What Major Role Muslim League Have Played From 1906 To 1913

what major role Muslim league have played from 1906 to 1913?
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Muslim league Aim and Objectives - 1906 to 1913
1- Secure political rights of muslims
- !reate loyalty to the "ritish
3- Secure supremacy of urdu la#guage
Muslim league - 1913 onwards
1-System of self gover#me#t u#der "ritish gover#me#t
- $i#du Muslim u#ity
3- %ood relatio#s a#d cooperatio# with commu#ities wor&i#g for similar goals
Muslim league 1937 onwards
struggle for i#depede#t state
'ow to u(re other )uestio# - Importance o muslim league
*irst of all+ it provided a separate platform for the muslims, -he muslims at that time
.elieved that they had certai# rights a#d aims a#d that they must prepare themselves to
achieve those rights,-hough simla deputatio# had put forward the dema#d for separate
electorate+ it was Muslim league that wor&ed a#d toiled to achieve a#d mai#tai# that
dema#d, -he "ritish did #ot trust the Muslims a#d ope#ly disow#ed them+ Ml ushered i# a#
era of co#fide#ce through it(s policy a#d was a.le to wi# them over,/t mo.ilised the muslim
#atio# of su.co#ti#e#t, $ad there .ee# #o Ml who would have protected a#d gai#ed
co#stitutio#al safeguards for the muslims? -he creatio# of 0a&ista# is u#dou.tedly
attri.uted to Ml, /t provided dy#amic political leaders to the Muslims 1ji##ah +i).al2, /t was
through the platform of Ml that 0a&ista# was created 1 see all the political developme#ts2, /t
filled i# the vaccum left after Sir syed, -rust "ills were approved .y Ml which e3te#ded
welfare services to Muslims of /#dia, 4ppoi#tme#t of judges i# $igh a#d supreme courts was
a dema#d of Ml that was accepted,-here were ma#y parties operati#g .ut muslim league
orga#ised a#d esta.lished itself as the o#ly political party represe#ti#g the muslims of i#dia,
/t champio#ed the cause of Muslim #atio#alism, 4#d what #ot 50
!omi#g to u(re #e3t )uestio# - draw bac!s in muslim league objectives
0erhaps u might fi#d some "draw.ac&s" if u deeply a#alyse the history + .ut i capitulate
here, 6o#(t have the temerity to castigate a# orga#isatio# that created such a .eautiful
homela#d for us i# such circumsta#ces+ fought a political war with two adversaries who
were more e3perie#ced a#d powerful .esides havi#g all mea#s at their disposal,
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4riel *arrar-Cellma#+ <o.ert *rasco
%1A&(IO# (O 23#1 4009 I%A#IA# "%1*I51#(IA/ 1/1&(IO#6
/# ?u#e 009+ the 0a&ista#i gover#me#t officially co#gratulated /ra#ia# 0reside#t
Mahmoud 4hmadi#ejad o# his re-electio#, 0a&ista#i 0reside#t 4sif 4li Dardari stated
that the electoral victory was a "a# ac&#owledgme#t of E4hmadi#ejad(sF outsta#di#g
services," 4llama Sajid 'a)vi+ the head of -ehri&-e-/slami+ said that the results of the
electio# demo#strate that 4hmadi#ejad e#joys the trust a#d support of the /ra#ia#
people a#d e3pressed hope that /ra# a#d 0a&ista# will e#joy a# i#creasi#gly stro#g
.o#d i# the future, -ehri-e-/slami is a Shia political party i# 0a&ista# that the former
0a&ista#i 0reside#t 0erve= Musharraf twice .a##ed for ties to terrorism,
#3&/1A%6
0a&ista# has pu.licly defe#ded /ra#Gs right to #uclear tech#ology, Some 4merica#
a#alysts also suspect 0a&ista#i scie#tists employed .y the 0a&ista#i military of
helpi#g /ra# ac)uire #uclear tech#ology+ although 0a&ista# officially de#ies a#y
i#volveme#t, $e#ry So&ols&i+ former deputy for #o#proliferatio# policy i# the Hffice of
the Secretary of 6efe#se+ e3plai#ed i# 003 that Ithe #otio# that 0a&ista# was#Gt
i#volved is getti#g less a#d less te#a.le,J Si#ce the#+ i#spectors have fou#d i# /ra#Gs
possessio# docume#ts from 0a&ista#i scie#tist 6r, 4,K, Lha# detaili#g how to shape
ura#ium for #uclear warheads+ while i# 007 the#-0a&ista#i 0reside#t 0erve=
Musharraf officially pardo#ed 6r, Lha# for his sale of #uclear tech#ology, 4ccordi#g to
a report .y the !o#gressio#al <esearch Service pu.lished i# 009+ 6r, Lha# Icould
#ot have fu#ctio#ed without some level of cooperatio# .y 0a&ista#i military
perso##el+ who mai#tai#ed tight security arou#d the &ey #uclear facilities+ a#d
possi.ly civilia# officials as well,J H# March 19+ 010+ 0a&ista# rejected a ;S media
report asserti#g that Lha# provided #uclear related i#formatio# a#d material+
i#cludi#g drawi#gs+ ce#trifuge compo#e#ts+ a#d a list of suppliers+ to /ra#, 4.dul
"asit+ a spo&esma# for the 0a&ista#i *oreig# Hffice+ descri.ed the claims+ pu.lished
.y the Cashi#gto# 0ost+ as "yet a#other repac&agi#g of fictio#+ which surface
occasio#ally for purposes that are self-evide#t,"
Hver the past several years+ 0a&ista# has i#creasi#gly called for peaceful
reco#ciliatio# o# the i#ter#atio#al #uclear sta#doff+ despite i#creasi#g co#cer# from
the ;' a#d Cashi#gto#,
/# a *e.ruary 010 meeti#g with her /ra#ia# cou#terpart+ 0a&ista#i 'atio#al
4ssem.ly Spea&er *ahmida Mir=a said that I0a&ista# is agai#st a#y &i#ds of sa#ctio#s
agai#st /ra# a#d .elieves that /ra#(s #uclear disputes should .e resolved peacefully
a#d through dialogue," /# a separate meeti#g with /ra#ia# 0reside#t Mahmoud
4hmadi#ejad+ Mir=a reiterated her earlier remar&s a#d assured him that 0a&ista#
supports /ra#(s i#depe#de#ce a#d progress i# all the areas+ especially i# utili=i#g
peaceful #uclear e#ergy, She also highlighted /ra#ia#-0a&ista#i commo#alities i#
religio#+ history+ a#d culture+ a#d added that e3tremism a#d terrorism is a commo#
threat to the sta.ility a#d progress of the e#tire regio#,
1&O#OMI& %1/A(IO#*$I"6
-he two cou#tries i#itiated sig#ifica#t cooperatio# i# the e#ergy sector i# 1991+ whe#
/ra# .ega# #egotiati#g a# oil deal with 0a&ista# a#d Katar, -his i#itial colla.oratio#+
however+ was limited a#d did #ot progress mea#i#gfully, /ra# agai# attempted
#egotiati#g with Katar regardi#g the co#structio# of gas pipeli#es to 0a&ista# i#
1999+ however was u#successful, !ooperatio# regardi#g e#ergy has #o#etheless
i#creased si#ce the 1990s a#d helped provide the fou#datio# for a more thorough
.ilateral trade #etwor& .etwee# /ra# a#d 0a&ista# i# rece#t years, "y 009+ 0a&ista#
was actively see&i#g /ra#ia# i#vestme#t i# .ilateral trade a#d e#ergy cooperatio#,
0a&ista# a#d /ra# have deepe#ed their eco#omic part#ership to such a# e3te#t that+
i# a joi#t stateme#t issued i# May 010+ the two cou#tries e3pressed satisfactio#
with a# i#crease i# .ilateral trade+ which surpassed M1, .illio# i# the previous
fi#a#cial year, /# 009+ 0a&ista# i#creased its #o#-oil e3ports to /ra# .y B0 perce#t+
reachi#g M@9 millio#, Similarly+ /ra#ia# #o#-oil e3ports to 0a&ista# i#creased .y 11
perce#t+ totali#g M@B millio# for the year, 6espite this growth+ Larachi !ham.eer of
!ommerce a#d /#dustry 0reside#t 4.dul Majid $aji Mohammad said the lac& of a
.a#&i#g system remai#s a major o.stacle to /ra#-0a&ista# trade,
Si#ce 009+ /slama.ad has i#creasi#gly tur#ed to -ehra# to supply 0a&ista#Gs growi#g
e#ergy #eeds, /# 4ugust 00B+ /ra# agreed to fi#a#ce a ro.ust e#ergy project that
would allow 0a&ista# to import 1+000 megawatts of electricity to overcome its power
shortage, -he project+ a M60 millio# e#deavor+ co#sists of ru##i#g a 100-&ilometer
electric li#e to help augme#t the 70 megawatts of electricity 0a&ista# already
receives daily from /ra#, /# 4pril 010+ /ra#ia# 4m.assador to 0a&ista# Mashallah
Sha&eri spo&e .efore the <awalpi#di !ham.er of !ommerce a#d /#dustry+ stressi#g
/ra#Gs commitme#t to eco#omic relatio#s with 0a&ista#, 4ccordi#g to the e#voy+ /ra#
i#te#ds to supply the 1+000 megawatts to 0a&ista# at a discou#ted rate,
/ra# a#d 0a&ista# have lo#g discussed the co#structio# of a +600-&ilometer+ M@,9
.illio# /ra#-0a&ista#-/#dia gas pipeli#e 1/0/2 that would pump gas from /ra#Gs South
0ars field to 0a&ista# a#d /#dia, E -e#tative tal&s o# the pipeli#e .ega# i# 1997+
however te#se political relatio#s .etwee# /#dia a#d 0a&ista# frustrated reali=atio# of
the project, /#ter#atio#al co#cer# over /ra#Gs #uclear program further delayed
agreeme#t a#d i# 'ovem.er 00@ /ra# a#d 0a&ista# accused /#dia of hesitati#g
.ecause of pressure from the ;#ited States,E0F /# *e.ruary 010+ /ra#ia# *oreig#
Mi#ister Ma#ouchehr Motta&i accused the ;S of i#terferi#g with the pla##ed pipeli#e
.y attempti#g to sway 'ew 6elhi away from the /0/, /#deed+ Cashi#gto# has
repeatedly urged /#dia #ot to follow through with the deal while /ra# faces sa#ctio#s
for its #uclear e#richme#t program, "oth <ussia a#d !hi#a have ta&e# sig#ifica#t
i#terest i# the pipeli#e+ with <ussiaGs %a=prom offeri#g to help supply oil a#d !hi#a
holdi#g tal&s with /ra# a#d 0a&ista# i# 00B to replace /#dia i# case 'ew 6elhi chose
to reject the part#ership,
/# May 009+ /ra# a#d 0a&ista# sig#ed a purchase agreeme#t stipulati#g that /ra#
will i#itially tra#sfer 30 millio# cu.ic meters of gas to 0a&ista# per day+ with the
volume eve#tually i#creasi#g to 60 millio#, -he deal+ to which /#dia was #ot a party+
e#sures gas supplies to 0a&ista# for a period of 9 years, H# ?u#e 13+ 010+ the two
sides formally co#cluded the M@,9 .illio# agreeme#t over the o.jectio#s of ;S Special
<eprese#tative for 0a&ista# a#d 4fgha#ista# <ichard $ol.roo&e+ who cautio#ed that
although the I;S u#dersta#ds that 0a&ista# faces EaF major e#ergy crisis,,, #ew
sa#ctio#s o# /ra# ca# impact 0a&ista#,J 4ccordi#g to a previous 0a&ista#i 0etroleum
Mi#istry stateme#t i# May 010+ Ithe capital cost for the 0a&ista# sectio# is
estimated at 1,69 .illio# dollarsNEa#dF the first gas flow is targeted .y e#d 017J
with /ra# completi#g the project ahead of schedule,
6uri#g a ?uly 30+ 009 i#terview with the /ra#ia# /slamic <epu.lic 'ews 4ge#cy+ 6r,
4shfa) $assa# Lha#+ a former eco#omic advisor i# 0a&ista#+ i#sisted that while
eco#omic ties .etwee# /ra# a#d 0a&ista# should e3pa#d at all levels+ cooperatio# i#
the e#ergy sector is vital for 0a&ista#, Lha# further e3pressed his view that the
pla##ed /ra#-0a&ista# pipeli#e would li&ely greatly .e#efit .oth cou#tries,
/ra#-0a&ista# cooperatio# o# tra#sportatio# issues e3pa#ded greatly i# 4ugust 009+
whe# the two i#augurated a# i#ter#atio#al freight rail li#e from /slama.ad to /sta#.ul
via -ehra#, -he li#e is a Ipilot projectJ of the Oco#omic !ooperatio# Hrga#i=atio#
1O!H2+ a !e#tral 4sia# trade .loc, 4lthough /ra# a#d -ur&ey already e#joy e3te#sive
rail cooperatio#+ tra#sportatio# ties with 0a&ista# are wea&er, 4ccordi#g to 6irector of
0a&ista# <ailways Shafi)ullah Lha#+ /slama.ad a#d -ehra# are see&i#g outside credit
to resolve differe#ces i# rail gauge i# order to regulari=e rail service .etwee# the two,
Hfficials e3pect to .egi# regular freight service alo#g the 6+900 &m li#e i# 4ugust
010,
/# *e.ruary 010+ 0u#ja. !hief Mi#ister Muhammad Shah.a= Sharif called for the
creatio# of a# eco#omic free-trade =o#e amo#g 0a&ista#+ /ra#+ -ur&ey a#d other
/slamic cou#tries, 6uri#g a cele.ratio# of the 31st <evolutio# 6ay of /ra#+ Sharif
#oted that Ideep+ frie#dly relatio#s e3ist .etwee# 0a&ista# a#d /ra# a#d it is the #eed
of the hour that socio-eco#omic cooperatio# should .e promoted,J
/ra#ia# a#d 0a&ista#i officials+ i# *e.ruary 010+ sig#ed the first memora#dum of
u#dersta#di#g 1Mo;2 .etwee# the two cou#tries o# cross .order trade, -he Mo; was
pe##ed duri#g the two cou#triesG first joi#t committee meeti#g o# .order trade i#
/ra#Gs southeaster# Sista# a#d "alouchesta# provi#ce, /raj $assa#pour+ the head of
Sista# a#d "alouchesta#(s trade orga#i=atio#+ stated that IE.Fased o# EtheF Mo;+
EtheF two cou#tries are .ou#d to hold pu.lic a#d speciali=ed fairs at their commo#
.orders a#d i# EtheF capital of Sista# P "alouchesta# provi#ce+ Daheda#+ a#d Kuetta
i# 0a&ista#," "oth sides also decided to esta.lish large storehouses to facilitate the
storage of trade commodities at their .order customs,
Sardar Muhammad Aatif Lha# Lhosa+ a 0a&ista#i advisor to the prime mi#ister o#
i#formatio# tech#ology+ has called for i#creased colla.oratio# .etwee# /ra# a#d
0a&ista# i# telecommu#icatio#s, 6uri#g a ?u#e 010 co#versatio# with /ra#Gs
am.assador to 0a&ista#+ Mashallah Sha&eri+ Lhosa e3pressed his .elief that
i#creased .ilateral activity i# the sector has the pote#tial to i#crease regio#al
eco#omic developme#t a#d security,
5I"/OMA(I&7MI/I(A%8 %1/A(IO#*$I"6
/ra# has developed deep eco#omic a#d political ties with 0a&ista#+ a# ally of the
;#ited States a#d a #uclear #eigh.or, /# 00@+ the 0rime Mi#ister of 0a&ista#+
Shau&at 4=i=+ said that 0a&ista# shares e3te#sive ties with /ra# I.ased upo# faith+
.elief+ joi#t history a#d culture, O3pa#sio# of cooperatio# i# the fields of trade a#d
i#vestme#t ca# further stre#gthe# the .ilateral ties,J /ra# a#d 0a&ista# cooperate i# a
#um.er of trade groups a#d agreed i# ?u#e 00B o# a list of 300 trada.le items i# a#
effort to stimulate eco#omic relatio#s, /ra# is active i# the Oco#omic !ooperatio#
Hrga#i=atio# 1O!H2Qa trade a#d i#vestme#t group that i#cludes all of the ce#tral
4sia# cou#tries+ fou#ded .y /ra#+ -ur&ey a#d 0a&ista#, 4dditio#ally+ .oth /ra# a#d
0a&ista# also hold o.server status i# the Sha#ghai !ooperatio# Hrga#i=atio# 1S!H2Q
a# 4sia# regio#al eco#omic a#d security group, !hi#a a#d <ussia are reportedly
co#sideri#g i#viti#g /ra# a#d 0a&ista# to full mem.ership i# the S!H so as to
participate i# resolvi#g the co#flict i# 4fgha#ista#, "/# the curre#t glo.al co#te3t+ the
top priority is fi#di#g a solutio# to the 4fgha# issue+" Secretary-%e#eral Murat.e&
Sa#sy=.ayevich /ma#aliev said duri#g a #ews co#fere#ce i# "eiji#g i# *e.ruary 010,
0a&ista# has helped e#courage trilateral trade with /ra# a#d -ur&ey i# commercial
goods a#d developme#t of i#frastructure .eyo#d the programs admi#istered .y
regio#al orga#i=atio#s such as the O!H,
/ra# has i#volved itself i# the political a#d military i#sta.ility i# 0a&ista#Gs 4fgha# a#d
/ra# .order regio#s, /# ?u#e 009+ the /ra#ia# Om.assy i# 0a&ista# do#ated
M90+000 as huma#itaria# aid for 0a&ista#Gs u#sta.le Swat provi#ce, /# a stateme#t+
the em.assy said that "/ra# de#ou#ces terrorist acts i# 0a&ista#(s #orther# areas a#d
a##ou#ces its readi#ess to re#ew support for peace a#d sta.ility i# 0a&ista#,"E3@F /#
?uly 009+ /ra#ia# 4m.assador to 0a&ista# Mashaallah Sha&eri called o# the 0a&ista#i
gover#me#t to secure the release of $eshmatollah 4ttar=adeh 'iya&i+ a# /ra#ia#
diplomat &id#apped .y gu#ma# i# 0eshawar i# 00B,E3BF Chile spea&i#g .efore the
/ra#ia# parliame#t i# ?uly 009+ /ra#ia# *oreig# Mi#ister Ma#ouchehr Motta&i stated
that he .elieved Ithat the curre#t situatio#s Ei# wester# 0a&ista#F are improvi#gN
crimi#al acts Ehave .ee#F reduced a#d co#trolled i# EtheF last year,J Motta&i further
i#dicated that /ra# had received a good degree of cooperatio# from the 0a&ista#i
gover#me#t i# impleme#ti#g #ew security measures o# the .order,
Spea&i#g i# ?uly 009+ *ormer /#terior Mi#ister a#d !hairma# of the 0a&ista#
0eopleGs 0arty Sherpao 4fta. 4hmad Lha# Sherpao praised a# /ra)i security forces
raid o# a 0eople(s Mujahedi# of /ra# camp located #orth of "aghdad, /ra#ia#
authorities reacted warmly to #ews of the raid+ which targeted a milita#t /ra#ia# e3ile
group hostile to the /slamic <epu.lic, Sherpao e3plai#ed his support for the raid .y
stati#g that #o cou#try should permit its territory to .e used for hostile acts agai#st
a#other sovereig# state, $e further added that "/ra# is our .rotherly cou#try a#d we
always wa#t /ra# to prosper,"
/# 4ugust 009+ /ra# too& part i# a meeti#g of the I*rie#ds of 6emocratic 0a&ista#,J
6uri#g the summit+ which was held i# -ur&ey a#d largely focused o# the security
situatio# i# 0a&ista#+ *oreig# Mi#ister Motta&i discussed the importa#ce of .ilateral
ties with his 0a&ista#i cou#terpart+ Shah Mahmood Kureshi, -he two also spo&e
a.out the #eed to com.at terrorism a#d esta.lish sta.ility i# 0a&ista#+ with Motta&i
addi#g that he co#siders 0a&ista#-/ra#-4fgha#ista# relatio#s to .e a# Iappropriate
modelJ for regio#al co#flict resolutio#,
-he two cou#triesG R.rotherlyG relatio#s were threate#ed i# Hcto.er 009 followi#g
attac&s agai#st the /ra#ia# /slamic <evolutio#ary %uard !orps 1/<%S2 i# Sista#-
"aluchista# provi#ce, 0reside#t 4hmadi#ejad pu.lically accused Icertai# officials i#
0a&ista#J of i#volveme#t i# the attac&s, -ehra# further dema#ded the e3traditio# of
4.dolmale& <igi+ the chief of suspected terrorist group ?u#dallah, 0a&ista#i officials
de#ied a#y i#volveme#t i# the attac&s+ rejecti#g /ra#ia# /#terior Mi#ister Mostafa
Mohammad 'ajjarGs accusatio# that ?u#dallah received fi#a#cial aid from 0a&ista#,
0a&ista# su.se)ue#tly released 11 /ra#ia# security officers accused of illegally
crossi#g the .order, 0a&ista#i 0reside#t 4sif 4li Dardari met with 'ajjar i# /slama.ad
a wee& after the attac&s, Dardari stated that the attac&ers Iwere the e#emies of .oth
cou#triesJ a#d vowed to cooperate with /ra# i# their capture, 4t the .egi##i#g of
'ovem.er 009+ however+ the /<%! accused 0a&ista# of releasi#g the leader of
?u#dallah immediately .efore the Hcto.er 1B .om.i#g i# Sista#-"aluchista#+ there.y
implicati#g the 0a&ista#i gover#me#t i# the attac&s, 4ccordi#g to the deputy head of
the /<%!+ "rigadier %e#eral $ossei# Salami+ the ?u#dallah leader+ 4.dolma&el <igi+
Iwas arrested o# Septem.er 6 i# 0a&ista#Gs "aluchista# provi#ce, "ut he was
released after a# hour with the i#terve#tio# of the 0a&ista#i i#tellige#ce service,J /#
March 010+ upo# receivi#g assura#ces from /slama.ad that authorities would ta&e
measures to improve security i# the area+ /ra# reope#ed its .order with 0a&ista#,
/ra# had closed the .order to trade four mo#ths prior i# respo#se to the Hcto.er
/<%! attac&,
6eputy *oreig# Mi#ister of /ra# $assa# Kash)avi said i# ?a#uary 010 that the
0a&ista#i gover#me#t should ta&e serious measures to stem terrorist activities across
the .order of the two cou#tries, 4ccordi#g to the mi#ister+ "the 0a&ista#i gover#me#t
is e3pected to live up to its promises a#d ta&e more serious measures to stem the
terrorist a#d evil activities,JE7BF -he same mo#th+ a# /ra#ia# *oreig# Mi#istry official
claimed there is a hidde# age#da .ehi#d the rece#t desta.ili=i#g measures o# /ra#(s
easter# .orders with 0a&ista# a#d 4fgha#ista#,
H# ?a#uary 16+ 010+ officials from 0a&ista#+ 4fgha#ista#+ a#d /ra# met to discuss
regio#al security a#d terrorism+ agreei#g o# a joi#t framewor& for cooperatio# i#
tac&li#g political volatility i# the area, -he three agreed that regio#al sta.ility a#d
security could o#ly .e adva#ced through si#cere adhere#ce to the pri#ciple of
#atio#al sovereig#ty a#d territorial i#tegrity,E90F 0a&ista#i *oreig# Mi#ister Shah
Mehmood Kureshi stated that "it is importa#t to co#sult amo#gst ourselves so that
we are o# the same page a#d we have closer positio#s o# differe#t issues that
co#fro#t our #eigh.orhood," 4 joi#t declaratio# from the meeti#g called for 0a&ista#+
4fgha#ista#+ a#d /ra# to coordi#ate efforts to com.at e3tremism as well as drug a#d
weapo#s smuggli#g, -he mi#isters also raised /ra#ia# co#cer#s regardi#g the
e3pa#ded prese#ce of ;S forces i# 4fgha#ista#,E91F 4 day after the meeti#g+ the
/ra#ia# am.assador to 0a&ista#+ Mashallah Sha&eri+ a##ou#ced that the third /ra#-
4fgha#ista#-0a&ista# summit will .e held i# -ehra# i# the #ear future,
/# ?a#uary 010+ /ra#ia# *irst Tice-0reside#t Mohammad <e=a <ahimi i#sisted that
/ra# co#siders dura.le security a#d sta.ility i# 0a&ista# to .e of paramou#t
importa#ce to /ra#ia# i#terests,E93F <efere#ci#g rece#t efforts .y -ehra# to esta.lish
sustai#a.le security i# 0a&ista#+ <ahimi stated that "/ra# .elieves that
comprehe#sive e3pa#sio# of ties with 0a&ista# plays a major role i# materiali=i#g the
i#terests of the two cou#tries a#d the regio#," $e called for the fortificatio# of the
/ra# a#d 0a&ista#Gs commo# .orders a#d added that "terrorist groups should #ot .e
allowed to distur. security of the two cou#tries( .order regio#s,"
6uri#g the first Meeti#g of the $eads of /#terpol of the Oco#omic !ooperatio#
Hrga#i=atio#+ held o# ?u#e 9+ 010+ /#terior Mi#ister 'ijjar urged the associatio#Gs
mem.ers to colla.orate more closely o# security issues, -he mi#ister proposed the
creatio# of a regio#al police head)uarters a#d e#couraged more rapid shari#g of
i#formatio# o# crimi#al i#vestigatio#s,
4m.assador Sha&eri has said that /ra# is determi#ed to co#ti#ue its i#volveme#t i#
0a&ista#i developme#t despite ever-i#creasi#g security challe#ges, /# a *e.ruary
010 message commemorati#g the 31st a##iversary of the victory of the /slamic
<evolutio# i# /ra#+ the am.assador #oted that "0a&ista#+ i# its capacity as a Muslim
#eigh.or+ has a special status i# the macro-strategy of the foreig# policy of /ra#+ with
dura.le security+ sta.ility a#d all-rou#d developme#t of 0a&ista# .ei#g /ra#(s desire,"
6uri#g a si3-day visit to /ra# i# *e.ruary 010+ 0a&ista#i 'atio#al 4ssem.ly Spea&er
*ahmida Mir=a met with /ra#ia# 0reside#t Mahmoud 4hmadi#ejad+ 0arliame#t
Spea&er 4li Aarija#i+ a#d *oreig# Mi#ister Ma#ouchehr Motta&i, Mir=a a#d Aarija#i
issued a joi#t stateme#t calli#g for the e3pa#sio# of ties .etwee# 0a&ista# a#d /ra# i#
the political+ eco#omic+ a#d cultural spheres, /ra# a#d 0a&ista# also agreed to
i#crease their parliame#tary cooperatio# o# glo.al issues at i#ter#atio#al .odies, /#
additio#+ the two cou#tries u#derli#ed the #eed to adopt a comprehe#sive political
approach i# the campaig#s agai#st terrorism+ drug traffic&i#g+ a#d orga#i=ed crime,
6uri#g a# 4pril 010 appeara#ce .efore the <awalpi#di !ham.er of !ommerce a#d
/#dustry+ /ra#ia# 4m.assador Sha&eri reaffirmed his cou#tryGs commitme#t to aidi#g
0a&ista# deal with its i#ter#al turmoil+ sayi#g that "/ra# is fully aware of the pro.lems
curre#tly faci#g 0a&ista# a#d our prime goal is to .ri#g 0a&ista# out of the prevaili#g
crisis,J
4ccordi#g to a May 010 joi#t stateme#t followi#g a meeti#g .etwee# 6eputy
*oreig# Mi#ister of /ra# Seyed 4meer Ma#soor "orghei(e a#d 0a&ista#i *oreig#
Mi#ister Shah Mehmood Kureshi+ /ra# a#d 0a&ista# support efforts .y 4fgha#
0reside#t $amid Lar=ai to achieve #atio#al reco#ciliatio# i# his cou#try, -he two
cou#tries further agreed to co#ti#ue cooperate to help a#d achieve sustai#a.le peace
i# 4fgha#ista#,
H# May 7+ 010+ 0a&ista#(s Se#ate !hairma# *aroo) 'ae& stressed the importa#ce of
parliame#tary relatio#s duri#g a meeti#g with /ra#Gs acti#g deputy foreig# mi#ister+
4mir Ma#sour "or)aei, -he two sides spo&e of the possi.ility of e3cha#gi#g
parliame#tary delegatio#s a#d lauded the two cou#triesG history of frie#dly relatio#s,
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
Che# 0ro.lems are so "ig P >our Stre#gth is #o Ao#ger e#ough to !a<<y them+
6o#(t %ive u0V "ecause where your Stre#gth O#ds the %race of 4lmighty 4AA4$
"egi#s
(+e ,ollowing 9 3sers *a' (+an! 8ou to Asi 8ousu:ai ,or (+is 3seul "ost6
"illa 1-uesday+ ?uly 09+ 0112+ $e##a Lha# 1*riday+ Hcto.er 17+
0112+ Shi&va 1Saturday+ May B+ 0112+ Stu##er 1Saturday+ May B+ 0112
#2
Saturday, May 28, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
"a!istan6 A victim o terrorism;;;
"A < I *(A #6 A =I&(IM O , (1%%O%I*M
15I(O%
6< 'HH< ;A $4K
A**I*(A#( 15I(O%
M;$4MM46 '4C4D L$4'
&O#(1#(
0reface v
1, >ear-wise Summary of $uma# Aosses i# -errorist 4cts5
1 ?a#uary 001 to 1@ ?a#uary 011
, <ah-e-<ast Hperatio# .y 4rmed *orces5 6 4pril 009W ?uly 009
3, <ah-e-'ijat Hperatio# .y 4rmed *orces5 1@ Hcto.er 009 H#ward
7, !asualties Suffered .y 4rmed *orces5 009-010
9, 0095 >ear of -errorism
6, 0a&ista# Aost M39.# i# -hree >ears i# Car o# -error
@, 'ew 6ime#sio#s of !ou#ter--errorism
B, Suicides "om.i#g a#d 6r -ahirul KadriGs *atwa
9, Aesso#s from Aahore
10, -ali.a# /#creasi#gly ;#popular i# 0a&ista#
11, -ali.a# 6ista#ci#g -hemselves from al-Kaeda
1, 33 -error $its !laimed 9+@07 Aives Si#ce 9X11
13, -he Sile#t Surge
17, ;,S, 6efe#ds Aegality of Lilli#g with 6ro#es
19, H.ama Moves to 6eli#& -errorism from /slam
16, Lohat Lilli#gs
1@, Soft o# Milita#cy
1B, %et the Milita#t Aeadership
19, -he <isi#g Milita#cy
0, Milita#cy5 <ealism 'eeded
1, -error i# Aahore
, -errorism a#d the Oco#omy
3, Search for Soul
7, 0rovi#ces "ac& Offorts to !om.at -error
9, 4 %ood 4#ti-terrorism Move
6, -errorism a#d <eligious /de#tities
@, Kuelli#g -errorism
B, -errorist 4ttac&s
9, Kuetta 4ttac&
30, Aa&&i Marwat "last
31, 6eployme#t of More 6ro#es 4gai#st 0a&ista#
3, -he Scourge of -errorism
33, 4ttac&i#g the %ha=i of Larachi
37, 6ro#e 4ttac&s May .e Aegal+ "ut 4re -hey Moral?
39, "y 0u.licly 4c&#owledgi#g the 0rice 0a&ista# 0ays for its !ou#ter-terrorism 0olicy+
the ;,S, is $elpi#g ;#tie its AeadershipGs $a#ds
36, 4 >ear of Su.-sectaria# Massacre
3@, Swa.i 4ttac&
3B, ;,S, 6ou.le-deali#g
39, ;,S, See&s to O3pa#d 6ro#e Hperatio#s
70, %over#me#t *irm i# Olimi#ati#g Me#ace of -errorism5 0rime Mi#ister
71, -error %roup *orms Suicidal %a#g
7, 4fgha#s /#volved i# -errorist 4ctivities5 Mi#ister of /#terior
73, 0a&-4fgha# ?oi#t 6eclaratio#5 4ccord to L#oc& Hut Milita#t Sa#ctuaries
77, ;,S,-0a&ista# Secret Offorts to 6efeat al-Kaeda5 0etraeus
79, 'atio#al 4ssem.ly "ody !o#dem#s 6ro#e 4ttac&s
76, 'o -ali.a# or Kuetta Shura i# "alochista#5 *!/%
7@, 0rime Mi#ister !alls for ?oi#t Strategy to !om.at -errorism
7B, 6ro#e 4ttac&s i# 0a&ista#
79, 0a&ista# 4rmyGs !o#tri.utio#s i# *ight 4gai#st -errorism
*ollow this li#& --: http5XXipripa&,orgXfactfilesXff19,pdf
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
"egi#s
"illa 1-uesday+ ?uly 09+ 0112+ shah7 1Mo#day+ 4ugust 01+
0112+ Stu##er 1Saturday+ May B+ 0112
#3
Saturday, May 28, 2011
/A>4S S4M/
?u#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 Mar 009
Aocatio#5 6 / L
0osts5
-ha#&s5 3
-ha#&ed 7 -imes i# 1 0osts
>
&an an' bod' tell t+at we +ave to memori: all t+e events regarding
operation against (errorism wit+ all t+e statistics o 5eat+?losses etc >>
#4
Sunday, May 29, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
@Il'as *ami
"rother / thi#& you do#t #eed to memori=e all the facts P figures1statistics2 .ut you
should remem.er the major eve#ts with e3act dates li&e @th Hct+ 0011;S i#vasio#
of 4fgha#ista#2+ 0th Mar+ 0031;S attac&ed /ra)2 etc, .ecause it .ri#gs fruitful
respo#se for you a#d creates a positive image i# the e3ami#er(s mi#d,,,,,,
regards,,,,,,,,,,,,
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
"egi#s
"illa 1-uesday+ ?uly 09+ 0112+ S>O64 S4"4$4- 1Mo#day+ May 30+ 0112
#5
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
"artition 5emand;;;;
"artition 5emand6 ,rom &ripps Mission to -and+i-2inna+ (al!s
"y
Massarrat 4.id
Kal.-i-4.id
Directly Mr. Jinnah arrived I (Cripps) broached the question of my past attitude
toards the Muslim !ea"ue and told him that the vies I too# to and a half years
a"o ere sincerely ta#en and represented my $ud"ment of the situation as it then
as and that I had re"arded the %a#istan propa"anda as pure political pressure. &e
responded very amiably to this' reco"ni(in" the sincerity of my vies' hich I told
him the last to years had chan"ed in vie of the chan"e in the communal feelin" in
India and the "roth of the %a#istan Movement). I then "ave him the documents to
read).. hich I thin# rather surprised him in the distance it ent to meet the
%a#istan case.*
-his article discusses i# details the growth of 0a&ista# dema#d from 197 to 1977+ its
official recog#itio# .y the "ritish gover#me#t a#d accepta#ce .y Mr, %a#dhi, -he
!ripps missio# was se#t to /#dia due to u#e3pected ?apa#ese victories which were
threate#i#g the i#vasio# of /#dia duri#g the Seco#d Corld Car, -he "ritish were also
u#der pressure from the ;S to resolve the politicaldeadloc& i# /#dia after the
!o#gress mi#istries resig#ed due to the failure of #egotiatio#s .etwee# the !o#gress
a#d the gover#me#t, Sir Stafford arrived i# /#dia o# 3 March+ 197 a#d gave a
stateme#t sayi#g that he had .ee# more associated with his frie#ds i# the !o#gress
party .ut also i#dicati#g that he was ope#ed to all other poi#ts of view, /# the
mea#time+ the Muslim Aeague was cele.rati#g its 0a&ista# day cele.ratio#s, ?i##ah i#
his speech+ referred to the !ripps missio# advisi#g Muslims to .e patie#t u#til his
proposals were put forward officially, $e i#dicated that the Aeague will #ot accept his
proposals if it were detrime#tal to Muslim i#terestV he also me#tio#ed that he will
resist a#d if #eeded+ the Muslims would die fighti#g for the creatio# of 0a&ista#,
$e also cautio#ed !ripps a#d the "ritish gover#me#t i# Ao#do# i#dicati#g that age#ts
of the !o#gress a#d age#ts of the "ritish were ma&i#g attempts to sa.otage the
Muslim Aeague pla#s, $e also .rought i# to atte#tio# of all the parties that although
!ripps was a frie#d of the !o#gress a#d e#joyed perso#al associatio# a#d hospitality
of 'ehru+ it will #ot have a#y #egative effect o# his deali#gs with the Muslim Aeague,
$e made it clear that !ripps had come to /#dia #ot i# his perso#al capacity .ut as a
represe#tative of "ritish gover#me#t, H# 9 March+ !ripps privately disclosed his
proposals to Kuaid-i-4=am ?i##ah a#d Maula#a 4=ad as preside#ts of Muslim Aeague
a#d !o#gress respectively, !ripps apologi=ed to ?i##ah for sayi#g some rude thi#gs i#
the -ri.u#e a.out Muslims a#d told him that he had revised his views o# 0a&ista#
dema#d due to the growth of 0a&ista# moveme#t duri#g the last two years, -here
was a# optio# clause i# !ripps proposals which allowed a provi#ce to succeed from
the mai# /#dia# u#io#V !ripps thought that this clause had particularly surprised
?i##ah which he thought we#t to meet ?i##ahGs 0a&ista# dema#d,
H# 9 March+ !ripps released his docume#ts a#d held a press co#fere#ce, H# 7 4pril+
i# his preside#tial address to the Muslim Aeague+ ?i##ah poi#ted out that !ripps
proposals were o#ly a draft declaratio#, $e also said that creatio# of 0a&ista# was a
remote possi.ility a#d there was a defi#ite prefere#ce for a #ew /#dia# ;#io# which
was the mai# o.jective a#d suggestio# a#d the draft declaratio# i#terviews a#d
e3pla#atio#s of Sir Stafford were goi#g agai#st Muslim i#terests a#d the Aeague was
called upo# to play the game with a loaded dice, $e as&ed !ripps to ma&e
adjustme#ts i# order to give real effect to the 0a&ista# dema#d, H# 13 4pril+ 197+ at
a press co#fere#ce+ he poi#ted out that 0a&ista# dema#d was #ot co#ceded clearly
a#d the right of Muslims to self determi#atio# was also de#ied, -hese proposals were
therefore rejected .y the Muslim Aeague, ?i##ah critici=ed the "ritish %over#me#t
a#d !o#gress party for a#other rou#d of #egotiatio#s+ ig#ori#g the Muslim Aeague at
a later stage, Chat happe#ed was that !ripps wa#ted to give .e#efits eve# ha#di#g
over power to !o#gress 0arty a#d especially givi#g the defe#ce portfolio of TiceroyGs
cou#cil to his !o#gress frie#ds .ut he could #ot do so due to the Ticeroy+ the
comma#der i# !hief a#d !hurchillGs oppositio#, ?i##ah critici=ed the !o#gress
dema#d to ma&e revolutio#ary cha#ges i# the /#dia# co#stitutio# .ecause it would
have torpedoed the 0a&ista# Scheme a#d dema#ded that "ritish %over#me#t should
first settle the case for 0a&ista# a#d the# proceed to frame the co#stitutio#
accordi#gly, %a#dhi was also critici=ed for #ot eve# accepti#g the remote a#d veiled
recog#itio# of 0a&ista# i# the draft declaratio# prese#ted .y !ripps,
/# the mea#time+ <ajagopalachariya+ !o#gress leader of Madras spo#sored two
resolutio#s i# his Madras legislature+ first recomme#di#g the accepta#ce of 0a&ista#
dema#d so that #atio#al gover#me#t could .e joi#tly formed .y the !o#gress a#d
Muslim Aeague a#d the seco#d resolutio# to get permissio# of !o#gress party for
havi#g a coalitio# gover#me#t with the Muslim Aeague i# Madras, 4s a matter of fact
<ajaji was thi#&i#g i# the lo#g- term .asis suggesti#g the recog#itio# of 0a&ista#
dema#d with the hope that the Muslims would with the passage of time forget the
0a&ista# idea after havi#g esta.lish wor&i#g relatio#ship with the !o#gress 0arty, "ut
the !o#gress was #ot far cited e#ough to have reali=ed this deep thi#&i#g a#d the
result was that <ajaji a#d his associates were either e3pelled from the !o#gress
0arty or were as&ed to resig#, ?i##ah said that i# !o#gress opi#io#+ <ajaji had #ot
o#ly committed a crime .ut a si# i# favour of idea of partitio#V it was %a#dhiGs #ew
tech#i)ue to mislead his people, 4lthough !o#gress policy was #ot to give eve# the
slightest recog#itio# to 0a&ista# dema#d+ ?i##ah declared that more a#d more
recog#itio# of his 0a&ista# claim was #ow comi#g forth, Ove# the "ritish had #ow
cha#ged a ce#tury-old policy with regards to future co#stitutio# of /#dia .y admitti#g
domi#io#s i#stead of domi#io# a#d u#io#s i#stead of federatio#,
?i##ah &ept o# issui#g messages of Ipreparatio#s for all sacrificesJ i# the cause of
/slam a#d 0a&ista#+ givi#g war#i#gs that /slam a#d Muslims would .e elimi#ated
from /#dia if 0a&ista# was #ot created, H# B ?u#e+ he critici=ed %a#dhi for declari#g
that the u#ity a#d $i#du Muslim settleme#t could o#ly come after the achieveme#t of
/#diaGs i#depe#de#ceV %a#dhi had throw# off the cloa& that he had wor# for the last
years, -hat %a#dhi had .ee# .efooli#g the Muslims .ut at last had show# himself
i# his true colors, ?i##ah said that he &#ew all alo#g that %a#dhi #ever wa#ted to
settle $i#du-Muslim )uestio# e3cept o# his ow# terms of $i#du domi#atio#V that
%a#dhi alo#e had dashed Muslims hopes whe#ever there was a cha#ce of agreeme#t
a#d #ow he was prese#ti#g his Kuit /#dia formulaV %a#dhi always &ept a loop whole
.ut i# a# orderly ma##er, -hose who u#derstood %a#dhiGs la#guage &#ew it very well
that he wa#ted the "ritish gover#me#t to accept that !o#gress mea#t /#dia a#d
%a#dhi mea#t the !o#gress party a#d therefore the "ritish should come to terms
with him as the sole spo&esma# represe#ti#g every party i# /#dia regardi#g the
tra#sfer of power,
?i##ah said that %a#dhi wa#ted to create !o#gress <aj with "ritish force a#d to
domi#ate Muslims a#d other mi#oritiesV .oth %a#dhi a#d 'ehru were i#dulgi#g i#
sloga#s o#ly, 'ehru had made it )uite clear that he was #ot prepared to discuss the
issue of 0a&ista# #or was he prepared to discuss the commu#al issues u#til /#diaGs
i#depe#de#ce was achieved, 'ehru had made it clear that those who were tal&i#g of
0a&ista# were .efooli#g the peopleV a#d the Muslim Aeague had #o co#structive
program, "ut ?i##ah declared that #othi#g was goi#g to move Muslims from their
declared purpose of achievi#g 0a&ista#, /# his discussio#s with <ajaji+ he had
declared that o#ly way that "ritish could do justice was to ha#d over Muslim
homela#ds to Muslims a#d $i#du homela#ds to $i#dus, -his would cause little
amou#t of trou.le a#d frictio#, 0a&ista# scheme was just a#d reaso#a.le for .oth
$i#dus a#d Muslims, -he !o#gress proposal for u#ited /#dia was a $i#du <aj over
hu#dred millio# Muslims, -hat the Muslims were a #atio# a#d they i#sisted upo# their
rights as a #atio# .ei#g ac&#owledgedV that the $i#dus would reco#cile themselves
withi# a few mo#ths if partitio# was impleme#ted, /t was more favoura.le to them
.ecause i# this way+ they would have received the gover#me#t of three-fourth of
/#dia whereas the Muslims would have o#ly o#e-fourth of the cou#try, ?i##ah said
that !o#gress sloga#s of i#depe#de#ce+ freedom a#d #atio#al gover#me#t were
#othi#g more tha# empty words, -he !o#gress had #ever give# a#y solid form of
co#stitutio# o# which they wa#ted to setup a# all /#dia ;#ited !e#tral %over#me#t,
$e said that the Muslims had the e3perie#ce of @ mo#ths of !o#gress rule #ot lo#g
ago u#der the 1939 4ct, 6uri#g !o#gress rule+ every effort was made to suppress
la#guage+ customs a#d culture of the Muslims, /# educatio#al i#stitutio#s+ which were
o#ly uslims+ stude#ts were pressuri=ed to use te3t .oo&s prescri.ed .y the !o#gress
gover#me#t emphasi=i#g o# $i#du !ulture a#d .elittli#g the Muslims i# ma#y ways,
$e poi#ted out that Muslims had their disti#ctive culture+ la#guage+ literature+ art+
architecture+ #ames+ #ome#clature+ values+ legal laws+ moral codes+ customs+
cale#dar+ history+ traditio#s+ attitudes a#d am.itio#sV that they had their ow# outloo&
o# life a#d off life a#d therefore+ .y all ca#o#s of i#ter#atio#al law+ they were a
#atio#,
$e said !o#gress had hegemo#y+ supremacy a#d domi#atio# with the help of "ritish,
-he "ritish would #ever .e forgive# if they tried to let dow# the Muslim commu#ity,
$e war#ed that #atio#al gover#me#t which !o#gress wa#ted to .e i#stalled+ would
try to sa.otage the 0a&ista# dema#d, $e remi#ded that the remotest recog#itio# of
0a&ista# dema#d .y !ripps proposal was descri.ed .y %a#dhi as Iwic&edJ, -his was
the first time u#der the "ritish rule i# /#dia that pri#cipal of 0a&ista# had .ee#
recog#i=ed .y the "ritish which was descri.ed as the .egi##i#g of the e#d, ?i##ah
was co#fide#t that the process of creatio# of 0a&ista# had .egu# a#d thought that
with determi#atio#+ patie#ce+ u#ity a#d discipli#e+ the Muslims would soo# ope# a
#ew chapter of history i# /#dia, $e wa#ted Muslim wome# a#d stude#ts+ to cooperate
i# this regard, $e was remi#di#g the stude#ts that pe#+ sword a#d eco#omic+
.a#&i#g+ commerce+ .oo& &eepi#g+ i#dustrial power W all &#owledge was #ecessary,
$e cited the e3ample of ?apa#+ imparti#g ech#ical a#d commercial educatio# to the
.oys 30 years ago, $e also remi#ded that whe# <ajaji was i# favour of accepti#g
0a&ista# dema#d+ %a#dhi had declared that 0a&ista# i# his opi#io# was a crime a#d
si#V all /#dia !o#gress committee had also rejected <ajajiGs i#itiative completely
tur#i#g dow# a#y idea of 0a&ista#, 'ehru had also made it clear that he was #ot
prepared eve# to discuss 0a&ista# scheme a#d called it a moc&ery, /# his press
i#terview at Aahore March+ 197+ ?i##ah refuted the charges that Muslims had
pla##ed to esta.lish 0a&ista# through the "ritish help, $e said that Iwe depe#ded
upo# #o.ody e3cept ourselves for the achieveme#t of our goal a#d that Muslim /#dia
was ready a#d willi#g to face every )uarter a#d o.stacle that may comeJ,
H# 4ugust+ 197+ ?i##ah declared that the Kuit /#dia moveme#t of !o#gress had
a# o.jective to get the co#trol of /#dia# admi#istratio# a#d destroy the 0a&ista#
dema#dV that %a#dhi a#d his !o#gress party were .lac&maili#g the "ritish a#d
coerci#g them to accept a system of gover#me#t to tra#sfer power that would
esta.lish $i#du <aj u#der the "ritish .ayo#et+ there.y placi#g the Muslims a#d
others at the mercy of !o#gress <aj o#ce agai#, $e said whe# %a#dhi had failed as
a# advisor to the "ritish+ he .ecame a coercer, $e poi#ted out that %a#dhi could #ot
.ear the remotest idea of separatio# u#der the 0a&ista# scheme+ .ecause all those
who favoured the idea of separatio# were e3pelled from the !o#gress party or were
as&ed to resig# from the !o#gress party, $e said that hu#dred millio# Muslims stood
for 0a&ista# dema#d a#d will #ever su.mit to $i#du raj a#d remi#ded the "ritish that
u#der their declaratio# of 4ugust 1970+ the "ritish gover#me#t was .ou#d to co#sult
the Muslims with regard to future co#stitutio#al adva#ce i# /#dia leadi#g eve#tually
to the tra#sfer of power, $e rejected the !o#gress argume#t that #o agreeme#t was
possi.le .etwee# Muslims a#d $i#dus as lo#g as the "ritish were i# /#dia, $e
repeated that the o.ject of the !o#gress was .y hoo& or croo& to .ri#g a.out a
situatio# i# /#dia that will destroy the 0a&ista# schemeV however he declared that the
Muslims would #ot remai# spectators a#y more,
H# 10 august 197+ he said that )uic&est way to achieve freedom of all the people of
/#dia was .y accepti#g the 0a&ista# scheme .y agreeme#t, $e advised to the
Muslims to &eep away from !o#gress moveme#t a#d co#ti#ue their #ormal life
peacefully, $e war#ed the !o#gress #ot to pressuri=e+ i#terfere+ harass or pic&et the
MuslimsV he also said that the Muslims would o#ly joi# provisio#al gover#me#t if a
declaratio# accepti#g the pri#ciple of 0a&ista# dema#d was issued .y the "ritish
gover#me#t, $e repeated that all parties should agree a#d guara#tee the rights of
the Muslims especially .y recog#i=i#g their right to self determi#atio#V that eve#
u#der the stress of war emerge#cy+ they would #ot accept a#y proposal that would
prejudice the 0a&ista# dema#d, -hat the Muslim Aeague had #ever put forward a#y
dema#d which could .e characteri=ed as u#reaso#a.leV that there could .e #o
compromise o# the )uestio# of right to self determi#atio# of Muslims #atio#V it is
their i#here#t .irthright a#d to de#y that was to de#y their very e3iste#ce,
$e also poi#ted out that the Muslims cou#tries li&e 4fgha#ista#+ /ra#+ /ra) a#d -ur&ey
were i# full sympathy with the 0a&ista# dema#d a#d that #ewspapers i# those
cou#tries were supporti#g the 0a&ista# scheme a#d that i# case of co#flict .etwee#
Muslims a#d the "ritish+ these cou#tries would support the Muslims, /# his message+
he remi#ded his critics that Muslims had come to /#dia as co#)uerors+ traders+
preachers a#d teachers a#d .rought with them their ow# culture+ civili=atio# a#d
esta.lished mighty empires a#d .uilt-up great civili=atio#s, -hey reformed a#d
remodeled the /#dia# su.co#ti#e#t, -hat hu#dred millio# Muslims of /#dia
represe#ted the largest compact .ody of Muslim populatio# i# a#y si#gle part of the
world, -hey had their ow# #atio#al culture a#d civili=atio# disti#ct from others, -he
Muslims stood for complete i#depe#de#ce a#d e)uality of all #atio#s, Muslim /#dia
was desti#ed to play a part as a powerful factor i# the world struggle that was goi#g
o# as well as future #ew world order a#d postwar peace settleme#ts of the world,
-he Muslims of /#dia were determi#ed to esta.lish their ow# i#depe#de#t a#d
sovereig# states where they were #o less tha# @0 millio#s+ which were their
homela#ds a#d where they were i# a majority, $e appealed to the Muslims to solidly
sta#d .y their goal of 0a&ista# that was a matter of life a#d death for them a#d the
future desti#y of Muslims /#dia a#d that if they did #ot achieve 0a&ista# they would
perish i# the world, $e critici=ed the people who were prese#ti#g #ew schemes i#
order to divert the Muslim mi#d from their 0a&ista# dema#dV ?i##ah did #ot approve
of a#y other scheme such as Sir Si&a#darGs formula for commu#al settleme#t, $e
descri.ed this moveme#t as &ite flyi#g i# /#dia,
H# 'ovem.er+ 197+ prese#ti#g a# address at Muslim ;#iversity+ 4ligarh+ ?i##ah
said that %a#dhi had hit upo# the Kuit /#dia sloga# without co#sulti#g a#y other
party a#d with the aim to side trac& the issue of 0a&ista#V he said Kuit /#dia
Moveme#t was #ot o#ly a war agai#st the "ritish .ut also could lead to a civil war+
that was destructive of Muslim civil rights, $e said that for last o#e thousa#d years+
the $i#dus had #ot ruled a#y part of /#diaV that 0a&ista# proposal co#cedes to them
three-fourth of /#diaV they were advised to gra. three-fourth a#d esta.lish their
$i#du <aj a#d leave o#e-fourth for the MuslimsV that Muslim /#dia will cooperate with
the "ritish a#d with the !o#gress o#ly o# e)ual footi#g a#d #ot as a# i#ferior party,
$e said that some $i#du leaders had #ow .egu# to reali=e that 0a&ista# offered the
.est solutio# a#d that it was #ow a reality,
$e also remar&ed that the Muslims had #ow fou#d o#e esse#tial grou#d a#d a
rallyi#g poi#t for themselves a#d that was 0a&ista#, ;,S, 0reside#t <oosevelt
declared that the 4tla#tic !harter was applica.le to whole of huma#ity+ .ut we did
#ot sta#d i# #eed of 4tla#tic !harter+ Muslims had their ow# !harter that was the
!harter for 0a&ista#V that they were i# the are#a reaso#i#g+ #egotiatio#s+ discussio#s
leadi#g to a peaceful settleme#t, -here could #ever .e justice to a#y.ody for a#
i#defi#ite period, 'o#-Muslims had #othi#g to fear from Muslims .ecause it was i#
the .lood of Muslims to .e just a#d fair to every.odyV #o.ody could say to Muslims
to )uit /#diaV their call was just a#d they would wi#,
4ddressi#g Muslim Stude#ts !o#fere#ce o# 19 'ovem.er+ 197+ he dema#ded that
the "ritish gover#me#t should issue a declaratio# guara#teei#g the Muslim dema#d
for 0a&ista#V they should give a pledge that they were ready to recog#i=e the right of
Muslims to esta.lish their sovereig# states i# =o#es where they were i# majority
which would .e decided .y Muslim ple.iscite, -here could the# .e a provisio#al
gover#me#t with all parties to cooperate with the same, <egardi#g the Si&h
apprehe#sio#s he poi#ted out that the $i#du-Muslim )uestio# was a# all /#dia o#e+
.ut the Si&h-Muslim )uestio# was a )uestio# .etwee# 0a&ista# a#d Si&hs, H# 1@
'ovem.er+ Sir 'a=im-ud-6i# also added that the Si&h commu#ity was #ot give# a
voice .y the !o#gress party a#d #o i#flue#ce i# the wor&i#g committee of that
political party whereas i# the 0u#ja.+ duri#g the last 0 years+ there had .ee# always
a Si&h represe#tative i# the 0u#ja. !a.i#et a#d they were havi#g a# effective voice
i# shapi#g policy of the 0u#ja. gover#me#t, /# the federal gover#me#t of #orth
wester# 0a&ista# the Si&hs could #ot .e ig#ored, 4 few days later he said that this
solem# declaratio# a#d solem# assura#ce would treat mi#orities #ot o#ly i# the
ma##er that a civili=ed gover#me#t should treat them .ut .etter .ecause it was a#
i#ju#ctio# i# the Kura# to treat the mi#orities i# a much .etter way,
0u#ja. 0remier+ Sir Si&a#dar $ayat Lha#+ gave a speech i# Ayallpur sessio# of the
Muslim Aeague+ 'ovem.er 197+ i# which he said that he had .ee# supporti#g the
Muslim Aeague right from 193@ Auc&#ow sessio# a#d fully supported the Aahore
resolutio# of the Muslim Aeague a#d his #ew formula 10u#ja. formula2 was #ot
agai#st the spirit of Aahore resolutio#, ?i##ah also poi#ted out that i# #ear future+
oppo#e#ts of the 0a&ista# scheme would give up their i#trigues+ mecha#i=atio# a#d
ma#euveri#g, $e assured them that if they e3ami#ed the 0a&ista# dema#d ho#estly+
dispassio#ately a#d i# fair#ess a#d justice+ he had #o dou.t that they would also
come to the co#clusio# that it was the o#ly solutio# of /#diaGs comple3 pro.lems a#d
the o#ly method of e#a.li#g the two #atio#s to live happily i# peace a#d frie#dship,
$e war#ed that Ithe $i#dus could #ever .e a.le to rule over the Muslims a#d they
should give up their dreams of esta.lishi#g $i#du <aj, !o#cludi#g+ he said Iif you did
#ot what was due to you+ let me have what was due to me, /f you do #ot+ / will ta&e
itJ,
4 few days later+ i# his press co#fere#ce+ he critici=ed the !o#gress decisio# to lau#ch
a re.ellio# agai#st the "ritish %over#me#t, $e war#ed that the !o#gress decisio#
was mea#i#gless a#d impossi.le to impleme#t a#d there was #o way out of the
political deadloc&, -hat the !o#gress wa#ted the "ritish to .ow to the !o#gress
wishes a#d if they did #ot drop pistol+ there was #o cha#ce of #egotiatio#s, $e said
that he was #ot ready to postpo#e the )uestio# of 0a&ista#, $e said that tra#sfer of
power was su.ject to the agreeme#ts a#d adjustme#ts .etwee# the major political
parties o# the .asis of e)uality a#d the right of Muslims to self determi#atio# a#d a#
agreeme#t to give effect to the 0a&ista# dema#d whe# the partitio# was carried out,
$e said that it was #ot the first time i# history that the territoriesX.orders would .e
redraw#V it had .ee# do#e earlier also, $e was #ot prepared to discuss i# details such
as the redistri.utio# of 0u#ja.Gs ou#daries,
"ei#g philosophical 9+ 6ec, 197+ he said Ithe positio# of Muslim /#dia duri#g the
last 00 years has .ee# that of a ship without a rudder a#d without a captai#+
floati#g o# the high seas full of roc&s, *or 00 years it remai#ed floati#g+ damaged+
disorga#i=ed+ demorali=ed+ still floati#g, /# 1936 with the cooperatio# of ma#y others
we salvaged the ship, -oday the ship has a wo#derful rudder a#d a captai# who is
willi#g to serve a#d always to serve, /ts e#gi#es are i# prefect wor&i#g order a#d it
has got its loyal crew a#d
officers, /# the course of the last five years it has tur#ed i#to .attleshipJ,
Spea&i#g of the reward of those who have ceaselessly wor&ed for Muslims+ Mr, ?i##ah
said5
"-he greatest reward is that today there is Muslim u#ity a#d solidarity, -he Muslims
are today spea&i#g with o#e voice, >ou have #ot o#ly a flag a#d a goal+ .ut also a
platform, / ve#ture to say that there is #o other commu#ity i# this su.co#ti#e#t
which is more orga#i=ed tha# Muslims today," Aet us tha#&V %od for it, Ce have to
forge our ow# charter Q #ot the 4tla#tic !harter, "ut it is 0a&ista#, 0a&ista# is there,
Ce have o#ly to ta&e it, Ce have to prepare ourselves for every sacrifice, Ce have
wor&ed o#ly for five years, /f we wor& with the same spirit / have #o dou.t that
0a&ista# will .e achieved soo#er tha# we may have a#ticipated, Muslim /#dia# today
is e#tirely differe#t from what it was five years ago,"
/# the mea#time+ Ticeroy Aord Cavell a#d secretary of state also added his share i#to
the trou.les of Kuaid-i-4=am ?i##ah a#d his dema#d for 0a&ista# .y supporti#g the
co#cept of /#diaGs geographical u#ity, ?i##ah u#dau#tedly critici=ed .oth the Ticeroy
a#d the secretary of State said IChile Mr, 4mery was e#gaged i# the research of
/#dia# history a#d preached u#ited /#dia+ we fi#d that the Ticeroy+ Aord Ai#lithgow+
has sudde#ly discovered almost seve# years after his stay here that /#dia is
geographically o#e, Chat does this i#dicate to a#y i#tellige#t ma#? -he $i#du
Mahasa.ha .y its 4&ha#d $i#dusta# resolutio# which it adopted at !aw#pore has
made a #ew year prese#t to the "ritish die-hards,'ullifyi#g the TiceroyGs support for
!o#gress sta#ce a#d also .oosti#g Muslim moral+ ?i##ah said that Muslim should
wor& for the collective good of their people a#d for a higher a#d #o.ler cause,
0a&ista# dema#d aimed at it a#d if we stood u#ited+ a#d faithful to our cause+ the
time was #ot far off whe# the Muslims would achieve their goal a#d prove themselves
worthy of their wo#derful a#d glorious past, $e said that the Muslims were
determi#ed to achieve their goal that is 0a&ista# a#d that #o power o# earth could
preve#t them from attai#i#g that goal, $e said that the day was #ot far away whe#
the Muslim will have their ow# capital,
'e3t mo#th 1o# 7 4pril+ 19732+ ?i##ah poi#ted out that Muslims were co#fro#ted .y
a# overwhelmi#g $i#du majority+ therefore+ they were #aturally afraid that after
.ei#g released from the "ritish yo&e+ might i# their case result i# e#slaveme#t to the
$i#dus, -his fear was #ot to .e ridiculed, $e )uoted #o#e other tha# Maula#a
Muhammad 4li who had .ee# a right ha#d ma# of %a#dhi sayi#g that %a#dhi was
wor&i#g u#der the i#flue#ce of commu#alist $i#du Mahasa.ha, $e i#dicated that the
Mahasa.ha a#d !o#gress age#da are the same, "oth orga#i=atio#s were fighti#g for
the supremacy of $i#duism a#d su.mersio# of MuslimsV %a#dhi #ever co#sulted the
Muslim commu#ity o# the )uestio# of starti#g civil diso.edie#ce moveme#t, $e
wa#ted to pass over the head of the /#dia# Muslim !ommu#ity, Muslims had .ee#
oppressed a#d persecuted .y the $i#du majority i# the last te# years .ut %a#dhi
#ever tried to improve matters or co#dem#ed $i#du terrorism agai#st Muslims, $e
#ever de#ou#ced the moveme#ts li&e Shuddhi a#d Sa#ghatham which ope#ly aimed
at a##ihilatio# of Muslims a#d /slam i# /#dia, $e repudiated a#d .ro&e dow# the
Madras $i#duMuslim agreeme#tV #ow Muslims had #o optio# .ut to follow the
Kura#ic teachi#gs to through the treaties a#d agreeme#ts o# $i#du commu#ity,
?i##ah said %a#dhi occupied the same positio# amo#g !o#gress as held .y Mussoli#i
amo#g fascists+ $itler amo#g 'a=is a#d Stallo#e amo#g commu#istsV that the
!o#gress as it stood was co#stituted a#d created .y %a#dhi,
H# B May 1973+ ?i##ah said that some respo#si.le leaders told him that %a#dhi #ow
reali=ed that he had made a mista&e a#d that he would .e prepared to reco#sider his
positio# if he was give# a# opportu#ity a#d also that he had cha#ged his attitude
towards the 0a&ista# scheme a#d would .e willi#g to come to a settleme#t o# the
.asis of 0a&ista# .ut the "ritish %over#me#t were preve#ti#g $i#du-Muslim
settleme#t .y refusi#g the people of high stature to esta.lish co#tacts with him for
this purpose, ?i##ah suggested that %a#dhi should write to him sayi#g that he had
a.a#do#ed his previous sta#ce a#d was willi#g to come to a# agreeme#t o# the .asis
of 0a&ista# dema#d the# the Muslim Aeague would .e willi#g to .ury the past, ?i##ah
declared that gover#me#t will #ot ma&e a#y attempt to stop a letter from %a#dhi
reachi#g him as the leader of Muslim Aeague, Muslim Aeague leader was always o#
the move doi#g e3cessive hard wor& #ot eve# cari#g a.out his poor health to the
e3te#t that he visited far flu#g a#d remotest areas i# "aluchista# a#d *ro#tier
provi#ce, $e appealed to the "aluchi people to sta#d u#ited a#d to ma&e efforts to
achieve the cherished goal which was 0a&ista#, 'o power could deprive you off your
right, $e said that "aluchista# although was a small a#d .ac&ward provi#ce+ it was
most importa#t part of his 0a&ista# scheme a#d whe# 0a&ista# was achieved+
"aluchista# will play a# importa#t part i# that /slamic &i#gdom, $e remi#ded the
people of "aluchista# that i# 19@-B+ he formulated Ifourtee# poi#tsJ a#d o#e of
the poi#ts was that "aluchista# should .e give# a status at power with other /#dia#
provi#ces a#d should .e give# same co#sideratio# a#d .e .rought o# the same
footi#g as other provi#ces of /#dia, $e said Mussalma#s had #ow u#derstood what
0a&ista# mea#t .ut there were age#ts of our political oppo#e#ts who were
deli.erately misleadi#g our people, "y achievi#g 0a&ista# every.ody u#derstood that
the Muslims would achieve i#depe#de#ce a#d would #ot .e domi#ated .y $i#du raj
or their powerful ce#tral gover#me#tV the mi#ority provi#ces Muslims were happy
that their .rothers i# the #orth-west =o#e will have their ow# $a&umat,
H# 10 ?uly+ 1973+ i# a pu.lic speech i# 0ashee#+ he declared that the 0atha#s of
"aluchista# area had do#e wo#ders duri#g the last three years a#d if they co#ti#ued
to wor& with the same spirit+ the# he assured that time was #ot far off whe# 0a&ista#
would .e a reality, $e said that there was a wide awa&e#i#g amo#gst the people of
"aluchista#,
-hey had fully reali=ed the positio# i# which they were placed, $e as&ed them to
forget their petty differe#ces a#d u#ite u#der the flag of Muslim Aeague for the
achieveme#t of their cherished goal of 0a&ista#, ?i##ah also co#veyed a similar
message to the 0atha#s of fro#tier sayi#g that the eyes of the Muslim /#dia were
loo&i#g at their respo#se .ecause every Muslim of /#dia had a great faith i# the
0atha#s a#d .elieved that they will .e the u#co#)uera.le soldiers of /slam li&e the
u#co#)uera.le roc&s of the *ro#tier provi#ce a#d through their efforts+ /slam i# /#dia
would .e a.le to revive its glorious past,
/t was followed up .y his Oid message highlighti#g that hu#dred millio# Muslims of
the su.co#ti#e#t have a great history a#d past a#d the Muslims should prove worthy
of their past .y .ri#gi#g a.out true re#aissa#ce a#d revive its glory a#d sple#dor that
Muslim /#dia will #ot rest u#til they had achieved cherished goal of 0a&ista#V they will
wor& for it+ live for it+ a#d if #ecessary+ die for it, $e appealed them to vote for
Muslim Aeague ca#didates i# comi#g electio#s, ?i##ah was attac&ed .y a Lha&sar
duri#g this period .ut he gave message to his followers to co#ce#trate their e#ergies
i# wi##i#g the electio#s which were .ei#g fought o# the .asis of 0a&ista#, /t may .e
#oted that eve#
faci#g a# assassi#+ ?i##ah .ehaved with a remar&a.le dig#ity, 4#d i# the mea#time+
givi#g a# i#terview+ he said that 0a&ista# was a# i#dispe#si.le co#ditio# of a#y
settleme#t .etwee# !o#gress a#d Muslim Aeague, $e declared that he had the
support of the 99Y of the Muslims of /#dia as proved i# the rece#t .i-electio#s, $e
dema#ded that 0a&ista# should .e .rought i#to operatio# without delay, $e
co#fide#tly declared that Aord Cavell would #ot .e a.le to hi#der the creatio# of
0a&ista#V two states must .e esta.lished+ the Muslim state of the #orth with a
populatio# of B0 millio# a#d $i#du state of south with 90 millio#,
4ddressi#g the a##ual sessio# of Muslim Aeague at Larachi+ i# 6ecem.er+ 1973+ he
declared that Muslims had made a remar&a.le progress over the years a#d #ow they
were impressi#g upo# the "ritish gover#me#t to divide a#d )uit, $e said that the
"ritish 0rime Mi#ister+ !hurchill+ had declared that he did #ot .ecome prime mi#ister
to li)uidate the "ritish empireV .ut he must .e told that the volu#tary li)uidatio# was
more ho#ora.le tha# compulsory li)uidatio# a#d that "ritish empire would have to .e
li)uidated o#e day whether+ !hurchill li&ed it or #ot, $e was co#fide#t that #either the
$i#dus #or !o#gress party #or "ritish with all diplomacy would #ot .e a.le to preve#t
the creatio# of 0a&ista#, H# 10 March+ 1977+ ?i##ah said 0a&ista# was #ot the
product of co#duct or misco#duct of $i#dusV it has always .ee# there o#ly the
Muslims were #ot co#scious of it, $i#dus a#d Muslims although livi#g i# the same
#eigh.orhood+ tow#s a#d villages a#d #ever .ee# a.le to .le#d i#to o#e #atio#, -hey
were always two separate e#tities, $e said that 0a&ista# started the mome#t the first
#o#-Muslim was co#verted i#to /slam, -his happe#ed lo#g .efore the Muslims
esta.lished their rule over /#dia, 4s soo# as a $i#du em.raced /slam+ he was outcast
#ot o#ly religiously .ut also socially+ culturally a#d eco#omically, -hroughout the
ages+ $i#dus had remai#ed $i#dus a#d the Muslims had remai#ed Muslims a#d they
had #ot merged i#to o#e e#tityV a#d that was the .asis for 0a&ista#, $e said that
every Mussalma# was the author of 0a&ista#, 'ow the )uestio# was how to create it
W #ot .y as&i#g+ #ot .y .eggi#g+ #ot eve# .y sayi#g prayers .ut .y wor&i#g with
trust i# %od, $e co#fide#tly declared that /#shallah 0a&ista# was #ow i# our ha#ds,
9 March+ 1977+ i# his 4ligarh Muslim ;#iversity address+ he said that Aord Cavell was
fishi#g i# the !o#gress waters, $e critici=ed Ticeroy for appeasi#g the 0u#dits of
4&ha#d $i#dusta#+ declari#g that divisio# of /#dia was i#evita.le+ .le#di#g of $i#dus
a#d Mussalma# was impossi.le a#d 0a&ista# was a certai#tyV it was futile a#d u#wise
for the "ritish to delay the creatio# of 0a&ista#, $e said that Muslim Aeague was the
authoritative a#d represe#tative orga#i=atio# of Muslim /#dia, Ticeroy a#d %a#dhi
performed the fu#eral of Muslim Aeague .ut we were saved .y the %od, Muslims had
esta.lished their charter of 0a&ista# a#d they did #ot #eed a#y other charter, -he
Muslims did #ot wa#t a#y lesso# i# geography+ or history, ?i##ah said that he was
as&ed to .ecome 0rime Mi#ister of %reat ;#ited /#dia .ecause the &ey to the
situatio# was i# his ha#ds, -he pla##i#g committee of MA will ma&e a scie#tific study
a#d survey of 0a&ista# areas to fi#d out what #atural mi#eral wealth 0a&ista# areas
co#tai#ed a#d what was the scope of various i#dustries i# these areas, -hey wa#ted
)ualified tech#icia#s+ scie#tists a#d e3perts who could help .uildup eco#omic a#d
i#dustrial life of 0a&ista# =o#es,,
$e critici=ed TiceroyGs sloga# of geographical u#ity, $e said viceroy had failed
.ecause he had disregarded the dema#ds of Muslim /#dia a#d .ecause he had go#e
out of his way to please the philosophers of 4&ha#d $i#dusta#, Muslim /#dia deeply
helped him to wi# the war+ it was esse#tial for the viceroy to have co#ceded 0a&ista#
dema#d .ecause the divisio# of /#dia was i#evita.le, $e said the Muslim Aeague was
#ot stro#g e#ough to see that #o mecha#i=atio# succeeded, ?i##ah discussed the
form of gover#me#t+ 0a&ista# was goi#g to have .y sayi#g that people were
co#fusi#g .y as&i#g a.out the form of gover#me#t whether 0a&ista# will have a
democratic+ social or #atio#alist form of gover#me#t, -hese issues were raised to
hoodwi#& Muslims at prese#t+ they stood .y 0a&ista# o#lyV it mea#t that they had to
ta&e possessio# of a territory first+ .ecause 0a&ista# could #ot e3ist i# the air, Che#
we had ta&e# possessio# of our homela#d o#ly the# the )uestio# would arise as to
what form of gover#me#t we were goi#g to esta.lish, $e did #ot allow Muslim mi#d
to .e diverted .y these sidetrac&i#g ideas, $e appreciated that ma#y O#glishme# a#d
$i#dus had show# reali=atio# that the effective solutio# of commu#al pro.lem was to
divide /#dia i#to $i#dusta# a#d 0a&ista#, -his was the .est solutio# of the /#diaGs
pro.lem .ecause the truth was daw#i#g more a#d more clearly o# the mi#ds of the
$i#dus, Cith the passage of time+ the oppo#e#ts of 0a&ista# scheme would reali=e
that 0a&ista# was really more .e#eficial to the $i#dus tha# the Muslims, -he $i#dus
had .ee# o.sessed with the ideas of esta.lishi#g u#ited ce#tral gover#me#t over the
whole of /#dia+ which they should have &#ow# was a# impossi.ility, -he good thi#g
was that this o.sessio# was #ow slowly fadi#g away a#d it was hoped that it would
.e &#oc&ed out of their mi#ds altogether,
?i##ah also critici=ed the si#ister moves a#d )uestio#s such as the classificatio# of
casts a#d sects i# /slam, $e said /slam did #ot recog#i=e a#y &i#d of disti#ctio# of
various classificatio#s a#d the 0rophet 10";$2 was a.le to level dow# all casts a#d
create #atio#al u#ity amo#g the 4ra.s, -hey wa#ted to destroy the curse of caste
system which had rui#ed the Muslim /#dia, -he Muslims were #ot goi#g to allow
a#yo#e to create disruptio#s of this &i#d, Hur .edroc& a#d sheet a#chor is /slamV
there was #o )uestio# of eve# Shias a#d Su##is, 4 little later+ he said that 0a&ista#
would give freedom for all religio#s a#d u#ity amo#g Muslims a#d complete toleratio#
was a# esse#tial co#ditio#+ precede#t to the achieveme#t of 0a&ista#, 4s lo#g as this
co#ditio# was #ot fulfilled+ they were #ot fit to get 0a&ista#, Ce were o#e #atio# a#d
we would .e a.le to achieve 0a&ista#V he also declared that the caste system was
respo#si.le for the slavery of /#dia, $e war#ed the commu#ists .y sayi#g that /slam
was their guide a#d complete code of life a#d they did #ot wa#t a#y ism, $e o#ce
agai# said that geography had .ee# altered i# the case of Sue= !a#al+ 0a#ama !a#al+
Spai#+ 0ortugal+ Swede#+ 'orway+ ;lster i# Oire a#d Suda# i# Ogypt W sayi#g that it
was o#ly a shooti#g refere#ce, $e as&ed Muslims to &eep o# marchi#g a#d marchi#g
forwardi#g with full determi#atio#,
H# March+ 1977+ he said that the Muslims were #earer to the reali=atio# to their
goal of 0a&ista# a#d the achieveme#t of their freedom tha# ever .eforeV for Muslims
0a&ista# mea#t their defe#se+ their delivera#ce a#d their desti#y, /t was the o#ly way
which would e#sure freedom a#d the mai#te#a#ce of Muslim ho#or a#d the glory of
/slam, -he fi#al victory depe#ded upo# the hard la.our that would .e putti#g forth,
$e visited 0u#ja. i# 4pril 1977+ a#d rejected the suggestio# that he should #ot have
carried out propaga#da for 0a&ista# i# the 0u#ja.+ .ecause 0u#ja. was with the
Muslim Aeague o#ly i# 4ll /#dia matters+ accordi#g to the Si&a#dar-?i##ah 0actV he
declared that his Muslim Aeague was fighti#g for the creatio# of 0a&ista# #ot o#
"om.ay .ut i# the 0u#ja.+ which was the cor#ersto#e of his proposed 0a&ista#i
State, $e a#ticipated that eve# the $i#dus who did #ot accept Muslim dema#d today
would do so i# future a#d he appreciated that the Si&h frie#ds had already .egu# to
appreciate Muslim view poi#t although they were #ot ready to e3press their feeli#gs
pu.licly,
$e said that some of the Si&h leaderGs policiessupporti#g ;#ited $i#dusta# was
impossi.le a#d could #ot .e accepted .y us #or it was i# their ow# i#terest, -hey
were completely misled .y outside age#cies who were poiso#i#g their mi#ds agai#st
0a&ista# dema#d, /# his press i#terview i# Aahore+ he declared that the chief mi#ister
of 0u#ja. a#d his mi#isters whole heartedly supported the 0a&ista# dema#d,
Spea&i#g i# ;rdu+ he declared that 0u#ja. held the &ey to 0a&ista#, $e ridiculed all
those who had raised the sloga#s 0u#ja. for 0u#ja.is a#d all those who were havi#g
divided loyalties, $e said that there could .e #o divided loyalties as far as Muslim
Aeague was co#cer#ed, Muslim Aeague was the custodia# a#d trusty of all i#terest
a#d classes that co#stituted the Muslim #atio#,
/# the mea#time Sardar Shau&at $ayat+ a mi#ister i# 0u#ja. !a.i#et+ was dismissed
.y %over#or 0u#ja. o# the recomme#datio# of the !hief Mi#ister+ Lhi=er
-iwa#a,?i##ah issued stateme#t sayi#g that -iwa#a had violated party discipli#e,
4ctually what happe#ed was that Sardar Shau&at $ayat had .ee# issui#g stateme#ts
a#d ma&i#g speeches i# favour of creatio# of 0a&ista# a#d he was war#ed .y
%over#or a#d !hief Mi#ister of 0u#ja. .ut he did #ot stop a#d co#ti#ued the
campaig# for 0a&ista#, Shau&at .ecame a martyr after his dismissal a#d the result
was that 0a&ista# Moveme#t gai#ed a treme#dous stre#gth a#d followi#g amo#gst
the Muslims, ?i##ah issued stateme#ts a#d made speeches critici=i#g 0u#ja. !hief
Mi#ster a#d populari=i#g the 0a&ista# dema#dV he appealed to every Muslim
orga#i=atio# i#cludi#g 4hrars to joi# the Muslim Aeague a#d support its program a#d
policies, $e advised the Muslims to .ury their past a#d wor& for their goal of 0a&ista#
for which the Muslim Aeague was carryi#g o# struggle,
<ajaji co#ti#ued his efforts to .ri#g a.out $i#du Muslim agreeme#tV he met %a#dhi
i# jail a#d got his approval for a formula &#ow# as the <ajaji formula, -he !o#gress
would accept the 0a&ista# dema#d i# pri#cipal a#d i# retur# the Muslim Aeague+ i#
retur#+ would cooperate with the !o#gress i# its dema#d for i#depe#de#ce a#d
i#terim gover#me#t for the tra#sitio#al period, -he fact of the matter was that .oth
<ajaji a#d %a#dhi were #ot serious i# accepti#g the 0a&ista# idea i# pri#cipal, "oth
<ajaji a#d %a#dhi were playi#g for time calculati#g that with the passage of time+ the
0a&ista# dema#d will fi==le out, -here was a series of letters .etwee# <ajaji+ %a#dhi
a#d ?i##ah a#d eve#tually tal&s .etwee# %a#dhi a#d ?i##ah were held from 09 to @
Septem.er+ 1977, 'o agreeme#t was co#cluded .etwee# the two leaders .ut the
accepta#ce of 0a&ista# dema#d .y %a#dhi a#d <ajaji i#vited a great deal of criticism+
especially i# the 0u#ja. a#d "e#gal, -he $i#du Mahasa.ha argued that the !o#gress
did #ot represe#t the $i#dus a#d /#dia# provi#ces did #ot .elo#g to %a#dhi or <ajajiV
a#d these leaders were #ot havi#g a#y authority to distri.ute /#dia# provi#ces as
they wished, Tarious political parties of the Si&hs critici=ed %a#dhi accepti#g the idea
of 0a&ista#,
$owever+ the 0a&ista# dema#d received a treme#dous .oost due to the discussio#+
correspo#de#ce .etwee# the leaders a#d the# the media coverage of this issue, *or
the first time+ the possi.le areas for the future state of 0a&ista# were discussed+
where.y ?i##ah dema#di#g all the majority Muslim provi#ces a#d accordi#g to <ajaji-
%a#dhi formula o#ly the areas where Muslims were i# a.solute majority were to .e
give# to 0a&ista#, ?i##ah a#d the Muslim Aeague were happy that he#ceforth the
settleme#t will .e o# the .asis of creatio# of 0a&ista#, Secret military+ i#tellige#ce
a#d !/6 reports a#aly=ed this situatio# sayi#g that due to the accepta#ce of 0a&ista#
dema#d+ !o#gress had severely damaged its relatio#ship with the Si&h commu#ity,
'ow the Mahasa.ha a#d the Si&hs feared that o#e day all the parties will accept the
0a&ista# dema#d, /# official circles+ it was co#veyed to viceroy .y the %over#or !0
a#d "erar that %a#dhi had co#veyed to Moo&erji that i# reality he had #o faith i#
0a&ista# a#d his approval of <ajaji formula was o#ly a matter of desira.ility a#d that
%a#dhiGs views o# partitio#+ Tivisectio# of /#dia a#d 0a&ista# scheme had #ot
cha#ged, H# the other ha#d ?i##ah did #ot have a#y faith left i# %a#dhiGs promises,
-he reality was that .oth leaders wa#ted to score poi#ts i# the art of diplomacy
.ecause there were pressures o# .oth ?i##ah a#d %a#dhi to have meeti#gs to sort
out their differe#ces e#di#g the political deadloc& .etwee# $i#dus a#d Muslims,
Hfficial circles fi#ally gave credit to ?i##ah for getti#g %a#dhiGs previous sta#ce
cha#ged i#to at least accepti#g the 0a&ista# dema#d i# pri#cipal, %over#or of Si#dh
had co#veyed to the Ticeroy that ?i##ah did #ot trust %a#dhi a#d &#ew that he had
#ot cha#ged his positio#s that he too& up two years ago,
6ailies such as -he Ohsa# a#d Dami#dar of Aahore gave captio#s readi#gV I%a#dhiji
accepts pri#cipal of 0a&ista# a#d Muslim AeagueGs glorious victory, !o#gress
eve#tually accepts 0a&ista# pri#cipalJ, Moo&erji of $i#du Mahasa.ha comme#ted that
%a#dhi should #ot have allowed his #ame to .e dragged i#to this ama=i#g offer which
was virtual accepta#ce of 0a&ista# ideaV that 0u.lic opi#io# should vigorously assert
itself a#d give i#dicatio# that u#der #o circumsta#ces a political settleme#t would .e
accepted which was .ased o# self destructive pri#cipal of 0a&ista# either of ?i##ah or
<ajajiGs .ra#d,
4#other top .rass Mahasa.ha leader+ Moo#je as&ed what right had the !o#gress to
settle the commu#al argume#t without securi#g the cooperatio# of $i#du
Mahasa.ha? !o#gress although claimi#g to represe#t the whole of /#dia did #ot a#d
could #ot represe#t either the $i#dus or the Muslims, "hai 0arama#a#d said that it
was most asto#ishi#g to fi#d a ma# of such determi#atio# as Mahatma %a#dhi should
have give# his co#se#t to <ajaji formula which was the first a#d far most importa#t
step towards the fulfillme#t of the scheme of partitio#i#g the cou#try,
?i##ah a#d Muslim Aeague were a.le to get treme#dous popularity after the %a#dhi-
?i##ah #egotiatio#sV ?i##ah+ i# his pu.lic address i# <awalpi#di+ @ ?uly+ 1977+ said
that he would .e a.le to co#vert .oth the "ritish %over#me#t a#d other $i#du 0arties
to his views a#d ma&e them agree to accept the 0a&ista# scheme, /t may .e #oted
that the Lha&sars were ma&i#g attempts to sa.otage his pu.lic addresses+ .ecause
he did #ot accept their i#vitatio# to ta&e salute from a co#ti#ge#t of local Lha&sars of
<awalpi#di a#d also that ?i##ah had #ot accepti#g their advice to have meeti#gs with
their leader a#d %a#dhi to sort out commu#al differe#ces .etwee# !o#gress a#d
Muslim Aeague, ?i##ah appreciated %a#dhi that at last he had accepted the pri#cipal
of 0a&ista# a#d the emai#i#g argume#t was that how a#d whe# this had to .e carried
out, ?i##ah said that he did #ot mi#d all vilificatio# a#d misi#terpretatio# a#d the
campaig# that was carried o# agai#st <ajajiGs proposal, $e also said that %a#dhi had
reali=ed that 1977 was #ot 1971,
'ow ?i##ah was fre)ue#tly repeati#g his stateme#ts o# 0a&ista# co#cludi#g that
I/#shaallah+ 0a&ista# was comi#g much earlier tha# a#ticipatedJ a#d also a#other
stateme#t repeated was that %a#dhi had accepted the pri#cipal of partitio# or
divisio# of /#diaJ, 4s regards the positio# of Si&h commu#ity+ he advised them #ot to
.e u#duly pertur.ed, $e as&ed them to give their proposals for #egotiatio#s with the
Muslim Aeague a#d also advised them #ot to put a#y o.structio# i# the way of
achievi#g 0a&ista# as they would .e i# a much .etter positio# i# 0a&ista# tha# i#
4&ha#d $i#dusta#, $e repeated his stateme#t eve# i# his press co#fere#ce that he
did #ot dispute that the Si&hs were a #atio#V that they should give the Muslim
Aeague their co#sidered dema#ds a#d must forget what had happe#ed i# the past
.etwee# two commu#ities suggesti#g to have a fresh start,
-o co#clude+ due to Kuaid-i-4=am ?i##ahGs effort+ the partitio# dema#d of the Muslim
Aeague .ecame a major issue i# /#dia# politics si#ce the 0a&ista# resolutio# was
passed, Muslim Aeague leader very successfully+ persuaded the "ritish gover#me#t to
recog#i=e the 0a&ista# dema#d+ while discussi#g co#stitutio#al adva#ce i# /#dia,
/t may .e me#tio#ed that "ritish 0rime Mi#ister !hurchill had refused to give a#y
ge#erous treatme#t to /#dia u#der the 4tla#tic !harterV he si#cerely .elieved that he
had #ot .ecome the "ritish 0rime Mi#ister to preside over the li)uidatio# of "ritish
Ompire, /t was duri#g his te#ure that "ritish %over#me#t had to recog#i=e the
pri#ciple of separatio#, Sir Stafford !ripps who had .ee# a great supporter of
!o#gress cause had to cha#ge his mi#d .y accepti#g the pri#ciple of separatio#,
?i##ah &ept o# addi#g to the stre#gth of the 0a&ista# Moveme#t ma&i#g very difficult
to ig#ore his dema#d for 0a&ista#, Che# the !o#gress lau#ched its Kuit /#dia
moveme#t pressuri=i#g the "ritish to leave /#dia as a u#ited a#d i#depe#de#t
cou#try+ ?i##ah descri.ed this moveme#t as a war agai#st the Muslim Aeague a#d
Muslim /#dia, Che# <ajaji a#d %a#dhi approached ?i##ah for #egotiatio#s+ they were
as&ed to accept the fu#dame#tals of 0a&ista# resolutio# first a#d the# proceed to
settle the matter i# details, ?i##ah dema#ded that 0a&ista# scheme .e recog#i=ed
.efore /#dia# i#depe#de#ceV %a#dhi was ready to accept this after /#dia .ecame
i#depe#de#t, /# summary+ from !ripps Missio# to %a#dhi-?i##ah tal&s+ ?i##ah was
a.le to i#crease his prestige a#d was a.le to treme#dously adva#ce the cause of his
partitio# dema#d or the case for 0a&ista#,
88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 88
8888
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
"egi#s
"illa 1-uesday+ ?uly 09+ 0112+ $e##a Lha# 1*riday+ Hcto.er 17+ 0112+ S>O64
S4"4$4- 1-uesday+ May 31+ 0112
#6
Wednesday, June 08, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
199A-96 1lections and "a!istan;;;;
199A-96 1lections and "a!istan6 "unjabBs "ivotal %ole
"y
Sharif al Mujahi
-he 1979-76 electio#s were .y far the most critical o#es at all levels i# all the a##als
of su.co#ti#e#tal history, -he first Simla !o#fere#ce had .ro&e# dow# o# 17 ?uly
1979 o# the co#troversial issue of the 4ll /#dia Muslim Aeague 14/MA2Gs
represe#tative character+ a#d Kuaid-i-4=am Mohammad 4li ?i##ah 11B@6-197B2 was
)uic& to dema#d a refere#ce to the electorate to .uttress his Idemo#stratio# of
imperious stre#gth at SimlaJ, -his demo#stratio#+ to )uote $, T, $odso#+ former
<eforms !ommissio#er 11971-72 a#d author of the most authoritative "ritish
accou#t of the %reat 6ivide+ Iwas a shot i# the arm for the Aeague a#d a serious
.low to its Muslim oppo#e#ts+ especially i# the 0u#ja.J,
!learly+ ?i##ahGs Simla strategy we#t e3tremely well with Muslims, /#deed+ Simla
e#dowed the Aeague with a treme#dous psychological .oost over#ight+ perhaps as
much as Auc&#ow 1193@2 a#d Aahore 119702 had do#e earlier, ?i##ah+ a strategist
with a# acute se#se of timi#g+ sei=ed the mome#t to call for ge#eral electio#s+ so
that the AeagueGs claim to .ei#g Muslim /#diaGs authoritative .ody a#d his claim to
.ei#g its sole spo&esma# get validated+ o#ce a#d for all+ at the husti#gs, *ortuitously
though+ Sir Stafford !ripps 11BB9-1992+ the /#dia e3pert i# the #ew+ postwar Aa.our
gover#me#t+ also urged the holdi#g of fresh electio#s+ if o#ly Ito e3pedite the mea#s
of arrivi#g at a perma#e#t settleme#tJ, %e#eral electio#s+ thus+ for wi#ter 1979-76,
'ot i#e3plica.ly though+ the two critical issues at sta&e were5 1i2 whether the 4/MA
was Muslim /#diaGs sole authoritative spo&esma#+ a#d 1ii2 whether Muslims favoured
0a&ista# or #ot,
4lthough every Muslim seat throughout the su.co#ti#e#t was importa#t+ more
critical+ however+ were those i# the 0u#ja. a#d "e#gal+ the most demographically
domi#a#t Muslim provi#ces, 4fter all+ if 0a&ista# were to .e esta.lished+ it had to .e
i# the Muslim provi#ces, 'o wo#der+ Maula#a 4.ul Lalam 4=ad 11BB9-199B2+ the
!o#gress <astrapathi+ wrote to Sardar Talla..hai 0atel 11B@9-19902+ the I/ro# Ma#J
of the !o#gress+ o# 1 Hcto.er that Ithe 0u#ja. a#d "e#gal hold the &ey positio# i#
the prese#t electio#J, 4#d the i#defatiga.le 0atel+ who+ though aili#g+ yet ra# the
!o#gressGs electio# campaig# so determi#edly a#d so efficie#tly from his sic& .ed at
0oo#a+ o# his part+ gave the utmost atte#tio# to "e#gal a#d the 0u#ja., 'o wo#der+
he immediately se#t a che)ue for <s, 90+000X- to the 4hrars i# the 0u#ja.+ followed
.y other huge tra#ches to the 0u#ja. !o#gress leadership+ while ma&i#g it a.solutely
clear to o#e a#d all that he would help out the provi#cial leadership Io#ly i# the
matter of Muslim co#stitue#ciesJ,
Su.se)ue#tly+ 0atel remi#ded Sachar that I-he 0u#ja. is E#ot o#lyF a prosperous a#d
&ey provi#ce of 0a&ista#J .ut that Ithe 0u#ja. EalsoF holds the &ey to the future of
/#diaJ+ a#d+ he called o# him to collect co#tri.utio#s from local i#dustrial mag#ates+
.ig .usi#essme# a#d la#dlords, -hat+ a.ove all+ u#derscores 0u#ja.Gs pre-emi#e#t
role i# the electoral .attle for 0a&ista#+ eve# from the !o#gressGs viewpoi#t,
4#other major compo#e#t of the !o#gressGs strategy was spelled out .y 4=ad after
meeti#g Mali& Sir Lhi=r $ayat Lha# -iwa#a 11900-@92+ the 0u#ja. ;#io#ist 0remier+
whe# he told reporters o# B Hcto.er at *alettiGs+ Aahore+ ICe are ready to e#ter i#to
a pact with a#yo#e Ewhatever their sta#di#g a#d whatever their o.jectives+F
e3cepti#g the AeagueJ, $e#ce the !o#gress clo..ered together a formida.le stri#g of
a#ti-Aeague forces W the e#tre#ched ;#io#ists+ the vociferous a#d agitatio# orie#ted
4hrars+ the milita#t Lha&sars+ the religio# i#vo&i#g came to .e a##ou#ced o# 1
4ugust 1979+ a#d were scheduled ?amiat al ;lema-i-$i#d a#d the much orga#i=ed
!o#gress W i#to a# almost impreg#a.le oppositio# i# the 0u#ja., "etwee# these
disparate groups+ 4=ad served as the !hief !oordi#ator+ fuelli#g them with the
re)uisite fu#ds through Sardar 0atel, 4 third compo#e#t was that the !o#gress
decided to approach the Muslim masses through its clie#t Muslim parties a#d the
much esteemed ulema+ who were e3pected to e3plode the ImythJ co#cer#i#g the
Aeague a#d 0a&ista#,
Ai&e %, M, Syed 11907-19992 i# Si#d+ 0remier Mali& Lhi=r $ayat Lha# -iwa#a as well
tried to co#fuse the ordi#ary+ almost gulli.le voters+ asserti#g that he a#d other
Muslim ;#io#ist mem.ers were Ifirm a#d u#compromisi#g supporters of 0a&ista#J+
.ut the gimmic& failed to wor&, 4#d this chiefly .ecause+ as agai#st the 0rovi#cial
Muslim Aeagues 10MAs2 i# Si#d a#d the 'orth-Cest *ro#tier 0rovi#ce+ the 0u#ja. 0MA
had .ecome much more orga#i=ed+ much more discipli#ed a#d much more .uoya#t+
if o#ly .ecause of its .rea&-up with the ;#io#ists i# 4pril 1977, /t was also the least
trou.lesome i# terms of feud a#d factio#, -hus+ the 0u#ja. team was a.le to remai#
i#tact u#der 'awa. /fti&har $usai# Lha# of Mamdot 11906-692+ the 0u#ja. 0MA
0reside#t, 4#d he was a.le to i#fuse the team spirit amo#g his colleagues+ chiefly
.ecause he was a self effaci#g+ .ut co#fide#t leader+ who+ .ac&ed .y ?i##ah all he
way+ wor&ed sile#tly+ sa#s am.itio#+ sa#s rhetoric a#d sa#s fa#fare, 4ll said a#d
do#e+ however+ it was ?i##ah alo#e who+ li&e Tladimir /lich ;lya#ove Ae#i# 11B@0-
1902+ the architect of the <ussia# <evolutio# 1191@2+ had provided the critical
li#&age .etwee# the top+ disparate 0u#ja. leadership,
Soo# after the $M%Gs a##ou#ceme#t of the ge#eral electio#s+ the adhesio# of some
topmost !o#gressites a#d ;#io#ists W most #ota.ly Mia# /fti&haruddi# 1190@-62+
0reside#t+ 0u#ja. 0rovi#cial !o#gress !ommittee 10!!2+ a#d Sir *ero=e Lha#
'oo#11B93-19@02+ Mem.er+ TiceroyGs O3ecutive !ou#cil+ 0remier -iwa#aGs cousi# a#d
;#io#ist 0artyGs fou#di#g mem.er+ followed .y "egum ?aha# 4ra Shah 'awa= 11B96-
19@92+ former ;#io#ist 0arliame#tary Secretary+ a#d several other ;#io#ist stalwarts
W served #otice o# .oth the !o#gress a#d the ;#io#ist 0arty that their respective
citadels were fast i# the process of crum.li#g dow#,
-he ulema a#d the mashai&s 1i#cludi#g the Sajjada 'ashi#s2+ i#spired a#d motivated
.y the much esteemed 6eo.a#d alim a#d 0ri#cipal+ 4llama Sha..ir 4hmad ;sma#i
11BB9-19792+ got activi=ed a#d mo.ili=ed+ almost over#ight, /# perspective+ 4llama
;sma#i had fortuitiously provided si#ce mid-Hcto.er 1979 the direly #eeded
theological weight i# 0a&ista#Gs favour agai#st the pervasive a#d persuasive a#ti-
Aeague i#flue#ce of the u.i)uitous a#d much esteemed !o#gress ulema at the grass-
root level,
4t a#other level+ stude#t leaders li&e 4.dul Sattar Lha# 'iya=i 11919-000s2 fou#der
of the 0u#ja. Muslim Stude#ts *ederatio# 1MS*2 1f, 193B2 a#d $ameed 'i=ami
11919-62+ third elected 0reside#t of the 0u#ja. MS* a#d later+ Oditor+ 'awa-i-Ca)t
1Aahore2+ played a leadi#g role i# orga#i=i#g a#d mo.ili=i#g stude#ts a#d you#g
wor&ers+ a#d leadi#g them i# small groups to visit small tow#s a#d their hi#terla#d+
orga#i=e mi#i gatheri#gs of village fol& at various places+ liste# to their pressi#g
pro.lems+ i# order to solve them or fi#d solutio#s to them, /#ter alia+ they sought to
educate a#d e3plai# to them the AeagueGs policies a#d programme i# ge#eral terms
a#d i# the co#te3t of the pressures a#d pro.lems that had held rural 0u#ja. hostage+
a#d its politics a#d ultimate goals, 4#d eve# as the electio#s approached+ thousa#ds
of stude#t volu#teers from 4ligarh ;#iversity+ /slamia !ollege a#d other i#stitutio#s
fa##ed out throughout the sprawli#g provi#ce to educate+ mo.ili=e a#d motivate the
ordi#ary voters to .race for total defia#ce+ .oth agai#st official pressure a#d the
mighty ;#io#ist orie#ted =ami#darsG dire threats a#d i#flue#ce,
Mea#time+ for a year or more+ #umerous 0rimary Aeagues had spru#g up or come to
.e esta.lished where there was #o#e+ a#d the Muslim Aeague 'atio#al %uards
1MA'%2 was duly reorga#i=ed as #ever .efore, /# ta#dem were several wome#
activist groups orga#i=ed i# several cities+ .esides the Muslim Come# Stude#tsG
*ederatio#+ fou#ded earlier i# 1971+ havi#g .ee# spruced up a#d streamli#ed W .oth
targeted to e#suri#g i#creasi#g wome# aware#ess+ motivatio# a#d participatio# i#
the AeagueGs campaig#, -hus+ wome# comprised almost o#e-third of the audie#ces i#
the electio# meeti#gs+ remi#isced Mia# Mumta= Lha# 6aulata#a 11916-992 later,
4dditio#ally+ authored .y 6aulata#a+ 0u#ja. 0MAGs %e#eral Secretary+ with the
assista#ce of #oted leftist+ 6a#ial Aatifi+ the 4cti#g Hffice Secretary of the 0u#ja. 0MA
si#ce ?uly 1977+ a radical ma#ifesto 119792 came to .e crafted, "y all accou#ts+ it
was a .ig leap forward, /t helped to e#dow the 0u#ja. Aeague electio# campaig# with
the direly #eeded progressive strea&, 4#d all the while+ the leadi#g ;rdu papers+
especially the 'awai-Ca)t+ Dami#dar+ /hsa# a#d -he Oaster# -imes+ carried o# a .lit=
u#deterred+ despite the ;#io#istsG sword over their u#easy heads,
-he chi#& i# the armour was+ however+ the AeagueGs meagre resources, 4s agai#st
the ;#io#istsG four millio# 1forty la&hs2 electio# chest+ #ot to spea& of the "irla a#d
6almia fu#ded millio#s at the !o#gressGs disposal+ the Aeague could possi.ly collect
o#ly a meagre sum of <s, B00+000, ?i##ah+ of course+ came to the 0MAGs rescue+
helpi#g it out to the tu#e of <s, 300+000 out of the !e#tral Aeague fu#dsV .ut still the
0rovi#cial AeagueGs resources were far too limited+ o.viously co#strai#i#g the spread
a#d i#te#sity of its electio# campaig#,
>et the greatest pro.lem co#fro#ti#g the rejuve#ated Aeague was that #ot o#ly were
the ;#io#ists i# power+ .ut that the %la#cy-Lhi=r a3is had as well Ico#spiredJ to
utili=e .ra=e#tly the .ureaucracy+ the most powerful a#d the most u.i)uitous i# the
e#tire su.co#ti#e#t+ to get a verdict i# their favour+ whatever .e the mea#s+
whatever the cost, I-he e#tire .ureaucracy W $i#du+ Muslim+ Si&h a#d the "ritish W
was agai#st usJ+ recalled 6aulata#a years later, /#deed ever si#ce the ge#eral
electio#s were a##ou#ced+ the greatest headache for the 0u#ja. leaders was how to
e#sure the Icomplete #eutrality of the state apparatusJ a#d several leaders wrote to
?i##ah+ stressi#g its imperative #eed, I-here have .ee#J+ admitted Aord Cavell
11BB3-19902+ the Ticeroy+ Ia lot of allegatio#s agai#st the ;#io#ist Mi#istryN to the
effect that they are a.usi#g their positio# to gai# adva#tage i# the electio#s,J ?i##ah
himself had to ta&e cog#i=a#ce of the gravity of these complai#ts5 Ivoters a#d N
wor&ersN are .ei#g coerced+ threate#ed+ i#timidated a#d persecutedJ+ he charged,
4#d si#ce .oth the Ticeroy a#d the %over#or 1"ertra#d %la#cy2 had tur#ed a Ideaf
earJ to all those Ishameful a#d crimi#al tacticsJ+ he told his .eleaguered followers
that there was I#o doorJ to &#oc& at a#d #o alter#ative left .ut Ito fightJ to the .itter
e#d,
Oarlier+ i# the ce#tral assem.ly electio#s+ held i# late 'ovem.er-6ecem.er 1979+ at
sta&e were si3 Muslim seats+ a#d the Aeague made a complete sweep of them, -hree
seats were .agged without a co#test+ a record for a#y provi#ceV a#d the
/#depe#de#ts 1mostly ;#io#ists2 a#d a Lha&sar+ who co#tested o# the other three
seats+ secured a total of mere +@BB 119,07Y2 out of 16+39B votes cast, -his mea#t
that the Aeague could surge forward+ ma&i#g a sham.les of the ;#io#ists, 4#d it did
i# the provi#cial electio#s held i# fe.ruary 1976,
-he Muslim Aeague co#tested all the eighty-si3 Muslim seats 1#i#e ur.a#+ seve#ty
five rural a#d two wome#2+ a#d two of its ca#didates retur#ed u#opposed, -he
;#io#ists co#tested seve#ty-si3 seats+ the 4hrars si3tee#+ the !o#gress eight a#d the
Lha&sars three, 4dditio#ally+ there were eighty-two /#depe#de#ts i# the field, -he
AeagueGs score was B@, per ce#t of the Muslim seats a#d 69,3 per ce#t of the total
Muslim voteV the ;#io#ists secured @,6 per ce#t votes while the rest @,77 per ce#t,
/# view of the !o#gressGs dire prog#osticatio#s the AeagueGs success may well .e
termed astou#di#g, 0atel+ the IlodestarJ of the !o#gress+ co#ceded+ al.eit
grudgi#gly+ I-he Aeague has scored .etter tha# e3pectedNJ /# the .attle for 0a&ista#+
0u#ja. was co#sidered the I&eyJ provi#ceV he#ce the 0u#ja. results se#t a wave of
joy throughout Muslim /#dia, 4# e#thralled ?i##ah lauded the 0u#ja. results+ sayi#g+
I-he Muslims played a mag#ifice#t part i# co#clusively provi#g that 0u#ja. is the
cor#ersto#e of 0a&ista#, 'i#ety perce#t fighti#g agai#st all odds is a sple#did
achieveme#t of which you+ Muslim /#dia a#d myself should .e proudJ+ he wired
Mamdot+ the 0u#ja. 0MA 0reside#t,
/# perspective+ however+ despite the temporary set.ac& to assume power after the
electio#s+ the 0u#ja. vote was the most critical o#e si#ce+ to 0atel+ amo#g others+
the 0u#ja. held Ithe &ey to the future of /#diaJ W a# assessme#t+ which was also
ge#erally shared .y "ritish officials a#d #o#-officials, *or i#sta#ce+ %over#or Sir $ugh
6ow of Si#d+ %over#or Sir $e#ry ?oseph -wy#am of !, 0, a#d "erar+ a#d Sir *ra#cis
Aow+ Oditor+ -he -imes of /#dia 1"om.ay2+ the foremost 4#glo-/#dia# daily+ told
Cavell that the 0u#ja. held Ithe &ey to the 0a&ista# pro.lemJ, Ai&ewise+ ;, S,
officials a#d diplomats i# 6elhi regarded 0u#ja. as Ithe &eysto#e of 0a&ista#J,
$e#ce despite what 4yesha ?alal+ herself a full.looded 0u#ja.i+ says a.out the
0u#ja.i Iopportu#istsJ i# her much acclaimed wor&+ 0u#ja. did play a critical role i#
securi#g 0a&ista#, 4#d o#ce 0u#ja. was firmly secured+ the 0a&ista# issue could #ot
.e shelved a#y more, 'or 0a&ista#Gs emerge#ce could lo#g .e thwarted, 4#d it came
eightee# mo#ths later,
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"egi#s
(+e ,ollowing 3ser *a's (+an! 8ou to Asi 8ousu:ai ,or (+is 3seul "ost6
$e##a Lha# 1*riday+ Hcto.er 17+ 0112
#7
Thursday, June 09, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
"a!istan)s -rowt+ 1Cperience D1997-4007E;;;;;
"a!istan)s -rowt+ 1Cperience D1997-4007E
"y
/shrat $ussai#
Institute O 0usiness Administration DI0AE? <A%A&$I
/# order to access the detailed paper clic& the followi#g address5
http5XXishrathusai#,i.a,edu,p&Xspeec,,,$;S4/'U4<-,pdf
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
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"egi#s
#8
Thursday, June 16, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
(+e 1lections o 1936-37;;;;;;
(+e 1lections o 1936-37 in t+e "unjab and
"olitical "osition o t+e Muslim /eague
"y
4&htar $ussai# Sa#dhu
H#ly two #omi#ees of the Muslim Aeague succeeded i# the electio#s of 193@, M4
?i##ah had .ee# a #o#-e#tity i# the 0u#ja. u#til the passage of the 0a&ista#
<esolutio# i# 1970, 4marjit Si#gh co#cludes that the 0u#ja. Muslim Aeague
e3perie#ced the severest set.ac& of its history i# the electio#s 193@, $e co#siders
the aftermath as the era of struggle for survival o# the part of the Aeague, L! >adav
writes o# the ?i##ah-Si&a#dar 0act that the "ritish ordered Sir Si&a#dar $ayat to
co#clude a pact with the Muslim Aeague to revive its image after the defeat i# the
electio#s 193@, /mporta#t docume#ts a#d solid argume#ts are there to challe#ge
such co#clusio#s, -hrough this article+ / have tried to address such co#te#tio#s,
-hrough my study+ / have tried to prove that the Aeague had deep roots i# the
0u#ja. .efore the electio#s of 193@ as it was perceived as the sole Muslim party at
the #atio#al level, -he electio# results were #o surprise to the Aeague leadership
.ecause of the prevaili#g circumsta#ces, -he AeagueGs decisio# to participate i# the
regio#al politics was a tur#i#g poi#t i# the history of the /#dia# Muslims which
e#a.led it to permeate amo#g the masses, /t also made the "ritish a#d their loyal
groups u#easy i# the 0u#ja., -he ;#io#ists i#te#ded to capture the Aeague .ut
.ecame a victim of their ow# tric&y politics,
-he Muslim Aeague is co#sidered to .e a wea& party duri#g the 1930s .ut actually it
had started successfully e#gagi#g the regio#al eleme#ts i# the Muslim politics duri#g
this time, 'o dou.t+ the AeagueGs positio# i# the 0u#ja. was #ot stro#g .ecause the
o#ly .lue-eyed group of the "ritish %over#or was the ;#io#ist 0arty which was
officially e#titled to have i#flue#tial positio# i# the .ureaucracy a#d the politics, -o
li#e up the 0u#ja. .ehi#d the Aeague was #ecessary .ecause without its .ac&i#g the
Aeague had a wea& voice i# all-/#dia issues relati#g to the Muslim commu#ity, -he
Aeague did #ot re)uire this .ac&i#g earlier .ecause every Muslim provi#ce was
thought to .e with the Aeague .ut the specific circumsta#ces of the pre-electio#
situatio# co#vi#ced M4 ?i##ah to e#ter the regio#al politics which was #ot the
traditio# of the parties wor&i#g at all-/#dia level, -he ce#tral political leadership
preferred their i#volveme#t i# the issues relati#g to the ce#tral politics,
"efore 1936+ the Aeague was co#fi#ed to the #atio#al politics had give# a free ha#d
to the regio#al parties ta&i#g for gra#ted their support, H# the other ha#d+ the
;#io#ist Muslims felt vul#era.le .y supporti#g the Aeague as they could lose political
a#d social status i# the provi#ce which they had .ee# e#joyi#g for a few decades,
-he Shiroma#i 4&ali 6al had got recog#itio# as a religious a#d political force amo#g
the Si&h commu#ity, -hey opposed the feudal leadership of the Lhalsa 'atio#al 0arty,
-he 4&al politics was mai#ly .ased o# a#tago#ism a#d hatred towards the Muslims
o# religious a#d historical grou#ds, -hey were opposed to the feudal leadership
withi# the Si&h commu#ity o# eco#omic a#d political reaso#s, -hey projected
themselves as the .e#efactors of the pa#th .ut actually they were &ee# to secure
eco#omic a#d political gai#s i# the guise of religio#, -his two-faced politics of the
major sta&eholders of the 0u#ja. created crisis i# the provi#cial politics, -he Aeague
permeated gradually amo#g the regio#al politics a#d secured sympathy of the
masses,
-he 1930s was a tur.ule#t phase of the 0u#ja. history, -he Muslim Aeague .ecame a
leaderless party for the time .ei#g as ?i##ah was i# O#gla#d a#d the local Muslims
were utili=i#g the 4ll-/#dia Muslim !o#fere#ce for their political activities, 'o o#e
valued the importa#ce of the Aeague a#d the si#cere Muslim leadership diverted its
atte#tio# to the regio#al parties, Sir 4gha Lha# joi#ed ha#ds with the 0u#ja.
;#io#ist 0arty a#d supported it fi#a#cially, Sir 4gha Lha# had #o voti#g .ase i# the
0u#ja. a#d his separatio# from the Aeague did #ot value as far as the electoral
politics was co#cer#ed, $e was respected .y the commu#ity o# his ge#erous fu#di#g
for the Muslim projects a#d i#flue#ce i# the imperial circles+ #evertheless+ his
severa#ce from the traditio#al Muslim represe#tative party was #ot a# e#couragi#g
sig#, ;#der such atmosphere+ M4 ?i##ah came .ac& a#d re-orga#ised the Aeague i#
early 1939, $e pla##ed to gather the promi#e#t Muslim leaders u#der the Aeague
flag a#d i#vited Sir *a=l-i-$usai# to preside over the Aeague sessio#, $e #ot o#ly
tur#ed dow# his re)uest to joi# the Aeague sessio# .ut also decided to resist the
Aeague leader to have a#y i#flue#ce i# the 0u#ja. affairs .ecause it could e#d the
commu#al harmo#y of the provi#ce, -he mai# argume#t for the refusal was that the
$i#du a#d Si&h commu#ities would #ever accept the AeagueGs positio#, /t is
surprisi#g that #o.ody )uestio#ed the commu#alistic character of Sir *a=l-i-$usai#
who had i#cessa#tly .ee# critici=ed .y $i#dus a#d Si&hs o# his pro-Muslim policies
which co#firmed him a Muslim rather tha# a cross-commu#al leader, -he #o#-Muslim
groups at protests agai#st him i#cluded the moderate factio# of the Si&hs as well,
-he pri#cipal issue was the office of the 0remiership, *a=l-i-$usai# feared that .y
joi#i#g the Aeague+ the Muslims of the 0u#ja. could .e deprived of the 0remierGs
office, -he machi#atio#s withi# the party were at pea& a#d #o#e was happy o# his
retur# from the ce#tre to the 0u#ja. politics, ;#der this specific situatio#+ he was
u#a.le to re#der support to the Aeague, $is pro-Aeague posture could .e a#
i#vitatio# to #ew pro.lems,
*a=lGs refusal to accept ?i##ahGs i#vitatio# to preside over the Aeague sessio# has
.ee# hailed .y ma#y writers a#d attri.uted to the political prude#ce of *a=l-i-$usai#
a#d as a# utter defeat of ?i##ah, -o Lhalid "i# Sayeed+ I?i##ah did #ot ma&e a#y
headway i# the 0u#ja.J .ut the factual positio# is that he #ever co#fi#ed himself to
the ce#tral politics a#d activated the party to capture the 0u#ja. as soo# as possi.le,
-he writers projected *a=lGs refusal promi#e#tly .ecause rejectio# of the i#vitatio# of
a leader li&e ?i##ah was #ot possi.le for a leader of a regio#al character, $e was
projected as a challe#ger to ?i##ah a#d his status was raised amo#g the a#ti-Aeague
circles, $owever+ such writers ig#ored the comi#g political developme#ts i# the
0u#ja. i# which ?i##ah .ecame assertive soo# after his e#try i# the regio#al politics,
-he decisio# to participate i# the regio#al politics .ecame imperative to stre#gthe#
the Aeague i# all-/#dia politics, "efore the refusal of *a=l-i-$usai#+ it was a ge#eral
perceptio# that all the ;#io#ist Muslims were with the Aeague .ut the rejectio# of the
?i##ahGs i#vitatio# co#vi#ced the Aeague leadership to come dow# to the regio#al
level to save the party from the .lac&maili#g .y the local leadership, Muslims were
luc&y that Aeague decided to challe#ge the regio#al parties well i# time as the first
ge#eral electio#s u#der the 1939 4ct were approachi#g which could provide a#
opportu#ity to deal with the regio#al parties a#d place the Aeague age#da directly
.efore the Muslim masses, /t pleased the Muslims of the 0u#ja. that they were
e3pecti#g a .etter alter#ate to the ;#io#ists who practically did #othi#g for the
commo# people, -heir utmost e#deavour was to facilitate the la#ded aristocracy a#d
the well to do families who were i#ter-li#&ed to each other .y i#ert-marriages
#eglecti#g the prevaili#g caste system,
"efore the electio#s of 193@+ Sardar "uta Si#gh+ the 6eputy 0reside#t of the !ou#cil+
co#tested electio# for the seat of 0reside#t of the 0u#ja. !ou#cil agai#st !h, !hhotu
<am, -he Si&hs were hopeful of the victory as the ur.a# $i#du mem.ers opposed
!hhotu <am, -his made Sardar "uta Si#gh a very stro#g ca#didate, "ut !hhotu <am
wo# the seat with 96 votes while Sardar "uta Si#gh .agged o#ly B votes, -he
defeat e#raged the Si&h parties who protested a#d left the !ham.er, -his shows the
e#viro#me#t of the commu#al relatio#s withi# the 0u#ja. legislature, -he #o#-
Muslims had .ee# with the;#io#ist leadership .ut with reservatio#s, -hey #ever gave
a free ha#d to the leadership i# commu#al a#d other political issues which had made
this coalitio# stro#g as well as vul#era.le, -hey .ei#g far away from the commu#al
ta#gles had .ee# ru##i#g the gover#me#tal affairs successfully .ut o# the other
ha#d+ ig#ori#g the real a#d core issues such as commu#alism was erro#eous which
ultimately proved harmful, Ove# the#+ every commu#ity was pursui#g the commu#al
age#da remai#i#g withi# the coalitio# gover#me#t, /# 193@+ the #o#-Muslim
mem.ers of the 0u#ja. Aegislative 4ssem.ly i#trigued agai#st Sir Si&a#dar a#d made
a u#ited effort to force the 0remier to leave the office through a #o-co#fide#ce
motio#, -hey collected 16 la&h rupees u#der Sardar "aldev Si#gh .ut #ot a si#gle
Muslim favoured this a#ti-Si&a#dar co#spiracy,
"rovincial 1lections o 1937
-he /#dia# 4ct of 1939 .rought major cha#ges i# the co#stitutio#al status of the
0u#ja., -he provi#cial !ou#cil was re#amed as the 0u#ja. Aegislative 4ssem.ly with
i#creased #um.er of its mem.ers 11@92, 4ll the mem.ers were to .e elected .y the
i#creased #um.er of voters, -he voti#g )ualificatio# was the educatio#+ .ei#g widow
or mother of the officer or military me# martyred i# war+ .ei#g ta3 payee+ .ei#g
te#a#t or la#d-ow#er of specific )ua#tity of la#d or pu.lic serva#t, -he Si&hs were
give# 1B per ce#t+ $i#dus 7 per ce#t a#d Muslims 7B per ce#t share i# the 4ssem.ly
seats, -he divisio# o# the commu#al .asis to Lripal !, >adav was a co#ti#uity of the
divide a#d rule policy of the "ritish who i#te#ded to damage the #atio#al cause of
/#dia .ut as a matter of fact #o commu#ity o.jected to itV they o#ly protested o# the
allocatio# of #um.er of seats i# the assem.ly, 4ccordi#g to the co#tradictory
dema#ds+ the Si&hs had dema#ded 30 per ce#t seats or the partitio# of the 0u#ja. at
the <ou#d -a.le !o#fere#ce duri#g 1930-319 which made the commu#al issue i#
the 0u#ja. very complicated a#d se#sitive as well, "efore the ge#eral electio#s of
193@+ the situatio# was u#democratic i# the provi#ce a#d the political tycoo#s were
hardly opposed i# their co#stitue#cies, /# the electio#s of 1930+ 6r, %o&al !ha#d
'ara#g 1O;2+ !h, !hhotu <am+ ;jjal Si#gh 1O;2+ S, Sampura# Si#gh 1O;2+ <aja
'are#der 'ath 1O;2+ S, ?ogi#der Si#gh 1O;2+ Mu&a#d Aal 0uri 1O;2 from the #o#-
Muslims a#d ?amal Lha# Aeghari 1O;2+ 4hmad >ar 6aulta#a+ Mu.ara& 4li Shah+ <a=a
Shah %ila#i 1O;2+ Mohammad $ayat Kureshi 1O;2+ *ero= Lha# 'oo# 1O;2+ !h, M,
Dafarullah Lha# 1O;2+ !h, Shaha.-ud-di# 1O;2+ 0ir 4&.ar 4li 1O;2+ 4.dul %ha#i 1O;2
a#d others from the Muslims were the promi#e#t figures who retur#ed to the
provi#cial legislature as u#opposed 1O;2, /t shows the e#viro#me#t of electio#s
where i#flue#tial families were playi#g the role of a pressure group or Ka.=a group,
Maula#a Ma=har 4li 4=har a#d Dama# Mehdi Lha# wo# .ye-electio# i# 1937 a#d
e#tered the 4ssem.ly,
-he electio#s of 193@ started with su.mitti#g the #omi#atio# papers i# 'ovem.er
1936 a#d polli#g was pla##ed from 6ecem.er 1936 to ?a#uary 193@, -he ;#io#ist
0arty havi#g #o threat from a#y other political party lau#ched its ca#didates a#d i#
ma#y cases it was decided .eforeha#d that the wi##i#g ca#didate would .e a#
e3isti#g ;#io#ist mem.er, "ei#g co#fide#t so the ;#io#ist 0arty did #ot co#test
electio#s as a democratic party, 4ccordi#g to /a# -al.ot it did #ot arra#ge a#y pu.lic
gatheri#g to co#vi#ce the voters a.out the ma#ifesto, -hey .elieved that the
gover#me#t officials were there to do this jo., -hey did #ot #eed to approach the
masses .ecause some specific groups had a right to cast the vote .ut the commo#
0u#ja.is were deprived of this .asic right, *urthermore+ the ;#io#ist 0arty was
e3isti#g as a ruli#g class havi#g #o ideology to follow therefore+ they were least
i#terested i# securi#g pu.lic sympathy,
/#teresti#gly+ the electio#s were the first electoral eve#t which attracted a huge
#um.er of co#testers a#d all the parties participated with full democratic =eal a#d
o#ly a few retur#ed as u#opposed to the 4ssem.ly while .efore 193@ most of the
ca#didates had faced #o difficulty i# re-capturi#g their seats, -he Si&hs a#d the
$i#dus joi#ed ha#ds agai#st the ;#io#ist gover#me#t which was .ei#g perceived as a
Muslim domi#atio# over the mi#orities, -he Shiroma#i 4&ali 6al co#tested electio#s
o# the .asis to save /#dia# freedom+ a#ti-!ommu#al 4ward pledge+ Si&h rights+ a#ti-
Shahidga#j struggle+ Lirpa# issue+ etc, -he 4&ali Si&hs a#d the !o#gress made
adjustme#t i# #umerous co#stitue#cies duri#g the electio#s which e#couraged them
to ma&e more joi#t efforts i# the political sphere, -he Si&hs e3pressed grave co#cer#
over the Muslim domi#atio# i# the 0u#ja. a#d vociferated agai#st the ;#io#ist
Muslims, -he Aeague came dow# to the regio#al politics which distur.ed the
ma&eshift arra#geme#ts i# the provi#cial political are#a, ?i##ah who was said to .e a
#o#-e#tity i# the 0u#ja. was there i# the 0u#ja. whe# the %urdwara Moveme#t was
lau#ched .y the Si&hs i# 190s, $e seemed favouri#g the 4&alis whe# they were
tortured .y the authorities, $e was the leader who resig#ed from the assem.ly whe#
the <owlatt 4ct was e#forced, $e was there i# the 0u#ja. whe# the Shahidga#j issue
was draggi#g whole of the 0u#ja. to a dreadful chaos, LA %ua.a a#d 4llama Mashri)i
re)uested ?i##ah to i#terfere while the %over#or a#d the ;#io#ist leaders were
waiti#g to e#d the Muslim-Si&h clashes, /t is i#teresti#g that the cross-commu#al
party 1the ;#io#ists2 had .ee# waiti#g for ?i##ah 1a commu#alist to the ;#io#ists2 to
cool dow# the commu#al fre#=y i# the provi#ce over the Shahidga#j issue,
-he !o#gress got majority i# B provi#ces out of 11 while the Aeague wo# o#ly two
seats i# the 0u#ja., "eside 16 i#depe#de#t ca#didates+ the party positio# was as
u#der5
%esults in "unjab
0arty-----------------------------Seats
4hrar-----------------------------0
Muslim Aeague --------------------0
Shiroma#i 4&ali 6al----------------11
Lhalsa 'atio#al 0arty--------------13
$i#du Mahasa.ha------------------1
0u#ja. ;#io#ist 0arty--------------9B
/ttehad-i-Millat--------------------0
/#dia# 'atio#al !o#gress-----------1B
!o#gress 'atio#alist 0arty----------01
+ource, -C .adav' /lections' 011213.
-he results reflect the tre#d of the Si&h voters towards the 4&alis who performed well
a#d got recog#itio# as the sole represe#tative of the Si&h pa#th, -he mai# o.jective
of the Aeague to co#test the electio#s was to a##ou#ce its e#try i#to the regio#al
politics to challe#ge the ;#io#ists who had refused to accommodate the Aeague
leadership, /t was a mere ppeara#ce a#d first show o# the part of the Aeague a#d the
real wor& were yet to .e do#e i# the future,
-he ;#io#ist 0arty mai#tai#ed its hegemo#y i# the 4ssem.ly .ut it secured @0 per
ce#t votes i# the rural a#d o#ly 9 per ce#t votes i# the ur.a# co#stitue#cies, 4part
from this+ it did #ot se#d a#y ca#didate i# the eight ur.a# co#stitue#cies reserved for
$i#dus, -he sweepi#g electio# results put the a#ti-Aeague parties i#to power .ut this
defeat did #ot discourage the Aeague .ecause the results were #ot out of
e3pectatio#, -he Aeague leadership .ei#g realist could #ot e3pect a miracle regardi#g
the results after faci#g a# e3treme difficulty i# fi#di#g ca#didates for the
co#stitue#cies, ?i##ah was sure that it was astarti#g poi#t for the Aeague a#d with its
first direct e#try i# the regio#al politics it could ma&e the local leadership reali=e that
they had a short time to survive, 4marjit Si#gh rites that the Aeague se#t 77
ca#didates i# the co#stitue#cies which is #ot a correct figure, H#ly 10 ca#didates i#
the 0u#ja. co#tested electio#s from the Aeague platform which shows that the
Aeague leadership had #o high e3pectatio#s, Cith 10 seats i# whole of /#dia
retai#ed the Aeague which came up as a sole represe#tative party of the Muslims,
-he !o#gress lau#ched 9@ Muslim ca#didates i# the 0u#ja. .ut o#ly 6 reached the
4ssem.ly, -he party secured less tha# 90 per ce#t of the total votes i#
/#dia,-herefore+ it was satisfyi#g for the Aeague that the !o#gress too had #ot
performed well i# the 0u#ja., -o ;ma Laura+ I-he o#ly redeemi#g feature for the
Aeague was that the performa#ce of !o#gress i# the Muslim majority areas was also
#ot impressive,J -he Aeague was the o#ly party which voiced for the rights of
Muslims, 4lthough the 0u#ja. ;#io#ist 0arty got majority i# the 0u#ja. 4ssem.ly yet
it had #o represe#tatio# i# other provi#ces of /#dia,
Overall %esults o t+e 1lections o 1937
0rovi#ce-----------4ctual Seats-----------!o#g, Co#-----------0erce#tage
"e#gal ----------------90 ----------------39-------------------- 3
'C*0---------------- 90 ------------------19-------------------- 3B
0u#ja. ----------------1@9 ----------------1B --------------------10
Si#dh ----------------60 --------------------B--------------------13
;0 ---------------- B --------------------133 --------------------9B
+ource, 4ma -aura' Muslims and Indian 5ationalism' 06728.
-he results of the 0u#ja. repudiated the !o#gressGs claim that it was represe#tative
of all the /#dia# commu#ities, /# ;0+ the !o#gressite Muslims were stro#g .ut I#o
Muslim was retur#ed o# the !o#gress tic&et,J -he 4&alis had a# u#dersta#di#g with
the !o#gress .ecause it mai#ly wa#ted to &#oc& dow# the other Si&h parties, -he
S%0!33 provided wor&ers+ fi#a#ces a#d support o# the religious .asis to the 4&alis
who floated huge sums of mo#ey to wi# the electio#s agai#st the rival Si&h parties,
-his a.use of %urdwara fu#ds .y the 4&alis was me#tio#ed i# %over#orGs letter, -he
0u#ja. %over#or Omerso# co#cluded that the I4&ali successes would have .ee#
fewer had they #ot used religious fu#ds for the purpose of .ri.i#g the electorates,J
-he real show of power i# the regio#al politics started after the electio#s, -he
electio#s produced stu##i#g implicatio#s which carved profou#d impact #ot o#ly o#
the politics of the 0u#ja. .ut also at all-/#dia level, -he #ota.le i#cide#t of the
electio#s 193@ was the !o#gress .etrayal of the Aeague i# the ;0 4ssem.ly which
accordi#g to "imal 0rasad upset the $i#du-Muslim u#dersta#di#g #ot o#ly i# the ;0
.ut also throughout the Su.co#ti#e#t,
-he !o#gress leadership opposed the ;#io#istsG which was #ot a sa#e strategy
.ecause the ;#io#ists a#d the "ritish had similar age#da for the u#ited /#dia .ut the
!o#gress could #ot .e#efit from this e#thusiasm, -he a#ti-Muslim policies of the
!o#gress mi#istries co#firmed the -wo-'atio# theory a#d forced them to follow the
Aeague regardi#g their political rights, -he a#ti-Muslim drive of the !o#gressG
gover#me#ts created favour.ale atmosphere for the Aeague leadership who had
already .ee# complai#i#g of the cruel me#tality of the $i#du majority towards the
Muslims, -he de.ate i# the "ritish 0arliame#t o# the a#ti-Muslim activities of the
!o#gress mi#istries was discouraged for the reaso# that such de.ate might result i#
commu#al clashes i# /#dia, -he avoida#ce of the su.ject .y "ritish 0arliame#t
ramified that there was somethi#g wro#g o# the part of the !o#gress mi#istries
which could produce te#sio# .etwee# Muslims a#d #o#-Muslims, ?i##ah passed a
remar& o# the a.use of power .y the !o#gress mi#istries that Ithe !o#gress was li&e
a poor ma# who had wo# a great deal of mo#ey i# a lotteryV that it was i#to3icated
with power,J $e also reiterated that ig#ori#g the Aeague .y the !o#gress was #ot a
reaso#a.le policy, -he !o#gress leadership would commit a greatest .lu#der if they
thought that the co#stitutio#al pro.lem would .e solved without the co#se#t of the
Aeague, $e further war#ed that the !o#gress should Irespect the other partiesJ if it
sought some agreed solutio# to the o#-goi#g co#stitutio#al deadloc&,
-he Muslims faced several pro.lems u#der the $i#du majority o# the social issues
a#d !o#gress rule o# the political rights, Ove# the $i#dus tried to get their #um.er
i#creased through false evide#ces, /# ?a#uary 1939+ $asa# 'i=ami i# a# editorial
wrote that the !o#gress co#sidered the Aeague as a# impractical party a#d the
$i#du-"ritish patch-up agai#st the Aeague was evide#t, $e suggested that ?i##ah
should focus o# ce#sus of the Muslims, $e e3plai#ed that ce#sus was goi#g to start
shortly a#d the Aeague could wor& agai#st the irregularities e3pected i# the ce#sus,
-he #o#-Muslim machi#ery was the real cause of such irregularities .ecause the #o#-
Muslim officials deli.erately registered the R$i#di la#guageG as the mother to#gue of
the Muslims which resulted i# decrease of the Muslim voters, 'i=ami Kuoted his ow#
e3ample a#d e3pressed that he should have .ee# registered as voter accordi#g the
eligi.ility criteria .ut his #ame was #ot there i# the votersG list, $e further re)uested
?i##ah to ta&e the ce#sus issue i#to co#sideratio# .ecause #i#e crore Muslims were
associated with the Aeague therefore it was #ecessary to collect the real figures of
the Muslim populatio#,
"opularit' o t+e /eague
-he Aeague secured two seats i# the 0u#ja. a#d displayed wea& performa#ce i# the
other Muslim majority provi#ces i# the electio#s which provided the a#ti-Aeague
parties a# opportu#ity to project it as a# e#d of the political career of ?i##ah a#d the
party, "ut as matter of fact+ this failure did #ot re.ut the Aeague a#d its leadership
.ecause ma#y had foretold that the Aeague would wi# o#ly a few of the Muslim seats
i# the comi#g electio#s, -he stature of ?i##ah remai#ed as importa#t a#d effective as
ever .efore, $e was the o#ly Muslim leader who could face the !o#gress leadership
o# e)ual terms, -he results did #ot pull him dow# i# the eyes of the Muslims, $is
frie#dly relatio#s with the promi#e#t Muslim families throughout the cou#try
mai#tai#ed his political positio# effective, 4hmad >ar 6aulta#a+ the Muslim ;#io#ist+
had a great respect for ?i##ah, Sometimes family mem.ers of the promi#e#t leaders
shared their i#terests with him, 4hmad >ar 6aulta#a wrote to ?i##ah+ I/ have
co#sidered you my leader duri#g the last 9 years a#d have always .ee# loyal to
you,J $e had a co#tri.utio# i# creati#g co#ge#ial e#viro#me#t for Sir Si&a#dar $ayat
a#d ?i##ah who later came to a pact at Auc&#ow i# Hcto.er 193@,
?i##ah was co#fide#t of the AeagueGs success i# the future politics therefore he
removed the shortcomi#gs of the party a#d IassuredNthat withi# a short time the
Aeague would .ecome a stro#g party capa.le of fighti#g a#y other party i# the
cou#try,J$is prophecy came true a#d the Muslims of the 0u#ja. co#verged i# the fold
of Aeague, Ove# the 0u#ja. 0remier u#der the peculiar circumsta#ces had to li#e up
u#der the leadership of ?i##ah, -he 0io#eer appreciated the AeagueGs success a#d
wrote that ?i##ah had got a firm footi#g i# the 0u#ja. Iwithi# a.out a year of his
lau#chi#g the programme,J
4ccordi#g to the ?i##ah-Si&a#dar 0act i# Hcto.er 193@ at Auc&#ow+ the ;#io#ist
leader promised ?i##ah to .ri#g the ;#io#ist Muslim mem.ers to the Aeague fold i#
the provi#cial 4ssem.ly, -his issue has ge#erated a# i#teresti#g de.ate amo#g the
scholars as to why Sir Si&a#dar $ayat we#t to Auc&#ow after wi##i#g the 0remierGs
office, -he factors might i#clude the $i#du-Si&h u#ity+ popularity of ?i##ah+ groupi#g
withi# the ;#io#ist 0arty a#d !o#gressG Mass !o#tact campaig# i# the 0u#ja.,
-he first reaso# might .e the Muslim Mass !o#tact Moveme#t of the !o#gress that
moved Si&a#dar to approach ?i##ah .ecause the Si&hs a#d $i#dus i#te#ded to topple
Sir Si&a#darGs gover#me#t, -hey lau#ched a campaig# to root out the Aeague a#d
;#io#ist i#flue#ce from the Muslim majority regio#, -he 4&alis were with the
!o#gress as Master -ara Si#gh supported 'ehru a#d stated that the 0u#ja. I0remier
was a stooge for the "ritish+ a#d that he was co#solidati#g the Muslim positio# i# the
0u#ja.,J -he other cause could .e the groupi#g withi# the ;#io#ist 0arty which was
divided i#to factio#s a#d the Aeague was causi#g further rifts amo#g the party
mem.ers, -he 0u#ja. Muslim Aeague though had #egligi.le stre#gth i# the 4ssem.ly+
yet it e#joyed the support of highly respected figures li&e 6r, Muhammad /).al, Sir
Si&a#dar tried to capture the Aeague so that #o rival could challe#ge his positio# i#
the provi#ce, -he other reaso# might .e the sympathy of the Muslim mem.ers with
the Aeague withi# the ;#io#ist 0arty as <aja %ha=a#far 4li Lha# disclosed later that
?i##ah himself deployed him to create a pro-Aeague atmosphere amo#g the ruli#g
Muslims,
Sir Si&a#dar was well aware of the se#sitive situatio# of the party a#d that groupi#g
withi# the party could wea&e# his political grasp i# the #ear future+ therefore he
decided to joi# ha#ds with ?i##ah, *urthermore+ he was clear that o#ly the Aeague
leadership could voice for the Muslim rights at the #atio#al level whose support was
#ecessary to stre#gthe# his positio#, L! >adav is of the opi#io# that Sir Si&a#dar
joi#ed ha#ds with ?i##ah u#der the "ritish motivatio#, -he writer too& it as a
suppositio# rather tha# referri#g to a#y docume#t, 0erhaps+ his #o#-co#sultatio# of
the 0u#ja. %over#orGs
*ort#ightly <eports co#vi#ced him to misi#terpret the situatio#, -he correspo#de#ce
.etwee# the 0u#ja. %over#or a#d the Ticeroy clarifies that the ?i##ah-Si&a#dar 0act
was a perso#al decisio# of Sir Si&a#der a#d it was asto#ishi#g for the "ritish as well,
4ctually+ Sir Si&a#dar came to the co#clusio# that o#ly ?i##ahGs support could save
him from the formida.le !o#gress a#d 4&ali Si&hs who had already .ee# u#ited i#
the 4ssem.ly a# year .efore, Sa#gat Si#gh co#cluded that Ithe ;#io#ists committed
the same .lu#der which the 4&alis had committed earlier .y ma&i#g 4&ali legislators
to accept !o#gress discipli#e,J
-he !o#gress-4&ali u#ity i# the 4ssem.ly alarmed Sir Si&a#dar who sought the
Aeague support, 4ccordi#g to Kal.-i-4.id+ Sir Si&a#der .ecause of the Corld Car //
could #ot afford the desertio# towards Aeague .ecause this tilt a#d popularity of the
Aeague could upset the Si&hs, -hough+ the threat from the !o#gress a#d 4&ali 6al
seems to .e pote#t however+ #o simple factor pushed Sir Si&a#dar to have a pact
with the Aeague i#stead all major a#d mi#or #euroses co#vi#ced him to come to
terms with the Aeague,
-he ?i##ah-Si&a#dar 0act stre#gthe#ed .oth the ;#io#is 0arty a#d the Aeague .ut at
the same time+ it also resulted i# the .itter#ess .etwee# Muslims a#d Si&hs i# the
0u#ja., Sir Si&a#dar could #ot visualise what side-effects the pact would have o# the
future politics, -he Si&h apprehe#sio#s i#creased .ecause the pact declared the
;#io#ist Muslims as the Aeague mem.ers while the Aeague was perceived as the
e#emy of the Si&h i#terests i# the 0u#ja. although they had #o evide#ce to prove the
Aeague as a# a#ti-Si&hs party, -he political i#terdepe#de#ce had .ou#d them i#to
coalitio# which the Si&hs had a.sor.ed as a #ecessary evil, -he other attractio# was
the official a#d social .e#efits which were possi.le i# the u#ity u#der which the cross-
commu#al phe#ome#o# was .ei#g projected, -he ?i##ah-Si&a#dar 0act shattered
co#fide#ce of Si&hs+ #evertheless they .ecame satisfied o# the clause of the 0act
which mai#tai#ed the e3isti#g arra#geme#ts i# the 4ssem.ly,
-his clause saved the #o#-Muslim a#d Muslim ;#io#ist coalitio# .y sideli#i#g the
Aeague, Sir Omerso# was pleased o# the positio# of Sir Si&a#dar a#d wrote to
Ai#lithgow o# 1 'ovem.er 193@ that the popularity of Sir Si&a#dar amo#g Si&hs a#d
$i#dus had saved the 0u#ja. coalitio# gover#me#t, -he 0remier e#joyed cordial
relatio#s with <aja 'are#dra 'ath who forced 6r, %o&al !ha#d 'ara#g to ca#cel the
u#ited $i#du co#fere#ce i# Aahore which was .ei#g held agai#st the ;#io#ist
Muslims, -he Si&hs disapproved the ?i##ah-Si&a#der 0act a#d projected it as a
co#spiracy agai#st the #atio#alists a#d commu#al harmo#y, 4 meeti#g at <awalpi#di
was arra#ged i# 'ovem.er 193B u#der Sardar "aldev Si#gh, -he 4&ali a#d !o#gress
flags were waved together a#d it passed a#ti-;#io#ist remar&s, -he spea&ers also
advised the Si&h audie#ces to joi# the !o#gress, Sajjad Daheer+ a !ommu#ist
ideologue+ comme#ted that the ?i##ah-Si&a#dar pact was Ia short-sighted policy o#
the part of the Aeague,J "ut the actual positio# was that+ the Aeague lost less a#d
gai#ed more from this pact, /t .rought a revolutio#ary shift i# the power of the
Muslim politics, -he gover#me#t officials a#d commo# Muslims perceived the Aeague
as the real power of the #ear future, ?i##ah was perceived as leader of the 0remier
so the pu.lic started complai#i#g to ?i##ah agai#st the provi#cial a#d ce#tral
gover#me#t, *or e3ample+ i# 4ugust 193B+ the people appealed to ?i##ah to help the
jo.-hu#ti#g Muslims, -he impressio# emerged that Sir Si&a#dar could #ot dare to
overloo& ?i##ahGs orders,
-he popularity of the Aeague was a sig# of the dow#fall of the ;#io#ist gover#me#t,
-he ;#io#istsG performa#ce we#t so low that ultimately it resulted i# its political
decli#e, /# 6ecem.er 193@+ the %over#or had to report that the ;#io#ist Mi#isters
were #ot arra#gi#g pu.lic meeti#gs while the !ommu#ist a#d the !o#gress leaders
had .ee# wor&i#g actively i# co#tacti#g the masses, -o him+ the 0remier &ept him
.usy i# the trivial admi#istrative issues i# the provi#ce, 4ll such cha#ges proved fatal
for the ;#io#ist 0arty while the decay of the ;#io#ists was a sig# of AeagueGs
domi#a#ce,
%radually+ the Aeague started ma&i#g its positio# stro#ge i# the 0u#ja. .ut the
u#just policies of the !o#gress mi#istries did more tha# other factors i# populari=i#g
the Aeague amo#g the /#dia# Muslims, Ove# .efore the passage of the Aahore
<esolutio# of 1970+ the Muslims were me#tally prepared to give full support to the
Aeague, /# ?a#uary 1939+ a.out 9+000 Muslims gathered i# 0at#a to atte#d the
Aeague meeti#g, -he press prese#ted the Aeague as the sole represe#tative party of
the /#dia# Muslims, $asa# 'i=ami e3pressed that the "ritish a#d the $i#dus should
wit#ess this recog#itio# of the Aeague a#d ho#our the reality otherwise it could .e
da#gerous for them, $e further reiterated that hatred was growi#g agai#st them day
.y day, $e also appreciated ?i##ah for his sagacious deali#g with the rival parties o#
the commu#al matters,
-he !o#gress leadership too& #o prude#t actio# i# deali#g with the commu#al issue
at the crucial stage i#stead they tried to let dow# the Aeague a#d its leadership, -he
Si&hs also remai#ed adama#tly with the !o#gress which #arrowed their role i# the
politics,
/# the sum+ the electio#s of 193@ were a starti#g poi#t for the AeagueGs participatio#
i# the regio#al politics a#d after the electio#s it prospered day .y day as far as the
massive support was co#cer#ed, /t did #ot loose its .ase+ ideology+ wor&i#g tempo
a#d co#fide#ce though it got two seats i# the first co#test, -he culmi#atio# poi#t of
its effort was the passi#g of the Aahore <esolutio# i# 1970+ just over years+ whe# it
declared a political war agai#st the philosophy of u#ited /#dia which all the
outsta#di#g factio#s such as the "ritish+ $i#dus+ Si&hs+ a#d #atio#alist Muslims
.elieved i#, 4 defeated party could #ot .e as assertive i# the political domai# as the
Aeague did, Moreover+ if the Aeague was followi#g the "ritish dictatio#+ the# it was
#ot supposed to go agai#st the will a#d ideology of the "ritish masters, -he AeagueGs
age#da dictated .y the "ritish should have .ee# o.served .y the ;#io#ists as well, /f
the Aeague was .ac&ed .y the "ritish+ the# the ;#io#ists a#d "ritish should #ot have
opposed the Aahore <esolutio# a#d the Aeague leadership, !o#sideri#g the Aeague as
a sister party+ 1if the 0remier had revived the Aeague u#der the "ritish dictatio#2 the
Si&hs+ $i#dus a#d ;#io#ist Muslims should have stre#gthe#ed the positio# of M4
?i##ah, "ut to the co#trary+ all of them+ alo#g with the "ritish made joi#t efforts to
de#y the true status of the Aeague which ratifies that the Aeague was #ot depe#di#g
o# the "ritish support .ut it was truly a represe#tative party of the /#dia# Muslims
which #ever compromised o# )uestio# of the Muslim rights,
-he Aeague leadership proved its sagacity i# the political affairs a#d caused crac&s i#
the a#ti-Aeague a#d pro-"ritish fort i# the 0u#ja., -herefore+ the electio#s of 193@
did #ot damage their image .ut populari=ed them amo#g the masses of the 0u#ja.,
-he Muslim massive respo#se made the Aeague so assertive a#d co#fide#t i# the
political domai# that it adopted the character of a mass party withi# a short spa# of
time,
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU UU
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
"egi#s
#9
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
"a vs ia;;;;
"a!istan Air ,orce vs; Indian Air ,orce
0a&ista# 4ir *orce 104*2 a#d /#dia# 4ir *orce 1/4*2 are the two regio#al forces
fre)ue#tly at war a#d e#gaged i# a #ever e#di#g arms race, $istory has proved 04*
to .e superior whe#ever the two forces were i#volved i# air com.at, -his was
primarily attri.uted to sou#d professio#alism a#d trai#i#g of 04* crew+ great
servicea.ility a#d up&eep of war reserves a#d a slight tech#ological edge of 04* over
/4*, /4* a#alysts co#cluded that 04*Gs possessio# of air to air missiles a#d a si#gle
operatio#al s)uadro# of superso#ic mach 1twice the speed of sou#d2 fighters a#d
their a.se#ce with the /4* provided 04* pilots with a treme#dous adva#tage a#d
were demorali=i#g for the /4* aircrew, /4*Gs #umerical superiority was effectively
#eutrali=ed a#d proved of little avail i# the co#flict,
%ive# the importa#ce of air power i# moder# warfare+ a crucial factor to a#aly=e the
outcome of a#y co#flict .etwee# 0a&ista# a#d /#dia .ecomes a#aly=i#g the via.ility
of each air force, "oth the forces reali=ed this fact lear#i#g from various co#flicts a#d
strived si#ce the# to achieve tech#ological edge over the other, 04* suffered a lot i#
this regard i# past two decades as 0a&ista# was o#e of the most sa#ctio#ed cou#tries
i# the world a#d sa#ctio#s were focused mai#ly o# military hardware, 4s a result of
sa#ctio#s+ 04* resorted to e3plore .lac& mar&et spares for e3isti#g fleet at lower
prices a#d made a tur# towards !hi#ese emergi#g tech#ology, 4 fair #um.er of
Mirage airframes a#d e#gi#es were purchased from #atio#s that had moth.alled a#d
retired them+ at a throwaway price, Ma#y of these were refur.ished a#d made fully
servicea.le+ some through i#dige#ous effort a#d some through foreig# co#tractors,
Moreover+ 04* i#ducted a huge #um.er of *-@0 a#d *-@0% aircrafts from !hi#a
spe#di#g comparatively less reve#ue a#d modified them for air defe#se role, -he
joi#t ve#ture of !hi#a a#d 0a&ista# also came i#to e3iste#ce i# the form of ?*-1@
aircraft which matched the capa.ilities of a#y moder# jet at a fractio# of price, -his
happe#ed primarily .ecause of sa#ctio#s that 04* has a mi3ture of war assets a#d
tech#ologies difficult for the e#emy to jam a#d i#tercept, / would comme#t that 04*
always &ept a mi#imum deterre#ce level with /4* smartly a#d efficie#tly spe#di#g a
very fractio# of mo#ey that /4* did,
-he capa.ility of air forces at the daw# of 011 is .eyo#d the #um.er a#d )uality of
jet fighters, Olectro#ic Carfare capa.ilities form a# importa#t eleme#t of moder#
warfare, "ased o# this prove# fact+ capa.ility of a#y air force is measured .y the
tech#ology of grou#d .ased se#sors+ #etwor& ce#tric operatio#s capa.ility+ stre#gth
of 4ir.or#e Oarly Car#i#g a#d !o#trol Systems+ 4vio#ics suite o# the air.or#e
platforms+ security of commu#icatio# a#d i#formatio#+ sophisticated weapo#s with
accurate delivery mecha#isms a#d Multirole capa.ilities of jet fighters, -hese
i#dicators e#a.le prompt decisio#s from higher echelo#s i# war sce#ario a#d thus
i#flicti#g heavy stri&es i# the e#emy territory without .ei#g #oticed a#d i#tercepted
.y e#emy radars, -he rule of the moder# air com.at is simple5 'o#e of your aircraft
gets #oticed .y e#emy radars a#d #o#e of e#emyGs aircraft gets .la#&ed from your
radars, "oth /4* a#d 04* have .ee# wor&i#g hard i# last few years to achieve
ma3imum tech#ological edge i# terms of electro#ic a#d #etwor& ce#tric warfare, /#
su.se)ue#t paragraphs+ / will a#aly=e a#d compare .oth air forces .ased o# various
i#dicators a#d capa.ilities specified a.ove,
&ombat Aircrats
"A, &apabilit'
0a&ista# 4ir *orce has a great history to cherish whe# it comes to air com.at, -his
was #ot .ecause of the #um.er of com.at aircrafts .ut the sou#d professio#alism of
its crew, 04* today carries appro3imately 790 com.at aircrafts o# its fleet of differe#t
varia#ts,
-he most capa.le fighter i# 04* service remai#s *-16 *ighti#g *alco#, 70 of the *-16
"loc& 19 models were delivered to 04* from 19B3 to 19B@, 6eliveries of a#other B
*-16s were stopped after the 1990 arms em.argo imposed o# 0a&ista# u#der the
0ressler 4me#dme#t .ut 17 of these were later delivered duri#g 009-00B, -he
prese#t *-16 fleet is .ei#g upgraded with MA; 1Mid-Aife ;pdate2 modificatio# &its a#d
*alco# Star Structural Service Aife O#ha#ceme#t &its .y -ur&ish 4erospace /#dustries,
-he MA; pac&age will i#clude #ew 40%-69 radars+ ?oi#t $elmet Mou#ted !uei#g
Systems alo#g with #ew commu#icatio#s+ targeti#g+ data li#& a#d electro#ic warfare
systems, -his upgrade will e#ha#ce the capa.ilities of more tha# a decade old fleet of
*-16s which would help reduce the yaw#i#g tech#ological gap with the /4*,
/# 006+ 1 *-16! a#d 6 *-166 "loc& 98 models were ordered with a further 1B
aircraft optio#al, 17 of the optio#al fighters were ordered i# 010, -he first .atch of 3
*-16!X6 fighters la#ded at 04* "ase Shah.a=+ ?acaco.ad+ o# 6 ?u#e+ 010, 4#
additio# of B *-16s with latest avio#ics suite would ma&e it a very pote#t weapo#
agai#st a#y /4* aircraft a#d .oost 04*Gs co#ve#tio#al deterre#ce, 4#d this
e#ha#ceme#t of 04*Gs deterre#ce will .e achieved at a fractio# of the cost of
purchasi#g a #ew weapo# system of a similar class li&e the *re#ch Mirage 000-9s,
-he B *-16s are priced at less tha# three millio# dollars a piece i# the i#ter#atio#al
mar&et, -heir mid life upgrade would cost a.out seve# a#d a half millio#s per piece
ma&i#g their u#it cost to .e a.out te# millio# dollars, 4 compara.le pla#e from
Ourope would cost at least five times as much+ .esides ta&i#g a much lo#ger period
for full assimilatio#,
-he ?*-1@ -hu#der+ a #ew fighter joi#tly developed .y !hi#a a#d 0a&ista#+ is
curre#tly .ei#g i#ducted .y the 04* a#d it is e3pected to gradually replace all
6assault Mirage ///X9+ 'a#cha#g 4-9 a#d !he#gdu *-@ aircrafts .y 019, 4 total of
90-300 aircrafts are pla##ed to .e .uilt+ with later aircrafts featuri#g improved
airframes+ avio#ics a#d e#gi#es, !urre#tly 17 aircrafts are i# service a#d the first ?*-
1@ s)uadro# is officially made operatio#al, -he first 0a&ista#i-.uilt ?*-1@+
ma#ufactured at the 0a&ista# 4ero#autical !omple3+ was rolled out a#d ha#ded over
to the 04* o# 3 'ovem.er 009, -he -hu#der may .e classified as a RMedium -echG
pla#e whe# compared to ;S4*Gs *- a#d *re#ch <afale+ .ut i# the /#dia W 0a&ista#
sce#ario especially i# the air defe#ce role it should serve the #atio# well for at least
two decades, /ts adva#ced 4/ radar+ avio#ics+ defe#sive suites a#d "T< capa.ility
would ma&e it a very pote#t aircraft agai#st a#y /4* fighter,
-he upgrade of old *-16s+ i#ductio# of #ew "loc& 9 models a#d locally developed ?*-
1@ multi role com.at pla#es provide 04* with "T< capa.ility thus e#di#g e3clusive
/4* "T< edge over 04*, 04* is also pla##i#g to add a few #um.er of 4merica# a#d
!hi#ese "T<s to its i#ve#tory with capa.ilities matchi#g to its adversary havi#g
ma3imum target ra#ge of 70 Lm, -he great avio#ics suite coupled with "T<
capa.ility will surely drive #uts to /4* pilots i# air com.at,
-he other air defe#ce fighter i# 04* fleet is the !he#gdu *-@+ of which two varia#ts
are i# serviceV 10 *-@0 a#d 60 *-@0%, 4# upgraded varia#t of the *-@M+ *-@0
i#corporates ma#y 04*-specific modificatio#s such as Marti#-"a&er ejectio# seat+ two
e3tra weapo# statio#s for a total of 9+ a# e3tra 30 mm ca##o# a#d a# /talia#-
desig#ed */4< %rifo @ multi-mode radar, *-@0 was i#ducted i# the late 19B0s a#d
early 1990s+ i#te#ded to suppleme#t a fleet of more adva#ced *-16 fighters, -he
%rifo @ radar was later upgraded to the %rifo @ m&,// versio#, -he *-@0% varia#t
i#corporates a Icra#&ed deltaJ wi#g which improves ta&e-off+ la#di#g a#d tur#i#g
performa#ce co#sidera.ly+ as well as e3tra space i# the #ose to accommodate the
much improved %rifo @0% radar, *-@ replaced arou#d 90 She#ya#g *-6 fighters
which were the 04*Gs wor&horse throughout the 19@0s a#d 19B0s, *-@ is also used to
perform limited stri&e duties,
-he seco#d most #umerous type is the *re#ch-desig#ed 6assault Mirage /// a#d
6assault Mirage 9+ which differ mai#ly i# #ose shape a#d avio#ics fit, Mirage ///
fighters are geared towards performi#g multiple missio# types+ i#cludi#g i#terceptio#
a#d stri&e+ whereas Mirage 9 fighters are more focused towards stri&e missio#s,
4rou#d 190 Mirage fighters are i# service+ ma#y of which are seco#d-ha#d e3amples
procured from other cou#tries+ ma&i#g the 04* the largest operator of the type i# the
world, /# the 1990s a#d early 000s+ 33 Mirage /// a#d 37 Mirage 9 fighters were
upgraded u#der 0roject <HSO 1<etrofit of Stri&e Oleme#t2 with moder# avio#ics+
sig#ifica#tly improvi#g their capa.ilities, Mirage /// <HSO fighters are co#figured for
multiple missio# types such as air superiority a#d stri&e+ whereas Mirage 9 <HSO
fighters speciali=e i# the dayX#ight stri&e role, -hrough pai#sta&i#g research a#d staff
wor& 04* succeeded i# ree)uippi#g a su.sta#tial portio# of its Mirage fleet with 4/
radar whose performa#ce eclipsed that of the *-16 radar, Modified to carry the all
aspect heat-see&i#g air to air missiles+ e3celle#t 4/ radar+ additio# of defe#sive
electro#ic suites a#d the speed to match the adversary+ the 04* Mirages have .ee#
co#verted i#to pote#t air defe#ce platforms,
-he 'a#cha#g 4-9! 1or 4-9///2 is a !hi#ese-desig#ed light .om.er, /#ducted i# 19B
to help defe#d agai#st a possi.le attac& from the Soviet ;#io#+ it replaced the last of
the 04*Gs "-9@ !a#.erra .om.ers a#d arou#d 100 were procured i# total for a
reported flyaway cost of ;S6M1 millio# each, 'um.ers were reduced later a#d
arou#d 7 remai# i# service, <etireme#t of the type was i#itially pla##ed i# the late
1990s a#d shortfall i# capa.ilities was to .e met .y upgraded Mirage 9 fighters
modified u#der 0roject <HSO+ .ut the aircraftGs e3celle#t flight safety record e#sured
it stayed operatio#al,
04* is pla##i#g to i#duct a #um.er of the !hi#ese !he#gdu *!-0+ a# adva#ced 04*-
specific varia#t of the !he#gdu ?-10, 36 fighters e)uippi#g two *!-0 s)uadro#s are
e3pected to .e delivered .y 019 a#d+ accordi#g to some reports+ the *!-0 fleet
may eve#tually .e i#creased to 190 fighters,
"ecause of a limited #um.er of com.at aircrafts+ 04* crew has .ee# sweati#g hard
day a#d #ight for &eepi#g the fleet at ma3imum level of operatio#al readi#ess,
-ogether+ all .ra#ches of 04* are deliveri#g u#precede#ted servicea.ility rates of
arou#d B9 perce#t a#d efficie#t ma#ageme#t of all resources, -he aggressive spirit
a#d readi#ess status of the 04* was o#e of the pri#cipal factors amo#gst ma#y
others that eve#tually made /#dia .li#& first a#d withdraw without a#y preco#ditio#s
.efore a#y e#cou#ter,
IA, &apabilit'
/4* operates appro3imately 7@1 fighters a#d 69 .om.ers of "ritish+ <ussia# a#d
*re#ch origi#, <ussia# aircrafts domi#ate /4* i#ve#tory which have #ot proved
worthwhile for /#dia i# past air .attles, /4* has always &ept #umerical superiority
over 04* a#d today /4* has a tech#ological edge over 04* as well, -his is attri.uta.le
mai#ly to a decade of sa#ctio#s imposed o# 0a&ista#, 04*+ .ei#g aware of this fact+ is
#ot far away from mi#imi=i#g this tech#ological gap a#d will .e a much superior air
force .y 019 i# terms of tech#ology,
-he primary air superiority fighter flow# .y /4* is Su&hoi Su-30 ML/, -he Su&hoi Su-
30ML/ is a multirole com.at aircraft joi#tly developed .y <ussiaGs Su&hoi !orporatio#
a#d /#diaGs $i#dusta# 4ero#autics Aimited 1$4A2 for the /#dia# 4ir *orce 1/4*2, 4
varia#t of the Su&hoi Su-30+ it is a# all-weather capa.le+ heavy class+ lo#g-ra#ge air
superiority fighter which ca# also act as a stri&e fighter aircraft, -he aircraft features
state of the art avio#ics developed .y <ussia+ /#dia a#d /srael which i#cludes display+
#avigatio#+ targeti#g a#d electro#ic warfare systems, Hther &ey avio#ics used i# the
aircraft were sourced from *ra#ce a#d South 4frica, Su&hoi Su-30 ML/ is highly
ma#euvera.le a#d it has the capa.ility to carry all aspect medium a#d lo#g ra#ge
laser guided+ radar guided+ -T guided a#d i#frared homi#g see&er air to air missiles
o# 1 hard poi#ts, 4#ti-Ship missiles+ !ruise missiles a#d !luster .om.s ca# also .e
hu#g o# few of its hard poi#ts, -his si#gle aircraft fulfills all /4* #eeds for attai#i#g
air superiority over 04*,
-he Mi&oya# Mi%-9 is the /4*Gs dedicated air superiority fighter a#d forms the
seco#d li#e of defe#ce for the /4* after the Su&hoi Su-30ML/, -he /4* operates 69
Mi%-9s+ all of which are curre#tly .ei#g upgraded to the Mi%-9SM- sta#dard with
state of the art avio#ics+ upgraded radar a#d air-to-air refueli#g to i#crease
e#dura#ce, 4ccordi#g to /#dia# sources+ two Mi%-9s from the /4*Gs 'o, 7@ s)uadro#
1"lac& 4rchers2 gai#ed missile loc& o# two *-16s of the 0a&ista# 4ir *orce 104*2
which were patrolli#g close to the .order to preve#t a#y i#cursio#s .y /#dia# aircraft+
.ut did #ot e#gage them .ecause #o official declaratio# of war had .ee# issued, -he
/#dia# Mi%-9s were armed with .eyo#d-visual-ra#ge air-to-air missiles whereas the
0a&ista#i *-16s were #ot,
-he 6assault Mirage 000 is a *re#ch multirole+ si#gle-e#gi#e fourth-ge#eratio# jet
fighter ma#ufactured .y 6assault 4viatio#, -he /4* curre#tly operates 91 Mirage
000$s, /#dia has assig#ed the #uclear stri&e role to its Mirage 000 s)uadro#s i#
service with the /#dia# 4ir *orce si#ce 19B9, /# 1999 whe# the Largil co#flict .ro&e
out+ the Mirage 000 performed remar&a.ly well duri#g the whole co#flict i# the high
$imalayas+ eve# though the Mirages supplied to /#dia had limited air i#terdictio#
capa.ility a#d had to .e heavily modified to drop laser-guided .om.s as well as
co#ve#tio#al u#guided .om.s, -wo Mirage s)uadro#s flew a total of 919 sorties+ a#d
i# 70 stri&e missio#s dropped 99+000 &g 110+000 l.2 of ord#a#ce, Oasy
mai#te#a#ce a#d a very high sortie rate made the Mirage 000 o#e of the most
efficie#t fighters of the /#dia# 4ir *orce i# the co#flict,
-he Mi&oya#-%urevich Mi%-1 is a superso#ic jet fighter aircraft+ desig#ed .y the
Mi&oya#-%urevich 6esig# "ureau i# the Soviet ;#io#, /# 1961+ the /#dia# 4ir *orce
1/4*2 opted to purchase the Mi%-1 over several other Cester# competitors .ecause
the Soviet ;#io# offered /#dia full tra#sfer of tech#ology a#d rights for local
assem.ly, -he Mi&oya#-%urevich Mi%-1 serves as a# /#terceptor aircraft i# the /4*,
-he /4* curre#tly operates a.out 00 Mi%-1s+ 11 of which have .ee# upgraded to
Mi%-1 "iso# sta#dard, Chile the Mi%-1 "iso# is li&ely to .e i# service till 01@+ the
remai#i#g aircraft are e3pected to .e phased out .y 013, -he Mi%-1s are pla##ed
to .e replaced .y the i#dige#ously .uilt $4A -ejas,
-he $4A -ejas is a lightweight multirole jet fighter developed .y /#dia, /t is a tailless+
compou#d delta wi#g desig# powered .y a si#gle e#gi#e, /t came from the Aight
!om.at 4ircraft 1A!42 programme+ which was started i# the 19B0s to replace /#diaGs
agei#g Mi%-1 fighters, -his aircraft features moder# state of the art avio#ics
i#cludi#g 'ight Tisio# %oggles 1'T%2 compati.le glass coc&pit+ *orward Aoo&i#g
/#frared 1*A/<2 a#d state of the art radar, -he aircraft co#tai#s secure commu#icatio#
e)uipme#t a#d data li#&s, -his aircraft will perform as good as 04* i#dige#ously
developed ?*-1@ thu#der aircraft i# air com.at,
-he Mi&oya# Mi%-@ is a varia.le-geometry grou#d-attac& aircraft+ origi#ally .uilt .y
the Mi&oya# desig# .ureau i# the Soviet ;#io# a#d later lice#se-produced i# /#dia .y
$i#dusta# 4ero#autics, H# @ May 1999+ duri#g the Largil Car+ o#e /#dia# Mi%-@
was lost together with a Mi%-1 while supporti#g /#dia# grou#d offe#sive i# Lashmir
regio#, "oth pilots ejected a#d o#e of them+ *light Aieute#a#t L,'achi&eta was later
captured .y 0a&ista#i forces a#d the other o#e S)#, Adr,4jay 4huja is .elieved to
have ejected safely+ .ut was su.se)ue#tly &illed .y the 0a&ista#is, Si#ce 001+ the
/#dia# 4ir *orce lost 13 Mi%-@s i# differe#t crashes,
-he SO0O!4- ?aguar is a# 4#glo-*re#ch jet grou#d attac& aircraft+ origi#ally used i#
the close air support a#d #uclear stri&e role .y the /#dia# 4ir *orce, /#dia# ?aguars
were used to carry out reco##aissa#ce missio#s i# support of the /#dia# 0eace
Leepi#g *orce i# Sri Aa#&a .etwee# 19B@ a#d 1990, -hey later played a# active role
i# the 1999 Largil Car with 0a&ista#+ droppi#g .oth u#guided a#d laser-guided
.om.s+ the /4* defi#i#g its role as a Ideep pe#etrati#g stri&e aircraftJ, -he ?aguar
remai#s a# importa#t eleme#t of the /#dia# military as+ alo#g with the Mirage 000+
the ?aguar is viewed as o#e of the few aircraft curre#tly capa.le of performi#g the
#uclear stri&e role with reaso#a.le cha#ces of success, -he ?aguar was also used i#
small #um.ers for the a#ti-ship role+ e)uipped with the Sea Oagle missile,
Anal'sis
6espite #umerical superiority+ M/% aircrafts have a .ig crash rate i# /4*, /4* a#alysts
have attri.uted i#creasi#g rate of M/% crashes to poor mai#te#a#ce practices a#d low
level of professio#alism i# /4* pilots, M/% aircrafts are i#ferior i# )uality to 4merica#
cou#terparts a#d thus very difficult to mai#tai#, -his co#se)ue#tly decreases the
servicea.ility rate a#d i#flue#ces the operatio#al readi#ess of /4*, Moreover+ <ussia#
jet e#gi#es have .ee# a major source of pro.lem i# /4* M/% aircrafts which have
.ee# #ic&#amed I*lyi#g !offi#sJ, /4* mai#te#a#ce crews are #ot as dilige#t+ their
mai#ly <ussia#XSoviet tech#ology is ge#erally less relia.le a#d less effective tha#
advertised+ a#d a large part of their fleet of Mi%-1s a#d Mi%-@s are outdated, 04*
aircraft are either of Cester# stoc& or !hi#ese a#d are far more mai#te#a#ce frie#dly,
0a&ista# has also .ee# upgradi#g their aircraft massively a#d has i#corporated a
comple3 com.i#atio# of tech#ology from across the glo.e W from !hi#a to "ra=il+
from Ourope to the ;S, /4* aircraft are mai#ly of SovietX<ussia# origi# a#d are #ot
desig#ed for easy mai#te#a#ce, -he Soviets desig#ed aircraft for mass productio#
a#d o# the view that com.at aircraft would have short lives i# a full scale co#flict, 4s
such+ ease of mai#te#a#ce was the last item o# their mi#d, Ove# the latest /#dia#
ac)uisitio# of <ussia# aircraft+ the Su-30 ML/ is &#ow# for .ei#g highly mai#te#a#ce
i#te#sive a#d e3tremely fragile, Modificatio#s to the *la#&ers have made them eve#
more difficult to mai#tai# W a#d e3ample .ei#g that /4* sometimes faces tire
shortages .ecause the i#creased to##age of the /#dia# *A4'LO<s ma&e their tires
.ur# out very rapidly,
4 .ig tech#ological gap was created o#ce /4* claimed to have "eyo#d Tisual <a#ge
1"T<2 capa.ility, "T< missile firi#g capa.ility provides the first shot opportu#ity to
a#y 4ir force+ especially agai#st a #o# "T< capa.le adversary, /#dia# 4* has .ee#
practici#g "T< missile lau#ches si#ce last two decades a#d #ow /4* is lear#i#g
adva#ce tactics with foreig# 4ir forces i# order to effectively employ its "T< missiles,
-oday /4* has a .ig i#ve#tory of <ussia# origi# "T< missiles a#d "T< lau#chi#g
capa.ility o# majority of aircrafts i# /4* fleet, -he truth .ehi#d the sce#e was
revealed duri#g a "T< missile firi#g camp co#ducted .y /4* whe# all fired "T<s from
various platforms missed their targets, *ailure of missiles to successfully e#gage the
targets really u#dermi#es <ussia# claim of I*ire a#d *orgetJ of their missiles
performa#ce,
H# the other ha#d+ due to various u#avoida.le reaso#s 04* was de#ied this capa.ility
a#d thus was forced to co#ti#ue relyi#g o# the short ra#ge /< missiles, -oday after a
decade of "T< tech#ological gap+ 04* has got the capa.ility of lau#chi#g "T<s o# *-
16s a#d ?*-1@s, 04* gai#ed "T< capa.ility after sig#i#g a .iggest ever si#gle e3port
order deal with ;,S i# the history of 4/M-10 4M<44M programme, -he missiles will
.e carried .y the 04*s #ewly ordered *-16!X6 "loc& 90X9 aircraft a#d its e3isti#g *-
164X" "loc& 19s+ which will ac)uire 4M<44M compati.ility as part of a mid-life
upgrade, 0a&ista# is also e3pected to ac)uire the !hi#ese-developed S6-10 10A-12
44M with its ?*-1@ -hu#der lightweight fighters, S6-10s would also .e part of a#y
pote#tial !he#gdu ?-10 order,
Air 5eense &apabilities
"A, &apabilit'
/# a#y future co#flict+ a stro#g air defe#se .ecomes a.solutely esse#tial for .oth 04*
a#d /4*, 4c)uisitio# of fresh radar se#sors+ their automatio#+ security of comma#d
a#d co#trol systems+ a larger a#d varied i#ve#tory of surface to air missiles a#d more
cohesive i#ter-service co-ordi#atio# are some of the areas that figure high i# the
priority list of .oth the forces, -he air defe#se set up has followi#g compo#e#ts W
#amely W armed i#terceptors+ surface to air missiles+ grou#d .ased se#sor #etwor&
a#d aircraft mou#ted radar platforms,
04* has i#vested efficie#tly i# this area .y procuri#g a wide ra#ge of 4merica# a#d
!hi#ese grou#d .ased moder# radars, -hese radars have .ee# deployed at optimum
locatio#s a#d elevated platforms to loo& deep i#side e#emy territory, Moreover+ this
variety of radars mea#s variatio# of tech#ology a#d thus ma&i#g it difficult for the
e#emy to apply cou#ter measures for jammi#g a#d i#terceptio#, -hese radars have
i#tegrated Olectro#ic !ou#ter !ou#ter Measures to .loc& a#y high power jammi#g
tra#smissio#s from the e#emy platforms,
-he limitatio# of la#d .ased radars of #ot .ei#g a.le to loo& .eyo#d a limited
dista#ce at low level due to curvature of the earth has give# way to the high speed
low level i#truders to remai# u# detected, -herefore+ there was a re)uireme#t to
attai# a capa.ility of aircraft mou#ted radar platforms with state of the art
tech#ology, -his capa.ility #amed 4C4!S 14ir.or#e Oarly Car#i#g a#d !o#trol
System2 was pursued largely .y 04* i# few rece#t years, 6espite the up gradatio# of
e3isti#g three 64-0 mou#ted state of the art platforms+ 04* has added four S44"-
000 1Swedish2 a#d four D6L-03 1!hi#ese2 air.or#e early war#i#g a#d co#trol
system aircrafts to its i#ve#tory, -hese aircrafts are capa.le of providi#g rou#d the
cloc& defe#se to 0a&ista#Gs aerial fro#tiers, -hese systems employ various Olectro#ic
/#tellige#ce 1OA/'-2+ !ommu#icatio# /#tellige#ce 1!HM/'-2 a#d Olectro#ic !ou#ter
Measures 1O!M2 features to preve#t agai#st jammi#g .y high power tra#smissio#s
from hostile eleme#ts, -hese platforms co#tai# multifu#ctio#al displays with state of
the art tech#ology havi#g target detectio# ra#ge of appro3imately 790 Lilometers,
-he use of these aircrafts has .ee# e#visaged i# multiple support roles of air defe#se
operatio#s+ stri&e guida#ce+ escorts+ army a#d #aval support missio#s, -hese
systems have i#tegrated /** capa.ility a#d they alo#g with other grou#d .ased
e)uipme#t have a commu#icatio# a#d radar jammi#g capa.ility, 04* has procured
these systems at a fractio# of price o#ce compared to very costly 4merica# .ased
systems,
04* operates #umerous com.at aircrafts for air defe#se operatio#s, -ill 1990+ *-16s
were the fro#t li#e air defe#ce i#terceptors with the 04*5 the Mirage a#d *-@s were
less effective, 4fter their successful modificatio#s+ /4* #ow has to co#te#d with
e)ually+ a#d i# some cases more pote#t i#terceptors, 04* had ma#aged+ at a fractio#
of price+ to mai#tai# a credi.le deterre#ce despite overwhelmi#g odds,
Surface to air weapo#ry is a# importa#t eleme#t of air defe#ce of a#y air force, /t is
a# i#tegrated part of huge air defe#ce #etwor& which i#cludes grou#d a#d air .ased
radars a#d com.at aircrafts, 04* co#tai#s a .ig variety of surface to air missiles
capa.le to target a#y moder# jet fighter, -he variety of surface to air missiles
i#cludes !rotale 7000+ Spada 000+ $K-+ $K-9+ <"S @0+ 4#=a+ Mistral a#d $atf,
-hese missiles ca# .e lau#ched from various porta.le platforms a#d ca# i#tercept
e#emy missiles a#d aircrafts at the ra#ge of appro3imately 30 Lms,
IA, &apabilit'
/#dia is i# the middle of a massive moder#i=atio# effort i# its air defe#se
i#frastructure, Si#ce the year 007 /#dia has started i#tegrati#g military a#d civilia#
assets+ chiefly airfields a#d radars+ for .etter air defe#se surveilla#ce, /#dia has also
i#tegrated software tech#ologies a#d imported hardware i#to the air defe#se
surveilla#ce mecha#ism, <ussia#+ *re#ch a#d 4merica# hardware a#d software are
helpi#g /#dia a lot, /#dia has to watch !hi#a o# the 'orth+ 0a&ista# o# the Cest a#d
"a#gladesh i# the Oast, /# additio#+ Sri Aa#&a is also a hot pot of pro.lems, -he gaps
are i# the areas of air surveilla#ce detectio# a#d operatio#al readi#ess, /# the age of
#uclear-armed 0a&ista# a#d !hi#a+ a delay of a few seco#ds ca# .e devastati#g, /4*
is pla##i#g to .uy sophisticated air defe#se e)uipme#t to reduce operatio#al gap
.etwee# detectio# of adversary a#d co#se)ue#t actio# .y i#terceptors,
/#dia+ with its vast airspace+ mai#tai#s a# adva#ced 4ir 6efe#ce %rou#d O#viro#me#t
System, -his system+ alo#g with the civilia# 4ir -raffic !o#trol+ is respo#si.le for the
detectio#+ ide#tificatio# a#d+ if #ecessary+ the i#terceptio# of aircraft i# /#dia#
airspace, -he 4ir 6efe#ce #etwor& is also i# the process of .ei#g upgraded to cater
for .allistic missile threats,
-he radar pic&et li#e of /#dia+ which lies a.out 190&m .ehi#d the .order+ co#sists of
a #um.er of radar clusters, -hese comprise three radar statio#s separated at a
dista#ce of the sum of their radii, -he e)uipme#t issued to these clusters ge#erally
comprises o#e lice#se-made Soviet S--6BX; a#d two 0-1BX-19 radars, -hese are the#
fla#&ed .y two 0-1X-19 radars, -he S--6BX; acts as the !o#trol a#d <eporti#g
!e#tre 1!<!2, -his may have cha#ged somewhat as the S--6B;+ which was plagued
with some #aggi#g developme#t pro.lems+ has largely replaced older Soviet-made
e)uipme#t, Moreover+ /#dia has .ee# lice#se produci#g the *re#ch desig#ed -<S-
196 3-6 surveilla#ce radar for a #um.er of years a#d has derived i#dige#ously
.uilt radar W 0SM-33 M&, from it, -hese have pro.a.ly suppla#ted most of the older
Soviet-.loc e)uipme#t, /t should .e poi#ted out+ that these radars are all lo#g-ra#ge
surveilla#ce types with ra#ges i# e3cess of 300&m a#d good performa#ce agai#st
targets flyi#g at all altitudes W eve# those employi#g electro#ic cou#termeasures
1O!M2, -hese radar pic&ets are respo#si.le for givi#g accurate i#formatio# o# the
i#trudi#g force to the 4ir 6efe#ce !o#trol !e#ters 146!!2 located .ehi#d the radar
pic&et li#e, -he pic&et li#e a#d the 46!! are separated .y a first layer of air defe#ce
weapo#s which are the first to e#gage the i#truders,
-he .ac&.o#e of the /#dia# 4ir 6efe#ce %rou#d O#viro#me#t system is the -$6-1999
3-6 lo#g-ra#ge surveilla#ce radar, -his radar+ origi#ally of *re#ch desig#+ has .ee#
lice#se produced i# /#dia for a #um.er of years, -his radar+ though somewhat elderly+
still has sterli#g performa#ce characteristics a#d is capa.le of ma3imum detectio#
ra#ges of up to 1000 &m+ though i# peacetime the /#dia# 4ir *orce usually limits its
power to a 700&m detectio# ra#ge,
/#diaGs air defe#ses curre#tly rely o# a mi3 of Mi%-1X-3X-9 a#d Mirage 000
i#terceptors a#d thirty-eight s)uadro#s of surface-to-air missiles, -he S4M u#its
comprise 30 s)uadro#s of S4-3. 0echoras a#d B s)uadro#s of S4-B. HS4-4LM
systems a#d are deployed to protect &ey air .ases as well as some major
militaryXi#dustrial ce#ters, /# additio#+ a large #um.er of A-70X@0 radar directed
70mm a#ti-aircraft gu#s a#d ma#-porta.le /gla-1M S4Ms are deployed to provide a
Rlast-ditchG tier of Rhard-&illG defe#ses, /t should .e poi#ted out+ however+ that this
system is geared up to the defe#ce of poi#t targets a#d #ot for overall area defe#ce,
/t also lac&s a via.le capa.ility agai#st .allistic missiles, Cith this i# mi#d+ the /#dia#
4ir *orce has .egu# a massive moder#i=atio# of its strategic air defe#ses,
-he first sig#s that /#dia was moder#i=i#g its air defe#ses came whe# a massive
order was placed for Su&hoi Su-30 com.at aircraft, -hese aircraft are primarily lo#g
ra#ge i#terceptorsV capa.le of i#tercepti#g targets at ra#ges e3ceedi#g 10&m,
/#diaGs i#terceptors are e)uipped with a mi3 of *re#ch a#d <ussia# air-to-air missiles,
Hwi#g to the large #um.er of these aircraft at the disposal of the /4*+ it is impossi.le
for their air defe#ce pote#tial to .e ig#ored,
-o cou#ter the dual #uclear threat from !hi#a a#d 0a&ista#+ /#dia pla#s to ma&e a
comprehe#sive .allistic missile defe#ce system o#e of its major defe#ce priorities,
/#diaGs first efforts i# this field ca# .e see# i# the much delayed 4&ash S4M, -his
medium ra#ge S4M will provide a limited 4-"M capa.ility to /#dia, Moreover+ /#dia
has a##ou#ced pla#s to develop a two-tier .allistic missile defe#ce system to deal
with i#comi#g .allistic missiles, -he system is to use satellites for commu#icatio#s
a#d a u#i)ue two layered defe#sive li#e usi#g surface-to-air missile for a#y i#comi#g
.allistic missile attac&, /#dia has also .ee# e#ha#ci#g its .allistic missile detectio#
capa.ilities .y purchasi#g two /sraeli %ree# 0i#e radars a#d a large #um.er of
4erostat radars,
/#dia# 4ir *orce has .ee# pursui#g a programme for the ac)uisitio# of 4ir.or#e Oarly
Car#i#g P !o#trol System 14C4!S2 capa.ility for over twe#ty years, -his )uest
fi#ally e#ded whe# a co#tract worth 1 .illio# ;SM was sig#ed for supply of three
/sraeli .uilt I0halco#J radar systems for mou#ti#g o# /4*Gs /A-@6 aircraft+ i# 4ugust+
003, 0halco# developed .y /sraeli 4erospace /#dustries is &#ow# to .e the latest
a#d most sophisticated 4C4!S of the world, $owever+ mou#ti#g 0halco# system o#
/A-@6 aircraft was #ot very wise .ecause /A-@6 is #ot very agile a#d does #ot co#tai#
a#y weapo# for self defe#se,
4#other Olectro#ic Carfare platform held with /4* is "oei#g W @3@ which is e)uipped
with /sraeli system a#d i#tegrated with latest state of the art powerful radio jammi#g
system, /4* has also i#ducted %ulf Stream /// as Sta#d offXOscort ?ammer which is
fitted with /talia# OC suit, 4.ove all+ /4* has i#tegrated Olectro#ic !ou#ter Measures
1O!M2 capa.ility to all of its com.at fighters,
Anal'sis
4s /#dia urges to deploy a sou#d .allistic missile defe#se program+ most of its grou#d
.ased se#sors are agei#g a#d getti#g old, -he availa.le a#d i#stalled grou#d .ased
se#sors actually are i#sufficie#t to cover /#dia# .orders from south, "allistic missile
defe#se programme would surely give /4* a tech#ological edge over 04* i#
preve#ti#g a#y #uclear .allistic missile stri&e, 04* must ta&e a serious #ote of this
a#d mai#tai# some deterre#ce level with /4* i# .allistic missile defe#se, 04* has got
a# upper edge i# terms of area coverage provided .y grou#d .ased se#sors, -hey
are of varyi#g #ature+ much sophisticated a#d cover le#gth a#d width of the cou#try,
0a&ista# operates a .ewilderi#g variety of radars from varyi#g sources, -he most
moder# u#its are -0S-@@ 3-6 lo#g ra#ge radars, -hese are suppleme#ted .y some
older 4merica#+ !hi#ese a#d "ritish lo#g ra#ge radars, 04* air defe#se #etwor& is
very comprehe#sive a#d well i#tegrated o#ce compared with /4* air defe#se
#etwor&, 0a&ista#Gs 4ir 6efe#ce !omma#d was formed over a decade .efore /#diaGs,
/t e3ercises co#trol+ surveilla#ce a#d coordi#atio# over all 0a&ista#i airspace, -he
46! $ead)uarters is .ased i# .u#&ers 9 to 10 meters .elow grou#d a#d has four
rows of co#soles with 0-9 me# operati#g them, 4ll u#its W aircraft+ air.ases a#d
444 u#its W are represe#ted o# scree#s, /# fact+ the 46! $K set-up is regarded as
.ei#g o#e of the most moder# i# e3iste#ce,
Moreover+ /4* 4C4!S platforms are #ot sufficie#t to mai#tai# a rou#d-the-cloc&
watch over 0a&ista# airspace a#d other .orders, /#dia has a .ig .order a#d #eeds a
ha#dful of air.or#e radar platforms to &eep a#d eye o# all the .order areas rou#d the
cloc&, /4* 4C4!S tech#ology is #ot very comprehe#sive a#d effective o#ce compared
to 04* 4C4!S tech#ology,
&9I *tructures
"A, &apabilit'
04* has wor&ed e3te#sively for improveme#ts i# !7/ 1!omma#d+ !o#trol+
!ommu#icatio#s+ !omputers+ a#d /#tellige#ce2 structures a#d a revamped+
moder#i=ed air defe#se a#d commu#icatio# #etwor&, Cor&i#g o# the pri#ciple of
#etwor& ce#tric warfare+ commu#icatio# .etwee# all the radar se#sors i#stalled
across 0a&ista# is shared at a ce#tral locatio# which ma&es it swift for the higher
echelo#s to ma&e )uic& decisio#s, -he i#formatio# shari#g .etwee# grou#d .ased
se#sors+ air.or#e radar platforms a#d red hot air defe#se alert com.at fighters is
very secure+ e#crypted a#d fast, -he i#formatio# shari#g .etwee# u#ma##ed aerial
vehicles a#d grou#d .ased decisio# ma&i#g age#cies is .ased o# real time data li#&,
/# few rece#t years 04* has .ee# a.le to develop a stro#g optical fi.er #etwor&
.etwee# differe#t .ases a#d ce#ters, Moreover+ the radio commu#icatio# .etwee# the
air a#d grou#d crew is e#crypted a#d secure,
IA, &apabilit'
/#dia# 4ir *orce has i#vested heavily i# its )uest to achieve #etwor& ce#tric
capa.ility, -he .iggest milesto#e accomplished i# this regard was the lau#ch of 4ir
*orce 'et 14*'O-2 with state of the art commu#icatio#s i#frastructure havi#g the
pote#tial for #etwor& ce#tric operatio#s, -he deployme#ts of 4*'O- a#d other
systems have put the /4* i# the forefro#t of 'etwor& !e#tric Carfare 1'!C2 e#a.led
#atio#s, -his )ua#tum leap i# the field of commu#icatio# P i#formatio# tech#ology
will help /4* field u#its to trai# a#d develop tactics+ tech#i)ues a#d procedures to
reali=e the full .e#efits of #etwor&-e#a.led capa.ilities, 4*'O- i#tegrates i#formatio#
shari#g .etwee# ;#ma##ed 4erial Tehicles 1;4Ts2+ 4ir.or#e Oarly Car#i#g a#d
!o#trol System 14C4!S2 aircrafts+ space .ased assets+ com.at fighters operati#g i#
46 role+ air defe#se se#sors+ air defe#se weapo#s a#d comma#d a#d co#trol
authorities i#corporati#g real time data li#&s+ optical fi.er li#&s+ e#crypted radio li#&s
a#d satellite commu#icatio# #etwor&,
Anal'sis
/#dia# 4ir *orce leads the are#a of #etwor& ce#tric warfare as /#dia has i#vested so
much i# its space programme, /#dia has ma#y satellites i# or.it which are also .ei#g
used for military reco##aissa#ce a#d #etwor& ce#tric warfare, /#dia will surely
achieve a total space co#trol over 0a&ista# if the situatio# dema#ds, /#dia# satellites
will also assist i# ma#y of the operatio#s of /#dia# military agai#st 0a&ista#, 0a&ista#
#eeds to gear up its space programme for assista#ce i# military operatio#s a#d
#etwor& ce#tric warfare capa.ilities, /t is perti#e#t to me#tio# here that 0a&ista# has
a leased satellite+ 04LS4--1+ i# the 3B degree Oast lo#gitude geostatio#ary or.it, -he
gover#me#t of 0a&ista# has gra#ted approval for the replaceme#t of 04LS4--1 .y a
#ew commu#icatio# satellite 04LS4- 1< .y 011,
04* has i#vested heavily to .uild a very stro#g comma#d a#d co#trol structure for its
air defe#se #etwor&, -oday 04* !7/ structures are very well i#tegrated a#d
comprehe#sive o#ce compared to /4*, -he data from all 04* air defe#se se#sors is
collected a#d tra#smitted through secure a#d fast commu#icatio# li#es to o#e ce#tral
locatio#, -his i#tegrated approach helps i# swift decisio# ma&i#g a#d reduces the gap
.etwee# detectio# of e#emy aircrafts a#d actio# .y frie#dly i#terceptors, /4* has got
a very moder# !7/ #etwor& i#frastructure .ut it is #ot i#tegrated, /# my opi#io#+ /4*
will .e a.le to develop a very comprehe#sive+ satellite .ased comma#d a#d co#trol
i#frastructure i# #ear future supported .y state of the art air defe#se #etwor&, -his
&i#d of setup will ma&e it #early impossi.le for a#y foe to pe#etrate i# /4* aerial
territory,
,orce Multipliers
"A, &apabilit'
-he !-130 $ercules has .ee# the 04*Gs primary tactical tra#sport aircraft si#ce its
i#ductio# i# the early 1960s, !urre#tly arou#d 9 !-130" a#d @ !-130O models are i#
service+ upgraded with 4lliso# -96-4-19 tur.oprops a#d e3te#ded fatigue lives .y
Aoc&heed-%eorgia !ompa#y, !-130 $ercules aircrafts have .ee# modified for
<eco##aissa#ce roles assisti#g 04* ;#ma##ed 4erial Tehicles 1;4T2 with real time
data li#&s to tra#smit i#formatio#,
-he !-130 is suppleme#ted .y 7 !4S4 !'-39 S-HA tra#sport aircrafts, $eavy-lift
tra#sports comprise 3 "oei#g @0@s tra#sferred from 0a&ista# /#ter#atio#al 4irli#es
si#ce 19B6, -he other tra#sport aircrafts i#clude 4ir.us 4310+ !ess#a !itatio# T+ %ulf
Stream /T+ Om.raer 0he#om+ !4S4 a#d $ar.i# >-1,
/# 6ecem.er 009 the 04* received its first of four /A-@B aircraft which is capa.le of
aerial refueli#g as well as tra#sporti#g cargo, 4erial refueli#g capa.ility was first
demo#strated duri#g the $igh Mar& 010 e3ercise o# 6 4pril+ 010 whe# two of the
04*Gs Mirage /// fighters were simulta#eously refueled i# the air .y the /A-@B, 4erial
refueli#g capa.ility will e#a.le 0a&ista# to stri&e deep i#side the e#emy territory a#d
i#crease the e#dura#ce of its fleet of jet fighters, /A-@B aircraft is e)uipped with
three-poi#t <ussia# ;04D refueli#g e)uipme#t, *uel ta#&s are fitted i# cargo hold for
aerial refueli#g role which ca# .e removed for tra#sport role,
04* i#cludes a good variety of $elicopters armed with state of the art avio#ics for
Search a#d <escue 1S4<2 role, -hese helicopters i#clude <ussia# Mi-1@ a#d locally
produced 4louette /// helicopters,
4c)uisitio# of dro#e capa.ility ra#&s higher i# the priority list of 0a&ista#i
%over#me#t, Oach a#d every i#dividual i# 0a&ista# is aware of the word I6ro#eJ, 04*
has .ee# wor&i#g si#ce last 3 years to gai# this capa.ility i#dige#ously a#d from
i#ter#atio#al suppliers, 04* has successfully added locally ma#ufactured S4-;M4
?asoos // a#d /talia# made SOAOZ %alileo *alco ;#ma##ed 4erial Tehicles to its
i#ve#tory, 4 small scale assem.li#g facility for *alco ;4T has also .ee# esta.lished at
0a&ista# 4ero#autical !omple3 104!2+ Lamra, -he primary role of these vehicles is
-actical <eco##aissa#ce+ -rai#i#g a#d Surveilla#ce, 4 huge effort is .ei#g made to
develop or purchase stri&e capa.le dro#e aircrafts, "urra) is the ;#ma##ed 4erial
Tehicle u#der developme#t .y 04* a#d 'OS!HM which will .e armed with Aaser
%uided Missiles a#d Aaser 6esig#ator,
IA, &apabilit'
/#dia# 4ir *orce uses /A-@B aircrafts for aerial refueli#g which allows /4* fighters to
remai# air.or#e for lo#ger periods+ he#ce e#ha#ci#g their effective ra#ge, 4erial
refueli#g also allows aircrafts to ta&e-off with greater payload 1.y carryi#g less fuel
duri#g ta&e-off2, -he /4* curre#tly operates 6 /lyushi# /A-@BML/s for aerial refueli#g
roles,
-ra#sport aircraft are typically used to deliver troops+ weapo#s+ supplies a#d other
military e)uipme#t to the /4* field of operatio#s, -he /4* curre#tly operates differe#t
types of tra#sport aircrafts for differe#t roles, -he major tra#sport aircraft i# /4* fleet
remai#s /A-@6 which is used for strategic or heavy lift operatio#s i# military tra#sport
roles, /lyushi# /A-@6 aircrafts are pla##ed to .e replaced .y mighty !-1@ %lo.emaster
aircrafts, /4* operates 4#to#ov 4#-3 i# .om.i#g roles a#d 0ara-droppi#g
operatio#s, /#dia# 4ir *orce has also i#ducted o#e !130? Super $ercules tra#sport
aircraft from ;S4 rece#tly,
/4* mai#tai#s a fleet of helicopters to support grou#d troops .y providi#g air cover
a#d .y tra#sporti#g me# a#d esse#tial commodities across the .attlefield, -he
primary helicopter i# /4* use is $4A 6hruv which serves i# tra#sport a#d utility roles,
$4A !heta& is a#other light utility helicopter used primarily for trai#i#g+ rescue a#d
tra#sport roles i# the /4*, Hther light a#d medium utility role helicopters flow# .y /4*
i#clude $4A !heetah+ Mi-B+ Mi-1@+ Mi-6 a#d Mi-39 used i# tra#sport roles a#d
search a#d rescue missio#s, /4* has ordered B0 Mi-1@T-9s to replace a#d augme#t
its e3isti#g fleet of Mi-Bs a#d Mi-1@s+ with a# order for 99 additio#al helicopters to
follow soo#,
/4* curre#tly uses the /4/ Searcher a#d /4/ $ero# ;#ma##ed 4erial Tehicles for
reco##aissa#ce a#d surveilla#ce purposes, -he /4/ $arpy serves as a# ;#ma##ed
!om.at 4erial Tehicle 1;!4T2 which is desig#ed to attac& radar systems, -he /4*
also operates the 6<6H Aa&shya which serves as realistic towed aerial su.-targets
for live fire trai#i#g,
Anal'sis
/#dia# 4ir *orce a#d 0a&ista# 4ir *orce have show# great i#terest to .oost their
dro#e capa.ility i# rece#t past, 'ew .attle li#es are .ei#g draw# for a spy dro#e
versus spy dro#e face-off .etwee# /#dia a#d 0a&ista#, Ove# as /slama.ad co#ti#ues
to .adger Cashi#gto# to give it armed dro#es li&e [0redatorsG+ 'ew 6elhi is )uietly
wor&i#g towards .olsteri#g its fleet of reco##aissa#ce a#d [&illerG ;#ma##ed 4erial
Tehicles 1;4Ts2, Chile /#dia is curre#tly way ahead of 0a&ista# i# the dro#e race+
armed ;4Ts i# the ha#ds of 0a&ista# could cha#ge the .allgame altogether,
(raining and 1Cercises
"A, &apabilit'
Superior weapo#ry .y itself ca##ot amou#t for much without a high sta#dard of
trai#i#g, 04* has always laid great emphasis o# this aspect a#d to a large e3te#t
04*Gs e3celle#t trac& record despite severe limitatio#s ca# .e e3plai#ed .ecause of
this approach, Cith the i#creasi#g sophisticatio# of moder# fleet of com.at pla#es+
se#sors a#d weapo# systems+ adva#ced trai#i#g aids a#d moder# trai#i#g tech#i)ues
have .ecome esse#tial, 4 su.sta#tial i#vestme#t has .ee# made a#d further pla##ed
i# this field i# the shape of simulators+ some that have .ee# i#ducted a#d a #um.er
of them are i# the process of .ei#g procured, Se#sors that help i# realistic air com.at
trai#i#g are i#cluded i# the prioriti=ed list, -he sta#dard of trai#i#g mai#tai#ed i# the
04* is recog#i=ed all over the world, /t is this trustworthy repute that today the
0a&ista# 4ir *orce has the credit of providi#g i#itial a#d speciali=ed trai#i#g to the
perso##el of over thirty allied cou#tries,
04* operates #umerous aircrafts for primary+ .asic+ i#termediate fighter co#versio#
a#d operatio#al trai#i#g, -hese aircrafts i#clude locally assem.led M*/-1@ Mushsha&
a#d M*/-399 Super Mushsha&+ !hi#ese made L-B+ *--9 a#d *--6 a#d 4merica# made
--3@, $uge effort a#d i#vestme#t has .ee# made to procure a#d i#stall aircraft
simulators a#d emerge#cy simulatio# systems for efficie#t o# grou#d trai#i#g of
pilots for ha#dli#g comple3 situatio#s a#d emerge#cies i# air, -rai#i#g of grou#d crew
a#d mai#te#a#ce perso##el has also .ee# revitali=ed i# few rece#t years through
#atio#al a#d i#ter#atio#al tech#ical trai#i#g programs,
04* co#ducts various #atio#al level e3ercises to assay its professio#al s&ills a#d
capa.ilities, -hese e3ercises i#volve various practices i#cludi#g air to la#d targeti#g
with missiles a#d .om.s o# firi#g ra#ges, $igh Mar& e3ercises were co#ducted i#
010 with participatio# of dro#e pla#es a#d ?*-1@ -hu#der aircrafts, -he e3ercises
also i#volved army a#d #aval co#ti#ge#ts to show a# i#tegrated approach to deal
with a#y eve#tuality i# case of war, 04* co#ducted Saffro# "a#dit e3ercise to trai#
the aviatio# force agai#st e3tremism,
04* also participates i# various i#ter#atio#al e3ercises with allied cou#tries, 04* *-
16s fre)ue#tly participate i# com.i#ed e3ercise of 0a&ista# ad -ur&ey code #amed
I4#atolia# OagleJ, 04* also co#ducts a joi#t air power employme#t e3ercise with
<oyal Saudi 4ir *orce i# which air operatio#s are .ei#g e3ecuted i# #ear realistic
e#viro#me#t, <ece#tly 04* *-16s traveled across 4tla#tic to participate i# o#e of the
most reputed i#ter#atio#al e3ercises #amed I<ed *lagJ, -hese e3ercises give 04*
pilots a#d tech#icia#s i#ter#atio#al e3posure a#d ho#e their com.at s&ills,
IA, &apabilit'
/#dia# 4ir *orce operates a com.i#atio# of aircrafts for pilot trai#i#g, -he $4A $0--3
6eepa& is /4*Gs .asic flight trai#i#g aircraft for cadets, -he $0--3 was grou#ded i#
?uly 009 followi#g a crash that &illed two se#ior flight i#structors+ .ut was revived i#
May 010 a#d is to .e fitted with a parachute recovery system 10<S2 to e#ha#ce
surviva.ility duri#g a# emerge#cy i# the air a#d to .ri#g the trai#er dow# safely, -he
$0--3 is to .e phased out soo#, $4A $?--16 Lira# m&,/ is used for i#termediate
flight trai#i#g of cadets+ while the $?--16 Lira# m&,// provides adva#ced flight a#d
weapo#s trai#i#g, Lira# will .e replaced .y the $4A $?--36 Sitara, -he "4O $aw& M&
13 serves as a# adva#ced jet trai#er i# the /4* a#d is progressively replaci#g the
Lira# M&,//,
/4* practices its fire power a#d com.at s&ills i# various i#ter#atio#al e3ercises with
ma#y cou#tries across the glo.e, -hese e3ercises give /4* pilots a# e3celle#t cha#ce
to demo#strate their air com.at s&ills a#d lear# a lot more from other pilots, O3ercise
I!ope /#diaJ is carried out regularly with ;S4* pilots which gives /4* pilots a great
cha#ce to assess a#d modify their com.at s&ills, /4* also participates i# I<ed *lagJ
which is a# i#ter#atio#al e3perie#ce with participatio# of ma#y air forces i# the world,
/4* pilots also get varyi#g terrai# e3perie#ces from mou#tai#s to deserts i# differe#t
i#ter#atio#al e3ercises with Hma#+ ;L+ /srael+ South 4frica a#d *ra#ce, Showcasi#g
its precisio# stri&e capa.ilities duri#g day a#d #ight+ /#dia# 4ir *orce carried out a
massive fire power .lit=&rieg usi#g its fro#tli#e aircraft such as S;-30 ML/+ Mirage-
000+ M/% @ a#d M/% 9+ at the 0o&hra# ra#ges i# <ajastha#, /#dia# 4ir *orce 1/4*2
aircrafts also carried out a local fire power demo#stratio# .lasti#g away targets .y
day+ dus& a#d #ight i# e3ercise+ ITayu Sha&ti-010J+ at 0o&hara# i# %ujarat state,
-he /#dia#s deserve credit for developi#g the tactics a#d trai#i#g programs re)uired
to fully employ their adva#ced aircraft, /4* carried out various i#ter#atio#al a#d local
e3ercises over varyi#g terrai#s to provide valua.le trai#i#g to its pilots i# few rece#t
years, -oday /4* pilots are very well trai#ed for a#y &i#d of air com.at agai#st a#y
possi.le threats,
Anal'sis
I%reat pilots are made #ot .or#N4 ma# may possess good eyesight+ se#sitive ha#ds
a#d perfect coordi#atio#+ .ut the e#d product is o#ly fashio#ed .y steady coachi#g+
much practice a#d e3perie#ce,
W 4ir Tice Marshal ?,O, ?oh#so#+ <4*
-o .egi# a compariso# of the two cou#triesG fighter pilotsG capa.ilities is #ot a# easy
tas&, Chile it is )uite commo# for a defe#ce a#alyst to compare air forces .ased o#
the )ua#tity a#d )uality of weapo#s systems+ it is very rare to fi#d a# o.jective study
of pilot capa.ilities, /# fact+ most a#alyses )ua#tify com.at capa.ility as a product of
#umerous factors+ such as aircraft+ logistics+ mai#te#a#ce+ mu#itio#s+ etc, "ut the
huma# factor 1pilot a.ility+ trai#i#g+ a#d tactics2 is rarely i#cluded .ecause its
measureme#t is very su.jective a#d its impact o# the e)uatio# so little u#derstood,
*ew will argue+ however+ that differe#ces i# pilot capa.ility do e3ist+ a#d some
aspects of the huma# factor should .e i#cluded i# the e)uatio# if we are to achieve
accurate compariso#s i# com.at capa.ility,
-here seems to .e a ge#eral co#se#sus of opi#io# today that i# a compariso# of
stre#gth .etwee# the /#dia# a#d 0a&ista#i air forces+ the /#dia# adva#tage i#
#um.ers is cou#ter.ala#ced .y the 0a&ista#i adva#tage i# perso##el+ trai#i#g+ a#d
tactics, Si#ce /#dia has .ee# successful i# #arrowi#g the tech#ology gap+ which
0a&ista# possessed over /#dia for three decades from the early 1960s to the late
19B0s+ some 0a&ista#i defe#ce policyma&ers have put eve# more emphasis o# the
perceived 0a&ista#i adva#tage i# perso##el, /# fact+ some would argue that the
0a&ista#i fighter pilot+ his trai#i#g+ a#d his tactics are so superior that eve# though
the /#dia#s have #ow caught up i# tech#ology+ the 0a&ista# 4ir *orce still has a#
overall edge i# com.at capa.ility as lo#g as the )ua#titative edge does #ot proceed
a.ove 351,
&onclusion
/#dia a#d 0a&ista# are the two peace lovi#g #atio#s who had #umerous armed
co#flicts+ .order s&irmishes a#d military sta#doffs agai#st each other, -he arms
fa#aticism from .oth #atio#s is evide#t from the allocated amou#t of defe#se .udget
every year, /# my opi#io#+ possi.ilities of a full scale armed co#flict .etwee# /#dia
a#d 0a&ista# are very meager, 4#y such eve#tuality will .ri#g .oth cou#tries at the
.ri#& of a #uclear war, /4* a#d 04* ca# sustai# co#ve#tio#al war for duratio# of a few
wee&s owi#g to limited logistic reserves a#d spares, 'o#e of the air forces would .e
a.le to achieve a complete air supremacy over the other, /#dia# 4ir *orce has always
e#joyed #umerical superiority over 0a&ista# 4ir *orce si#ce i#depe#de#ce, /4* has
also mai#tai#ed a clear tech#ological edge over 04* si#ce last two decades primarily
.ecause of military sa#ctio#s imposed o# 0a&ista#, 04* has .ee# a.le to #arrow
dow# the tech#ological gap i# few rece#t years while &eepi#g the mi#imum level of
deterre#ce with /4* smartly a#d efficie#tly, /4*Gs superiority i# tech#ology a#d
#um.er is effectively cou#ter .ala#ced .y sou#d professio#alism a#d dilige#ce of 04*
crew, /t is ma#ifestatio# of great will a#d valor of 04* air crew that it is ready to
sta#d firm agai#st a "eyo#d Tisual <a#ge 1"T<2 capa.le adversary, -oday 04* is o#
the edge of fi#ishi#g the yaw#i#g tech#ological gap .y i#ducti#g moder# state of the
art weapo#ry to its fleet, /4* has provided e3te#sive trai#i#g to its pilots to
effectively employ "T<s .y participati#g i# various i#ter#atio#al e3ercises, /t is the
right time for 04* to u#dersta#d the li&ely cha#ges of the future com.at sce#ario a#d
develop tactics which ca# e#sure effective utili=atio# of 04* "T< capa.ility, /#dia has
got a well esta.lished space program assisti#g i# military operatio#s, 0a&ista# #eeds
to .oost up its space research a#d developme#t a#d its role i# #etwor& ce#tric
warfare, Officie#t .allistic missile defe#se program is a#other area to po#der .y
0a&ista#i gover#me#t,
/4* o# the other ha#d #eeds to completely revitali=e its air defe#se se#sor #etwor& to
close a#y possi.le gaps for the i#truders, /4* air defe#se comma#d a#d co#trol
system is also re)uired to .e ce#trali=ed a#d i#tegrated, -he )ua#tity of 4ir.or#e
Oarly Car#i#g a#d !o#trol System 14C4!S2 aircrafts held i# the i#ve#tory of /4* are
#ot e#ough for providi#g rou#d the cloc& defe#se of aerial fro#tiers, /#dia# 4ir *orce
#eeds to i#duct a few more such aircrafts i# its fleet to provide rou#d the cloc& vigil
across all fro#tiers,
4 special a#alysis "y M; M; 3sman
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
"egi#s
#10
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
Aim and objective o "a!istan;;;
Aim and objective o "a!istan
"y
4#war ?alal
-wo #atio# theory is the pedestal o# which 0a&ista# came i#to e3iste#ce -hough
ma#y did #ot agree with the ratio#ale of two-#atio# theory .ut few could dispute that
0a&ista# came i#to e3iste#ce o# its .asis, $owever+ what was the real aim of
0a&ista#, -his is disputed a#d is .ei#g de.ated si#ce its i#ceptio# .y political thi#&ers
a#d researchers si#ce the day o#e,/# this regard there are mai#ly two views, H#e
view co#te#ds that 0a&ista# was created for /slam,
-he other o#e argue that its purpose was to safeguard the political,+ religious,
cultural as well as eco#omic i#terests of the muslims of /#dia, /# simple words the
first view is that 0a&ista# mea#t to .e /slamic state while the other i#sist that
0a&ista# was to .e a Muslim State, -he supporters of the first view .ase their
argume#ts .y referri#g to the thoughts a#d co#cept of /llama /).al a#d some
speeches of Kuaid 4=am a#d also refer to some well &#ow# sloga#s raised a#d
cha#ted duri#g the struggle for 0a&ista# , Ai&e wise they co#te#d that /llama /).al+
co#sidered as the creator of co#cept of 0a&ista#+ dema#ded i# his address a separate
state for the muslims of #orth /#dia so that they could adopt a system accordi#g to
/slamic laws
4.out Kuaid 4=am co#cepts they refer some of his followi#g li&e stateme#ts, Ce
have to fight a dou.le edged .attle+ o#e agai#st the $i#du !o#gress a#d the "ritish
/mperialists+ .oth of them .ei#g capitalists, -he Muslims dema#d 0a&ista# where
they could rule accordi#g to their ow# code of life a#d accordi#g to their ow# cultural
growth+ traditio#s a#d /slamic laws,J 1speech at the *ro#tier Muslim Aeague
!o#fere#ce o# 'ovem.er 1+ 19792
/# 4ugust 1971+ Kuaid-e-4=am gave a# i#terview to the stude#ts of the Hsma#ia
;#iversity to a )uestio# that Chat are the esse#tial features of religio# a#d a
religious state? K 4 said Q- that Q- /# other words+ the /slamic state is a# age#cy
for e#forceme#t of the Kura#ic pri#ciples a#d i#ju#ctio#s Similarly they also refer to-
the sloga#Q-0a&ista# La Matla. Lia ? Aa /llaha /lla 4llah +cha#ted duri#g 0a&ista#
moveme#t -he co#te#der of the seco#d viewW Muslim state W have their ow#
argume#ts "esides other argume#ts they also )uote from differe#t speeches a#d
stateme#ts of Kuaid 4=am with the aim to prove that he 1K 4 2 #ever mea#t 0a&ista#
to .e a theocratic state, Some of their argume#ts are as u#der W /f 0a&ista# was
.ei#g created for /slam why the religious political parties a#d most of ;lema1religious
scholars2 opposed it, Kuaid 4=am a#d other Aeague leaders were though muslims .ut
they were all secular regardi#g politics, Kuaid 4=am well &#ow# speech of 11 4ugust
197@ to the co#stitue#t assem.ly i# which he declared that religio# has #othi#g to do
with the affairs of the state Iyou will fi#d that i# course of time $i#dus would cease
to .e $i#dus a#d Muslims would cease to .e Muslims+ #ot i# the religious se#se
.ecause that is the perso#al faith of each i#dividual+ .ut i# the political se#se as
citi=e#s of the state, J -he first Aaw mi#ister of 0a&ista# appoi#ted .y Kuaid-e-4=am
was Mu#dle +a $i#du, /* Kuaid 4=am mea#t to ma&e 0a&ista# as religious state he
would have appoi#ted some muslim scholar i#stead of him o# that very importa#t
post,
"esides the a.ove argume#ts the supporters of this view also .ri#g forth cou#ter
argume#ts i# respo#se to the argume#ts of the first view, <egardi#g /llama /).al
co#cept they affirm that of course he did tal&ed a.out /slamic state .ut he #ever
mea#t it to .e theocratic state if loo&ed i# proper co#te3t of his thoughts a#d
philosophy, 'o dou.t he dreamed a#d wished for such i#depe#de#t muslim state i#
the muslim majority areas of /#dia where the /slamic pri#ciples a#d laws may .e
applied i# such way where it should also .e compati.le with the moder# thoughts
a#d re)uireme#ts Cith it they also add+ that e3cept some ra#dom e3celle#t views
a#d comme#ts + /).al had #ot sorted out a detailed a#d feasi.le pla# for it at the
mome#t 1 though he did urge the #eed for /jthihad i# this regard 2, 4s for Kuaid
4=am views they argue that of course he too have e3alted the great a#d high
pri#ciples of /slam a#d its importa#ce a#d efficacy i# his various stateme#ts however
this did #ot mea# that he wa#ted a theocracy, -hey co#te#d that his views are
)uoted with out co#te3t otherwise his approach was secular a#d li.eral,1 Secular
does #ot mea# a#ti religio# as ofte# wro#gly u#derstood mai#ly due to the
propaga#da of orthodo3 2 they refer differe#t )uotatio#s from the speeches of Kuaid
4=am which show that his co#cept of 0a&ista# was of moder# a#d li.eral state,
4part from the a.ove argume#ts the holders of this sta#ce also .ri#g forth
argume#ts .y recou#ti#g the political .ac&grou#d of 0a&ista# moveme#t /llama /).al
had prese#ted his well &#ow# 4ddress i# 1930 while Muslims league u#der ?i##ah for
a lo#g time co#ti#ued efforts for reachi#g some sort of arra#geme#t with the
co#gress a#d the "ritish gover#me#t where the political cultural a#d eco#omic rights
of the muslims could .e give# co#stitutio#al guara#tee, *or this he made ma#y
efforts e#compassi#g a whole decade a#d it was after league a#d ?i##ah .ecome
co#vi#ced that #o such guara#tee could .e gra#ted the# i# march 1970 0a&ista#
resolutio# was passed which stated that i# the light of lot e3perie#ce MA has reached
to the co#clusio# that o#ly separate state could .e the o#ly solutio# of muslims
political pro.lems, Hf course o# that occasio# ?i##ah did tal& of two #atio#s a#d
ela.orated the two #atio# theory W $owever that did #ot mea# that the dema#ded
state was aimed for /slam ,$ere it could .e further said that if co#gress would have
#ot .ee# adama#t i# gra#ti#g what the Aeague were dema#di#g the# league would
have #ever passed the Aahore resolutio# , Supporters of this view ela.orate that
though MA did pass 0a&ista# <esolutio# however as politics is the #ame of see&i#g
differe#t possi.ilities ,a#d a politicia#s has several alter#ative optio#s so Kuid 4=am
too as a politicia# had several optio#s for the protectio# of /#dia# muslim material
i#terests a#d preservatio# of cultural ide#tity ,
4mo#g which o#e was though divisio# of /#dia .ut it was #ot i#fle3i.le , ?i##ah
co#ti#ued tal&s with .oth "ritish gover#me#t a#d !o#gress leaders + eve# after the
1970 resolutio# + for see&i#g some other co#stitutio#al ways of the /#dia# pro.lem /t
mea#s that 0a&ista# was #ot the fi#al a#d u# #egotia.le optio# .efore Aeague a#d
?i##ah, Similarly Aeague a#d ?i##ah accepted the ca.i#et missio# pla# i# 1976
though it had rejected the dema#d for 0a&ista# a#d i#stead a sort of loose federatio#
or say co#federatio# was proposed, -he accepta#ce of that pla# .y league a#d ?i##ah
mea#t that creatio# of separate state was #ot their mai# a#d ultimate dema#d,
4s i# the ca.i#et missio# pla# muslim could have got the safe guards of their rights
for which they were dema#di#g si#ce lo#g so league accepted it, -he arroga#t a#d
imposi#g attitude of 'ehru a#d 0atel a#d the prejudiced policy of co#gress regardi#g
the pla# compelled ?i##ah to withdraw his earlier accepta#ce of the pla#+ otherwise
/#dia would have #ot .ee# divided , 1 4 promi#e#t /#dia# politicia# ?aswa#t Si#gh
has also said that i# his .oo&- ?i##ah + 0artitio# a#d /#depe#de#ce 2 -he positive
respo#se of ?i##ah regardi#g the ca.i#et missio# pla# shows that if the esta.lishme#t
of /slamic state was his .asic aim he would have .ee# totally adama#t for e3clusively
i#depe#de#t muslim state a#d would have #ever show# a#y elasticity ,4.out the
/slamic factor i# the moveme#t they 1 adhere#ts of this sta#ce 2 are of the view that
the sloga# of /slam raised duri#g the moveme#t of 0a&ista# was + i# the first place +
#ot the official sloga# of Muslim league as #or Kuaid 4=am #or the top leaders of the
moveme#t raised it + rather it was .ei#g cha#ted .y the wor&ers at the lower level
a#d seco#dly it was just for motivati#g the muslim masses a#d musteri#g their
support while .asic e#d was protectio# of political cultural a#d eco#omic i#terests of
the muslims of #orth /#dia, 4ccordi#g to them if some sectio#s of league adopted the
sloga# of /slam for its moveme#t, it was justified a#d was a proper approach see# i#
the co#te3t of the situatio# of that time ,-hey argue that raisi#g of such sloga# was
aimed for the success of such moveme#t which had a very great o.jective, 0olitical
system of 0a&ista# a#d ?i##ah o.servatio# a.out /slamic pri#ciples, <egardi#g the
stateme#ts of ?i##ah a.out the /slamic pri#ciples i# the co#stitutio#al a#d political
system of 0a&ista# the supporters of the later view poi#t 1 moder# muslim state 2
4rgue that i# political affairs his approach was of course + that of secular a#d li.eral
politicia# while with this he was a muslim too , -hough Kuaid 4=am #ever claimed
#or thought of himself a#y sai#tli#ess or holi#ess+ .ut as commo# a#d simple muslim
he was fighti#g for the rights of muslims of /#dia with all si#cerity which eve# his
worst .ut ho#est oppo#e#ts ca# #ot de#y + /t was due to his .ei#g muslim that he
co#sidered Muslims as separate #atio# a#d who had differe#t i#terests from those of
$i#dus- a#d .ecause of it he was holder of two #atio# theory Chat Kuaid 4=am
thought a.out the lofty pri#ciples #o .elievi#g muslim ca# disagree with, 4.out the
/slamic ideal a#d pri#ciples +,i# particular those related with social eco#omic aspects +
his o.servatio#s were that it were #ot o#ly fully compati.le with the moder# world
.ut i# several respects were also more .etter a#d suita.le compared to wester#s
o#es,
$ere it #eed to .e me#tio#ed that his approach towards religio# differe#t from that of
the orthodo3 religious class + who mai#ly co#fi#e /slam to the petty fi)i issues or
hadood laws or i#sist o#ly i# its form + *or Kuaid 4=am+ the spirit of /slam was of real
importa#ce , /# this regard his views were i# li#e with that of /).al+ though he was
#ot scholar of /).al cali.er however the source of his /slamic i#sight was+ .esides his
ow# perso#al readi#g + the views of 4lama /).al a#d some other e#lighte#ed
scholars, /# li#e with his disti#ctive solem#ity he si#cerely .elieved that /slamic ideals
a#d pri#ciples+ i# particular those related with the socio a#d eco#omic aspects a#d
rule of justice etc had great value a#d importa#ce so he ear#estly thought that these
pri#ciples a#d ideals must .e guidi#g source for the co#stitutio#al set up of 0a&ista#,
-hough religio# as u#derstood a#d preached .y Mullahs was #ever the aim of Kuaid-
e-4=am however i# spite of his all secularism he was also #ot averse to the /deals of
/slam Q /t is reaso#a.ly supposed that had he .ee# alive for some time he would
have recomme#ded such set-up for 0a&ista# where .oth the /slamic ideals a#d
moder# thoughts esse#tial for progress would have .ee# fully accommodated a#d
0a&ista# would have .ee# such moder# welfare Muslim State which would .e secular
a#d also the .earer of moral a#d spiritual culture,
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#11
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
2inna+Bs "a!istan> > >
2inna+Bs "a!istan
"y
4rdeshir !owasjee
-$O followi#g e3cerpts .eg comme#ts from all those who have .ee# or are #ow
occupyi#g the power seats of the /slamic <epu.lic of 0a&ista#,
*rom Mohammad 4li ?i##ah[s preside#tial address at the 4ll-/#dia Muslim Aeague

User Name
Log in
sessio# i# 6elhi i# 4pril 19735 I-he mi#orities are e#titled to get a defi#ite assura#ce
or to as&5 [Chere do we sta#d i# the 0a&ista# that you visualise?[ -hat is a# issue of
givi#g a defi#ite a#d clear assura#ce to the mi#orities, Ce have do#e it, Ce have
passed a resolutio# that the mi#orities must .e protected a#d safeguarded to the
fullest e3te#t+ a#d as / said .efore+ a#y civilised gover#me#t will do it a#d ought to
do it, So far as we are co#cer#ed+ our ow# history a#d our prophet have give# the
clearest proof that #o#-Muslims have .ee# treated #ot o#ly justly a#d fairly .ut
ge#erously,J 1<i=wa# 4hmed+ ed,+ Sayi#gs of Kuaid-i-4=am Mohammad 4li ?i##ah +
Larachi5 0a&ista# Moveme#t !e#ter+ 19B6+ p, 30,2
Chile discussi#g 0a&ista# i# a# i#terview give# to a represe#tative of the 4ssociated
0ress of 4merica o# 'ovem.er B+ 19765 I$i#du mi#orities i# 0a&ista# ca# rest
assured that their rights will .e protected, 'o civilised gover#me#t ca# .e ru#
successfully without givi#g mi#orities a complete se#se of security a#d co#fide#ce,
-hey must .e made to feel that they have a ha#d i# gover#me#t a#d to this e#d
must have ade)uate represe#tatio# i# it, 0a&ista# will give it,J
14hmed+ Sayi#gs + p, 69,2
/# ?i##ah[s i#terview give# to a <euters correspo#de#t o# May 1+ 197@+ he assured
the mi#orities of 0a&ista# Ithat they will .e protected a#d safeguarded, *or they will
.e so ma#y citi=e#s of 0a&ista# without a#y disti#ctio# of caste or creed,J $e had #o
dou.t i# his mi#d that they Iwill .e treated justly a#d fairly a#d the collective
co#scie#ce of parliame#t itself will .e a guara#tee that the mi#orities #eed #ot have
a#y apprehe#sio# of a#y i#justice .ei#g do#e to them,J
1Sailesh "a#dopadhaya+ Kuaid-i-4=am Mohammad 4li ?i##ah a#d the !reatio# of
0a&ista# + 'ew 6elhi5 Sterli#g 0u.lishers+ 1991+ p, 36,2
*rom ?i##ah[s address to the !o#stitue#t 4ssem.ly o# 4ugust 11+ 197@5 ICe should
.egi# to wor& i# that spirit a#d i# course of time all these a#gularities of the majority
a#d mi#ority commu#ities+ the $i#du commu#ity a#d the Muslim commu#ity Q
.ecause eve# as regards Muslims you have 0atha#s+ 0u#ja.is+ Shias+ Su##is a#d so
o#+ a#d amo#g the $i#dus you have "rahmi#s+ Tash#avas+ Lhatris+ also "e#galis+
Madrasis a#d so o# Q will va#ish, /#deed if you as& me+ this has .ee# the .iggest
hi#dra#ce i# the way of /#dia to attai# the freedom a#d i#depe#de#ce a#d .ut for
this we would have .ee# free people lo#g lo#g ago, 'o power ca# hold a#other
#atio#+ a#d specially a #atio# of 700 millio# souls+ i# su.jectio#V #o.ody could have
co#)uered you+ a#d eve# if it had happe#ed+ #o.ody could have co#ti#ued its hold o#
you for a#y le#gth of time+ .ut for this, -herefore+ we must lear# a lesso# from this,
>ou are freeV you are free to go to your temples+ you are free to go to your mos)ues
or to a#y other place of worship i# this state of 0a&ista#, >ou may .elo#g to a#y
religio# or caste or creed+ that has got #othi#g to do with the .usi#ess of the stateN,
Ce are starti#g with this fu#dame#tal pri#ciple that we are all citi=e#s a#d e)ual
citi=e#s of o#e state, -he people of O#gla#d i# course of time had to face the realities
of the situatio# a#d had to discharge the respo#si.ilities a#d .urde#s placed upo#
them .y the gover#me#t of their cou#try+ a#d they we#t through that fire step .y
step, -oday+ you might say with justice that <oma# !atholics a#d 0rotesta#ts do #ot
e3istV what e3ists #ow is that every ma# is a citi=e#+ a# e)ual citi=e# of %reat "ritai#
a#d they are all mem.ers of the #atio#, 'ow / thi#& we should &eep that i# fro#t of
us as our ideal a#d you will fi#d that i# course of time $i#dus would cease to .e
$i#dus a#d Muslims would cease to .e Muslims+ #ot i# the religious se#se+ .ecause
that is the perso#al faith of each i#dividual+ .ut i# the political se#se as citi=e#s of
the state,J 1 6aw# + /#depe#de#ce 6ay Suppleme#t+ 4ugust 17+ 1999,2
?i##ah[s i#terview with a <euter[s correspo#de#t o# Hcto.er 9+ 197@5 IOvery
citi=e# is e3pected to .e loyal to the state a#d to owe allegia#ce to it, -he arm of the
law should .e stro#g e#ough to deal with a#y perso# or sectio# or .ody or people
that is disloyal to the state, Ce do #ot+ however+ prescri.e a#y school.oy tests of
their loyalty, Ce shall #ot say to a#y $i#du citi=e# of 0a&ista#5 if there is war would
you shoot a $i#du?J 14hmed+ Sayi#gs + p, 7,2
?i##ah[s .roadcast to the people of 4ustralia o# *e.ruary 19+ 197B5 I-he great
majority of us are N mem.ers of the Muslim .rotherhood of /slam i# which we are
e)ual i# right+ dig#ity a#d self respect, !o#se)ue#tly we have a special a#d a very
deep se#se of u#ity, "ut ma&e #o mista&e5 0a&ista# is #ot a theocracy or a#ythi#g
li&e it, /slam dema#ds from us the tolera#ce of other creeds a#d we welcome i#
closest associatio# with us all those who+ of whatever creed+ are themselves willi#g
a#d ready to play their part as true a#d loyal citi=e#s of 0a&ista#,J 14hmed+ Sayi#gs +
p, 69,2
arfc9cyber.net.p#
+ource2Dan
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ar.a.01 1-hursday+ 6ecem.er 13+ 012+ "illa 1-uesday+ ?uly 09+ 0112+ faheem
aura&=ai 1Mo#day+ ?uly 07+ 0112
#12
Saturday, July 02, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
*ectrarian &onlicts in "a!istan ;;;
*ectrarian &onlicts in "a!istan
"y
Moo#is 4hmar
Abstract
:he history of sectarian conflict in %a#istan is as old as the e;istence of this country.
.et' the intensification of sectarian divide in %a#istan as observed durin" late 08<6s
and early 0876s because of domestic political chan"es and the implications of Islamic
revolution in Iran and the subsequent adverse reaction in some =rab countries to the
assumption of poer by cler"y operatin" from the holy city of >um. :he military
re"ime of ?eneral Mohammad @ia2ul2&aq' hich sei(ed poer on July A' 08<<
pursued a policy of BIslami(ationC resultin" into the deepenin" of sectarian divide
beteen +unnis and +hiiates on the one hand and amon" different +unni "roups on
the other. :his paper attempts to analytically e;amine the dynamics of sectarian
conflict in %a#istan by respondin" to folloin" issues, :he bac#"round of sectarian
divide in %a#istan and ho sectarian polari(ation beteen the +unni and +hitte
communities impacted on state and societyD the phenomenon of reli"ious e;tremism
and intolerance led to the emer"ence of sectarian violence in %a#istanD the state of
%a#istan failed to curb sectarian conflict and polari(ation at the societal level
promoted the forces of reli"ious e;tremismD the role of e;ternal factors in
au"mentin" sectarian divide in %a#istan and forei"n forces "ot a free hand to launch
their pro;y ar in %a#istan on sectarian "roundsD and strate"ies should be
formulated to deal ith the challen"e of sectarian violence in %a#istan.
1; Introduction
Sectaria# issue i# 0a&ista# is a major desta.ili=i#g factor i# the cou#tryGs political+
social+ religious a#d security order, Chile causi#g u#rest+ disorder a#d viole#ce i#
society+ the sectaria# co#flict i# 0a&ista# for the last @ years resulted i#to thousa#ds
of deaths from suicide attac&s+ .om. .lasts+ assassi#atio#s a#d other terrorist acts,
-he state actors+ i#stead of see&i#g the ma#ageme#t a#d resolutio# of a co#flict+
which has divided Muslims o# sectaria# grou#ds+ tried to e3ploit the issue for political
o.jectives, <egardless of scattered eve#ts of Shia-Su##i discord+ sectaria# harmo#y
i# 0a&ista# was a model of tolera#ce a#d .rotherhood amo#gst differe#t sects i# the
religio# of /slam,
Chile Shias co#stitute roughly 19-0Y of the populatio# of Su##i domi#ated
0a&ista#+ that commu#ity lived i# harmo#y a#d peace u#til early 19B0s whe# a series
of eve#ts triggered sectaria# viole#ce, /f viewed historically+ the Shia commu#ity
struggled side .y side with the Su##i majority i# the a#ti-4hmadi moveme#t of 19@7,
Chile the 4hmadis were declared as #o#-Muslims .y the 0arliame#t of 0a&ista#+ the
Shia commu#ity o.served with eager#ess the ce#tral role played .y the clergy of /ra#
i# the massive popular uprisi#g agai#st the Shah, -he /slamic <evolutio# of *e.ruary
19@9 was a watershed i# mo.ili=i#g the Shias of 0a&ista# for a# assertive role i#
state a#d society,
*rom a#y sta#dpoi#t+ the history of sectaria# co#flict i# 0a&ista# is as old as the
e3iste#ce of this cou#try, >et+ the i#te#sificatio# of sectaria# divide i# 0a&ista# was
o.served duri#g late 19@0s a#d early 19B0s .ecause of domestic political cha#ges
a#d the implicatio#s of /slamic revolutio# i# /ra# a#d the su.se)ue#t adverse
reactio# i# some 4ra. cou#tries to the assumptio# of power .y clergy operati#g from
the holy city of Kom, -he military regime of %e#eral Mohammad Dia-ul-$a)+ which
sei=ed power o# ?uly 9+ 19@@ pursued a policy of usi#g religio# for political purposes
.y u#leashi#g a process of R/slami=atio#G resulti#g i#to the deepe#i#g of sectaria#
divide .etwee# Su##is a#d Shiiates o# the o#e ha#d a#d amo#g differe#t Su##i
groups o# the other, 4s rightly argued .y a# a#alyst o# co#flict a#d dispute
resolutio#+ Ihe 1Dia2 followed a policy of Su##i sectaria#ism+ which wit#essed
mushroomi#g of madrassas all over 0a&ista#, /# 19B7 whe# the Saudi 4ra.ia#
gover#me#t dema#ded that the 0a&ista#i army replace Shia soldiers i# 0a&ista#i
army u#its .ased i# Saudi 4ra.ia with Su##i soldiers+ %e#eral Dia-ul-$a) decided to
withdraw the e#tire co#ti#ge#t of 0a&ista#i troops from that cou#tryJ, >et despite
almost two decades of the post-Dia era+ there is #o e#d to sectaria# polemics a#d
hatred+ which u#der the state patro#age of Dia-ul-$a) wea&e#ed the #atio#al u#ity of
0a&ista#,
-his paper attempts to a#alytically e3ami#e the importa#t dy#amics of sectaria#
co#flict i# 0a&ista# .y respo#di#g to followi#g )uestio#s5-
1. Chat is Sectaria# co#flict a#d how it has permeated i# 0a&ista#i society?
2. Chat is the .ac&grou#d of sectaria# divide i# 0a&ista# a#d how sectaria#
polari=atio# .etwee# the Su##i a#d Shitte commu#ities impacted o# state a#d
society?
3. $ow the phe#ome#o# of religious e3tremism a#d i#tolera#ce led to the
emerge#ce of sectaria# viole#ce i# 0a&ista#?
4. Chy the state of 0a&ista# failed to cur. sectaria# co#flict a#d how polari=atio#
at the societal level promoted the forces of religious e3tremism?
5. Chat is the role of e3ter#al factors i# augme#ti#g sectaria# divide i# 0a&ista#
a#d why foreig# forces got a free ha#d to lau#ch their pro3y war i# 0a&ista#
o# sectaria# grou#ds?
6. Chat plausi.le strategies should .e formulated to deal with the challe#ge of
sectaria# viole#ce i# 0a&ista#?
0a&ista# as the seco#d largest Muslim cou#try of the world is faci#g a# uphill tas& of
cur.i#g i#tolera#ce+ hate+ e3tremism a#d viole#ce targeti#g Shia or Su##i
commu#ities, Su##i populatio# i# 0a&ista# is @9-B0Y of the total populatio# while
the Shia populatio# is roughly 0Y, Si#ce early 19B0s+ whe# sectaria# viole#ce got
a# impetus i# 0a&ista# till today+ thousa#ds of people have .ee# &illed i# sectaria#
viole#ce i# differe#t parts of the cou#try, !ou#tless suicide attac&s at the religious
sites of Su##is a#d Shiites #ot o#ly deepe#ed religious schism .ut also led to the
assassi#atio# of hu#dreds of professio#als from the two sides, Sectaria# groups+
which emerged duri#g 19B0s a#d early 1990s+ pursued a policy of a##ihilati#g each
other, -he worst part of sectaria# viole#ce i# 0a&ista# is periodic attac& o# each
otherGs mos)ues a#d religious schools .y various e3tremist Shia a#d Su##i groups,
"y late 19B0s+ as a result of sustai#ed viole#ce agai#st each other+ a stage came
whe# some Su##i a#d Shia groups .ega# to declare each other as #o#-Muslims, "y
attac&i#g each otherGs religious .eliefs+ various Su##i a#d Shiite leaders augme#ted
i#sta.ility a#d crisis at the societal level,
4ccordi#g to the "russels .ased /#ter#atio#al !risis %roup 1/%!2+ Isectaria# co#flict
i# 0a&ista# is the direct co#se)ue#ce of state policies of /slami=atio# a#d the
margi#ali=atio# of secular democratic forces, /#stead of empoweri#g li.eral+
democratic voices+ the gover#me#t has co-opted the religious right a#d co#ti#ues to
rely o# it to cou#ter civilia# oppositio#, -he political use of /slam .y the state
promotes a# aggressive competitio# for official patro#age .etwee# a#d withi# the
ma#y variatio#s of Su##i a#d Shia /slam+ with the clerical elite of major sects a#d
su.-sects strivi#g to .uild up their political parties+ raise jihadi militias+ e3pa#d
madrassa #etwor&s a#d+ as has happe#ed o# MusharrafGs watch+ .ecome a part of
the gover#me#t,J 4ccordi#g to the /%! report+ Ili&e all other 0a&ista#i military
gover#me#ts+ the Musharraf admi#istratio# has also wea&e#ed secular a#d
democratic political forces, 4dmi#istrative a#d legal actio# agai#st milita#t
orga#i=atio#s has failed to disma#tle a well-e#tre#ched a#d widely spread terror
i#frastructure, 4ll .a##ed e3tremist groups persist with #ew la.els+ although old
#ames are also still i# use, -he jihadi media is flourishi#g+ a#d the leadi#g figures of
e3tremist Su##i orga#i=atio#s are free to preach their jihadi ideologies, -he .a##ed
groups such as the Aash&ar-e--ai.a+ the Siphae Saha.a a#d the ?ash-e-Mohammad
appear to e#joy virtual immu#ity from the law, -hey have gai#ed #ew ave#ues to
propagate their milita#t ideas si#ce the chief patro#s of jihad+ the ?amiat ;lema-e-
/slam 1?;/2 a#d the ?amaat-e-/slami+ have ac)uired promi#e#t a#d powerful roles i#
MusharrafGs political structure,J -he /%! report .lami#g the state of 0a&ista# of
promoti#g sectaria# viole#ce is co#trary to the claims made .y /slama.ad that the
Musharraf regime is deadly agai#st sectaria#ism a#d has ta&e# #umerous measures
to cut various sectaria# groups to their si=e, 0articularly si#ce Septem.er 11+ 001+
the gover#me#t has lau#ched a massive crac&dow# o# various religious e3tremist
groups+ i#cludi#g sectaria# groups a#d is pursui#g a policy of Re#lighte#ed
moderatio#,G $ave the policy ma&ers of 0a&ista# too& a#y #otice of the fi#di#gs of
/%!Gs report was its deli.eratio#s were ig#ored .y them .ecause to a large e3te#t the
state structures of this cou#try are #ot receptive to ideas a#d suggestio#s which ca#
.ri#g )ualitative cha#ge i# the society, *ollowi#g a policy of divide a#d rule is their
age-old practice a#d a#y deviatio# from such type of a# approach is co#sidered .y
the people at the helm of affairs as detrime#tal to their i#terests,
O3ter#al factors li&e the /slamic revolutio# i# /ra#+ the Saudi role of promoti#g
Caha.i sect of /slam a#d the i#volveme#t of hard-li#e religious groups of 4fgha#ista#
i# 0a&ista#Gs i#ter#al politics further complicated the sectaria# co#flict, -he support
re#dered .y /ra#+ Saudi 4ra.ia a#d some other Muslim cou#tries to various Shiite
a#d Su##i groups of 0a&ista# resulted i#to the out.rea& of sectaria# pro3y war, H#e
#eeds to co#template how the me#ace of sectaria# polari=atio# a#d viole#ce i#
0a&ista# could .e tactfully ha#dled a#d why the fault li#es i# sectaria# co#flict have
#ot .ee# properly dealt so far? /f the state of 0a&ista# a#d its apparatus seriously try
to weed out the terrorist a#d viole#t eleme#ts from various Su##i a#d Shiite groups
a#d cur. e3ter#al ha#d i# fa##i#g sectaria# feeli#gs+ much ca# .e do#e to sort out
thi#gs which cause a#d promote sectaria# viole#ce i# the cou#try, Chy the state of
0a&ista# could#Gt redeem the ramificatio#s of its 4fgha# policy duri#g the Soviet
military i#terve#tio# i# 4fgha#ista# whe# hu#dreds of thousa#ds of local a#d foreig#
?ihadis followi#g strict Su##i teachi#g were give# a free ha#d, -he post-Soviet
military withdrawal period i# 4fgha#ista# wit#essed the mushroomi#g of various
Caha.i groups who preached hatred agai#st Shiias #ot o#ly i# 4fgha#ista# .ut also
i# 0a&ista#,
II; 5'namics o *ectarian 5ivide
Internal d'namics
4ccordi#g to a well-researched study o# Sectaria# co#flict i# 0a&ista# with a case
study of ?ha#g district i# the provi#ce of 0a&ista#+ Mut&tar 4hmed argues that the+
I#ature of Shia-Su##i viole#ce u#der the "ritish was radically differe#t tha# it had
.ee# u#der the earlier Muslim empires or caliphates, 0reviously+ it was always a
co#flict either .etwee# the esta.lished Su##i authorities a#d a#ti-status )uo Shia
de#omi#atio# 1that is ;mmayedsX 4..asides vs, followers of *atimidas dy#asties2 or
.etwee# the Su##i-Shia dy#asties or caliphates 1that is+ Mughals vs, the Shia
dy#asties of 6ecca# a#d 4..asides vs, *atmides i# Ogypt2, ;#li&e the alie# rule of the
"ritish+ the co#flict decli#ed to commu#itiesG level+ i#volvi#g the ge#eral pu.lic a#d
theologia#s ali&e i# sectaria# viole#ce, -he role of the gover#me#t was limited to that
of ar.iter+ e#forcer of law or ma#ipulator+ if so re)uired+ i# the larger colo#ial
i#terests, $owever+ the state was secular a#d largely u#represe#tative a#d+
therefore+ the use of sectaria# idiom was limited to the purpose of self-ide#tificatio#J
"ut+ after the creatio# of 0a&ista# o# 4ugust 17+ 197@+ the Shia-Su##i relatio#s were
#ot ideal .ut shrouded with mistrust a#d suspicio# agai#st each other, Muslims from
/#dia+ who migrated to 0a&ista# after the partitio# of 4ugust 197@ .rought with them
the .aggage of sectaria# .ias a#d hatred, >et the two commu#ities lived side .y side
a#d there were very few i#cide#ts of sectaria# viole#ce causi#g physical casualties of
the two sides,
/t was o#ly after the co#troversial process of /slami=atio# u#leashed .y the military
ruler of 0a&ista#+ %e#eral Mohammad Dia-ul-$a) that sectaria# co#flict too& a viole#t
tur#, DiaGs policy to i#troduce /slamic Sharia+ which is termed as a radical .ra#d of
Su##i $a#ifi system of jurisprude#ce+ shattered the .o#d of u#ity .etwee# Shias a#d
Su##i commu#ities, -he impositio# of Da&at i# 0a&ista# .y the regime of Dia-ul-$a)
i# 19B0 was veheme#tly resisted .y Shia leader, 4# importa#t Shia cleric+ Mufti
?aafar $usai# 11916-19B32 argued that if 0a&ista# was to have /slamic law+ the ShiGa
should .e allowed to follow their ow# jurisprude#ce &#ow# as ?aafariya fi)h after the
si3th ShiGa imam ?afar al-Sadi), -he sectaria# li#es were clearly draw# as the Shias
i# 0a&ista# i#spired .y the /ra#ia# /slamic revolutio# refused to su.scri.e to the
Su##i .ased Shariah laws a#d dema#ded that their ide#tity as a separate sect i#
/slam must .e recog#i=ed,
-he Shia-Su##i co#flict i# 0a&ista# has more eco#omic ratio#ale tha# religious or
political, 0articularly i# the district of ?ha#g of 0u#ja.+ the worse phase of sectaria#
.loodshed was the outcome of grieva#ces held .y the peasa#ts .elo#gi#g to the
Su##i sect a#d the feudal la#dlords .elo#gi#g to the Shia sect, -he eco#omy of ?ha#g
was primarily co#trolled .y the feudal Shias, I-he primary eco#omic move agai#st
the Shias assumed sectaria# a#d cultural dime#sio#s whe# e#trepre#eurs of Su##i
moveme#t of $a) 'awa= ?ha#gvi emphasi=ed o# the cultural differe#ces .etwee# the
Su##is a#d Shias, -he Sipha-e-Saha.a 0a&ista# 1SS02+ 4rmy of the compa#io#s of
last 0rophet 10";$2 which was formed i# reactio# to -heree&-e-*i)-e-?afariya
1Moveme#t for the /mpleme#tatio# of Shia law2 i# early 19B0s dema#ded that Shias
should .e declared as #o#-Muslims, 4#other Shia orga#i=atio# called as Sipah-e-
Muhammadi 0a&ista# 1SM02 was formed which also pursued a milita#t course agai#st
the Su##i commu#ity, Aas&har-e-?ha#gvi 1A?2 a# a#ti-Shia milita#t Su##i orga#i=atio#
with its .ase i# ?ha#g was formed i# 1999 as a .rea&-away factio# of SS0,J
0rior to that+ o# Septem.er 6+ 19B9+ Maula#a $a) 'awa= ?ha#gvi+ a 6eo.a#di alim
1scholar2 of ?amiat-i-;lema-i-/slam 1?;/2 1*2 fou#ded 4#juma# Sipha-i-Saha.a
0a&ista# 14SS02 later re#amed as Siphah-/-Saha.a 0a&ista# 1SS02 i# ?ha#g, /t was
the first orga#i=ed Su##i 0arty with a# overt o.jective to defe#d the ho#or of Saha.a
a#d cou#ter what Maula#a ?ha#gvi perceived as the i#creasi#g Shia activism u#der
the impact of the /ra#ia# revolutio#, $e formally dema#ded the 0a&ista# gover#me#t
to declare Shias #o#-Muslims, $e also asserted that 0a&ista#+ with majority Su##i
populatio#+ .e declared a Su##i State+ as+ Shias with Shia majority /ra# was a Shia
State, $e rese#ted that+ while i# /ra# #o Su##i was allowed u#der the co#stitutio# to
hold &ey state officer+ #o such restrictio# was placed o# Shias i# 0a&ista#,J 4ccordi#g
to 6r, Mohammad Caseem+ a 0a&ista#i political scie#tist+ Ithe social .ase of sectaria#
co#flict has sig#ifica#tly e3pa#ded .ecause of the followi#g factors5
1. -he use of pri#t media,
2. 4ccessi.ility to the mea#s of electro#ic commu#icatio#s,
3. "etter tra#sport services which have i#creased mo.ility of sectaria# activists,
/t helps people from district areas to joi# sectaria# #etwor&s+ ge#erate fu#ds
a#d pla# co#certed political activities at the provi#cial a#d #atio#al levels,J
Cith su.sta#tial motivatio#+ fu#di#g+ trai#i#g a#d #etwor&i#g various sectaria#
groups i# 0a&ista# were set for a show dow#, /#cide#ts of sectaria# &illi#gs .ecame a
commo# feature i# 0a&ista# si#ce mid-19B0s, -hose &illed i# Shia-Su##i viole#ce i#
0a&ista# i#cluded+ religious leaders+ promi#e#t perso#alities+ lawyers+ doctors a#d
eve# small childre#, 4 6eo.a#di cleric+ Maula#a Saleemullah Lha#+ fou#ded Sawad-
e-4=am 4hle-Su##i 1%reater ;#ity of the Su##is2 i# 19B0+ dema#di#g that 0a&ista#
.e declared a Su##i state a#d that the ShiGa .e declared #o#-Muslims, Soo# after+
sectaria# riots .ro&e out i# Larachi a#d Sawad-e-4=am followers attac&ed ShiGa
houses a#d religious gatheri#gs, -he Sawad-e-4=am created a major Su##i Sectaria#
group+ 4#juma#-e-Sipah-e-Saha.a 14SS2 or Society of the 4rmy of the 0rophetGs
!ompa#io#s, 11 SS0 ce#tered its struggle to co#fro#t with Shias a#d to declare them
a #o#-Muslim mi#ority li&e the 4hmadis, %e#eral DiaGs regime saw the SS0 as a chec&
o# the rise of Shia i#flue#ce a#d gave it a free ha#d, Soo# covert li#&s were
esta.lished .etwee# SS0 a#d 0a&ista#Gs /#ter-Services /#tellige#ce 1/S/2 which
ma#aged official 0a&ista#i support of ?ihadi operatio#s i# 4fgha#ista# a#d /#dia#-
co#trolled Lashmir, -herefore+ the deepe#i#g of Shia-Su##i polemics had ta&e# place
duri#g the i#itial a#d middle era of DiaGs material law .ut it ca# also .e argued that if
Shia milita#cy i# 0a&ista# was the outcome of DiaGs co#troversial policy of
/slami=atio#+ the Su##i milita#cy was i# reactio# to Shia assertio# .ac&ed .y /ra#,
>et+ o#e ca##ot e3o#erate the faulty approach of the regimes of "e#a=ir "hutto+
'awa= Sharif a#d 0erve= Musharraf as all the three i#stead of esta.lishi#g the writ of
the state i# areas .adly affected .ecause of sectaria# viole#ce+ tried to cover up
thi#gs, 0redicta.ly+ sectaria# groups crossed the thi# li#e .etwee# political struggle
a#d terrorism a#d resorted to worst &i#d of &illi#gs a#d various terrorist acts,
1Cternal 5'namics
-he assertio# of milita#t Su##i a#d Shia /slam is also the outcome of e3ter#al
factors, /ra# a#d Saudi 4ra.ia were held respo#si.le for fighti#g their pro3y sectaria#
war i# 0a&ista#, -he impositio# of *i)ah-i-?afria i# /ra# .y 4yotullah Lhomei#i a#d
the fear of a revolutio# spillover i# the #eigh.ori#g cou#tries led the 4ra. world+
particularly /ra) a#d Saudi 4ra.ia+ to a co#fro#tatio#al path with -ehra#, -his
perceived fear e#gaged /ra# a#d Saudi 4ra.ia i# a pro3y war for religio-political
i#flue#ce a#d clout i# 0a&ista#+ 4fgha#ista# a#d the #ewly i#depe#de#t Muslim
repu.lics of !e#tral 4sia, /# 199B+ a #ew sectaria# group called as Su##i -ehri&
1moveme#t2 was esta.lished i# Larachi u#der the leadership of Maula#a Saleem
Kadri, /t #eeds to .e me#tio#ed that i# a deadly suicide attac& i# Larachi i# a
religious gatheri#g orga#i=ed .y the Su##i -ehri& o# 4pril 11+ 006+ it e#tire
leadership was wiped out, 4ccordi#g to a 0a&ista#i a#alyst #ow .ased i# the ;#ited
State+
-he /ra#ia#s were+ most li&ely+ assisti#g 0a&ista#iGs ShiGa with mo#ey a#d Diaul $a)
i#vited the Saudis to help Su##i sectaria# groups, -he 4fgha# ?ihad had already
resulted i# the free flow of arms a#d military trai#i#g for Su##i /slamists, Soo#+ some
of these Su##i milita#ts were attac&i#g the ShiaGa i# a# effort to purify 0a&ista# of
their heterodo3y, ShiGa militias emerged to fight the Su##i e3tremists with similar
tactics, 6uri#g the last twe#ty-five years+ #early two thousa#d people have .ee#
&illed+ a#d thousa#ds more maimed+ i# attac&s .y =ealots of the rival sects i#
0a&ista#, "etwee# 19B9 a#d 007+ 6BB people were &illed i# 1+B3@ reported i#cide#ts
of sectaria# co#flicts, /# 009+ si3ty-two i#cide#ts resulted i# 160 deaths+ a#d i# the
first three mo#ths of 006+ si3 i#cide#ts occurred i# which 136 people were
reportedly &illed,
-herefore+ the two e3ter#al eve#ts+ which had a su.sta#tial role i# shapi#g the
dy#amics of sectaria# co#flict i# 0a&ista# were the a#ti-Soviet ?ihad lau#ched .y a
co#glomeratio# of 4fgha# Mujahidee# groups a#d seco#d the /ra#ia# revolutio#
which overthrew mo#archy .ut esta.lished a ShiGa ideological state, 'evertheless+
Ithe /ra#ia# revolutio# had a multifold impact, -he *irst sei=ure of power .y a#
avowedly /slamist group i# a# /slamic revolutio# .rought /ra#Gs ShiGa clergy to power
a#d e#ergi=ed ShiGa all over the Middle Oast+ particularly those i# the %ulf states,
Saudi 4ra.iaGs mo#archy was wedded to Caha.ism+ a#d the Su##i rulers of all the
%ulf states had suppressed their ShiGa mi#orities si#ce the emerge#ce of the moder#
Middle Oast,J *urthermore+ Ithe /ra#ia# gover#me#t threate#ed the Saudis a#d their
allies with its rhetoric of e3porti#g the /ra#ia# revolutio#, -he /ra#ia#s also provided
overt a#d covert assista#ce to ShiGa orga#i=atio#s a#d moveme#ts, -he %ulf states
retaliated .y emphasi=i#g the heresy of ShiGism i# a# effort to mo.ili=e their Su##i
a#d Caha.i .ase, Che# /ra)Gs dictator Saddam $ussai# i#vaded /ra#+ Saudi 4ra.ia
a#d other %ulf mo#archies supported him as a defe#der of Su##i 4ra. i#terests i# the
face of ShiGa 0ersia# threats, Su##i /slamist groups i# the %ulf forgave $ussei#Gs past
attac&s o# /slamic o.serva#ce a#d his repressio# of such groups as the Muslim
"rotherhood,J /ra# challe#ged Saudi 4ra.iaGs pre-emi#e#t positio# a#d status i# the
Muslim world, -his led to large-scale pa#-/slami=atio# attempts .y Saudi 4ra.ia a#d
other %ulf cou#tries+ as well as .y Ai.ya a#d /ra)+ to e3port Su##i-Caha.i /slamism
to other parts of the Muslim world, 0a&ista# was called as a mai# .attlegrou#d i#
/ra#-Saudi .attle,
/# 19B7+ the 6eo.a#di scholar Muhammad Ma#=ur 'uma#i wrote a tract asserti#g
that the e3cesses of the /ra#ia# revolutio# proved that Shiism was u#-/slamic, -he
preface to his wor& was writte# .y Sayyid 4.ul $asa# 4li 'advi+ rector of the
'adwatul ;lema a#d recipie#t of Saudi 4ra.iaGs Li#g *aisal 0ri=e for Service to /slam,
4#other pro-Saudi religious leader i# 0a&ista#+ 4srar 4hmed we#t so far as to argue
that Shiism+ which origi#ated soo# after the demise of 0rophet Mohammad+ was part
of a# early ?ewish co#spiracy agai#st /slam,J ;#fortu#ately+ /ra# a#d Saudi 4ra.ia+
the two Muslim cou#tries+ .ut followi#g differe#t sects of /slam+ failed to u#dersta#d
that their political co#fro#tatio# would create i#sta.ility i# other Muslim cou#tries a#d
e#da#ger the sectaria# harmo#y, /ra#-/ra) war+ which co#ti#ued for eight lo#g years
further+ wea&e#ed the positio# of Muslim cou#tries a#d i#ducted a# eleme#t of
sectaria#ism, -he fallout of the /ra#-/ra) war was also to .e see# i# 0a&ista#+ which
.ecame a .attlegrou#d of Su##i-domi#ated regime of Saddam $ussai# a#d the Shiite
state of /ra#, "oth cou#tries were a.le to fu#d their pro3ies i# 0a&ista# who used
sectaria# card so as to accomplish their vested i#terests, *urthermore+ 0a&ista#
.ecame a# easy .attlegrou#d of /ra# a#d Saudi 4ra.ia of supporti#g their respective
sectaria# groups with mo#ey a#d political i#doctri#atio# while the state of 0a&ista#
misera.ly failed to preve#t foreig# i#terve#tio# resulti#g i#to the out.rea& of
sectaria# viole#ce i# the cou#try,
-he ShiGa clergy of /ra# a#d 0a&ista# were li#&ed historically+ .ut these li#&s .ecame
politici=ed o#ly after the /ra#ia# revolutio# of 11@9, -he cha#gi#g role of the ShiGa
/mamia Stude#tGs Hrga#i=atio# 1/SH2 provides a# e3ample of the #ew reality, "efore
19@9+ the group .ega# offeri#g scholarships to ShiGa stude#ts to study i# /ra#, -he
i#creased co#tacts .etwee# 0a&ista#i ShiGa stude#ts a#d clergy a#d their /ra#ia#
cou#terparts created a cadre of politici=ed ShiGa leaders, -'*? fou#der+ ?aafar $usai#+
was succeeded as the leader of the 0a&ista#i ShiGa .y 4llama 4rif $ussa# al-$usa#i
1197@-BB2+ who had studied at ShiaGs academies i# 'ajaf+ /ra) a#d Kom+ /ra#,
$usai#i had come i#to close co#tact with 4yatollah Lhomei#i i# .oth places, Che#
Su##i sectaria# terrorism .ega# duri#g the 19B0s+ /ra#ia# diplomats i# 0a&ista# were
amo#g its targets, /# the mi#ds of Su##i sectaria# milita#ts+ 0a&ista#Gs ShiGa groups
a#d /ra# were closely li#&ed, -he e#d of /ra#-/ra) war i# 19BB+ the Soviet military
withdrawal from 4fgha#ista# i# *e.ruary 19B9+ the i#ter#al power struggle i#
4fgha#ista# followi#g the Soviet withdrawal+ the emerge#ce of hardcore Caha.i
-ali.a# a#d their sei=ure of power i# 1996 a#d other su.se)ue#t eve#ts tra#sformed
the sectaria# co#flict i# 0a&ista#, -he level of polari=atio# at the sectaria# level
augme#ted with the rise of spli#ter groups of various Shia a#d Su##i religious
orga#i=atio#s, O3ter#al factor is still releva#t as far as sectaria# viole#ce i# 0a&ista#
is co#cer#ed+ .ut its i#te#sity has decreased, /# the rece#t past+ /ra) has emerged as
a major .attlegrou#d of Shia a#d Su##i commu#ities with the alleged i#volveme#t of
/ra# i# support of /ra)i 4ra. Shia groups growi#g with the passage of time,
(+e new paradigms o sectarian conlicts
Si#ce 19B0s o#wards+ 0a&ista# has e3perie#ced sustai#ed sectaria# viole#ce resulti#g
i#to the &illi#g a#d i#jury of thousa#ds of people, *our importa#t flashpoi#ts+ which
emerged si#ce 19B0s i# the co#te3t of sectaria# viole#ce i# 0a&ista# are5-
1. Larachi
2. ?ha#g
3. Kuetta
4. Aahore
Some of the facts discussed .elow may provide shoc&i#g i#formatio# a.out the havoc
played .y the me#ace of sectaria# viole#ce i# 0a&ista#,
_ --/# March 009+ 73 Shias were &illed i# a .om. .last i# *atehpur, H# May @+
009+ twe#ty people were &illed i# a suicide .om.i#g i# 0a&ista# targeti#g the Sufi
Shri#e of "ari /mam+ /slama.ad, /# May 009+ si3 employees of a fast-food
restaura#t were .ur#t to death i# Larachi duri#g a riot that followed a suicide attac&
o# a mos)ue, Shiites set o# fire the restaura#t after the mos)ue attac& i# which at
least five people were &illed,
_-- -he year 007 was o#e of the .loodiest o# record i# terms of sectaria# viole#ce i#
0a&ista# with more tha# 00 &illi#gs, 19 people were &illed i# a Larachi Shia mos)ue
attac& i# May 007, H# May 30 i# Larachi a# elderly Su##i cleric Mufti 'i=amuddi#
Sham=ai was shot deadV 30 people were &illed i# a suicide attac& o# a Shia mos)ue
i# Sial&ot i# Hcto.er 007, 4 car .om. &illed 70 Su##is i# Multa# i# Hcto.er 007,
H# Hcto.er 10+ a Shia mos)ue i# Aahore was the target of a terrorist attac&, 4 .om.
was .lasted at the e#tra#ce of the $usai#i $all mos)ue whe# a suicidal .om.er
deto#ated a device as people had gathered for eve#i#g prayer, -he i#cide#t &illed two
security guards a#d four others i#cludi#g a .oy of 13 years old, H# May 17+ si3
mem.ers of a Shia family were shot dead,
_-- ?uly 7+ 003 i# Kuetta+ "alochista#+ fifty-four Shias were &illed i# a# /mam.argah
i# Kuetta, /# Hcto.er 003+ /slama.ad faced a spell of viole#ce whe# a promi#e#t
Su##i leader+ Maula#a 4=am -ari)+ the leader of Milat-e-/slamiya was gu##ed dow#,
4rou#d 100 people were &illed i# Sectaria# viole#ce duri#g the year 003,
4ccordi#g to the ""! #ews report of Septem.er B+ 009+ arou#d 7+000 people have
.ee# &illed i# the past 9 years of sectaria# viole#ce i# 0a&ista#,
III; (+e Ha' Out>
/t seems the sectaria# divide i# 0a&ista# ca##ot .e removed without pursui#g a
policy of pragmatic realism, 4 policy of peaceful coe3iste#ce a#d reco#ciliatio# is
esse#tial so as to ma#age+ if #ot resolve+ sectaria# co#flicts i# 0a&ista#, Chat
strategies should .e formulated a#d adopted i# order to deal with sectaria# viole#ce
i# 0a&ista# a#d to .ridge the gap .etwee# the two major Muslim groups? Chat
should .e the role of state i# deali#g with the sectaria# co#flict a#d how civil society
ca# play a via.le role to e#d sectaria# polari=atio# i# the cou#try?
/# the last twe#ty-si3 years+ sustai#ed viole#ce resulti#g i#to the &illi#g+ i#jury a#d
material losses of .oth Su##i a#d Shia commu#ities seem to have made the tas& of
sectaria# reco#ciliatio# difficult, 'ot o#ly milita#t sectaria# groups happe# to further
divide the Shia a#d Su##i commu#ities+ .ut e3ter#al factors also fuel sectaria#
co#flict i# 0a&ista#, >et+ some of the strategies+ which could .e helpful i# co#trolli#g
sectaria# viole#ce are as follows5-
1. -here should .e a co#stitutio#al provisio# to declare promoti#g sectaria#
hatred a#d viole#ce a serious crime .y awardi#g severe pu#ishme#t,
2. /# the sylla.i taught i# differe#t educatio#al i#stitutio#s+ particularly i#
schools+ all such materials which promote hatred a#d .iases o# the .asis of
religio#+ sect+ se3+ eth#icity a#d culture must .e removed from te3t.oo&s a#d
other sources of readi#g,
3. -he state apparatus must .e #eutral as far as deali#g with Shia a#d Su##i
co#flict is co#cer#ed, State should #ot favor a#y sectaria# group,
4. -he media+ .oth pri#t a#d electro#ic+ must .e i#structed to do respo#si.le
reporti#g o# Sectaria# matters,
5. -hose sectaria# orga#i=atio#s+ which have .ee# .a##ed .y the gover#me#t+
should #ot .e allowed to reappear u#der a differe#t #ame,
6. O3ter#al i#terve#tio# i# sectaria# matters must .e effectively chec&ed,
Some of the recomme#datio#s prese#ted .y the /%! i# its report e#titled+ I-he State
of Sectaria#ism i# 0a&ista#J 1B 4pril 009 are5-
1, <ecog#i=e the diversity of /slam i# 0a&ista#+ reaffirm the co#stitutio#al pri#ciple of
e)uality for all citi=e#s regardless of religio# or sect+ a#d give mea#i#g to this .y
ta&i#g the followi#g steps5
<epeal all laws+ pe#al codes a#d official procedures that rei#force sectaria#
ide#tities a#d cause discrimi#atio# o# the .asis of faith+ such as the
ma#datory affirmatio# of
<epeal the $udood laws a#d .lasphemy laws,
6is.a#d privately-ru# Sharia courts i# the 'orth Cest *ro#tier 0rovi#ce
1'C*02 a#d ta&e actio# agai#st religious orga#i=atio#s operati#g them
6o #ot use =a&at or other sources of gover#me#t fu#di#g to fi#a#ce the
activates+ educatio#al or otherwise+ of a#y sectV a#d
0urge /slamic Studies te3t.oo&s of sectaria# material that promises or
u#dermi#es specific sects,
, 6is.a#d+ i# furthera#ce of 4rticle 96 of the co#stitutio#+ all private militias+
i#cludi#g those orga#i=ed for sectaria# a#d jihadi causes,
3, Ma&e cur.s o# sectaria# leaders a#d e3tremist groups more affecti#g .y+
/mpleme#ti#g the laws agai#st hate speech a#d i#cide#t of commu#al viole#ceV
leaders respo#si.le for ver.al or writte# edicts of apostasy,
-a&i#g legal actio# agai#st the admi#istratio# of a#y mos)ue or madrasa or
religious leader respo#si.le for ver.al or writte# edicts of apostasy,
-a&e legal actio# agai#st the admi#istratio# of a#y mos)ue or madrasa whose
leader calls for i#ter#al a#d e3ter#al jihad,
0u.lici=i#g the evide#ce for .a##i#g ?ihadi groups,
!a#celi#g the pri#t declaratio#s 1lice#ses2 of jihadi pu.licatio#s a#d
prosecuti#g the pu.lishers
!losi#g dow# madrasas ru# .y sectaria# a#d jihadi orga#i=atio#s,
O#di#g registratio# of #ew madrasas u#til a# #ew madras law is i# place+ a#d
registeri#g all madrasas u#der this #ew lawV i#cludi#g those curre#tly
registered u#der the Societies 4ct,
4ppoi#t prayer leaders a#d orators at mos)ues a#d madrasas ru# .y the
4u)af 6epartme#t 1the gover#me#t departme#t of religious e#dowme#ts2
o#ly after verifyi#g that the applica#t has #o record of sectaria# e3tremism+
a#d dismiss those sectaria# leaders who are employees of the 4u)af
6epartme#t,
%uara#tee the physical security of judges presidi#g over cases of sectaria#
terrorism,
/%!Gs recomme#datio#s to ma#age a#d reduce the i#te#sity of sectaria# viole#ce i#
0a&ista# are useful provided the state a#d societal actors ta&e #otice of the
serious#ess of sectaria# co#flict a#d e#sure law i# order to preve#t all those forces+
whether domestic or foreig# who are respo#si.le for causi#g sectaria# hatred a#d
viole#ce, Most importa#t+ there is a #eed to create sectaria# harmo#y at the
grassrootsG level .y i#cludi#g readi#g materials at the school level+ which ca# e#sure
sectaria# tolera#ce a#d goodwill, !ivil society must #ot sit idle a#d watch the erosio#
of sectaria# harmo#y, Tarious civil society groups must u#leash the process of
sectaria# tolera#ce .y lau#chi#g campaig# i# media a#d also see&i#g the support of
trade u#io#s+ stude#ts+ teachers+ lawyers+ political parties+ wome# orga#i=atio#s a#d
traders i# cur.i#g sectaria# viole#ce a#d creati#g tolera#ce i# society so that viole#ce
a#d terrorism practiced .y various sectaria# groups is reduced, "efore it is too late+
the state a#d #o#-state actors of 0a&ista# must effectively deal with the me#ace of
e3tremism, -he <ed mos)ue episode i# /slama.ad is a remi#der of how fragile
0a&ista#i society is while deali#g with a group of religious e3tremists who wa#t to
impose their parochial .eliefs a#d way of life o# others,
-he lesso#s which o#e lear#s from more tha# two decades of sectaria# viole#ce i#
0a&ista# is the level of tolera#ce which has gow# dow#, *or the ma#ageme#t a#d
resolutio# of a#y co#flict+ it is imperative that the parties who are e#gaged i# that
co#flict must e3press political will+ accommodatio#+ fle3i.ility+ maturity a#d tolera#ce
with each other, ;#fortu#ately+ .ecause of the misma#ageme#t of the sectaria#
co#flicts i# 0a&ista#+ #either the state #or the society could preve#t the emerge#ce
a#d stre#gthe#i#g of those groups who carried a missio# to a##ihilate each other, 4s
a result+ the sectaria# divide i# 0a&ista# is #ot peaceful+ as it used to .e earlier .ut is
marred with hatred a#d viole#ce agai#st each other, 0erhaps+ the recomme#datio#s
suggested i# this paper to effectively a#d professio#ally deal with the sectaria# issue
i# this cou#try may help restore religious harmo#y a#d coe3iste#ce o#e the o#e ha#d
a#d cur. milita#cy+ e3tremism a#d terrorism,
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
"egi#s
aura&=ai 1Mo#day+ ?uly 07+ 0112+ $e##a Lha# 1*riday+ Hcto.er 17+ 0112
#13
Monday, July 04, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
1lectoral "olitics in "a!istan;;;
1lectoral "olitics in "a!istan D19AA-1969E
"y
-ahir Lamra#
0a&ista#i political elite too& #o less tha# 3 years to hold the ge#eral electio#s i# the
cou#try, $owever i# the i#terve#i#g period people we#t to the polls ma#y a time, -he
provi#cial electio#s i# the 0u#ja. a#d 'C*0 were held i# 1991 a#d shortly afterwards
the same e3ercise was repeated i# Si#dh a#d Oast 0a&ista#, -hose electio#s did #ot
co#tri.ute i# a#y ta#gi.le measure to .ri#g a.out the developme#t of political
i#stitutio#s i# 0a&ista#, Che# i# Hcto.er199B 4yu. Lha# promulgated Martial Aaw at
the .ehest of /s&a#der Mir=a+ the process of political tra#sitio# reverted-.ac& to
s)uare o#e, -he forces of ce#trali=atio# got stre#gthe#ed .eyo#d measure i# a plural
cou#try li&e 0a&ista#, /# this paper electoral reforms a#d the electio#s held duri#g
the 1990s a#d 1960s has .ee# critically a#alysed, -he creatio# of electio#
commissio# a#d its role as e#visaged i# the first two co#stitutio#s 11996 P 1962 has
also .ee# .rought i#to focus,
/t has .ee# cited .y ma#y scholars that the provi#cial electio#s held particularly i#
Cest 0a&ista# duri#g the 1990s were Rfarce+ a moc&ery a#d fraud upo# the
electorateG, -he party i# power deployed all sorts of wholesome a#d illegal tactics to
retai# its hold o# the three provi#ces, $owever+ i# Oast "e#gal Muslim Aeague had
.ee# discredited so thoroughly that ;#ited *ro#t almost swept it out of e3iste#ce
from the regio#, -hat happe#ed despite !e#tral %over#me#tGs u#e)uivocal support
for the former, !o#trariwise+ as >u#as Samad argues+ the !e#tral %over#me#t ceased
to .e #eutral a#d #o#-partisa# i# the electio#s+ held i# the 0u#ja.+ 'C*0 a#d Si#dh
respectively, /t was co#te#ded that the state fu#ctio#aries at the .iddi#g of the
!e#tral %over#me#t i#terfered with the free e3ercise of .allot, 'omi#atio# papers of
the oppositio# ca#didates were rejected Ro# most fa#ciful a#d flimsy grou#ds a#d i#
some cases seco#ders+ proposers were &id#apped,G 0olitical oppo#e#ts were harassed
a#d throw# i#to priso# o# the prete3t of .ei#g da#gerous to the State, -hese
a#omalies+ whe# reported i# the press+ triggered very serious dou.ts i# the mi#ds of
the ge#eral pu.lic+ ma&i#g there.y the credi.ility of those electio#s dou.tful,
Hste#si.ly i# order to dispel those dou.ts a#d to restore co#fide#ce amo#g the
masses as regards the rule of democracy+ the #ewly i#stalled !e#tral %over#me#t
appoi#ted a# Olectoral <eforms !ommissio# o# 19th Hcto.er 1999, $e#ce i# this
paper+ the electoral reforms commissio#+ the *ra#chise !ommissio# a#d the electio#s
held duri#g 4yu. regime would .e the focus of our study,
-he Olectoral <eforms !ommissio# co#sisted of the !hairma# a#d two mem.ers, -he
!hairma# of that !ommissio#+ Muhammad /.rahim Lha# assumed office o#
Hcto.er whereas the two mem.ers+ !haudhry *a=l /lahi a#d Mr, 4&&as 4li Lha#
joi#ed !hairma# at Aahore respectively o# 7th 'ovem.er a#d 3rd 'ovem.er, Aahore
was desig#ated as !ommissio#Gs $ead)uarter, !ommissio# was supposed to suggest
the ways a#d the mea#s to revise the electoral laws a#d rules so that #ot o#ly Rfree
a#d fairG electio#s could .e secured .ut also Rto preve#t malpractices from a#y source
at a#y stage of a# electio# so as to e#sure freedom a#d secrecy of the .allot i# order
that a true represe#tatio# of the people shall .e achieved,G !ommissio#+ after
gatheri#g i#formatio# from the pu.lic at large a#d the# studyi#g the e3isti#g laws
a#d regulatio#s i# 0a&ista# as well as i# other cou#tries was mea#t to su.mit its
report i# three mo#ths, !ommissio# drew up )uestio##aire comprisi#g thirty o#e
)uestio#s of varyi#g #ature a#d pu.lished it, /t was give# the widest possi.le
pu.licity through radio a#d the other mea#s of i#formatio# li&e press a#d its copies
were se#t to importa#t political parties+ orga#i=atio#s a#d groups, "esides+
!ommissio# co#ducted e3te#sive tours of all the major cities for eliciti#g pu.lic
opi#io# o# the co#duct of the electio#s, !ommissio# mem.ers also i#terviewed a#d
e3ami#ed large #um.er of people i#cludi#g party represe#tatives, *airly large
#um.er of opi#io# gathered+ was of the view that method employed Rfor
superi#te#de#ce+ directio# a#d co#trol of the preparatio#+ pu.licatio# a#d revisio# of
the electoral rolls a#d the co#duct of the electio#s to the AegislatureG was deficie#t i#
the e3treme, /t had .ee# the privilege of the provi#cial gover#me#ts to appoi#t
Olectio# !ommissio#ers to oversee the co#duct of the electio#s, -herefore they could
.e i#flue#ced .y those who had the power to appoi#t them, /t was therefore
recomme#ded .y the <eform !ommissio#5
I/t is a fact .eyo#d dispute that the e3isti#g machi#ery for superi#te#de#ce+ directio#
a#d co#trol of the preparatio#+ pu.licatio# a#d revisio# of the electoral rolls a#d the
co#duct of electio#s to the Aegislatures is a.solutely u#satisfactory+ a#d that it has
totally failed to achieve a true represe#tatio# of the people, Ce+ therefore+ suggest
that the matters just referred to a.ove should .e wholly vested i# a !ommissio#+
&#ow# as the Olectio# !ommissio#, -he said !ommissio# should co#sist of the !hief
Olectio# !ommissio#er+ a#d such #um.er of other Olectio# !ommissio#ers as the
0reside#t of 0a&ista# may from time to time determi#e, -he appoi#tme#t of the !hief
Olectio# !ommissio#er should+ su.ject to the provisio#s of a#y law made i# that
.ehalf .y the 0arliame#t is made .y the 0reside#t i# his discretio# a#d whe# a#y
other Olectio# !ommissio#er is so appoi#ted+ the !hief Olectio# !ommissio#er should
act as the !hairma# of the Olectio# !ommissio#, "efore each ge#eral electio# to the
parliame#t a#d the Aegislative 4ssem.ly of each provi#ce+ the 0reside#t may also
appoi#t+ after co#sultatio# with the Olectio# !ommissio#+ such <egio#al
!ommissio#ers as he may co#sider #ecessary to assist the Olectio# !ommissio# i#
the performa#ce of the a.ove fu#ctio#s, Su.ject to the provisio# of a#y law made .y
the parliame#t+ the co#ditio#s of service a#d te#ure of office of the Olectio#
!ommissio# a#d the <egio#al !ommissio#ers should .e such as the 0reside#t may
determi#e+ provided that the !hief Olectio# !ommissio#er would #ot .e removed
from his office e3cept i# li&e ma##er a#d o# the li&e grou#ds as a judge of a $igh
!ourt+ a#d the co#ditio#s of service of the !hief Olectio# !ommissio#er shall #ot .e
varied to his disadva#tage after his appoi#tme#t, 0rovided further that a#y other
Olectio# !ommissio#er or a <egio#al !ommissio#er shall #ot .e removed from his
office e3cept o# the recomme#datio# of the !hief Olectio# !ommissio#er,
-he $ead of the State or the %over#or of a 0rovi#ce+ should+ whe# so re)uested .y
the Olectio# !ommissio#+ ma&e availa.le to the Olectio# !ommissio# or to the
<egio#al !ommissio#er such staff as may .e #ecessary for the discharge of the
a.ove-me#tio#ed fu#ctio#s of the Olectio# !ommissio#,J
-hat recomme#datio# #otwithsta#di#g+ o#e must #ot loose sight of the fact that the
provisio# to that effect had already .ee# made i# 1996 !o#stitutio#, -he Olectio#
!ommissio#+ as provided i# the !o#stitutio# had followi#g duties5
1. to prepare electoral rolls for electio# to the #atio#al 4ssem.ly a#d the
0rovi#cial 4ssem.lies a#d to revise such rolls a##uallyV a#d,
2. to orga#i=e a#d co#duct electio#s to the 'atio#al assem.ly a#d the 0rovi#cial
4ssem.lies,
-he Olectio# !ommissio# of 0a&ista# was created o# 3rd March 1996 u#der the
4rticle 13@ of the !o#stitutio# of 1996 with the !hief Olectio# !ommissio#er as its
head, -he *irst !hief Olectio# !ommissio#er was appoi#ted o# 9th ?u#e 1996, Mr,
Lha# *,M, Lha# was the first i#cum.e#t who remai#ed i# that positio# u#til Bth
Hcto.er 199B, /ro#ically his services were #ot i#vo&ed as there had .ee# #o electio#s
duri#g his te#ure as !hief Olectio# !ommissio#er, -he Olectio# !ommissio# of
0a&ista# was co#ceived as a# i#depe#de#t a#d auto#omous co#stitutio#al .ody
charged with the fu#ctio# of co#ducti#g tra#spare#t+ free+ fair a#d impartial electio#s
to the 'atio#al a#d 0rovi#cial 4ssem.lies, $owever o# very few occasio#s i# the
e#tire history of the Olectio# !ommissio#+ tra#spare#cy a#d impartiality of the
electio#s could .e e#sured, -he holdi#g of electio#s to the office of the 0reside#t a#d
the Se#ate were the fu#ctio#s of the !hief Olectio# !ommissio#er, ;#der the e3isti#g
laws the co#duct of Aocal %over#me#t Olectio#s is also the respo#si.ility of the !hief
Olectio# !ommissio#er,
!o#stitutio# of 1996
4fter #i#e years+ 0a&ista#i ruli#g elite was eve#tually successful i# frami#g a
co#stitutio# i# 1996, -he !o#stitue#t 4ssem.ly adopted it o# 9 *e.ruary+ 1996+ a#d
it was e#forced o# 3 March+ 1996, 0a&ista#(s status as a domi#io# e#ded a#d the
cou#try was declared a# /slamic <epu.lic of 0a&ista#, -hereupo# the !o#stitue#t
4ssem.ly of 0a&ista# .ecame the i#terim 'atio#al 4ssem.ly a#d %over#or %e#eral
/s&a#der Mir=a was swor# i# as the first 0reside#t of 0a&ista#, -hat co#stitutio# was
le#gthy a#d detailedV it co#tai#ed 37 articles divided i#to thirtee# parts a#d si3
schedules, /t provided for federal system with the pri#ciple of parity .etwee# Oast
0a&ista# a#d Cest 0a&ista# despite former was a majority provi#ce, -he !e#tre was
i#vested with such powers as to ta&e u#ilateral actio# i# emerge#cy a#d it could
i#flue#ce the provi#cial auto#omy, <egardi#g o#e u#it Latheri#e 4d#ey o.serves
R6espite the relative homoge#eity of its u#its+ 0a&ista# pursued a strategy that made
the u#its less homoge#eous+ mergi#g the provi#ce its Cester# wi#g i#to o#e u#it i#
1999,G9-hat merger gave rise to i#tra-regio#al disse#tio#s i# the days to come, /#
Si#dh a#d 'C*0 the political am.ie#ce started ree&i#g with a#ti-0u#ja.i feeli#gs,
"aluchista# was #o e3ceptio# either+ i# that particular regard,
-he !o#stitutio# provided for the parliame#tary form of gover#me#t+ where real
e3ecutive authority was vested i# a ca.i#et presided over .y the 0rime Mi#ister+
which was collectively respo#si.le to the legislature, 0arliame#t accordi#g to that
!o#stitutio# would .e u#icameral therefore it co#sisted o#ly of the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly
a#d e)uality .etwee# the two Ci#gs 1i,e,+ Oast 0a&ista# a#d Cest 0a&ista#2 was
esta.lished i# it, /t was to co#sist of 300 mem.ers, 'atio#al 4ssem.ly was to meet
at least twice a year with at least o#e sessio# at 6ha&a, 'ow the 0reside#t was the
head of the state i#stead of the %over#or %e#eral to .e elected .y a# Olectoral
!ollege comprisi#g mem.ers of the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly a#d 0rovi#cial 4ssem.lies,
-he democratic rights a#d freedoms such as freedom of speech a#d e3pressio#+ of
assem.ly a#d associatio#+ of moveme#t a#d of professio# were all provided i# the
!o#stitutio#+ with the usual )ualificatio#s, Cith regard to civil rights+ familiar rights
such as rights of life+ li.erty a#d property were gra#ted+ agai# with the usual
)ualificatio#s a#d safeguards, -he judiciary was give# power to e#force the
fu#dame#tal rights a#d the courts were to decide if a law was repug#a#t to a#y
provisio#s of the fu#dame#tal rights, 4s per the !o#stitutio#+ ;rdu a#d "e#gali were
made #atio#al la#guages while O#glish was to remai# the official la#guage for the
first 9 years, 4fter te# years( passage of the !o#stitutio#+ the 0reside#t was to
appoi#t a commissio# with the tas& to ma&e recomme#datio# for the replaceme#t of
O#glish as the official la#guage, RAi#guistic commu#ities were #ot accommodated at
the provi#cial level or at the ce#tre u#der the 1996 co#stitutio# with the .elated
e3ceptio# of the recog#itio# of "e#gali as a state la#guage o# par with ;rdu, 0a&ista#
did #ot recog#i=e the legitimacy of provi#cial la#guages,G
4lo#g with other /slamic provisio#s i# the !o#stitutio#+ the 0reside#t was re)uired to
.e a Muslim of at least 70 years of age, -he H.jectives <esolutio# was+ however+ o#ly
made the pream.le of the !o#stitutio# a#d #ot i#cluded i# its mai# te3t, -he
0reside#t had the discretio#ary powers to ma&e the appoi#tme#t of the !hairma#
a#d mem.ers of the Olectio# !ommissio#+ 6elimitatio# !ommissio# a#d 0u.lic
Service !ommissio#, $e also had the power to appoi#t the 0rime Mi#ister from
amo#gst the mem.ers of the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly, $owever+ his appoi#tee had to ta&e
a vote of co#fide#ce from the 4ssem.ly withi# two mo#ths of his appoi#tme#t, -he
0reside#t also had the power to remove the 0rime Mi#ister if he felt that the 0rime
Mi#ister had lost the co#fide#ce of the majority of the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly mem.ers,
-he !o#stitutio# offered direct electio#s u#der adult fra#chise, Overy citi=e# of
0a&ista# with mi#imum age of 1 was allowed to vote i# the electio#s, -he provi#cial
structure was #o differe#t to the o#e i# the ce#ter, -he patter# for the ce#ter-
provi#ce relatio#s was the same as it had .ee# provided i# the %over#me#t of /#dia
4ct+ 1939, -here were federal+ provi#cial a#d co#curre#t lists of su.jects, -here were
30 items i# the federal list+ 97 items i# the provi#cial list a#d 19 items i# the
co#curre#t list, -he federal legislatio# was to get precede#ce over provi#cial
legislatio# regardi#g the co#curre#t list, <esiduary powers were vested i# the
provi#ces, /# case of a co#flict .etwee# ce#ter a#d provi#ces or .etwee# the two
provi#ces+ the !hief ?ustice of the Supreme !ourt was to act as the mediator,
Some positives i# that !o#stitutio# #otwithsta#di#g %e#eral Muhammad 4yu. Lha#+
the mighty !omma#der i# !hief of the 4rmed *orces had stro#g reservatio#s
regardi#g that docume#t, /# his .oo& *rie#ds 'ot Masters+ he castigates it as Ra
docume#t of despairG a#d R#o .etter tha# a .u#dle of u#wor&a.le compromises,G10 $e
flays !haudhry Muhammad 4li .y sayi#g R-he 0rime Mi#ister 1!haudhry Muhammad
4li2 was so a#3ious to go dow# i# history as the author of a co#stitutio# that he was
prepared to accommodate all poi#t of view, Chat the cou#try got was #ot a
co#stitutio# .ut a hotch potch of alie# co#cepts which had already .rought e#ough
co#fusio# a#d chaos to the cou#try, -he !o#stitutio#+ .y distri.utio# power .etwee#
the preside#t+ the 0rime Mi#ister a#d his !a.i#et+ a#d the provi#ces+ destroyed the
focal poi#t power a#d left #o o#e i# a positio# of co#trol,G11 4ccordi#g to him
/s&a#dar Mir=a was shrewd e#ough to see how the co#stitutio# could .e used to
promote political i#trigues a#d .argai#i#g,G1 -he !o#stitutio# of 1996 proved to .e
short lived as o# Hcto.er @+ 199B+ Marital Aaw was promulgated a#d the co#stitutio#
was a.rogated, -he coup detat was i# fact Si&a#der Mir=aGs .rai# child however he
was summarily ousted from the positio# of power .y 4yu. Lha#, $e#ce #ew era i#
the history of 0a&ista# was ushered i# wherei# the co#trolled versio# of democracy
was i#troduced,
(able
&ities--(otal votes--A'ub <+an--Miss ,atima 2inna+--Ot+er &andidates--
Invalid--(otal cast o votes
Larachi-----190@------B3@---------1079-------7------13------1903
$ydera.ad-----706------01---------01-------0------0------709
Aahore-----110------B19---------3@1-------1------1@------10B
Ayallpur-----39@------@7---------13-------0-----0------39@
<awalpi#id-----319------0---------106-------------B------31B
0eshawar-----91------99---------19-------0------6------90
6acca-----99B-----199---------393-------1-------------999
!hittago#g-----337------1B1---------191-------0------------337
Lhul#a-----B3------16@---------113-------------0------B
!omilla-----B@------196---------1B-------0------------B6
(otal-----6441------333A---------4I09-------10------A9------640I
+ource, Ibid p. 1A
http,EE.storyofpa#istan.comEarticlete;t.aspFartidG=6H6)
Iotin" in some urban centres in the %residential /lections' 08HA.01
4yu. Ora1199B-19692V Cith 4yu. Lha#Gs arrival o# the political stage i# 199B+ the
System of "asic 6emocracy system was i#troduced i# which Rthe voters delegate
their rights to choose the preside#t a#d the mem.ers of the #atio#al a#d provi#cial
assem.lies to B0+000 represe#tatives called "asic 6emocrats,G
4t the lowest level were the ;#io# 0a#chayats+ each co#tai#i#g te# elected a#d five
#omi#ated mem.ers, Oach elected mem.er was to represe#t from 1000 to 1900
people, -hey primary respo#si.ility was to oversee the judicial police a#d
developme#tal fu#ctio#s pertai#i#g to their areas, -he #e3t tier was the su. district
cou#cil called teshil cou#cil i# Cest 0a&ista# a#d -ha#a cou#cil i# Oast 0a&ista#,
-hese cou#cils comprisi#g preside#ts of u#io# pa#chayat a#d officers of developme#t
departme#ts had .ee# e#trusted with developme#t activities with i# their respective
areas, -he other two tiers #amely the district cou#cil was .ei#g presided over .y
deputy commissio#er a#d divisio#al cou#cils .y the commissio#ers, -hese cou#cils
had mem.ers e)ually divided i#to official a#d #o# officials, Olectio# to u#io#
pa#chayat was to .e held o# the .asis of adult fra#chises,
4yu. has put the co#stitutio#al cloc& .ac& to the days of Aord Mayo a#d Aord <ipo# W
the late #i#etee#th ce#tury --- whe# democratic e3perime#ts were i#itiated .y
putti#g life i#to the e3isti#g i#dige#ous local i#stitutio#s a#d creati#g other wider
orga#s of local gover#me#t li&e the district .oards a#d the Mu#icipal cou#cils 4yu.
e3perime#t also i#dicates the sort of gover#me#t that is li&ely to wor& i# a# 4sia#
cou#try, 6emocracy i# 0a&ista# accordi#g to 4yu. should .e a gover#me#t for the
people .y the .ureaucratic elite, Chether this .ureaucracy will evo&e support i# Oast
0a&ista#+ particularly whe# .oth the army a#d civil service are domi#ated .y west
0a&ista#is remai#s to .e see#,
-he pu.lic meeti#gs held to face the electorate were joi#t affairs+ held u#der the
chairma#ship of the 6istrict Magistrate or some other civil service fu#ctio#ary, 4ll
ca#didates sat o# the platform a#d each was allowed the same #um.er of mi#utes i#
which to address the audie#ce, -he audie#ce was #ot restricted to the Olectoral
!ollege+ .ut mem.ers of the ge#eral pu.lic were admitted a#d could as& )uestio#s
alo#g with the others, /# these circumsta#ces+ it is #ot surprisi#g that the electio#
passed off i# a largely tra#)uil atmosphere,
-he first electio#s to .e held u#der this system were scheduled to ru# duri#g the e#d
of 1999 a#d the early 1960, !a.i#et advised 4yu. to see& the vote of co#fide#ce
from the B0000 mem.ers of elected "asic 6emocrats, -he "asic 6emocratic gave
him a# overwhelmi#g vote of co#fide#ce, -he .allot was held o# 17 *e.ruary a#d the
result was a##ou#ced o# 19 *e.ruary 1960, / received co#formatio# i# 99,6 per ce#t
of the appro3imately B0+000 votes cast,1B ",6 system however failed to produce a
class of #ew leaders+ i#sightful a#d i#depe#de#t i# their outloo&, -hey were
su.servie#t to the 4yu. regime .ecause the "asic 6emocracies Hrder+ 1999+ had
give# e#ough powers to the .ureaucracy to co#trol these i#stitutio#s, Moreover+ due
to fear of victimi=atio# a#d the desire to wi# favour+ the mem.ers did ta&e steps to
displace the .ureaucrats associated with these i#stitutio#s,
6espite 4yu.Gs depictio# .y $u#ti#gto# as a# i##ovator who through the device of
"asic 6emocracies sought to tra#sform the i#stitutio#al .asis of 0a&ista#Gs politics+ he
was the pater#alist of the <ajGs #o#-regulatio# provi#ces, $e rei#troduced the
#i#etee#th ce#tury ideas of political tutelage through i#direct electio# a#d official
#omi#atio# of represe#tatives, $owever+ li&e the pater#alistic 0u#ja.i colo#ial
officials+ 4yu. discovered that while this model of gover#a#ce would wor& i# a static
society+ it was fou#d wa#ti#g i# a period of <apid socio-eco#omic cha#ge, ?ust as the
developme#t of the ca#al colo#ies i# colo#ial 0u#ja. threate#ed .ureaucratic
gover#a#ce as was see# i# 190@ distur.a#ce so the process of migratio# a#d
ur.a#i=atio# u#leashed .y the gree# revolutio# a#d i#dustriali=atio# put a# i#creasi#g
strai# o# the 4yu. system i# the post 1969 period,
-he "asic 6emocrats collectively formed the Olectoral !ollege which affirmed 4yu.
Lha# as preside#t i# ?a#uary 1960, -he .allot showed @90B7 votes i# favour a#d
o#ly B9 agai#st, -hey similarly reelected him as preside#t i# 1969 followi#g his
electio# co#tested agai#st Miss *atima ?i##ah, -he "asic 6emocrats also chose the
mem.ers of the 'atio#al a#d 0rovi#cial 4ssem.lies i# the party-less electio# of 4pril
196,
4ccordi#g to 4yu. Lha#+ .y the .egi##i#g of 196 people had .egu# to reali=e the
utility a#d effective#ess of .asic democracies a#d it was .ecomi#g o.vious that /
i#te#ded to give them political fu#ctio#, -he #ew co#stitutio# was a##ou#ced o# first
march 196 the .asic democrats the# proceed to elect the represe#tative of the
people to #atio#al assem.ly i# 4pril 196 a#d to the provi#cial assem.ly i# May
196,
0rior to these electio# I/ issued a# Hrder authori=i#g the electio# commissio# to ta&e
all #ecessary measure to e#sure that the electio#s were co#ducted ho#estly+ justly
a#d fairly a#d that corrupt practices were elimi#ated, ,, it was i#teresti#g to see the
ma#y of those who had pu.licly critici=ed a#d discredited the system eati#g their
wards a#d approachi#g democrats for support, -he masters were goi#g to household
serva#ts a#d elite to tur.a#ed #atives for votes, /t was a fitti#g #emesis,J
-he first sessio# of the #atio#al assem.ly elected i# 196 was held o# ?u#e B+ 196,
Soo# after that it .ecame o.vious that political groupi#gs started emergi#g i# the
assem.ly, 4yu. Lha# reali=ed that IOlectio#J a#d I4ssem.liesJ #ecessitated the
e3iste#ce of political parties, -he formatio# of his ow# party or the adhere#ce to o#e
already e3isti#g+ therefore+ .ecame i#evita.le for him, -hus o#e of the earliest .ills
to .e passed .y the #atio#al assem.ly was the 0olitical parties "ill which .ecame law
o# ?uly 16+ 196, /t permitted the revival of political parties although i# a very
tru#cated a#d restricted ma##er, H# May 3+ 1963+ 4yu. Lha# .ecame a mem.er of
the 0a&ista# Muslim Aeague 1co#ve#tio#2+ which was fou#ded i# Septem.er+ 196+ at
a co#ve#tio# i# Larachi a#d almost immediately .ecame the official gover#me#t
party, /# 6ecem.er+ 1963+ 4yu. Lha# assumed the preside#cy of the 0a&ista# Muslim
Aeague+ thus givi#g the fi#ishi#g touch to his co#trol of the cou#try politics a#d
political activities,
;#der the co#stitutio#+ a 0reside#tial electio# was to .e held withi# 10 days .efore
the e3piry of the i#cum.e#tGs term of five years, Si#ce the date for the electio# was
fi3ed for ?a#uary 1969, 4yu. was #omi#ated as 0reside#tial ca#didate for re-
electio# .y the !o#ve#tio# Muslim Aeague, $e was+ however+ a#3ious to &#ow whom
the oppositio# would #omi#ate as his oppo#e#t,
-he oppositio# parties i# the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly had already joi#ed forces to oust
4yu. from power+ u#der the .a##er of the !om.i#ed Hppositio# 0arties 1!H02, -his
group i#cluded the !ou#cil Muslim Aeague+ led .y Lhwaja 'a=imuddi# a#d Mia#
Mumta= Lha# 6aulta#aV the 4wami Aeague+ led .y Shei&h Muji.ur <ehma#V the
'atio#al 4wami 0arty+ led .y Maula#a "asha#iV the 'orth Cest *ro#tier group of the
'atio#al 4wami 0arty+ led .y Cali Lha#+ so# of the famous 4.dul %hafar Lha#V the
'i=am-i-/slam 0arty+ led .y !haudhry Mohammad 4li a#d *arid 4hmadV a#d the
?amaat-i-/slami+ led .y Maula#a Maudoodi o# 16 Septem.er 1967+ it was a##ou#ced+
after much co#fa.ulatio#+ that the !om.i#e Hppositio# 0arties had i#vited Miss
*atima ?i##ah+ the Kuaid-i-4=am + to .e their ca#didate+ a# i#vitatio# she accepted
although she had .ee# virtually i#active i# politics si#ce her .rotherGs death,
H# 'ovem.er 1+ 1967+ the Olectoral !ollege was duly electedV a#d+ the followi#g
day+ its mem.ers were called upo# to elect a 0reside#t+ which+ accordi#g to article
169 of the co#stitutio#+ they had to do .efore March @+ 1969, -he Olectio#
!ommissio# had .ee# set up o# Hcto.er 1+ 1967+ with %, Muee# al-6i# as !hief
Olectio# !ommissio#er a#d ?ustice M, <, Lha# a#d ?ustice Sardar Muhammad /).al
as mem.ers, -he last date for filli#g #omi#atio# papers was 'ovem.er 6+ 1967,
/# lieu of the electio#s of 969 com.i#ed oppositio# parties alleged that 4yu. Lha# as
*ield Marshal he was .ei#g paid .y the gover#me#t+ which accordi#g to the
co#stitutio# made him i#eligi.le to sta#d for a#y electio#, -his pla# if it had
succeeded would have created )uite a predicame#t for 4yu. Lha#, "ut he came to
&#ow of it .eforeha#d+ a#d ma#euvered to regulari=e his positio# through order
issued with retrospective effect, $owever+ eve# these orders .eari#g a wea&
ratio#ale+ where #o less em.arrassi#g for him,
-he oppositio# parties from the very outset had .ee# apprehe#sive that the ge#eral
electio# would #ot .e fair a#d free, -hat alleged that the previous few .y Welectio#
had .ee# marred .y u#i#hi.ited official i#terfere#ce a#d he#ce there was #o .asis for
them to .elieve that this i#terfere#ce would #ot .e restored .y the ruli#g party i# the
comi#g electio#, -hey dema#ded that the various measure of political co#trol li&e the
press a#d pu.licatio# ordi#a#ce+ the loudspea&er ordi#a#ce+ a#d the pu.lic safety
acts should .e withdraw#+ all political priso#ers should .e released+ steps .e ta&e# to
e#sure that sectio# 177 of the 0e#al !ode would #ot .ee# forced duri#g the electio#
campaig# to cur. their political activity a#d that the official machi#ery would #ot .e
misused to their detrime#t,
Hppositio# alleged that the delimitatio# of co#stitue#cies for electio# to the Olectoral
!ollege had #ot always .ee# do#e o# the .asis of the provisio#s laid dow# i# the
Olectoral !ollege 4ct+ 1967, /t was alleged that pri#ciples li&e territorial co#tiguity
a#d the populatio# limit of 10@ voters for each u#it were ofte# flouted .y the
Olectio# !ommissio# authorities i# order to .estow special adva#tage to some
perso#s with utter disregard to the co#ve#ie#ce of people, !o#stitutio#al petitio#
were filed i# high courts a#d stateme#ts were issued to the press i# which specific
i#sta#ce of .reach of the provisio#s of the Olectoral !ollege act were cited,
*ault' voterBs list
-he oppositio# was also of the view that the registratio# of voters had also .ee# do#e
with mala fide co#sideratio#, /t charged that the #ames of perso#s who had .ee#
thought to .e a#tago#istic to the party i# power had .ee# omitted form the voter list
whereas fictitious #ames had .ee# i#cluded i# them to e#a.le .ogus voti#g i# favor
of the ruli#g party,
/t was alleged that i# Oast 0a&ista# ma#y i#te#di#g voters+ who we#t to the
registratio# office i# 6acca duri#g the wee& followi#g the day the Olectoral !ollege
4ct+ 1967 was ame#ded were told that #o i#structio# had .ee# received .y the Oast
0a&ista# Olectio# 4uthority for further i#clusio# of #ames i# the electoral rolls from
the !hief Olectio# !ommissio#er, -he official co#cer#ed+ therefore+ refused to register
their #ames, -hose i#dividuals suffered the most .y that a#omaly+ who wa#ted to file
their #omi#atio# for the electio# to the Olectoral !ollege .ut could #ot do so si#ce
their #ames had .ee# omitted from the voterGs lists,
0ogus =oting
>et a#other source of grieva#ce to the oppositio# parties was the practice of the
"ogus voti#g duri#g the Olectoral !ollege polls, /t was alleged that the procedure laid
dow# for the Olectoral !ollege electio# were #ot fool proof, -he procedure suffers
from certai# .uilt i# loopholes permitti#g large scale .ogus voti#g a#d all ma##ers of
corrupt practices, *irstly+ it was #ot re)uired of the voters to sig# his #ame or give his
thum. impressio# .efore receivi#g his .allot paper from the presidi#g offices a#d
seco#dly+ ide#tity of the voters was justified .y a polli#g age#t of a#y of the
ca#didates after which he was accepted as prima-facai voter i# the u#it, 4lthough the
ide#tity of a voter could .e challe#ged .y a#other age#t+ the challe#ged vote+
however+ was ta&e# i#to accou#t for the purpose of cou#ti#g,
4#other factor that had .ee# attri.uted to the victory of the 4yu. La# was the
du.ious role of Maula#a "hasha#i, $e was a stau#ch supporter of the Miss *atima
?i##ah .ut remai#ed i#active duri#g the electio# campaig# i# Oast 0a&ista#, -he
rumor was that immediately .efore the electio#s "hasha#i had .ee# wo# over the
4yu. a#d a deal had .ee# wor&ed out .etwee# them, 33"ut that co#te#tio# is
corro.orated .y /fti&har 4hmad who states Rthe refugees i# Lhul#a a#d <ajshahi
divisio# who te#ded to support 4yu.+ especially si#ce "hasha#i who had co#sidera.le
support i# <ajshahi divisio# did #ot campaig# actively for Miss ?i##ah,G
-he 0MA secured a thumpi#g majority 10 seats i# those electio#s, -he oppositio#
could cli#ch o#ly 19 seats, !om.i#ed Hppositio# 0arty 1!H02 wo# 10 seats whereas
'6* .agged 9 seats i# Oast 0a&ista# a#d 1 i# Cest 0a&ista#, -he rest of the seats
we#t to the i#depe#de#ts, -he most u#e3pected victory was that i# Cest 0a&ista# of
Miss ?i##ahGs ca#didate $assa# 4 Shei&h+ who routed Siddi)ue 6awood a leadi#g
i#dustrialist+ sitti#g M'4 a#d 0MA treasurer .y a co#vi#ci#g majority, H#e u#usual
feature of the electio#s was the large #um.er of teid seats three of them prestige
seats, H#e mi#ister a#d 7 sitti#g M'4s lost their seats, 4lthough the 0MA wo# B0Y
of the seats+ it secured o#ly 97,BY 1Oast 79,67YV Cest 61,31Y2 of the total votes
cast+ the oppositio# secured a little more tha# 9Y+ the rest .ei#g secured .y the
i#depe#de#ts,
-he voti#g tre#d duri#g these electio#s i#dicated that the voters were more
i#flue#ced .y the i#dividual rather tha# parties a#d their ma#ifestos, /t is however
sig#ifica#t to #ote that the i#depe#de#ts supported largely .y the oppositio# secured
91,Y of the votes i# Cest 0a&ista# a#d the i#depe#de#ts a#d the oppositio#
together o.tai#ed 61,@ Y of the votes i# Oast 0a&ista#, 4#other tre#d that emerged
from the preside#tial a#d 4ssem.ly electio#s was that while the majority of the MO!
favoured the e3isti#g regime+ they were e3tremely u#predicta.le o# some matters,
-heir u#predicta.le dispositio# is ma#ifested .y the fact that a massive 63,3Y votes
were cast to the 0MA i# the preside#tial electio#s whereas 91,BY of votes we#t to
0MA i# the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly polls a#d 7,7Y i# the 0rovi#cial 4ssem.ly polls, -his
i#co#siste#t voti#g patter# demo#strated fle3i.ility o# part of at least o#e third of the
MO!s .ased upo# theories of discretio# a#d co#scie#ce,
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"egi#s
aura&=ai 1Mo#day+ ?uly 07+ 0112+ $e##a Lha# 1*riday+ Hcto.er 17+ 0112
#14
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
India And "a!istan;;;
India And "a!istan6 63 8ears /ater
"y
6r, 4rshad M, Lha#
/f you read /#dia -oday+ you are left with the impressio# that /#dia is a# O#glish-
spea&i#g la#d of .illio#aire .usi#essme#+ larded s)ua..li#g politicia#s a#d sca#dal-
pro#e movie stars all livi#g i# fa.ulous houses, /f you visit the cou#try+ o#e whiff of
the air outside your air-co#ditio#ed city hotel dispels the myth,
4ugust 19 is /#diaGs /#depe#de#ce 6ay, 0a&ista#+ the little cou#try that thought it
could .ut could#Gt+ pipped it .y o#e day a#d cele.rates o# 4ugust 17, /t is #ow 63
years si#ce /#depe#de#ce+ so what have these cou#tries achieved aside from
destructive wars withi# a#d agai#st each other a#d a sta#dard of livi#g that is .y a#y
measure a.out the worst i# the world with the e3ceptio# of certai# .lighted regio#s
of 4frica,
-o ma&e a poi#t+ o# 0a&ista#Gs /#depe#de#ce 6ay+ "alochis attac&ed a#d &illed a
do=e# a#d more #o#-"alochis i# "alochista# provi#ce, /t is .oth a spillover effect
from the war i# 4fgha#ista# a#d the rese#tme#t they feel i# the use of their ow#
resources Q #atural gas a#d mi#erals Q .y the rest of the cou#try while
developme#t i# "alochista# is #eglected, !o#ti#ui#g alo#g the .order with
4fgha#ista#+ the 0ashtu#sG sympathy lies with their .rethre# o# the other side, 4#d
as the 0a&ista# military tries vai#ly to assert co#trol+ attac&s a#d .om.i#gs i# major
populatio# ce#ters have mushroomed,
/#dia fares little .etter, *ar from cele.rati#g /#depe#de#ce 6ay+ the Lashmiri
Moslems were out demo#strati#g i# te#s of thousa#ds despite rece#t &illi#gs of
protesters, /tGs #othi#g #ew as estimates of civilia#s &illed si#ce the trou.les .ega#
ra#ge from 70+000 to 100+000, -hi#gs are )uieter o# the 0a&ista#i side as those
reside#ts do #ot feel discrimi#ated agai#st, "ut )uite pro.a.ly+ the Lashmiris would
rather .e rid of .oth a#d have a# auto#omous State of their ow#,
Lashmir is #ot the o#ly i#surrectio# /#dia faces, Chat started forty-three years ago
as a peasa#t re.ellio# i# 'a3al.ari+ Cest "e#gal is #ow a full-fledged guerrilla war led
.y the Maoist factio# of the !ommu#ist 0arty of /#dia, /t affects twe#ty of /#diaGs
twe#ty-eight States though the worst &illi#gs Q .y gover#me#t supported militias
a#d 'a3alites 1Maoists2 of local farmers caught i# .etwee# Q have .ee# occurri#g i#
!hattisgarh a#d ?har&ha#d, -he cause? Kuite simply a la#d gra. .y powerful
i#dustrial corporatio#s who claim they will .ri#g developme#t a#d jo.s,
-ell that to a farmer i# a la#d with rich soil ear#i#g twice the #atio#al average, 'ow
his ow# master+ u#educated .ut with &#owledge of farmi#g i# his .o#es a#d love of
his la#d+ he would .e e3cha#gi#g this freedom for life as a lowly serva#t su.ject to
the whims of his masters, $e has chose# to fight N a#d die if #eed .eV #ot u#li&e the
Lashmiris+ the "alochis+ the 0ushtoo#s a#d others across the Su.co#ti#e#t, /s 'epal
a har.i#ger i# this co#te3t?
-he stupidity a#d ridiculous #ature of the /#dia-0a&ista# co#flict is highlighted .y a
curre#t simple fact, -he prese#t 0rime Mi#isters of .oth cou#tries are eth#ic
0u#ja.is, /t mea#s they ca# spea& to each other i# their mother to#gue, $owever+
the people from other provi#ces i# their respective cou#tries would #ot .e a.le to
u#dersta#d them, 4s 0u#ja. co#stitutes a large part of 0a&ista#+ Ma#moha# Si#gh+
the /#dia# 0rime Mi#ister+ is u#derstood .y a vastly larger proportio# of 0a&ista#is
tha# /#dia#s` -he pro.lem+ the cou#tries face+ is a religious sectaria#ism e#couraged
.y the "ritish i# /#dia similar to the *re#ch Isolutio#J i# Ae.a#o# a#d what we have
rece#tly do#e i# /ra),
-he eco#omic picture for either cou#try is also #ot particularly rosy+ especially i#
compariso# with #eigh.ors other tha# "a#gladesh a#d+ of course+ 4fgha#ista#, /#dia
has the lowest life e3pecta#cyV 0a&ista# o#ly slightly .etter, -heir similar %'/ per
capita is roughly half that of "huta# or Sri Aa#&a a#d o#e seve#th of Malaysia+ also a
former "ritish colo#yV it is also a third that of !hi#a 1perhaps eve# less as the
!hi#ese curre#cy is u#dervalued2, Chat is more sig#ifica#t is the virtually #ew
i#frastructure i# !hi#a+ the trai#s+ roads+ ports+ etc, Q i#teresti#g to o.serve also
that while /#dia is .ecomi#g a call-ce#ter hu. offeri#g relatively low-s&illed jo.s+
!hi#a is already the worldGs factory ge#erati#g well-paid ma#ufacturi#g jo.s for its
people,
Chereas the Hlympic %ames hosted .y !hi#a demo#strated the #atio#Gs emerge#ce
as a superpower-to-.e+ the almost farcical preparatio# for the !ommo#wealth %ames
i# 'ew 6elhi+ comi#g this Hct, 3rd+ is i# star& co#trast, -he e#terprise is .eset .y
corruptio# sca#dals+ cost overru#s of a# order of mag#itude+ i#efficie#cy+
i#compete#ce a#d .urreaucratic i#fighti#g, /t is sad a#d pai#ful to watch, Hf course+
0a&ista# would #ot have fared a#y .etter Q just loo& at the respo#se to the floods,
-hese floods i# 0a&ista#+ devastati#g as they have .ee#+ do offer a# opportu#ity for
/#dia to e3te#d a helpi#g ha#d, -he M9 millio# co#tri.utio# to the relief fu#d is a
good start, "ut it is a# i#ta#gi.le swamped i# the pool of aid from other cou#tries,
/magi#e /#dia providi#g direct a#d immediate relief i# the form of food+ te#ts+
helicopters to ferry sorely #eeded supplies+ a#d volu#teers+ eve# the military+ who
will .e see# .y 0a&ista#is as helpers i# this catastrophe rather tha# i# the familiar
role of e#emy, /t would dramatically alter the 0a&ista#i mi#d-set+ a#d assuage the
a#ger at the treatme#t of their Lashmiri .rethre#, Hf course it is goi#g to ta&e ma#y
more co#fide#ce .uildi#g measures .y .oth sides .efore the #u&es #o lo#ger sta#d
ready for mutual a##ihilatio#,
Chat of the future? H#e ca# easily visuali=e the /#dia# Su.co#ti#e#t i# a political a#d
eco#omic model #ot u#li&e the Ouropea# !ommo# Mar&et, /# such a sce#ario+ a
semi-auto#omous Lashmir might well fi#esse the whole thor#y pro.lem of who it
.elo#gs to, Aiste#i#g to the grieva#ces of their mi#orities+ liste#i#g to each other+
would lay the fou#datio# for sta.ility i# the regio#, Htherwise+ the two cou#tries will
co#ti#ue to waste resources o# military spe#di#g a#d to muddle through+ laggi#g
further a#d further .ehi#d colo#ial co#temporaries li&e Malaysia,
Dr. =rshad M -han is a retired %rofessor. = frequent contributor to the print and
electronic media' his or# has been quoted in the 4.+. Con"ress and published in the
Con"ressional Jecord.
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"egi#s
#15
Frday, July 15, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
"a!istanBs demograp+ic dilemma;;
"a!istanBs demograp+ic dilemma
"y
Michael Lugelma#
0a&ista#Gs 011 ce#sus &ic&ed off i# 4pril+ .ut less tha# three mo#ths later+ it is
em.roiled i# co#troversy, Several mem.ers of the Si#dh !e#sus Mo#itori#g
!ommittee have rejected as Iseriously flawedJ the rece#tly completed household
cou#t, -hey allege that ce#sus wor&ers+ directed .y a# u#specified Ieth#ic group+J
have cou#ted LarachiGs Ii##s+ washrooms+ a#d eve# electric polesJ as households i#
a# effort to dilute the cityGs #ative ISi#dhiJ prese#ce,
-hese !e#sus Mo#itori#g !ommittee mem.ers are #ot the o#ly 0a&ista#i politicia#s
to .e co#cer#ed a.out the ce#sus, 0a&ista# is e3perie#ci#g rapid ur.a#i=atio#V while
a third of the cou#tryGs people have lo#g .ee# rurally .ased+ at least 90 perce#t of
the populatio# is e3pected to live i# cities .y the 00s, 0a&ista#Gs political leadership
draws much of its power from rural la#dholdi#gs+ power that could .e greatly
reduced if a ce#sus co#firms this migratio# toward cities,
-his politici=atio# u#derscores the perils of ce#sus-ta&i#g i# 0a&ista#, /# ma#y other
#atio#s+ it is a routi#e process completed regularly, >et i# 0a&ista#+ myriad factors Q
from catastrophic floodi#g a#d i#sufficie#t fu#di#g to the tur.ule#t security situatio#
a#d i#te#se political oppositio# Q have co#spired to delay it for three co#secutive
years+ ma&i#g the cou#try ce#sus-less si#ce 199B,
4ccurate ce#sus data e#a.les gover#me#ts to ma&e decisio#s a.out how to .est
allocate resources a#d services, /# 0a&ista#+ such decisio#s are critical, !o#sider that
its curre#t populatio#+ estimated at a.out 1@9 millio#+ is the worldGs si3th-largest, /t
has the highest populatio# growth+ .irth+ a#d fertility rates i# South 4sia Q o#e of
the last regio#s+ alo#g with su.-Sahara# 4frica+ still e3perie#ci#g you#g a#d rapidly
risi#g populatio#s, 4dditio#ally+ with a media# age of 1+ 0a&ista#Gs populatio# is
profou#dly youthful, -wo-thirds are less tha# 30 years old+ a#d as a perce#tage of
total populatio#+ o#ly >eme# has more people u#der 7,
4ccordi#g to some demographers+ these co#ditio#s prese#t opportu#ities, /f a large+
youthful populatio# e#ters the wor&force i# droves+ it ca# spar& eco#omic growth a#d
free up state resources to .e used for social welfare, /# a# era of e#dlessly .ad #ews
a.out 0a&ista#+ it is ta#tali=i#g to e#visio# the effects of attai#i#g this Idemographic
divide#dJ i# the cou#try, /magi#e a millio# #ew employees floc&i#g to 0a&ista#Gs
.urgeo#i#g /- i#dustry+ a sce#ario eco#omist Shahid ?aved "ur&i predicts could
ge#erate M0 .illio# i# e3port ear#i#gs, Hr visuali=e a #ew ge#eratio# of e#gi#eers
a#d scie#tists u#loc&i#g the pote#tial of 0a&ista#Gs massive u#dergrou#d mi#eral
reserves+ estimated to .e valued i# the trillio#s of dollars,
Such cheery thoughts+ however+ overloo& the dreadful state of 0a&ista#Gs school
system a#d eco#omy, /f 0a&ista#is are to e#ter the wor&force+ they will #eed to .e
properly educated Q yet a staggeri#g 70 millio# out of 0a&ista#Gs @0 millio# 9-to-19-
year-olds are #ot i# school, 4dditio#ally+ if 0a&ista#is are to .e gai#fully employed+
the eco#omy must .e large e#ough to a.sor. them+ #o simple feat i# a la.or
eco#omy that at prese#t creates o#ly a millio# #ew jo.s a year+ yet could face 1@9
millio# pote#tial wor&ers .y 030 1curre#t u#employme#t ru#s at a.out 19 perce#t+
a#d u#deremployme#t is su.sta#tial as well2, ;#surprisi#gly+ 0a&ista#Gs 0la##i#g
!ommissio# deputy chairma# estimated last year that i# order to employ 0a&ista#Gs
#early 100-millio#-stro#g u#der-0 populatio#+ %60 growth will #eed to soar to 9
perce#t 1it is curre#tly mired at ,7 perce#t2,
-he most li&ely a#d devastati#g co#se)ue#ce of 0a&ista#Gs demographic dilemma is
#atural resource scarcity, 0a&ista# is already desperately short o# water a#d la#d,
Cater availa.ility has plummeted from a.out 9+000 cu.ic meters per capita i# the
1990s to less tha# 1+900 today Q perilously close to the 1+000 cu.ic meters per
capita level desig#ated as water-scarce, Mea#while+ accordi#g to o#e stri&i#g
estimate+ 0a&ista# loses #early three acres of good agricultural la#d every 0
mi#utes, %ive# 0a&ista#Gs populatio# de#sity of roughly 30 people per s)uare
&ilometer+ such shortfalls put imme#se pressure o# remai#i#g supply, *i#ally+ as
illustrated .y 0a&ista#Gs co#sta#t .lac&outs+ the cou#tryGs e#ergy grid is already
u#der major pressure+ a pro.lem that will o#ly grow worse with demographic
pressure if #o actio# is ta&e#,
!ompou#di#g these co#strai#ts is 0a&ista#Gs poor resource gover#a#ce, 4t least 90
perce#t of 0a&ista#Gs water resources are used for agriculture+ yet the cou#tryGs
farmi#g sector is ravaged .y water wastage, *lood irrigatio# is used much more tha#
water-savi#g drip irrigatio#+ while sugar a#d wheat Q some of the worldGs most
water-i#te#sive crops Q domi#ate 0a&ista#Gs agricultural mi3,
-he# there is lea&age, Cater e3pert Simi Lamal calculates that simply pluggi#g the
cou#tryGs lea&y ca#al system would free up 10 times more water tha# would .e
ge#erated .y a large dam, /slama.ad+ however+ #ot o#ly .uilds large dams+ .ut also
co#structs giga#tic water fou#tai#s a#d leases large swaths of farmla#d to foreig#
i#vestors for large-scale agricultural productio#, -his all adds to the strai# o#
precious water a#d la#d supplies,
;#less 0a&ista#Gs #atural resource gover#a#ce ta&es a dramatic tur# for the more
judicious+ resource scarcity could soo# .e more reality tha# threat, $ere+ it is
i#structive to ju3tapose 0a&ista#Gs future populatio# projectio#s with those of #atural
resource supply, 4ccordi#g to the ;,', 0opulatio# 6ivisio#Gs #ewest mid-ra#ge
estimates+ 0a&ista#Gs populatio# will rise to @9 millio# .y 090, $owever+ this
estimate optimistically assumes a# eve#tual drop i# 0a&ista#Gs total fertility rate
1-*<2+ which #ow registers at a.out 3,6 childre# per woma#, 4ssumi#g -*< remai#s
co#sta#t Q .y #o mea#s a# u#li&ely prospect+ give# that the cou#tryGs co#traceptive
prevale#ce rate hovers at o#ly 30 perce#t Q the projectio#s soar to #early 3B0
millio# people,
Mea#while+ as early as 09+ 0a&ista#Gs total water dema#d is e3pected to e3ceed
availa.ility .y 100 .illio# cu.ic meters, -his deficit represe#ts five times the amou#t
of water that ca# prese#tly .e stored i# the reservoirs of the vast /#dus <iver
system, 0ut differe#tly+ i# less tha# 19 years+ 0a&ista#Gs chief water storage source
could fall far short of satisfyi#g dema#d for huma#ityGs life.lood,
-o overcome its demographic 1a#d co#curre#t resource2 challe#ges+ 0a&ista# will
#eed to revamp its educatio#al system+ e#large its eco#omy+ a#d e3pa#d access to
family pla##i#g services, -hese represe#t herculea# tas&s i# the .est of times+ a#d
0a&ista# is e3perie#ci#g o#e of the more traumatic periods i# its history,
>et this all amou#ts to putti#g the cart .efore the horse, 0a&ista# ca##ot e3pect to
ma&e progress o# populatio# policy u#til the #atio# is willi#g to accord priority to
populatio# issues+ which starts with havi#g accurate data a.out the cou#tryGs
populatio#, I4t #o poi#t+J accordi#g to De.a Sathar+ o#e of 0a&ista#Gs most respected
demographers+ Ihas serious atte#tio# .ee# devoted to studyi#g 0a&ista#Gs large
populatio# #um.ers+ their distri.utio#+ a#d the implicatio#s they hold for the
cou#tryGs developme#t+ politics+ a#d ultimate sta.ility,J
-his must cha#ge, -o its credit+ /slama.ad has sig#aled its i#te#tio# to .ri#g
demographics to the policy fro#t .ur#er, /t has christe#ed 011 as I0opulatio# >earJ
a#d has declared Q i# the words of 0rime Mi#ister >ousaf <a=a %ila#i Q that Iall
hopes of developme#t a#d eco#omic prosperity would flou#der if we as a #atio# lose
the focus a#d do #ot &eep EtheF populatio# issue i# the spotlight,J
-he first step is to complete that ce#sus, -he 0opulatio# !e#sus Hrga#i=atio#
estimates that assumi#g all goes well+ data collectio# will .e completed .y the e#d of
the year, $ereGs hopi#g that #atural disasters ta&e the rest of 011 off+ political poi#t-
scori#g a.ates+ fi#a#ci#g proliferates+ a#d security improves just a .it Q so that
0a&ista# ca# ta&e a# i#itial step toward tac&li#g what may well .e its greatest
developme#t challe#ge,
Michael -u"elman is the +outh =sia associate at the Koodro Kilson International
Center for +cholars and lead editor of Jeapin" the Dividend, Lvercomin" %a#istanCs
Demo"raphic Challen"es.*
+ource, Morei"n %olicy
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"egi#s
#16
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
Indo-"a! water dispute;;;
Indo-"a! water dispute
"y
Mohammad ?amil
/#dia has started co#structio# of some of the pla##ed dams o# wester# rivers+ thus
posi#g a serious threat to the agriculture a#d hydel projects of 0a&ista#, /#diaGs
thi#&-ta#&s have .ee# wor&i#g o# river diversio# pla#s with a view to creati#g acute
water shortage i# 0a&ista#+ which could lead to acute shortage of wheat a#d other
crops a#d also sto&i#g i#ter-provi#cial co#flicts over distri.utio# of water,
-he /#dus <iver "asi# has .ee# a# area of co#flict .etwee# /#dia a#d 0a&ista# for
a.out four decades, Spa##i#g 1+B00 miles+ the river a#d its tri.utaries together ma&e
up o#e of the largest irrigatio# ca#als i# the world, -he divisio# of the river .asi#
water has created frictio# amo#g the cou#tries of South 4sia+ a#d amo#g their states
a#d provi#ces, /# 0a&ista#+ accusatio#s of overdrawi#g of share of water made .y
each provi#ce have argua.ly resulted i# the lac& of water supplies to coastal regio#s
of 0a&ista#, Chereas 0a&ista# media has .ee# highlighti#g i#ter#al political
s)ua..les+ it #ever paid atte#tio# to /#diaGs efforts to dry 0a&ista# a#d failed to
lau#ch a sustai#ed offe#sive though co#structio# of /#dia# dams o# wester# rivers+
which is posi#g a direct threat to 0a&ista#Gs #atio#al i#terest,
H# 1st 4pril 197B+ /#dia had stemmed the flow of tri.utaries to 0a&ista# a#d
disco#ti#ued water to the 6ipalpur ca#al a#d mai# .ra#ches of ;pper "ari 6oa.
!a#al, 0a&ista# wa#ted a# e)uita.le allocatio# of the flow of /#dus <iver a#d its
tri.utaries .etwee# the /#dia a#d 0a&ista#, 'egotiatio#s had started from 1991+ a#d
the treaty was sig#ed i# 1960 that gave 0a&ista# the right to receive u#restricted
flow of the wester# rivers+ a#d it was o.ligatory o# the part of /#dia to allow the flow
of water u#impeded with mi#or e3ceptio#s, /t was provided i# the treaty that i# case
of a dispute+ the Corld "a#& would appoi#t a R#eutral e3pertG whose decisio# would
.e fi#al, 0a&ista# had ta&e# the issue of "aglihar 6am with the ;#ited 'atio#s+ a#d
verdict was give# .y the #eutral e3pert suggesti#g ame#dme#ts, $ad /#dia ta&e#
0a&ista#Gs o.jectio#s to the project seriously a#d #ot tried to ride roughshod
i#tra#sige#tly+ .oth would have avoided the em.arrassme#t of faci#g a #eutral e3pert
to adjudicate their dispute,
H#e does #ot have to .e a# agricultural scie#tist to &#ow that water is i#dispe#sa.le
to agriculture, /t is a critical i#put i#to agriculture of a cou#try especially whe# it is
situated i# a# arid or semi-arid =o#e, $avi#g all said+ if "hasha dam is #ot
co#structed withi# #e3t five to 10 years+ 0a&ista# will #ot .e a.le to produce e#ough
food-grai#s to meet the #eeds of the growi#g populatio#, Aoss of storage capacity
due to sedime#tatio# is causi#g serious drop eve# for e3isti#g agricultural productio#,
*ood shortages a#d e#ergy shortfall have already .lighted 0a&ista# with the result
that i#dustry i# all the provi#ces is o#ly partially ru##i#g a#d could come to a
gri#di#g halt, 0revious gover#me#ts had #ot ta&e# timely actio# a#d did #ot ta&e up
the matter with the ;' or /#ter#atio#al !ourt of ?ustice, -he prese#t gover#me#t a#d
oppositio# parties seem to .e too preoccupied with their power-shari#g or power-
gra..i#g pla#s a#d do #ot have time to focus o# the pro.lems faced .y the #atio#, /t
was i# this .ac&drop that Muttehida Lisa# Maha= had .lamed the gover#me#t for its
apathy to their pro.lems,
/#ter#atio#al commu#ity must reali=e that water issue .etwee# /#dia a#d 0a&ista#
could .e a source of co#flict a#d war .etwee# two #uclear states would #ot o#ly
e#da#ger the regio# .ut the world at large, -he 0eople of 4=ad ?ammu a#d Lashmir
should also raise their voice agai#st /#dia# water aggressio#, -he /#dus "asi#
comprises the <iver /#dus a#d five mai# rivers+ #amely ?helum+ !he#a.+ <avi+ "eas
a#d Sutlej, -he total area of the /#dus "asi# is roughly 790+000 s)uare miles+ most
of which lies i# 0a&ista#, /# 0a&ista# there e3ists o#e of the most highly developed
ca#al irrigatio# system a#d appro3imately 3@ millio# acres of la#d is depe#de#t o#
the flow of /#dus water, 4t the time of i#depe#de#ce+ though major portio# of the
/#dus "asi# 131 Millio# 4cres2 formed part of 0a&ista#+ however the co#trol of most
of e3isti#g structures o# the rivers of /#dus "asi# fell i#to the /#dia# ha#ds+ .ei#g
upper riparia#, -he co#se)ue#ces of such a# u#fair demarcatio# surfaced soo# after
whe# /#dia started i#terferi#g with the waters flowi#g dow#stream .y stoppi#g
waters o# rivers <avi a#d Sutlej 1irrigati#g 1,6 Millio# 4cres i# 0a&ista#2 from 1 4pril
197B,
-he stress+ which su.se)ue#tly mou#ted i# the regio# was felt arou#d the glo.e+ a#d
i# 1991 Corld "a#& offered its good offices for resolutio# of the issue, -he efforts
ultimately culmi#ated i#to a# agreeme#t .etwee# 0a&ista# a#d /#dia i# the shape of
/#dus Caters -reaty sig#ed i# 1960, 4s per /#dus Caters -reaty+ /#dia got the
complete rights o# the easter# rivers 1<avi+ Sutlej+ a#d "eas2 whereas 0a&ista# was
give# the rights o# wester# rivers 1/#dus+ ?helum+ !he#a.2 with some specific
provisio#s for use of water .y /#dia from these rivers,
-he /#dus Caters -reaty 1960 is .ei#g impleme#ted through a#d i#stitutio#al
arra#geme#t+ that is+ 0erma#e#t /#dus !ommissio# comprisi#g of two
!ommissio#ers+ o#e from each cou#try, !urre#tly+ the !ommissio# is i#volved i#
resolutio# of three major water disputes+ which i#cluded "aglihar $ydroelectric 0la#t+
Lishe#ga#ga $ydroelectric 0la#t a#d Culler "arrage, 4s stated a.ove #eutral e3pert
gave the verdict a#d some of 0a&ista#Gs co#cer#s were addressed+ though 0a&ista#
still has reservatio#s a.out the verdict, -he i#formatio# a.out "aglihar $ydroelectric
0la#t+ located o# <iver !he#a.+ was commu#icated .y /#dia i# 199, *aili#g to
resolve the issue .ilaterally at the !ommissio# a#d gover#me#t levels+ the issue of
"aglihar $ydroelectric 0la#t was referred to the Corld "a#& upo# which the
determi#atio# .y a 'eutral O3pert who upheld 0a&ista#Gs o.jectio#s o# free.oard+
po#dage a#d level of power i#ta&e,
$owever+ the 'eutral O3pertGs determi#atio# regardi#g locatio# of spillway gates a#d
co#cessio# to /#dia to draw-dow# 1@ meters .elow the 6ead Storage Aevel surpassed
#ot o#ly his give# ma#date+ .ut also was #either a# issue #or a )uestio# prese#ted
to the 'eutral O3pert, 0a&ista# thus reserves the right to refer the determi#atio#
regardi#g Idraw dow#J, -he "aglihar $ydroelectric 0la#t was commissio#ed i# 00B+
a#d duri#g its i#itial filli#g+ /#dia agai# violated the clauses of the -reaty .y #ot filli#g
the dam i# stipulated timeframe a#d .y #ot e#suri#g re)uisite i#flow at Marala $ead
wor&s of 0a&ista# causi#g loss to 0a&ista#i farmers,
/#dia is o.liged to provide i#formatio# of their projects to 0a&ista# si3 mo#ths .efore
starti#g co#structio#, /# all i#sta#ces+ /#dia started wor& without providi#g re)uisite
i#formatio#, 4lso+ the i#formatio#+ whe#ever provided+ is #ormally i#complete, /#dia
stalls resolutio# process o# the plea of more discussio#s at the level of the
!ommissio# while the co#structio# co#ti#ues, -his leads towards a fait accompli
situatio# whe# 0a&ista# approaches for resolutio# of issues to the i#stitutio#s 1Corld
"a#&X!ourt of 4r.itratio#2, /#dia terms the flow of water recorded .y 0a&ista# as
u#der-reported, Cithout a#y prejudice to the sta#d ta&e#+ 0a&ista# has suggested
the i#stallatio# of -elemetric System for measureme#t of flow of /#dus System of
<ivers+ particularly o# the wester# rivers to e#sure the tra#spare#cy i# recordi#g the
flow of water, /#dia should .ear i# mi#d that it ca##ot dry 0a&ista# through water
terrorism+ a#d it co#ti#ued with its si#ister desig#s+ 0a&ista# would #ot sit just to
watch its destructio#,
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"egi#s
#17
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
Mumbai 0lasts and Indo-"a! %elations;;;
Mumbai 0lasts A &onspirac' (o 5erail "a!-India "eace (al!s
"y
<ahil >asi#
4s terror o#ce agai# struc& Mum.ai o# ?uly 13+ &illi#g 1 people a#d i#juri#g more
tha# 170 others+ /#dia# leaders mostly avoided poi#ti#g a fi#ger at 0a&ista#+ for the
first time i# the history of .oth the #atio#s, Aoss of lives a#d property is co#dem#a.le
i# the stro#gest words .ut this #ew tre#d will go a lo#g way i# reduci#g trust deficit
.etwee# .oth the cou#tries havi#g a hostile record, ?ust .efore a fort#ight from
0a&ista# a#d /#dia foreig# mi#ister-level tal&s i# 'ew 6ehli+ the well-coordi#ated
attac&s might .e a pla##ed co#spiracy to derail the resumptio# of peace process .ut
this softe#i#g to#e a#d te#or of the politicia#s might have .uried the dreams of
/#dia# fa#atics,
"esides+ the timi#g of the serial .lasts raised suspicio# over whether these .lasts
were e#gi#eered .y right-wi#g e3tremists to disrupt the rapprocheme#t gesture, /#
the mea#time+ /#dia# *oreig# Mi#ister S,M, Lrish#aGs RmatureG stateme#t that the
tal&s will ta&e place as scheduled foiled this co#spiracy of Re3tremistsG, Similarly+
/#dia# $ome Mi#ister !hidam.aram also avoided to put .lame o# a#y terror group
.esides sayi#g that the pro.e will #ot .e .ased o# a#y Ipre-determi#ed
assumptio#sJ, 4voidi#g a .lame game+ i# a# effort to avert reachi#g hasty
co#clusio#s o# the latest Mum.ai .lasts+ would prove to .e a# upright developme#t,
4 #um.er of times i# the past+ 0a&ista# a#d /#dia peace process had .ee# spoiled .y
such acts committed .y the e3tremists, -he same mista&e should #ot .e repeated
#ow a#d the tal&s must go o# to ta&e the -himpu spirit ahead,
/# this regard+ outgoi#g /#dia# *oreig# Secretary 'irupama <aoGs stateme#t that
/#dia# dise#gageme#t with 0a&ista# after 00B Mum.ai terror attac&s was a mista&e+
also reflects a cha#ge of mi#d, Ms <aoGs views are i#dicative of a co#se#sus withi#
the /#dia# esta.lishme#t to push the peace process forward, -his seems to .e a
departure of typical /#dia# mi#dset to level .aseless allegatio#s agai#st 0a&ista# a#d
spread #egative propaga#da which was agreed upo# .y the foreig# secretaries of
.oth the #eigh.ors i# their rece#t meeti#g i# /slama.ad, H# the other ha#d+ this
attitude show# .y the /#dia# politicia#s has clearly disappoi#ted the ;S haw&s who
wa#ted to e3ploit these attac&s a#d &eep 0a&ista#+ already u#der imme#se pressure
after Hsama .i# Aade# raid+ fulfilli#g their dema#ds o# their terms,
-his 4merica# frustratio# ca# .e see# i# a leadi#g editorial pu.lished i# the 'ew >or&
-imes 1'>-2 #amed RMore horrors i# Mum.aiG, <eadi#g .ehi#d the li#es+ the '>-
actually tried to urge the /#dia# politicia#s #ot to react i# a respo#si.le way as it is
the high time to ma#ipulate the situatio#, /#dia#s are treadi#g carefully .ut the ;S
tried to co#vey a veiled message to the /#dia# esta.lishme#t to poi#t fi#ger at
0a&ista#+ sayi#g Rif 0a&ista#is were .ehi#d this latest horror+ /slama.ad must e#sure
that they are .rought to justice this time,G /f /#dia#s ta&e a leaf out of 4mericaGs
.oo&+ their i#vestigators may esta.lish a li#& of a#y terror outfit i#volved i# the
attac&s with 0a&ista#-.ased Aash&ar-e--ai.a 1Ae-2+ to set RterrorismG as mai# age#da
of upcomi#g tal&s which would li&ely to cast a #egative impact o# the peace process,
-his would also .e assumed as a# effort to put the Lashmir dispute o# the
.ac&.ur#er i# the tal&sG age#da, /t must .e u#derstood i# the clearest of terms that
a#y tal&s without &eepi#g Lashmir dispute at the ce#tre will fail to get some co#crete
results, /#dia# authorities should properly i#vestigate these attac&s to reach a#y
credi.le co#clusio#s o# the .asis of solid evide#ces, -he /#dia# gover#me#t should
also tighte# the #oose arou#d /#dia#-.ased milita#t groups which had .ee# fou#d
i#volved i# such attac&s i# the past, "oth the cou#tries have to wor& together to wipe
out cross-.order terrorism a#d this ca# o#ly happe# if 0a&ista# o# its part .ri#gs the
culprits of 00B Mum.ai terror attac& to justice, -he process of avoidi#g #egative
propaga#da a#d .lame game ca# .e the first major step i# this lo#g a#d .umpy road
to .ury the hatchet .etwee# .oth the arch rivals,
<ahil >asi# is a se#ior writer a#d researcher .ased i# Aahore, $e ca# .e reached
at rahil,yasi#agmail,com
Source5 cou#tercurre#ts
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"egi#s
#18
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
(wo 0lows to;;;;
(wo 0lows to India-"a!istan (ies
"y
-ridivesh Si#gh Mai#i
-wo #ew developme#ts could hurt the /#dia-0a&ista# dialogue+ which was restored
.arely three mo#ths ago after a hiatus of more tha# two years,
*irst+ the three .lasts that roc&ed Mum.ai o# ?uly 13 have come just whe# the
dialogue seemed to .e headed i# the right directio#+ a#d .arely two wee&s .efore the
foreig# mi#isters of .oth cou#tries were set to meet i# 6elhi, -he timi#g has
prompted sectio#s of the media a#d strategic commu#ity to suggest the attac& could
have ema#ated from 0a&ista#,
4s a result of this latest i#cide#t+ the same old )uestio#s a.out whether /#dia is
doi#g the right thi#g .y eve# carryi#g o# with the dialogue are .ou#d to come to the
fore agai# W should /#dia have seriously co#sidered a# Hperatio# %ero#imo-li&e
assault to disma#tle terrorist camps i# 0a&ista#? /s peace with 0a&ista# o#ly a
dream? Such )uestio#s are sure to put the Ma#moha# Si#gh-led ;04 gover#me#t i#
a tight spot,
Si#ghGs policy of e#gagi#g with 0a&ista# has already .ee# criticised .y mem.ers of
the Rstrategic e#clave+G who say his )uest for peace with the latter is futile, 4#d+ i# all
pro.a.ility+ the appetite for peace with 0a&ista# will dwi#dle eve# further for a
#um.er of reaso#s, *irst+ as i# the aftermath of 6X11+ some mem.ers of the
.usi#ess commu#ity have come dow# heavily agai#st the gover#me#t for #ot .ei#g
serious e#ough i# ma&i#g /#dia terror free, -his is o#e issue the gover#me#t ca#Gt
afford to ig#ore, 4lso+ with ;ttar 0radesh electio#s arou#d the cor#er+ the oppositio#
"?0 1itself i# total disarray2 will .e happy to resort to ji#goism a#d to play the
terrorism card,
-he gover#me#t+ mea#while+ is#Gt e3actly at the pea& of its popularity, /#deed+ it has
.ee# du..ed o#e of the most corrupt gover#me#ts i# post-i#depe#de#ce /#dia
1although headed .y o#e of the most ho#est prime mi#isters2, H# top of this+ the
lac&lustre !a.i#et reshuffle o# ?uly 1 has o#ly worse#ed thi#gs for the ;04+ with a
ti#y mi#ority of mem.ers+ such as Ma#i Sha#&ar 4iyar of the !o#gress 0arty+ calli#g
for a# u#i#terrupted dialogue with 0a&ista#,
-he other developme#t that could hurt e#gageme#t .etwee# /#dia a#d 0a&ista# is
the #ot so judicious reactio# of /#dia# O3ter#al 4ffairs Mi#ister SM Lrish#a to the ;S
scrappi#g of aid to 0a&ista#, Lrish#a showed u#characteristic alacrity i# welcomi#g
this step+ telli#g jour#alists5 RCith refere#ce to the special circumsta#ces .etwee#
/#dia a#d 0a&ista#+ a#d how /#dia has co#siste#tly ta&e# the view that it is #ot
desira.le that this regio# .e heavily armed .y the ;#ited States+ which will upset the
e)uili.rium i# the regio# itself+ to that e3te#t /#dia welcomes this step,G
Cas this the right thi#g to say+ a#d right #ow? Cith this latest e#gageme#t just a few
mo#ths old+ could#Gt the aged .ut dapper Lrish#a have .ee# more #ua#ced i# his
respo#se? /f he was really itchi#g to say somethi#g a#d ear# ;S .row#ie poi#ts+ he
could have .ee# a .it more precise .y suggesti#g that /#dia is#Gt averse to aid .ei#g
gra#ted to 0a&ista#+ .ut o#ly for developme#t purposes,
Chile Lrish#a may have thought his stateme#t would .e correctly i#terpreted .y the
civilia# esta.lishme#t i# /slama.ad+ he must u#dersta#d that the civil-military
.ala#ce is heavily tipped i# favour of the latter, 4#d a#yway+ his comme#ts will have
irritated eve# the civilia# leadership+ wea&e#i#g them o# all issues+ i#cludi#g
#egotiatio#s with /#dia, Chile factually Lrish#a may .e spot o#+ foreig# policy does#Gt
hi#ge merely o# facts a#d i#te#tio#s,
/#diaGs foreig# policy ma#dari#s are faced with .ala#ci#g the twi# aims of improvi#g
ties with .oth the ;#ited States a#d 0a&ista#, /tGs #ot impossi.le+ .ut itGs a mammoth
tas& for sure,
+ource, :he Diplomat
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"egi#s
#19
Thursday, July 21, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
%eligious connectivit' ;;;;
%eligious connectivit' in Indo-"a! conteCt
"y
-ridivesh Si#gh Mai#i
'early 67 years after the partitio# of /#dia+ there are i#dividuals i# .oth /#dia a#d
0a&ista# who ferve#tly .elieve that faith is respo#si.le for all the acrimo#y prevale#t
.etwee# the two #uclear states, /# the aftermath of 9X11+ fissures .etwee# the
R/slamicG a#d R#o#-/slamicG world Q a categorisatio# which is rather #e.ulous Q have
o#ly Rvi#dicatedG the claims that faith is a cause of co#flict .etwee# .oth cou#tries,
-his+ however+ is merely o#e side of the story+ a#d just as there is a# i#complete
u#dersta#di#g of /#do-0a& history+ so is there a# i#complete u#dersta#di#g of some
co#temporary positive eve#ts, /# the last si3 years+ Si&h pilgrims have .ee# payi#g
o.eisa#ce at historical religious shri#es i# 0a&ista#+ such as 'a#&a#a Sahi. a#d 0a#ja
Sahi., -hese pilgrimages have #ot .ee# disrupted eve# duri#g times of te#sio#,
0ilgrims+ who are apprehe#sive .efore they visit 0a&ista#+ retur# with a differe#t
opi#io#+ as they are warmly received .y the 0a&ista#i pu.lic,
Hf late some i#teresti#g ideas for e#ha#ci#g religious co##ectivity .etwee# /#dia a#d
0a&ista# have .ee# gai#i#g grou#d, *irst+ the moveme#t for the Lartarpur corridor
has .ee# gai#i#g grou#d .oth i# /#dia a#d a.road, *or those #ot familiar with the
term+ Lartarpur 1#ow i# 0a&ista#2 is the place where the fou#der of the Si&h faith+
%uru 'a#a&+ spe#t the last 1B years of his life a#d had .oth $i#du a#d Muslim
followers, Lartarpur+ which falls i# district 'arowal+ is home to the Si&h shri#e 6ar.ar
Sahi.+ a#d this shri#e is .arely three &ilometres from the /#dia# .order, "efore the
/#do-0a& war of 1969+ it is said that there was a .ridge o# the <avi that Si&h pilgrims
could cross over a#d visit 6ar.ar Sahi., 6uri#g the 1969 war+ however+ this .ridge
was destroyedV it might .e me#tio#ed that the relatio#ship .etwee# the two
cou#tries .ecame more te#se i# the aftermath of this war a#d visa regimes .ecame
stricter with the passage of time,
*or a lo#g time Q #early a decade Q Si&hs+ predomi#a#tly settled i# the /#dia#
0u#ja.+ have .ee# dema#di#g visa-free access to 6ar.ar Sahi., H#e of the
i#dividuals who have .ee# tirelessly wor&i#g for this cause is Luldeep Si#gh Cadala+
a well-respected leader of /#dia# 0u#ja.,
-he 0a&ista#i side has .ee# )uite up.eat a.out this dema#d a#d the mi#ister for
religious affairs a#d mi#orities i# the previous Musharraf gover#me#t+ /ja=ul $a)+
a##ou#ced that the 0a&ista#i gover#me#t would have #o o.jectio# to Si&h pilgrims
crossi#g over to the 0a&ista#i side to pay o.eisa#ce without a visa+ provided they
retur# the same day, Ove# the prese#t gover#me#t has .ee# )uite e#couragi#g i# its
respo#se a#d has i# fact started co#structi#g a road that would ma&e the pilgrimage
smoother, -his is a sig#ifica#t developme#t+ give# that it has ta&e# place i# the
aftermath of the Mum.ai attac&s a#d whe# relatio#s have .ee# rather topsy-turvy,
-he /#dia# gover#me#t has .ee# promisi#g that it will loo& i#to the issue .ut there
has #ot .ee# much progress, -he earlier /#dia# e3ter#al affairs mi#ister a#d prese#t
fi#a#ce mi#ister+ 0ra#a. Mu&herjee+ visited the /#dia# side of the .order Q 6era
"a.a 'a#a& Q i# ?u#e 00B+ which is also home to a Si&h shri#e a#d promised the
Si&h commu#ity that the gover#me#t is loo&i#g i#to various ways of goi#g ahead
with the visa-free pilgrimage from 6era "a.a 'a#a& to Lartarpur, /# the mea#while+
the Mum.ai attac&s happe#ed a#d thi#gs slowed dow#+ though a resolutio# was
passed i# the /#dia# 0u#ja. assem.ly+ i# Hcto.er 010+ for goi#g ahead with this
project,
/#teresti#gly+ a former ;S diplomat+ 4m.assador ?oh# Mc6o#ald+ who ru#s a# '%H
called the /#stitute for Multi--rac& 6iplomacy 1/M-62+ has also .ee# lo..yi#g for the
cause ever si#ce he visited the site i# ?u#e 00B, /M-6 .rought out a feasi.ility study
i# 009+ a#d has recomme#ded that this site .e declared a peace =o#e, Mc6o#ald+
who was shoc&ed to see the .ar.ed wire that separated 6era "a.a 'a#a& from
Lartarpur+ has .ee# lo..yi#g hard with diplomats from /#dia a#d 0a&ista# a#d
officials i# the ;S gover#me#t,
Ai&e /#dia# 0u#ja.+ /#dia# Lashmir too year#s for more porous .orders a#d /M-6+
which first mooted the idea for the Sri#agar-Mu=affara.ad .us service+ has also
rece#tly proposed a .us service from Mu=affara.ad to $a=rat.al, /t is crucial for
ce#tral gover#me#ts o# .oth sides to ta&e these a#d other proposals for .oosti#g
religious tourism+ as /#dia a#d 0a&ista# are .oth home to historical religious sites of
#umerous faiths,
/#cludi#g such i#itiatives i# /#do-0a& #egotiatio#s .etwee# foreig# mi#isters or
foreig# secretaries will hyphe#ate them to the overall relatio#ship+ whereas religious
tourism ca# actually .e promoted joi#tly .y the mi#istries of tourism a#d culture a#d
mi#orities affairs+ with assista#ce from the co#cer#ed religious orga#isatio#s a#d
state gover#me#ts, Some of the issues that ca# .e e3ami#ed are the difficulties
pilgrims curre#tly face i# securi#g visas a#d i#creasi#g co##ectivity to religious
shri#es through railX.us or+ wherever possi.le+ .y la#d,
0romoti#g i#itiatives such as the o#es discussed a.ove is a remi#der of the commo#
South 4sia# past+ a# i#tegral compo#e#t of people-to-people co#tact, /t will also .e
.e#eficial for the eco#omies of .oth cou#tries+ more so the 0a&ista#i eco#omy+ which
is i# a desolate co#ditio#,
:he riter is an =ssociate Mello ith :he Lbserver Jesearch Moundation' 5e Delhi
22Daily :imes22
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
"egi#s
#20
Monday, !u"ust 01, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
5esigner oreign polic';;;;
5esigner oreign polic'
"y
4yesha Siddi)a
/t seems that 0a&ista# will #ow have a flow of foreig# desig#ers such as $ermes
1which ma&es the "ir&i# ha#d.ag2+ 0rada a#d others comi#g to the cou#try to set up
shop, -heir i#terest+ it seems+ is ig#ited .y a#other rumour that 6elhi is co#sideri#g
ha#di#g over Lashmir to $i#a <a..a#i Lhar rather tha# 0a&ista# due to her suave
dressi#g 1/#dia# leaders are #ot worried that she may give the territory to 0a&ista#
si#ce her feudal-la#dow#i#g .ac&grou#d may #ot allow her to do so2, -he #ew
foreig# mi#ister has dual ow#ership .y .oth the political gover#me#t a#d the
esta.lishme#t+ a#d it is a great idea to have her there to sweep foreig# leaders off
their feet,
/tGs hard to .eat the 0a&ista#i esta.lishme#tGs i##ovative a#d creative i#sti#cts, Kuite
a few years ago+ a promi#e#t ge#eral of the Musharraf team had claimed a.out a
certai# female+ who was .ei#g lau#ched as the esta.lishme#tGs #ew i#tellectual
missile+ that a few more li&e her would ma&e the world cha#ge its perceptio# a.out
0a&ista#, -he media hype i# /#dia arou#d $i#a <a..a#i LharGs visit will pro.a.ly
ma&e some people happy+ especially those who decided to i#vest i# the #ew foreig#
mi#ister, /tGs certai#ly a good choice si#ce it helps i# .ri#gi#g the political gover#me#t
a#d the esta.lishme#t together+ especially i# terms of ow#ership of the mi#ister,
Chile she owes her promotio# to her political masters+ Lhar is )uite adept at
survivi#g through differe#t regime types+ a )uality that will ta&e her a lo#g way, *or
the sceptics who compare her with Shah Mahmood Kureshi+ they must remem.er
that the you#g LharGs prese#ta.ility is compara.le to that of the former foreig#
mi#ister vis-b-vis his e3pe#sive 4rma#i suits, *urthermore+ li&e him+ she will .uild
her way i#to the party a#d the esta.lishme#t,
%ood prese#tatio# a#d outloo& 1which i#cludes the capacity to co#duct o#eself well+
spea& i# a foreig# la#guage a#d seem visi.ly i#tellige#t2 are the traits which the
esta.lishme#t &ee#ly loo&s for i# a foreig# mi#ister, $eXshe does #ot have to .e
imagi#ative or i#spired .y the idea of ma&i#g a#y origi#al co#tri.utio# to foreig#
policy, Ce co#ti#ue to operate i# the prism of a foreig# policy which was joi#tly
ma#ufactured .y the military esta.lishme#t a#d the political gover#me#t of the
19@0s, Hver the years+ foreig# mi#isters are e3pected o#ly to co#duct the orchestra
rather tha# write the sympho#y themselves,
4s far as /#dia is co#cer#ed+ there is very little that a dashi#g foreig# mi#ister is
e3pected to do, / remem.er a di##er at the 0a&ista#i $igh !ommissio# i# Ao#do# o#
the occasio# of Shah Mahmood KureshiGs first visit to the ;L after .ei#g swor# i# as
foreig# mi#ister, 6uri#g his &ey#ote speech+ he e3pressed great e#thusiasm for
solvi#g all outsta#di#g issues with /#dia a#d ta&i#g the relatio#ship forward,
/#teresti#gly+ the army a#d #aval attaches sitti#g i# a far-off cor#er i# that very room
whispered to each other a#d other guests o# their ta.le a#d prese#ted a totally
differe#t worldview, Cith time+ Kureshi lear#t to liste# more i#te#tly to the
esta.lishme#t that he was always a part of rather tha# go the way the political
gover#me#t i#itially i#te#ded,
$i#a <a..a#i Lhar is i#tellige#t a#d &#ows how #ot to roc& the .oat, She stuc& to the
draft as far as her visit to /#dia was co#cer#ed, /# a#y case+ she represe#ts a political
gover#me#t which is curre#tly caught i# a .i#d a#d ca##ot ma&e origi#al
co#tri.utio#s to foreig# policy+ certai#ly #ot i# terms of relatio#s with /#dia, She will
#ot try to get origi#al either as her mai# co#stitue#t Q the esta.lishme#t Q would
wa#t her to stic& to cosmetics,
/t is a good sig# that the two #eigh.ours are tal&i#g to each other a#d are .ei#g civil,
Htherwise+ thi#gs are pretty much at a sta#dstill, -he /#dia# military wo#Gt .udge
from Siache# without a joi#t agreeme#t to map the e3isti#g positio#s first, H# Sir
!ree&+ the 0a&ista# 'avy has go#e .ac& yet agai# to solvi#g the issue o# the .asis of
a# old 1917 map rather tha# through other i##ovative ways, -here is #o moveme#t
o# trade either,
Surely this is just the .egi##i#g of yet a#other chapter i# /#dia-0a&ista# peace tal&s,
$i#a Lhar was of the view that the flow of peace i#itiatives will #ot .e reversed this
time, "ei#g foreig# mi#ister+ she pro.a.ly has greater i#sight, "ut the fact is that itGs
#ot her words .ut the mood of the esta.lishme#t that will .e the evide#ce of whether
the time has come for the two states to seriously tal& peace, Mea#while+ we should
suffice with $ermes a#d 0rada,
%ublished in :he /;press :ribune
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#21
Wednesday, !u"ust 03, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
2udiciar' vs t+e eCecutive;;;;;
2udiciar' vs t+e eCecutive in "a!istan and t+e 3*
"y
6r Ma#=ur Oja=
!o#trary to sloga# of 000 leaders a#d ma#y others+ 0a&ista#Gs judiciary is acti#g very
prude#tly as it carefully ma&es its steps i# the co#ti#uously evolvi#g situatio#, -he
Supreme !ourt of 0a&ista# headed .y !hief ?ustice /fti&har Muhammad !haudhry+
seems to u#dersta#d the evolutio#ary process that 0a&ista# is goi#g through, 4s a
matter of fact+ the judiciary is mi#dful of the way the judicial power has .ee# i#vo&ed
.y courts i# the ;S a#d Ourope throughout the 19th ce#tury, -herefore+ at the e#d of
the day+ 0a&ista#Gs judiciary will have the last laugh if it stic&s to the path it has
ta&e#,
-he Supreme !ourt passed a judgeme#t to reappoi#t a# official+ Sohail 4hmed+ who
was headi#g the i#)uiry a.out the $ajj sca#dal, -he rumour a#d some pu.lished
reports i#dicate that Mr 4hmed was tra#sferred to #ewly formed provi#ce of %ilgit-
"altista# .ecause he as&ed 0rime Mi#ister %ila#iGs so# to appear .efore the
i#vestigati#g authorities, Chatever the reaso# may .e+ his removal seemed to .e
retri.utio# agai#st Mr 4hmed, -he said official was a.idi#g .y the orders of the court
that aggravated some top leaders i# the e3ecutive .ra#ch, -he pro.lem for the court
is that if the officials a.idi#g .y the decisio# of the highest court are goi#g to .e
pu#ished .y the e3ecutive .ra#ch+ #o o#e will follow the Supreme !ourt a#d a#archy
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a#d lawless#ess will proliferate, 4#other legal poi#t for the court5 if the law a.idi#g
officials are harassed wro#gfully+ does the co#stitutio# protect them?
-he Supreme !ourt decided that wro#gfully treated officials have co#stitutio#ally
protected rights that ca# .e e#forced .y the highest court of the la#d, -he court did
#ot challe#ge the e3ecutive .ra#chGs authority over the federal age#ciesV rather+ they
asserted that gover#me#t officials have protectio# .y the co#stitutio#, -he court did
#ot i#sist o# .ri#gi#g .ac& Mr 4hmed to the same positio#+ o#ly as&i#g the e3ecutive
.ra#ch to appoi#t him to .ri#g him .ac& to a .efitti#g positio# i# the *ederal
/#vestigatio# 4ge#cy 1*/42 from where he was tra#sferred, -he court stu##ed the
0a&ista# 0eopleGs 0arty 10002 .y e3te#di#g the period to impleme#t its decisio#,
-herefore+ o#e ca##ot claim that the Supreme !ourt was ma&i#g decisio#s i# haste
a#d ve#gea#ce,
/t seems that the !haudhry !ourt is followi#g the patter# that was adopted .y their
cou#terparts i# the west a#d the ;S, /# the ;S+ Mar.ury vs Madiso# is the milesto#e
case i# which the ;S Supreme !ourt+ headed .y ?oh# Marshall+ adopted a
reco#ciliatory approach while esta.lishi#g the co#stitutio#al right of the highest
judicial .ody to e3ami#e the acts of the e3ecutive .ra#ch,
/# this case the aggrieved perso#+ Cilliam Mar.ury was appoi#ted .y the ;S
0reside#t ?oh# 4dams to .ecome a justice of peace i# the 6istrict of !olum.ia+
commo#ly &#ow# as Cashi#gto# 6!, $owever+ .efore Mr Mar.ury too& the oath+
0reside#t -homas ?efferso# wo# the preside#tial electio# a#d refused Mr Mar.ury to
ta&e the seat, -he court decided that it would #ot as& the e3ecutive .ra#ch to ho#our
the appoi#tme#t of a previous preside#t .ut it asserted that i# future the elected
gover#me#t will have to impleme#t all decisio#s of the Supreme !ourt i# such cases,
/t is co#sidered as a la#dmar& decisio# i# the history of ;S judiciary,
"efore this decisio#+ the ;S judiciary was co#sidered as a place for failed politicia#sV
however+ the compositio# of this .ra#ch of the state was cha#ged forever,
4fterwards+ the .est legal mi#ds were attracted, "efore this+ the judiciary was a co-
opted .u#ch of the gover#me#t li&e it has .ee# i# 0a&ista#, 4t that time the ;S
ruli#g still had feudalisticXslave-ow#i#g me#tality similar to 0a&ista#, /# fact+
0reside#t ?ames Madiso# e3pressed similar co#cer#s that 0reside#t 4sif Dardari a#d
0rime Mi#ister %ila#i are e3pressi#g, /# Mr 4hmedGs+ case !hief ?ustice !haudhry
&#ows that the %ila#i gover#me#t may resist the reappoi#tme#t of the aggrieved
official .ut it tried to fi#d a middle way,
/# 0a&ista#+ li&e the ;S+ the judiciary was always co#sidered su.servie#t to the
gover#me#ts whether headed .y the civilia#s or .y the military, 'o o#e+ .efore !hief
?ustice !haudhry+ had the guts to sta#d up to a head of the state a#d say #o to
illegal dema#ds, /# the moveme#t for the restoratio# of the judiciary+ !hief ?ustice
!haudhry ear#ed a# u#precede#ted status, -hough #ot a #ecessary co#ditio# for this
post+ he was put .ac& to this positio# .y a popular moveme#t+ which mea#s that he
represe#ted the will of the people that the prese#t elected gover#me#t is tryi#g to
claim, 4s a matter of fact+ it was the moveme#t led .y !hief ?ustice !haudhry that
forced %e#eral Musharraf to flee a#d paved the way for the restoratio# of democracy
a#d retur#i#g of "e#a=ir "hutto a#d Mia# 'awa= Sharif,
/# the o#goi#g tussle .etwee# the judiciary a#d the e3ecutive+ it is appare#t that our
gover#i#g elite led .y 4sif 4li Dardari a#d %ila#i represe#t the feudal a#dXor their
mi#dset just the way 0reside#t ?efferso# did i# 1B03, -he 000 did #ot support the
judiciary duri#g the electio# at the cost of alie#ati#g ce#tral 0u#ja., Aater o#+ the 000
gover#me#t refused to rei#state the judiciary5 /t was mass pressure that forced them
to do so, -he judiciary represe#ts the middle class aspiratio#s+ which is deep i#
ce#tral 0u#ja. a#d e#lighte#ed sectio#s of other provi#ces, /f our readi#g of the
historical process is valid+ i# the course of evolutio# the judiciary is goi#g to prevail
li&e elsewhere i# the developed #atio#s,
:he riter can be reached at man(ure$a(9yahoo.com
+ource2Daily :imes
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"egi#s
"illa 1-hursday+ Hcto.er 13+ 0112
#22
Monday, Se#te$%er 12, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
0aloc+-Islamabad conlict
-enesis o t+e 0aloc+-Islamabad conlict
"y
Sa#a "aloch
"alochista#Gs co#tri.utio# to the cou#try is $imalaya#, $owever+ "alochista#Gs
immeasura.le #atural wealth a#d strategic sig#ifica#ce tur#ed i#to a curse rather
tha# a .lessi#g for the "aloch people,
-he gravity of "aloch tri.ulatio#s is deep-rooted+ e3te#di#g .ehi#d the mi#ds of the
political parties a#d educated youths to the masses that are e3perie#ci#g
discrimi#atio#+ oppressio# a#d i#justices i# their everyday life,
Oach regio#+ tow# a#d village has its ow# story of #eglect+ u#derdevelopme#t a#d
e3ploitatio#, Start from the "aloch coast that hosts 0a&ista#Gs three moder# .ut
devoid of the "aloch #aval facilities i#cludi#g ?i##ah 'aval .ase at Hrmara, !haghai
a#d Lhara#+ strategically sig#ifica#t regio#s+ where the #uclear test was co#ducted
a#d copper a#d gold are .ei#g mi#ed+ to Aas.ela+ a# i#dustrial tow# 1for Larachiites2
a#d where 0a&ista# Space a#d ;pper 4tmosphere <esearch !ommissio# 1S;04<!H2
facilities are located+ to 6era "ugti &#ow# for its high )uality gas productio# si#ce
1993+ to Kuetta a#d "ola# where coal is .ei#g mi#ed Q a#d you will .e co#fro#ted
with a misera.le social a#d eco#omic state of affairs,
$owever+ all these areas have sophisticated military+ paramilitary a#d #aval facilities
.ut #o#e of them have moder# educatio#+ health+ electricity+ gas or opportu#ities of
livelihood,
*uelli#g the #atio#al eco#omy for years a#d helpi#g save .illio#s of dollars worth of
foreig# e3cha#ge i# terms of e#ergy import+ "alochista#Gs 9@ perce#t populatio# lives
without gas facility+ @B perce#t without electricity+ a#d 6 perce#t without safe
dri#&i#g water, "alochista# has just 3,7 perce#t of gas co#sumers+ as compared to
67 perce#t of 0u#ja. alo#e+ which produces o#ly 7,@9 perce#t of #atural gas,
"alochista# .ei#g the major coal produci#g provi#ce is deprived of its .e#efits,
6uri#g the 1960s+ whe# Aahore was i# Cest 0a&ista#+ 9B perce#t coalmi#es of the
provi#ce were allotted to people havi#g #o affiliatio# with the provi#ce, -oday the
local la.ourers i# these R.lac&-goldG regio#s live without water+ electricity+ educatio#
a#d a health system, $owever+ Shei&hs a#d 0arachas are imme#sely .e#efitti#g from
the wealth ge#erated .y the "aloch coal,
-he Mo; sig#ed .y /slama.ad with a !hi#ese compa#y regardi#g Sai#da& !opper-
%old 0roject is a classic co#firmatio# of the a.use of "aloch wealth a#d
discrimi#atio#, /slama.ad a#d the !hi#ese compa#y are ta&i#g 90 a#d 7B perce#t
respectively a#d leavi#g o#ly two perce#t profit for "alochista#, "esides this mega
e3ploitatio#+ the Sai#da& project is a #o-ma#Gs la#d for local "aloch youth a#d
guarded .y #o#-"aloch *ro#tier !orps 1*!2, !haghai+ the gold produci#g regio#+ is
the poorest of the poor,
!ou#tless Mo;s of such e3ploitative #ature are i#&ed with foreig# a#d local
compa#ies to i#siste#tly e3ploit "aloch resources, -hese i#clude the 6uddar Aead-
Di#c 0roject a#d the <e&o 6i) copper-gold project, Hil a#d gas e3ploratio# lice#ses
are give# without ta&i#g accou#t of "aloch #eeds a#d dema#ds,
/slama.adGs desire to e#tirely co#trol a#d effusively e3ploit "alochista#Gs strategic
la#d+ e#ergy resources+ a#d eco#omic .e#efits without "aloch will+ desire a#d
legitimate participatio# are the raiso# dGctre .ehi#d mou#ti#g te#sio# a#d mistrust
.etwee# the "aloch a#d /slama.ad
;#fortu#ately+ /slama.adGs dirty policies are #ot just co#fi#ed to e3ploiti#g "aloch
wealth .ut the esta.lishme#t is also i# co#sta#t efforts to margi#alise a#d upset the
very li.eral a#d social fa.ric of "aloch society .y supporti#g religious parties a#d co-
opti#g glutto#ous tri.al a#d drug .aro#s+ which is part of the policy to retai# its
u#)uestio#i#g co#trol o# "alochista#Gs affairs,
Aac&i#g political visio# a#d a democratic culture+ /slama.adGs super-esta.lishme#t is
gover#i#g "alochista# through a system &#ow# as Rco#trolG, !o#trol+ a suppressive
system+ is a set of mecha#isms used i# multi-eth#ic states .y the domi#a#t eth#ic
groups to co#tai# a#d &eep its co#trol o# disside#t eth#ic mi#orities+ plu#der their
wealth+ destroyi#g their culture a#d creati#g mass fear through disappeara#ces+ &ill
a#d dump policies a#d strappi#g prese#ce of military a#d paramilitary forces,
!o#trol is .ased o# a rogue approach that o#e eth#ic group ta&es over the state+
imposes its culture o# society+ allocates to itself the lio#Gs share of resources a#d
ta&es various measures+ i#cludi#g viole#t mea#s 1military operatio#s2 to preve#t the
#o#-domi#a#t group from orga#isi#g politically,
!o#trol wor&s through three i#terrelated mecha#isms5 a2 6ivide a#d rule5 i#ter#ally
creati#g rifts a#d divisio# amo#g the #o#-domi#a#t groupsV .2 eco#omic
depe#de#ce5 ma&i#g them perma#e#tly depe#de#t for their livelihood o# the
domi#a#t group a#d ce#tral gover#me#tV c2 !o-optio#5 i#volvi#g sectio#s of the #o#-
domi#a#t elite li&e greedy tri.al chiefs+ feudal+ drug tycoo#s+ corrupt i#tellectuals a#d
politicia#s through partial dispe#satio# of .e#efits a#d favours,
-he militaryGs fresh+ u#warra#ted a#d i#discrimi#ate crac&dow# agai#st moderate
"aloch #atio#alists+ i#tellectuals+ stude#ts+ poets+ a#ti-esta.lishme#t tri.al elders+
.usi#essma# a#d civilia#s is a reflectio# of the R=ero tolera#ceG policy agai#st the
eth#ic "aloch people,
4ll glit=y mega-projects a#d co#trol developme#ts lau#ched i# "alochista#+ i#cludi#g
those for gas developme#t+ coalmi#i#g+ %wadar 0ort+ Mira#i 6am+ coastal highway+
ca#to#me#ts+ a#d the e3tractio# of copper a#d gold deposits do #ot e#visage a#y
participatio# or direct .e#efit to the people a#d the provi#ce,
4# u#employed "aloch feels more depressed a#d e3ploited whe# a# u#s&illed soldier
o# their soil is .rought a#d employed from a#other provi#ce to fill the positio# that is
legally+ #aturally a#d co#stitutio#ally the right of a local "aloch youth,
-he provi#ce is of strategic importa#ce a#d shares lo#g .orders with /ra# a#d
4fgha#ista# a#d a 1+@00-&ilometre-lo#g coastli#e, "ut .order a#d coastal security is
100 perce#t co#trolled .y #o#-"aloch paramilitary forces, 4rou#d @0+000 jo.s i# the
*!+ !oast %uard+ police+ maritime security a#d the 4#ti-'arcotics *orce are occupied
.y #o#-locals+ which leave thousa#ds of )ualified "aloch youths u#employed,
"aloch .itter#ess .y all mea#s is ge#ui#e a#d the co#ti#ued plu#der of "alochista#Gs
#atural resources a#d its eco#omic a#d political margi#alisatio# a#d militarisatio# are
the major causes of mou#ti#g te#sio# .etwee# the "aloch a#d /slama.ad, 0olitical
i#sta.ility is o# the rise,
/slama.adGs relia#ce o# .rute force may help the ce#tral gover#me#t to create short-
term cosmetic calm .ut u#rest a#d frustratio# will further lead to growi#g mistrust
.etwee# the "aloch a#d /slama.ad,
-hough physically superior+ /slama.ad has moc& co#trol over "alochista#+ .ut
emotio#ally a#d morally /slama.ad seems terri.ly defeated i# "alochista#, -he
gruesome policy of &ill a#d dump of "aloch political activists has resulted i# a
perma#e#t fracture i# "aloch-/slama.ad relatio#s,
'o dou.t+ "alochista#Gs attractive a#d rich la#dscape+ strategic coastli#e+ si=ea.le
territory a#d its locatio# is very ce#tral to the esta.lishme#tGs strategic visio#V
however+ i# the rapidly cha#gi#g geo-political sce#ario+ overloo&i#g the ge#ui#e
co#cer#s of the "aloch a#d the feeli#gs of the people of the provi#ce will result i#
irrepara.le loss to the esta.lishme#t,
-he writer is a "aloch leader a#d former Se#ator who resig#ed from the Se#ate of
0a&ista# i# protest agai#st /slama.adGs oppressive policies towards the "aloch
people, $e ca# .e reached at.aloch.#pagmail,com
+ource222Daily :imes
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"egi#s
"illa 1-hursday+ Hcto.er 13+ 0112+ lawyer777 1Su#day+ Hcto.er 09+ 0112
#23
Tuesday, &'to%er 11, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
5emocrac'
Our eCperience in democrac'
"y
Shamshad 4hmad
Over si#ce the emerge#ce of the #atio#-state+ the world has e3perie#ced ma#y forms
of political systems ra#gi#g from mo#archies to repu.licsV from aristocracies to
oligarchies a#d from tyra##y to democracy, -he e3pla#atio# a#d appraisal of
democracy has .ee# a favourite theme of ever-o#goi#g discussio# si#ce the earliest
times of political speculatio#, 4fter ce#turies of trial a#d error+ democracy has
emerged as the preferred choice, /t is #ow co#sidered u#iversally applica.le a#d is
also the most prevale#t model of gover#me#t i# our era,
-he moder# versio# of democracy is a represe#tative system i# which the pro.lem is
how to secure a system of voti#g that e#sures the electio# of represe#tatives who
reflect as completely as possi.le the varieties of opi#io# of the electorate, -he
)uestio# of represe#tatio# is thus the most fu#dame#tal pro.lem of todayGs
democracy, I0ureJ democracy+ i# which the politically )ualified mem.ers of the
commu#ity meet together for the discussio# a#d decisio# of pu.lic )uestio#s+ is
u#iversally regarded as suita.le o#ly for small commu#ities with simple collective
#eeds, /t has #ever widely e3isted a#d has #ow ge#erally disappeared+ eve# from
societies that claim to .e democratic to their core,
-here may .e #o ideal state .ut i# his Social !o#tract+ <ousseau had visualised his
ow# ideal of a state with a democratic system i# which the sovereig# power rests
with the people+ for they alo#e are i# possessio# of a# i#alie#a.le Rge#eral willG, /# his
view+ o#ly a popularly elected gover#me#t ca# impleme#t the ge#eral will, $egel+ a
19th-ce#tury philosopher+ glorified the state power .eyo#d limits .ut also recog#ised
peopleGs ge#eral will,
%over#me#t .y Rpopular majoritiesG mea#s rule .y the average ma#+ who is ge#erally
less i#tellige#t+ co#trolled i# his opi#io#s a#d co#duct more .y emotio# tha# .y
reaso#+ of limited &#owledge+ lac&i#g the mea#s of leisure #ecessary for the
ac)uisitio# of i#formatio#+ &#owledge a#d u#dersta#di#g+ a#d suspicious of a#y
superior a.ility i# others, Chat political virtue+ it is as&ed+ is there i# mere superiority
i# #um.ers? Hur ow# philosopher poet 4llama /).al ac&#owledged this .y sayi#g
that Idemocracy is a form of gover#me#t i# which heads are cou#ted+ #ot weighed,J
/# practice+ therefore+ democracy is the most difficult a#d ris&y of all forms of
gover#me#t si#ce it re)uires the widest spread of i#tellige#ce a#d educatio#, /# the
words of a cy#ic+ Iyou must #ot e#thro#e ig#ora#ce just .ecause there is so much of
it,J "ut all this #otwithsta#di#g+ i# todayGs civilised world+ there is #o alter#ative to a
democratic form of gover#me#t, -his+ however+ #ecessitates a state a#d methods of
its gover#a#ce to .e .ased o# a Isocial co#tractJ to provide for the security a#d
protectio# of its citi=e#s a#d their property .y utilisi#g the whole force of the
commu#ity,
'o dou.t+ o# their emerge#ce as two i#depe#de#t states o# the map of the world as
a result of a democratic political process+ .oth /#dia a#d 0a&ista# i#herited a
parliame#tary traditio# a#d .ega# their i#depe#de#t statehood with a democratic
path clearly charted out for them, -o start with+ however+ there was #o level playi#g
field for the state of 0a&ista# which had to .uild a# e#tire gover#me#t from the
scratch i# 197@ u#der a state of emerge#cy whereas /#dia was .or# with a# i#tact
.ureaucratic apparatus i# 6elhi, /# /#dia+ o# the other ha#d+ the !o#gress emerged
after i#depe#de#ce as virtually a mi#i-parliame#t+ with ha.its of de.ate+ argume#t
a#d #egotiatio#, /#dia ma#aged to forge a democratic co#stitutio# .y 1990+ a#d
despite its huge si=e a#d socio-eco#omic challe#ges+ has .ee# holdi#g electio#s every
five years,
/# 0a&ista#+ the visio# of a democratic a#d progressive future was u#am.iguously
articulated i# a resolutio# adopted at the first meeti#g of the !ou#cil of the 0a&ista#
Muslim Aeague i# 6ecem.er 197@+ whe# it pledged Ito wor& for a# ideal democratic
state .ased o# social justice+ as a# upholder of huma# freedom a#d world peace+ i#
which all citi=e#s will e#joy e)ual rights a#d .e free from fear+ wa#t a#d ig#ora#ce,J
-his visio#+ however+ remai#s u#fulfilled, Cith its fou#derGs early demise i#
Septem.er 197B+ the #ew State of 0a&ista# lost the promise of healthy political
growth with acute systemic deficie#cies a#d fre)ue#t leadership miscarriages+
restricti#g its tra#sitio# to democracy,
4fter the Kuaid+ it was left without a#y se#se of directio#+ a#d came to .e possessed
.y a corrupt political hierarchy of #o more tha# a .u#ch of self-servi#g+ feudalist a#d
opportu#istic politicia#s who were to ma#age the #ewly i#depe#de#t 0a&ista# i#
collusio# with civil a#d military .ureaucracy, /# the process+ we saw a co#ti#ui#g
cycle of gover#me#tal cha#ges .y #o#-political mea#s, MachiavelliGs political
philosophy .ased o# the Idoctri#e of #ecessity+J .ecame a# i#tegral part of our .ody
politic, 6emocracy was #ever allowed to flourish i# the cou#try, 0a&ista# e3perie#ced
fre)ue#t political .rea&dow#s+ lo#g spells of military rule+ i#stitutio#al paralysis+
e#demic corruptio#+ a#d ge#eral aversio# to the rule of law,
%ive# the commo# history of the twi# #eigh.ours+ o#e wo#ders why /#dia is
democratic a#d 0a&ista# is #ot, Chat after all is wro#g with 0a&ista#? *or us+ it is #ot
sufficie#t o#ly to attri.ute 0a&ista#Gs failure i# democracy to its leadership
miscarriages a#d military ta&e-overs, -here are i# fact deep-rooted historical+ socio-
cultural a#d geo-political factors that have .ee# co#ditio#i#g the post-i#depe#de#ce
democratic traditio# i# 0a&ista#, Si#ce i#depe#de#ce+ the politics a#d gover#me#ts i#
0a&ista# have also remai#ed hostage to the elite classes which have .ee# i#imical to
a#y political li.eralisatio# i# the cou#try,
$istorically+ i# the late #i#etee#th a#d early twe#tieth ce#turies+ the "ritish had .ee#
gradually devolvi#g power to local authorities i# several provi#ces across /#dia .ut
those reforms were #ever e3te#ded to the 'orth-Cest *ro#tier 0rovi#ce a#d 0u#ja.+
the territories that later made up the .ul& of 0a&ista# after the 197@ partitio#, -hus
several of the provi#ces /#dia i#herited from the <aj already had some e3perie#ce i#
democracy+ 0a&ista# i#herited two highly militarised provi#ces with #o such traditio#,
-his u#palata.le colo#ial legacy i# co#ju#ctio# with the cou#tryGs feudalised political
parties+ social co#servatism+ a#d outside i#flue#ces provided a fertile grou#d for
0a&ista#Gs army to grow i# si=e a#d scale a#d gai# a# i#creasi#gly stro#g i#flue#ce
over the state,
-he over.eari#g feudal power structure i# 0a&ista# is also the cause of our political
decay, /t has always resisted la#d reforms i# the cou#try which it sees will stri&e at
its ow# roots, ;#li&e /#diaGs !o#gress 0arty+ the Muslim Aeague+ 0a&ista#Gs fou#di#g
party was almost wholly domi#ated .y a few feudal families+ which the "ritish had
patro#ised .efore partitio# a#d were powerful e#ough to retai# co#trol over #atio#al
affairs through the .ureaucracy a#d the armed forces, Ove# after the Muslim
AeagueGs disi#tegratio#+ the same feudalised oligarchy co#sisti#g of differe#t me# at
differe#t times u#der differe#t political flags remai#ed i# power with or without
military colla.oratio#,
-he most importa#t factor circumscri.i#g democracyGs growth i# 0a&ista# has .ee#
its geopolitical locatio# which #ot o#ly shaped its perso#ality as a state .ut also
co#ditio#ed its domestic as well as e3ter#al .ehaviour, /# that i#te#sely .ipolar world+
the you#g state of 0a&ista#+ faced with the star& reality of its geo-political
e#viro#me#t+ gravitated #aturally to the pole that it thought stood for freedom a#d
democracy, -he Cest+ however+ loo&ed at 0a&ista# solely as a strategic asset i# its
Ico#tai#me#tJ policy agai#st Soviet e3pa#sio#ism, -he e#sui#g se)ue#ce of history
spea&s for itself i# determi#i#g what really happe#ed to democracy i# 0a&ista#,
*or us+ the co#cepts of a good society a#d a good state or for that matter Rgood
methods of gover#me#tG remai# merely philosophical e3pressio#s with #o practical
releva#ce, Cith a# i#grai#ed culture of political opportu#ism a#d greed+ we have yet
to discover a theory of state a#d methods of gover#me#t which will suit the ge#ius of
our #atio#,
:he riter is a former forei"n secretary. /mail, shamshad08309yahoo.com
+ource222:he 5es
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"egi#s
"illa 1-hursday+ Hcto.er 13+ 0112+ S>O64 S4"4$4- 1-uesday+ Hcto.er 11+
0112+ -he;#iter 1Ced#esday+ Hcto.er 1+ 0112
#24
Thursday, &'to%er 13, 2011
"illa
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 009
0osts5 106
-ha#&s5 0@
-ha#&ed 93 -imes i# 36 0osts
Asi 8ousu:ai
6ear a#d respected sir+ you have .ee# o#e of my most favourite mem.er of this
forum, / always restlessly wait for your posts, -ha#& you soooo much, / salute you,
May your efforts # this forum last forever,
(+e ,ollowing 3ser *a's (+an! 8ou to 0illa ,or (+is 3seul "ost6
4sif >ousuf=ai 1Saturday+ 6ecem.er 7+ 0112
#25
Saturday, (e'e$%er 24, 2011
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
HomenBs protection law
HomenBs protection law6 a good irst step
"y
Syed Mohammad 4li
4fter much hesitatio#+ the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly has fi#ally passed the 0reve#tio# of
4#ti-Come# 0ractices "ill+ 011, H#ce the Se#ate passes it a#d the preside#t sig#s
it+ a mi#imum legal .e#chmar& will .e availa.le to pe#alise those who de#y a woma#
her right to i#herita#ce or those who e#gage i# practices li&e wa#i+ swara or .adla-i-
salah+ all of which force wome# a#d girls i#to marriage to settle perso#al+ family or
tri.al disputes,
-his passage of the legislatio# has .ee# rightly lauded as a show of parliame#tGs
collective resolve to preve#t lo#gsta#di#g ge#der i#justices i# 0a&ista#, Some legal
e3perts are however poi#ti#g out that #ot much co#sideratio# has go#e i#to drafti#g
the legislatio#, -hey are trou.led .y the .illGs prescriptio#s of ma&i#g i#herita#ce a#d
marriage disputes+ till #ow a civil matter+ i#to a crimi#al offe#ce, 4t the procedural
level+ it has .ee# further poi#ted out that ma&i#g i#herita#ce-related offe#ces
effective from the date of the death of the deceased is u#realistic si#ce this does #ot
ta&e i#to accou#t delays which usually occur duri#g the process .y+ which a#
i#herita#ce is divided,
Similarly+ it has .ee# )uestio#ed how the proposed law will disti#guish .etwee#
forced marriages a#d arra#ged marriages go#e wro#g+ if wome# u#satisfied i# the
latter situatio# file crimi#al complai#ts claimi#g coercio# a#d see& to i#itiate crimi#al
proceedi#gs agai#st their families or i#-laws,
!o#versely+ it has .ee# poi#ted out that+ i# its prese#t form+ the .ill is #ot
comprehe#sive, *or i#sta#ce+ su#g-chati+ which is a#other form of child marriage+
has #ot .ee# me#tio#ed i# the .ill as a pu#isha.le offe#ce, Hther critics also co#sider
the overall legislatio# as .ei#g too #arrowly focused o# pu#itive aspects+ without
ta&i#g i#to accou#t the reaso# why ma#y wome# are still u#a.le to report offe#ces
agai#st them i# the first place, -heir criticism is .ased o# their opi#io# that the .ill
does #ot propose a# ade)uate mecha#ism to e#sure more effective reporti#g of such
crimes to e#sure that offe#ces agai#st wome# reach a court of law,
/deally the draft of this importa#t .ill should have .ee# shared with a .roader ra#ge
of releva#t sta&eholders wor&i#g o# ge#der e)uity issues+ a#d eve# with lawyers
from the lower courts who have practical e3perie#ce of deali#g with these cases, $ad
this .ee# do#e+ the a.ove-me#tio#ed flaws a#d loopholes could have .ee# removed,
-he passage of the .ill i# the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly+ after two failed attempts+ itself
mar&s a positive step towards recog#isi#g the fact that wome# i# 0a&ista#i society
#eed legal protectio# to safeguard their rights, *urthermore+ it ta&es ta#gi.le steps
towards addressi#g ge#der-.ased disparities due to which so ma#y 0a&ista#i wome#
co#ti#ue to suffer,
Su.se)ue#t to overcomi#g the fi#al drafti#g a#d legislative hurdles+ it will .e eve#
more importa#t to e#sure that the sa#ctio#s laid dow# i# the law are put i#to effect,
6oi#g so will+ i# tur#+ re)uire co#te#di#g with a ra#ge of i#ade)uacies withi# our
justice system+ especially i# the lower courts, Moreover+ the police a#d patwaris+ who
are the most releva#t officials whe# it comes to deali#g with forced marriages a#d
i#herita#ce issues+ must .e made aware of the co#te#ts of the .ill so that they ca#
play a more proactive role i# e#suri#g that the availa.le provisio#s are e#forced to
improve the situatio# of wome# i# 0a&ista#,
%ublished in :he /;press :ribune' 5ovember NAth' N600
,
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"egi#s
#ai#a &ha# 1Mo#day+ 6ecem.er 6+ 0112
#26
Thursday, January 12, 2012
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
0aloc+istan Issue
0aloc+istan J point o no return>
"y
"y Mali& Siraj 4&.ar
Sardar 4taullah Me#gal+ "alochista#Gs first chief mi#ister+ rece#tly said after a
meeti#g with 0MA-' chief 'awa= Sharif that the situatio# i# "alochista# had reached
a Ipoi#t of #o retur#J+ addi#g that he had I#o co#trolJ over the disillusio#ed "aloch
youths who had ta&e# to the hills to wage a war of li.eratio#, -he "aloch are a#gry
with 'awa= Sharif+ /mra# Lha# a#d the ?amaat-e-/slami, -he a.ove three+ they
complai#+ orga#ise marches agai#st ;S foreig# policy or i# support of 0alesti#e .ut
they do #ot stage similar lo#g marches i# major cities li&e /slama.ad+ Aahore a#d
Larachi to co#dem# the militaryGs violatio# of huma# rights i# "alochista#,
-he "aloch feel .etrayed .y the judiciaryGs sile#ce over the R&ill a#d dumpG operatio#s
goi#g o# i# the provi#ce, 4lthough the !hief ?ustice of 0a&ista# is a #ative of
"alochista#+ the ape3 court seems to have a.stai#ed from playi#g a proactive role i#
halti#g the &illi#g a#d dumpi#g of those who disappear i# the provi#ce, 0erhaps+ the
army chief should sa#ctio# a# i#depe#de#t i#)uiry i#to the cases of the missi#g
perso#s,
-he federal gover#me#t should u#derta&e a comprehe#sive list of co#fide#ce-.uildi#g
measures to .ri#g "alochista# .ac& from the Rpoi#t of #o retur#G, -hese should
i#clude eco#omic a#d co#stitutio#al pac&ages a#d will have to .e impleme#ted over a
lo#g period of time,
*or i#sta#ce+ the federal gover#me#t should ma&e sure that #o "aloch activist is
arrested or &illed for at least o#e year, -his may loo& difficult at this poi#t .ut it is
e3tremely importa#t for .oth sides to prove their commitme#t to a dura.le peace
withi# a specified time frame, 4#other possi.le .rea&through ca# come forward if the
military a##ou#ces a u#ilateral e#d to its operatio#s i# the provi#ce,
$ere are some respo#si.ilities the "aloch #atio#alists should also ow#, -hey should
remai# assured that they have a ge#ui#e a#d co#vi#ci#g case of .ei#g su.jected to
oppressio#+ therefore+ they do #ot #eed to e3aggerate these i#justices, O3aggeratio#
ca# hi#der the resolutio# of political disputes through peaceful #egotiatio#s, -he
"aloch could have prese#ted a stro#g case o# a#y forum without foolishly resorti#g
to &illi#g u#armed 0u#ja.i settlers i# "alochista#, -hese &illi#gs have treme#dously
u#dermi#ed the legitimacy of their struggle, 4 lot of "aloch leaders a#d activists
justify these &illi#gs .y termi#g them as a Rreactio#G to the militaryGs .rutalities,
4#ti-0u#ja.i rhetoric ca# serve as a catalyst to gar#er support from disgru#tled
political activists .ut it ca##ot serve a#y lo#g-term i#terest for a political moveme#t,
'atio#al moveme#ts #eed more sophisticated philosophical a#d ideological
fou#datio#s, 4# i#tri#sic eleme#t of the "aloch culture is the ce#turies-old co#cept of
.ahot 1protectio#2 which mea#s to protect the life of a RsettlerG or a# RoutsiderG who
comes to a "aloch area, -hroughout "aloch history+ we have #ot see# such .ra=e#
attac&s o# RoutsidersG o# "aloch la#d as wit#essed after the &illi#g of 'awa. 4&.ar
"ugti, -hese attac&s clearly co#tradict the "aloch code of co#duct+ &#ow# as
"alochiatd a#d they also alie#ate supporters of "alochista# who live outside the
provi#ce a#d the cou#try, Cill the real progressive "aloch leaders sta#d up a#d
apologise to the families of 0u#ja.i settlers who were u#justly &illed?
-oday+ criticisi#g certai# "aloch leaders is co#sidered almost .lasphemous a#d this
closed the doors for disse#ti#g ideas, -he you#g "aloch .elieves his leader ca#Gt err,
>et+ i# my judgme#t+ the very leaders who galva#ised the middle class "aloch
youths+ lac& the political acume# a#d the visio# to provide their followers a#d the
rest of the world a clear roadmap for ma3imum auto#omy or a# i#depe#de#t
"alochista#, Che# leaders are caught up i# a situatio# where they have ma3imalist
dema#ds .ut #o visio# of how to achieve their goals+ they e#d up getti#g all their
soldiers arrested or &illed,
Aastly+ the "aloch a#d the ce#tre #eed co#sta#t a#d lo#g-term e#gageme#t, -hey
must+ at least+ .e clear a.out what they sta#d for i#stead of eter#ally a#d fatally
fighti#g without ma&i#g a# i#ch of progress toward their desired desti#atio#s,
%ublished in :he /;press :ribune' January 0Nth' N60N.
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"egi#s
#27
Tuesday, January 1), 2012
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
$istor' o "a!
"arliamentar' $istor' o "a!istan
-he Muslims of /#dia had+ si#ce the middle of the last ce#tury+ .egu# the struggle for
a seperate homela#d o# the .asis of the -wo 'atio# -heory, 6espite their lo#g
associatio# a#d i#teractio#s at various levels+ the $i#dus a#d Muslims of /#dia
remai#ed two seperate a#d disti#ct socio-cultural e#tities, -heir social segregatio#
persisted due to their homela#d, Leepi#g i# view the situatio#+ at that time+ the
"ritish rulers were left with #o optio# .ut to eve#tually accept the dema#ds of the
Muslims of /#dia,
H# ?u#e 3+ 197@+ Aord Aouis Mou#t.atte#+the last Ticeroy of /#dia+ called the
co#fere#ce of all the leaders of the su.-co#ti#e#t a#d commu#icated to thes $is
Majesty(s %over#me#t(s 0la# for the tra#sfer of power, 4t that time+ a #otificatio# was
issued i# the %a=ette of /#dia+ pu.lished o# ?uly 6+ 197@+ i# which the first
!o#stitue#t 4ssem.ly of 0a&ista# was give# shape with si3ty si3 Mem.ers i#cludi#g
o#e female Mem.er,
-he state of 0a&ista# was created u#der the /#depe#de#ce act of 197@, -he act made
the e3isti#g !o#stitue#t 4ssem.lies the domi#io# Aegislatures, -hese 4ssem.lies
were to e3ercise all the powers which were formerly e3ercised .y the !e#tral
Aegislature i# additio# to the powers regardi#g the frami#g of a #ew !o#stitutio#+
prior to which all the teritories were to .e gover#ed i# accorda#ce with the
%over#me#t of /#dia 4ct+ 1939,
-he first sessio# of the firt !o#stitue#t 4ssem.ly of 0a&ista# was held o# 4ugust 10+
197@+ at Si#d 4ssem.ly "uildi#g+ Larachi, H# 10 P 11 4ugust+ 9B Mem.ers too&
oath, H# 4ugust 11+ Kuaid-i-4=am Muhammad 4li ?i##ah was elected u#a#imously as
the 0reside#t of the !o#stitue#t 4ssem.ly of 0a&ista#+ a#d the 'atio#al *lag
wasformally approved .y the 4ssem.ly,
H# 4ugust 1+ 197@+ a resolutio# was approved regardi#g officially addressi#g Mr,
Muhammad 4li ?i##ah as "Kuaid-i-4=am Muhammad 4li ?i##ah", H# the same day+ a
special !ommittee called the "!ommittee o# *u#dame#tal <ights of !iti=e#s a#d
Mi#orities of 0a&ista#"+ was also appoi#ted to loo& i#to a#d advise the 4ssem.ly o#
matters relati#g to fu#dame#tal rights of the citi=e#s+ particularly the mi#orities+ with
the aim to legislate o# these issues approopriately, /# this way due importa#ce was
give# to the mi#orities a#d fu#dame#tal rightd of the citi=e#s at large+ from day o#e,
H# 4ugust 17+ 197@+ the tra#sfer of power too& place, Aord Aouis Mou#t.atte#+
%over#er %e#eral of /#dia+ addressed the !o#stitue#t 4ssem.ly of 0a&ista#, -he
Kuaid gave a reply to the address+ i# the $ouse+ o# which the pri#ciples of the State
of 0a&ista# are laid, H# 4ugust 19+ 197@+ Kuaid-i-4=am was swor# i# as the first
%over#er %e#eral of 0a&ista# a#d Mia# Sir 4.dur <ashid+ !hief ?ustice of 0a&ista#+
too& oath of office from him, -he Kuaid remai#ed i# this postio# till his death o#
Septem.er 11+ 197B,
%ive# the foremost tas& .efore the *irst !o#stitue#t 4ssem.ly of frami#g the
!o#stitutio# for the 'atio#+ wor& o# it started from the very .egi##i#g, H# March @+
1979+ the H.jectives <esolutio#+ which #ow serves as the gru#d #orm was i#troduced
.y the first 0rime Mi#ister 'awa.=ada Aia)at 4li Lha#+ a#d later adopted .y the
!o#stitue#t 4ssem.ly o# March 1+ 1979, -he H.jectives <esolutio# affirmed that
sovereig#ty over the e#tire u#iverse .elo#ged to 4llah 4lmighty alo#e a#d the
authority which $e had delegated to the State of 0a&ista# through its people+ was a
sacred trust,
4fter the passage of the H.jectives resolutio#+ o# the same day+ a "asic 0ri#ciples
!ommittee comprisi#g 7 mem.ers was formed to prepare a draft !o#stitutio# o#
the .asis of the H.jectives <esolutio#, H# Hcto.er 16+ 1991+ 0rime Mi#ister
'awa.=ada Aia)at 4li Lha# was assassi#ated a#d Lhwaja 'a=imuddi# too& over as
the 0rime Mi#ister o# Hcto.er 1@+ 1991,
-he fi#al draft of the co#stitutio# was prepared i# 1997, "y that time Muhammad 4li
"ogra had ta&e# over as the 0rime Mi#ister, $owever+ .efore the draft could .e
placed i# the $ouse for approval+ the 4ssem.ly was dissolved .y the the %over#er
%e#eral %hulam Muhammad o# Hcto.er 7+1997, -he 0rime Mi#ister+ however+ was
#ot dismissed a#d was as&ed to ru# the admi#istratio#+ with a reco#stituted !a.i#et+
u#til such time as the electio#s were held,
-he seco#d !o#stitue#t 4ssem.ly of 0a&ista# was created o# May B u#der %over#er
%e#eral(s Hrder 'o, 1 of 1999, -he electoral college of this 4ssem.ly were the
provi#cial 4ssem.lies of respective 0rovi#ces, -he stre#gth of this 4ssem.ly was B0
mem.ers+ half each from Oast P Cest 0a&ista#, H#e of the major achiveme#ts of this
4ssem.ly was the esta.lishme#t of Cest 0a&ista#+ with the aim to create parity
.etwee# the two wi#gs, -he seco#d achieveme#t of this 4ssem.ly was to give the
first !o#stitutio# to the #atio#,
-he draft of this !o#stitutio# was i#troduced i# the 4ssem.ly o# ?a#uary 9+ 1996+
a#d it was passed .y the 4ssem.ly o# *e.ruary 9+ 1996,-he asse#t to the %over#er
%e#eral was give# o# March + 1996, -his !o#stitutio# was e#forced with effect from
March 3+ 1996, ;#der this !o#stitutio# 0a&ista# .ecame a# /slamic <epu.lic,
H# March 9+ 1996+ Major %e#, /s&a#der Mir=a .ecame the first elected 0reside#t of
0a&ista#, 4ccordi#g to the !o#stitutio#of 1996+ the 0reside#t was the O3ecutive $ead
of the *ederatio# a#d was to .e elected .y all the mem.ers of the 'atio#al a#d
0rovi#cial 4ssem.lies, $e was to hold office for five years, -he 0reside#t was to act
o# the advice of the !a.i#et escept where he was empowered to act i# his discretio#+
which was limited to a few cases o#ly, -hus the li#& factor .etwee# the 0reside#t a#d
the !a.i#et was the 0rime Mi#ister,
;#der the !o#stitutio# of 1996+ the 0arliame#t of 0aa&ista# was u#icameral,
Aegislative ppowers vested i# the 0aliame#t which co#sisted of the 0reside#t a#d the
'atio#al 4ssem.ly comprisi#g 300 mem.ers divided i# to half .etwee# Oast a#d Cest
0a&ista#, /# additio# to those 300 seats+ five seats for wome# were reserved for each
of the two wi#gs for a period of te# years,
4lthough the first electio#s were scheduled for early 1999+ 0reside#t /s&a#der Mir=a
was compelled to a.rogate the co#stitutio#+ dissolve the 'atio#al 4#d 0<ovi#cial
4ssem.lies+ a#d declare Martial Aaw o# Hcto.er @+ 199B, $e 4ppoi#ted %e#eral
Muhammad 4yu. Lha#+ !omma#der-i#!hief of the 4rmy as the !hief Martial Aaw
4dmi#istrator,
H# Hcto.er @+ 199B+ %e#eral Muhammad 4yu. Lha#+ too& over as the seco#d
0reside#t of 0a&ista#, 4 #ew co#stitutio# was framed a#d give# to the #atio# o#
March 1+ 196, %e#eral electio#s u#der the #ew co#stitutio# were held o# March B+
196+ a#d electio#s to the speacial seats reserved for wome# were held o# May 9+
196, -he first sessio# of the third 'atio#al 4ssem.ly was held o# ?u#e B+ 196, -he
!o#stitutio# of 196+ e#visaged a federal state with preside#tial system of
gover#me#t+ with 'atio#al 4ssem.ly a#d 0rovi#cial 4ssem.lies, 4ll e3ecutive
authority of the <epu.lic of 0a&ista#+ u#der the !o#stitutio#+ vested i# the office of
the 0reside#t,
H# March 9+ 1969+ the seco#d Martial Aaw was imposed a#d %e#eral 4gha
Muhammad >ahya Lha# too& over as the 0reside#t of 0a&ista# a#d !hief Martial Aaw
4dmi#istrator, $e+ issued a Aegal *ramewor& Hrder+ u#der which the first ever
ge#eral electio#s were held o# 6ecem.er @+ 19@0+ a#d the compositio# of the
4ssem.ly was .ased for the first time+ co#sisti#g of 169 from Oast a#d 177 from
Cest 0a&ista#, Soo# after the electio#s the provi#ce of Oast 0a&ista# seceded from
Cest 0a&ista# a#d .ecame "a#gladesh, H# 6ecem.er 0+ 19@1+Dulfi&ar 4li "hutto
too& over as the 0reside#t of 0a&ista# as well as the first civil !hief Martial Aaw
4dmi#istrator,
-he first civilia# sessio# of the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly + due to the delay caused .y the
separatio# of Oast 0a&ista#+ was held o# 17th 4pril 19@ at the State .a#& .uildi#g i#
/slama.ad+ i# which all 177 Mem.ers from west 0a&ista# a#d two from former Oast
0a&ista# 1Mr, 'urul 4mi# P <aja -ridev <oy2 who had chose# to joi# 0a&ista#+
participated, 1@ 4pril + 19@ a# /#terim !o#titutio# was adopted .y the 'atio#al
4ssem.ly,
4 !o#titutio#al !ommitee was formed to prepare the first draft for the purpose of
frami#g a perma#e#t !o#stitutio#, -he report of the !ommitee was prese#ted with a
draft !o#stitutio# o# 31 6ec(19@, /t was passed .y the 4ssem.ly o# its sessio# of
10 4pril+ 19@3+ u#a#imously+ a#d was authe#ticated .y the 0reside#t of 4ssem.ly o#
1 4pril + 19@3, -he !o#stitutio# called !o#titutio# of /slamic <epu.lic of 0a&ista#
19@3+ was e#forced o# 4ugust 17 + 19@3, H# the same day Dulfi)ar 4li "htto too&
oath as the 0rime Mi#ister while Mr, *a=al Olahi !houdri too& oath as the 0reside#t of
0a&ista#,
-he !o#stitutio# of 0a&ista#+ 19@3+ provides for a parliame#tary form of gover#me#t
where the O3ecutive 4uthorityof the State vests i# the 0rime Mi#ister, -he 0reside#t
accordi#g to the origi#al !o#stitutio# of 19@3+ was at the ape3+ with o#ly a titulat
role represe#ti#g the u#ity of the <epu.lic,
;#der the !o#stitutio# of 19@3+ the term limit of the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly is five years
u#less soo#er dissolved, -he stre#gth of the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly mem.ership is #ow
1@+ as the !o#stitutio#al provisio# of 0 special seats for wome# lapsed i# 1990,
-he electio#s to the mi#ority seats are held o# seperate electorate .asis co#sisti#g of
#o#-Muslim populatio# of the cou#try u#der the same ge#eral procedures as those
for the Muslim seats a#d at the same time,
6espite the te#ure of the 4ssem.ly .ei#g five years+ as prescri.ed i# the
!o#stitutio#+ Mr, D, 4, "hutto+ o# ?a#uary @+ 19@@+ a##ou#ced the holdi#g of
electio#s .efore time, Chich resulted i# a severe political crisis a#d Martial Aaw was
imposed .y %e#eral Muhammad Dia-ul-$a)+ the 4rmy !hief+ o# ?uly 9+ 19@@, 4fter
four years+ o# 6ecem.er 7+ 19B1 u#der the 0reside#tial Hrder+ a *eral !ou#cil was
co#stituted, -he mem.ers were #omi#ated .y the 0reside#t, %e#eral Olectio#s were
later held o# *e.ruary 9+ 19B9 o# #o#-party .asis,
H# March + 19B9+ revival of !o#stitutio# Hrder was issued i# which a large #um.er
of amme#dme#ts were made i# the !o#stitutio# of 19@3, -he first sessio# of the
19B9 4ssem.ly was held o# March 0+ 19B9, Mr, Muhammad Lha# ?u#ejo was
#omi#ated+ u#der the !o#stitutio#+ as the 0rime Mi#ister of 0a&ista# .y the
0reside#t+ %e#eral Muhammad Dia-ul-$a),
-he 0arliame#tary history of 0a&ista#+ though che)uered a#d crisis ridde#+ o#e has
ma#aged to come through to the poi#t where prese#tly we have held five ge#eral
electios i# last twelve years, -he -hirtee#th a#d the *ourtee#th 4mme#dme#ts have
rei#foreced the sta.ility .y preve#tio# of political defectio#s,
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"egi#s
#28
Tuesday, *o+e$%er 13, 2012
?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
Impact o "rivati:ation on *ustainable 5evelopment
"y
/shrat $usai#
-he impact of 0rivati=atio# o# Sustai#a.le 6evelopme#t is difficult to measure as it
i#volves several comple3 a#d little u#derstood tra#smissio# cha##els, -o start with+
successful privati=atio#+ if impleme#ted properly+ leads to efficie#cy i# allocatio# of
resources+ higher productivity a#d i##ovatio# a#d e#trepre#eurship, -hese outcomes
the# impi#ge upo# a cou#tryGs growth #e3us a#d help accelerate the rate of
eco#omic growth, /f the patter# of eco#omic growth is such that it co#serves
depleta.le #atural resources a#d preserves the e#viro#me#t the# we are o# path to
sustai#a.le developme#t,
/t must .e poi#ted out that #o#e of these li#&s are automatic or ca# .e ta&e# for
gra#ted, -here may .e .rea&dow#s or co#gestio# or lea&ages i# these cha##els a#d
the results may .e )uite differe#t from what we e3pect them to .e,
Chat is the co##ectio# .etwee# growth a#d privati=atio# the#? %rowth ta&es place
o#ly whe# productivity from the e3isti#g resources W Aa.our a#d !apital W or a#d
tech#ology &eep o# risi#g, Ce have to therefore see what eco#omic theory a#d
empirical evide#ce tell us a.out this,
/# Oco#omic theory+ welfare theorem suggests that private ow#ership of the mea#s
of productio# i# a competitive e)uili.rium is optimal, %over#me#t ca#+ however+
i#terve#e to regulate #atural mo#opolies or other mo#opolies+ or tac&le e3ter#alities
or provide pu.lic goods, "ut u#der competitive mar&et structure+ the ratio#ale for
state ow#ed e#terprises is very wea&, 0rivate ow#ership leads to higher rates of
productivity growth a#d decli#i#g costs i# the lo#g ru#,
Ompirical e3perie#ce from all parts of the developi#g a#d emergi#g cou#tries has
clearly demo#strated that State Hw#ed O#terprises 1SHOs2 e3hi.it a sig#ifica#t lower
productive efficie#cy i# compariso# with privately ow#ed compa#ies, -he glo.al
e3perie#ce shows that .y a#d large+ productivity actually decli#es or remai#s
stag#a#t whe# the .usi#esses are ma#aged a#d operated .y the gover#me#t thus
slowi#g dow# or hurti#g the pace of growth, H# the other ha#d+ the record of
privati=atio# i# the last three decades has .ee# )uite successful i# raisi#g
productivity particularly i# cou#tries which have put i# place stro#g regulatory
mecha#ism a#d sou#d corporate gover#a#ce, 6espite this stro#g empirical evide#ce+
the popular perceptio# prevails that privati=atio# is u#fair+ hurts the poor+ the
dise#fra#chised a#d the wor&ers a#d .e#efits the already rich, <egulatory capture
also remai#s a serious pro.lem that puts the privati=atio# process to ris&, /t must .e
co#ceded that privati=atio# is #ot a pa#acea for all eco#omic ills a#d u#der certai#
strategic co#sideratio#s it is #either advisa.le #or desira.le to resort to privati=atio#,
-he ha#gover of the past i# ge#eral a#d the li#geri#g fasci#atio# for the socialist
model amo#g some of our i#tellectuals i# particular co#ti#ue to have a domi#a#t
i#flue#ce o# our thi#&i#g, Some of the rese#tme#t agai#st private profit ma&i#g is
also )uite legitimate a#d u#dersta#da.le, /# the past+ private e#trepre#eurs i#
0a&ista# did #ot ma&e RprofitsG i# the real eco#omic se#se of the word .y ear#i#g a
retur# o# their i#vestme#t i# a competitive world, H# the co#trary+ they ear#ed
Rre#tsG through the ma=e of permits+ lice#ces+ preferred credit .y the .a#&s+
su.sidies+ privileges+ co#cessio#s a#d specific S<Hs gra#ted to the favored few,
'aturally whe# o#e sees people .ecomi#g rich #ot through the di#t of their hard
wor& a#d e#terprise .ut .y ma#ipulatio#+ .ac& door e#try+ co##ectio#s+ reciprocity+
payi#g .ri.es+ adopti#g e3tra legal mea#s+ .ypassi#g the esta.lished rules a#d laws+
getti#g scarce foreig# e3cha#ge )uotas+ evadi#g ta3es+ defaulti#g o# .a#& loa#s a#d
riggi#g the mar&ets etc,+ we should #ot .e surprised to see the ve#om agai#st the so
called Rprivate profitsG, -herefore the role of the gover#me#t policy a#d regulatio# i#
&eepi#g these malpractices i# chec& .ecomes critical,
-he %lo.al *i#a#cial crisis of 00B has .ee# i#terpreted .y ma#y comme#tators as
the resurge#ce of #atio#ali=atio# a#d asce#da#cy of State ow#ership, -he fact
remai#s that the state had to step i# with capital i#jectio# to avert the systemic ris&
whe# the private mar&ets had failed to provide the re)uired resources, Mar&et failure
had to .e resolved through %over#me#t i#terve#tio#, 4fter four years the shares of
%over#me#t i# most of these .a#&s have .ee# .y a#d large divested,
0rivati=atio# has+ therefore+ to .e see# i# the overall co#te3t of the respective roles
of the state a#d mar&ets i# a particular cou#try, 4lthough this relatio#ship varies a lot
ra#gi#g from the majority state ow#ership i# socialist cou#tries to 'ordic model a#d
fi#ally to a largely private ow#ed eco#omy the state has to play a critical role i# all
i#sta#ces, -he State has to .e stro#g to com.at the e3cesses of the mar&et a#d cope
with mar&et failures, /t is #ot that the state should play a lesser or reduced role .ut a
differe#t role i# so far as it has to provide a# e#a.li#g e#viro#me#t through security
of life a#d property+ protectio# of property rights a#d rule of law a#d create
#ecessary co#ditio#s for growth through i#vestme#t i# huma# developme#t a#d
i#frastructure, -he gover#me#t has to play a# effective role i# regulati#g a#d
mo#itori#g the mar&et to promote healthy competitio# a#d avoid the riggi#g of the
mar&et .y a few, !ompetitive Mar&ets are the .est &#ow# vehicle for efficie#t
allocatio# a#d utili=atio# of resources a#d thus the decisio#s as to what goods a#d
services to produce+ how much to produce+ distri.ute a#d trade ca# .e do#e well o#ly
.y the private sector a#d #ot .y the .ureaucrats, -his divisio# a#d redefi#itio# is also
esse#tial to reduce corruptio# a#d provide a level playi#g field for all eco#omic actors
i# the growth process that is e)uita.le a#d sustai#a.le, Mar&et-.ased competitio#+
privati=atio# of pu.lic .a#&s a#d a stro#g regulator have successfully reformed the
.a#&i#g sector i# 0a&ista# duri#g the last several years a#d this model should .e
replicated elsewhere i# the eco#omy, /t is #ot ideology .ut pragmatism a#d lear#i#g
from the past mista&es that should drive our eco#omic policies a#d strategies,
-he .asic reaso# for privati=i#g these e#terprises is that the gover#me#t should #ot
.e i# the .usi#ess of ru##i#g .usi#esses .ut regulati#g .usi#esses, -he role of the
gover#me#t should .e that of a #eutral umpire+ who lays dow# the grou#d rules for
.usi#esses to operate a#d compete+ to mo#itor a#d e#force these rules+ to pe#ali=e
those fou#d guilty of co#trave#tio#s a#d to adjudicate disputes .etwee# the
competi#g .usi#ess firms, /f the gover#me#t ow#ed firm itself is o#e of the players i#
the mar&et+ there is a stro#g co#flict of i#terest a#d the other mar&et players lose
co#fide#ce i# the #eutrality of the umpire, ;#der these circumsta#ces+ the mar&et
.ecomes chaotic+ disorderly a#d u#ruly as there is #o #eutral Rperso#G to mo#itor a#d
e#force the rules, -he eco#omy thus pays a heavy price for this loss of the mar&et
mecha#ism i# the productio#+ sale a#d distri.utio# of goods a#d services, -he
co#troversy .etwee# the 0/4 a#d private airli#es is a ma#ifestatio# of this te#de#cy,
/f the RumpireG favors its ow#ed e#terprise i,e, 0/4 a#d discrimi#ates agai#st the rival
private airli#es+ the ultimate result would .e the wi#di#g up of these airli#es, -he
growth of aviatio# i#dustry ca# ta&e place o#ly if competitio# is a.le to cut dow# the
prices a#d stimulate dema#d for air travel i# the cou#try, /# a.se#ce of such
competitio#+ the 0/4 would have prefere#tial access to traffic rights+ airports a#d
i#frastructure a#d the pla#es would fly with empty seats as the tic&et prices would
#ot .e mar&et .ased .ut ar.itrarily high, -he co#sumers of airli#e i#dustry W e3isti#g
a#d pote#tial W will .e the loser i# this .argai#,
"rivati:ation 1Cperience in "a!istan
/# 0a&ista#+ the privati=atio# process was i#itiated i# the early 1990s+ as part of the
larger eco#omic reforms program, -he 0rivati=atio# !ommissio# was set up i# 1991+
i# order to provide a# i#stitutio#al framewor& for the privati=atio# process i# the
cou#try, -he 0rivati=atio# !ommissio# 10!2 was e#trusted with selli#g federal
gover#me#t property Q such as its share i# .a#&s+ i#dustrial u#its+ pu.lic utilities+ oil
a#d gas compa#ies+ tra#sport compa#ies+ a#d i#frastructure service providers Q i#
a# ope# a#d tra#spare#t ma##er, -he followi#g o.jectives were sought to .e
achieved .y privati=atio#5
1; %eduction in iscal deicit
-owards the e#d of the eighties+ the mou#ti#g losses of pu.lic sector e#terprises
were .ecomi#g a .urde# o# the #atio#al e3che)uer, -he fiscal deficit reached a high
of B,9 perce#t of %60 i# 19B@-BB+ which severely co#strai#ed the fiscal space
availa.le to the gover#me#t,
4; Increase in t+e eicienc' levels
Officie#cy levels of pu.lic sector e#terprises were low i# 0a&ista#, 0roductio# costs of
pu.lic e#terprises were high as a result of political i#terfere#ce, Chile private
producers could .e forced to reduce their cost to a mi#imum for their survival+ pu.lic
firms were #ot u#der pressure to reduce costs as they were u#der #o compulsio# to
e#sure a# accepta.le retur# to their e)uity holders, 0rivate firmsG ma#agers had
more fle3i.ility i# ta&i#g decisio#s .ut this was #ot so i# pu.lic sector firms as their
accou#ta.ility for results was almost #o#-e3iste#t, Moreover+ pu.lic sector firmGs
i#vestme#t decisio#s were largely i#flue#ced .y political co#sideratio#s+ thus
adversely affecti#g efficie#cies i# the allocatio# of resources,
3; (o oster competition
/t was .elieved that whe# pu.lic sector u#its were sold to a large #um.er of private
parties+ this would result i# healthy competitio# i# differe#t sectors of the eco#omy,
-he creatio# of a# auto#omous !ompetitio# !ommissio# of 0a&ista# 1!!02 i# rece#t
years is a# attempt to avert collusio#+ carteli=atio# a#d other a#ti-competitio#
practices .y private eco#omic actors,
9; 0road basing o eKuit' capital
"road-.asi#g the ow#ership of e)uity capital was #ecessary for achievi#g distri.utive
justice, 0rivati=atio# could help achieve that, Moreover+ privati=atio# would result i#
stre#gthe#i#g a#d deepe#i#g of the capital mar&et whe# a perce#tage of shares of
pu.lic e#terprises were sold to the pu.lic through the stoc& e3cha#ge,
A; %eleasing resources or p+'sical and social inrastructure
0rivati=atio# of loss ma&i#g pu.lic e#terprises would ma&e more fu#ds availa.le for
pu.lic sector developme#t projects aimed at upgradi#g physical i#frastructure a#d
improvi#g social services,
/ would #ow li&e to assess this e3perie#ce .y selecti#g three e3amples of
privati=atio# i# 0a&ista# W "a#&i#g+ telecommu#icatio#s a#d power, / would also
argue that the decisio# to ca#cel privati=atio# of Steel Mills has .ee# harmful to the
larger eco#omic i#terests of the cou#try,
;#til 001 the .a#&i#g system was i#curri#g losses a#d <s, 71 .illio# was i#jected .y
the %over#me#t from the ta3payersG mo#ey i#to $"A a#d ;"A for repairi#g their
.ala#ce sheets, "y 00@+ the three .a#&s that were privati=ed W 4llied "a#& Aimited
14"A2+ $a.i. "a#& Aimited 1$"A2 a#d ;#ited "a#& Aimited 1;"A2 W were ma&i#g
profits .efore ta3 of <s, 3 .illio# that rose to <s, @3 .illio# .y 011, !orporate ta3es
paid .y these three .a#&s alo#e amou#ted to appro3imately <s, 9 .illio# a##ually,
/# additio#+ the gover#me#t as a shareholder i# these .a#&s has ear#ed huge
divide#ds every year si#ce privati=atio#, -he residual e)uity holdi#g of the
%over#me#t i# these three .a#&s has multiplied several fold a#d the mar&et value of
the shares held .y the gover#me#t i# these .a#&s today must .e a multiple of the
amou#t they received at the time of privati=atio#, /t is speculative to co#struct
cou#terfactuals .ut my guess is that if the gover#me#t had held o# to these .a#&s
a#d #ot divested the shares alo#g with the ma#ageme#t to the private ow#ers the
#et losses suffered .y the e3che)uer would have .ee# close to <s, 90 .illio# a##ually
ta&i#g a highly co#servative view, /magi#e the effect of these losses o# a# already
stressed fiscal .ala#ces a#d the wide#i#g fiscal deficit,
/t is #ot the fiscal aspects of privati=atio# .ut the other fi#a#cial sou#d#ess i#dicators
which have all improved si#ce 00, %ross 'o#-0erformi#g loa#s had decli#ed from
9 perce#t to @ perce#t .y 00B .efore risi#g to 19 perce#t i# 011 due to the
stag#atio# i# eco#omic activity, 'et '0As were dow# to 3 perce#t W a# i#ter#atio#al
#orm .ut have go#e up to 6 perce#t i# the last four years, $ad the '0As remai#ed at
pre-privati=atio# levels i#terest rates would have .ee# much higher tha# what we
have wit#essed, !redit to private sector would have .ee# further stifled, !apital
stre#gth of the .a#&i#g sector has improved sig#ifica#tly, /# 00+ capital ade)uacy
ratio was B,B perce#t a#d capital to assets ratio 7,B perce#t, "y 00B+ capital
ade)uacy ratio had improved to 13,7 perce#t a#d further to 19,1 .y March 01,
-he story of privati=atio# of the .a#&s i# 0a&ista# is a# e3emplary illustratio# of what
good the eco#omy ca# reap if there is a .road political co#se#sus, -he privati=atio#
was started .y 'awa= Sharif %over#me#t i# 1991 .ut was pursued .y all successive
gover#me#ts W 6emocratic a#d Military, M!" a#d 4llied "a#& were privati=ed i# the
early 1990s 14llied "a#& Aimited had to .e reprivati=ed i# 0072, 0rofessio#al
.a#&ers were appoi#ted as !hief O3ecutives of $"A a#d ;"A a#d perso#s from
private sector e#joyi#g reputatio# of compete#ce a#d i#tegrity appoi#ted o# the
"oard of 6irectors i# 199@,
-he %over#me#t+ .esides i#jecti#g fresh e)uity to stre#gthe# the capital .ase of the
#atio#ali=ed commercial .a#&s did away with the u#due i#terfere#ce of la.our u#io#s
i# decisio# ma&i#g process of the .a#&s+ a.olished the 0a&ista# "a#&i#g !ou#cil a#d
gave auto#omy to the State "a#& of 0a&ista#,
4ll the #atio#ali=ed commercial .a#&s+ e3cept o#e+ have .ee# privati=ed, 4s a
co#se)ue#ce their domi#atio# of the .a#&i#g sector has .ee# reduced from almost
100 perce#t i# 1991 to a.out 0 perce#t .y ?u#e 007, Ove# i# the case of 'atio#al
"a#& of 0a&ista# 3,9 perce#t shares were floated through Stoc& Mar&et mai#ly
aimed at small retail i#vestors,
-here is a #eed for further reforms i# the .a#&i#g sector particularly fosteri#g
competitio#+ .roade#i#g access to fi#a#cial services+ loweri#g the cost of
i#termediatio# a#d elimi#ati#g wea& .a#&s through mergers a#d co#solidatio#, "ut it
would .e fair to co#clude that the .a#&i#g system has .ecome more efficie#t i# the
post-privati=atio# period compared to the two decades whe# '!"s domi#ated the
sce#e, -he system was a.le to withsta#d the shoc& of %lo.al fi#a#cial crisis )uite
well,
/ would also li&e to allay some fears a#d e3plode the myths a.out privati=atio#, -he
most commo# myth agai#st privati=atio# is loss of employme#t, -his fear is largely
u#fou#ded, -he e3ample of privati=atio# i# .a#&i#g sector co#troverts those who
ma&e such claims, /# 199@ whe# the restructuri#g+ dow#si=i#g a#d privati=atio#
pic&ed up speed there were 109+000 employees wor&i#g i# the sector, 4fter
privati=atio# was completed+ the wor& force had e3pa#ded to 117+000 i#direct
employme#t i# form of outsourci#g of services a#d co#tractual employme#t have
created ma#y more additio#al jo.s, /t is true that the patter# of employme#t has
cha#ged a#d more productive a#d s&illed wor&ers have .ee# ta&e# up at the e3pe#se
of low s&illed or u#s&illed wor&ers, -hese u#s&illed wor&ers #ow wor& for outsourci#g
services providers, "ut this is the esse#ce of eco#omic developme#t i,e, the shift
from low productivity to high productivity .y s&ill up-gradatio#, -he profits of the
.a#&s have rise# si#ce privati=atio# #ot o#ly due to .etter ma#ageme#t .ut .ecause
of this shift from low s&ill to high s&ill ma#power,
-he other fear is that wor&ers will #o lo#ger .e protected as the power to fire them is
much easier u#der private ow#ership, -he process of hiri#g a#d firi#g of employees
i# a pu.lic sector compa#y is highly co#voluted+ comple3 a#d cum.ersome, -hose
fou#d guilty of i#fractio#s or #eglige#ce of duties or eve# corruptio# ca# o#ly .e
dispe#sed with after a protracted process of discipli#ary proceedi#gs that sometimes
ta&e several years to complete, /# the mea#while+ the employee co#ti#ues to stay
put i# service a#d receives all the emolume#ts a#d per&s, /# a rare case+ a
departme#tal i#)uiry comes up with a guilty verdict+ the employee ca# appeal to the
*ederal Services -ri.u#al a#d if he is u#successful+ the# all the way to the Supreme
!ourt, Chy will a#y right mi#ded .oss choose to go through such a# ordeal?
0rivati=atio# e#a.les the ma#agers to disti#guish the hard wor&i#g a#d productive
wor&ers from the la=y a#d i#compete#t, -he former are rewarded for their
performa#ce while the latter are the target of firi#g, "ut this is the esse#ce of a#
efficie#t eco#omy, ;#io#s ca#+ of course+ still act as the watchdogs to protect the
ge#ui#e i#terest of the wor&ers eve# u#der private ow#ers, -he most powerful u#io#
i# the ;S is the ;#ited 4uto Cor&ers despite the fact that all three .ig auto
compa#ies are privately ow#ed,
'e3t we come to the 0-!A+ / #eed #ot remi#d this august gatheri#g a.out the
revolutio# i# -elecom sector that has affected the lives of the majority of 0a&ista#i
citi=e#s si#ce the historic decisio# to .rea& the mo#opoly of the state ow#ed 0-!A+
privati=e it a#d ope# up the sector to the private sector, $ad the 0-!A remai#ed a
state mo#opoly with its co#trol o# the i#frastructure a#d the .ac&.o#e the private
sector operators would #ot have come forward to participate i# the auctio# for %
spectrum+ the sector would #ot have ope#ed up for fierce competitio#+ the
pe#etratio# ratios would #ot .e a#ywhere close to what we have achieved a#d the
co#sumers would #ot have .e#efitted i# price+ services a#d co#ve#ie#ce as much as
it has,
/t is true that 0-!A u#der #ew ow#er has #ot come up to our e3pectatio#s as it has
#ot paid the .ala#ce amou#t of MB00 millio# that is outsta#di#g for several years, "ut
it must .e co#ceded that u#li&e state ow#ed e#terprises they have )uic&ly respo#ded
a#d adapted to the cha#ged mar&et co#ditio#s, -hey reali=ed that the fi3ed li#e voice
segme#t .usi#ess has #o future i# light of the mo.ile telepho#y a#d shifted to the
6ata Services segme#t+ wireless local loop+ .road .a#d+ corporate services solutio#s+
carrier services+ a#d i#ter#atio#al telepho#y .usi#ess, 0-!A with its spectrum+
#etwor&s a#d i#frastructure ca# do eve# .etter .ut had it remai#ed a state ow#ed
compa#y the cha#ges we are o.servi#g i# the .usi#ess model .y adopti#g i##ovative
opportu#ities would #ot have .ee# forthcomi#g, -he decli#e i# reve#ues ear#ed .y
the 0-!A prior to privati=atio# were i# fact Rmo#opoly re#tsG .ecause of the mar&et
power e#joyed .y them, -he efficie#cy a#d customer services of the state ow#ed
0-!A could ca# .e gauged .y the fact that getti#g a la#d li#e telepho#e co##ectio#
.efore 009 was a# ordeal, Oither you #eeded a political leader to i#tercede o# your
.ehalf or you had to pay a hefty .ri.e to the 0-!A officials,
/ #ow tur# to the LOS!, 6uri#g the difficult period whe# the #ew private ow#ers were
struggli#g with a myriad of pro.lems i#herited from the old compa#y / was tau#ted
ma#y time .y my jour#alist frie#ds a.out my i#terview i# the $erald, / had told the
i#terviewer that it would .e a great service to the cou#try if LOS! was sold for eve#
o#e paisa, / stood .y that stateme#t the# a#d / still sta#d .y it, -ha#& %od that / got
vi#dicated .y the fact that the compa#y made a profit for the first time i# years a#d
also the media compared the u#i#terrupted supply of electricity to i#dustry i# Larachi
a#d 0u#ja. a#d the e3te#t of load-sheddi#g i# Larachi a#d Aahore,
/ am the first o#e who &eeps telli#g the LOS! se#ior ma#ageme#t that they have a
lo#g way to go a#d there are ma#y milesto#es they have to reach, "ut at least the
directio# is set, 4 compete#t a#d dedicated ma#ageme#t team is i# place,
Shareholders are co#ti#uously mo#itori#g a#d &eepi#g a vigila#t eye over their
performa#ce, /#vestme#t pla#s i# ge#eratio#+ tra#smissio# a#d distri.utio# are at
various stages of e3ecutio# some of them havi#g .ee# partially achieved, Systems
a#d procedures are .ei#g put i# place, /#tellige#t use is .ei#g made of tech#ology to
ma#age load distri.utio# a#d pea& dema#d allocatio#s, !ustomer services u#its with
their staff trai#ed a#d retooled have .ee# empowered to solve pro.lems faci#g the
complai#a#ts, Tolu#tary separatio# scheme+ despite li#geri#g difficulties for a
prolo#ged period+ is .egi##i#g to alig# ma#power supply with the dema#d, *i#a#cial
co#trols have .ee# stre#gthe#ed a#d recovery of dues had .ee# stepped up, -heft
a#d -P6 losses+ still high a#d i# u#accepta.le ra#ge+ are .ei#g vigorously tac&led,
-he citi=e#s of Larachi would feel satisfied whe# they get u#i#terrupted supply of
electricity at afforda.le rates, -his would re)uire efforts of fuel switchi#g+ i##ovative
a#d creative solutio#s to mi#imi=e theft a#d -P6 losses+ greater efficie#cy i#
ge#eratio# a#d additio# of #ew capacity,
"ut / am sa#gui#e that had LOS! faced the &i#d of pro.lems it had duri#g the last
few years as a pu.lic sector e#tity the heads of ma#y !hief O3ecutives would have
rolled .y #ow, -he lac& of co#ti#uity i# the top leadership .ri#gs to halt the e3ecutio#
of the pla#s a#d strategy that yield results after a time lag, 4s the ma#ageme#t team
.ecomes demotivated a#d a#3ious a.out their ow# jo. security they spe#d most of
their time a#d e#ergies i# lo..yi#g the political leaders rather tha# doi#g the wor&
they are assig#ed, 4 vicious cycle sets i#, 4s the !hief O3ecutive is u#a.le to achieve
the desired targets give# to him .y the Mi#ister he is removed from the jo., $is
removal creates further u#certai#ty amo#g the ma#agers who accelerate their efforts
to save their jo.s or joc&ey for top positio#, / do #ot have the data .ut it would .e
i#teresti#g to see as to how ma#y !OHs have served at 6/S!Hs i# the last three
years,
Steel Mills is a typical e3ample of what is wro#g with pu.lic ow#ership, /t has
a#ti)uated machi#ery+ is highly overstaffed+ is poorly ma#aged with wea& gover#a#ce
a#d almost #o oversight a#d accou#ta.ility, /t suffers from huge u#der i#vestme#t+
lea&ages a#d discrimi#atory prici#g that favors selected few at the cost of the ta3
payers, !o#tracts are awarded o# co#sideratio#s other tha# lowest competitive .id,
*re)ue#t cha#ges i# &ey ma#ageme#t positio#s+ ar.itrary a#d whimsical decisio#
ma&i#g a#d disco#ti#uity i# policies ma&e the matter worse, $ow ca# o#e e3pect
u#der these circumsta#ces that it ca# .e a source of profits to the gover#me#t or a
low cost supplier of raw materials to the i#dustry? 'ewspaper reports .ased o# 0u.lic
4ccou#ts !ommittee i#dicate that had the Mill .ee# privati=ed i# 00@+ the ta3
payers would have saved <s, 100 .illio# i# losses i#curred a#d several hu#dred
millio# dollars of foreig# e3cha#ge .y averti#g imports of steel, !apacity utili=atio#
had plu#ged so low that it ca##ot meet the mar&et dema#d a#d imports have to
meet domestic dema#d,
-here are ma#y ris&s to privati=atio# which have to .e ma#aged a#d mi#imi=ed .y
the %over#me#t, 0rivate ow#ership a#d efficie#t fu#ctio#i#g of mar&et mecha#ism
re)uire certai# legal a#d regulatory safeguards, /# a.se#ce of these safeguards+
private mo#opolies or oligopolies ca# surface+ mar&et distortio#s ca# acce#tuate a#d
mar&ets ca# .e rigged for the .e#efit of the few, Stro#g legal a#d regulatory
i#stitutio#s with compete#t staff of u#impeacha.le i#tegrity would .e a.le to cou#ter
these evils forcefully a#d provide a level playi#g field for all mar&et participa#ts, Ce
have to stre#gthe# these legal a#d regulatory i#stitutio#s .efore privati=atio# ta&es
place, -he rece#t fi#a#cial crisis i# the ;S shows that e3clusive relia#ce upo# self-
regulated mar&ets a#d #eglect of regulatio# are u#wise a#d have proved
catastrophic, 0a&ista# escaped the wrath of this giga#tic crisis .ecause of the
stri#ge#t regulatory framewor& that did #ot allow the private .a#&s ow#ers a#d
ma#agers to ta&e e3cessive ris& with depositorsG mo#ey,
0u.lic policy should also .e geared at removi#g prefere#tial treatme#t or gra#ti#g of
co#cessio#s or privileges to particular segme#t or group .ased o# political loyalty+
affiliatio# or similar co#sideratio#s, -he %over#me#t has to create a level playi#g
field a#d act i# a# eve# ha#ded ma##er, 'o firm specific S<Hs should .e issued to
favor a particular e#terprise at the e3pe#se of the other, ;#der these circumsta#ces+
private ow#ers will ear# true profits through competitio# a#d #ot ear# re#ts a#d the
justified grudge agai#st the private sector a#d privati=atio# ca# .e mi#imi=ed, -he
collusio# .etwee# the gover#me#t officials a#d the political leaders a#d u#scrupulous
wheelers dealers amo#g the private sector has .rought .ad #ame to privati=atio# i#
ma#y cou#tries i#cludi#g 0a&ista#, 4#y sem.la#ce of favoritism would wrec& the
whole privati=atio# process, -ra#spare#cy will lead to success,
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
"egi#s
#29
Tuesday, January 01, 2013
4sif >ousuf=ai
Se#ior Mem.er

?oi# 6ate5 'ov 00@
0osts5 606
-ha#&s5 1@
"a!istan - "olitics
-he prese#t 'atio#al 4ssem.ly completes its te#ure o# 16 March 013+ so the
ge#eral electio#s might .e held 6 4pril 013, "y 31 Hcto.er 01+ 0a&ista# had
draw# up a prelimi#ary road-map u#der which the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly will .e
dissolved i# ?a#uary 013+ a careta&er gover#me#t i#stalled+ followed .y ge#eral
electio#s, 0reside#t 4sif 4li Dardari a#d 0rime Mi#ister <aja 0ervai= 4shraf would+
however+ ta&e a fi#al decisio# o# the i#stallatio# of a careta&er set-up+ dissolutio# of
the assem.lies a#d ge#eral electio#s after co#sulti#g their coalitio# part#ers soo#, /#
case the 'atio#al 4ssem.ly is dissolved i# ?a#uary 013+ the co#stitutio#al limit for
holdi#g electio#s would .e 90 days while the !o#stitutio# dema#ds electio#s withi#
60 days after the completio# of the co#stitutio#al te#ure of the assem.ly, /t would .e
a historic la#dmar& i# the cou#try that a democratic gover#me#t would complete its
co#stitutio#al te#ure for the first time, H# the other ha#d+ as the 013 ge#eral
electio#s get closer+ the political wheeli#g a#d deali#g i# the cou#try has gathered
pace a#d #ew political allia#ces are goi#g to .e forged .efore the #e3t electio#s, -he
process will gai# mome#tum as tal&s for #ew political allia#ces start,
0a&ista#(s political system is .ro&e#5 its political parties are i#effective+ fu#ctio#i#g
for decades as i#strume#ts of two families+ the "huttos a#d the Sharifs+ two cla#s+
.oth corrupt, -he "hutto-Dardari a3is may .e co#sidered "left lea#i#g+" while the
Sharif .rothers may .e co#sidered "right lea#i#g," -he Sharifs are much closer to
0a&ista#(s military+ a#d to 0a&ista#(s Muslim fu#dame#talists, 0u#ja.i+ the Sharifs
represe#t 0a&ista#(s major eth#ic .loc+ a#d the devout Su##i Sharif has a#
adva#tage over the "huttos+ who have Shiite ties,
0a&ista# held successful electio#s i# *e.ruary 00B a#d has a coalitio# gover#me#t,
Toti#g i# 0a&ista# is i#te#sely perso#al+ with parties gatheri#g votes primarily
through allegia#ce to a# i#dividual ca#didate who is either a feudal or has a prove#
a.ility to deliver services, 0a&ista# is a developi#g cou#try with some moder#
facilities i# major cities .ut limited i# outlyi#g areas, -he i#frastructure of areas of
0a&ista#-admi#istered Lashmir a#d the Lhy.er 0a&htu#&hwa 1L02 regio#s were
devastated .y a# Hcto.er B+ 009+ earth)ua&e a#d have #ot yet .ee# fully re.uilt,
Massive floodi#g i# 010 destroyed i#frastructure throughout the /#dus <iver valley,
0a&ista# co#ti#ues to face e3traordi#ary challe#ges o# the security a#d law
e#forceme#t fro#t, -he cou#try has suffered greater military+ law e#forceme#t+ a#d
civilia# casualties i# fighti#g e3tremism a#d terrorism tha# almost a#y other cou#try,
/# the midst of this difficult security situatio#+ 0a&ista#(s civilia# gover#me#t remai#s
wea&+ i#effectual+ a#d corrupt,
>ousuf <a=a %ila#i was appoi#ted 0rime Mi#ister o# March a#d swor# i# o# 9
March 00B, H# 9 March 00B %illa#i received a u#a#imous vote of co#fide#ce from
the 0arliame#tV this gave the #ew gover#me#t si3 mo#ths to move forward a#d
tac&le sig#ifica#t eco#omic a#d terrorism challe#ges, %illa#i the# outli#ed the
coalitio# gover#me#t(s "*irst 100 6ays" pla#, 4fter wee&s of difficult #egotiatio#s+ the
0a&ista# 0eople(s 0arty 10002 a#d its coalitio# part#ers came to a# agreeme#t o# the
first tra#che of ca.i#et mi#isters,
H# Septem.er 6+ 00B+ 4sif 4li Dardari+ widower of assassi#ated 0a&ista# 0eople s ,
0arty 10002 leader "e#a=ir "hutto+ was elected preside#t a#d head of state, 6omestic
politics was i#itially domi#ated .y u#certai#ty a.out the fate of 0reside#t Dardari, $e
e#joyed approval rati#gs i# the 0 perce#t ra#ge a#d repeatedly clashed with &ey
power ce#ters+ i#cludi#g the military+ politically am.itious Supreme !ourt !hief
?ustice /fti&har !haudhry+ a#d oppositio# leader 'awa= Sharif,
0a&ista#(s lo#g term sta.ility depe#ds more a#d more upo# the gover#me#t(s
willi#g#ess to co#fro#t difficult eco#omic policy choices it has lo#g sought to avoid,
0a&ista# must .egi# to address a .readth of eco#omic challe#ges that would
overwhelm ma#y emergi#g eco#omies5 overhauli#g the ta3 i#frastructure+
elimi#ati#g over M7 .illio# i# circular de.t i# its e#ergy sector+ alteri#g reve#ue
shari#g agreeme#ts amo#g the provi#ces a#d the *ederal %over#me#t+ reversi#g a
co#tractio# i# co#sumer credit a#d e3pa#di#g fi#a#cial access+ removi#g price
co#trols i# commodity mar&ets+ preve#ti#g a crisis i# water distri.utio#+ a#d .rea&i#g
0a&ista#(s depe#de#ce o# e3ter#al fi#a#cial support,
4 #um.er of e3tremist groups withi# 0a&ista# co#ti#ue to target ;,S, citi=e#s a#d
other Cester# i#terests a#d 0a&ista#i officials, -errorists have demo#strated a
willi#g#ess a#d capa.ility to attac& targets where ;,S, citi=e#s are &#ow# to
co#gregate or visit, -errorist actio#s may i#clude+ .ut are #ot limited to+ suicide
operatio#s+ .om.i#gs -- i#cludi#g vehicle-.or#e e3plosives a#d improvised e3plosive
devices -- assassi#atio#s+ carjac&i#gs+ assaults+ a#d &id#appi#gs, 0a&ista#i military
forces are curre#tly e#gaged i# a campaig# agai#st e3tremist eleme#ts across ma#y
areas of the *ederally 4dmi#istered -ri.al 4reas 1*4-42 a#d parts of the Lhy.er
0a&htu#&hwa 1L02 0rovi#ce+ formerly &#ow# as 'orthwest *ro#tier 0rovi#ce 1'C*02,
/# respo#se to this campaig#+ milita#ts have i#creased attac&s agai#st .oth civilia#
a#d gover#me#t targets i# 0a&ista# s cities a#d i# late 010 lau#ched several ,
coordi#ated attac&s agai#st 0a&ista#i gover#me#t a#d civilia# targets+ especially i#
"ajaur a#d Mohma#d 4ge#cies,
Hver 900 civilia#s a#d 6@0 law e#forceme#t perso##el died i# terrorist-related
i#cide#ts i# 011+ a#d the prese#ce of al-Ka ida+ -ali.a#+ a#d i#dige#ous milita#t ,
sectaria# groups co#ti#ues to pose pote#tial da#ger to foreig#ers throughout
0a&ista#, -errorists targeted civilia#s i# attac&s o# mar&ets+ clu.s a#d restaura#ts+
places of worship+ schools+ a#d outdoor recreatio# eve#ts i# 0a&ista#, /# additio#+ the
summer a#d early fall of 011 saw out.rea&s of serious political viole#ce i# Larachi+
with estimates of death tolls there i# the hu#dreds, Om.assies of most wester#
cou#tries+ i#cludi#g the ;#ited States+ ;#ited Li#gdom+ !a#ada+ 4ustralia+ a#d 'ew
Deala#d Om.assies issued travel advisories recomme#di#g agai#st #o#-esse#tial
travel to 0a&ista#, Ove# demo#stratio#s i#te#ded to .e peaceful ca# tur#
co#fro#tatio#al a#d possi.ly escalate i#to viole#ce, <allies+ demo#stratio#s+ a#d
processio#s occur regularly throughout 0a&ista# o# very short #otice a#d have ofte#
ta&e# o# a# a#ti-4merica# or a#ti-Cester# character,
4 judgme#t the Supreme !ourt delivered i# late 009 struc& dow# a co#troversial
am#esty that former prime mi#ister "e#a=ir "hutto a#d her family had received i#
late 00@ a#d would allow a M60-millio# Swiss graft case agai#st "hutto s widower+ ,
0reside#t 4sif 4li Dardari to .e reope#ed, $owever+ the 0a&ista# gover#me#t has
refused to as& Swit=erla#d to reope# the case+ argui#g that the preside#t e#joys
immu#ity from prosecutio# i# a#d outside 0a&ista# while i# office,
H# 4pril 19+ 010 preside#t 4sif 4li Dardari sig#ed i#to law the 1Bth 4me#dme#t to
the 0a&ista#i !o#stitutio#, -he ame#dme#t realig#s e3ecutive powers .y restori#g
the prime mi#ister as the premier civilia# official a#d retur#i#g the preside#cy to its
origi#al+ more ceremo#ial role+ largely elimi#ates the 1@th ame#dme#t co#stitutio#al
cha#ges made .y former 0reside#t Musharraf to stre#gthe# the preside#cy, Dardari
thus gave up &ey preside#tial powers, 0a&ista# Muslim Aeague-'awa= 10MA-'2 had
less i#terest i# tryi#g to force Dardari out o#ce his preside#tial powers were reduced
to that of a figurehead preside#t+ while Dardari would i# a#y eve#t remai# a powerful
political figure .y virtue of his role co-chairi#g the 000,
-he reform pac&age also reorga#i=ed ce#ter-provi#ce relatio#s+ empoweri#g
provi#cial assem.lies to elect their ow# chief mi#isters, -he co#stitutio#al reform
pac&age helped Dardari shri#& the moral high grou#d 'awa= Sharif had gai#ed o# the
1@th ame#dme#t issue+ while also &eepi#g the smaller #atio#alist parties that favor
provi#cial auto#omy+ i#cludi#g 4'0 a#d MKM+ o# the 000(s side,
"y late 011 te#sio# was growi#g .etwee# the gover#me#t a#d the military over a
pro.e i#to the gover#me#t(s role i# a sca#dal ce#tered o# a memo that sought ;,S,
help i# cur.i#g the army(s power, 0rime Mi#ister >ousuf <a=a %ila#i(s office said o# 9
?a#uary 01 that he was "dispelli#g" comme#ts this mo#th that accused top military
officials of su.verti#g gover#me#t cha##els i# supporti#g a court i#vestigatio# of the
sca#dal, %ila#i said the cou#try "ca##ot wor& i# a# atmosphere of co#fro#tatio#"
amo#g i#stitutio#s, -he remar&s followed tal&s with army chief of staff %e#eral
4shfa) Laya#i a#d i#tellige#ce chief Aieute#a#t %e#eral 4hmed Shuja 0asha,
0a&ista#(s .eleaguered prime mi#ister+ >ousuf <a=a %ila#i+ made a rare appeara#ce
.efore the cou#try(s supreme court 19 ?a#uary 01+ amid i#creased te#sio#s
.etwee# his gover#me#t a#d the cou#try s fiercely i#depe#de#t judiciary, %ila#i ,
appeared .efore the supreme court i# a .id to avoid .ei#g held i# co#tempt for his
failure to pursue corruptio# cases agai#st 0reside#t 4sif 4li Dardari, %ila#i told the
court his gover#me#t was u#a.le to i#itiate legal proceedi#gs agai#st the preside#t
.ecause he has immu#ity while i# office,
"y mid-01 Dardari s gover#me#t was reeli#g from a com.i#atio# of rolli#g power ,
.lac&outs+ risi#g u#employme#t+ milita#t attac&s a#d a te#se relatio#ship with the
;#ited States, -here was a situatio# of crisis a#d feeli#g of u#certai#ty+ a#d i# this
&i#d of situatio# gover#me#t officials do #ot really ta&e very .old steps .ecause they
do# t &#ow who would .e there ruli#g the cou#try #e3t wee&, 4#d the whole thi#g ,
goes i# favor of those who challe#ge the state authority+ who are crimi#als+ who are
creati#g pro.lems .ecause they get relatively free ha#d,
0a&ista#(s Supreme !ourt triggered a political crisis whe# it co#firmed a ruli#g 19
?u#e 01 that >ousuf <a=a %ila#i was i#eligi.le for office, -he court had previously
fou#d him guilty of co#tempt for refusi#g a judicial order to as& Swit=erla#d to
i#vestigate claims of corruptio# agai#st 0reside#t 4sif 4li Dardari, -he Supreme
!ourt(s actio# mar&ed the first time a 0a&ista#i prime mi#ister was removed .y the
judiciary, Mem.ers of the oppositio# a#d others who support the court welcomed the
ruli#g+ which they see as a gesture agai#st corrupt a#d i#effective gover#me#t, -he
cou#try(s leadi#g oppositio# 0-/ party declared the court(s decisio# to dis)ualify
0rime Mi#ster >ousuf <a=a %ila#i from office a victory for justice Hthers felt the court
overstepped its .ou#daries,
-he 0a&ista# 0eople(s 0arty+ which held a majority i# parliame#t with its coalitio#
part#ers+ #omi#ated the te3tiles mi#ister+ Ma&hdoom Shaha.uddi#+ for the prime
mi#ister(s post, "ut a 0a&ista#i judge issued a #o#-.aila.le arrest warra#t 1 ?u#e
01 for Shaha.uddi# i# co##ectio# with a sca#dal i#volvi#g illegal imports of the
drug ephedri#e duri#g his time as health mi#ister,
%A2A "1%=1* A*$%A,6 H# ?u#e 01 0a&ista#i lawma&ers elected a #ew prime
mi#ister to replace ousted >ousuf <a=a %ila#i+ i# a .id to e#d the cou#try(s political
crisis, 0arliame#t voted overwhelmi#gly i# favor of former water a#d power mi#ister
<aja 0erve= 4shraf+ who had .ee# hit with corruptio# allegatio#s a#d was partly
.lamed for the cou#try(s electricity crisis, 4shraf wo# 11 votes i# the 37-mem.er
#atio#al assem.ly, $e is a mem.er of the ruli#g 0a&ista# 0eople(s 0arty+ which holds
a majority i# parliame#t with its coalitio# part#ers, Sardar Mehta. 4..asi of the
oppositio# 0a&ista# Muslim Aeague - ' received B9 votes, Si#ce 0rime Mi#ister 4shraf
seemed li&ely to face the same pressure to i#vestigate 0reside#t Dardari+ a #um.er
of a#alysts are dou.tful that the switch at top levels of the gover#me#t will e#d the
cou#try(s political sta#doff,
"or# o# 6ecem.er 6+ 1990 i# Sa#ghar+ Si#dh+ <aja 0erve= 4shraf was the *ederal
Mi#ister for /#formatio# -ech#ology a#d earlier Mi#ister for Cater a#d 0ower i# the
prese#t 000-led gover#me#t, <aja 0erve= 4shraf has remai#ed !hairma# of Social
4ctio# from 1997-1996, $e has .ee# twice elected as a Mem.er of the 'atio#al
4ssem.ly from his co#stitue#cy of %ujar Lha#+ <awalpi#di with the latest .ei#g of
*e.ruary 00B electio#s, "efore ta&i#g oath of the 0rime Mi#ister of 0a&ista# he was
Secretary %e#eral of the 0000, $e is the graduate from ;#iversity of Si#dh 119@02,
$e is a .usi#essma#, Married with two so#s a#d two daughters+ he has travelled to
Saudi 4ra.ia+ ;,L+ *ra#ce+ %erma#y+ $olla#d+ /rela#d+ ;,4,O+ !hi#a+ "elgium a#d
'orth Lorea,
H# 0B 4ugust 01 0a&ista#(s Supreme !ourt ordered 0rime Mi#ister <aja 0erve=
4shraf to appear .efore it to e3plai# why he has #ot ta&e# actio# to reope#
corruptio# i#vestigatio#s agai#st the preside#t, -he move was the latest episode i# a
lo#g-ru##i#g sta#doff .etwee# the gover#me#t a#d the judiciary,
-he o#ly so# of assassi#ated former 0a&ista#i prime mi#ister "e#a=ir "hutto told
hu#dreds of thousa#ds of supporters o# 6ecem.er @+ 01+ the fifth a##iversary of
his mother(s death+ that he would carry forward her legacy+ a# appeara#ce desig#ed
to a#oi#t him as a political heir, "/ am the heir to the martyr+(( "ilawal "hutto Dardari+
7+ told the crowd i# the souther# provi#ce of Si#dh+ referri#g to his mother a#d to
his gra#dfather+ the fou#der of the curre#t ruli#g party who was ha#ged .y a former
military ruler, "/f you &ill o#e "hutto+ there will .e a "hutto i# every house,(( "hutto
was joi#ed .y hu#dreds of high-ra#&i#g officials+ i#cludi#g the curre#t preside#t+ his
father 4sif Dardari+ to commemorate his mother(s &illi#g i# a gu# a#d suicide attac&
duri#g a 00@ political campaig# rally, $e is still #ot old e#ough to co#test the
electio#s scheduled for spri#g 013 - the mi#imum age is 9, "hutto+ who has his
mother(s good loo&s+ will o#ly tur# 9 i# Septem.er 013,
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%o#dal 1-uesday+ ?a#uary 01+ 0132
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What Major Role Muslim League Have Played From 1906 To 1913

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What Major Role Muslim League Have Played From 1906 To 1913

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