STORYTELLING AS A MODE OF MORAL ARGUMENT:

A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FISHER

Bruce E. Gronbeck
The Umvarsitv of Iowa
Allow ma one additional prefatory comment: When Professor Fisher
sent me his paper, he asked that I "be kind to the Old Man " As a
faithful and successful alumnus of the graduate program in which I
teach. Professor Fisher assuredly is deserving of kindness. And so,
following the Biblical injunctions which are a part of my upbringing as
a pietistic Norwegian Lutheran, I will be as kind as I can and in the
only way I know how--by offering gentle but firm corrections. Anyone
raised on as much Old Testament literature as I was knows that correc-
tion IS an ultimate expression of kindness and love. And so. Professor
Fisher, rest assured that what follows is not meant as rebuff, but as
moral and intellectual guidance.
Lat me begin, then, with a bald statement of two positions I am tak-
ing on issues raised by Professor Fisher's paper: I will concede--and
indeed, vigorously support--the notion that narrative is perhaps th
most important (and, to me, even the most interesting) form of human
communication. But, with equal vigor, I will deny that narrative is a
paradigm--or even, more simply, a form--of moral argument. To expli-
cate these two propositions, I will start where Professor Fisher stai-ts,
with some ontological and epistemological concerns. Such philosophical
statements will set up what 1 still consider to be some important distinc-
tions between narrative and argumentative discourse.
ONTOLOGICAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF HUMAN BEINGS
In support of the analysis of narrative and argumentation I wish to
put forth today, I mutt begin with an ontological consideration different
from-'but inclusive of--the one articulated by Professor Fisher. With
Ernst Cai i i rer and Kenneth Burke, ' I take the notion of animal lymbo*
llcum as the first principle of humanity. That is, I take the aistin-
guishing characteristic of human beings to b their symbol-using abili-
ties. As a corollary to this proposition, further, I take all other
ontological descriptors of human beings-* homo itbmr. homo soclologut,
homo dramatit, and yes, even homo ratlonlli and homo narrnt as
descriptors subsumed by or derived from the central notion erf animal
tynAKilkum. Thus, I would argue that:
As homo fabr, my constructive actions have meaning
only because of the symbolic interpretations attached to them
by myself and others.
At homo sociologui, my relationships with others ar
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governed and made meaningful only because our roles and
rules for their execution have been formulated m a cultural
symbolicum.
As homo dramatis, my lines of conduct are meaningful
to others only because scripts-for-life tre p re-given m the
society into which I was born.
As homo rationalis, my inferences are found valid or
not according to logical rules articulated in particular arenas
or situations by significant others.
And, as homo narrens, my understanding of narrative
structures is derived from socialization--from having been
taught how to tell and interpret stories.'
Were I not animal symbolicum, I would have none of the capacities- sug-
gested by the second-level descriptors. If you do not believe that, try
convincing your dog (a) that its action of defecating on the floor is
morally corrupt; (b) that your master-sUve relationship with it is justi-
fied by the social order; (c) that Lassie Com* Home provides it with
mythic depiction of an ideal life for dogs; (d) that .it logically, no mat-
ter how much it wishes to, cannot be both in and outside the house
simultaneously; and (e) that Benji* is a literary artifact which violated
the classical unities of time and space.
It may seem that I am asserting the obvious when urging that we
understand the human being to be animal symbolicum, but the point
must be made explicitly if we are going to conceptualize properly the
relationships between narrative and argumentative discourse If both
homo rationalit and homo narrens are understood to be second-level
descriptors of human characteristics, then we can be rather sure that
they operate in comparatively discrete realms of human activity, and
that they serve separable functions in human life- More specifically, I
will argue shortly, homo rationalis and homo narrens bear different and
separable relationships to the collective process of moral decision-mak-
ing.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE
tion. With more time, I would defend the following notions:
(11 That which counts as "knowledge" in any society is acquired
but partially through personal interaction with the world of sensory
experience. Our most useful and important kinds of knowledge are
gained in interaction with "significant others"--family meniben, acquain-
tances, and institutional representatives--in our lives.
(2) We, therefore, tre born into a pre-existing cultural symbolicum,
a world or web of meaning which comes to us individually as pre-formu-
lated social knowledge.
(3) We acquire that social knowledge in myriad ways, but primarily
through admonition, imitation, and technical instruction.'
(4) Narratives are especially important vehicles by which cultural
representatives pass on social knowledge to new member* of societies,
(a) Because a narrative discourse of necessity must position its mes-
sages in time and space--that is, in the fundamental orientational per-
spectives of exiitence itself--narratives make strong demands upon our
innata perceptual processes. (b) Because the essence of narrative
discourse is "storytelling," such discourses are centered on pecsonae
and their actions, and hence are imitative of human life.^ (c) Because
narrative discourses structure characters and their actions, they
become primary vehicles for admonition, including moral admonitions,
(d) But, because narratives create and populate a universe in some
ways familiar to but in an important sense separable from their readers
or spectators, those admonitions usually are only implied.' (e) Hence,
while narrative discourse is preeminently useful m inculcating social
creatures, narratives themselves do not 'argue" as such; one only can
argue from narratives, not within them.
My last assumption--4e--is beginning to move us into some distinc-
tions between narrative and argumentative discourse, and hence I
should stop for a comment. The epistemological assumptions I have just
articulated, of course, may not be universally acceded to, yet they
have strong support from a large and growing intellectual community,
including scholars from anthropology, political science, mythic studies,
literary criticism, social theory and sociology, rhetorical studies, and
even psychology. In variant forms, these assumptions collectively pro-
vide the base for the many types of "social constructionism" theory,
"social constructivism," and most other branches of symbolic interaction-
ism in twentieth-century thought.*
NARRATIVE, ARGUMENT. AND MORAL OILEMMAS
Having advanced some basic, abstract philosophical propositions, I
now am ready to plunge into the question governing Professor Fisher's
paper: Via what means do social beings put their knowledge into
action, especially in situations characterized by moral diiemmas? Or,
phrased in a slightly different manner, in what forms is social know-
ledge made relevant to the processes of moral decision making?
Within the Aristotelian tradition of practical discourse, the answer to
these (questions is clear: rhetorical and dialectical discourse. To Aris-
totle. ' rhetoric" was understood as a systematic method of inquiry into
the world of contingent human affairs: the result of that inquiry was
the persuasive discourse, a discourse capable of generating assent to
moral/advisory propositions put to one's culturemates. And. "dialectic"
was understood as a parallel systematic method of inquiry into the prin-
ciples governing those human affairs; the result of that inquiry was the
philosophical discourse, a dtscourse capable of generating assent to
ontological, epistemological, teleological, and matacri tical propositions
put to one s intellectual peers in the academy. Both "rhetoric" and
'dialectic" were presumed to operate argumentatively--bilaterally, justi-
ficatorily, and verbally.*
sitive to the demands ot narrative proDaDiiity na narracive fidelity.
He supports that argument both theoretically and practically, i.e. by
discussing both characteristics of narrative discourse and attributes of
popular audiences who are presumed incapable of following eNpert rhe-
torical discourse in a technological age. If I may suggest an implicaticin
cf Professor Fisher's position vis-a-vis Aristotle's, it seems that he is
leaving intact dialogical inquiry as a tool for the intelligentsia, but. in
following arguments similar to some advanced by Bitter,* he distrusts
'ordinary" citizens' abilities to make moral judgments when confronted
by conflicting rhetorical or popular argumentative discourses. In other
words. Professor Fisher presumably accepts an Aristotelian notion of
dialectic, and is only out to replace rhetorical inquiry as a precursor to
persuasive discourse treating moral dilemmas.
Given assumptions I already have laid out, you probably can guess
that I am adhering to a neo-Aristotelian position on matters relative to
narrative, rhetoric, and moral dilemmas. Hence I would offer the fol-
lowing kind corrections to Professor Fisher:
{}) I certainly agree that narrative discourse can be and ought to
be thought of as a premiere comniunication paradigm. If nothing else,
the work of Havelock on the classical Greeks as well that of most of the
mythicists demonstrate narrative s ancient heritage, and, of course,
contemporary narrative theory is rich in such implications.*
(2) I agree that a doctrine of "good reasons" and its logic are cen-
tral to an understanding of moral decision-making processes, but--and
here I begin my correction of Professor Fisher--I deny that the narra-
tive paradigm is adequate as a logic. Interestingly, Professor Fisher
begins his present paper with a reference to his award-winning 1976
essay, "Toward a Logic of Good Reasons."** I say "interestingly"
because I chaired the SCA Committee on Awards that gave him a prize
for that essay. I therefore know the essay well, but even now as I
reread it I find no implication whatsoever for a narrative paradigm of
moral decision making. While he certainly does suggest, in the Toul-
min-like model of argumentation he constructs therein, that the sources
of valuative warrants for arguments are varied, he is very clear in say-
ing that the source of argumentative l ogi c-of the inferential process
per se--is Aristotelian. To quote the 1978 Fisher on the matter of ade-
quate reasoning criteria: "(Judgmental criteria must] be infused with
the tests of different types of reasoning: example, analogy, sign,
cause, definition, and authority."' ^
(3) t deny the adequacy of the narrative paradigm as an argumen-
tative frame because "storytelling" is grounded in mimetic rather than
enthymematic psychological activity. That is, a "story" is adjudged
adequate or inadequate on the bases of its verisimilitudeits similarity
to human experience and its internal consistency--while an enthymematic
argument is adjudged adequate or inadequate on the bases of its con-
formity to culture-specific rules of reasoning. As I noted earlier, I
believe one cartnot argue within, but only from, a story. I accept or
this point a position taken by Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann:
As long as I live in fantasy worlds, I cannot 'produce,' in the
sense of an act which gears into the external world and alters it.
As long as I tarry in the world of fantasy I cannot accomplish
anything, save just to engage in fantasy. However, under certain
circumstances, I can sketch out in advance the course of fantasy
as such (I will imagine the fairy gives me three wishes), and I can
then fulfill the project. It is still uncertain whether this falls
under a broadly conceived definition of the concept action.' It is
important that fantasy ing remains secluded by itself, that the
intention to act is absent--in contrast to the plan of an act in the
everyday life-world which (strictly as a plan) is also in a certain
sense 'merely thinking.' . . . In fantasy's finite province of
meaning only factual, not logical, incompatibilities can be over-
come. "
In a similar argument likewise quoting Schutz and Luckmann s analysis,
my colleague Michael McGee concludes that "Stories as such function
cntologically, establishing the grounds for accepting such-and-such
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interpretations as 'factual.'"' * Again, tfien, stories can define, can
even reinforce social criteria for legitimating thus-and-so at factual,
even as valued, but thay cannot argu*. In the language of faculty
psychology, stories can control perception, to be sure, but they cannot
serve as inferences. Narratives can only be interiorized, not exterior-
ized.
(4) In general, than, I still would maintain that "argumentation"
and "narrative" comprehend disparate mental operations. More specifi-
cally, (a] argumentation depends upon reasoning facilities, and narra-
tive, upon abilities of listeners to comprehend fictive or non-fictive
symbolic universes; (b) argumentation works by representation, while
narratives work by presentation; (c) argumentation becomes a matter of
intellection, while narrative force lies in the power of depiction; and
(d) adequate argumentation relies upon inference, while adequate narra-
tives rely upon characterological enactment.
PARTING THOUGHTS
On several key points, then, it might appear that I am taking Prof-
essor Fisher to task with some little severltysomething I promised not
to do. Actually, I do not think I am, for when alj the dust clears I
really am calling only for one adjustment of his position. His analysis
of the narrative paradigm, its mechanisms, and its force can stand if he
quits his attempt to describe it as a paradigm of argumentation, that is,
if he more simply recognizes that human beings argue front and not
within such structures. With that adjustment, his discussions of narra-
tion and perception, of "conceptual incommensurability," of the engines
of narratives, and of narratives' relationships to audiences will make
generally good sense. With that adjustment, he will be helping ui
understand the importance of narratives as the sources of social know-
ledge--knowledge advocates can bring to bear even on issues as compli-
cated, twisted, and sociopolitically important as nuclear war.
In keynoting this conference four years ago, I discussed the crisis
in the study of argumentation and rationality. I tajked about the new
"-isms" ana "-ologies" which have been challenging the traditional
aisumptioni of validity as standards of argumentative rationality--pri-
marily, the substitution of community-based "rules" for mathefnatical
constructs. I concluded from a review of recent research that the
"thaory of argunwntation over the last fIftMn yaars has baen viawed by
tha naw prophats ai a poatic rather than a logical antarprisa." *^ The
essentially poetic stress U|>on argumentative actors and upon the scripts
they employ in their interaction with others, to my mind then and now,
i> not something to be denigrated or feared, however. That stress is
to be applaudea, for it allows us to conceptualize and analyze argumen-
tative discourse contextually, in situ. And, insofar as we come to
understand the situational demands which govern decision making,
andwith Professor Fisherthe role of narratives in orienting argumen-
tative actors* fundamental perceptions of the world, we will be advanc-
ing significantly our abilitfy to both characterize and rasolva our cul-
ture's moral dilemmas. And, I would add, insofar as we seek to
analyze tha rols of cultural conditioning in the "ordinary" citizen s
ttrugglei to maka moral decision* in tha faca aven of technical argu-
ments, we need not fear this citizen's irrationality, for we will hava
come to understand popular reasoning as it can --rather than should
--operate in human affairs.
Prafeisor Fisher, then, for his contributions to a fundamental char-
acterization of narrative procedures, is to be applauded--with all the
kindnass I can muster.
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Notas
Most of Cassirer's writings deal in one way or another with the
notion of animal symbohcum. See, e.g., his Language and Myth
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1953] and His An Essay on
Man (New York: BanUm Books, 1970). Cf. David Bidney, "On
the Philosophical Anthropology of Ernst Cassirer and Its Relation
to the History of Anthropological Thought, ' in Tha Philosophy of
Ernst Cassirar, ed. Paul Schiipp (La Salle, III.: Open Court
Publishing Co., 1956), pp. 502ff. Perhaps Kenneth Burkes
clearest statement on this ontological question comes in his "Defi-
nition of Man," in his Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on
Lifa, Litaratura, and Method (1966; rpt. Berkeley: Univ. of
Calif. Press, 1973), pp. 3-24.
I develop most of these ideas in "Dramaturgical Theory and Criti-
cism: The State of the Art (or Science?)," Western Journal of
Speech Convnunicatlon, 44 (Fall 1980), 315-330; "On Classes of
Inferences and Force," in Explorations In Rhatoric: Studies in
Honor of Douglas Ehningar, ad. Ray E. McKerrow (Glenview, Ml.:
Scott, Foresman and Co., 1982), pp. 85-106: and "Sociocultural
Notions of Argument Fields: A Primer,'* in Dimansions of Argu-
ment: Proceedings of the Second Summer Confaranca on Argu-
mantatlon, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale,
Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 1-20.
These three routes to learning Edward Hall termi "formal,"
'^informal," and "technical' learning. See his still-useful Tha
Silent Languaga [1959; rpt. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publica-
tions, Inc., 1966), The Major Triad," pp. 63-92.
This, of course, is the whole point of Aristotle's definition of
"tragedy" in the Poatics (1449b). Because drama (poetic litera-
ture] is "an imitation of an action," action (mythos) is its primary
element, and character (athos) is a close second in importance.
As well, thought (dianola) is the third element in the Aristotelian
model; his discussion of 'thought" (1456a-1456b) could well hava
been written by a scholar interested in "the social construction of
reality." One further point: Aristotle's discussion of dianoia is
comparatively short, because, as he tells his readers (1456a), the
concept is well developed in the Rhatorlc. Hence, intriguingly,
he essentially collapses the distinction between poetic and rhetori-
cal works on tha question of social knowledge. There is at least
a suggestion, therefore, that pre-given, culture-specific role
requirements and rules-for-living are foundational to all processes
of meaning-assrgnation. Even in Aristotle, thus, does the human
being come off as animal symbolfcum. I treat this idea more fully
in Bruce E. Gronbeck, Narrative, E d T l i i
P i " Sh Sh
E beck, Nar
Programming," Southern Spa
(Spring 19^), 229-243.
I treat ths fy
, Enactment, and Television
Communication Journal, 48
5.
If poetic discourses actually state admonitions, we usually would
identify them with such rhetorical-generic labels as 'didactic" or
"propagandistic" literature. That is because any admonition
offered in a narrative discourse is assumed to apply to the char-
acters within the dramatic or poetic universe, not the "rsal
world." and because, at noted earlier, the notion of "imitation"
implies a separation (nonnally called "aesthetic distance") between
the narrative and the "real' worlds. Tho relationships existing
hence, are highly cooiplex, given that both "identification" and
yet "separation" are essential to understanding those relation-
ships. This, I suspect, is why Kenneth Burke makes so much of
the idea of 'representative anecdote" as the connective construct
between fictive and factual life in his A Grammar of Motives (New
York: Prentice-Hall, I nc. , 1945), esp. pp. 59-61, and his Lan-
guage as Symbolic Action, "Form and Persecution in the Orest-
ei a, ' pp. 125-138.
I sketch my understanding of these intellectual moves more ful l y
in Gronbeck, "Dramaturgical . . . ," and my "Qualitative Comniu-
nication Theory and Rhetorical Studies in the 19&0s," Central
States Spexh Journal, 32 (Winter 19B1), 243-253. I would add,
for good measure, that I think most of these assumptions would
pass muster among many continental scholars writing in the neo-
MarKist traditions of England, France, and Germany, although of
course they would more fully analyze perceptual processes within
the phenofflenological frame governing much of their work, and
would make more of the ways in which class structures control
our dealings with and understanding of the material world.
For dilations of my understanding of Aristotle on these matters,
see Richard McKeon, ed and intro. , The Basic Works of Aristotle
(New York: Random House, 1941), pp. iiiivi-xii, and James H
McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory,"
Speech [Coniinunlcatlon| Monographs, 3 (1936), 49-74.
Lloyd F. Bitier. "Rhetoric and Public Knowledge."
Philosophy, and Literature: An Explanation, ed, Don _M^ Burks
(West Lafayette,
67-93.
Rhetoric,
M. B
Purdue University Press, 1978).
The centrality of narrative forms to the very formation of Greek
culture--and, by implication, of all cuitures--is demonstrated bril -
liantly by Eric A. Havelock in his Preface to Plato, Belknap Press
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963)--a book
almost universally quoted by narrative and oral scholars. I shall
not, here, reproduce in support of this proposition a complete
bibliography on myth and society. Suffice it to say that the
mythic catalogues produced by Fraser and Bullfinch, the multi-vo-
lumed analyses of ancient myths offered by Joseph Campbell, the
contemporary structuralist studies of myth prepared by Claude
Levi-Strauss and Roland Barthes, the political analyses of Murray
Edelman, the sociological work of Orrin Klapp, and the anthropo-
logical-structuralist work of Victor Turner all document this
claim. Finally, I would urge the reader to follow Professor Fish-
er s lead in examining the Fall 1980 number of Critical Inquiry
(now available in bookform at On Narrative) for numerous articles
outlining current understandings of narrative theory.
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (December 1978), 376-384.
Fisher, p. 380.
Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann
13.
See his "1984: Some Issues in the Rhetorical Study of Political
Communication," forthcoming in the Political Communication Year-
book, to be published by Sage Publishing Co. and edited by
Keith Sanders.
Bruce E. Gronbeck, "From Argument to Ar|^umentation: Fifteen
Years of Identity Crises," in Proceedings of^the Sunmr Confer-
ence on Argunwntation, ed. Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell
(Annandale, Va. : Speech Communication Association, 1979). p.
10.