the repealing act ta1es effect$
Repeal is by no means e.ui!alent to a declaration that
the repealed statute is in!alid from the date of its
enactment$
4he repeal of a law does not undo the conse.uences of
the operation of the statute while in force, unless such
result is directed by epress language or by necessary
implication, ecept as it may affect rights which
become !ested when the repealed act was in force$
"amos v. M%nicipa#ity of Daet
'P --, 1nown as the LK& was repealed by RA
,*86 1nown as LK& of *++*, which too1 effect
on #anuary *, *++:$
%ec$ 7 (d" of the new code pro!ides that rights and
obligations eisting on the date of the effecti!ity
of the new code and arising out of contracts or any
other source of prestation in!ol!ing a local
go!ernment unit shall be go!erned by the original
terms and conditions of said contracts or the law
in force at the time such rights were !ested$
On 2urisdiction, generally
5either the repeal nor the eplanation of the law
depri!es the court or administrati!e tribunal of the
authority to act on the pending action and to finally
decide it$
Keneral ruleD where a court or tribunal has already
ac.uired and is eercising 2urisdiction o!er a
contro!ersy, its 2urisdiction to proceed to final
determination of the cause is not affected by the new
legislation repealing the statute which originally
conferred 2urisidiction$
RuleD once the court ac.uires 2urisdiction o!er a
contro!ersy, it shall continue to eercise such
2urisdiction until the final determination of the case
and it is not affected by subse.uent legislation !esting
2urisdiction o!er such proceedings in another tribunal
admits of eceptions$
Repeal or epiration of a statute under which a court or
tribunal originally ac.uired 2urisdiction to try and
decide a case, does not ma1e its decision subse.uently
rendered thereon null and !oid for want of authority,
unless otherwise pro!ided$
In the absence of a legislati!e intent to the contrary,
the epiration or repeal of a statute does not render
legal what, under the old law, is an illegal transaction,
so as to depri!e the court or tribunal the court or
tribunal of the authority to act on a case in!ol!ing such
illegal transaction$
Ghere a law declares certain importations to be illegal,
sub2ect to forfeiture by the &ommissioner of &ustoms
pursuant to what the latter initiated forfeiture
proceedings, the epiration of the law during the
pendency of the proceedings does not di!est the
&ommissioner of &ustoms of the 2urisdiction to
continue to resol!e the case, nor does it ha!e the effect
of ma1ing the illegal importation legal or of setting
aside the decision of the commissioner on the matter$
On 2urisdiction to try criminal case
Once a 2urisdiction to try a criminal case is ac.uired,
that 2urisdiction remains with the court until the case is
finally determined$
A subse.uent statute amending or repealing a prior act
under which the court ac.uired 2urisdiction o!er the
case with the effect of remo!ing the courts(
2urisdiction may not operate to oust 2urisdiction that
has already attached$
On actions, pending or otherwise
RuleD repeal of a statute defeats all actions and
proceedings, including those, which are still pending,
which arose out of or are based on said statute$
4he court must conform its decision to the law then
eisting and may, therefore, re!erse a 2udgment which
was correct when pronounced in the subordinate
tribunal, if it appears that pending appeal a statute
which was necessary to support the 2udgment of the
lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal$
On !ested rights
repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights that
accrued and became !ested under the statute before its
repeal$
4he statute should not be construed so as to affect the
rights which ha!e !ested under the old law then in
force, or as re.uiring the abatement of actions
instituted for the enforcement of such rights$
Rights accrued and !ested while a statute is in force
ordinarily sur!i!e its repeal$
4he constitution forbids the state from impairing, by
enactment or repeal of a law, !ested rights or the
obligations of contract, ecept in the legitimate
eercise of police power$
%yco v. P+
Ghere a statute gi!es holders of bac1pay
certificates the right to use said certificates to pay
their obligations to go!ernment financial
institutions, the repeal of the law disallowing such
payment will not depri!e holders thereof whose
rights become !ested under the old law of the
right to use the certificates to pay their obligations
to such financial institutions$
1n Pak Le%ng v. +igorra
A statute gi!es an appellant the right to appeal
from an ad!erse decision, the repeal of such
statute after an appellant has already perfected his
appeal will not destroy his right to prosecute the
appeal not depri!e the appellate court of the
authority to decide the appealed case$
"ep%b#ic v. Migrino
IssueD whether prosecution for uneplained wealth
under RA *-,+ has already prescribed$
@eldD Bin his pleadings, pri!ate respondent
contends that he may no longer be prosecuted
because of the prescription$
It must be pointed out that %ec$ : RA *-,+ should
be deemed amended or repealed by Art$ EI, %ec$
*7 of the *+;, &onstitution$
On contracts
Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on the
basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal or
amendment of said law will not affect the terms of the
contract nor impair the right of the parties thereunder$
Effect of repeal of ta laws
Rule fa!oring a prospecti!e construction of statutes is
applicable to statutes which repeal ta laws$
%uch statute is not made retroacti!e, a ta assessed
before the repeal is collectible afterwards according to
the law in force when the assessment or le!y was
made$
Effect of repeal and reenactment
%imultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does
not affect the rights and liabilities which ha!e accrued
under the original statute, since the reenactment
neutraliAes the repeal and continues the law in force
without interruption$
4he repeal of a penal law, under which a person is
charged with !iolation thereof and its simultaneous
reenactment penaliAing the same act done by him
under the old law, will not preclude the accused(s
prosecution, nor depri!e the court of the 2urisdiction to
try and con!ict him$
Peop#e v. A#m%ete
Ghere the reenactment of the repealed law is not
simultaneous such that the continuity of the
obligation and the sanction for its !iolation form
the repealed law to the reenacted law is bro1en,
the repeal carries with it the depri!ation of the
court of its authority to try, con!ict, and sentence
the person charged with !iolation of the old law to
its repeal$
Effect of repeal of penal laws
Ghere the repeal is absolute, so that the crime no
longer eists, prosecution of the person charged under
the old law cannot be had and the action should be
dismissed$
Ghere the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute
and the act which was penaliAed by a prior law ceases
to be criminal under the new law, the pre!ious offense
is obliterated$
4hat a total repeal depri!es the courts of 2urisdiction to
try, con!ict, and sentence, persons, charged with
!iolations of the old law prior to the repeal$
Repeal of a statute which pro!ides an indispensable
element in the commission of a crime as defined in the
RP& li1ewise operates to depri!e the court of the
authority to decide the case, rule rests on the same
principle as that concerning the effect of a repeal of a
penal law without .ualification$
ReasonD the repeal of a penal law without
dis.ualification is a legislati!e act of rendering legal
what is pre!iously decreed as illegal, so that the person
who committed it is as if he ne!er committed an
offence
EceptionD
where the repealing act reenacts the statute and
penaliAes the same act pre!iously penaliAed under
the repealed law, the act committed before
reenactment continues to be a crime, and pending
cases are not thereby affected$
Ghere the repealing act contains a sa!ing clause
pro!iding that pending actions shall not be
affected, the latter will continue to be prosecuted
in accordance with the old law$
Distinction as to effect of repeal and epiration of law
In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated and the
stigma of con!iction of an accused for !iolation of the
penal law before its repeal is erased$
Effect of repeal of municipal charter
4he repeal of a charter destroys all offices under it, and
puts an end to the functions of the incumbents$
4he con!ersation of a municipality into a city by the
passage of a charter or a statute to that effect has the
effect of abolishing all municipal offices then eisting
under the old municipality offices then the eisting
under the old municipality, sa!e those ecepted in the
charter itself$
Repeal or nullity of repealing law, effect of
Ghen a law which epressly repeals a prior law is
itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby
re!i!ed unless epressly so pro!ided
Ghere a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional,
it will ha!e no effect of repealing the former statute,
the former or old statute continues to remain in force$
CHAPTER ELEVEN: Const!tut!ona' Construt!on
&onstitution defined
fundamental law which sets up a form of go!ernment
and defines and delimits the powers thereof and those
of its officers, reser!ing to the people themsel!es
plenary so!ereignty
written charter enacted and adopted by the people by
which a go!ernment for them is established
permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to
eisting conditions but also to future needs
basically it is the fundamental laws for the go!ernance
and administration of a nation
absolute and unalterable ecept by amendments
all other laws are epected to conform to it
Origin and history of the Philippine &onstitutions
*+-7 &onstitution
Peop#e v. Linsangan 0 eplained as to how this &onstitution
came aboutD
4ydings3)cduffie Law3 allowed the /ilipinos to adopt
a constitutions but sub2ect to the conditions prescribed
in the Act$
o Re.uired - stepsD
drafting and appro!al of the
constitution must be authoriAed
it must be certified by the President
of the F%
it must be ratified by the people of
the Philippines at a plebiscite
*+,- &onstitution
o adopted in response to popular clamor to meat
the problems of the country
o )arch *8, *+8,D &ongress passed Resolution
5o$:, which was amended by Resolution 5o$
9, calling a con!ention to propose
amendments to the &onstitution
*+;, &onstitution
o after ED%A Re!olution
o also 1nown as the *+;, &harter
Primary purpose of constitutional construction
primary tas1 of constitutional construction is to
ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers of the
constitution as epressed in its language
purpose of our &onstitutionD to protect and enhance the
people(s interests
&onstitution construed as enduring for ages
&onstitution is not merely for a few years but it also
needs to endure through a long lapse of ages
WHY/ 'ecause it go!erns the life of the people not
only at the time of its framing but far into the
indefinite future
it must be adaptable to !arious crisis of human affairs
but it must also be solid permanent and substantial
Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property of
the people (rich or poor"
It must be construed as a dynamic process intended to
stand for a great length of time to be progressi!e and
not static
Ghat it is 5O4D
o It should 5O4 change with emergencies or
conditions
o It should 5O4 be infleible
o It should 5O4 be interpreted narrowly
Gords employed should not be construed to yield
fied and rigid answers because its meaning is applied
to meet new or changed conditions as they arise
&ourts should construe the constitution so that it would
be consistent with reason, 2ustice and the public
interest
@ow language of constitution construed
primary source in order to ascertain the constitution is
the LA5KFAKE itself
4he words that are used are broad because it aims to
co!er all contingencies
Gords must be understood in their common or
ordinary meaning ecept when technical terms are
employee
o G@MR 'ecause the fundamental law if
essentially a document of the people
Do not construe the constitution in such a way that its
meaning would change
Ghat if the words used ha!e both general and
restricted meaningR
RuleD general pre!ails o!er the restricted unless the
contrary is indicated$
Ordi##o v. COMELEC
IssueD whether the sole pro!ince of Ifugao can be
!alidly constituted in the &ordillera Autonomous
Region under %ection *7, Article *6
@eldD 5o$ the 1eywords pro!inces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connotes that a
region consists of more than one unit$ In its ordinary
sense region means two or more pro!inces, thus Ifugao
cannot be constituted the &ordillera Autonomous
Region
Marcos v. C*ief of Staff
IssuesD
o the meaning or scope of the words any court
in %ection *, Article *, of the *+-7
&onstitution
o Gho are included under the terms inferior
court in section : Article ,
@eldD %ection *, of Article *, prohibits any members
of the &ongress from appearing as counsel in any
criminal case $ 4his is not limited to ci!il but also
to a military court or court martial since the latter is
also a court of law and 2ustice as is any ci!il tribunal$
Inferior courts are meant to be construed in its
restricted sense and accordingly do not include court
martials or military courts for they are agencies of
eecuti!e character and do not belong to the 2udicial
branch unli1e the term inferior court is$
Another RFLED words used in one part are to recei!e
the same interpretation when used in other parts unless
the contrary is applied=specified$
Lo'ada v COMELEC
the term B'atasang Pambansa,C which means the
regular national assembly, found in many sections of
the *+,- &onstitution refers to the regular, not to the
interim 'atasang Pambansa
words which ha!e ac.uired a technical meaning before
they are used in the constitution must be ta1en in that
sense when such words as thus used are construed
Aids to construction, generally
apart from its language courts may refer to the
following in construing the constitutionD
o history
o proceedings of the con!ention
o prior laws and 2udicial decisions
o contemporaneous constructions
o conse.uences of alternati!e interpret3tations
these aids are called etraneous aids because though
their effect is not in precise rules their influence
describes the essentials of the process (remember
preambleR ganito lang din yun"
Realities eisting at time of adoptionH ob2ect to be accomplished
@istory basically helps in ma1ing one understand as to
how and why certain laws were incorporated into the
constitution$
In construing constitutional law, the history must be
ta1en into consideration because there are certain
considerations rooted in the historical bac1ground of
the en!ironment at the time of its adoption (Legaspi !$
)inister of /inance"
A$%ino v. COMELEC
IssueD what does the term Bincumbent president in sec$
- of Article *, of the *+,- &onstitution refer toR
@eldD @istory shows that at that time the term of
President )arcos was to terminate on December -6,
*+,-, the new constitution was appro!ed on 5o!ember
-6, *+,: still during his incumbency and as being the
only incumbent president at the time of the appro!al it
2ust means that the term incumbent president refers to
)r$ )arcos
#ustice Antonio concurring opinion statesD the only
rational way to ascertain the meaning and intent is to
read its language in connection with the 1nown
conditions of affairs out of which the occasion for its
adoption had arisen and then construe it$
/n re erm%de'
incumbent president referred to in section 7 of Article
*; of the *+;, constitution refers to incumbent
President A.uino and >P Doy Laurel
Civi# Liberties 1nion v. E)ec%tive Secretary
issueD whether EO :;9, which authoriAes a cabinet
member, undersecretary and assistant secretary to hold
not more than two positions in the go!ernment and
KO&&s and to recei!e corresponding compensation
therefore, !iolates %ec$ *-, Art$ , of the *+;,
&onstitution
court eamined the history of the times, the conditions
under which the constitutional pro!isions was framed
and its ob2ect
heldD before the adoption of the constitutional
pro!ision, Bthere was a proliferation of newly3created
agencies, instrumentalities and KO&&s created by PDs
and other modes of presidential issuances where
&abinet members, their deputies or assistants were
designated to head or sit as members of the board with
the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems,
allowances and other prere.uisites of office
since the e!ident purpose of the framers of the *+;,
&onstitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, >ice President, members of the &abinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
multiple go!ernment offices or employment in the
Ko!ernment during their tenure, the eception to this
prohibition must be read with e.ual se!erity
on its face, the language of %ec *- Art$ , is prohibitory
so that it must be understood as intended to be a
positi!e and une.ui!ocal negation of the pri!ilege of
holding multiple go!ernment offices or employment
Proceedings of the con!ention
RFLED If the language of the constitutional pro!ision
is plain it is not necessary to resort to etrinsic aids
EE&EP4IO5D when the intent of the framer doesn(t
appear in the tet or it has more than one construction$
Intent of a constitutional con!ention member doesn(t
necessarily mean it is also the people(s intent
4he proceedings of the con!ention are usually in.uired
into because it sheds light into what the framers of the
constitution had in mind at that time$ (refers to the
debates, interpretations and opinions concerning
particular pro!isions"
L%' Farms v. Secretary of DA"
Ghether the term BagricultureC as used in the
&onstitution embraces raising li!estoc1, poultry and
swine
4ranscript of the deliberations of the &onstitutional
&ommission of *+;8 on the meaning of BagricultureC
clearly shows that it was ne!er the intention of the
framers of the &onstitution to include li!estoc1 and
poultry industry in the co!erage of the constitutionally3
mandated agrarian reform program of the Ko!ernment
Agricultural lands do not include commercial
industrial, and residential lands
@eldD it is e!ident in the foregoing discussion that %ec
: of RA 887, which includes Bpri!ate agricultural
lands de!oted to commercial li!estoc1, poultry and
swine raisingC in the definition of Bcommercial farmsC
is I5>ALID, to the etent of the aforecited agro3
industrial acti!ities are made to be co!ered by the
agrarian reform program of the %tate
Monte-o v. COMELEC
Ghether the &O)ELE& has the power to transfer, by
resolution, one or more municipalities from one
congressional district to another district within a
pro!ince, pursuant to %ec : of the Ordinance appended
to the *+;, &onstitution
4he &ourt relied on the proceedings of the
&onstitutional &ommission on Bminor ad2ustmentsC
which refers only to the instance where a municipality
which has been forgotten (ano ba TtoL1inalimutan ang
municipality" is included in the enumeration of the
composition of the congressional district and not to the
transfer of one municipality from one district to
another, which has been considered a substanti!e or
ma2or ad2ustment
&ontemporaneous construction and writings
may be used to resol!e but not to create ambiguities
In construing statutes, contemporaneous construction
are entitled to great weight howe!er when it comes to
the constitution it has no weight and will not be
allowed to change in any way its meaning$
Gritings of delegates 0 has persuasi!e force but it
depends on two thingsD
o if opinions are based on fact 1nown to them
and not established it is immaterial
o on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may
not be a shade better in the eyes of the law$
Pre!ious laws and 2udicial rulings
framers of the constitution is presumed to be aware of
pre!ailing 2udicial doctrines concerning the sub2ect of
constitutional pro!isions$ 4@F% when courts adopt
principles different from prior decisions it is presumed
that they did so to o!errule said principle
&hanges in phraseology
'efore a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of
re!isions and changes in phraseology (e$ deletion of
words" and these changes may be in.uired into to
ascertain the intent or purpose of the pro!ision as
appro!ed
@OGE>ER mere deletion, as negati!e guides, cannot
pre!ail o!er the positi!e pro!isions nor is it
determinati!e of any conclusion$
&ertain pro!isions in our constitution (from *+-7 to
the present" are mere reenactments of prior
constitutions thus these changes may indicate an intent
to modify or change the meaning of the old pro!isions$
,a#man v. Pamaran
the phraseC no person shall be compelled in a
criminal case be a witness against himselfC is changed
in such a way the words criminal cases had been
deleted simply means that it is not limited to criminal
cases only$
&onse.uences of alternati!e constructions
conse.uences that may follow from alternati!e
construction of doubtful constitutional pro!isions
constitute an important factor to consider in construing
them$
if a pro!ision has more than one interpretation, that
construction which would lead to absurd, impossible
or mischie!ous conse.uences must be re2ected$
e$g$ directory and mandatory interpretationD Art$ ; %ec
*7(*" re.uires 2udges to render decision within specific
periods from date of submission for decision of cases
(construed as directory because if otherwise it will
cause greater in2ury to the public"
&onstitution construed as a whole
pro!ision should not be construed separately from the
rest it should be interpreted as a whole and be
harmoniAed with conflicting pro!isions so as to gi!e
them all force and effect$
sections in the constitution with a particular sub2ect
should be interpreted together to effectuate the whole
purpose of the &onstitution$
To#entino v. Secretary of Finance
>A4 Law, passage of bill
in!ol!ed are article 8 %ec$ :9 and RA ,,*8 (>A4
Law"
contention of the petitionerD RA ,,*8 did not originate
eclusi!ely from the @OR as re.uired by the
&onstitution because it is the result of the
consolidation of two distinct bills$
&ourtD re2ected such interpretation$ (guys alam niyo na
naman to, that it should originate from @OR but it
could still be modified by the %enate"
)andatory or directory
RFLED constitutional pro!isions are to be construed as
mandatory unless a different intention is manifested$
GhyR 'ecause in a constitution, the so!ereign itself
spea1s and is laying down rules which for the time
being at least are to control ali1e the go!ernment and
the go!erned$
failure of the legislature to enact the necessary
re.uired by the constitution does not ma1e the
legislature is illegal$
Prospecti!e or retroacti!e
RFLED constitution operates prospecti!ely only unless
the words employed are clear that it applies
retroacti!ely
Magtoto v. Mang%era
%ec :6 of Article I> of the *+,- &onstitutionD Bno
person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself$ Any confession obtained in !iolation of
this section shall be inadmissible in e!idenceC
&ourt held that this specific portion of the mandate
should be gi!en a prospecti!e application
Co v. E#ectric Trib%na#
%ec$ *(-" Art$ 9 of the *+;, &onstitution states that
those born before #anuary *,, *+,- of /ilipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citiAenship upon
reaching the age of ma2orityC are citiAens of the
Philippines has a retroacti!e effect as shown to the
clear intent of the framers through the language used
Applicability of rules of statutory construction
Doctrines used in Sarmiento v. Mison is a good
eample in which the %& applied a number of rules of
statutory construction$
IssueD whether or not the appointment of a
&ommissioner of &ustoms is sub2ect to confirmation
by the &ommission on appointments
Kenerally, constitutional pro!isions are self3eecuting
RFLED constitutional pro!isions are self eecuting
ecept when pro!isions themsel!es epressly re.uire
legislations to implement them$
%EL/ EEE&F4I5K PRO>I%IO5%3 pro!isions which
are complete by themsel!es and becomes operati!e
without the aid of supplementary legislation$
#ust because legislation may supplement and add or
prescribe a penalty does not render such pro!ision
ineffecti!e in the absence of such legislation$
In case of DoubtR &onstrue such pro!ision as self
eecuting rather than non3self eecuting$
Mani#a Prince !ote# v. ,S/S
IssueD w=n the sale at public bidding of the ma2ority
ownership of the )anila @otel a .ualified entity can
match the winning bid of a foreigner
@eldD resolution depends on whether the issue is self
eecuting or not$ 4he court ruled that the .ualified
/ilipino entity must be gi!en preference by granting it
the option to match the winning bid because the
pro!ision is self eecuting$
3 4he End 3
B4hat in all things, KOD may be glorifiedC