Civil Law 1 (B)

B2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof.
Aguiling-Pangalangan | 1

Persons and Family Relations
B2013 Digests Compilation

1
st
Semester AY 2009-2010
Prof. Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalangan

B2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof. Aguiling-Pangalangan | 2

Requisites of Marriage >> Essential Requisites >> Legal Capacity; male and female

JONES v. HALLAHAN
FACTS: The appellants, both female, are seeking a
review of a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court which
held that they were not entitled to marry each other.
They contend that they were deprived of their
constitutional right to marry, of association and to free
exercise of religion when they were refused the issuance
of license.
ISSUE: WON two wom en can marry each other as
protected by the constitution.
HELD: NO. There is no constitutional protection of the
rights to marry between couples of the same sex.
Marriage has always been considered the union
between a man and a woman.
The appellants are prevented from marrying not by the
statutes of Kentucky or the refusal to issue them a
license, but rather by their own incapability of entering
into a marriage as it is defined. A license to enter into a
status or relationship which the parties are incapable of
achieving is a nullity.

GOODRIDGE v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
FACTS: Seven couples of the same sex were not
permitted by the Massachusetts town clerks to acquire
marriage licenses. The couples then filed action for
declaratory judgment against the Department and
Commissioner of Public Health, asserting that the denial
of the Department in providing marriage licenses for
them was against their equal protection and due
process rights and that circumstances in which the
absence of the full legal protections of civil marriage
has harmed not only the plaintiffs, but also their adopted
children.
ISSUES: Whether or not the denial of marriage license
to all same-sex couples is against provisions of the
Massachusetts Constitution.
HELD: Court declared that barring an individual from the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage
solely because that person would marry a person of the
same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.

RATIO:
State interest:
Providing a favorable setting for procreation
Ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing
Preserving scarce State and financial resources
Avoid interstate conflict.
Answers:
Fertility is not a condition of marriage, no privileged form
of intimacy or means of creating a family
Best interest of the child does not depend on parents
sexual orientation, marital children reap a measure of
family stability and economic security
Not true that same sex couples are more financially
independent, benefits do not depend on whether or not
couples are financially dependent on each other
Each state is independent.
Barred access to the protections , benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage for same sex couples
deprives them of membership in communitys most
rewarding and cherished institutions (Family) Exclusion
contradicts constitutional principles of respect for
individual autonomy and equality under the law.


SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. He alleged he
had always identified himself with girls since childhood.

Feeling trapped in a mans body, underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself
to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and
was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex
from "male" to "female." After complying with the
requirement of publishing the petition in newspapers of
general circulation, no opposition to the petition was
made.
RTC Decision on June 4, 2003- Rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner
However, on August 18, 2003 the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
CA Decision on February 23, 2006- Rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision
of the CA.
ISSUES:
1) WON a persons first name cannot be changed on the
ground of sex reassignment
2) WON the law allows the change of entry in the birth
certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment
3) WON entries in the birth certificate can be changed as
to the first name or sex on the ground of equity
HELD: Petition is denied. Cost against petitioner.
RATIO: (FROM ADAPT)
A persons first name cannot be changed on the
ground of sex reassignment.
- The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
- A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
- Hence, a petition for a change of name is controlled by
statutes.
*Art. 376 of the Civil Code states: No person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority.
*R.A. 9048 (Clerical Error Law) amended Art. 376,
providing an exception. Clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname can be made
without undergoing judicial process so long as the
Implementing Rules and Regulation of the said law is
followed. This authority and power is vested to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
- In sum, the remedy and proceedings regulating change
of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
- R.A. 9048, Sec. 4. Grounds for Change of First Name
or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually
and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
- Petitioner hinges his argument on the 3rd ground.
However, the Court held that it would actually create
confusion. He was unable to present compelling reasons
for his claim.
- Technically, there were two reasons why the Court
dismissed the petition for a change of first name (not
including sex): (a) it was outside the courts jurisdiction
as provided in R.A. 9048, (b) even if it was properly filed
before the Office of the Civil Registrar, the petition would
still fail since there was no compelling reason presented
by the petitioner.

2. No law allows the change of entry in the birth

certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment.
-Under R.A. 9048, no correction involving the change of
nationality, age, status, or sex is allowed, as stated in
the definition of what clerical or typographical error
means.
- Art. 407 and 408 of the Civil Code provide for acts
(legitimization, adoption, etc.), events (marriages,
naturalization, etc.), and judicial decrees (legal
separation, annulment, etc.) wherein errors may be
corrected. However, this doesnt include the ground of
sexual reassignment.
- Moreover, there is technically no error in the
petitioners birth certificate. What petitioner wants is
simply to change the entries.
- Under Art. 413 of the Civil Code, it states that: All
matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
be governed by special laws. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, there is no special law.

3. Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to
first name or sex be changed on the ground of
equity.
-The RTC erred when it stated that no harm may to
others or to society is made in allowing the correction of
entries. It is noted that one of the reasons why petitioner
wanted to change his birth certificate is to be able to
marry. This poses serious public issues. First is on the
essential requisite of marriage that the parties must be a
man and a woman. Second, there are various laws
which apply particularly to women such as the provisions
of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code

and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

Requisites of Marriage >> Essential Requisites >> Consent freely given

PEOPLE vs SANTIAGO
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija
Facts: Felipe Santiago invited Felicita Masilang, aged
about 18 and his niece by his deceased wife, to
accompany him to an errand. After Masilang agreed,
Santiago brought her to an area hid from public view,
and expressed his intention to have sexual intercourse
with her. When she refused to do so, he raped her.
Afterwards, he brought her to the house of his uncle,
Agaton Santiago, where a protestant minister wed the
defendant and Masilang. When she told his father what
happened, the latter initiated the prosecution for rape.
The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija found the
defendant-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentenced to prison (14yrs 8mos 1day, with the
accessories prescribed by law); also required to endow
the injured party (P500), to recognize and maintain the
offspring, if any (P15/mo), and to pay the costs.
Issue: W/N Criminal liability of Felipe Santiago was
extinguished when he wed Felicita Masilang
Decision: No it was not
Ratio: The marriage between Santiago and Masilang
was void due to the fact that the latter's consent was
given under duress. Consent to marry, being an
essential requisite for the validity, was not given
voluntarily, thus renders the marriage void. Santiago 's
attitude towards Masilang also showed that the
motivation for the marriage was only to save him from
criminal prosecution and not to make her his wife.


BUCCAT v. MANGONON DE BUCCAT

FACTS: Plaintiff Godofredo Buccat sought to annul his marriage with respondent Luida Mangonon de Buccat. Plaintiff
alleged that he consented to the marriage because the respondent assured him that she was a virgin. However,
respondent gave birth to a nine-month old baby 89 days after cohabiting. As a result, plaintiff abandoned respondent.
ISSUE: WON the case at bar presents clear and irrefutable evidence necessary for annulling the marriage.
HELD/RATIO: NO. It is unbelievable that plaintiff did not suspect the very advanced state of pregnancy of respondent.
There is no basis to consider the fraud in the case at bar.
DECISION: Affirmed.

EIGENMAN VS. GUERRA, ET AL
May 11, 1964
Ponente: Bengzon, J.
Facts and Background of the Case: Less than two years of being married, Eigenman requested for an annulment from
his wive Guerra. This is an appeal from the judgement of the Court of First Instance dismissing Eigenmans action.
Legal Issue/s: WON the following issues annuls or voids the Eigenman-Guerra marriage:
Eigenmans age and the lack of consent from his mother
Eigenmans consent being obtained from intimidation
Eigenman-Guerra application for marriage license irregularity results to a lack of a valid license and therefore marriage
void ab initio.
Contentions and Resolutions:
Eigenman Facts found by the Court Guerra
Eigenman was more than sixteen
and less than twenty years of age
at the time of the marriage
celebration.
In his application for marriage,
Eigenman represented himself as
25 years and 8 months of age.
His marriage was solemnized
without the consent of his mother.
Eigenmans mother discussed the
contemplated marriage with
Guerras family. Mother was also
present at the marriage
ceremony. Newlyweds lived with
the mother for 3-4 months.
Plaintiffs mother was present
during the marriage ceremony,
they

Eigenman Facts found by the Court Guerra
His consent was obtained
through the use of threat,
intimidation and force by Guerras
father
No factual or legal basis. The
intimidation cited was merely an
admonition typical from
concerned parents.

The application for marriage
license was sworn before an
officer not legally authorized to
administer oaths resulting to a
marriage license without legal
effect.

Held and Ratio: CFI ruling is affirmed.
No, appellant is now estopped from denying. He knowingly misrepresented himself and can therefore not claim for
annulment. The mothers consent, although not in the written form only affects the issuance of the marriage license and is
only a formal requisite, not essential to the validity of a marriage solemnized under a license with all other requisites valid.
No, there was no reasonable and well grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon Eigenmans person or property
from the alleged intimidating words.
No, marriages may only become void ab initio if no marriage license exists, A marriage under a license is not invalidated
by the fact that it was wrongfully obtained.

Formal Requisites >> Authority of Solemnizing Officer

NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY
Facts: Mayor Navarro is filing this administrative case
against Judge Domagtoy for:
Solemnizing the marriage of Mr. Tagadon & Ms. Borga,
despite knowing that the former is only separated from
his first wife.
Performing a marriage ceremony for Mr. Santiago & Ms.
Del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction
In his defense Domagtoy states that in the first case Mr.
Tagadon had an affidavit stating that the latter has not
seen his wife for over seven years and is presumed to
be dead and so may remarry. Then in the other case Mr.
Sumaylo he is authorized by Art. 7 of the Family code
(stating that as a member of the judiciary he may
solemnize marriage) and applying Art. 8 he may
solemnize it at any other place requested by both parties
in writing.
Issue(s): W/N the marriage of Mr. Tagadon is valid?
W/N a judge can solemnize marriage outside his
jurisdiction upon written request of the parties?
Held: No. The marriage of Mr. Tagadon is void since he
is only separated from his wife and a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
required before Mr. Tagadon can remarry.
No. Judges appointed to specific jurisdictions may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and NOT

beyond. In a jurisdiction beyond the judges' he has no
authority and a formal requisite is lacking.
Notes: The marriage is valid but the officer may be
subject to administrative liability. In this case with other
reasons showing gross misconduct and ignorance of the
law, he was suspended for 6 months and given a stern
warning.

MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, v. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
Ponente: Puno, J.
Facts: This case concerns an incident wherein Occiano,
the respondent, who is an MTC judge, solemnized the
marriage of the petitioner and Dominador Orobia despite
their lack of the required marriage license and the fact
that said ceremony took place outside his territorial
jurisdiction. Araes alleges that when her husband died,
she was unable to inherit the properties he left as well
his pension benefits because the marriage was a nullity,
hence, the filing of the Administrative Case against
Occiano. Occiano, in his Comment, contended that he
only agreed to solemnize the marriage despite it being
outside his jurisdiction because of the groom was not fit
to travel to his jurisdiction. He adds that he refused to
solemnize the marriage at first upon discovery of their
lack of a marriage license, but given the circumstances,
he finally agreed to do so out of human compassion.
Araes, after reading said Comment, subsequently filed
an Affidavit of Desistance, admitting that Occiano initially
refused to solemnize the marriage because they didnt
have a marriage license, but eventually agreed to do so
because of her own insistence and that she only filed the
case out of rage. Despite this, the Office of the Court
Administrator still decided against the respondent.
Issue: W/N Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage
outside his territorial jurisdiction and without a marriage
license.
Held: Respondent is guilty. [The Court gave him a
STERN WARNING and fined him P5,000.]
Ratio: Re: lack of jurisdiction: According to the SC, the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 [BP 129] states
that the authority of RTC judges and those of inferior
courts to solemnize judges is only within their territorial
jurisdictions. The Court reiterated its Navarro v.
Domagtoy decision, wherein it held that judges
appointed to specific jurisdictions [unlike those in the
appellate courts] may solemnize weddings only within
those jurisdictions, and while it may not affect the
marriages validity, said judges will be open to
administrative liability.
Re: lack of a marriage license: The marriage license
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize,
except in certain cases provided by law. Hence, Occiano
did not have authority when he solemnized the marriage.
Also, in People v. Lara, the Court held that a marriage
without a license is void, and even if a license is
subsequently issued, it will still be void.
Note: Despite the Affidavit of Desistance, Occiano cant
escape liability because the withdrawal of the complaint
doesnt necessarily exonerate the respondent from
disciplinary action.


Voidable Marriages >> Grounds for Annulment
Katipunan v. Tenorio
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant got married in 1919.
They freely cohabited as husband and wife and bear 4
children.
Defendant had a very severe attack of madness on
1926 and was admitted to San Lazaro Hospital for
insanity.
Since then she had been admitted and discharged
from Psychopathic Hospital for three or four times
because of recurring malady attacks.
Plaintiff then filed a case for annulment of their
marriage having as cause of action her wifes insanity
during the time of their marriage.
He contended that briefly after their marriage, he
noticed her derangement and hoped that she will get
back to reason but his hope did not come true.
Defendants mother and guardian claimed that the
defendant suffered from illness only after delivery on
her (defendant) 4
th
child.
Witness (1) for plaintiff discredited for being in no
normal condition to assess the mental condition of
defendant: long before the wedding, defendant used to
utter incoherent words which amused her while she
was conceiving a baby.
Husband/plaintiff admits that he did not notice
defendants insanity during marriage, the same
observation given by a witness (2) to the celebration.

Issue: WON the defendant is insane during the
marriage and thus supplies ground for annulment.
Held: No. Claim of defendants insanity during (and
even before) marriage not supported by facts of the
case.
Ratio:
Plaintiff and witness (2) claimed that defendant
showed no sign of insanity during the celebration of
the marriage.
(-Claim of witness (1) for plaintiff, if not discredited,
could have given support to claim that insanity
continued to marriage and could be ground for
annulment (Engle v. Doe, 47 Phil., 760-761))
Marriage was held valid because the applicable law
General Order No. 68, section 10(3) (and even the
newer Act 3613, section 30(c)) required that the
insanity of a party should have occurred during the
celebration to have a ground for annulment.
(-More so, the defendant had lucid intervals and they
continued to cohabit which, in effect, ratified the
marriage.)
By: Aboy Bayalan


Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay

Facts:

Emilio and Isabel were married on July 9, 1958. They
had three children all surnamed Cojuangco
Suntay.
Isabel filed a criminal case against her husband,
Emilio. In retaliation, Emilio filed a complaint for
legal separation against his wife, charging her,
among others, with infidelity and praying for the
custody and care of their children who were
living with their mother.
The trial court rendered a decision regarding the
case filed by Emilio. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null
and void and of no effect as between the
parties.
As a basis thereof, the CFI said:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff
was confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital
X X X It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the
symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophrenia has made
themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that
the disease was worsening with time, until 1965
when he was actually places under expert
neuro-psychiatrist treatment; that even if the
subject has shown marked progress, the
remains bereft of adequate understanding of
right and wrong.
X X X This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of
the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art 85. A marriage may be annulled for the any
of the following causes after existing at the time
of the marriage:
(3) That either party was of unsound mind,
unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother,
Cristina. The latter is respondent Isabels
paternal grandmother.
Respondent Isabel filed a petition for issuance in her
favor of Letters of Administration of the iNtestate
Estate of her late grandmother. She contents
that she is one of the legitimate
grandchildren of the decedent and prayed
that she be appointed as administratix of the
estate.
Petitioner, as the surviving spouse of the decedent,
claims otherwise. He argues that under Art 992
of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no
right to succeed by right of representation.
As a consequence of the court declaration
rendering the marriage of respondent Isabels
parents null and void, Isabel is to be
considered an illegitimate child.
Issues:
Whether the marriage between Emilio and Isabel is
null and void OR merely annulled?

WON respondent Isabel is a legitimate child of Emilio,
therefore, has a right in the estate of her paternal
grandmother?
Held:
The marriage is merely annulled.
Respondent Isabel is a legitimate child. However, her
rights to the estate of Cristina is to be determined
through another trial.

Ratio:
The marriage of Emilio and Isabel was annulled on the
basis of Art 85, par 3, of the Civil Code which refers to
marriages which are considered voidable.
Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable
marriage before the decree of annulment, she is
considered legitimate. A voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it
is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment.

Buccat v. Buccat
Facts:
Godofredo wants his marriage with Luida to be
annulled.
He argued that he gave his consent to their marriage
because Luida promised to hi that she was still a
virgin.
They got married on November 26, 2009.
After 3 months (89 days) of cohabitation, Luida gave
birth to a baby. Thus, Luida is 6 months pregnant
when they got married.
CFI of Baguio held that marriage could not be
annulled.

Issue: WON the case at bar presents enough clear
and irrefutable evidence necessary for the
annulment of marriage
Held: NO. There is no enough evidence. Decision of
CFI of Baguio AFFIRMED.
Ratio:
It is impossible for the plaintiff to not suspect that his wife
(or wife-to-be then) is not pregnant since he married her
during the 6
th
month of her pregnancy, which is already
an advanced state of pregnancy.
Given that, case could not fly on the basis of fraud on
the part of the defendant-appellee.
The allegation that it is not strange to find people with
developed abdomen is considered was not entertained.
Said argument is considered to be puerile (immature/
juvenile).

By: Richard Beltran


Aquino v. Delizo
Facts:
Petitioner Aquino filed a complaint for annulment of his
marriage with respondent Delizo claiming that on the
date of their marriage on Dec. 27, 1954, Delizo had
concealed from him her pregnancy by another man
and that four months after their marriage, Delizo had
given birth to the child.
Delizo argues that the child had been conceived out of
lawful wedlock between her and Aquino
At the trial, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal was ordered
to represent the State and prevent collusion.
Delizo neither appeared nor presented evidence
Aquino testified and presented only documentary
evidence in the form of the marriage contract
Trial Court ruling dismissed the complaint noting that
no birth certificate of the child had been presented and
holding that concealment of pregnancy cold not
constitute as fraud which would annul the marriage
CA ruling affirmed dismissal of the complaint holding
that petitioners inability to present birth certificate was
excusable neglect, however it was not impossible for
petitioner and respondent to have had sexual
intercourse during their engagement and it seemed
unbelievable that petitioner did not even notice or
suspect respondent was pregnant
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
presented the ff. affidavits:
from his brother stating that he and Delizo had
been living together and had begotten three
children including the one he and Delizo had
endeavoured to conceal from petitioner
from Delizo admitting her pregnancy by
petitioners brother and that she had hidden this
pregnancy at the time her marriage to petitioner
from Albert Powell stating that he knew that
Delizo and petitioners brother had been living
together as husband and wife before Delizos the
date of marriage with petitioner
birth certificates of three children of Delizo with
petitioners brother
pictures that showed Delizos natural
plumpness as early as 1952 and as late as
November, 1954. Delizos pregnancy, which would
have been 4 months at the time, did not show in the
photograph taken on November 1954

Issue: WON there are sufficient grounds for
marriage to be annulled
Held: Yes. Decision complained of is set aside and the
case is remanded to the court a quo for a new trial.
Ratio:
Under the new Civil Code, the concealment by the wife
of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes
fraud. At four months pregnancy, it cannot be said that
Delizos pregnancy was apparent especially since she
was naturally plump as alleged by petitioner and also
medical authorities agreed that even on the 5
th
month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of the womans abdomen is
limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only
to fat formation. Furthermore, there could have been
further difficulty in ascertaining if she was pregnant or
not if she had attempted to conceal the true state of
affairs.
Though CA stated that it was not impossible for
petitioner and respondent to have had sexual
intercourse before their marriage and that the child could
be their own, this was dismissed by the SC as purely
conjectural and with no support or justification in the
record.
Lastly, failure of the defendant to file her answer cannot
be taken as evidence of collusion especially since a
provincial physical had been ordered by the Government
precisely to prevent such collusion.
*Note: Case is similar to Buccat v. Buccat however in
that case, plaintiffs claim that he did not suspect the
pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable
because it was proven that she had already been in an
advanced stage of pregnancy at the time of their
marriage.
By: Welga Carrasco

Jimenez vs. Republic of the Philippines
Facts:
Joel Jimenez seeks to have his marriage with Remedios
Caizares annulled on the ground that her vagina was
too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for
intercourse. He claims that her condition existed at the
time of the marriage and continues to exist. This is the
reason why he left the conjugal home 2 nights and 1 day
after their marriage.
The city attorney was tasked to inquire whether there
was collusion between the parties and to ensure that the
evidence presented is not fabricated.
Remedios did not file an answer to the summons served
upon her, nor did she comply with the municipal courts
order to undergo a physical examination, nor did she
attend the hearings. Because of this, the municipal court
entered a decree annulling their marriage.
The city attorney filed for a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the defendants impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law. The court
should have punished her for contempt instead. He
avers that the courts act would encourage married
couples who want to end their marriages to collude and
simply allege the impotency of their spouse.
Issue: W/N a marriage may be annulled on the
strength of a lone testimony of one spouse alleging
their partners impotency.
Held: No, it may not.
Ratio:
The state has a deep interest in Marriage because its
security and stability are largely dependent upon it. This
is why the state surrounds it with safeguards to maintain
its purity, continuity and permanence. Therefore, to
prevent the bringing about of a condition that would
shake the foundation of marriage or lead to its
destruction, its incidents are governed by law and not by
will of the parties.
The law requires that legal grounds must be proved to
exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. The
presumption is for potency, not impotency which is an
abnormal condition.
In the case at bar, whether the wife is impotent or not
can not be sufficiently determined due to her abstinence
from taking part in the proceedings. The lone testimony
of a husband is insufficient to annul a marriage.
By: Mickey Chatto


Sarao v. Guevara
Facts:
Marriage: June 3, 1936 in Manila
Husband tries to have sex with his wife but the latter
showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening
In the evening, husband found the orifice of the vagina of
his wife sufficiently large for his organ but she
complained of pains; he also noticed some purulent
matter in her private parts
Since the coitus is not a success, every attempt on
plaintiffs part to have carnal act with his wife proved a
failure because she complained of pains and he did not
want her to suffer
The wifes uterus and ovaries were surgically removed
since they are bound to be affected with the tumor; it did
render her incapable of procreation but not of copulation
Husband saw the operation and since then has lost his
desire to have sex with his wife
Issue: Can their marriage be annulled because one is
physically incapable of entering into the married state?
Held: NO. CFI decision is AFFIRMED, marriage is not
annulled
Ratio:
The test of impotency is not the ability to procreate,
but the ability to copulate
The defect must be one of copulation, not
reproduction; must be permanent and lasting
The defendant was not impotent at the time of the
marriage
She was not made unfit for sex by the removal of
ovaries and uterus
The plaintiff was not able to consummate the
marriage due to his own voluntary desistance
Fraud was not alleged in the complaint and has not
been approved at the trial
By: Jiselle Compuesto

People v. Santiago
Facts:
Felipe Santiago invited his 18 year old niece by
marriage, Felicita Masilang, to accompany him to an
errand.
Santiago brought her to an area hidden from public view
and expressed his intention to have sexual intercourse
with her. Felicita refused, so Felipe raped her.
Felipe brought Felicita to his uncles house (Agaton
Santiago); a protestant minister came and went through
the ceremony of marrying the couple.
Felipe gave Felicita a few pesos and sent her home.
Felicita told her father and thus the prosecution for rape
was started.
CFI: sentence = prison (14yrs,18mos,1day), P500,
recognize offspring if any (P15 per month)
Issue: W/N criminal liability was extinguished when
Felipe wed Felicita
Held: Judgment affirmed.
Ratio:
The marriage ceremony was not valid and was a mere
ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from the
criminal consequences of his act. The marriage is void
because the manner in which Felipe dealt with the girl
after the marriage, as well as before, shows that he had
no bona fide intention of making her his wife, therefore
there is no essential consent on his part.
*no essential consent = void; violence/intimidation that
vitiated consent = voidable
By: Gia Comsti

OTHER EFECTS OF LEGAL SEPARATION

Laperal vs. Republic
Elisea Laperal, petitioner v. Republic of the Philippines,
oppositor
Nature: Appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City
Date: October 30, 1962
Ponente: Barrera, J.
Facts:
March 34, 1939 Elisea Laperal married Enrique R.
Santamaria and during her marriage, she naturally used
Elisea L. Santamaria instead of her maiden name
January 18, 1958 Enrique was given a decree of legal
separation from Elisea
May 10, 1960 Laperal filed in the CFI of Baguio a
petition praying that she be allowed to change her name
and/or permitted to resume using her maiden name:
ELISEA LAPERAL on the ground that she has been
legally separated from Enrique and likewise ceased to
live with him for many years.
City attorney of Baguio opposed the petition as this
violated article 370(should be 372) of the civil code and
that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court
CFI DENIED Article 372 requires the wife, even after
the decree of legal separation, to continue using the
name and surname she employed before legal
separation
CFI after motion of petitioner treats the petition as one
for a change of name - GRANTED
To allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed
legally separated from her husband, to continue using
her married name would give rise to confusion in her
finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets
Issue: WON the petitioner be allowed to resume using
her maiden name
Held: No. (petition is dismissed.)

Ratio:
The language of the statute (Art 372) is mandatory. This is so because married status is unaffected by the separation,
there being no severance of the vinculum (a bond signifying union or unity; tie).

Petitioner Supreme Court Ruling
The appellate court contends that the
petition is substantially a change of
name.

In Laperals petition the only reason relied upon for the change of
name is the fact that she is legally separated from her husband
and that she ceased to live with him for many years.
Rule 103 which refer to change of name in general cannot prevail
over the specific provision of Article 372 of the Civil Code.
Even applying Rule 103, the fact that legal separation alone is not
a sufficient ground to justify the change of the name, for to hold
otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the
mandatory provisions of Article 372.
Laperal owns extensive business
interests ant that continued use of her
husbands surname may cause undue
Without basis
Not the cause upon which petition was based and theres no

confusion in her finances and eventual
liquidation of conjugal assets

evidence to this effect has been adduced.
Conjugal partnership between the petitioner and her husband had
automatically been dissolved and liquidated (Art. 106). Thus, there
be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of conjugal assets

By: Camille Umali

DIVORCES >> FOREIGN DIVORCES
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
Facts:
Alice Reyes is a Filipino citizen while Richard Upton is a
US citizen. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and
after their marriage, they resided in the Philippines. In
1982, they divorced in Nevada, US. Alice remarried in
Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. In June 8, 1983, Richard
filed suit against Alice stating that Alice's business in
Manila, The Galleon Shop, is conjugal property of the
parties and that he be declared with the right to manage
the conjugal property. Alice moved to dismiss the case
stating that the cause of action is barred by the Nevada
divorce proceedings because Richard had
acknowledged that he and Alice do not have community
property as of June 11, 1982. The Pasay RTC denied
the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines, hence the divorce
decree has no bearing in the case.

Issue:
W/N the foreign divorce on the parties is valid and
binding in Philippine jurisdiction.

Held:
Yes, the divorce is valid.

Ratio:
The Nevada divorce decree is binding on Richard
(private respondent) as he is an American citizen. The
divorce decree released Richard from his marriage with
Alice, therefore he is no longer her husband. He would
have no standing to sue in this case as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets
By: Lia Veneracion

Quita v. Dandan (1998)
Facts:
Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan married sometime in 1941.
They did not have any children. They filed a divorce in
San Francisco, California, USA which was granted on
July 23, 1954. Three weeks after she married Felix
Tupaz, a marriage that also led to a divorce. She was
married for the third time to Wernimont.
In 1972, Arturo died intestate. A certain Lino Inciong
then filed a petition praying that the Philippine Trust
Company be the administrator of Arturos estate.
Blandina (saying that she was the surviving spouse),
together with 6 children filed for a petition to be the heirs
of Arturo. Arturos brother, Ruperto intervened prating
that he be declared an heir.
The trial court invoked the ruling in Tenchavez v.
Escano, which held that a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity
of the Civil Code was not entitled to recognition was
valid in this jurisdiction, and discarded the divorce
between Fe and Arturo. (Adapt, 2009)
On motion for reconsideration, the petition was granted
ruling that the children were legitimate w/ the exception
of one illegitimate, and therefore entitled to one half of
the estate with the other half going to Ruperto.
On appeal, the court ruled that the case was decided
without a hearing, and therefore violated Sec. 1 Rule 90
of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
W/N Quita was still entitled to be an heir of Arturo
despite their divorce in the United States.
Held/ Ratio:
No. A statement of hers proves that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce was issued. After a
declaration that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at
that time, the ruling in Van Dorn saying that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law should be applicable. All her marital rights
with Arturo would then be dissolved.
By: Incess Allarey

Llorente vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Lorenzo, a serviceman of the US Navy, visited his wife in
the Philippines (1945) and discovered her pregnant and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother. Wife,
Paula, gave birth to a baby boy whose certificate stated
that the child was illegitimate and the line of the fathers
name was left blank. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula
and drew a written agreement wherein: 1.) support for
Paula would be suspended, 2.) marital union would be
dissolved in accordance with judicial proceedings, 3.) a
separate agreement would be made re: conjugal
property, and 4.) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for
her adulterous acts.
In 1951, Lorenzo filed for divorce with the Superior Court
of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley,
and actively participated in the proceedings. A year later,
the divorce decree became final.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia
Fortunato who had no knowledge of his previous
marriage. Their marriage produced three children. On
March 31, 1981, Lorenzo drew his last will and
testament leaving all his properties to Alicia and the
children. In 1983, Lorenzo filed a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein he
moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratix of
his estate. However, before the proceedings could be
terminated, Lorenzo died.
Upon his death, Paula filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Iriga a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos
estate in her favor. Alicia filed the same, but the court
ruled in favor of Paula. The court reasoned out that
Lorenzos divorce to Paula was void and inapplicable in
the Philippines, thus Alicias motion for reconsideration.
The court modified its decision declaring Raul and Luz
Llorente illegitimate children of Lorenzo as they were not
legally adopted by him. Alicia further appealed but was
denied by the CA , thus the existence of current petition.
Lorenzo became a US citizen in 1943. Almost 8 years
prior to the filing of divorce.

Issue: WON Alicia is entitled to inherit from the late
Lorenzo Llorente
Held: Yes
Ratio: The fact that Lorenzo became an American
citizen, procured a divorce from Paula, married Alicia,
executed his will and then died is duly established and
undisputed. The trial court and the CA disregarded the
wills disposition in favor of Alicia because they
considered her a mere paramour. But the divorce should
be recognized as a matter of comity. The effect of such
a divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
deceased) is best determined by the trial court.
Note:
Since Lorenzo was a foreigner (November 30, 1943-
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816), he was not
covered by Philippine laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity.
By: Anne Amantillo


DIVORCES >> MUSLIM DIVORCES

Yasin vs. Judge, Sharia District Court
Hatima C. Yasin, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Hadji Hasan S. Centi, petitioner vs. The Honorable
Judge Sharia District Court, Third Sharia Judicial
District, Zamboanga City, respondent
Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Sharia
District Court, Third Sharia Judicial District, Zamboanga
City
Date: February 23, 1995
Ponente: Bidin, J.
Facts:
May 5, 1990 Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Sharia
District Court in Zamboanga City a Petition to resume
the use of maiden name
Yasin, a divorcee and Muslim Filipino, was formerly
married to Hadji Idris Yasin in accordance with Muslim
rites and customs
May 13, 1984 they were granted a decree of divorce in
accordance with Islamic Law; former husband
contracted another marriage after the divorce
July 4, 1990 respondent court held that the petition is
insufficient in form and substance in accordance with
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and ordered petitioner to
effect the necessary amendment
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
petition filed is not covered by the Rules of Court but a
petition to resume the use of her maiden name and
surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce
and after subsequent marriage of her former husband
Aug. 10, 1990 respondent court denied motion on the
ground that petition is substantially for change of name
and compliance with Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is
necessary
Issues:
WON a petition for resumption of maiden name and
surname is also a petition for change of name
WON petitioners divorce allows her to resume her
maiden name and surname
Held:
No; Yes
Ratio:
The true and real name of a person is that given to him
and entered in the civil register. Under Art. 376 of the
Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the
true or official name recorded in the civil register. (Art.
376: no person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority.) Thus, the petition for the
resumption to her maiden name in view of dissolution of
her marriage by virtue of a divorce decree granted in
accordance with Muslim law is not covered by the Rules
of Court.
There is no law which provides that the wife shall
change her name to that of the husband upon marriage.
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no
longer exists, the divorcee need not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status in
order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her
former husbands name is optional and not obligatory for
her. Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond,
and the spouses may contract another marriage in
accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
* This case recognizes the effects of Muslim divorces.
By: Anisah Azis


DE FACTO SEPARATION

Perez v. Court of Appeals (1996)
FACTS
Private respondent Ray is a doctor of medicine
practicing in Cebu while petitioner Nerissa is a registered
nurse.
They got married on December 6, 1986 and after six
miscarriages, Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II
on July 20, 1992 in New York.
In 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. But
after sometime only Nerissa returned to the US and Ray
stayed in the Philippines to take care of his sick mother
and promised Nerissa to follow her with the baby.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs
first birthday, the couple was no longer in good terms.
The petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and
rely solely on her husbands meager income of P 5,000.
She longed to be with her only child but he was being
kept away from her by her husband. Thus, she did not
want to leave Ray Perez II with her husband and in-laws.
On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he
could raise his son even as he practiced his profession.
He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here
since they have their own home and car. They could live
comfortably on his P 15, 000 monthly income as they
were not burdened with having to pay any debts.
Despite mediation by the priest who solemnized their
marriage, the couple failed to reconcile. They were
separated in fact.
On July 26, 1993, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas
corpus asking the respondent to surrender the custody
of their son to her.
The trial Court awarded the custody of Perez II to
Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code.
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by
the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
Upon appeal of Ray Perez, CA reversed the trial courts
order and awarded the custody of the boy to his father,
saying that it would be for the best interest and welfare
of the child.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been
denied, she filed the instant petition for review where the
sole issue is the custody of Ray Perez II, now three
years old.
ISSUE
Is Article 213 of the FC the applicable law? Which of
the parents should take the custody of the child?
HELD/RATIO
Yes, Article 213 is the applicable law because even
though the couples are only separated in fact, the Code
does not qualify the word separation to mean legal
separation. In short, the case of this couple is still
covered within the articles terms.
Custody over the minor Ray Perez II is awarded to his
mother, the petitioner. Both the mother and the father
have ample means to support the child; however, a child
under seven years of age should not be separated from
his mother without justifiable reason. Supreme Court
believes:
The mother would still be able to raise a family well
despite the petitioners unmanageable work schedule.
Delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons
(e.g. day care centers, own mother, relative) would not
detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter
exercises supervision.
Respondents flexible schedule on the other hand is not
well-founded.
The fact that private respondent lives near his parents or
sister is not crucial in this case.

Petitioner, despite work schedule in hospital, may be
expected to arrange her schedule in such a way as to
allocate time for her son.
It does not follow that petitioner values her career more
than her family simply because she wants to work in the
United States.
Digest: Carla Badi

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR
FACTS
Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr.
to investigate Soledad S. Escritor, a court interpreter in
the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, who is living
with a man not her husband and having borne a child
within this live-in arrangement.
Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral
act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed.
Escritor was already a widow when she entered the
judiciary. She admitted that she started living with
Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive
but living with another woman.
Both Quilapio and Escritor are members of the religious
sect Jehovahs Witnesses
They asserted that their conjugal arrangement conforms
to their religious beliefs and has approval of her
congregation in the execution of the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness after 10 years of living together,
and this Declaration, if approved by the elders of the
congregation, allows members of the sect who have
been abandoned by their spouses enter into marital
relations. Insofar as the congregation is concerned,
there is nothing immoral about this conjugal
arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio.
At the time of the execution of the pledge Escritors
husband was still alive but living with another woman.
Quilapio was also married but had separated in fact from
his wife.
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
Allows members of the JW congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital
relations.
Makes the resulting union binding in congregations
around the world EXCEPT in countries where divorce is
legal.
Conditions/ requirements for the declaration;
Couple could not secure the civil authorities approval of
the marital relationship because of legal impediments.
Only couples who have been baptized and in good
standing may execute the declaration with the approval
of the elders of the congregation.
Once the legal impediments are lifted, the validity of the
declarations ceases and the couple should legalize their
union.
ISSUE
W/N respondent Escritor is guilty of the administrative
charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct, given that
she was practicing an arrangement that is approved by
her religious sect.

HELD
Respondents Escritor is not guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct. Her conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption
from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom
of religion.
RATIO
In resolving claims involving religious freedom, two
things should be put into consideration:
Benevolent neutrality or accommodation, which is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the religious
clauses in our Constitution;
Benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may

be allowed, not to promote the governments favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. It allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
and
The compelling state interest test, which must be applied
in deciding respondents plea of exemption based on the
Free Exercise Clause (this Clause prohibits government
from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practice)
The compelling state interest test is needed to prove that
the state interest sough to be promoted must be so
paramount and compelling as to override the free
exercise claim. Three conditions of the test:
(a) a statute or government action has burdened
claimants free exercise of religion, and there is no doubt
as to the sincerity of the religious belief;
(b) the state has failed to demonstrate a particularly
important or compelling governmental goal in preventing
an exemption;
(c) the state has failed to demonstrate that it used the
least restrictive means. (Free exercise is a fundamental
right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny.)
Subjecting the case to the compelling state interest test:
The law or government practice inhibits the free exercise
of respondents religious beliefs;
There is no doubt as to the sincerity and centrality of the
respondents faith to claim the exemption based on the
free exercise clause;
The OSG has failed to demonstrate that there was a
grave abuse which endangered paramount interests
which could limit or override respondents fundamental
right to religious freedom;
The government was not able to show that the means it
seeks to use to achieve its legitimate state objective is
the least intrusive means.
The state has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Also, to deny the exemption
would effectively break up a union of two individuals who
have managed to stay together as husband and wife and
have the effect of defeating the very substance of
marriage and the family.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on
the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a
clear and present danger of substantive evil which the
state has the right to prevent.
Public morality expressed in law is secular. There is a
distinction between public & secular morality and
religious morality. Benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests. Also, the
jurisdiction of the court extends only to public & secular
morality. There is no jurisprudence in Philippine
jurisdiction holding that the defense of religious freedom
of a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses under the
same circumstances as respondent will not prevail over
the laws on adultery, concubinage or some other law.
The governments conduct may appear innocent and
non-discriminatory but in effect, it is oppressive to the
minority.
NOTES
Strains of jurisprudence on the religious clauses:
A. Separation wall of separation must exist between
the state and the Church to protect the state from the
Church in real life, church and state are not and
cannot be totally separate
Strict Separation protect state from church and there
must be no interaction between the two
Strict Neutrality/Separation (aka governmental neutrality)
wall of separation does not require the state to be their
adversary, rather the state must be neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers only secular criteria may be the basis of
government action
B. Benevolent Neutrality (aka Accommodation) wall of
separation is meant to protect the church from the state;
recognizes that religion plays an important role in public
life
Mandatory accommodation the Court finds that
accommodation is required by the free exercise clause;
occurs when all three conditions of the compelling
interest test are met

Permissive accommodation the Court finds that the
state may, but is not required to, accommodate religious
interests
Prohibited accommodation establishment concerns
prevail over potential accommodation interests
OTHER NOTES
The Catholic Church worries about probable abuse of
religious rights in relation to dissolution of marriage.
Pangalangan:
Even before Escritor, the Philippines already has laws
on the dissolution of marriage i.e. Art. 36 FC
(psychological incapacity), Art. 26 FC (foreign divorces)
and Art 15 (by nationality principle, the Filipino who has
acquired new citizenship or has been naturalized can file
for divorce if his/ her adoptive adopted county allows it).
The declaration gives a sense of normalcy and veneer of
legality however this does not change laws on marriage.
Escritor still needs to validate her marriage because
there are benefits that are only available to those who
are legally married.

Digest: Joie Bajo

Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife >> Cohabitation, mutual love and respect

NARAG V. NARAG
FACTS
Complainant filed administrative complaint for gross
immorality for husbands courting his former student
(Gina Espita) and eventually leaving her and her
children to cohabit with the latter.
Complainant/wife then sought dismissal of the
administrative case on the following grounds: (1) she
fabricated allegations on the complaint to humiliate her
husband; (2) letters from alleged paramour were
forgeries; (3) she suffered from emotional confusion from
extreme jealousy and claimed her husband to be
responsible and faithful. IBP then dismissed complaint
for failure to prosecute.
Wife filed disbarment case again stating that she
dropped the former disbarment case because she was
threatened by respondent.
Respondent prayed for IBP to affirm its decision
(dismissal) and alleged that the first case was dropped
by complainant on her own will.
Husband professed his love for his wife and children and
alleged that his wife is an incurably jealous woman.
He tried to exculpate himself and claimed that his wifes
allegations are not true.
Complainant presented witnesses, among them are
Charlie Espita, Brother of alleged paramour of
respondent Gina Espita.
Testified that respondent lives in and had two children
with his sister Bienvenido Eugenio, Father-in-law of
Charlie Espita Strengthened Charlies statement that
respondent and Gina Espita live in as husband and wife
Nieves Reyes Friend of complainant and respondent
Learned from couples children that Atty. Narag left their
family
Convinced, together with her own husband, complainant
to accept respondent back
However, the couple parted ways again where the
respondent maltreated his wife first then returned to his
paramour Jervis Narag Son of complainant and
respondent Claimed that he did not feel much from his
father who was always away from them Dominador
Narag, Jr. Son of complainant and respondent Claimed
that his wife left him for being ashamed of what
happened to his family (where respondent left them for

his paramour) and her sister was adversely affected by
the same happening
Complainant also presented respondents love letters to
his paramour proclaiming his love for the latter and
claiming her (Ginas) children as his own. The
handwriting on these letters was compared to cards
given by the respondent to the petitioner. The court
affirmed that the letters and cards were written by one
and the same person.

ISSUE
WON respondent Atty. Dominador Narag was guilty
of gross misconduct and thus deserved to be
disbarred.
HELD
YES. Respondent was DISBARRED and his name
ORDERED STRICKEN of the Roll of Attorneys.
RATIO
The testimonies provided by witnesses for the
complainant regarding his abandonment of his family
and living in with another woman were strong.
Furthermore, the witnesses lacked the ill motive to
testify falsely against him.
Respondent did not present any evidence to counter the
allegation that he wrote the letters that complainant
claims he wrote for his paramour.
The evidence and witnesses presented by respondent
failed to debunk the claim of complainant that he had an
illicit relationship with Gina Espita. Also, some of the
witnesses he presented relied only on information fed by
him or other people but actually do not have actual
knowledge of the issue.
Being able to provide well for the family, being a
successful lawyer and a politician are insufficient
proofs for his moral fitness to the legal profession.
Evidence show that he indeed abandoned his family
and thus removed him from the position of being a good
husband and father. The Court reminded him of his
duties as a father and as a husband (see assigned
provision below).
APPLICABLE PROVISION
FC Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.
Digest: Aboy Bayalan

GOITIA v. CAMPOS
FACTS
The parties were legally married an lived together for
about a month. Within the period of their cohabitation,
the defendant, Jose, demanded that Eloisa should
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs.
Plaintiff-appellant refused to perform any act other than
legal and valid cohabitation. Defendant, then,
maltreated her by word and deed. Subsequently, she
was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and live with
her parents.
She filed this action against her husband for support
outside their conjugal domicile.
ISSUE
WON a spouse (in this case, the husband) is STILL
obliged to support the other when the latter is living
outside their conjugal domicile.
HELD
Yes. (CONCURRING OPINION: The wife is legally still
within the conjugal domicile)


RATIO
Defendant-appellee Court
Defendant cites a ruling of the Supreme Court of
Spain stating that the obligation of the spouse to
give support even without cohabition is limited to
cases wherein there is a legal decree of separation
OR a judgement of divorce.

Since in the case at bar, the wife merely left the
conjugal abode in the absence of any judicial
decree, the husband is not obliged to give support
to the wife.
Such doctrine would not control this jurisdiction
because the substantive law of the Philippines is
different from that of Spain.

The doctrine is also NOT APPLICABLE to cases
wherein one of the spouses was compelled to
leave the conjugal abode by the other or where
the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and
the wife seeks to force him to furnish support.

Moreover, should the doctrine cited by the
defendant prevail, it would allow married persons to
disregard the marriage bond and separate from
each other of their own free will.

NOTES
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. X X X The law will not
permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving away his wife to seek protection in the parental home.
Digest: Mary Beley

DANIEL STEVEN WARREN, appellant, v. THE STATE, appellee. [Supreme Court of Georgia. No. 42545. November
6, 1985]

FACTS
Daniel Steven Warren was indicted for the rape and
aggravated sodomy of his wife.
His pre-trial general demurrer and motion to dismiss had
been denied. Hence, this interlocutory appeal.
ISSUE
WON within the rape statute, there exists an implicit
marital exclusion that makes it legally impossible for a
husband to be guilty of raping his wife
WON within the aggravated sodomy statute, there
exists an implicit marital exclusion that makes it
legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of raping his
wife
WON there will be a deprivation of due process rights by
interpreting that the criminal law has no marital
exemptions.
HELD
There is NO implicit marital exclusion in the rape statute
There is NO implicit marital exclusion in the aggravated
sodomy statute

There is NO deprivation of due process
RATIO
The theories by which the idea of a marital exclusion to
the rape statute are hinged on are no longer valid given
that there have been dramatic changes already when it
comes to womens rights and the status of women and
marriage.
The Three theories which are the basis of marital
exclusion are the following:
Lord Hales contractual theory- a husband is not guilty
of raping his wife because the wife have given up herself
already unto her husband upon marriage
That the wife is the property/ chattel of the husband
Unity of person theory- That the vey being or legal
existence of a woman was suspended during marriage
Furthermore, it is incredible to think that any state would
allow women to consent to marriage if by entering into
that contract, they are making themselves unprotected
under the law from the ultimate violation of the self,
which occurs in rape. Rape is recognized as highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost
total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of
the female victim.

Lastly, the Georgia rape statute did not expressly stated
that it includes marital exemption. The old statutory rape
law, which may contain the common law marital
exemption has already been repealed in 1968.
It is clear in the aggravated sodomy state, enacted in
1968, that there was no marital exemption for sodomy
based on consent. Sodomy is the carnal knowledge
and connection against the order of nature by man with
man, or in the same unnatural manner with woman.
Even in common law, consent of the other party is not a
defense for sodomy. Consent only shows the other
partys guilt.
Due process only requires that the law give sufficient
warning that men may conduct themselves so as to
avoid that which is forbidden. In this case, the rape and
aggravated statutes, which are broadly written, had just
been applied for the first time.

Digest: Richard Beltran

THURMAN v. CITY OF TORRINGTON
FACTS
Wife and son brought civil rights action against city and
police officers alleging that constitutional rights were
violated by non-performance or malperformance of
official duties by the officers in regard to threats and
assaults by the wifes estranged husband
It was alleged that there was a violation of the
equal protection clause because city and police officers
used an administrative classification of assault
complaints that manifested itself in discriminatory
treatment violative of equal protection or in other words,
police power was fully provided to persons abused by
someone whom the victim had no domestic relationship
with, but police consistently afforded less protection
when the victim was a woman abused or assaulted by a
spouse or boyfriend or when a child was abused by the
father or stepfather
Charles and Tracey Thurman were married but
became estranged after some time. Tracey lived
separately from the husband with their only child
Charles, Jr, in the St. Hilaire-Bentley residence.
For a period of 8 months, Tracey had repeatedly
notified the defendant police officers of the city of
repeated threats upon her life and the life of her child by
her estranged husband Charles but her attempts to file
complaints against him in response to his threats of
death and maiming were repeatedly ignored or rejected
by defendants. The following occurred in those months:
Charles attacked Tracey at the home of Judy
Bentley & Richard St. Hilaire. Judy & Richard filed
complaint & requested efforts to keep Charles off their
property. Charles repeatedly threatened Tracey and son
but police made no attempt to arrest or look for him
In one incident, Charles forcefully took their son.
Tracey & Richard filed complaint but was not accepted
even on ground of trespassing. Charles threatened
Tracey while she was in her car & she even broke her
windshield. He was arrested & convicted of breach of
peace. Allowed conditional discharge with conditions to:
1) stay completely

away from Tracey St. Hilaire-Bentley residence and 2) to
commit no more crime
Tracey requested for arrest warrant for her husband due
to threats that he would shoot them. Complaint was
refused. Told to return after 3 weeks for warrant. Tracey
kept going back to the police department to obtain a
warrant of arrest and to request police protection from
her husband but she kept being told to come back at a
later time for reasons such as the
officer who issued warrant of arrests was on vacation No
warrant was issued, Charles still not arrested
CULMINATION OF THREATS: Charles
returned to the St. Hilaire-Bentley residence one
afternoon and demanded to speak to Tracey. Tracey
called police department to pick him up. Tracey spoke to
husband but she was stabbed repeatedly in the chest,
neck & throat. 25 minutes after Traceys call, one police
officer arrived while Charles was still holding the bloody
knife. He dropped the knife, went into the house and
brought Charles Jr. and dropped the child on the
wounded mother and thereafter kicked Tracey for the
second time. Four more police arrived, and still Charles
was permitted to wander about the crowd and threaten
Tracey. It was only when he approached Tracy while she
was lying on a stretcher that they arrested him.
Tracey alleged that:
Charles worked as a counterman in a diner
where he served members of the police department & he
bragged to them that he would get Tracey & kill her.
Police consistently afforded less protection when
victim is a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or
boyfriend, or a child abused by father or stepfather.
ISSUE
WON there is a violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
HELD
Yes.
RATIO
A man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a
woman merely because he is her husband. A police
officer may not knowingly refrain from interference in
such violence and may not automatically decline to
make an arrest simply because assaulter and victim are
married to each other. Failure of city officials and police
officers to perform their duty of taking reasonable
measures to protect safety of persons whom they know
may be attacked is a denial of equal protection laws.
Equal protection of laws is not restricted to racial
discriminations; it also involves alien-based
classifications, discriminatory legislative actions and
discriminatory administration & enforcement of law by
the government. Classifications can only be justified by a
compelling or overriding state interest. Thus, police
action is subject to this. Police officers are expected to
preserve the law and order and to protect the personal
safety of everyone in the community including women
assaulted by people w/whom they have a domestic
relation. The inaction of the police during all those times
that Tracey has complained is proof that this has been a
practice and is tantamount to an administrative
classification employing discriminatory application of law.
State failed to present a compelling interest in applying
such discrimination.
However, Charles Jr. cant claim that he was
denied equal protection of the laws. He was rarely
present during assaults thus he didnt suffer from police
inaction unlike his mom. He was not part of the court
orders.

Digest: Welga Carrasco

PEOPLE V. LIBERTA
FACTS
Defendant Mario Liberta was married to Denise Liberta.
After the birth of their son, defendant began to beat
Denise.
Denise brought a proceeding to the court seeking
protection from the defendant. Defendant was ordered to
move out and stay away from the family home and from
Denise. Defendant may visit his son each weekend.
Defendant did not visit his son one weekend. Instead, on
a weekday, he called Denise to ask if he could visit his
son.
Denise allowed defendant to fetch her and their son and
to take them to the motel where defendant was staying,

after being assured that a friend of defendant would be
with them at all times. When they arrived at the motel,
the friend left.
Defendant attacked Denise, threatened to kill her, forced
her to perform fellatio on him, to engage in sexual
intercourse, and to tell their son to watch.
Defendant allowed them to leave after the incident.
Denise went to the hospital to be treated of scratches
and bruises inflicted by her husband, then to the police
station to complain the defendant for rape in the first
degree and sodomy in the first degree.
Sec 130.35 of the Penal Law:
A male is guilty of rape of the first degree when he
engages in sexual intercourse with a female by forcible
compulsion.
Female = any female person who is not married to the
actor
A person is guilty of sodomy in the first degree when he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
person by forcible compulsion.
Deviate sexual intercourse = sexual conduct between
unmarried persons consisting of contact between penis
and anus, mouth and penis, or mouth and vulva
not married in the definitions of both female and
deviate sexual intercourse = marital exemption for both
rape and sodomy
Exception to the marital exemption = husband and wife
are considered not married if at the time of the sexual
assault they are living apart pursuant to:
A court order
A decree or judgment of separation
A written agreement of separation
Facts (continuation):
Defendant moved to dismiss indictment, asserting that
he was still married to Denise so he came within the
marital exemption. Trial court granted defendants
motion.
On appeal by the People, the Appellate Division held
that a Family Court order of protection is a type of court
order which requires living apart. Thus, defendant and
Denise were not married for purposes of statute at the
time of the incident. Defendant was convicted of rape in
the first degree and sodomy in the first degree.
On appeal by defendant, he asserts:
Order of protection is not a type of court order which
requires living apart and thus he is within the marital
exemption.
He cannot be convicted of either rape in the first degree
or sodomy in the first degree because both statutes are
unconstitutional being in violation of the equal protection
clause.
Both statutes burden some (unmarried) but not other
(married) males (underinclusive)
Rape statute burdens only men, but not women
(underinclusive)
ISSUES/HELD
Is the Family Court order of protection the type of court
order which requires living apart? YES
Are the rape and sodomy statutes unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause in that they burden
unmarried but not married males? YES
Is the forcible rape statute unconstitutional for violating
the equal protection clause in that it burdens men but not
women? YES
Is the defendant guilty of rape in the first degree and
sodomy in the first degree? YES
RATIO
1. Before, the marital exemption applied as long as the
marriage legally existed. In 1978, the legislature
expanded not married to include husbands and wives
not living together pursuant to a court order, a decree of
separation, or a written agreement of separation. In
addition to this clear statement of legislative intent, the
plain language of the statute indicates that the Family
Court order of protection is a type of court order which
requires husband and wife to live apart.

2. Debunking arguments for marital exemption:
The marital exemption is based on the mutual
matrimonial consent, that the wife had given up herself
to the husband. This classifies unmarried men differently
from married men because married men are exempted
from prosecution for rape. Statute may draw a distinction

based upon marital status provided that the classification
is based on a ground of difference which rationally
explains different treatment. This classification has no
rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape
and nonmarital rape. Statute is therefore
unconstitutional.
Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does
not consent. It is a degrading violent act which violates
the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes
severe lasting physical and psychic harm. To ever imply
consent to such an act is irrational. Marriage has never
been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced
intercourse.
The traditional views, that the wife is property of the
husband, and that her legal existence is
incorporated into that of the husband, are no longer
recognized today because a woman is recognized as a
whole human being.
There is also the argument that marital exemption
protects against government intrusion into marital
privacy and promotes reconciliation of the spouses, so
that the elimination of the exemption would be disruptive
to marriages. However, marital exemption does not
further marital privacy because right of privacy protects
consensual acts, not violent sexual assaults. Elimination
of the marital exemption would not disrupt the marriage
by discouraging reconciliation. It is actually the act of
rape which disrupts the marriage.
Marital rape is said to be a difficult crime to prove
because lack of consent has to be shown. A related
argument is that such prosecutions could lead to
fabricated complaints by vindictive wives. However, in
most rape cases, proving lack of consent is always
difficult. Similarly, there is no greater possibility of
married women fabricating complaints than unmarried
women doing so.
Final argument for marital exemption is that marital rape
is not as serious as other rape cases, and so it should
be dealt with less severely such as in assault statutes.
However, the fact that a rape statute exists is evidence
of its being different from and more severe than assault.
Studies also show that marital rape is generally more
severe and traumatic than other rape cases.

3. Debunking arguments for gender exemption:
The statute applies to males who rape females but not to
females who rape males. Rape statutes historically apply
to conduct of males because the purpose was to protect
the chastity of the females and thus their property
value. The same is no longer true today. A statute which
treats males and females differently violates equal
protection unless the classification is based on the
achievement of an important government objective.
Otherwise, gender exemption renders the statute
unconstitutional.

Because only females can become pregnant, the State
constitutionally differentiates between rape of females
and rape of males. The primary purpose behind the
statutory rape

X. Property Relations
A. General Provisions

Collector v. Fisher
The COLLECTOR of Internal Revenue, petitioner v.
Douglas FISHER and Bettina, Fisher, and the Court of
Tax Appeals, respondents

28 January 1961
Barrera, J.:

Facts
1874: Stevenson was born in the Philippines to British
parents.
1909: he married a British woman, Beatrice, in Manila.
1945: he and his wife moved and established their
permanent residence in San Francisco, California, USA.
1947: in San Francisco, he executed his will wherein he
made his wife sole heiress to the real and personal
properties acquired while in the Philippines.
1951: he died in San Francisco.

1951: administration proceedings were instituted for the
settlement of the estate in the Philippines. A certain
Scott was appointed administrator of the estate. He filed
a preliminary estate and tax return with the reservation
of having the estates appraised at their values 6 months
after the death of Stevenson. Collector of Internal
Revenue accepted the valuation in the said estate and
tax return.
1952: Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the
estate to spouses Fisher.
1953: Scott filed a second amended estate and
inheritance tax return which contained claims for
additional exemptions and deductions pursuant to the
National Internal Revenue Code of the Philippines and
the US Internal Revenue Code. The estate claimed that,
it had overpaid the government. The Collector denied a
refund of the amount allegedly overpaid.
Spouses Fisher, as assignees of Beatrice, filed an action
for the recovery of said amount.
After the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, both
parties appealed.

Pertinent Issue: What law governs the property
relations of the spouses?
Pertinent Held/Ratio
Lower court applied the doctrine in our civil law that in
the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, contracting
parties are presumed to have adopted the system of
conjugal partnership. This is being disputed by the
Collector who contends that the property relations ought
to be determined by the national law of the decedent
husband, the law of England. Both parties adhere to the
nationality theory. Court held that the national law of the
husband becomes the dominant law in determining
property relation of the spouses.
Both spouses are foreigners who married in the
Philippines. The English law applies. But the pertinent
English law has not been proven by the petitioner. In the
absence of proof, the Court is justified in indulging in
processual presumption, in presuming that the law of
England on this matter is the same as our law
(presumption of adoption of the system of conjugal
partnership).
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or
resident, or non-resident with properties therein, there
are imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both
estate and inheritance tax. Under the laws of California,
only inheritance tax is imposed. The US Internal
Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on non-residents
not citizens of US, but does not provide for any
exemption on the basis of reciprocity. If we exempt the
Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not entitle
a Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in
California. The Filipino is disadvantaged. The lower court
erred in exempting the estate in question. Court held that
the estate should be exempted from neither estate nor
inheritance tax.
-faye-

Requisites for donations
Domalagan v. Bolifer
Jorge DOMALGAN, plaintiff-appellee Versus Carlos BOLIFER, defendant-appellant
8 February 1916 Johnson, J.
Nature: APPEAL from judgment of CFI ordering defendant Bolifer to return the money paid to him in consideration of the
promise of marriage, together with the interest
Facts:
Plaintiff Jorge Domalagan and defendant Carlos Bolifer
entered into a contract agreeing that plaintiff Domalagan
was to pay defendant Bolifer the sum of P 500 upon the
marriage of the son of the former and the daughter of the
latter.
Domalagan paid Bolifer P 500 and an additional P16
which is a token of future marriage

Bolifers daughter married another man.
Upon learning of the marriage of the defendant Bolifers
daughter, Domalagan demanded for the return of P516
together with the interest and damages (resulting from
the fact that in order to raise the said money, he was
obliged to sell his real property at a great sacrifice)
CFI ruled that Domalagan is entitled to the sum of P516
with interests but not the damages because no evidence
was sufficiently shown that Domalagan suffered
additional damages. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether plaintiff Domalagan delivered the sum of P516
to Bolifer
Whether the contract in regard to the delivery of money
by reason of prospective marriage is valid and effective
considering that it is a verbal contract
Held/Ratio:
YES. The lower court found a large preponderance of
evidence showing that the plaintiff had delivered to the
defendant the sum of P516 in substantially the manner
alleged in the complaint. There is an abundance of
uncontradicted proof supporting the findings of the lower
court.
YES. Paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions states that:
In the following cases an agreement hereafter made
shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or
some note or memorandum thereof be in writing,
and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent;
evidence, therefore of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:
3. An agreement made upon the consideration of
marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry.
Section 335 does not render oral contracts invalid but
merely unenforceable. A contract may be valid and yet,
by virtue of section 335, the parties will be unable to
prove it. But, if the parties to an action during the trial do
not object to the admissibility of oral evidence to support
contracts and permit the contract to be proved by
evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding
upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.

IN RELATION TO DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS:
P516 IS NOT A DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS
SINCE IT WAS NOT GIVEN TO EITHER OR BOTH OF
THE FUTURE SPOUSES. THE SUM OF MONEY
GIVEN TO DEFENDANT BOLIFER FAILS TO SATISFY
THE THIRD REQUISITE OF DONATION PROPTER
NUPTIAS, I.E., ART. 82. XXX IN FAVOR OF ONE OR
BOTH OF THE FUTURE SPOUSES.
-Arianne-

Serrano v. Solomon
Estanislao SERRANO, plaintiff-appellant Versus Melchor
SOLOMON, defendant-appellee
29 June 1959
Montemayor, J.
Facts
Melchor Solomon desired to marry Alejandria Feliciano,
the ward of Estanislao Serrano. Because of this, he
wrote a deed of donation proper nuptias where he
stipulated that he shall donate all of his exclusive
properties to their children who would be born out of
their marriage. But if their union be childless, then of
all Solomons properties (as well as conjugal property)
will be given to his brothers, sisters, or their heirs, if
Solomon shall die before his wife. If, however, his wife
dies first, then of his properties shall be given to those
who raised Alejandria.
Nine months later, Alejandria died without issue. Serrano
then filed an action to enforce the supposed donation in
his favour (as the one who raised Alejandria) since she
died childless.
The trial court ruled that there was no donation propter
nuptias since it was not made in consideration of the
marriage and it was not in favour of either of the spouses
but to a third person.

Issue

W/N the donation was made in consideration of the
marriage or in consideration of the death of either
spouse in the absence of any children.
Held
It was made in consideration of the latter, hence it was
not a donation proper nuptias.
Rationale
Marriage was not the only consideration or condition in
this case, but that either spouse shall have to die before
the other and that the marriage would be childless.
Hence, it could not be said that it was in consideration
of the marriage Also, the donation being made was not
in favour of Alejandria but to Serrano.
The law (Art 1327 Civil Code) requires that donations
propter nuptias must be a.) made only before the
marriage, b.) in consideration of the marriage, and c.) in
favour of either or both spouses. Since the latter two
requirements were unsatisfied, it is not a donation
propter nuptias.
** Obiter: It is not a donation inter vivos because the
donee never accepted it in a form required by law.
Neither can it be a donation mortis causa because the
donor is still alive.
-Mickey-

Solis v. Barroso
Fortunata SOLIS, plaintiff-appelle Versus Maxima
BARROSO et al., defendants-appellants
Date: October 30, 1928 Ponente: Avacena, C.J.
Facts:
Spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a
donation propter nuptias of some lands in favour of their
son Alejo Lambino and Fortuna Solis (Alejos fiance) in
a private document in consideration of their marriage.
One of the conditions of this donation is that in case of
death of one of the donees, one-half of those lands
would revert to the donors while the surviving done
would retain the other half.
On June 8, 1919, Alejo and Fortunata were married and
the donors delivered the possession of the donated
lands to them. On Aug. 3, 1919, Alejo Lambino died. In
the same year, donor Juan Lambino also died. After the
latters death, his wife Maxima Barroso recovered
possession of the donated lands.
Fortunata Solis filed an action against Maxima Barroso
and the other heirs of Juan Lambino, demanding that
they execute the proper deed of donation, transferring
one-half of the donated property, and moreover, to
proceed to the partition of the donated property and its
fruits. The court in accordance with Art. 1279 ordered
defendants to execute such deeds of donation.
Issues:
Was the donation propter nuptias valid?
Is marriage a consideration in donation propter nuptias?
Held: Judgment of CFI is REVERSED; defendants are
absolved from the complaint
Ratio:
In this case, the donation propter nuptias did not
become valid neither did it create any right because it
was not made in a public instrument. Also, Art. 2179 of
CC is not applicable because it refers to contracts valid
in themselves, and not to the form required for their
validity, which they already have, but it simply refers to
the essential requisite to make them effective.
In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a
consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to
give birth to the obligation. A valid donation not revoked
if the marriage did not take place will forever be valid.
This is so because the marriage in a donation propter
nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such,
presupposes the existence of the obligation which may
be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition
necessary for the birth of the obligation.
Street, J., dissenting
A donation propter nuptias is made for a valuable
consideration within the meaning of Art. 622 of CC.
-Jiselle-

Mateo v. Lagua
Bonifacia MATEO, et al., petitioners, Versus Gervasio
LAGUA, et al., respondents
23 October 1969

FACTS
Cipriano Lagua was the original owner of three parcels
of land.

(1917) Lagua and his wife, in a public instrument,
donated two lots to their son Alejandro in consideration
of his marriage to Bonifacia Mateo, and the couple then
took possession of the property but the Certificates of
Title remained in the donors name.
(1923) Alejandro died, Bonifacia and daughter lived with
father-in-law Cipriano who undertook farming of the lots.
(1926) Cipriano refused t deliver owners share of
harvest to Bonifacia.
Justice of Peace Court: awarded possession of two lots
to Bonifacia.

(1941) Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the two lots
in favor of Gervasio, his younger son.

(1956) Bonifacia stopped receiving owners share of
harvest and learned of the sale of lots to Gervasio.

CFI: Bonifacia was seeking annulment of deed of sale
and recovery of possession of property and the court
declared the sale null and void, ordered the Register of
Deeds to cancel the TCTs, ordered Gervasio and
Cipriano to vacate and deliver the possession of land to
Bonifacia

(1957) Justice of Peace Court: Gervasio wants
reimbursement for improvements made by them on the
lots but was dismissed by the Justice of Peace.
Gervasio appealed to CFI and filed another case for
annulment of donation of the two lots, because the two
lots were all that Cipriano owned, thus neglected leaving
something for his own support and prejudiced the
legitime of Gervasio. (Both cases heard jointly)

(1958) Cipriano died
CFI: dismissed first case because of lack of cause of
action since Gervasio has been declared as possessor
in bad faith, therefore not entitled to reimbursement for
improvements; second suit was dismissed on ground of
prescription since action to annul was brought after 41
years

CA: affirmed ruling of CFI in first suit; in the second suit,
court said that the donation to Alejandro exceeded his
legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could
have freely given will prejudice the legitime of Gervasio,
thus the donation is inofficious and Bonifacia was
ordered to reconvey 494.75 sq.m. to be taken from any
convenient part of the lots

ISSUES
W/N CA acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the
donation for being inofficious

W/N CA is correct in ordering herein petitioners to
reconvey to respondent Gervasio an unidentified 494.75
sq.m. portion of the donated lots

HELD/RATIO
Yes. The appealed case was not exclusively for
annulment of the entire donation, but merely the portion
which infringes upon the legitime of Gervasio. This was
not barred because marriage is merely an occasion or
motive of the donation propter nuptias (not its causa),
and the action to enforce Gervasios legitime only
accrued upon the death of his father in 1958. The court
also ruled that such donation of property may be
reduced for being inofficious. Being liberalities, they
remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the
donors death, if they should infringe the legitime of a
forced heir.

No. The CA acted on unsupported assumptions: 1) 3 lots
were the only properties of composing net hereditary
estate of the deceased Cipriano, 2) Alejandro and
Gervasio were Ciprianos only legal heirs, 3) that
Cipriano left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc. 4) that
in the computation of heirs legitime, the area and not the
value, would be considered. Art.908
1
of Civil Code must
be followed. Thus, before any conclusion about legal
share may be reached the ff must be done: 1) net estate
of decedent must be ascertained, 2) deduct all payable
obligations from value of property at time of his death, 3)
all donations subject to collation would be added to it, 4)
with partible estate determined, compulsory heirs can be
established, 5) ascertain whether donation had
prejudiced legitimes

NOTE: di ko na sinama yung Annotation part, yung case
lang talaga
-Gia-

1
To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at
the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all
debts, and charges, which shall not include those imposed in
the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be
added the value of all donation by the testator that are
subject to collation, at the time he made them.

Void Donations
Nazareno v. Birog
Bonifacio NAZARENO, plaintiff-appellant Versus
Francisco BIROG and Apoloniano Ariola, defendants-
appellee

FACTS: Andrea Rodriguez and Juan Aben were married
and had a daughter named Alberta Aben. Their daughter
Alberta later got married to Mariano Meleno Nazareno
and had a child named Bonifacio Nazareno (plaintiff).
When Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo
Braganza. Andrea and her second husband Cirilo had
no offspring.
In March 1917, Cirilo executed a deed of donation of
land to his then six-year old step-grandson Bonifacio.
The donation was accepted in the same deed by Alberta
and Mariano, parents of Bonifacio. Cirilo continued to
possess and enjoy the land.

Beginning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the land:
71 acres and 30 centares to Birog for 1, 100 (paid)
2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200 (initially with remaining
balance of 300, later paid 275, wrote promissory note for
25)
1 hectare and 70 ares to Ariola for 1, 600 (balance of
600, promissory note for that sum payable at end of Feb
or March 1935)

These two buyers immediately took possession of the
land and cultivated them. Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and
since Ariola had not paid by Feb1935, plaintiff wrote him
a letter demanding the payment. Pedro Braganza
(brother of Cirilo) collected balance of 25 from Birog in
March 1935).

ISSUE: WON plaintiff, Nazareno, may recover title and
possession of a parcel of land described here.

HELD/RATIO: No. Not only did he lose ownership of the
two portions of the land that the Birogs and Ariolas
possess, he signed a deed in favor of Ariola on the third
and last portion; therefore, he is estopped from claiming
the land.
More importantly, appeal must be dismissed since
plaintiff has no cause of action. The deed of donation
upon which he bases his claim to land is null and void
since it is made by the donor to a grandchild of his wife
by the wifes previous marriage. The donation falls
under the prohibition in Art.1335, CC. Neither has the
plaintiff acquired the land by prescription for there is no
evidence that he ever possessed it or claimed it against
his grandfather (as evident in deed in favor of Ariola,
signed by Nazareno as witness).

Judgement affirmed.

-Raf-

Matabuena v. Cervantes
Cornelia MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellant Versus Petronila CERVANTES, defendant-appellee
Facts:
Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes are in a
common-law relationship as husband and wife. Before
getting married in March of 1962, Matabuena donated a
piece of land to Petronila Cervantes in 1956. After about
six months from the date of marriage (September),
Matabuena died intestate.
The sister of Felix Matabuena, Cornelia Matabuena,
claims that the donation in March of 1962 is void. The
lower court ruled that since the donation was made at
the time before the marriage, it is valid.
Issue: WON the donation made is valid (To answer this,
the court must answer WON Art. 133 of the NCC should
also apply to common-law relationships.)
Art. 133. Every donation between the spouses during
the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not
apply when the donation takes effect after the death of
the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other
on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
Held: The donation is void. Art. 133 of the NCC apply to
common-law relationships as well.
Ratio: Policy considerations of the most exigent
character as well as the dictates of morality require that
the same prohibition should apply to a common law
relationship. In relation to this, a 1954 CA decision
Buenaventura vs. Bautista, interpreting a similar
provision of the old CC ruled that if the policy of law is to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is
every reason to apply the same to persons living
together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials. The spirit of the law is as much part of it as
what is written.
-Al-

Harding v. Commercial Union
Mrs. Henry E. HARDING and her husband, plaintiffs-
appellees Versus COMMERCIAL UNION Assurance
Co., defendant-appellant
Appeal from a judgment of CFI of Manila (granting action
by plaintiffs to recover from defendants P3000+interest
due them from an insurance policy)
Facts:
01Jan1916 Henry Harding gave his wife a Studebaker
automobile as a present.
Previous owners: Canson Harding J. Brannigan
JC Graham Henry Harding
It was repaired and repainted at Luneta Garage at a cost
of P900. Luneta Garage, as an agent, offered Mrs.
Harding an insurance policy of the defendant. Proposal
was made specifying P3500 as the Price paid by
proposer and P3000 as Present Value. Mr. Server,
GM of Luneta Garage and an agent of defendant
examined automobile and attested to its estimated
value.
A policy was thereafter issued, with the premium at P150
or 5% of the estimated value. Policy specifies that it shall
indemnify the insured against loss or damage to any
motor car described in the policy, among others.
24Mar1916 automobile was totally destroyed by fire.
Defendant did not pay Mrs. Harding for the losses
despite her compliance with all the necessary conditions
(proofs of loss and interest).
Hardings instituted action to recover from defendants the
sum of P3000+interest due them from the insurance
policy. CFI granted amount demanded plus interest and
costs.

Issues/Held/Ratio
1. W/N automobile was owned by plaintiff, and W/N she
had insurable interest. Yes. Yes.

2. W/N the automobile falls under the prohibition of
gifts between spouses according to CC Art. 1334.
No.
Art. 1334 All gifts between spouses during the marriage
shall be void. Moderate gifts which the spouses bestow
on each other on festive days of the family are not
included in this rule.
a) Defendant cannot question the validity of the
transfer. Only spouses or other interested persons
affected by such may do so.
b) Burden of proof is on party alleging that the
transfer is not within the exception. This depends
also on the circumstances and social standing of the
parties.

3. W/N plaintiff is guilty of fraud. No. There was good
faith belief in Mrs. Haridng representation as to the cost
of the automobile, based on information given to her by
her husband and Mr. Server. Besides, the proposal,
even through an agent, must be considered as acts of
the insurer and not of the insured.
Decision
Based on 1 and 3, CFI decision affirmed.
-Jill-


Sumbad v.CA
Emilie T. SUMBAD and BeatriceB. Tait, petitioners Versus The COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents
21 June 1999
Mendoza, J.
FACTS
After the death of his wife, Agata B. Tait, in April 30,
1936, George K. Tait, Sr. lived in common-law
relationship with Maria F. Tait to whom on April 2, 1974
he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio
Sum-at, Bontoc. George himself passed away on
December 24, 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria F. Tait
sold lots included within the Sum-at property in favor of
private respondents. Private respondents purchased the
lots on the strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at
property showing the seller, Maria F. Tait, to be the
owner of the property in question and thereafter planted
different kinds of fruit trees and plants on the lots
purchased by them.
On July 24, 1989, petitioners Emilie T. Sumbad and
Beatrice B. Tait brought an action for quieting of title,
nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession
with damages against private respondents. They
alleged that they are the children and compulsory heirs
of the spouses George and Agata; and that after the
death of their mother, their father sold the Otucan
property owned by the spouses and used the proceeds
thereof to purchase a residential lot in Sum-at.
Petitioners further alleged that from 1982 to 1983, Maria,
without their knowledge and consent, sold lots included
within the Sum-at property to private respondents; that
prior to the sales transactions, private respondents were
warned that the Sum-at property did not belong to Maria
but to the heirs of George; that this notwithstanding,
private respondents proceeded to purchase the lots in
question from Maria; that Maria had no right to sell the
Sum-at property; that the deeds of sale are null and void
and did not transfer title to private respondents; that
petitioners discovered the transactions only in 1988 but,
as soon as they learned of the same, they lost no time in
communicating with private respondents; and that
private respondents refused petitioners request for a
meeting, leaving the latter no other alternative but to file
the case in court.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, but
their motion was denied by the trial court in its Order,
dated September 26, 1989. In their answer, they denied
that (1) they had been informed of petitioners claim of
ownership of the lots and (2) that petitioners learned of
the sales to them only in 1988. They alleged that the
Sum-at property, covered by Tax Declaration No. 399,
did not belong to the conjugal partnership of George and
Agata for the reason that Agata died more than thirty
(30) years before the issuance of Tax Declaration No.
399 in 1973; that the late Maria, second wife of George,
did not need the consent of petitioners to be able to sell
the Sum-at property to private respondents; that private
respondents were purchasers in good faith and for
value; that the action was barred by laches; that they
were in possession of the lots and had introduced
improvements thereon; and that they had separate tax
declarations covering their respective lots.
In her deposition, Shirley Eillenger stated that she and
Raquel Tait, Georges ward, were boardmates in a
dormitory. Shirley stated that she saw and read the
contents of the Deed of Donation regarding the Sum-at
property with Georges signature. She further testified
that in 1979 or 1980 she saw Raquel type the Deed of
Donation at the dormitory and forge the signature of
George who was already dead at the time. On cross-
examination, Shirley stated that it took Raquel about 20
to 30 minutes to type the Deed of Donation; that Raquel
Tait had a form from which she copied the Deed of
Donation; that Raquel Tait did not refer to a tax
declaration in preparing the Deed of Donation; and that it
took the male boarders the entire morning, from 8
oclock until 11 oclock, to copy the signature of George.

ISSUES
(1) WON the deed of donation inter vivos is null and void
on the ground that it is a forgery, as testified by Shirley
Eillenger.
(2) WON the deed of donation is invalid under Art. 749 of
the Civil Code, which requires a public instrument as a
requisite for the validity of donations of immovable
property.
(3) WON the deed of donation contravenes Art. 133 of
the Civil Code, and Art. 87 which extends the prohibition
to common-law relations.

(4) WON petitioners are guilty of laches.

HELD/RATIO
(1) NO. The testimony of Eillenger is vague and
incredible. Raquel Tait, who must have been a young
girl about 20 years of age in 1979 or 1980 (she gave her
age as 30 on April 11, 1990), could NOT have, in 20 to
30 minutes, prepared the document in all its legal form
supposedly copying only from a format. It also taxes
the mind to believe that Raquel Tait had called the boys
in the boarding house and, within the view of every one,
asked them to forge the signature of George K. Tait, Sr.
and, with the boys failing to accomplish the task, herself
forged the signature not only of George but also of Maria
Tait in that one sitting and in that short span of time.
Petitioners should have presented handwriting experts to
support their claim that Georges signature on the deed
of donation was indeed a forgery.
(2) NO. Petitioners contend that the person who
notarized the deed had no authority to do so. However,
petitioners have not shown this to be the case. The
acknowledgment clause states that the person who
notarized it was the deputy clerk of court, Gonzalo
Reyes, who acted For and in the absence of the Clerk
of Court. Sec. 21 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917, as amended by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641 states,
among others, that a person who by authority of law
shall act in the capacity of the officers mentioned above
shall possess the same power.
(3) NO. This point is being raised for the first time in the
[Supreme] Court. Litigants cannot raise an issue for the
first time on appeal as it would contravene basic rules of
fair play and justice. Assuming, however, that they are
not thus precluded, there was no evidence to show that
George and Maria continuously maintained common-law
relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was
made.
(4) YES. Petitioners waited for 12 years before claiming
their inheritance, having brought their present action only
on July 24, 1989. Laches is the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable length of time to do that which, by exerting
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.
Being guilty of laches, petitioners are precluded from
assailing the donation made by their father in favor of
Maria.
The CA observed that, assuming that the plaintiffs were
not aware of the existence of said document, as they
now claim, they could not have failed to notice that the
land in question had been occupied by Maria F. Tait and
later by defendants who bought portions thereof and that
said defendants, numbering nine (9), and their families,
had built their respective houses and introduced other
improvements on the portions they had purchased from
Maria F. Tait and had resided therein since 1982 and
1983. As stated by the trial court, the plaintiffs offered
no plausible excuse for their failure to assert their rights
sooner. They apparently waited until Maria F. Tait died
in 1988 before assailing the validity of the sales made by
the latter in favor of the defendants.

DECISION CA decision affirmed
-Herson-


Ching v. Goyanko
Maria B. CHING, petitioner Versus Joseph C. GOYANKO, et al., respondents
10 November 2006
Carpio-Morales J.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Facts:
Joseph Goyanko Sr. and Epifania dela Cruz were
married and had seven children (respondents). Joseph
Sr. and Epifania purchased a property but the property
was registered to their aunt Sulpicia Ventura as Joseph
Sr. and Epifania were Chinese citizens at that time.
Epifania and Joseph Sr. became estranged. Joseph
starts living together with Maria Ching (petitioner).
Sulpicia executed a deed of sale to Joseph Sr. and then
Joseph executed a deed of sale to Ching.
When Joseph Sr. died, his children with Epifania filed a
complaint for recovery of property, prayer of nullification
of deed of sale and issuance of a new deed in favore of
their father. They claimed that Ching forged their fathers
signature.
RTC dismissied petition.
They believed the signature on the deed was genuine as
there was a witness when it was notarized.
Property was not part of conjugal property of Epifania
and Joseph Sr.
The property has been registered to Maria Ching. As a
Torrens title, it is not subject to collateral attack.
CA reversed RTC decision. Therefore, petitioner
appealed to SC.
Issues: W/N the deed of sale to Ching is VOID.
Held: Petition is denied for lack of merit. The contract
of sale is null and void for being contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
Ratio:
Yes, it is a violation. Art. 1490 states, The husband and
wife cannot sell property to each other, except this
applies even to common law relationships. As it is
contrary to morals and public policy. The prohibition
applies to couple living as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage, otherwise, the condition of those
who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those
in legal union.
Law prohibits spouses from selling property to each
other (subject to certain exemptions). Donations
between spouses during marriage are also prohibited.
Reasons: to prevent undue influence by one spouse
over the other.
1409 of Civil Code contracts whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals and good customs,
public order, and policy are void and inexistent from the
beginning. The sale was made by the husband in favor
of a concubine after he abandoned his family and left the
conjugal home. The sale was subversive of the
stability of the family. 1352 also states that contracts
without cause or with unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatsoever.
-Margie-


B. System of Absolute Community

Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo

Date: January 30, 1976
Nature: Petition for Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ponente: Antonio

Facts:
This concerns the partition of the conjugal partnership
properties of two marriages contracted by one Nicolas
Delizo. Nicolas first marriage was to Rosa Villafer, and it
lasted from 1891 to 1909 when Rosa died. He got
married again to Dorotea de Ocampo, and their marriage
lasted from 1911 to 1957, when Nicolas died. An action
for partition of the conjugal properties involved in the two
marriages was then instituted by Nicolas 2 children from
the first marriage as well as the heirs of the 3
rd
child from
the first marriage, given that the 3
rd
child had already
passed away, against their father, his 2
nd
wife, and their
9 children.
To be able to properly partition the properties, one must
first determine which of the properties go to the first
marriage, and which go to the second. In this case, most
of the properties have been found
to go to the CPG of the 2
nd
marriage.
However, the point of contention is the 66-hectare parcel
of land in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose. The Court of
Appeals held that said land belonged to the CPG of the
1
st
marriage, having found that Nicolas had acquired the
said parcel of land as homestead from various people
[Pedro Salvador, Mauricio Salvador, Nicolas Dacquel,
Mariano Antolin, and Francisco Pascua] during the time
when he was still married to Rosa. The CA only
disagreed with the trial courts holding that the CPG was
converted to a co-ownership between Nicolas and his
children upon Rosas death, which would mean that all
the fruits of the properties shall belong to said co-
ownership. The CA said that it was through the labor and
industry of Nicolas and Dorotea that the Caanawan
property had flourished, hence, the fruits should go to
them.
Unsatisfied with such judgment, Dorotea et al., now
elevate this case to the SC, contending that the
Canaawan properties could not have been part of the 1
st

marriages CPG because given that said lands were
homesteads, they only had possessory rights over such
during the first marriage and it was only during the
second marriage that the exclusive right to the lands was
confirmed.
Issue:
W/N the Caanawan homesteads belong to the CPG of
the 1
st
marriage.
Held:
The property belongs to the second marriage.
Ratio:
According to Act 926 [The Homestead Act], the right of
the homesteader to the homestead patent does not
become absolute until he complies with all the
requirements of the law, namely: that the person filing
the application shall prove by 2 credible witnesses that
he has resided upon and cultivated the land for the term
of 5 years immediately after filing the application and
shall make an affidavit attesting that such land is not
encumbered or alienated.
Given that the cabecillas (Pedro and Mauricio Salvador)
only started distributing lands to homesteaders only on
1905, the same year Rosa and Nicolas arrived in Barrio
Canaawan, and given that the homesteads he
purchased from Dacquel, Antolin, and Pascua had only
been in their possession approximately since 1905 as
well, then when the 3 conveyed such to Nicolas, not one
of them could have complied with the previously
mentioned requirements [specifically the 5-year
requirement]. They themselves had no legal or equitable
title regarding the said lands, so what they transferred to
Nicolas were only inchoate rights as applicants for
homesteads, not ownership rights.
The principle then is that the deciding factor in
determining to which martial CPG the homestead
belongs is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the
homestead patent but the time of registration [the time of

the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law
for the acquisition of such right to patent].
It was only during the 2
nd
marriage that the land was
registered. Hence, the Canaawan homestead is part of
the CPG of the 2
nd
marriage.

Onas v. Javillo
Rosario Onas, oppositor and appellant vs. Consolacion Javillo et al., petitioners and appellees
Date: March 20, 1934
Nature: Appeal from an order of the CFI approving the partition of property belonging to the state of the deceased
Crispulo Javillo.
Ponente: Goddard
Facts:
Crispulo Javillo had two marriage. The first with Ramona
Lewis with whom he had had 5 children (Appellees) and
the 2
nd
(after the death of Lewis) with Rosario Onas
(appellant) with whom he had four children. Crispulo
died and an administrator was appointed Santiago
Andrada. He submitted two projects of partition, the first
denied by the court and the second being the one
involved in the case right now. There was an agreement
entered between the parties as to property acquired
during the first and second marriages. The appellant
contests that the lower court erred in stating that all the
properties of the second marriage was acquired with the
products of the properties of the first marriage and
therefore allowing the distribution of the estates of the
heirs of both marriages based on such wrong
assumption. Appellant also argues that the lower court
erred in approving such partition despite it not containing
all the properties of the deceased Crispulo Javillo.
Issue:
-W/N the lower court erred in holding that all the
properties of the 2
nd
marriage came from the products of
the 1
st
marriage.
-W/N the second partition should be approved.
Held/ Ratio:
-No. First of all it is absurd to think that all the properties
acquired in the second marriage (20 parcels of land) was
the product of the properties of the 1
st
marriage. Then
upon the death of the first spouse, the conjugal
community would automatically cease to exist and the
dissolution of such community property would mean that
not all the property of the first marriage may be brought
into the second since the share of the wife would be
inherited by the 5 children of the 1
st
marriage and
therefore cannot be the sole capital of the properties in
the 2
nd
marriage. That half also ceases to be owned by
the husband and cannot be claimed by even his heirs
(like his heirs from the 2
nd
marriage) and therefore it
cannot be held that the properties of the 2
nd
marriage
came solely from the properties of the 1
st
.

-No. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
lower court. The partition is not in conformity with the law
since no liquidation of the partnership property or
conjugal property of the first marriage occurred. of all
the conjugal property of both marriages belongs to the
deceased and therefore should be shared. The other
of the first marriage should go to the 5 children of that
marriage and the other of the 2
nd
marriage should go
to widow or second spouse. Moreover the second
spouse has a right of usufruct over the property of her
deceased husband equal to 1/9 of the 2/3 of that
property which constitutes the legitimes of the children of
both marriages which is 2/27 of the property belonging to
her husband. (The legitime of a spouse in an intestate
succession is equal to that of 1 child. So in this case
there being nine children 1/9 is the share of the widow,
1/3 cause husband's estate is divided between children
of the 1
st
marriage, widow and all his children from both
marriages).


C. Conjugal Partnership Gains

Administration and Disposition of the CPG

Felipe v. Heirs of Maximo Aldon (1983)
Eduardo Felipe, Hermogena Felipe and Vicente Felipe, petitioners vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, respondents
FACTS:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara
the Aldons bought several pieces of land
the lands were divided into three lots
1951: Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the Felipe
spouses without the consent of her husband,
Maximo.
1976: the heirs of Maximo Aldon, (widow Gimena &
their children Sofia and Salvador Aldon) filed a
complaint in CFI-Masbate against the Felipes.
The Aldons alleged that they are the owners of the lots
involved and that they had orally mortgaged the same
to the defendants; and an offer to redeem the
mortgage had been refused so they filed the complaint
in order to recover the three parcels of land.
The Felipes possessed the land since 1951, action
was filed in 1976. In the meantime, Maximo Aldon
died.
Fathers share in the land is of the lands and the
childrens share is 2/3 thereof, 1/3 is for the widow.
The Felipes assert that they had acquired the lots from
the Aldons by purchase and subsequent delivery to
them.
TC: declared Felipes the owner of the lots.
CA: reversed TC decision: the Aldons are the owners
of the lots in question.

ISSUE:
Whether the conveyance or transaction is an oral
contract of mortgage or a contract of sale.
WON a sale of lands belonging to the conjugal
partnership made by the wife WITHOUT the consent
of the husband is valid.
WON the children have the right of action.
HELD/RATIO:
Shares of the lands awarded to the Aldon children.
Felipes are possessors in bad faith and are
commanded to make accounting of the fruits of the
corresponding shares and pay their value to the
Aldon children.

Factual issue, not entertained by SC
-not entertained by the SC because factual issues are
not to be passed upon by the SC in an appeal thru
petition.
NO. Sale is voidable.
CC 165: the husband is the administrator of conjugal
partnership.
CC 166: subject to certain exceptions, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership w/o the wifes consent.
CC 172: the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
w/o the husbands consent except in cases provided by
law.
The sale does not fall under the exception in CC Art 172.
The sale made by Gimena is a voidable (as
distinguished from being invalid as declared by CA)

Gimena has no capacity to give consent to the
contract of sale. The capacity to give consent
belongs to both spouses.
Based on legal provision that a contract is annullable if
entered into by H w/o Ws consent when it is required.
The voidable contract by Gimena is subject to
annulment by her husband only during the marriage
because the husband is the victim who has interest in
the contract.
Gimena cannot ask for its annulment because she is
the one responsible for the defect.
EVEN AFTER TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE AND
THE DISSOLUTION OF CPG BY Hs (MAXIMO
ALDONs) DEATH:
Gimena still cannot seek annulment.
BEFORE TERMINATION OF PARENTS MARRIAGE
AND DISSOLUTION OF CPG. NO
Children have inchoate right to the lands sold when the
marriage of their parents still subsist so they cannot seek
the annulment.
AFTER TERMINATION OF PARENTS MARRIAGE
AND DISSOLUTION OF CPG. YES.
The children acquired the right to question the defect
since it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their
fathers share in the lands.
Childrens cause of action accrued upon their fathers
death in 1959 so action has not yet prescribed
(PRESCRIPTION IS 30 yrs) upon filing in 1976.
By: Ms. Joei

Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr. (1980)
Teofista P. Tinitgan, Efren Tinitigan, Elsa Tinitigan and Severino Tinitgan, Jr., petitioners vs. Severino Tinitigan, Sr. and
the Court of Appeals, respondents Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc. Aand Teofista Payuran Tinitigan, petitioners, vs. the
Court of Appeals, Honorable Pedro C. Navarro, Chiu Chin Siong and Severino Tinitigan, Sr., respondents.
Nature: Petition for certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Date: 30 October 1980
Ponente: Makasiar, J.
Facts:
Teofista Payuran (Payuran) and her children entered
into a contract with Pentel (without husbands consent)
leasing a house and lot property in Loring St., Pasay City
(Loring property).
Payuran and her children also entered into a contract
with United Electronics Corporation (UEC) leasing a
factory building with the land where such building was
erected (also without husbands consent).
Husband Severino Tinitigan, Sr. (Tinitigan) filed a
complaing seeking to annul the contract entered into by
Payuran, et al with UEC. It was later amended to include
the following:
x x 2. to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff
from encumbering or disposing properties in the name of
the Molave Development Corporation or those in the
name of Severino Tinitigan Sr. and Teofista Payuran; x x
x.
The said case was amicably settled. Then Tinitigan
sought judicial approval of sale for Php300 000 of
property leased by Payuran to Pentel. He said that this
was necessary to pay for outstanding conjugal
obligations.
Tinitgans prayer was granted.
Payuran filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the
judicial approval of sale awarded to the husband alleging
that such property is a suitable condominium/hotel site
and thus selling it at Php300 000 will incur them
substantial loss. This motion was dismissed for lack of
merit (dismissed after next bullet).
She filed for legal separation and CPG dissolution two
days after the filing of the motion for reconsideration.
The wife Payuran was appointed administratrix of the

conjugal property subject to three conditions. The most
pertinent is:
3) that the disposition of the property located at Loring
St., Pasay City shall be subject to the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal
Tinitigan then sold Loring property to Chiu and not to Lim
(Pentel president and lessee/preferred buyer under
contract with Payuran). This sale was approved by CFI
Rizal Br. II.
Wife appealed the judicial order approving the sale
executed by husband. This was denied by the same
court for such order was interlocutory and thus not
subject to appeal.
Payuran and her children filed a petition for certiorari to
CA. CA upheld CFI orders.
Appealed to SC. CPG dissolved during case pendency.
Loring property adjudicated in favor of Payuran.
Issues:
WON husband Tinitigan may sell property under wife
Payurans administration.
WON CFI judges order giving husband the authority to
sell Loring property is void for lack of jurisdiction over
such property.
WON the sale executed by Tinitgan in favor of Chiu is
valid.
WON the order granting husband authority to sell Loring
property valid even if there is a standing contract
between the wife and Pentel where the latters president
leases the premises and was granted the option to buy
said property.

Held and Ratio:
YES. The time Tinitgan obtained the judicial order
authorizing him to sell the property in question was
before the court granted Payuran administration over
conjugal property. Before such grant of administration,
the husband was the legal conjugal property
administrator (NCC Art. 165). Even if she was in fact the
one administering their conjugal property, the law
requires that she be authorized by the husband to be
administratrix and such authorization should be in a
public instrument (NCC Art. 168) for her administration
to be legally recognized.
ORDER VALID. The judge acquired jurisdiction over the
Loring property because the original complaint (which
was limited to the property leased to UEC) was
amended to include all properties under their corporation
and under the spouses names (see bullet #3).
SALE TO CHIU VALID. The judicial order granted by the
court in favor of Tinitigan was for the laws requirement
of wifes consent (which he was not able to secure from
her) and not to give Lim the exclusive right to buy the
property in question.
ORDER GRANTING HUSBAND AUTHORITY TO SELL
LORING PROPERTY VALID. Contract between wife
(and children) and Pentel was executed without
husbands consent (required by NCC Ar. 172). Even if
she was administratrix during the time of the execution
of the contract, it still would be violative of NCC Art. 388
for her failure to obtain judicial authority to encumber or
alienate conjugal property or her husbands property.
By: Mr. Aboy


Guiang v. CA (1998)
Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang, defendants-petitioners v. Court of Appeals and Gilda Corpuz, plaintiff-
respondents
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Ponente: Panganiban, J. Date: June 26, 1998
Facts :
Spouses Gilda and Judie Corpuz bought a lot in South
Cotabato. After several years, the couple sold one-half
of their lot to defendants-spouses Guiang. When Gilda
(wife) went to Manila to look for a job, she learned
through their daughter that her husband intended to sell
the remaining one-half portion of their lot. Gilda objected
to this, however, her husband still pushed through the
sale.
Plaintiff-respondent Gilda then found the petitioners
staying at their house. She filed a barangay case against
petitioners herein for trespassing. The parties agreed to
sign a document known as amicable settlement which
states that plaintiff-respondent Gilda would leave
voluntarily the house of spouses Guiang.
Defendants-petitioners contend that the (1) contract of
sale was merely voidabe, and (2) such contract was
ratified by private respondent when she entered into an
amicable settlement with them.
Issue: WON the sale of their property (which is part of
the conjugal property) by the husband without the
consent of the wife is void?
HELD: Yes. The sale is VOID.
RATIO:
Petitioners Court
The absence of private respondents consent
merely rendered the sale voidable under Art. 1390
of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidbale or
annullable x x x
Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
Art. 1390 refers to contracts vitiated by vices of
consent. In this case, private respondents consent
to the contract of sale of their conjugal property
was totally inexistent or absent.

The applicable provision is Art. 124 of the FC.
Petitioners contend that the sale was duly ratified
by the contending parties through the amicable
settlement
The amicable settlement is a direct offshoot of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights. Under Art. 1422, a
contract which is the direct result of a previous
illegal contract. Is also void and inexistent.

The settlement does not mention a continuing
offer to sell the property or an acceptance of
such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect
that private respondent would vacate the property.
Such document is not the acceptance intended
in Art 124.

By: Ms. Mary B.

Relucio v. Lopez (2001)
Imelda Relucio, petitioner vs. Angelina Mejia Lopez, respondent
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside a CA decision to deny a petition of certiorari that
assails the trial courts order denying petitioners motion to dismiss the case against her inclusion as party defendant.
Ponente: Pardo, J.
Facts:
Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for appointment as
sole administratix of conjugal partnership of properties,
forfeiture, etc. against Alberto Lopez and the petitioner,
Imelda Relucio.
Alberto is the husband of the respondent, who
abandoned her and her four children. Upon
abandonment, Alberto arrogated upon himself full and
exclusive control and administration of the conjugal
properties, spending and using it for his own gain and
benefit to the exclusion of Angelina and their four
children.
Alberto had an illicit relationship with Imelda and the two
cohabited since 1976. It was alleged that the two
amassed the properties that belong to the conjugal
partnership of Angelina and Alberto. The proceeds of
the amassed properties are allegedly being spent for the
benefit of Imelda and the two illegitimate children.
In order for Albertos properties to avoid being charged
of its share in the conjugal partnership, he concealed it
to the private respondent by not placing them under his
name. He even removed and transferred the ownership
of some of them under the name of other people.
Imelda filed a motion to dismiss the petition filed by
Angelina on the ground that the action has no cause
against her. However, the trial court judge denied her
motion on the ground that she is a necessary or
indispensable party because some of the subject
properties are registered in her name and Alberto. When
she assailed the trial court decision at the Court of
Appeals, the court also denied her petition. Hence, this
appeal.

Issues:
WON respondents petition as sole administratix of the
conjugal partnership etc. against her husband
established a cause of action
2
against petitioner.
WON petitioners inclusion as party defendant is
essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication
of the controversy.
Held/ Ratio:
No. For a motion to dismiss a cause of action to be
sustained, the complaint must show that the claim for
relief does not exist. In this case, the complaint is by an
aggrieved wife against her husband. Nowhere in the
allegations does it appear that relief is sought against
petitioner. Hence, a cause of action against Imelda
has not been established. A real party in interest is one
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement
of the suit. If the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest,
she cannot be an indispensable party.
No. In the three causes of action raised by Angelina, all
controversies could be adjudicated even if Imelda is not
a party defendant. The only indispensable party is
Alberto.
In the judicial appointment of Angelina as sole
administratix of the conjugal partnership or ACP arising
from her marriage to Alberto, Imelda is an indispensible
party. In fact, Imelda is a complete stranger to this cause
of action. The administration of property of the marriage
is only between Alberto and Angelina, to the exclusion of
all other persons.
In the accounting of conjugal partnership arising from
their marriage, Imelda again has nothing to do with the

2
Cause of action- an act or omission of one party, the defendant, in violation
of the legal right of the other.
Elements: 1.) a right in favour of the plaintiff 2.) an obligation on the part of
the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right 3.) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff

Lopezs conjugal property. Hence, the cause of action is
only against Alberto.
In the forfeiture of Albertos share in property co-owned
by him and Imelda, Angelinas asserted right to forfeit
only extends to Albertos share alone. It does not cover
the share of Imelda. Hence, Imelda again is an
indispensable party.
Claims for moral damages and support could only come
from Alberto. Support could not be compelled from a
stranger.
Dispositive:
The court grants the petition and reverses the decision
of the court of appeals.
By: Mr. Richard

Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa (2002)
Thelma A. Jader-Manalo, petitioner, vs. Norma Fernandez Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, respondents
Facts:
Petitioner Thelma Jader-Manalo allegedly saw an
advertisement in the newspaper placed by the
respondent spouses, Edilberto and Norma Camaisa, for
the sale of two of their properties
Petitioner negotiated with a real estate broker authorized
by the respondents
She visually inspected the properties and was shown its
documents
She made a definite offer to buy properties to
respondent Edilberto with the knowledge and conformity
of his wife Norma and in the presence of the broker
They agreed upon the price and mode of payment and
the agreement was handwritten and signed by
respondent Edilberto
Formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter
prepared and was formally signed by Edilberto and
thereafter two checks were delivered to him in the
presence of the broker and an employee in Edilbertos
office
The next day, petitioner received a call from respondent
Norma requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions
of the contracts. Petitioner was accompanied by her
lawyer when she and the spouses met. Notations on the
on the contract were handwritten and they agreed to
meet again for the formal signing of the contracts
When they met again for the affixing of Normas
signature, respondent spouses informed petitioner that
they were backing out of the agreement because they
needed spot cash for the full amount of the
consideration.
Petitioner reminded respondents that contracts to sell
had already been perfected and Normas refusal to sign
the same would unduly prejudice the petitioner
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages in the RTC
Respondents claim that checks issued were returned to
her by Edilberto and petitioner accepted the same
without any objection
Respondent Norma denied that she ever participated in
the negotiations
TC and CA decided against petitioner

Issue: WON the husband may validly dispose of
conjugal property without the wifes written consent
Held: No.
Ratio: Both parties admitted that there had been
negotiations, an agreement and a downpayment and
also that respondent Norma refused to sign contract to
sell. The law requires that the disposition of conjugal
property by the husband as administrator in appropriate
cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise,
disposition is void. Art. 124 of the FC provides XXX
These powers do not include powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court
or the written consent of the spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition shall be void
XXX. The properties were conjugal and hence for the

contracts to be effective, consent of both husband and
wife must concur. Respondent Norma never gave her
written consent to the sale and being merely aware of
the transaction is not consent.
The argument of petitioner that because Norma unjustly
refused to affix her signature and thus the court
authorization was warranted under Art. 124 is without
merit. If written consent of the other spouse cannot be
obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought
to court which will give authority if the same is warranted
by the circumstances. However it should be stressed
that under Art. 124, court authorization is only resorted
to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent
is incapacitated. Petitioner failed to allege and prove that
respondent was incapacitated to give consent to the
contract.
By: Ms. Welga

Villanueva v. Chiong (2008)
Walter Villanueva and Aurora Villanueva, petitioners, vs. Florentino Chiong and Elisera Chiong, respondents
QUISUMBING, J .:
Facts:
Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were
married in January 1960 but have been separated in fact
since 1975.
During their marriage, they acquired a lot in Dipolog City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title.
1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the
lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in instalments.
Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build
a store and a house thereon.
After their last instalment payment on December 1986,
petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of
a deed of sale in their favour, but Elisera, refused to sign
a deed of sale.
July 1991, Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for
Quieting of Title with Damages. February 1992,
petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages. The RTC consolidated
these two cases.
May 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners.
July 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the
deed of absolute sale and ordered petitioners to vacate
the lot and remove all improvements therein. RTC
likewise ordered Florentino to return to petitioners the
consideration of the sale with interest from May 1992.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision.
Issues:
Is the land in question exclusive property of Florentino
Chiong or a conjugal property of respondents?
CONJUGAL PROPERTY
Was the sale of land by Florentino Chiong without
Elisera Chiongs consent valid? NO
Ratio:
Petitioners contend that the lot belongs exclusively to
Florentino because (1) respondents were already
separated in fact at the time of sale and (2) the share of
Elisera, the eastern part of the lot, had previously been
sold. Petitioners aver that while there was no formal
liquidation of respondents' properties, their separation in
fact resulted in its actual liquidation. Further, assuming
arguendo that the lot is conjugal, the transaction should
not be voided as Florentino had one-half share over it.
Elisera counters that the sale of the lot to petitioners
without her knowledge, consent or authority, was void
because the lot is conjugal. She adds that the sale was
neither authorized by any competent court nor did it
redound to her or their children's benefit. As proof of the
lot's conjugal nature, she presented a transfer certificate
of title, a real property tax declaration, and a
Memorandum of Agreement which she and her husband
had executed for the administration of their conjugal
properties.
Petitioners contention that the lot belongs exclusively to
Florentino, because his separation in fact from his wife

Elisera at the time of sale dissolved their property
relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents' separation in
fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor
prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. Under Article 178 of
the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband
and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership.
Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired
by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to
belong to the CPG, unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Petitioners'
mere insistence as to the supposed exclusive nature of
the lot is insufficient to overcome such presumption
when taken against all the evidence for respondents.
On the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be
presumed that the lot was acquired during the marriage
and that it is conjugal property since it was registered "in
the name of Florentino Chiong, married to Elisera
Chiong" But Elisera also presented a real property tax
declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners
of the lot. In addition, Florentino and Elisera categorically
declared in the Memorandum of Agreement they
executed that the lot is a conjugal property. Moreover,
the conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino
in the Deed of Absolute Sale, where he declared his
capacity to sell as a co-owner of the lot.
However, the sale by Florentino without Elisera's
consent is not void ab initio. Without the wife's consent,
the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is not
void, but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the
Civil Code provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non
compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife's consent
ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within
ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts
for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered
into without her consent, when such consent is required,
or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and
Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal
property to be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of
Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold
the lot and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is
voidable conformably with Article 173.
Petitioners finally contend that, assuming arguendo the
property is conjugal, the transaction should not be
entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share over the
lot. This lacks merit. The plain meaning attached to the
plain language of the law is that the contract, in its
entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's
consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress
intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract
shall "prejudice" the wife, such limitation should have
been spelled out in the statute.
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of
what has been given is proper. Article 1398 of the Civil
Code provides: An obligation having been annulled, the
contracting parties shall restore to each other the things
which have been the subject matter of the contract, with
their fruits, and the price with its interest, except in cases
provided by law.
The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of
existence, and to restore the parties, insofar as legally
and equitably possible, to their original situation before
the contract was entered into.

By: Ms. Faye


Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities

Santero v. CFI of Cavite (1987)
PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE SANTERO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ, VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA, MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and
REYNALDO EVARISTO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of PABLO SANTERO, respondents
Date: September 14, 1987
Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS:
Anselma Diaz filed a Motion for Allowance for the
support of her four children with the late Pablo Santero.
The support included educational expenses, clothing
and medical necessities.
Princesita, Federico and Willie, children of Pablo
Santero by another woman, opposed the motion on the
ground that the wards for whom allowance is sought are
no longer schooling and have attained majority age so
that they are no longer under guardianship.
In reply, Anselma Diaz admitted some of the children are
of age and are not enrolled due to lack of funds but they
will resume schooling as soon as they are given the
requested allowances. She cited the following:
Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance,
according to the social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person
entitled to be supported until he completes his education
or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even
beyond the age of majority.
Rule 83 Sec. 3, Rules of Court. Allowance to widow and
family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of
a deceased person, during the settlement of estate, shall
receive therefrom, under the direction of the Court, such
allowance as provided by law.
CFI granted the Motion.
Diaz filed another Motion for Allowance praying that
support be given to all of her seven children with Pablo
Santero. CFI granted the motion but later ordered the
administrator of Santeros estate to retrieve the
allowance of the three additional recipients.
Princesita, Federico and Willie filed a petition arguing
that private respondents are not entitled to allowance
since they have already attained majority age, two are
gainfully employed, and one is married. Also, they are no
longer under guardianship. Petitioners further alleged
that the administrator of Santeros estate does not have
sufficient funds to cover the allowance because
whatever funds are handled by the administrator
constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever
will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit properties from
where these funds held by the administrator are derived.

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER the four children of Anselma Diaz can
inherit from the estates of the Pablo Santeros parents
2. WHETHER the four children of Anselma Diaz are
entitled to allowance despite being of age, being
gainfully employed, and married

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO.
The four children may not inherit from the intestate
estate of Pablo Santeros parents because they are
illegitimate children. According to Art. 992 of NCC, An
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother XXX.
2. YES. The four children of Anselma are entitled to
allowance.
The controlling provisions are Arts. 290 and 188 of NCC
and not Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court.

Art. 188. From the common mass of property support
shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children
during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until
what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support which
exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. (1430)
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully
employed or married is of no moment and should not be
regarded as the determining factor of their right to
allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court
gives allowance only to the widow and minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased, NCC gives the
surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.
Also, since the provision of NCC is a substantive law, it
cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court which is a procedural rule. However, spouse
refers to legitimate spouse (not common-law spouses
who are mothers of the children in this case).
By: Ms. Arianne

E. Separation of Property and Administration of Common Property by One Spouse
1. Judicial separation of property for Sufficient Cause
Garcia v. Manzano (1958)
Gonzalo Garcia, plaintiff-appellant vs. Consolacion Manzano, defendant-appellee
Ponente: Reyes, J. B. L., J.

Facts
Garcia and his wife Manzano have been living
separately from each other (for almost 10 years) and all
attempts for reconciliation have failed. During their
marriage, they jointly accumulated real and personal
properties.
However, upon separation, Manzano assumed complete
management and administration of the conjugal
partnership property as well as the sole enjoyment to it
and its fruits, to the prejudice of Garcia, and even
fictitiously alienated majority of the property to third
persons. She had allegedly neglected to file any income
tax return, and refused to turn over Garcias rightful
share and participation in the conjugal property.
Garcia now files an action against Manzano for the
judicial declaration of the separation of their conjugal
property.
Manzano seeks to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it did not allege any of the grounds recognized in
Article 191 of the new Civil Code for a judicial decree of
separation of properties.

Issue
W/N judicial decree of separation of conjugal property is
the proper remedy.

Held
No, it is not. Petition dismissed without prejudice to
proper proceedings.

Rationale: The separation of property shall not prevail
unless it is expressly stipulated in the marriage
settlement or by judicial decree, which may only be
ordered by the causes in Art. 191 of the Civil Code.

Art. 191 includes:
Penalty carrying with it civil interdiction
Declared absence
Legal separation
Abuse of powers of administration of the
conjugal property by the husband
Abandonment by the husband
Agreement to dissolve subject to judicial
approval
The enumeration is limitive in view of the Codes
restrictive policy.
Although Garcia contends that husband should be
entitled to the same remedy as the wife, the philosophy
espoused by the Civil Code is that it is the husband who
is the administrator of the conjugal property by express
provision of law. Therefore, the wife can not legally
mismanage conjugal property without the consent of the
husband or the courts.
The Civil Code contemplates remedies that are available
exclusively to the wife against the abuses of the
husband, who is the legal administrator.
The proper remedy for Garcia, then, is not a judicial
separation of property but to revoke the power granted
to the wife and to resume the administration of the
community property.
3

By: Mr. Mickey

3
Court to Garcia: Be a man!

Partosa-Jo vs. CA (1992)
Prima Partosa-Jo, petitioner, vs. CA and Ho Hang (with aliases Jose Jo and Consing)

Facts:
Jose Jo admits to having cohabited with three women
and fathered 15 children.
In 1980, Prima (first wife) filed for judicial separation of
conjugal property.
The RTC ruled in favour of Prima. However, the
dispositive portion was incomplete insofar as it carried
no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of
conjugal property although it was extensively discussed
in the body of the decision.

Penultimate paragraph of the decision (argued by the
plaintiff on the disposition re separation of conjugal
properties):
It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in
question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the
defendant in this case, subject to separation of property
under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code,
which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated
herein.

Issue:
Is a decree of judicial separation on this case justified?

Held:
Yes. On the grounds of physical separation coupled with
husbands refusal to support the wife (abandonment).

Ratio:
Abandonment
Now, Art. 128 of FC.

[CC] Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband
and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the
conjugal partnership, except that:
xxx xxx xxx

(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just
cause for at least one year, she may petition the court
for a receivership, or administration by her of the
conjugal partnership property or separation of property.
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private
respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he
denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete
City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact
that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of resuming their
conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the
determination by this Court of the action for support in
1988, the private respondent refused to give financial
support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the
parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to
constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial
separation of their conjugal property.

In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second
ground allowed by Article 128, for the fact is that he has
failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to
the family as husband or parent. Apart from refusing to
admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in
Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting
with other women and siring many children by them. It
was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their
daughter that prompted her to file the actions against
him for support and later for separation of the conjugal
property, in which actions, significantly, he even denied
being married to her. The private respondent has not
established any just cause for his refusal to comply with
his obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.

Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article
135 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation
is highly improbable.

Whether FC is applicable:
Ramirez v. CA: The greater weight of authority is
inclined to the view that an appellate court, in reviewing
a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question
according to the law prevailing at the term of such
disposition, and not according to the law prevailing at the
time of rendition of the appealed judgement.

The conjugal property of the petitioner and the private
respondent is hereby ordered divided between them,
share and share alike. This division shall be
implemented by the trial court after determination of all
the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership, including those that may have been illegally
registered in the name of the persons.

By: Ms. Jiselle


Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz
Estrella dela Cruz, plaintiff-appellee vs. Severino dela Cruz, defendant-appellant
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of CFI Negros Occidental
Ponente: Castro, J.
FACTS
Estrella and Severino were married on Feb. 1, 1938 and
had 6 children. They acquired 7 parcels of land of
Bacolod Cadastre, 3 parcels of Silay Cadastre and
varied business ventures.
4

In 1949, Estrella suspected the existence of illicit
relations between Severino and Nenita (she found a
note from Nenita, Severino admitted amorous relation
but said he would forsake his mistress, she found
another letter from Nenita telling Severino to meet her in
Baguio)
In 1955, Severino had not slept in the conjugal dwelling
and had short visits wherein the couple engaged in brief
conversations. After 1955, Severino never visited the
conjugal abode and denied communication with Estrella.
Severino denied abandoning his wife and children
saying that his intention was not to abandon his wife and
children but only to teach Estrella a lesson as she was
quarrelsome and extremely jealous and he could not
concentrate on work because she always quarreled with
him.
He never failed, even for a single month to give his
family financial support.

ISSUES

4
Bacolod Cadastre lands at P45,429; Silay Cadastre lands at P43,580;
hacienda in Silay with net profit of P3,390.49 for year 1957; Various business
ventures with fixed assets of P496,006.92 and net profit of P75,655.78 for
year 1956; Principal business (Phil. Texboard Factory) with net gain of
P90,454.48 for year 1957; Various enterprises of conjugal partnership with
total assets at P1,021,407.68 not including those of the Top Service Inc of
which firm Severino has been president since 1959 with a paid up capital of
P50,000 (10,000 of which was contributed by him)
1. W/N the separation of Severino from Estrella
constitutes abandonment in law that would justify a
separation of conjugal partnership properties
2. W/N Severinos failure and/or refusal to inform Estrella
of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse
of his powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership as to warrant a division of the matrimonial
assets

HELD/RATIO
1. No. Abandonment is the act of the husband in
voluntarily leaving his wife with intention to forsake her
entirely, never to return to her, and never to resume
marital duties or claim marital rights; such neglect as
either leaves the wife destitute of the common
necessaries of life or would leave her destitute but for
charity of others. In this case, there was no
abandonment because it was only physical separation
and not financial desertion. Severino still continued to
make contributions at intervals for the support of his wife
and children. Also, there was no credible evidence that
an illicit relation existed between Nenita and Severino.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that shows that
Severino has squandered the conjugal assets since at
the time f the trial the assets value increased to over a
million pesos.
2. No. For abuse to exist, it is not enough that the
husband perform an act prejudicial to the wife, nor is it
sufficient that he commits acts injurious to the
partnership (may be because of mere inefficiency in
administration). Abuse connotes willful and utter
disregard of the interests of the partnership. If there is
only physical separation between spouses, and the
husband continues to manage the conjugal properties
with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency and
religiously gives support to his wife and children, the
court is not disposed to grant the wifes petition for

separation of property. The courts decision does not
imply condonation of the separation but it is designed to
protect the conjugal partnership from waste and shield
the wife from want. Also, the court says that a judgment
ordering the division of conjugal assets where there has
been no real abandonment, the separation not being
wanton and absolute, may altogether slam shut the door
for possible reconciliation.
By: Ms. Gia

2. Voluntary Separation of Property

In re Voluntary Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Jose Bermas, Sr. and Pilar Manuel Bermas (1965)
Jose Bermas Sr. and Pilar Manuel Bermas, petitioners-appellants
22 June 1965
Concepcion, J.
Facts:
Jose and Pilar Bermas executed an Agreement for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Separation of
Property in order to preserve peace and harmony in
their family, as well as prevent friction and confusion,
since Jose has two sets of children, one by a former
marriage and one with Pilar. The agreement states that
during their marriage, they acquired 12 parcels of land
and 2 buildings. It also enumerates their exclusive
properties and also provides that any property acquired
by any or both of the spouses shall be his or hers
exclusively or to both of them, as the case may be. They
allege that under CC Art. 191, the voluntary dissolution
of the conjugal partnership during the marriage is
allowed, subject to judicial approval, that they have no
outstanding debts and that the separation of properties
would not prejudice any creditor or third person.

However, the lower court denied the petition on the
ground that CC Art. 192 states that a conjugal
partnership shall only be dissolved once legal separation
has been ordered, and this cannot take place, pursuant
to Article 191 except upon civil interdiction, declaration of
absence or abandonment. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the
Bermas couple is allowed.
Held and Ratio:
NO. The CPG of first marriage must first be liquidated
before the liquidation of CPG of second marriage.
Moreover, there was no evidence that the children from
previous marriage were mentioned in the petition neither
where both sets of children notified regarding the
dissolution of CPG.
[This liquidation should not and cannot be effected
without a liquidation of the conjugal partnership between
Jose and his first wife, in which the children by the first
marriage have an interest. Said dissolution could
adversely affect the rights of said children by first
marriage, for, in case of doubt, the partnership property
shall be divided between the different (conjugal)
partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to
the property belonging to the respective spouses (CC
189).]
Decision:
Remanded for further proceedings in conformity with SC
decision.
By: Ms. Crystal


XI. Family
B. Family Home

SIARI VALLEY ESTATES INC. V LUCASAN
Petitioner: Siari Valley Estates Inc v. Respondent: Filomeno Lucasan
Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J.
Facts
CFI ordered Lucasan to deliver to the Siari Valley
Estates Inc. the cattle inside his pasture or pay P40,000
for the value of the cattle and another P40,000 for
damages.
SC affirmed the decision and thus made it final.
The sheriff then levied the lands belonging to the
defendant and auctioned to the said corporation.
Lucasan failed to redeem the land within one year and
thus issued to the corporation, the final certificate of
sale. Upon petition of the corporation, a writ of
possession was issued directing the sheriff to place said
corporation in possession of the lands, but they failed to
take possession of it. They then filed another petition for
its possession
Respondent filed an opposition stating that he owns one
of the parcels of land in the auction and in this land, he
built his family home.
RTC ruled in favour of petitioner. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by respondent which was at
first denied, but soon afterwards, ordered possession of
all the lands to the petitioner except for one parcel of
land where the family home of Lucasan was built.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari
Issue
WON the levy of the sheriff regarding the one parcel of
land was in accordance with the law.
WON the family home extra judicially established by
respondent on the lot and house in question is exempt
from execution (TOPICAL ISSUE)
Held
No, the notice of levy merely described the property as
unregistered land and the same was registered under
Act 3344 in the office of the register of deeds. Section 7
Rule 49 states that Where the property has been
brought under the operation of the Land Registration
Act, the notice shall contain a reference to the number of
the certificate of title and the volume and page in the
registration book where the certificate is registered"
Since the notice of the levy contains no reference
number of its certificate and the volume and page in the
registry book where the title is registered, it follows that
the said notice is legally ineffective and did not have the
effect of binding the property for purposes of execution.
Hence, levy is invalid and has no legal effect.
No, Article 243 (3) of NCC provides that "The family
home extra judicially formed shall be exempt from
execution" except "for debts incurred before the
declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property." In
this case, the family home was constituted after the
debts had been incurred and this provision will not apply.
The reason why a family home constituted after a debt
had been incurred is not exempt from execution is to
protect the creditor against a debtor who may act in bad
faith by resorting to such declaration just to defeat the
claim against him.
(Santiago)


MODEQUILLO vs. BREVA
Jose Modequillo, petitioner, vs. Hon. Augusto V. Breva, Francisco Salinas, Floriper Abellan-Salinas, Juanito Culan-Culan
and Deputy Sheriff Fernando Plata, respondents.
Date: May 31, 1990
Ponente: Gancayco, J.
Facts:
Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay have been
adjudged to be jointly and severally liable to pay the
Salinas spouses for the death of their son, as well as to
pay Renato Culan-Culan for his hospitalization expenses
moral damages (there was a vehicular accident). They
also had to pay the attorneys fees and litigation
expenses of the said parties.
The RTC of Davao issued a writ of execution to satisfy
the said judgment on the goods and chattels of
Modequillo and Malubay. The sheriff levied on a parcel
of residential land and a parcel of agricultural land, both
located in Davao del Sur.
Jose Modequillo filed a Motion to Quash the levy of
execution on the ground that the residential lot is
where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of this case (accident took place in 1976
and the decision pertaining to damages became final on
1988) and is therefore exempt from execution, forced
sale, or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the
Family Code and that the judgment debt is not one of the
exceptions enumerated under Article 155 of the Family
Code.
RTC denied the motion. A motion for Reconsideration
was filed and was also denied.
Issue: WON the said residential house is exempt from
execution of the money judgment
Held:
No. Unlike in the Civil Code, there is no need to
constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially
under the Family Code. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is a family home as contemplated by
law. It is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:

Art 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the
building. (243a)
The residential house of petitioner became a family
home by operation of law only on August 3, 1988, upon
effectivity of the Family Code. The contention of the
petitioner that it should be considered as a family home
since 1969 is not well taken. Under Article 162 of FC,
The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. It does not mean that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the FC and therefore are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the FC.
The home of the petitioner is not exempt from execution
for the payment of his liabilities. The vehicular accident
happened on March 16, 1976. The money judgment was
rendered on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the
effectivity of the FC.
(Tiu)


Taneo v. CA
Pablito Taneo, jr. Jose Taneo, Nena Catubig and Husband, Cilia Moring and Husband, petitioners vs. CA and Andon
Gilig, respondents.
Facts:
Property in question is house and lot, alleged to be the
family home of the petitioners.
As a result of a judgment in a civil case, two properties
were levied to satisfy the judgment. One of the
properties is the alleged family home of the petitioners.
Important dates:
September 18 1941- Land acquired by Pablo Taneo,
father of petitioners
March 7 1964- House was erected on land
June 24 1964- Judgment obligation of the petitioners
against Abdon Gilig
January 24 1966- Registration of instrument on
constitution of family home
February 12 1966- Properties were auctioned; Abdon
Gilig was highest bidder
October 19 1973- Approval of Taneos application for
free patent for homestead
December 10 1980- Free patent was issued
Issues:
WON conveyance by public auction is prohibited by
homestead law (Sec 118 of Commonwealth Act 141)
WON the family home is exempt from execution

HELD/RATIO:
NO
Even before application for homestead had been
approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the owner of the
land.
Prohibition does not apply since the judgment debt and
execution sale took place prior approval for free patent.
NO
FAMILY HOME is the dwelling place of a person and his
family. It is said, however, that the family home is a real
right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the
land on which it is situated, which confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which
must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs.
It cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
CIVIL CODE VS FAMILY CODE
Civil Code- a family home may be constituted judicially
(court order) or extra-judicially (registration in Registry of
Property).
Family Code- registration no longer necessary; family
home deemed constituted from time it is occupied as
family residence.
Case falls under Civil Code; Family Code is not
retroactive- all existing residences at time of effectivity of
FC are considered family homes and PROSPECTIVELY
entitled to benefits accorded thereto
CIVIL CODE- January 24, 1996- registration as family
home- not exempt since debt was incurred before the
declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property
NOT BUILT ON OWN LAND- family home is the dwelling
house where a person and his family reside and the
LAND it is situated on. It is understood that the house
should be built on a land not belonging to another.

(Torres)


Versola vs. Court of Appeals
Spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola, petitioner v. Hon. Court of Appeals , Sheriff Reynaldo Madolaria, Judge Lydia
Layosa, RTC of Quezon City Branch 217, Registry of Deeds of QC and Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh, respondents
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
Date: July 31, 2006
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
Dolores Ledesma entered into a loan transaction
with Dr. Victoria Ong Oh where the latter granted P1
Million loan to the former. As security, Ledesma issued a
check of the same amount and promised to execute a
deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot.
Mortgage did not materialize. Ledesma only delivered
the duplicate copy of the TCT of the property to Dr. Ong.
Ledesma sold the house and lot to petitioners for
P2.5M. Spouses Versola paid a downpayment of P1M
with the remaining balance payable in monthly
instalments but before the instalments come due,
Ledesma asked spouses to pay the remaining.
Petitioner applied for a loan with Asiatrust Bank Inc.
In the course of application, Asiatrust convened the
petitioners, Dr. Ong Oh and Ledesma. They arrived at a
scheme such that Dr. Ong granted Ledesma an
additional loan, Ledesma executed the Sale transferring
the title to spouses Versola, Dr. Ong delivered the title to
Asiatrust and Asiatrust approved the loan application of
the petitioners.
However, when Asiatrust tried to register the property, a
notice of levy was annotated on the title in connection
with Ledesmas obligation to a certain Miladays Jewels,
Inc. When Dr. Ong tried to present the check issued
by Ledesma, the same was dishonored for the
account was already closed.
Dr. Ong filed a complaint against Ledesma, spouses
Versola and Asiatrust.
RTC: in favor of Dr. Ong
CA: affirms the decision of RTC with modification as to
the amount payable.
Dr. Ong filed a motion for Execution and was granted.
The property in the name of petitioners was levied upon.
The sheriff set the sale of the property at a public
auction.
Spouses Versola objected but the sheriff still sold the
property and awarded price to Dr. Ong.
Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the
redemption period. Thus, the sheriff issued a Final Deed
of Sale.
Two years later, petitioner file a motion on the following
grounds:
property sold is the family home of the petitioners which
is exempted from execution under Art. 155
no application was made by Dr. Ong for the
determination of the value of their family home to be
subjected to execution, as required by Art. 160
Issue: WON petitioners timely raised/proved that the
property is exempt from execution (i.e. that it is their
family home.) - NO
Ratio:
Petitioner Court
The property was their family home Right to exemption or forced sale under Art. 153 of FC is personal
privilege granted to the debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by
the sheriff but by the debtor himself prior to sale at auction.
It is not sufficient that person claiming exemption alleges that such is a
family home must be set and proved to Sheriff. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming exception.

Instead of substantiating their claim, spouses presupposed that the sheriff
had prior knowledge that such property was their family home.
Petitioners assertion of exemption was a mere afterthought, sheer
artifice to deprive respondent of fruits of the verdict of her case.
They registered their opposition prior to the
auction sale but such was treated as a mere
scrap of paper and is deemed not filed.
Inaction of sheriff was justified. Petitioners never filed any motion before
the court to hold the auction sale.
Said motion was treated by court as scrap of paper presumably because it
doesnt contain a notice of hearing.
There was no order of clearance from trial
court for the sheriff to proceed with the
auction sale, in violation of Art. 160
It was correct for sheriff to continue the auction sale as there was no order
forthcoming to suspend the sale absent any motion from petitioner.
There were serious defects in the conduct of
execution sale sheriff based execution on
decision of RTC not CA.
Unfounded although sheriff quoted decision of RTC in the Final deed of
sale, the statement of accounts submitted by respondent and computation
of sheriff showed that the sale was based on the decision of the CA.

Patricio v. Dario III

Date: November 20, 2006
Petitioner: Perla G. Patricio
Respondents: Marcelino G. Dario III and The Honorable Court of Appeals

Facts:
In July 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was
survived by his wife, petitioner Perla, and their two sons,
Marcelino Marc and Marcelino G. Dario III, private
respondent. Among the properties he left was a parcel of
land with a residential house and a preschool building
built thereon.
In August 1987, the three extrajudicially settled the
estate of the deceased. Petitioner and Marcelino Marc
formally advised private respondent of their intention to
partition the subject property and terminate the co-
ownership. However, private respondent refused to
partition the property on the ground that his 12 year-old
son, who is the grandson of spouses Marcelino and
Perla, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.
Issue:
W/N Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the grandson of
petitioner, is a minor beneficiary of the family home. If he
is not, the partition of the family home is proper.

Held/Ratio:
Marcelino Lorenzo IV is not a minor beneficiary of the
family home, therefore, since there is no legal
impediment to partition the subject property, the partition
of the property is proper.
Art. 159 of the FC provides that the family home shall
continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years
or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the
heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. If there are beneficiaries
who survive and are living in the family home, it will
continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10
years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the
family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of
age.
There are three requisites in order to be considered as a
beneficiary of the family home: (1) they must be among
the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the FC; (2)
they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent
for legal support upon the head of the family.
The grandson satisfies the 1st and 2nd requisite: he is a
grandchild of the deceased and has been living in the
family home since 1994, within 10 years from the death
of the decedent. However, he does not satisfy the 3rd
requisite because a grandson cannot demand support

from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are
capable of supporting him. The liability of legal support
falls on his parents, especially his father, the head of his
immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation
upon the parents, and only in their default is the
obligation imposed on the grandparents. (refer to Art.
199, order of support)

(Veneracion)

Veneracion vs. Mancilla
July 20, 2006 Ponente: Callejo, Sr.
Facts:
Elizabeth Mandinueta , married to Geronimo Veneracion
loaned PHP1,200,000.00 from Charlie Mancilla. To
secure the loan, she issued a real estate mortgage over
her residential house and lot.
Elizabeth failed to pay the loan. Mancilla then filed for
the foreclosure of the mortgaged property. The RTC
ruled in favor of Mancilla. Elizabeth appealed to CA
wherein she failed to file her appeal brief. CA dismissed
the appeal. After which, she filed a manifestation stating
that she would not file a brief but she prayed that the
accrued interest be reduced.
When case was remanded to the trial court, the property
was ordered to be executed and it was auctioned
wherein the heirs of Mancilla were the winning bidders.
Upon the death of Geronimo, his children filed a petition
alleging that their parents were common law spouses
that was why Elizabeths status was single when she
mortgaged the property. And that even though Elizabeth
was the only registered owner of the mortgaged
property, Geronimo contributed to its acquisition. They
alleged, therefore that the property was conjugal and
that it being the family home, under Art. 155, it should
be exempted from forced sale.

Issue:
W/N the mortgaged property was conjugal in nature and
could be considered a family home.
Held/ Ratio:
NO. In the case at bar petitioners failed to prove that the
said property was conjugal and that Geronimo
contributed to the acquisition of the property. (Adapt:
They failed to append to their petition copies of the
receipts for the installment of the property allegedly paid
by their father Geronimo which will support their
assertion.) Their allegation that for them proves the
contribution of Geronimo (Elizabeth had no source of
income) was easily rebutted by Elizabeths claim that
she had loaned from Banco Filipino the sum of
PHP1,200,000.00 to pay Mancilla. Furthermore, in
Elizabeths plea that that the accrued interest she was
ordered to pay by RTC was inequitable, she impliedly
admitted the correctness of RTCs decision.

(Allarey)


ARRIOLA v. ARRIOLA

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
Parties Involved: Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola, petitioners, vs. John Nabor Arriola, respondent
Ponente: Austria- Martinez, J.

Facts:
Fidel Arriola and Victoria Calabia (first wife) = John
Fidel Arriola and Vilma G. Arriola (second wife) =
Anthony

When Fidel Arriola died, he left a parcel of land. RTC
ordered the partition thereof among his heirs namely
Vilma, Anthony, and John, in equal shares of 1/3 each.
The said parties failed to agree on how to partition the
land, thus, respondent John sought its sale through a
public auction which the petitioners acceded to.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the
said land.
Petitioners, Vilma and Anthony, opposed to include the
house standing on the subject land.
This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, praying
that petitioners be declared in contempt. RTC denied the
motion.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
praying that he be allowed to proceed with the auction.
CA granted petition.

Issue: WON the public auction should include the subject house.

Regional Trial Court Court of Appeals
The house should not be included because
respondent never alleged its existence in his
complaint for partition or established his co-
ownership thereof
The house should be included because it is a
mere accessory to the subject land owned by the
deceased.
Both properties form part of the estate of the
deceased and are held in co-ownership by his
heirs, the parties herein.
Hence, the partition of said estate should cover not
only the land but the house as well

Held: No
Examining the NATURE of the subject house:
Petitioners claim that said house has been their
residence for 20 years.
Art. 153, FC: The Family Home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence xxx [it] is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to
the extent of the value allowed by law.

Art. 159, FC: The Family Home shall continue despite
the death of one or both spouses xxx for a period of 10
years xxx.
Thus, the Family Home consisting of the subject
house and lot on which it stands cannot be
partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the
co-ownership of the parties, herein. Fidel Arriola died
on March 10, 2003. Thus for 10 years from said date
(until March 10, 2013), or for a longer period, if there is
still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home
he constituted cannot be partitioned, MUCH LESS when
no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise
set aside the restriction and order the partition of the
property.
Purpose of Article 159:
Avert the disintegration of the family unit following the
death of its head
Preserve the family home as the physical symbol of
family love, security and unity

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is partly granted. The house
standing on the subject land is exempted from partition
by public auction within the period provided in Article
159.

In the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate
public auction of the portion of the subject land, which
falls OUTSIDE the specific area of the Family Home.
(Amantillo)

Kelley v. Planters Products, Inc.
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY, complainants v. Planters Products, Inc. and Jorge A.
Ragutana, respondents
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari contending that the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2000-
0188 by the RTC Naga City.
Date: July 9, 2008
Ponenete: Corona, J
Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired
agricultural chemical products on consignment from
respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to
Authers failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an
action for sum of money against him.
After trial on the merits, the Trial court decided in favor of
PPI and issued a writ of execution. Pursuant thereto,
respondent sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana sold on execution
real property covered by TCT No. 15079 located in Naga
City. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of PPI as
the highest bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the said sale,
petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley (Doris)
filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy
in the Trial court on the ground that the subject
property was their family home which was exempt
from execution.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the alleged
family home with damages against Ragutana and PPI.
The case was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
and lack of cause of action. The dismissal was upheld by
the CA.

Issue:

WON a duly constituted family home is exempt from
execution.
Held:
Yes, a duly constituted family home is exempt from
execution. The case should be remanded for further
hearings.
Ratio:
There must be proof that the alleged family home
was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or
by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the
house where they and their family actually reside and
the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be
part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property
of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of
the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its
constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and
P200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to
constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after
the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988)
are constituted as such by operation of law. All
existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled
to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code.

The exemption is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long
as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. (The
Court cited art. 155, the exception to the exemption)

Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among
those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his
favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the
family home is actually worth more than the maximum
amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court
which rendered the judgment for an order directing the
sale of the property under execution. The court shall so
order if it finds that the actual value of the family home
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the
time of its constitution. If the increased actual value
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law in Article
157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons
constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of
the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same
rule and procedure shall apply.
The Court granted the petition only to the extent of
allowing petitioners to adduce evidence in the trial
court that TCT No. 15079 is in fact their family home
as constituted in accordance with the requirements
of law.
Note: prior to elevation to SC, the lower court did not
take into consideration the contention of the petitioner
that the involved property is their family home, and
rendered its decision despite the allegation of such.
(Arnesto)

Albino Josef v. Santos
Albino Josef, petitioner, vs. Otelio Santos, respondent
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
Petitioner was found to be liable to respondent for failing
to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from
respondent on various dates in 1994.
July 16, 2003 RTC granted respondents motion for
issuance of writ of execution.
Aug. 29, 2003 certain personal properties were
auctioned off.
Oct. 28, 2003 a real property located at Marikina City
was sold through public auction.
Petitioner claims that the personal properties belong to
his children, and that the real property was his family
home, thus exempt from execution.

CA dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration,
hence this case.

Issue: WON RTC Order dated July 16, 2003 is valid.

Held: NO.

Ratio:
RTC did not take into account petitioners allegations in
his opposition that the house and lot in which he was
residing at the time was his family home thus exempt
from execution.
The court should have made an earnest determination of
the truth to petitioners claim that the house and lot in
which he and his children resided was their duly
constituted family home; thus, the order is null and void.
RTC should have observed the following procedure:
Determine if petitioners obligation to respondent falls
under either of the exceptions under Article 155 of the
Family Code;
Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioners claim that
the property was his family home; conduct an ocular
inspection of the premises; an examination of the title;
an interview of members of the community where the
alleged family home is located, in order to determine if
petitioner actually resided within the premises of the
claimed family home; order a submission of photographs
of the premises, depositions, and/or affidavits of proper
individuals/parties; or a solemn examination of the
petitioner, his children and other witnesses. At the same
time, the respondent is given the opportunity to cross-
examine and present evidence to the contrary;
If the property is accordingly found to constitute
petitioners family home, the court should determine:
if the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred
prior to, or after, the effectivity of the Family Code;
if petitioners spouse is still alive, as well as if there are
other beneficiaries of the family home;
if the petitioner has more than one residence for the
purpose of determining which of them, if any, is his
family home; and
its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying
the provisions of Articles 157 and 160 of the Family
Code.
The same is true with respect to personal properties.
RTC had enough time to conduct the crucial inquiry. The
courts inaction on petitioners plea resulted in serious
injustice to the latter, not to mention that its failure to
conduct an inquiry based on the latters claim bordered
on gross ignorance of the law.
Petitioner claimed exemption from execution of his
family home soon after respondent filed the motion for
issuance of a writ of execution, thus giving notice to the
trial court and respondent that a property exempt from
execution may be in danger of being subjected to levy
and sale. Thereupon, the trial court is called to observe
the procedure as herein laid out; on the other hand, the
respondent should observe the procedure prescribed in
Article 160 of the Family Code, that is, to obtain an order
for the sale on execution of the petitioners family home,
if so, and apply the proceeds less the maximum
amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the Code
which should remain with the petitioner for the rebuilding
of his family home to his judgment credit. Instead,
both the trial court and respondent completely ignored
petitioners argument that the properties subject of the
writ are exempt from execution.
(Azis)


XII.Paternity and Filiation

Perido vs. Perido (1975)
Leonora Perido, joined by husband Manuel Pirote, Inocencia Perido, Albenio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, joined
by husband Bienvenido Balyao, Leticia Perido, joined by husband Felix Villaruz, Eufemia, Consolacion, Alfredo, George,
Amparo, Wilfredo, Margarita, (all surnamed Perido); Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde, petitioners vs. Maria, Sofronio,
Juan, Gonzalo, Pacita, Magdalena, Alicia, Josefina, Fe, Teresa and Luz (all surnamed Perido), respondents
Ponente: Makalintal, C.J.:
Nature: Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental that the children of Lucio Perido with his second wife are legitimate.
Facts:
- Lucio Perido contracted two marriages during his
lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong. They had
three children (and 13 grandchildren and 3 great
grandchildren).
- After the death of Benita, he contracted another
marriage with Marcelina Balinguat and they had five
children (and 8 grandchildren). Lucio died in 1942, while
Marcelina died in 1943.
- In August 1960, the children and grandchildren of the
first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a
document denominated as Declaration of Heirship
and Extra-Judicial Partition, whereby they partitioned
among themselves eight lots, all of the Cadastral Survey
of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental.
- The children of his first marriage have second
thoughts about the partition and so they filed a complaint
in the CFI of Negros Occidental against the children of
the second marriage. They were praying for the
annulment of the Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
Judicial Partition. Petitioners alleged, among other
things, that the five children of Lucio with his second
wife Marcelina are all illegitimate and therefore no
successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido.
- Both CFI and CA held that the children are legitimate.
Hence appeal.
Issue: WON the children of Lucio in his second marriage
are legitimate? (Topical)
Held/Ratio:
Yes, they are legitimate. The Court concluded that the
five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Balinguat
were born during their marriage, and therefore
legitimate.
The petitioners insisted that said children were
illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born
out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Peridos
first wife, while the last two were also born out of
wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before
or after their marriage. Petitioners also contended that
Lucio was still a widower, as late as 1923, as shown on
the face of certificates of title issued to him in said year.
However, evidence shows that Lucio Peridos first
wife died during Spanish regime and under such
circumstance Lucio Perido had no legal impediment
to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their
first child in 1900. With regard to the civil status of
Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued
to him in 1923, the CA correctly held that the statement
was not conclusive to show that he was not actually
married to Marcelina. Furthermore, it is weak and
insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons
living together as husband and wife are married to
each other. This presumption, especially where the
legitimacy of the issue is involved (like in this case) may
be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of
those who allege the illegitimacy.
(Badi)

Social Security System vs. Aguas

Social Security System, petitioner, vs. Rosanna H. Aguas, Janet H. Aguas, and minor Jeylnn H. Aguas, represented by
her Legal Guardian, Rosanna H. Aguas, respondents.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Date: 27 February 2006
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.
Facts:
Pablo Aguas (Pablo) died and his surviving spouse
Rosanna Aguas (Rosanna), was claiming from SSS for
death benefits. Included in the claim was that the
deceased had a minor child with her, Jeylnn Aguas
(Jeylnn).
The deceaseds sister contended to the SSS that
Rosanna left the family abode for another man for more
than six years and that her brother did not have a
legitimate child with the respondent child. The SSS then
conducted an investigation regarding the statement of
Pablos sister.
SSSs investigation turned out to be consistent with the
allegation of Pablos sister- Rosanna left Pablo more
than 6 years before the latters death; she was living with
another man named Romeo dela Pea; she has children
with Romeo, including Jeylnn, aka Jenelyn (by another
birth certificate, born before Pablos death; Pablo was
incapable of having a child with Rosanna. Accordingly,
SSS advised Rosanna to refund the pension that she
already received.
They then requested SSS for reconsideration which was
denied. They also petitioned to the Social Security
Commission (SSC) for the restoration and repayment of
the pension, where they were joined by Janet Aguas
(Janet) claiming that she was an adopted child of the
deceased Pablo. The backed their petition with the
following: marriage certificate of Rosanna and Pablo,
Janets and Jeylnns certificates of live birth, and Pablos
death certificate.
The SSC ruled against this cases respondents on the
following findings: Rosanna committed adultery; Jeylnn
Aguas and Jenelyn dela Pea are one and the same
and evidence show that she was Rosannas child by
Romeo and not by Pablo.
Rosanna, et al then appealed to CA which ruled in their
favour on the following grounds: birth certificates of
Janet and Jeylnn show that they were Pablos children
and it was not shown that Rosanna ceased to receive
support from the deceased and that her alleged adultery
was not proven. And even if Rosanna was married to
Romeo, such marriage will be void which thus will not
make her not dependent to Pablos support

Issues:
WON Rosanna, Jeylnn, and Janet are entitled to the
death benefits by virtue of Pablos death.

Held and Ratio:
No. Even though Rosanna had proven that she was
Pablos legitimate spouse (by marriage certificate), she
was not able to prove that she was his dependent before
his death. Dependency must be shown and cannot be
presumed with the fact of marriage alone. Wife who left
her husband for more than 6 years cannot be said to be
dependent upon the support of the latter. They
separated because of the commotion brought by Romeo
claiming that Jeylnn should be named after him because
he, and not Pablo, is the father of the child. The child
was registered and baptized (again after doing both
under the name of Jeylnn Aguas) with the name Jenelyn
dela Pea and with mother the same as Jeylnn,
Rosanna. Jenelyns and Jeyllns date of birth were only
three months apart, an impossibility given that they have
the same mother. Thus, Jeylln and Jenelyn are one and
the same.
Yes. Her birth certificate with Pablos signature as
father is competent evidence of paternity.
Furthermore, the deceased did not exercise his
personal right to assail Jeylnns legitimacy.
No. Presumption of legitimacy under FC Art. 164 cannot
stand for Janet because her date of birth was not
substantially proven. Art. 164 presumption requisites: (1)
childs parent legally married, (2) childs birth occurred
during subsistence of mentioned marriage. The record of
birth she presented was not verified by the civil register.
Further, Janets adoption did not undergo any legal
proceeding which should have yielded documents that

she was indeed legally adopted by the deceased (thus
not legally adopted). Only legally adopted, and not
merely adopted children are considered dependent
children (of course, aside from legitimate children) by
Sec. 8 (e) of RA 1161.
(Bayalan
Re: Baby M

Nature: Appeal I the Supreme Court of New Jersey
Ponente: Wilentz, CJ
FACTS:
William Stern (natural father of Baby M) and Mary Beth
Whitehead (surrogate mother) entered into a surrogacy
contract for a fee of $10,000. It provides that Sterns
wife, was infertile, that they wanted a child, and that Mrs.
Whitehead was willing to provide that child as the mother
through artificial insemination of Sterns sperm.
Mrs. Whitehead husband was also a party to the
contract; Mrs Stern was not.
The Infertility Center of New York (ICNY) arranged for
the surrogacy contract.
Reason of spouses Stern:
Mrs. Stern has multiple sclerosis, rendering pregnancy a
serious health risk
Mr. Sterns family had been killed in the Holocaust.
Thus, he wanted to continue his bloodline.
Reason of Mrs. Whitehead:
She feels sorry with families who could have no children
She also wanted the $10,000 to help her family
When Mrs. Whitehead gave birth to Baby M, she
turned over the child to the Sterns. However, she felt
deeply disturbed with unbearable sadness.
BASICALLY, there was a struggle between the Sterns
and Whiteheads. This commotion even resulted to the
Whiteheads fleeing to Florida and hiding from the Sterns
in order to keep (sort of kidnapping) Baby M.
Trial Court:
Surrogacy contract is VALID.
The trial court devoted the major portion of its opinion to
the question of the babys best interests.
It awarded the custody to Mr. Stern based on the same
kind of evidence and analysis as might be expected had
no surrogacy contract existed.

Mrs. Whites contentions:
The surrogacy contract conflicts with public policy
She asserts tender years doctrine, wherein the child
should be place with the mother absent a showing of
unfitness.
Sterns contentions:
The spouses invoke their constitutional right of
privacy right of procreation, and the right of consentin
adults to deal with matters of reproduction as they see
fit.
Childs best interest would be ensured if custody is given
to them
Guardian ad litem:
Based on her role (to protect the childs best interest),
she believed that the Sterns should have primary
custody, with no visitation rights for Mrs. Whitehead at
least until Baby M reaches maturity
IMPT: This position does not rest on the validity of the
surrogacy contract


SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
HELD:
The surrogacy contract is INVALID. However,
Custody was granted to the Sterns, with visitation rights
for Mrs. Whitehead.
RATIO:
It is in direct conflict with existing statutes,
specifically:
Laws prohibiting the use of money in connection with
adoptions
Laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or
abandonment before termination of parental rights is
ordered or an adoption is granted
Laws that make surrender of custody and consent to
adoption revocable in private placement adoptions
It is in conflict with public policies of the State,
specifically:
Protection of the child from unnecessary separation from
his natural parents
Rights of natural parents should be equal concerning the
child

It is in direct conflict with existing statute

Stipulation in the
contract
In violation of:
Mr. Stern paid ICNY
$7,500 while Mrs.
Whitehead received $10,
000 for her services
Laws prohibiting the use of money in connection with adoptions

Evil in baby bartering:
Child is sold without regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable
parent
Natural mother does not receive the benefit of counselling and guidance to
assist her in making the decision
Adoptive parents may not be fully informed of the natural parents medical
history
The termination of Mrs.
Whiteheads parental
rights was not approved
by the DFYS. There was
also no showing of
abandonment or neglect
on her part.
Laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before
termination of parental rights is ordered or an adoption is granted

Three forms of termination:
An action by an approved agency
An action by the Division of Youth and Family Services (DFYS)
An action in connection with a private placement adoption

The surrogacy contract did
not contain a clause
Laws that make surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in

giving her a right to
rescind. It was intended to
be an irrevocable
consent
private placement adoptions

There is only one irrevocable consent: a consent to surrender of custody
and placement with an approved agency or with DYFS

It is in conflict with public policies of the State
Protection of the child from unnecessary separation
from his natural parents
A child, instead of starting off its life with as much
peace and security as possible, finds itself
immediately in a tug-of-war between contending
mother and father.
Rights of natural parents should be equal
concerning the child
In contrast, the surrogacy contracts purpose is to
give the father the exclusive right to the child by
destroying the rights of the mother

Differences between an adoption and a surrogacy contract
Adoption Surrogacy Contract
Adoption actually relieves the natural mother of
supporting an infant, which is in some sense the
equivalent payment
Cannot survive without money
The use of money DOES NOT PRODUCE THE
PROBLEM.

Conception -> Birth -> Funds are offered
The PROBLEM is the purchase of the womans
procreative capacity, at the risk of her life

Funds/Money offered -> Conception -> Birth
Does not lead to the highest paying, ill suited,
adoptive parents
The highest bidders will presumably become the
adoptive parents
Mothers consent to surrender her child is
revocable
Consent occurs so early that no amount of advice
would satisfy the potential mothers need, yet the
consent is irrevocable
The difference that the unwanted pregnancy is unintended while the situation of the surrogate
mother is voluntary and intended is REALLY NOT SIGNIFICANT.

CUSTODY & VISITATION RIGHTS ISSUES

CUSTODY WAS GIVEN TO THE STERNS

The best interests of Baby M calls for the custody in the Sterns.
Whiteheads household:
Doubtful stability of their household due to serious financial troubles
Mr. Whiteheads employment was always at risk due to his alcoholism
Mrs. Whitehead had not worked for quite some time
Mrs. Whitehead perceived herself as omnipotent and omniscient. (She says that she knows what her children are
thinking; she knows what Baby Ms cries mean)
Sterns household:
Finances are more than adequate. Household is stable.
During the 1 years of custody, Baby M has done very well
Best interests does not contain within it any idealized lifestyle. All other factors must be considered.

MRS. WHITEHEAD WAS ENTITLED TO VISITATION
The nature of this visitation right is to be determined by the court. Case remanded.
(Beley)

Johnson vs. Calvert
Anna Johnson (Plaintiff and Appellant), v. Mark Calvert et al. (Defendants and Respondents)
May 20, 1993
Ponente: Panelli, J.
Facts:
Mark and Crispina Calvert are married and wants to
have a child. However, Crispina was forced to undergo a
hysterectomy (surgical removal of the uterus) in 1984.
Her ovaries still remain capable of producing eggs. In
light with that, the couple considered surrogacy. In 1989,
upon hearing about the plight of Crispina, Anna Johnson
offered to serve as a surrogate for the Calverts.
Anna and the couple signed a contract agreeing that an
embryo created by the sperm of Mark and the egg of
Crispina would be implanted in Anna. The child born
would be taken into Mark and Crispina's home as their
child and that Anna would relinquish all parental rights
to the child in favor of Mark and Crispina. In return, Anna
will be paid $10,000 in a series of instalments and will
get a life insurance
On January 19, 1990, the zygote was implanted on
January 19, 1990 and Anna has been confirmed
pregnant in less than a month.
The relations between the two parties deteriorated. Mark
learned that Anna had not disclosed she had suffered
several stillbirths and miscarriages. Anna felt the
Calverts did not do enough to obtain the required
insurance policy, felt abandoned during an onset of
premature labor in June.
Anna sent the Calverts a letter demanding the balance
of the payments due her or else she would refuse to give
up the child to which the Calverts responded with a
lawsuit, seeking a declaration they were the legal
parents of the unborn child. In consequence, Anna filed
her own action to be declared the mother of the child.

The child was born. In the blood test results, Anna was
excluded as the genetic mother. The parties agreed to a
court order providing that the child would remain with
Mark and Crispina on a temporary basis with visits by
Anna.
The trial court ruled that Mark and Crispina were the
child's genetic, biological and natural parents and that
Anna had no parental rights to the child. The court also
terminated the order allowing visitation. With this
judgment, Anna appeals.

Main Issue:
Who is the childs natural mother under the California
Law? Crispina (the wife, whose ovaries were used to
form the zygote) or Anna (the gestating woman)?
Held/ Ratio:
It is Crispina. She who intended to procreate the child -
that is, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise
as her own- is the natural mother under California law
Under the Uniform Parentage Act
5
, maternity could be
established either by presentation of blood test evidence
(used by Crispina) or by a womans proof of her giving
birth to the child (used by Anna). The said act does not
give preference to which evidence will be given more
weight such that the one who uses that evidence will be
the one that will be favoured as the mother of the child.
Given this deadlock, the court then resorted to
considering the intent of the parties in the surrogacy
agreement. It is not legally possible to rule that both are
the childs natural mother since for any child, California
law recognizes only one natural mother despite
advances in reproductive technology.
In this case, it was Crispina, together with Mark, who
intended the birth of the child and took the steps
necessary to effect in vitro fertilization. If not for their
intention, the child would not exist. Anna is just a mere
instrument in the procreation of the Calverts child. Upon
entering the contract with the Calverts, Anna intended to

5
Uniform Brigandage Act- its purpose was to eliminate the legal
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. It bases
parent and child rights on the existence of a parent and child
relationship rather than on the marital status of the parents.

bring Crispinas child. It was not the interest of the
parties to donate a zygote to Anna. Had the parties
known that Anna would be intending to claim marital
rights over their children, the Calverts would probably
not permit Anna to carry the zygote. As such, Anna's
later change of heart should vitiate the determination
that Crispina is the child's natural mother.
Drawing an analogy to artificial insemination, Anna
argues that Mark and Crispina were mere genetic
donors. Thus, they are not entitled to any constitutional
protection. However, the analogy is inaccurate. In
artificial insemination one intends to donate genetic
material to someone. The Calverts did not intend to
donate their zygote to Anna when they resorted to
surrogacy. Rather, they intended to procreate a child
genetically related to them.
(Beltran)

In Re Adoption of Anonymous
Preliminary Information:
2 types of artificial insemination
1. Homologous AI (AIH) -wife is impregnated with
husbands semen
2. Heterologus AI (AID) -artificial insemination of wife
by anonymous third-party.
-may be consensual (with husbands consent) or
nonconsensual (w/o husbands consent)
Facts:
During the marriage, the child was born out of
consensual AID. Husband was listed as the father in
the birth certificate.
The couple separated and later divorced. Both the
separation agreement and the divorce decree declared
the child to be the daughter and child of the couple.
Wife was granted support and the husband visitation
rights. He faithfully supported and visited child.
Wife remarried and new husband wanted to adopt the
child. Under the law, for the adoption to be valid, consent
of both parents are required. 1
st
husband refused to give
his consent.
Petitioner wife claimed his consent was not required
because he was not the parent of the child.
ISSUE:
1. WON father of child born out of consensual AID by
wife is a parent whose consent is require for adoption
of such child by anotherYES
2. WON a child born after consensual AID during the
marriage is a legitimate child entitled to rights and
privileges of naturally conceived child of same
marriageYES
RATIO:
1. Term father is not limited to a biologic or natural
father. The determinative factor is whether the legal
relationship of father and child exists. The principle of
equitable estoppel was cited in the case of Peope v.
Sorensen where it was held that: a reasonable man who,
because of his inability to procreate, actively participates
and CONSENTS to his wifes artificial insemination in
hope that a child will be produced whom they will treat
as their own, KNOWS that such behavior carries with it
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES. One who CONSENTS to
the production of a child cannot create temporary
relation to be assumed and disclaimed at will, but the
arrangement must be of character as to impose an
obligation of supporting those for whose existence he is
directly responsible.
2. In Gursky v. Gursky, it was held that a child born from
consensual AID was an illegitimate child. Court did not
find this ruling as persuasive because the donor is
anonymous and the wife does not actually have sexual
intercourse or commit adultery with him. Also, the
husband himself gave his consent so that there can be
no marital infidelity. Child is not born out of wedlock but
in and during wedlock.
Also New York has a strong policy in favor of legitimacy
wherein children born out of void and voidable marriages
are legitimate. In the face of such policy, it would seem
absurd to hold illegitimate a child born during a valid
marriage, of parents desiring but unable to conceive a
child, and both consenting and agreeing to the
impregnation of the mother by a carefully and medically
selected anonymous donor.

(Carrasco)

Do New Reproductive Techniques Threaten the Family?
What about surrogate motherhood disturbs people? Fears about commercialization of childbearing & childrearing. Fears
of exploitation of women & of the poor. Fear that surrogacy involves an attack on our concept of the family.

The picture of a mother handing over her child & getting paid for it does not fit easily with current values or with
conventional notions of family. Surrogacy must also inevitably harm the older children whom most surrogates have. The
surrogates parents & even her in-laws are also very upset that their grandchild is being given away or sold. The conflict
can cause a permanent rift in the family. Other new reproductive techniques are like surrogacy in this respect, & they also
tend to undermine our concept of family.

Surrogacy arrangements usually use artificial insemination. Artificial insemination is the oldest & simplest of the
reproductive techniques other than sexual intercourse. It has been in use for more than a century. It involves depositing
ejaculated sperm in a womans uterus with a needleless syringe. It is usually performed by a doctor, but it is simple
enough that individuals can perform it themselves. A woman may be inseminated with her husbands sperm (AIH) or a
donors sperm (AID) when the husband is sterile or does not want to pass on his genes. Single women who want children
also use AID. Usually, when doctor performs AID, the woman & the donor remain anonymous.

Some raise moral objections to artificial insemination. To beget without the possibility of a continuing father-child
relationship would be to withdraw biological potential from personal potential. The donors action, made possible by
human science, is anti-human. But artificial insemination is legal. Difficult question common to modern reproductive
techniques such as artificial insemination: whether artificial insemination should be available to facilitate parenthood for
anyone other than married couples. Analogous to conventional sexual intercourse: state policy to limit to married couples
sexual intercourse & childbearing resulting from it, but anti-fornication laws have limited effectiveness.

In vitro fertilization (IVF) refers to the process by which a doctor stimulates a womans ovaries, removes several eggs in a
procedure called a laparoscopy, & fertilizes them in a Petri dish. When each egg has divided a few times, the doctor can
transfer the eggs to the uterus of the woman, with the hope of producing a test-tube baby. The success rate is low less
than 20%. Another use of IVF is to transfer the fertilized ova to the uterus of a woman other than the donor ovum
donation. Ovum donation may also be done by fertilizing the ovum in the donor for a short time, then washing it out &
transferring it to the uterus of the gestational mother.

These procedures raise questions about the meaning of the genetic tie. When the egg is donated by one woman &
incubated in another, the intention might be either (1) that the gestational mother would be the mother to the child, or (2)
that the egg donor, perhaps unable to bear the child herself, would be the mother to the child after the gestational mother
gives birth. The gestational mother is a surrogate.

1987: a gestational surrogate in South Africa gave birth to her own grandchildren. This illustrates the complications which
surrogacy can bring to traditional family structure. Why not welcome these new developments? They are used to create
families for couples who could not procreate. The Catholic Church, which objects to separating sex from procreation, says
it threatens the sanctity of the traditional family unit, for a third party to have any role in donating or gestating the child. But
this objection does not explain why it is important that the childrearing function not be separated from childbearing. & the
practice of adoption, which the Catholic Church supports, similarly involves separation of childbearing & childrearing.

Others, conscious of the injustices & inequities in the traditional family structure, laud the change in social structure that
new reproductive approaches would entail.

We lack the technology to fully develop a baby outside the womb. Basic issue: whether there is a legal obligation to
transfer all fertilized ova to a receptive uterus. Case for transfer: each fertilized ova represents life. Those who oppose
abortion would predictably also oppose death for these embryos.

IVF raises abortion issues. In a case where a mother gave birth to quintuplets out of IVF (which is an unusually high
survival ratio), some doctors advise the abortion of the excesses taking into consideration the health risks. On moral
grounds, they believe that these selective abortions are unassailable, because their purpose is to preserve life to enable
the remaining fetuses to survive. It is possible to avoid the abortion debate & the ethical issues by having a mandatory
transfer policy. Problems with this policy: (1) when a mother becomes ill or dies, & (2) restricting research &
experimentation.

Should we allow embryos to be the subjects of research & experimentation? This will contribute to medical advances
brain tissue transplant from aborted fetuses has contributed dramatically to the treatment of Parkinsons disease.
Ethicists: such uses of fetuses could create personal & commercial motives for women to conceive & abort; fetuses would
become organ farms. Other related issue: how long researchers should be entitled to keep the embryos alive (experts:
only 14 days after conception). Rationale for 14 days: about that long for a fertilized egg to implant naturally in the uterine
wall.

Consequence of removing embryo from womans body: possibility of genetic experimentation & manipulation. Option not
to transfer defective eggs small step from diagnosing hereditary disease before implantation or even allowing parents
to select gender of their offspring. If society is to allow research, it must decide for what purpose it will allow embryos to be
created. To enhance opportunity of pregnancy? To superovulate (to produce & retrieve more eggs than to be used) to
avoid subsequent laparoscopy? To facilitate research? To arrange for egg donation from women not seeking pregnancy?
This may create a profitable occupation for women willing to sell their eggs. As regards the preservation & storage of
fertilized ova, time may come when there is a commercial market for frozen embryos created from genes of celebrities
an example of a fundamental social change.

Questions raised as regards frozen embryos: (1) Is it permissible to transfer the embryo after the parents have died? (2) Is
the frozen embryo a person who can inherit when her genetic parents die? (3) Should the gestational mother be
considered the sole legal parent in the event of transfer?

Parents entirely capable of producing their own biological child by themselves could acquire the option of producing a
child who is genetically linked to both parents without the necessity of undergoing pregnancy or childbirth. Demand
increases for surrogates. Possible exploitation of poor & Third World women. With or without regulation, modern
reproductive technology may sharply transform our views about the family, even human life. Professor Schultz: from a
time when parenting is determined by fate to a time when it will be determined by decision-making is a positive
development. She suggests that mutually binding contracts are appropriate media for decision-making concerning
childbearing & childrearing.


XII. PATERNITY AND FILIATION

D. Legitimated Children
Estate of De Los Santos v. Luciano
Intestate estate of the deceased Antonio Escobar. THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, administrator.
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUCIANA DE LOS SANTOS, represented by the executor JOSE SANTOS, claimant-
appellee,
vs. MARIA LUCIANO, claimant-appellant.
Date: August 11, 1934
Ponente: Villareal, J.
Nature: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring Luciana de los Santos, wife of deceased
Antonio Escobar, as his sole heir, succeeded by her heirs when she died.
Facts:
On January 1, 1837, a girl four days old, alleged to be a
natural daughter of Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra,
was baptized in the Ermita church and given the name of
Tomasa Escobar.
Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra were married on
August 2, 1838, and subsequently had legitimate
children named Antonio and Fortunato.
Tomasa Escobar grew up and lived under the care of the
spouses Leon and Josefa Escobar until she married.
Said spouses supported her, treated and presented her
as their daughter.
When Tomasa Escobar became a widow, she went back
to live with said spouses, together with her only
daughter, Maria Luciano who was born on December 17,
1864.
Leon Escobar built a house for Tomasa Escobar and her
daughter and the two lived there. He visited them in said
house frequently and sent Antonio and Fortunato to
keep them company at night.
Upon Tomasa's death, Leon took said Maria Luciano
into his home until she married and was taken by her
husband to the province.
Leon died on February 12, 1887. When Fortunato
became ill, his brother Antonio asked Maria Luciano to
come to Manila to nurse him, sending her money for
passage.
Upon Fortunato's death, Antonio took Maria Luciano into
his home where she lived Antonio's death.
Maria Luciano claims to be the legitimate niece of the
deceased Antonio Escobar, alleging that she is the
legitimate daughter of Tomasa Escobar, a legitimated
sister of said deceased Antonio Escobar by the
subsequent marriage of their parents, and therefore the
only heir to the estate of her said uncle.

Issues: (1)W/N Tomasa Escobar was a natural daughter
of the spouses Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra,
legitimated by subsequent marriage of the latter
(2)W/N Maria Luciano, as legitimate daughter, born
under the prior legislation, of Tomasa Escobar (a child
legitimated by subsequent marriage) is entitled to inherit
from the intestate estate of her uncle, who is a
legitimate son of her mother's parents, and who died on
July 21, 1932, under the new law (Civil Code)

Held/Ratio:
(1) Yes. Tomasa Escobar was born on December 29,
1836, and her alleged parents Leon Escobar and Josefa
Esguerra were married on August 2, 1838, that is under
the prior legislation which is Law I, Title XIII, Partida IV.
Her status as a legitimated daughter should therefore be
determined by said law which reads as follows:

Law I, Title XIII, Partida IV.Moreover, the children
which a man has by a woman whom he keeps as a
concubine will be legitimate, if he marries her
afterwards; for although children of this kind are not
legitimate when they are born, marriage has such
force that, as soon as the father and mother are
married, the children become for that reason,
legitimate.XXX
It is a well-established doctrine that a child is considered
natural when at the time of its conception or birth its
parents could have married without dispensation and
when the father has expressly or tacitly acknowledged it.
The fact that before and after their marriage the spouses
Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra had Tomasa
Escobar with them and their legitimate children and that
they supported her, took care of her, and treated and
presented her to society as their daughter, and the fact
that they built a house for her and her daughter, all show
that said spouses Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra
acknowledged her as their daughter.
Such acknowledgment, in addition to the freedom of her
parents to marry without dispensation at the time of her
conception or birth, gave Tomasa Escobar the status of
a natural child of Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra,
the subsequent marriage of the latter legitimated her.

(2)Yes. CFI decision reversed. Claimant-appellant
Maria Luciano is declared to be the sole heir to the
intestate estate of Antonio Escobar.
Applying the twelfth transitory provision of the Civil
Code, inasmuch as Antonio Escobar died after the Civil
Code took effect, his inheritance should be allotted and
divided in accordance with said Code.
The CFI, in rejecting Maria's claim to her uncle's estate,
based its opinion on article 943 of the Civil Code which
provides that "a natural the legitimate child had no right
to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged
it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the
natural or legitimated child," interpreting the word
"legitimated" to mean a child legitimated by royal
concession as well as one legitimated by subsequent
marriage. However, such interpretation could not have
been the intention of the legislator because children
legitimate by subsequent marriage have the same rights
as legitimate children, and those legitimated by royal
concession only have the same rights as acknowledged
natural children. The word "legitimated" as employed in
article 943 of the Civil Code, has the same meaning as
"natural", and thus refers only to a child legitimated by
royal concession and not to one legitimated by
subsequent marriage. Thus, article 943 is not applicable
in Maria's case but Article 953.
Applying Art 953 of the Civil Code, when Antonio
Escobar died intestate on July 21, 1932, his niece,
the herein claimant-appellant Maria Luciano,
daughter of his sister legitimated by subsequent
marriage of their parents, was entitled to inherit the
full ownership of the other half, the usufruct of
which belonged to the surviving spouse. However,
the usufructuary right of the widow Luciana delos
Santos was extinguished upon her death which took
place on December 27, 1932, thereby consolidating
the naked ownership with the usfruct of the other
half in the herein claimant-appellant Maria Luciano.
-Ms. Milaor-


Ramirez v. Gmur
In the matter of the estate of Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller. Ana M. RAMIREZ, executrix & appellant,
vs. Otto GMUR, as guardian of minors Esther Renate, Carmen Maria & Leontina Elizabeth all surnamed Mory, claimant &
appellant

Date: Aug. 5, 1918 Nature: Appeal from CFI Iloilo judgment

Facts:
Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a Switzerland native,
resided in the Philippine Islands. He married Doa Ana
M. Ramirez. They had no children.
Samuel died in Iloilo on June 29, 1913. He left a
valuable estate w/c he disposed by will.
Will was probated Aug. 1913. His widow, Ana, was
appointed executrix & letters testamentary were issued
to her.
All properties were given to the widow except Swiss
properties w/c were given to his brothers and sister.
Samuel, in making the will, ignored the possible claims
of 2 sets of children born to his natural daughter, Leona
Castro.
Biographical facts regarding Leona
born in Bacolod on April 11, 1875 to Felisa Castro
(mother) & unknown father. Upon the margin of her
original baptismal entry had an annotation w/c provides
that Samuel recognized Leona in a public document &
such was authenticated by signature of Fr. Ferrero. Fr.
Ferrero attested to this fact.
Leona was taken into Samuels family & she was
brought up as a member of the family. Samuel tacitly
recognized & treated Leona as his daughter.
1895: Leona married Frederick von Kauffman, British
born in HK who lived in Iloilo. They had 3 children.
April 1899: Frederick brought Leona to Switzerland to
recuperate where she was placed in a sanatorium
(hospital. Illness not specified.) Frederick went back to
the Phil while Leona was left in Switzerland.
Leona informed H that she wanted to remain free & did
not want to resume common life w/him. So in 1904,
Frederick went to Paris to obtain divorce under French
laws. Divorce was decreed on Jan. 5, 1905 in favor of H
& W was in default. Leona was then staying in Paris but
no evidence that she was permanently domiciled there.
Leona became attracted to Dr. Ernest Emil Mory,
physician in Swiss sanatorium. He was previously
married to but now divorced from Helena Wolpman.
Ernest & Leona had a daughter named Leontina
Elizabeth born on July 21, 1900. They got married in
London on May 5, 1905. Two more daughters were born
after the marriage (Carmen Maria & Esther).
Leona died Oct. 6, 1910.
Around Feb. 20, 1914: Otto Gmur appeared as guardian
of 3 Mory claimants.
Ana insists that WRT Mory claimants, Samuel did not
recognize Leona. She further claims that Leontina, the
eldest of the Mory children should be considered as the
legitimate child of the 1
st
marriage since she was born
while the marriage was still subsisting. SC finds last
argument untenable. Current contention is that she was
legitimated by Ernest & Leonas subsequent marriage.
With regards to the 2 younger Mory children, its argued
that theyre legitimate being born after the marriage of
their parents w/c is claimed to be valid.
Dec. 29, 1915: CFI concluded that Leona was Samuels
recognized natural daughter & if she were alive, shed be
his forced heir entitled to 1/3 of his estate. Leontina
Elizabeth was declared a legit daughter whereas
Carmen & Esther are illegitimate. Leontina entitled to 1/3
of the estate and remaining 2/3 to Ana. Both Gmur &
Ana appealed.
Frederick appeared as guardian of his own children in
the proceedings. Petition was granted on March 24,
1916. He then filed a petition on April 1, 1916 setting
forth rts of his children to share in the estate. On April
26, 1916, Gmur complained that matter has been
decided already on Dec. 29, 1915, Ana denied
Fredericks allegations. Frederick insists that the decree
of divorce was invalid & that all 3 Mory children are
offspring of adulterous relations & that his children, being
the legitimate offspring, are alone entitled to participate
in the proceedings.
CFI decided on Nov. 14, 1916 that Leona was the
acknowledged natural daughter of Samuel & that the 3

kids from her 1
st
marriage were legitimate and were
entitled to share in Samuels estate. Decision excluded
Mory claimants. Gmur appealed.
Both appeals were consolidated.

Issues:
1. WON Leona is a recognized natural daughter of
Samuel. .
2. WON the Mory children are entitled to inherit.
3. WON the probate of a will affects the rights of forced
heirs who dont appear to contest the probate.
4. WON an order for the distribution of an estate is
conclusive & final as against persons who are not before
the court.

Held: CFI decision admitting Leontina to participate in
the estate is reversed. Fredericks children admitted to
share equally in 1/3 of estate. In other respects, Nov. 14,
1916 decision affirmed. (1. YES. 2. NO. 3. NO. 4. NO.)

Ratio
(on issue 1)YES. she is a recognized daughter of
Samuel.
Prior to her first marriage, she was in an uninterrupted
enjoyment of de facto status of natural child & treated as
such by Samuel.
Document presented by Fr. Ferrero admissible since
hes the custodian of church records. Original document
not needed since they have shown that diligent search
was made to find it, to no avail. Thus, secondary
evidence presented by the priest is sufficient.
Applicable provision: Law 11 of Toro w/c became Law 1,
title 5, book 10 of the Novisima Recopilacion w/c
provides that recognition could be established by proof
of acts on part of the parent unequivocally recognizing
the status of his child. This is different from CC Art. 131
provision w/c provides that acknowledgment must be
made in the record of birth, by will or in other public
instrument. Regardless of what provision is applied, its
sufficiently shown that Leona was recognized.
On Anas contention that only children born of persons
free to marry may possess status of recognized natural
child: There being no evidence to show Felisa Castros
status at the time Leona was born, she will be presumed
single or widow. Court cant entertain contrary
presumption that Felisas guilty of adultery.
As a recognized natural daughter, had she survived her
dad, she would have been his forced heir (CC Art. 807
(3) & 939) & entitled to 1/3 of the inheritance (CC Art.
842).
(on issue 2)NO. The Mory children are not entitled to
inherit.
Fredericks children are legitimate & entitled to inherit,
thus no need to discuss.
With respect to Leontina (eldest) of Mory children: first
marriage was still subsisting when she was born thus
shes an offspring of an adulterous intercourse w/c is not
capable of legitimation (CC Art. 119).
Divorce is invalid & cant be recognized in courts of the
Republic of the Philippines. French tribunal has no
jurisdiction to entertain an action for dissolution of
marriage contracted in the Phil by persons domiciled
here esp since such marriage is indissoluble under Phil
laws. Although the spouses (first marriage) have
traveled to different places, all those stays were limited &
thus we cant say that they have established their
domicile elsewhere. It has been established that court of
a country in w/c neither spouse is domiciled & w/c
one/both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their
matrimonial status & a divorce granted by such court is
not entitled to recognition anywhere. Going to one place
for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce w/o intention to
remain in that place is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
on courts of that state esp if cause of divorce is not
recognized by the laws of the state of that persons own
domicile. During the time they obtained divorce decree,
the Phil law provided that a valid marriage can only be
dissolved by death of one of the parties. The law invoked
in obtaining the divorce allowed divorce where wife has
been guilty of adultery/husband guilty of concubinage.
Evidently, this should not be upheld since it is repugnant
to the moral sensibilities of our people & its contrary to
law.
The divorce being invalid, the claims of the Mory children
should then be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated & acknowledged natural children,
excluding kids of adulterous relations. Descendants

under CC Art. 941 cant include illegitimates born of
adulterous relations.
(on issue 3) NO. The probate of a will does not affect
the rights of forced heirs who dont appear to
contest the probate.
Rights of forced heirs to their legitime are not divested
by decree admitting a will to probate, regardless of fact
that no provision has been made for them in the will.
Decree of probate is conclusive only as regards due
execution of will.
Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 753: forced heirs cant be
prejudiced by failure of testator to provide for them in his
will. And even if testator intended to leave everything to
his wife, will is intrinsically invalid if it would cut off the
rights of his forced heirs.
(on issue 4) NO. An order for the distribution of an
estate is not conclusive & final as against persons
who are not before the court
Proceedings involving Gmur & Ana did not involve
Fredericks children. Court was unaware of their
existence. They were not notified nor were they
represented in the proceedings. But not that their right to
participate was vested immediately upon Samuels death
to the extent to w/c their mom would have been entitled
to participate had she survived Samuel. The decision
under these proceedings was not published nor were
persons entitled to participate personally informed.
Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 753: after payment of
debts & expenses of administration, court shall distribute
residue of estate among persons entitled to receive it
whether by terms of will or by operation of law.
Law does not provide for notice by publication or
otherwise of application for order of distribution to
persons estate. A purely ex parte proceeding w/o notice
by personal service/publication by w/c court undertakes
to distribute property of deceased persons can be
conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented.
Code of Civ Procedure Sec. 41: 10 yrs actual adverse
possession by occupancy, grant, descent or otherwise
shall vest title in the possessor. This indicates that
decree of distribution under w/c one may be placed in
possession by descent is not conclusive. Action of
revindication may be brought by heir against persons put
in possession by decree at any time w/in period allowed
by gen statute of limitations (Layre vs. Pasco).
Application of Fredericks children was presented in
proper time & judgment in their favor is correct. Mory
claimants are barred from participating.
-Ms. Milaor-

In Re Julian Wang
In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
also known as Julian Lin Wang, to be amended/corrected as Julian Lin Wang, Julian Wang, duly represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, petitioner vs. Cebu City Civil Registry, duly represented by the Registrar Oscar B. Molo,
respondent.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC of Cebu City Br. 57
Date: March 30, 2005 Ponente: Tinga, J.
Facts:
I will not blot out his name from the book of life -
Revelations 3:5
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on
February 20, 1998 to Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe
Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
They got married on September 22, 1998 and after
which they executed a deed of legitimation of their son.
The childs name was changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Parents of Julian plan to stay in Singapore for a long
time because they will let him study there together with
his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was also born
there. In Singapore, middle names or maiden surname
of the mother are not carried in a persons name. They
anticipated that Julian will be discriminated against

because of his current registered name. Julian and his
sister might also ask whether they are brother and sister
since they have different surnames. Also, Mandarin
doesnt have the letter R, but if there is, they
pronounce it as L. These were the reasons given for
the name change.
On September 22, 2002, Julian, represented by his
mother, filed a petition for change of name in the Civil
Registry of Cebu.
On April 30 2003, RTC rendered a decision denying the
petition. The trial court found that the reasons given for
the change of name did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child.
Under Article 174 of the FC, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of the father and mother, and
there is no reason why this right should be taken from
Julian, considering that he is still a minor. Trial court
added that when Julian reaches the age of majority, he
could then decide whether he will change his name by
dropping the middle name.
May 20,2004- trial court denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration. Trial court maintained that
Singaporean practice does not justify the dropping of the
middle name of a Filipino child.
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari,
questioning whether the dropping of the middle name is
contrary to Article 174. Petitioners also argued that the
SC should take into consideration the best interests of
the child and that the middle name would undermine the
childs social acceptance and integration into the
Singaporean society.
SC required the Solicitor General to comment on the
petition of which the SolGen agreed that the trial court
correctly denied the petition for name change. It has not
been shown that the use of middle names is actually
proscribed by Singaporean law.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for change of name as
regards to the reasons adduced should be allowed.

Held: No. Petition for Review on Certiorari is denied.

Ratio:
The change of name is a privilege and not a right, so
that before a person can be authorized to change his
name, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason to justify the change. Among the
grounds for name change which have been held valid
are: 1) when name is ridiculous, dishonourable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2) when the
change results as a legal consequence; 3) when change
will avoid confusion; 4) when one has continuously used
and been known by a Filipino name, and is unaware of
an alien parentage; 5) sincere desire to adopt Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage; 6) when the
surname causes embarrassment and no fraudulent
causes were established. In denying or granting petitions
for such, the question of proper and reasonable cause is
left to the sound discretion of the court.
This case is novel in the sense that only the middle
name is requested to be removed. Middle names serve
to identify the lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others bearing the same
name.
Petitioner cites three cases to support his cause. These
are Oshita v Republic, Alfon v Republic and Calderon v
Republic. These cases do not apply because they are
not analogous to the present case. In Oshita, the court
recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had
during the time against the Japanese so they allowed
the name change. In Alfon, the court granted the petition
since the petitioner had been known since childhood
with that name and to avoid confusion. In Calderon, the
court granted the petition filed by a mother on behalf of
her illegitimate child on the ground of the best interests
of the child to avoid the stigma of illegitimacy. In the
case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for
the name change is convenience which is clearly
insufficient. Also, petitioner is still a minor and it is best
that the matter of name change is best left to his
judgment when he reaches the age of majority.
-Mr. Mislang-


XIII. Adoption

Who may adopt/be adopted
In Re: Adoption of Edwin Villa
In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor, Edwin Villa y Mendoza. Luis E. Santos, Jr. And Edipola V. Santos, petitioners-
appellants, vs. The Republic of the Philippines, oppositor-appellee.
Nature: An appeal from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, dismissing the petition instituted by
spouses Luis Santos and Edipola Santos for the adoption of Edwin Villa.
Date: September 29, 1967 Ponente: Angeles, J.
Facts:
January 8, 1963- Above-named spouses filed petition
before the court a quo praying that the minor Edwin Villa
y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their son by
adoption.
Petitioners are both 32 years old, residing in Manila.
They do not have children, and neither of them has been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Critical Fact: Edwin Villa is a child of Francisco Villa
and Florencia Mendoza who are also the common
parents of the petitioner wife, therefore, Edipola and
Edwin are siblings.
Both spouses are financially stable, Luis being a lawyer
and successful businessman while Edipola is a nurse by
profession.
Spouses instituted action because after Edwin was born,
they were the ones who took care of him and there
developed a deep and profound love for each other. The
natural parents also gave their consent and conformity to
the adoption and that they fully understood the legal
consequences of the adoption of their child.
The trial court dismissed the petition reasoning that the
adoption will result in an incongruous situation where the
minor Edwin, brother of petitioner-wife, will also be her
son.
Thus this petition. Solicitor General argued for the State.
Issue: Whether or not an elder sister may adopt a
younger brother.
Held: Yes. Decision appealed from is set aside.
Adoption granted.
Ratio:
In the absence of provisions that relatives by blood or by
affinity are prohibited from adopting one another, the
adoption should be allowed. The theory advanced by the
trial court is that adoption among people who are related
by nature should not be allowed because dual
relationship will result. Article 335 of the CC enumerates
persons who may not adopt, and petitioner-appellants
herein are not among those prohibited from adopting.
Article 339 names those who cannot be adopted, and
the minor child is not one of those. The interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted is the paramount
consideration. Adoption statutes are designed to provide
homes, care and education for unfortunate children, and
should also be construed to encourage adoption of such
children by persons who can properly rear and educate
them.
With respect to the fact that this adoption would result in
a dual relationship between parties, that fact should not
prevent the adoption. Similar dual relationships also
result under our law on marriage when persons who are
already related by blood or affinity, marry each other. But
as long as such marriages are not within the
relationships prohibited by law, they are allowed.
-Mr. Mislang-


Republic v. CA & Bobiles
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals, Bobiles, respondents
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Date: January 24, 1992 Ponente: Regalado, J.
Facts:
Mrs. Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason
Condat on Feb. 2, 1988. The RTC finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance granted the adoption.
The law at time of filing was Presidential Decree 603
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which states that a
petition for adoption may be filed by either spouse or by
both of them. While the case was pending in the Court of
Appeals, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988,
which states that a joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory (Art. 185).
Petitioner now contends that the petition for adoption
should be dismissed outright as it was filed solely by
Mrs. Boiles without joining her husband, in violation of
Art. 185 of the Family Code. It also argues that the
Family Code should be applied retroactively to the
petition for adoption as the latter did not acquire a vested
right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her
petition for adoption.
Issues:
W/N the Family Code should be applied
retroactively.
W/N the petition is in violation of Art. 185
Ratio:
NO. Art. 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive
effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject
to the qualification that such retrospective application will
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Family
Code cannot be made to apply retroactively especially
when it impairs vested rights. Mrs. Boiles upon filing, her
right to file such petition alone was already vested and
cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a
new law. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of
failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force
and effect at the time.
NO. Although the husband Dioscoro was not named as
one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by
his wife, his affidavit of consent attached to the petition
shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting
the child. This and his subsequent confirmatory
testimony in open court are sufficient to make him a co-
petitioner.
-Ms. Mo-

Republic v. Toledano
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner vs. Toledano, et al, respondents
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC of Iba, Zambales
Date: June 8, 1994 Ponente: Puno, J.
Facts:
Husband Alvin Clouse is a natural born American citizen
who married a Evelyn, a Filipino who became a
naturalized American Citizen in Guam. The spouses
sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the
younger brother of one of the wife Evelyn A. Clouse.
Nery Alcala, the mother of Solomon and Evelyn also
consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to
support and educate her son. The social worker
assigned to this case also favorably recommended the
granting of the petition for adoption.
When the RTC granted the petition for adoption, the
petitioner through the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed that under Articles 184 and 185 of the Family
Code, the spouses are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Alcala.

Paragraph 3 of Article 184 expressly enumerates the
persons not qualified to adopt:
3. An alien, except:
a. A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity;
b. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or
her Filipino spouse;
c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may
adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except
in the ff. cases:
When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child;
When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of the other.
Issue:
W/N the Clouses are qualified to adopt Solomon Alcala.
Held/Ratio:
The husband is not qualified to adopt as in relation to
Art. 184, he is not a former Filipino citizen, Solomon
Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the
legitimate child of his spouse, and when the spouses
jointly filed their petition to adopt, the wife was also no
longer a Filipino citizen.
The wife Evelyn is qualified to adopt, as she was a
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt her younger
brother. However, the petition for adoption cannot be
granted in her favor alone without violating Art. 185 that
requires a joint adoption by husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Art. 184.
-Ms. Mo-

Republic v. Miller
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondents
Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ponente: Pardo, J.
Facts:
The spouses Miller are both American citizens residing
in the Philippines who cannot have a child of their own
because of the wifes medical problems. On July 29,
1988, they filed with the RTC of Angeles City a verified
petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag,
the legitimate son of the spouses Madayag, who has
been in the custody of the Millers since the first week of
August 1987 or barely a month after he was born.
Michaels parents, who had no visible means of
livelihood, consented to the adoption because of poverty
and deep concern for the childs future. They executed
affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption
by the Millers. The DSWD recommended approval of
the petition on the basis of its evaluation that the Millers
were morally, emotionally and financially fit to be
adoptive parents and that the adoption would be to
Michaels best interest and welfare. On May 12, 1989,
the trial court rendered a decision granting the
petition for adoption which the Solicitor General, in
behalf of the Republic, appealed to the Court of Appeals
on the ground that under the Family Code (effective
August 3, 1988), aliens were prohibited from adopting a
Filipino child.
Issue:
W/N the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child
despite the prohibition under the Family Code
Held/Ratio:
Yes. Adoption statues hold the interests and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education
for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family in the person of
the adopter, as well as for childless couples or persons

to experience the joy of parenthood. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of
the law.
The petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988
under the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code (effective December 10, 1974) which allowed
aliens to adopt. An alien qualified to adopt under the
Child and Youth Welfare Code acquired a vested
right (A vested right is one whose existence,
effectivity, and extent does not depend on events
foreign to the will of the holder. It expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately
just and imperative right which enlightened free society
cannot deny. The term includes not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also
an exemption from new obligations created after the
right has been vested.) which could not be affected
by the subsequent enactment of a new law
disqualifying him. The enactment of the Family Code
will not impair the right of the Millers, who are aliens, to
adopt a Filipino child because the right has become
vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption
and is to be governed by the law then in force.
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. Once jurisdiction attaches, it cannot be
ousted by a subsequent happening or event, even if it is
of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction
from attaching in the first place.
An alien who filed a petition for adoption before the
effectivity of the Family Code, although denied the
right to adopt under Art. 184 of the said Code, may
continue with his petition under the law prevailing
before the Family Code.
-Ms. Mopia-
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim
Petitioner: Monina P. Lim
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner)
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Facts:
Short version: petitioner and Primo Lim were married.
They were a childless couple. Two children were
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Since
spouses are eager to have a child, they registered
and named the children as Michelle P. Lim and
Michael Jude P. lim. Spouses reared and cared for
the children as if their own. Husband died, and
petitioner married Angel Lim, an American citizen.
Petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
the two children. At the time of the filing of the
petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was 18 years and
seven months old. Both adoptee gave their consent.
Trial Court denied the petition.
Long version: petitioner is an optometrist by profession.
On 23 June 1974, Monina (petitioner) married Primo Lim
(Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a
certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have
a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the
children to make it appear that they were the childrens
parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle
was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of
petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. Michael was
11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners
clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they
were their own. They sent the children to exclusive
schools. They used the surname Lim in all their school
records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner
married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by
availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No.
8552[6] (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated
the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner
filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC.

Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of
the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25
years old and already married, while Michael was 18
years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the
adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.[7]
Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown
in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioners husband Olario
likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was
considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts
of her natural parents were unknown. The DSWD issued
a similar Certification for Michael.
Issue: WON petitioner, who has remarried, can singly
adopt. Ruling: NO.
Ratio:
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the
petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband.
Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III
of RA 8552 reads:
xxx SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may
adopt:
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each
other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted
provision means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child which is
the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt with her husband.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three
exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as
shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There
are certain requirements that Olario must comply being
an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
that his country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living
in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior
to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own
country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of
these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.
Note: EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
Adoption has the following effects:
(1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s)
and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is
the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including but not limited to:
(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child
is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
compulsory heirs of each other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate
child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child
such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother;
(2) to receive support from their parents; and

(3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional
rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with
respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to
which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.
-Mr. Arnesto-

Nature of Adoption Proceedings

Lazatin v. Campos (1979)
RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L.
DE LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L. VELOSO, respondents

Nature: PETITION for certiorari from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay branch).
Ponente: Teehankee, J.
Facts: Dr. Mariano Lazatin died intestate. He was
survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted
twin daughters, respondents Nora L. de Leon and Irma
Lazatin. Three months after his death, Margarita also
died, leaving a holographic will providing, among others,
for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent
Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter and a legacy of
education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato
Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
During her lifetime, Margarita kept a safety deposit box
at a bank which either she or respondent Nora could
open. Five days after Margaritas death, respondent
Nora opened the safety deposit box and removed its
contents to get her stock certificates and other small
items deposited therein. Eventually, private respondents
filed a petition to probate the will of Margarita. Days
after having learned that respondent Nora had opened
this box, petitioners son, Ramon, filed a motion in the
probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed
a will subsequent to that submitted for probate.
Respondent Nora admitted that she opened the box but
there was no will or any document resembling a will
inside.
Seven months after the death of Margarita, petitioner
intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle
the estate of the late Mariano, as an admitted
illegitimate (not natural) child. He also filed a motion
to intervene in the estate of Margarita as an adopted
child on the basis of an affidavit executed by Marianos
brother that petitioner was an illegitimate son and was
later adopted by Mariano. The affidavit was later
modified to state that petitioner was adopted by both
Mariano and Margarita. Petitioner attempted to prove
that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his
parents, that he had been supported by them until their
death, and that he was formerly known as Renato
Lazatin but was compelled to change his surname to
Sta. Clara when the deceased spouses refused to give
consent to his marriage to his present wife. He also
presented photographs where respondent Irma
addressed herself as his sister and of deceased
Margarita and petitioner when he was a boy.
Issue: W/N petitioner is an adopted child of the
spouses Mariano and Margarita
Held/Ratio: He is not. Adoption is a juridical act which
creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
Only an adoption made through the court, or in
pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99
of the ROC is valid in the Philippines. Because
adoption is not of natural law but is entirely artificial,
the statutory requirements must strictly be carried
out; otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The
fact of adoption is NEVER presumed, but must be
affirmatively proved by the person claiming is
existence. The evidence petitioner presented does not
show or tend to show that a specific court of competent
jurisdiction rendered an order approving his adoption as
a child of the spouses Mariano and Margarita in an
adoption proceeding initiated by the latter, specifically:

He did not manifest, much less show by what particular
court was the adoption decreed or by whom was the
petition heard.
There are no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding
or to the adoption decree.
The CFI of Manila reported that after diligent search
there was no record found regarding the adoption of
Renato allegedly filed sometime between 1928 and 1931
by the deceased spouses.
The certification of the LCR of Manila that their pre-war
records relative to decisions of the CFI were either
destroyed or burned during the Liberation of the City of
Manila does not furnish any legal basis for a
presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner since there
was no proof that petitioner was really adopted in Manila
or that an adoption petition was indeed filed in the CFI of
Manila by the deceased spouses where a judgment of
approval was rendered by said court.
He did not secure a copy of the newspaper publication of
the adoption as required under Sec. 4, Rule 99 of the
ROC or a certification of the publishing house to that
effect.
The identity of the one who gave written consent to the
adoption, whether the parents or the orphanage, as
required by Sec. 3, Rule 99 of the ROC is absent.
Parol evidence that a child has lived with a person not
his parent and has been treated as a child to establish
such adoption cannot substitute in the absence of proof
of such order of adoption by the court. Petitioners
attempts to prove his adoption by acts and declarations
of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory
presentation of the judicial decree of adoption.
Rather, the thrust of petitioners evidence is to establish
his status as an admitted illegitimate child which was the
very basis of his petition for intervention in the estate
proceedings of the late Mariano, not an adopted child.
Although declarations in regard to pedigree are admitted
since they are natural expressions of persons who must
know the truth, there is better proof available in
proving an adoption and it should be produced.
Secondary evidence is also admissible where the
records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or
destroyed. However, prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must first establish
the former existence of the instrument. The correct
order of proof is: existence execution loss
contents, although this order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court. Since petitioner
failed to establish the former existence of the
adoption paper and its subsequent loss or
destruction, he cannot introduce secondary evidence.
The mere fact that the deceased spouses treated
petitioner as their child does not constitute
admissible proof of adoption.
Consequently, he cannot intervene in the settlement of
Margaritas estate. For one to intervene in an estate
proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the
estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir
or one who has a claim against the estate, like a
creditor. A child by adoption cannot inherit from the
parent by adoption unless the act of adoption has
been done in strict accord with the statute. The
burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
person claiming such relationship. He must prove
compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the
jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. Since
petitioner failed to submit proof of his hereditary interest
in the estate, his intervention in the probate proceedings
should be denied as it would merely result in
unnecessary complication.
Petitioner will have to decide whether he will pursue his
theory of having the status of an admitted illegitimate
child of the deceased Mariano at the continuation of the
proceedings for declaration of heirship and for probate of
the alleged holographic will of the deceased Margarita
where he failed to establish his status as an alleged
adopted child.
-Ms. Mopia-


Santos v. Aranzanso
Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, petitioners, v. Gregoris Aranzanoand Demetria Ventura, respondents.
Nature of the Case: PETITION for review by way of certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
(Penned by Bengzon, J.P., J.)
Facts of the Case: A petition for adoption of Paulita
Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio Santos
and Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on June 4, 1949. Paulina Santos was then 17yrs
old and Aurora Santos was 8yrs old. The petition alleged
inter alia that the whereabouts of the minors' nearest kin
even their parents was unknown and that the minors
have been abandoned by their parents since the
outbreak of the war. A guardian ad litem was appointed
by the court which gave his written consent to the
adoption. Paulina being 17yrs old, likewise gave her
written consent thereto. After due publication and
hearing, the court granted the petition for adoption.
It was rather unfortunate that eight years later, on
October 21, 1957, Juliana Reyes died intestate. On
November 25, 1957 Simplicio Santos filed in the CFI of
Manila a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of Juliana Reyes. In said petition he stated that the
surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as a surviving
spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also
prayed that he be declared the administrator of the
estate. Gregoria Aranzano, hereon respondent, alleging
that she is the first cousin of the deceased, filed an
opposition to the petition for the appointment of
administrator. She also asserted that the Santos-Reyes
marriage was void for being bigamous and that the
adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was void
for want of parental consent. Demetria Ventura, alleging
that she is a first cousin of the deceased and the mother
of Paulina filed a concurring opposition. Pacita and
Consuelo Passion, also intervened in the estate
proceedings contending they are first cousins of the
deceased.
The CFI decided the point in dispute, ruling that the
validity of the adoption could not be assailed collaterally
in the intestate proceedings. Aggrieved, respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the CFI. The appellate court contended that
absence of consent is a jurisdictional defect subject to
collateral attack.
Petitioners, then filed a petition for review to the
Supreme Court.
Principal Issues:
(1)Whether parental consent is an absolute requisite in
an adoption proceeding considering the circumstances
of the case.
(2)Whether the validity of an adoption could be
collaterally assailed in an estate settlement proceedings.
Held:
(1) Under our law it is NOT an ABSOLUTE requisite. It is
true that the consent of parents is a jurisdictional
requisite to the validity of a decree on adoption.
However, it is not absolute. The court grounded its ratio
on Section 3, Rule 99, Revised Rules of Court, of which
the pertinent line runs this way:
Section 3. Consent to Adoption. There shall be filed with
the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by
the child if over 14 yrs of age and not incompetent, and
by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such
child, or if there is no such parents by the general
guardian or guardian ad litem of the child...
Stated simply, if the natural parents have abandoned
their children the consent of the guardian ad litem will
suffice. What is abandonment then in this context?
Abandonment, under American rulings, imports any
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child. It means refusal or neglect
to perform legal and natural obligations of care and
support. It is a fact that the adopted children were living
with petitioners since they were infants. Also, for several
years the parents of the adopted children were unheard
of despite diligent effort of petitioner.


(2) The Court of Appeals cannot review the findings of
abandonment made by the adoption court. It is a well
settled rule that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior
or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact
established before it, the determination of that fact
cannot be questioned in a collateral attack. Anent the
alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the
natural parents, suffice it to mark that publication was
sufficiently made. Notice, moreover, is not required in
adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent.

(3) Regarding the side issue that the Santos-Reyes
marriage was not valid, even if we assume for purposes
of argument that it was not valid as alleged, it will not
make any difference as far as the right of respondents to
intervene in the intestate proceedings. Juliana would
then be deemed to have filed the adoption as a person
whose status is single. The defect would only lie on
Simplicio. Aurora and Juliana have successional rights
to the estate as adopted children to the exclusion of
respondents.
-Mr. Oyales-

DSWD v. Belen
Department of Social Welfare and Development, represented by Corazon M. Layug, complainant, versus Judge Anatonio
Belen and Elma Vedana, respondents.
Nature of the case: Administrative matter initiated by complainant against respondents for alleged anomaly in an
adoption proceeding.
Penned by: Regalado, J.
Facts of the case: In this complaint, Corazon M. Lapug
in behalf of DSWD charged Judge Antonio Belen for an
erroneous decree of adoption in violation of Article 33 of
PD 603 otherwise known as The Child and youth
Welfare Code and the corresponding Supreme Court
Circular No. 12. Respondent Elma Vedana, on the
other hand, is charged with disregarding the provisions
of the same circular. Spouses Desiderio Soriano and
Aurora Bernardo Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of
their niece, Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in the RTC. Judge
Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner
spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their
own. Respondent based his decree primarily on the
findings of the Adoptive home Study Report and Child
Study Report (prepared by Elma Vedana, herein
respondent) that the adopting parents and the adoptee
have already developed love and emotional attachment.
On these considerations, respondent judge decided and
proceeded to dispense with trial custody.
When Zhedell sought to obtain the requisite travel
clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive
parents in the United States, the department uncovered
what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree
regarding said minor. The DSWD have not any record in
its files regarding the adoption and that there was never
any order from respondent judge to conduct a Home
and Child Study Report. It was also alleged that
respondent Elma Vedana asked for an undisclosed sum
of money. After investigation, the Office of the Court
Administrator, recommended that respondent judge be
reprimanded.
Issues: (1)Whether the respondent judge followed the
proper course when he failed to notify the DSWD of the
proceedings.
(2)Whether a Social Welfare Officer of the RTC could
arrogate unto himself the function of the preparation of
the case study
Held: (1) No, he did not. The law is very clear and
simple. Indeed, Article 33 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code provides in no certain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the
Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work
counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to
be adopted, his natural parents as well as prospective
adopting parents, and has submitted its report and
recommendations on the matter to the court hearing
such petition

In the same token, Circular 12 directs RTC hearing
adoption cases:
to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and
Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of
adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to
those cases already filed.
to strictly COMPLY with the requirements in Article 33.
The respondents failure to do so, he may have wittingly
or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future
of the adoptee. The respondent judge was sternly
censured.
(2) No she could not. Her task being to coordinate with
the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the
relevant case study reports and not to make the same
and recommend by herself the facts on which the court
was to act.
-Mr. Oyales-

Consent Necessary for Adoption
Duncan v. CFI
Robin Duncan and Maria Christensen v. CFI-Rizal, presided over by Hon. Herminio Mariano
Esguerra [1976]. Petition for review on certiorari, of CFI decision.
Facts:
Husband is a British national residing in the RP for the
last 17 years. Wife is an American born in (and a
resident of) the RP. The couple sought to adopt a
child previously baptized and named by them as Colin
Berry Christensen Duncan. But the CFI denied the
petition for adoption, saying that the consent given in
Exhibit J is improper and falls short of the express
requirement of the law, which says that:
Art. 340 (CC) The written consent of the following to
the adoption SHALL be necessary... [2] The parents,
guardian, or person in charge of the person to be
adopted.
So, the proper person supposed to give consent should
first be (in the order of preference) the parent or mother
herself. The couples principal witness, Atty. Velasquez,
under whose care the baby was entrusted by the
unwedded mother, claims to know the natural mothers
identity.
But divulging it (to have the written consent) would
violate the client-attorney relationship, especially since
the mother didnt want her identity revealed. So as a de
facto guardian, Atty. Velasquez signed the consent,
instead of the mother.

Issue:
Whether Atty. Velasquez is the proper person required
by law to give such consent.
Held:
Yes. Baby Colin Berry is declared as the adopted child
and heir of the petitioners-couple.
Ratio:
Only one of two persons described by law may be
considered as legally capable of giving the written
consent:
[1] Art. 340 (CC) the parent, guardian, or person in
charge of the person to be adopted;
[2] Rule 99 (ROC) each of the known living
parents...who has NOT abandoned such child.
The unwedded mother has not bothered to inquire into
the condition of the child, much less contribute to the
livelihood, maintenance, and care of the same. The
court is convinced that the mother had completely
and absolutely abandoned her child, and can be
declared as such.
Only Atty. Velasquez appears to be the person who
could be considered as the guardian exercising
patria potestas (Latin for power of a father) over
such abandoned child. Child was not under the

custody of an orphan asylum, and no guardian ad litem
was assigned by the court.
Even with dura lex sed lex, the law (requiring that the
natural parents shall give consent first and foremost)
should be softened with less severity in cases of
adoption, out of compassion and humane understanding
especially for children born out of wedlock. The texts and
intendments of the law should be construed so as to give
all chances for human life to exist. The spirit of the law is
to uphold, encourage, and give life and meaning to the
existence of family relations.
The adoptive spouses are not only qualified but also
have extended much love and care for the child, who is
now about 9 years old. Hindering legal adoption would
do an injustice not only for the child and adoptive
spouses, but all persons who will be similarly situated.
-Mr. Punongbayan-

Cang v. CA
Herbert Cang v. CA and spouses Ronald and Maria Clavano
Romero [1998]. Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision.
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert and wife Anna begot 3 children.
Later, wife learned of husbands extramarital affair, and
filed a petititon for legal separation. The Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court granted it, and the spouses
agreed in a joint manifestation that, among others: [1]
The children shall be entitled to support; and [2] the wife
shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement
with any person/s without the written consent of the
husband.
Husband left for US, sought divorce from wife in the
Second Judicial District Court of Nevada, which issued
the divorce decree and granted sole custody of the 3
minor children to the wife. While in the US, husband
married then divorced again, and ultimately never
remarried. He continued remitting money for the
childrens expenses.
Meanwhile, wife Annas brother and sister-in-law, a
childless couple, filed proceedings for the adoption
of the 3 minor children before RTC-Cebu, and petition
bears the signature of the eldest child consenting to his
adoption. Anna also files affidavit of consent alleging
that:
[1] husband Herbert evaded his legal obligation to
support the children; [2] her brothers and sisters had
been helping her in taking care of the children; [3] Anna
would be going to the US to attend to a family
business, and leaving the children would be a
problem that would hamper her job-seeking venture
abroad.
Husband immediately returned to the RP and filed an
opposition, saying that although wifes brother and
sister-in-law were financially capable, their finances are
too meager compared to theirs, and wouldnt allow
anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his
beloved children.
RTC-Cebu issued an order that wife Anna in effect
relinquished custody over the children, and custody
should be transferred to the father. Another branch of
the RTC-Cebu then issued a decree of adoption to
Annas brother and sister-in-law.
Husband Herbert, before the CA, opposed and
contended that the lower court erred in that he didnt
have a written consent to the adoption, and 2 children
didnt properly give their written consent. The CA
affirmed the decree of adoption, saying that the court
has held that the consent of the parent who has
abandoned the child is not necessary (as in Dayrit v.
Piccio, Santos v. Ananzanso). Herbert has not been
performing his duties as a father, contrary to his
protestations.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written
consent of a natural parent.
Held:
Because the husband didnt really abandon the children,
his consent was necessary. Since it was not obtained,
the petition for adoption of the 3 children is denied.
Petition is GRANTED, and the CA decision is set aside.

Ratio:
As clearly inferred from Art. 188 of the FC, and Rule 99
of the ROC, the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensible for the validity of the decree of adoption.
But the requirement can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child, or is insane or
hopelessly intemperate.
Although not a trier of facts, the SC finds that the RTC
and the CA failed to appreciate facts and circumstances
that shouldve elicited a different conclusion on whether
the petitioner-father has so abandoned his children.
To abandon is to forsake entirely, renounce
utterly, or forgo all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child; to neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe their children.
Here, the husbands conduct didnt manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is NOT tantamount to abandonment. While
physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care, and support.
There were several pieces of evidence not only on
financial support, but also the emotional exchange of
sentiments between petitioner and his family, via letters.
The lower courts attached too high a premium to the
prospective adopters financial status, but totally
brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption
on the emotional and psychological well-being of the
children.
The SC has previously decided that parental authority
cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he
could give the child a larger measure of material comfort
than his natural parent. The lower courts conclusion that
petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary
support than his inability to provide them the material
comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide.
There should be proof that he had so emotionally
abandoned them, that his children would not miss
guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting
parents. The children needed him not only because
he could cater to their whims but also because he
was a person they could share with their daily
activities, problems, and triumphs.
That the mother Anna went abroad as well to find better
employment worsened the scenario for the kids. While
Annas brother and sister-in-law were capable of
providing to the children, the brother was commuting to
and fro Manila, while the sister-in-law was an
international flight stewardess. A closer look into their
testimonies reveals that they merely wanted to keep the
children away from their father, stemming from the
notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. That the
petitioner had an affair with a paramour cant be
taken as sufficient basis that hes an unfit father. A
bad husband is not necessarily a bad father.
-Mr. Punongbayan-

Landingin v. Republic
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Nature: petition for review on certiorari of a decision by the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing decision by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tarlac
Date: June 27, 2006 Ponente: Callejo Sr., J.
Facts:
Diwata Landingin, a 57-y.o. widow, U.S. citizen of
Filipino parentage and resident of Guam, employed
there as a restaurant server, filed a petition for the
adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos, children of
Landingins brother (D), and Amelia Ramos.
1990 Manuel Ramos, father of the children, died. The
childrens mother went to Italy to work in order to provide
support for herself, her parents, and her children.
Meanwhile, the children were left in the care of their
paternal grandmother, and were supported primarily by
their paternal relatives, including herein petitioner

1995 In Italy, Amelia Ramos became the live-in partner
of Jun Tayag, a married man. The two had a son. The
three are considered Italian residents (but not citizens).
Amelia continued to send support to her parents and her
children, though the amount she sent to the latter was
much less than what her affluent in-laws provided.
Elaine, eldest of her children by her deceased husband,
consulted her for serious personal problems.
2000 The guardian of the children, their paternal
grandmother, died. Landingin then sought to adopt her
nieces and nephew.
The DSWD conducted a case study prior to the adoption
hearing. The social welfare officer in charge submitted a
child study report with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors
Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for
adoption because of the following reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily
consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata
Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the
parental care, guidance and support they need. An
Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which
is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also
expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the
petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of
consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close
attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as
second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary
guardian who has also family to look after. As young
adolescents they really need parental love, care,
guidance and support to ensure their protection and well
being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D.
Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their
maternal aunt Diwata Landingin.
Said consent of the mother was based on an interview
conducted by the social worker when she was
fortuitously able to meet Amelia Ramos when the latter
visited the Philippines with her (adulterous) son. In said
interview, Amelia allegedly stated her opinion that her
children in the Philippines need what she cannot
provide, herself having another family in Italy.
Consent of the petitioners (adult) children, required by
law (according to Sec. 9 of R.A, was provided through a
document executed in Guam
RTC approved adoption. The Office of the Solicitor
General appealed. Based on the lack of written consent
of the mother, the lack of the written consent of the
petitioners children, and the petitioners failure to
establish that she would be able to support the children
should they be placed in her custody, the RTC decision
was reversed. According to petitioner, the consent of the
mother was not necessary, as by her actions of
establishing another family in Italy, she has abandoned
her children by her deceased husband.
Issues:
W/N consent was given in the appropriate form
HELD: No
W/N the consent of the mother is not necessary
HELD: No
W/N the petitioner is capable of supporting the children
HELD: No
Ratio:
Consent has to be written, i.e. in the proper form. The
document was executed in Guam. It does not follow the
requirements for recognition in the Philippines of a legal
document executed abroad, as stated in Section 2 of Act
No. 2103, which reads
An instrument or document acknowledged and
authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered
authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are
made in accordance with the following requirements:
The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg d
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or
place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done.
[a lengthy provision stating further authentication
procedures]
The mother did not abandon her children, as the
petitioner contends. She continued to support them, and

remains in contact with her children, even providing her
eldest child advice on serious personal matters, advice
that the same child sought out. Merely permitting a child
to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is
not abandonment as contemplated by law. The Court
noted that if the children were abandoned, the petitioner
should have sought the consent of their legal guardian.
Petitioner is a part-time waitress living in a house that is
still being amortized. The Court found it doubtful that the
petitioner could sufficiently handle the financial aspect of
rearing three minors in the U.S. The records do not
prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings
and her children are financially able and that they are
willing to support the children.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the
best of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are
legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling
of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from
filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
-Mr. Reyes-

Ratterman, Adoption and the Rights of Putative Fathers: A Review of New York Law
The legal rights of unmarried fathers have changed dramatically since 1970. Both in society and in the law, there has
been an increased concern and respect for the involvement of fathers in the lives of their nonmarital children. Putative
fathers who have established a relationship with their children [by definition, out of wedlock] are considered to have
parental rights equal to those of the mother. However, in recognition that some unwed fathers may have no
connection to their children beyond genetic parenthood, the extension of parental rights to putative fathers has
been limited by the courts.
In New York, the legislature has adopted specific statutory guidelines for identifying unwed fathers who have a
constitutionally protected parental right which must be surrendered or terminated before their child can be adopted. In
addition, New York law identifies fathers who have some lesser connection with their child which entitles them to notice of
adoption proceedings. If a father does not meet the criteria for either of these categories, the child may be adopted
without the putative fathers consent or notice. New Yorks statutory scheme, which has survived constitutional scrutiny by
the U.S. Supreme Court, provides clear criteria for identifying and protecting the rights of nonmarital fathers.

Constitutional Rights
In Stanley v. Illinois (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an unmarried father who had a relationship with his
children has a right to participate in a hearing regarding the best interests of the children prior to having his
parental rights terminated. In Caban v. Mohammed (1979), the Supreme Court held that a New York law which gave
no rights to an unwed father is unconstitutional. The father in said case provided his children support while he lived
with their mother [in unwedded cohabitation] and had regular contact with them after he lived apart from them. As a result
of Caban, the aforesaid New York law was amended to specify when a father of a nonmarital child must consent to an
adoption.
In Lehr v. Robinson (1983), where the father seemed to have no interest in the child and filed a paternity claim only two
years after the childs birth, the Supreme Court held that a father who has never established a substantial
relationship with the child is not entitled to notice of an adoption. The Court stated that:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward
to participate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial
protection under the Due Process Clause [14
th
Amendment]...But the mere existence of a biological link does not
merit equivalent constitutional protection.
If one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned
or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a State from according the two
parents different legal rights.

Fathers with Full Substantive Rights
[As previously stated,] Unwed fathers who have maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child
have the same rights as unmarried mothers with respect to their children, and must execute a voluntary surrender or have
their parental rights terminated before the child can be adopted.
If the father of a child under six months old openly lived with the child continuously for six months, held himself to be the
father of the child during the same period, and provided financial assistance for the mothers pregnancy or the birth of the
child, the child cannot be adopted without his consent. If the child is over six months old, if there is proof of regular support
and contact by the putative father [visited monthly or maintains regular communication with the child or the person in
custody of the child], said child cannot be adopted without the fathers consent.
Fathers with Due Process Rights
Putative fathers who do not meet the statutory criteria which would require their consent to adoption may still qualify to be
notice fathers under New York law. Special notice provisions give these fathers due process rights with respect to
voluntary surrenders and termination of parental rights involving their nonmarital children. These provisions [for notice
of adoption proceedings] do not include men convicted of first degree rape when the child who is the subject of
the termination was conceived as the result of the rape. All other fathers who have been legally recognized as the
childs father and have shown interest in the childs welfare prior to adoption proceedings are qualified. The sole purpose
of notification to these fathers is to enable him to present evidence to the court relevant to the best interests of
the child. The putative father will only be given custody of the child or be able to block the adoption if it is in the
childs best interests. The right to notice may be waived by the putative father.
Fathers Without Rights
Fathers who have not made efforts to establish a relationship with a nonmarital child do not have a right to be
included in the court decision to approve a mothers surrender, to terminate the mothers rights, or to approve
the adoption of the child.
Fathers Unable to Meet Rights Criteria
Fathers who are kept away from their children because of a court order to protect the mother from domestic violence, are
not consent fathers, as it was by their violent behaviour, not the mothers actions to protect herself from violence, that
prevents the father from establishing a relationship with his children (In the Matter of Raquel Marie X, 1989).
Incarcerated fathers, if they meet the criteria, are entitled to either substantive of due process rights, e.g. a father who has
regular contact with his child, though he is behind bars, is a consent father.
A father who voluntarily took drugs, thus rarely visited nor provided support to his child, cannot be a consent nor a notice
father (In the Matter of Leah M.L., 1989).
If the mother concealed her pregnancy, the father, upon learning of his parenthood, can, should he be shown to be the
father of the child, can be allowed to intervene in adoption proceedings, if it was the mother who unjustly denied him the
opportunity to be part of the childs life. There is, however, no statutory obligation imposed upon the mother to assist
the father in either establishing or maintaining contact with their child (In the Matter of Adoption of Emily Ann,
1987).
The courts have tended to be more sympathetic to fathers who allege that interference by a relative prevented them from
establishing a parental relationship with the child, as long as the father shows earnest interest in the childs welfare as
evidenced by effort.
Delays in Adoptions

[In conclusion,] the statutory scheme for putative fathers in adoption in practice in New York sets up an equitable balance
between the rights of a nonmarital father to maintain a parental relationship with the child and the childs right to an
expeditious adoption decision consistent with the best interests.
-Mr. Reyes-

Effects of Adoption

Tamargo v. CA
Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and Aurelia Tamargo, petitioners, vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, The Hon. Ariston L.
Rubio, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Victor Bundoc, and Clara Bundoc, respondents.
Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
Date: June 3, 1992
Ponente: Feliciano, J.
Facts:
October 20, 1982 10-year old Adelberto Bundoc shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death
Petitioners Macario Tamargo, Jennifers adopting parent
and spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifers
natural parents, filed a civil complaint for damages
against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc,
Adelbertos natural parents with whom he was living at
the time of the tragic accident
A criminal case was filed against Adelberto for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence but he was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he
had acted without discernment
December 10, 1981 (prior to the incident) spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt
the minor Adelberto Bundoc
November 18, 1982 the petition for adoption of
Adelberto was granted (after Adelberto had shot and
killed Jennifer)
Respondent spouses Bundoc (natural parents of
Adelberto) claimed that the Rapisura spouses (adopting
parents of Adelberto) were the indispensable parties in
the suit since parental authority had shifted to the
adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed
Petitioners contend that since Adelberto was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority
had not ceased by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption
Trial Court: dismissed the complaint after ruling that the
Bundoc spouses were not the indispensable parties to
the action. The Tamargos filed a motion for
reconsideration and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration but both were denied because of their
failure to give copies to all the parties concerned 3 days
before the hearing
Court of Appeals: dismissed the petition ruling that the
petitioners had lost their right to appeal

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners, notwithstanding loss of
their right to appeal, may still file the instant petition
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as
parental authority is concerned, may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents
the indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against their adopted child when actual custody was
still lodged with the biological parents (Topical
Issue)


Held/Ratio:
YES. Although the petitioners motion for reconsideration
did not comply with the requirements of Section 13 Rule
41 and Section 4 Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court
(that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties
concerned at least 3 days before the hearing and that
the said notice shall state the time and place of hearing),
they were considered pro forma (as a matter of form)
and hence did not interrupt and suspend the
reglementary period to appeal.
In view of the nature of the issue raised in this petition
and in order that substantial justice may be served, the
Court invoked its right to suspend the application of
technical rules to prevent manifest injustice. Indeed, the
rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. If a technical
and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim
would be defeated.

NO.
It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundocs voluntary
act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave
rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him.
Art. 2176 of the CC provides: Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x
x .
Since Adelberto was a minor when he shot Jennifer,
Art. 2180 of the CC will apply: The obligation imposed
by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company. X X X X X X X X X. The
responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of
their minor children living with them is based upon the
parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an
unemancipated child living with its parents commits a
tortious act, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty to supervise
the child who is in their custody and control. The
presumption can be overturned by proof that the parents
exercised all diligence to prevent damage.
Bundoc spouses had parental authority over
Adelberto when the shooting occurred. It would thus
follow that the natural parents who had actual custody of
the minor Adelberto are the indispensable parties to the
suit for damages.
However, the Bundoc spouses rely on Art. 36 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that a
decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date
the original petition was filed. Aside from this, they
rely on Art. 39 of the same code which states that
adoption shall dissolve the authority vested in the
natural parents, except where the adopter is the
spouse of the surviving natural parent.
The Court is not convinced by the arguments of the
Bundoc spouses. The Civil Code states that the basis of
parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and the
minor child living with them and over whom, the law
presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.
Art. 221 of the FC reiterates this by providing that
parents who have actual custody of the child shall be
held liable for the damages ensued by the child living in
their company and under their parental authority.
Retroactivity may be allowed if it will permit the accrual
of benefits or advantages in favor of the adopted child.
However, retroactive effect may not be given so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing
at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. In this case,
it will be unfair to burden the Rapisura spouses with the
liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen or prevented (since they were in the United
States at that time and did not have physical custody of
Adelberto).
Art. 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides
that no petition for adoption shall be finally granted
unless adopting parents are given a supervised trial
custody period of at least 6 months to asses their
readiness. During the period of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. In this
case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or
had already been completed at the time of the incident.

In any case, the actual custody of Adelberto was with
his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

Dispositive: Petition granted due course. The CA
Decision is reversed & set aside. Petitioners complaint
reinstated & remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.
-Ms. Reyes-

Sayson v. CA
Mauricio Sayson, Rosario Sayson-Malonda, Basilisa Sayson-Lirio, Remedios Sayson-Reyes and Juana C. Bautista,
petitioners, vs. The Honarable Court of Appeals, Delia Sayson, assisted by her husband, Cirilo Cedo, Jr., Edmundo
Sayson and Doribel Sayson, respondents.
Nature: Petition for review by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals
Date: January 23, 1992 Ponente: Cruz, J.
Facts:

Eleno and Rafaela begot five children: Mauricio,
Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios, and Teodoro. Eleno died
on November 10, 1952 while Rafaela died on May 15,
1976. Teodoro married Isabel Bautista. Teodoro died on
March 23, 1972 while Isabel died on March 26, 1981.
Their properties were left in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim
to be their children (see diagram above).
April 25, 1983 - Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and
Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista (Isabels
mother), filed a complaint for partition and accounting of
the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The
action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel
Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed
estate as the decedents lawful descendants (Civil Case
No. 1030).
July 11, 1983 Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel Sayson
filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and
partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson, against the couples four surviving children.
Their complaint asserted that Delia and Edmundo were
the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they claim to
be entitled to inherit Teodoros share in his parents
estate by right of representation (Civil Case No. 1042).
Eleno (died 1952) Rafaela (died 1976)
Mauricio Rosario Basilisa Remedios Teodoro
(died 1972)
Isabel
(died 1981)
Delia
(adopted)
Edmundo
(adopted)
Doribel
(legitimate)

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein
respondents on the basis of practically the same
evidence.
In the second case (Civil Case No. 1042), the court held
that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted
children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the
decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. Doribel was
their legitimate daughter as proven by her birth
certificate dated February 27, 1967. Consequently, the
three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and
Rafaela by right of representation.
In the first case (Civil Case No. 1030), the court held that
the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro
and Isabel, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their
estate.
CA Ruling: Decision in Civil Case No. 1030 is affirmed.
On the other hand, decision in Civil Case No. 1042 is
modified in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
DISQUALIFIED from inheriting from the estate of Eleno
and Rafaela.
The petitioners contend that:
Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born on February 25, 1967,
when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9,
1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from
adopting based on Article 335 of the Civil Code which
names among those who cannot adopt those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction.
Doribel is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who
manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that
she was her natural mother.

Issues:
Whether or not Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted
children of Teodoro and Isabel
Whether or not Doribel is a legitimate child of Teodoro
and Isabel
Whether or not Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel are entitled
to inherit from Teodoro and Isabel
Whether or not Delia and Edmundo are entitled to inherit
from Eleno and Rafaela (Topical Issue)

Held/Ratio:
YES. It is too late now to challenge the decree of
adoption. It was issued in 1967, therefore it has
become final and executory. Assuming that the
petitioners were the proper parties, what they should
have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption on the basis of Doribels birth which disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting. But they never made
this appeal even though Mauricio claimed he had
personal knowledge of such birth. Aside from this, the
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be
made collaterally but in a direct proceeding frontally
addressing the issue. In the case of Santos v.
Aranzanso, the Court held that an adoption order
implies the finding of the necessary facts and the
burden of proof is on the party attacking it.

YES. Doribels birth certificate is a formidable piece
of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
recognition under Art. 265 of the CC and Art. 172 of
the FC. Although the birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence, no such evidence is provided by the
petitioners. Mauricios testimony that he was present
when Doribel was born to Edita Abila is suspicious as it
comes from an interested party. Abilas affidavit denying
her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship
of Doribel is hearsay, and was never offered as evidence
in the lower courts. Even without Abilas affidavit, the
birth certificate must be upheld in line with the
decision in Legaspi v. Court of Appeals where it was
held that the evidentiary nature of public documents
must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete,
and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In addition,
Doribels legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint
for partition and accounting; it should be questioned in
a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

YES. Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their
adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the
intestate estate of the deceased couple based on Art.
979 of the CC which states the legitimate children,
which includes adopted children, succeed their parents.
The underlying philosophy of the article is that a
persons love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and

thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. Aside
from this, it is also supposed that a one of a persons
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love for
them and as a provision for their continued care after
his death.

NO. As the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right
to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents. However, this is
not the case for Delia and Edmundo. In the case of
Delia and Edmundo, the grandparents (Eleno and
Rafaela) were total strangers. While it is true that an
adopted child is deemed to be a legitimate child and
have the same right as the latter, these rights do not
include the right of representation. The relationship
created by adoption is between only the adopting
parents and the adopted child and does not extend
to the blood relatives of either party.

Dispositive: Petition denied. Court of Appeals decision
is affirmed with costs against the petitioners.
-Ms.Reyes-

Johnston v. Republic
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, ANA ISABEL HENRIETTE ANTONIA CONCEPCION
GEORGIANA, ISABEL VALDES JOHNSTON, petitioner-appellant,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Date: April 30, 1963 Ponente: Labrador, J
Facts: Petitioner Isabel Valdes Johnston is married to
Raymund Jonhstion.
She filed a petition adopting Ana Isabel Henriette
Antonio Concepcion Georgiana.
The lower court granted her petition but gave Ana Isabel
the surname VALDES.
Petitioner filed a motion to change the surname given to
VALDES JOHNSTON.
She argues that:
since she is married, her adopted daughter should be
allowed to use the surname she is using.
Giving the daughter her maiden name would imply that
she was begotten out of wedlock which would be
embarrassing and humiliating to both of them.
The Respondent Solicitor General argued that the child
should use the surname of the petitioner alone and not
the surname of her husband.
It will create more confusion because it creates the
impression that she was adopted by the petitioners
husband also. In this case, it is not true. Child was
adopted without husbands concurrence.
Issue:
Should the adopted child be allowed to use the surname
of adopters husband (Valdes Johnston)?
Held: No. Petition denied.
Art. 341 of the Civil Code entitles minors to use
adopters surname. Surname being her surname and
not the one she acquired by virtue of marriage.
Petitioner made the adoption singly, without the
concurrence of her husband.
Consent of husband to the adoption by her individually
did not have the effect of making him an adopting father
so as to entitle adopted child to use his name (While he
consented, did not join the adoption).
To allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband
of the adopter, would mislead the public into believing
that he had also been adopted by the husband, which is
not the case.
Questions of successional rights may arise.
-Mr. Rimban-

Republic v. CA and Wong
Date: May 21, 1992 Ponente: Regalado, J.
Facts:
Maximo Wong was the natural child of Maximo Sr. and
Segundina Alcala.
He was later adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong.
Upon reaching the age of 22, Maximo Wong filed a
petition to change his name to Maximo Alacala on the
following grounds:
having a Chinese name isolated him because the name
suggests Chinese ancestry when in fact he is a Filipino
Muslim living in a Muslim Community.
He is being ridiculed because of his Chinese name
hampering his business and social life.
His adoptive mother did not oppose his desire to use his
former surname.
He is now emancipated and can decide what is in his
best interest.
Solicitor general opposed the petition on the following
grounds:
Allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and
friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the
petition for change of name.
For private respondent to cast aside the name of his
adoptive father is crass ingratitude to adoptive parents.
Issue:
Whether the reasons given by Maximo for changing his
name are valid, sufficient and proper.

Held:
Petition denied. Court granted change of name.
Maximos argument of being ridiculed and embarrassed
because of his name is substantiated.
He receives few customers in his furniture business
because nobody believes he is Muslim.
He did not disrespect his adoptive parents as evidenced
by his securing her adoptive mothers consent before
filing his petition.
While the law says that the adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter, the change to the adoptive
surname is a mere incident that accompanies adoption.
It is not the object of adoption. The object of adoption is
to take into ones family the child of another as a son or
daughter, giving it the title, rights and privileges of such.
Change of surname does not affect his status as an
adopted child and legal heir
Changing ones surname does not change the effects of
adoption on the child. The adoptive mother also made it
clear in her affidavit that she consents without affecting
the legal adoption granted which makes Maximo her
legal heir.
Change of name does not affect family relations, rights
and duties , civil status, legal capacity or citizenship.
The court does not believe that by reverting to his old
name, private respondent would then be using a name
which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law
prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but
the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the
use of any other surname, and only subjects such
recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial
sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it permits.
Article 189 gives the adopted child the right to use the
surname of the adopter. It is not to be imposed on the
child especially if it is detrimental to his welfare.
-Mr. Rimban-


Republic v. CA and Caranto
Date: March 15 1996 Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Facts:
Jaime and Zenaida Carnato filed a petition for the
adoption of Midael Manzon, 15 years old, who has been
living since he was seven years old. The petition prayed
for:
Midael to become the child of Zenaida and Jaime.
Dissolution of the authority vested in the natural parents
of the child,
Surname of child be legally changed to that of the
petitioners and his first name which was mistakenly
registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."
Solicitor General opposed the petition for the change of
name because the petition was mainly for adoption
purposes
RTC dismissed opposition of Solicitor General and
granted the petition of the spouses.
Solicitor General appealed in the CA. He further argued
that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
adoption because in the notice published in the
newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of
"Midael. He argued that the notive ny publication should
have stated the true name of the child.
CA affirmed the RTCs decision. A petition for review
was then filed in SC
Issue: WON, RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private
respondents' petition for adoption.
WON both the CA and RTC erred in granting private
respondents' prayer for the correction of the name of the
child in the civil registry.
Held: Yes; Yes
Ratio:
The error in the name in the notice of publication is not a
substantial defect but merely a clerical one and thus
does not require a separate petition to be applied for the
change of name to prevent multiplicity of actions.
Midael and Michael "can be read and pronounced
with the same rhyme and tone and thus could not
possibly cause confusion. The purpose of publication
requirement is to notify those who have an objection to
the adoption and this was served in this case sufficiently
despite the clerical error.
RTC erred when it failed to apply Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court in the case. Rule 108 also includes correction of
entries in the civil registrar when there is a change of
name. The RTC not applying 108 when it should be
applicable in this case was not able tom comply with its
requirements. These are 1.) Making the local civil
registrar a party in the proceeding and 2) publication of
the order once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Moreover, the notice that was published was only with
regard to the adoption and not the change of name.

-Mr. Santiago-
Republic v. Hernandez
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs, Hon. Jose Hernandex, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 158,
Pasig City and Spouses Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, respondents.
Date: February 9, 1996 Ponente: Regalado, J.
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin
Earl Bartolome Moran. In the same petition, they prayed for
the change of name of said minor adoptee to Aaron
Joseph, the same being the name with which he was
baptised in keeping with religious tradition. They added that
it is the name by which he has been called by his adoptive
family, relatives and friends.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion for the relief for change of
name in the same petition for adoption, arguing that these

petitions should be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings. Private respondents, on the other hand,
argued that a permissive joinder of causes of action is
allowable to avoid multiplicity of suits.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents,
approving the petition for adoption and the petition for
change of name. It adopted a liberal stance and held that
no one will be prejudiced by the change of name of the
adoptee.
ISSUES:
WON the trial court erred in granting the prayer for the
change of name of the adoptee embodied in the petition for
adoption
WON there was a lawful ground for the change of name.
HELD:
NO. What the law allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is the use of the surname of the adopter by the
adoptee upon issuance of the decree of adoption. However,
the first name of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of the
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptees first name. Changing the
given or proper name of a person cannot be done without
judicial order. If a change of name is desired, it can only be
done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive
and procedural requirement for a special proceeding for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. A
proceeding for change of name is governed by its own set
of rules. It cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition be justified
under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of
action. The joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two
or more demands or rights of action in one action. It can
only be done if (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action
arise out of the same contract, transaction, or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of
the same nature and character. Neither of the said
requirements are present in the case at bar.
NO. Jurisprudence has recognized the following grounds to
justify change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonourable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name and is unaware
of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to
anybody; (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest. The only justification advanced for
the change of name was the fact that adoptees baptism
under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been
known since he came to live with the private respondents.
These grounds cannot be recognized. The change of
surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption does not
lawfully extend to his given name.
This decision does not entirely foreclose and is without
prejudice to private respondents privilege to legally change
the name of their adopted child, provided the same is
exercised via a proper petition for change of name.
-Ms. Tiu-

Adoption Decree
Reyes v. Sotero
Ana Joyce Reyes, petitioner, vs. Hon. Cesar M. Sotero, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, Atty. Paulino
Saguyod, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as Special Administrator, Corazon
Chichioco, Angelito Lising, Erlinda Espacio, Gonzalo Zalzos, and Ernesto Lising, respondents.
Facts:
Respondent Corazon Chichioco filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor and
settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising, claiming
that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died
intestate. The deceased left real properties and assorted
pieces of jewelry and money allegedly in the possession

of petitioner Ana Joyce Reyes, grandniece of the
deceased.
Reyes filed an opposition claiming that she was an
adopted child of Lising and her late husband, Serafin
delos Santos. She asserted that the issuance of letters
of administration is unnecessary as she was the only
heir of Lising. She further alleged that Chicioco is unfit to
be the administrator because of her antagonistic
interests against decedent.
She also presented proofs that she was legally adopted
by the deceased and her late husband. She presented
the following:
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on Register of Court
Decrees, she was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin
delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec.
Proceeding No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre at the CFI
of Tarlac, Branch 3
Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-
Tarlac City stating that a judgment was rendered
decreeing petitioners adoption by Elena Lising and
Serafin delos Santos
A copy of Judicial Form No. 43 indicating that the
adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of the
RTC-Tarlac City
A Decree of Final Distribution issued by the Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office showing that upon the death of
Serafin delos Santos, death benefits were to be paid to
his widow, Elena Lising, and his daughter Ana Joyce
delos Santos.
Chichioco filed a petition for the annulment of the
adoption decree claiming that no proceedings for
adoption of petitioner took place since the Provincial
Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor
General had no records of the adoption case. The CA
dismissed this case for procedural reasons.
Respondents claimed that reasonable doubts have been
cast on petitioners claim that she was legally adopted.
They have also filed a criminal complaint against
petitioner for falsification of adoption decree, which was
eventually dismissed.
In the meantime, parties were enjoined from dissipating
and disposing any or all of Elena Lisings properties.
Upon request of Chichioco, Atty. Paulino Saguyod was
appointed as the special administrator.
Chichioco filed a motion before the RTC to enjoin
petitioner from conducting business in the property
belonging to the estate. Petitioner allegedly converted
the basement of Lisings residence into a billiard hall
without authority of the special administrator. Petitioner,
on the other had, argued that as the sole heir, she had
the right to possess and use the decedents property.

In due course, the CA held that the presiding judge
Sotero gravely abused his discretion in appointing his
clerk of court as the special administrator. Such act
could engender a suspicion that the Judge and his clerk
are in cahoots in milking the decedents estate.
Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to comply with the bond
requirement. The CA also held that it was incumbent for
petitioner to prove that she was legally adopted by the
deceased.
Issue: WON petitioner still had to prove the validity of
her adoption due to imputations of irregularities
Held:
No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any
evidence other than those which she already presented
before the trial court. These documents are presumed to
have been regularly issued as part of the official duties
of that said public officers perform. The adoption decree
is a public document required by law to be entered into
public records. Such public documents are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. The certifications
suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners adoption until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence.
Such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate
action brought principally for nullifying the adoption
decree. It cannot be attacked collaterally in a proceeding
for the settlement of a decedents estate. Petitioners
status as an adopted child of the decedent remains
unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought
against her standing as such. For as long as petitioners
adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim
any interest in the decedents estate.
-Ms. Tiu-


Inter Country Adoption
Adoption Issues
Ziegler: International Adoption in the Best Interest of the Child
Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children- Concerned at the large
number of children who are abandoned or become orphans owing to violence, internal disturbance, armed conflicts,
natural disasters, economic crisis or social problems, attempted to formulate guidelines for countries to follow in child
placement problems.
Section 1- Family as the cornerstone of child welfare
Child welfare depends upon family welfare
First priority for a child is to be cared for by his or her parents
Section 2- Guidelines for foster placement
Section 3- National and international adoption
If a child cannot be placed in a foster or adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the country of
origin, inter-country adoption MAY be considered as an alternative. (DOMESTIC ADOPTION is PREFERRED)
Contra-argument: Life with an adoptive family in a developed country is significantly more likely to provide the
material security and affection called for, which are the paramount considerations.
Arguments against INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION
National Pride- maintain status and sense of dignity in the world community (e.g., South Korea restricted number of
international adoptions permitted, with total abolition as long-run goal; reversed however in 1981 because of economic
difficulties)
Counter-arguments:
America as melting pot of cultures; Nurtures cultural diversity; All Americans share an Amercian culture
Reality is the culture these children will be experiencing in their home country is poverty and decay.
Internationally adopted children do not grow up without a culture; they grow-up with the culture of their adoptive
country. Moreover, adoptive parents are observed to exert effort to familiarize their adoptive child to cultures of
the country of their origin.
Unacceptable form of international charity
Different conception of national pride- They believe their country and heritage is special, and that their children would be
deprived of something valuable if they were removed from it.
Loss of human resources
Anti-American/ Anti-Western feelings- poignant example of exploitation and expropriation of less developed countries
valued resources
Best interest of the child
It would be best interest of child to remain with family of at least at the country of origin
Deprivation of cultural identity

Racial discrimination
Counter-argument: Experiences of racial discrimination is extremely limited. Studies indicate adopted children
have generally experienced positive adjustment in their adoptive homes.
Unnecessary separation from family
Counter-argument: Not financially feasible
IA acts as escape valve for less developed countries and as conscience-saving mechanism for developed countries, at
the expense of the best interest of the child.
Counter-arguments:
International community will not see their moral obligation as completely relieved simply because they support
or engage in international adoption.
Due to financial and societal constraints in less developed countries, significant number of children be
abandoned.
IA is dictated by demands of adoptive parents, rather than needs of children involved- creation of adoption market-
IA facilitates child trafficking
Counter-argument- can be addressed by setting standards and guidelines.
-Ms. Torres-

XIV. PARENTS AND CHILDREN

Peskind: Determining the Undeterminable: The Best Interest of the Child Standard as an Imperfect but Necessary
Guidepost to Determine Child Custody

History of Allocation of Child Custody
The history of the legal standards governing custody disputes between a childs parents reveal a dramatic movement from
rules to a highly discretionary principle gradually shorn of narrowing

PATERNAL PREFERENCES
Until late 19
th
English law automatically mandated that children be placed with their father. Derived from ancient Rome
where the pater-familias ruled and dominated all aspects of domestic and public life. Children were considered as
property of their father, which resulted to total control by their father.
Colonial American era- Father, as economic head of the household, was awarded custody due largely to the childs
importance as an asset in an economy with a deficient labor force.
Revolutionary American- erosion of patriarchal preference. The family, rather than an organic whole with the patriarch as
its head, gave way to a collectivity of individuals, each with his or her own rights and interests.

19
th
Century American jurisprudence- reject the rule of the absolute paternal preference. While the father still dominated
as the head of the family, individual rights of the other members were started to be protected.
TRANSITIVE PERIOD
Rules based on fault emerged: The children will be best taken care of and instructed by the innocent party.
Origination of maternal preference- The wife typically filed for divorce, necessarily requiring her to plead and prove fault in
order to prevail.
MATERNAL PREFERENCE
20
th
Century- Law more formally evolved in favor of a maternal preference for custody.
As women began to obtain greater social and economic power, their ability to provide for their childrens maintenance and
education increased proportionately. It was also during this period that women came to be recognized as being better able
to care for their children as a result of maternal instincts.
Tender years doctrine came to accept women as having superior morals and nurturing skills, better suiting then for the
care and rearing of children
FAMILY LAW TRANSFORMED- factors affecting transformation
Emergence of feminism as a political force- also largely contributed to the demise of maternal preferences for custody
Federalism in family laws
Turmoil of the 1960s and the 1970s- In the wake of rising divorce rates, challenges to womens traditional roles, and
mens claims of sex discrimination in custody awards, most states abandoned the maternal presumption in favor of a
more gender neutral best interests standard.

BEST INTEREST STANDARD: IS THERE A BETTER WAY?

Three primary objections:
The standard is indeterminate and unpredictable
The standard is impossible to adjudicate
The standard is unjust

INDETERMINACY AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF BEST INTEREST STANDARD
Best interest standard must necessarily be open ended because each individual child and family situation is unique. By
having an open-ended standard, judges can exercise their discretion so broadly as to neutralize any effective standard.

CAN SCIENCE QUANTIFY A CHILDS BEST INTEREST?
The courts seem not only to accept psychological expert testimony on complex family issues, but to demand it to effect
what they see as a reasonable resolution to problems with no single correct solution.

The courts reliance has INHERENT PROBLEMS: Psychology is an undeveloped and controversial discipline.
THE BEST INTEREST STANDARD IS DIFFICULT OT ADJUDICATE
There is requirement for the court to make predictions of future conditions affecting a childs welfare.
Best interest standard is people oriented instead of act oriented. Acts are determinate and are a concrete basis for courts
to rely on.
THE STANDARD IS UNJUST
Compromise expose children to a split the baby shared custody arrangement that may be deleterious to their emotional
welfare, forcing them to commute between two frequently warring homes.
Due to uncertainty of outcome, litigation costs increase and the role of lawyers become more significant.

OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO THE BEST INTEREST STANDARD

Sex-based standards- Standard that relies on sex of the parent has been universally rejected; outdated and unfair way
to adjudicate child placement.
Primary caretaker preferences- Relies predominantly on the past allocation of parenting responsibilities.
Courts consider: (1) parental planning and agreement about the childs custodial arrangements and upbringing; and (2)
continuity of existing parent-child attachments.
Least detrimental alternative standards- acknowledge that child is already a victim of his environmental circumstances,
that he is greatly at risk, and that speedy action is necessary to avoid further harm being done to his chances of healthy
psychological development.
Comparisons of various standards-

PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THEORETICAL PROBLEMS
Litigation controls
Expidited litigation-
Allocate responsibility to the trial court to assure that custody proceedings conclude within one year from the filing of the
petition for dissolution of marriage.
Financial issues are separated from custody issues.
Less reliance on conclusions of custody evaluators regarding childrens best interest- court should exercise
greater control over custody experts. There should be enhanced scrutiny of credibility of supposed experts. Their
testimony should also be limited to the objective indicia they are trained to evaluate.
Better appellate review- There needs to be a record for all contested custody litigation.
Enhanced trial skills of practitioners and jurists- Courts should certify a lawyer to engage in such litigation or,
alternatively, require mandatory minimum experience to ensure full and adequate representation.

-Ms. Torres-

Custody
Gender and Tender Years Presumption
Ex Parte Devine
Re: Christopher P. Devine v. Alice Beth Clark Devine
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review decision of Court of Civil Appeals
Date: March 27, 1981 Ponente: Maddox, J.

Facts:
Alice and Christopher were married in 1966 and got
separated in 1979.
They have two children, Mathew Patrick (born in 1972)
and Timothy Clark (born in 1975).
The children are of tender years as contemplated by
the tender years doctrine or presumption.
The mother was a teacher and currently employed at the
US Army as Educational Specialist. The father was a
member of the faculty and head of the Guidance and
Counselling Department at a university. Both are
deemed fit and proper persons to be vested with care,
custody and control of the minor children. No evidence
was presented that they were unfit.
Since theres a presumption in Alabama that when
dealing with minors, the natural mother is presumed
in the absence of evidence to the contrary to be the
proper person to be vested with custody, the custody
was awarded to Alice.
CA: tender years presumption is not a classification
based upon gender, but merely a factual presumption
based upon the historic role of the mother

Issue: WON the tender years presumption is
constitutional
Courts reliance on the tender years presumption
deprived the father of his constitutional entitlement to the
equal protection of the law

Held: No. It violates the 14
th
amendment to the US
Constitution. CA decision reversed and remanded with
directions.

Ratio:
Any statutory scheme which imposes obligations on
husbands, but not on wives, establishes a classification
based upon sex which is subject to scrutiny under the
14
th
amendment.
Reed, Frontiero, Orr and Caban: tender years
presumption represents an unconstitutional gender-
based classification which discriminates between
fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings
solely on the basis of sex
Tender years presumption rejects the fundamental
proposition that maternal and paternal roles are not
invariably different in importance
Even if mothers as a class were closer than fathers to
young children, this parent-child relation becomes less
acceptable as age of child increases.
Even though procedure for presumption is always
cheaper and easier than individualized determination, in
view of the fact that the welfare of children and
competing claims of parents are at stake, such
means of determination cannot be justified.
DIRECTIONS of court: court should consider the
individual facts of the case in order to truly consider
the best interests of the children:
Sex and age of children

Emotional, social, moral, material and
educational needs
Home environments of parties
Characteristics of the parties: age, character,
stability, mental and physical health, capacity
and interest for emotional, social, moral, material
and educational needs of children
Interpersonal relationships: child to parent and
between children
Effect on child of disrupting or continuing an
existing custodial status
Preference of child, if of sufficient age and
maturity
Recommendation of expert witnesses or
independent investigator
Available alternatives
Notes for Discussion (History of the Tender Years Presumption/Doctrine):
1. Common Law
Father rather than the mother has the virtual absolute right to the custody of the minors
Base on the feudalistic notions concerning the natural responsibilities of the husband at common law
Husband is the head or master of his family, and as such has the responsibility for the care, maintenance, education and
religious training of the children.
Right is not given to him for his own gratification but because nature and law
By marriage, husband and wife becomes one person with legal identity. As a result, wifes rights were often subordinated
to those of her husband.
Blackstone: mother was entitled to no power over children, but not only to reverence and respect.
2. 19
th
Century England
Began to question the paternal preference rule: hardship inflicted upon unoffending mothers by a state of law which took
little into account of their claims or feelings
3. US: Helms v. Franciscus
It would violate the law of nature to snatch an infant from the care of its mother
Hold nature in contempt and snatch helpless, puling infancy from the bosom of an affectionate mother, and place it in the
coarse hands of the father. The Mother is the softest and safest nurse of infancy
Began the process of evolution, reflecting a change in social attitudes
4. Recent years
Criticized by legal commentators as an outmoded means of resolving child custody disputes
See ratio
-Ms. Umali-


Cervantes v. Fajardo
In the matter of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus of minor Angelie Anne C. Cervantes
Nelson Cervantes and Zenaida Cervantes, petitioner v. Gina Fajardo and Conrado Fajardo, respondents
Nature: Petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus re: Angelie Anne Cervantes
Date: January 27, 1989 Ponente: Padilla J.
Facts:
Angelie was born in 1987 to respondents Conrado and
Gina, common-law husband and wife.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to Ginas
sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Cervantes, who
took care and custody of the child since she was barely
2 weeks old.
An affidavit of consent to the adoption of child was
executed by respondent.
RTC: approved the petition for adoption
Freed from parental authority of her natural parents as
well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them
and that the child will be known as Angelie Anne
Cervantes rather than Angelie Anne Fajardo
Petitioners received a demand from respondents to
pay the latter P150,000 or they would get back the
child. Petitioners refuse to accede.
While petitioners were at work, respondent took the
child and brought Angelie to her house.
Petitioner demanded that Gina return the child but Gina
refused saying that she had no desire to give up her
child for adoption and that it wasnt fully explained to her.
However, she sent a word to the petitioners that she will
return the child if the former will pay her the amount
she asked for.
The social worker who had conducted the study and
submitted the report thereon testified that she had
interviewed Gina and the respondent manifested her
desire to have the child adopted by petitioners.
Issue: Who should have the custody of the child?
Held: Spouses Cervantes should have the custody of
the child.

Ratio:
In all cases involving custody, care, education and
property of children, the childs welfare is paramount.
The provision that the child under 5 shall not be taken
away from the mother will not apply if the court finds
compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
Foremost consideration is: moral, physical, and social
welfare of the child taking into consideration the
resources, moral and social standing of the contending
parents.

The natural parents are not suitable because:
Conrado was legally married to another woman. His
open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor
that desirable atmosphere to develop into an upright and
moral-minded person
Gina also has a child with another married man. This
could affect the moral outlook and values of the minor.
Gina was jobless and maintains illicit relationship with
married man.

Petitioners are should be granted the custody
because:
They were legally married.
They were morally, physically, financially, and socially
capable of supporting the child
They could giver her a future better than the natural
mother.
Minor was legally adopted with full knowledge and
consent of the natural parents.
A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving
authority vested in natural parents

Adopting parent has the right to the care and custody of
the adopted child and exercise parental authority and
responsibility over the child.
-Ms. Umali-

Espiritu v. CA
Petitioners: Reynaldo Espiritu and Guillerma Layug
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Teresita Masauding
Facts:
Reynaldo and Teresita met in 1976. Teresita left for
California and eventually, Reynaldo was also sent to the
US (Pennsylvania) for work. They maintained a
common-law relationship and in 1986, Rosalind was
born.
They got married in 1987, while they were on a brief
vacation in the Philippines. Upon their return to the US in
1988, Teresita gave birth to Reginald.
The couple separated in 1990. Teresita left Reynaldo
and the children, and went back to California. Reynaldo
brought his children home to the Philippines but since
his work in the US was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his
children with his sister (Guillerma) and her family.
Reynaldo also filed a criminal case of bigamy against
Teresita.
In 1993, the trial court declared Reynaldo to have sole
parental authority. In 1994, Teresita appealed; the CA
then gave her custody of the children.
Issue: Who is more suitable and better qualified to have
custody of the children?
Held: Reynaldo, the father, is more suitable and better
qualified to have custody of the children.
Ratio:
There is nothing to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit"
parent. Also, it was Teresita who left the conjugal home
and the children, to go to California.
Whether the child is under or over 7 years of age, the
paramount criterion must always be the child's
interests. In the present case, both children are now over
7 years of age and their clear choice is the father.
Considerations involving the choice made by a child
must be ascertained at the time that either parent is
given custody over the child. Moreover, the illicit/immoral
activities of the mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to
conflicting moral values in Rosalind.
Given the findings of the trial court:
Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying
Reynaldo at the time she had a subsisting marriage with
another man.
--> Apparently, Teresita was already married to Roberto
Lustado (1984) when she married Reynaldo (1987).
She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love
affair with one of Reynaldo's fellow NSC employees.
--> When Rosalind was a little over 5 years old, she was
referred to a child psychologist to determine the effects
of uprooting her from the school where she was
studying. The responses of Rosalind about her mother
were very negative. Rosalind suffered from emotional
disturbance because, as she revealed, she saw hew
mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man (Perdencio
Gonzales) who lived in their house and worked for her
father. Rosalind also refused to go back to the US and
be reunited with her mother.
She is incapable of providing the children with
necessities and conveniences commensurate to their
social standing because she does not even own any
home in the Philippines.
She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.
--> Her conduct and demeanor in the courtroom
demonstrated her ebullient temper that tended to
corroborate the alleged violence of her physical
punishment of the children (even if only for ordinary
disciplinary purposes) and emotional instability, typified

by her failure (or refusal?) to show deference and respect to the Court and the other parties.
-Ms. Veneracion-

Celis v. Cafuir

Date: June 12, 1950 Petitioner: Ileana A. Celis Respondent: Soledad Cafuir
Facts:
In 1946, Ileana gave birth to Joel (John) Cafuir. Due to
the anger and extreme displeasure of her father and
because of her father's objection to having her son in
their home, nine days after the baby's delivery, Joel was
given to the custody of Soledad. Ileana spent several
days in Soledad's house while recuperating; later, she
returned to her own home leaving her child to the care of
Soledad. Ileane visited her child every Saturday.
In 1948, Ileana married Agustin C. Rivera. The couple
then decided to get back Joel. But respondent refused to
give up the child.
Issue: Who has the right to the custody of Joel?
Held: Ileana must be given custody of the child.
Ratio:
Ileana did not renounce her custody of and patria
potestas (parental authority) over her child.
The documents wherein the boy's mother is supposed to
have definitely renounced custody over the child cannot
be reasonably interpreted as having contemplated such
renunciation.
First document: merely entrusted her son to Soledad
because she did not have the means to bring him up.
The word "entrusted" cannot convey the idea of definite
and permanent renunciation of the mother's custody of
her child.
Second document: merely designated Soledad as the
"real guardian" of the child. This does not mean that said
guardian will always assume and discharge the duties of
the office or position. Guardianship is temporary.
"no one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs.
Soledad Cafuir" --> future act; does not mean that she
has already adopted Joel
Ileana is now married to a man who with her is ready
and willing to assume the responsibility of support and
education; the couple is now able to discharge and cope
with said responsibility.
-Ms. Veneracion-

Gamboa v. CA
Date: July 11 2007 Ponente: Velasco J.

Facts:
Franklin and Agnes were married on December 23, 2000
and established their conjugal dwelling in Diniwid,
Boracay Island.
On December 2002, Simone, their child was born.
In 2005, the couple started to have marital problems
regarding Agnes insistencethat they should stay in
Makati while Franklin would rather have it if they stay in
Boracay.
On March 2006, Agnes asked for money and Franklins
permission to bring their daughter to Makati for a brief
vacation. Franklin agreed but they never came back.
Franklin filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA
for Agnes to produce Simone

On May 19, 2006 CA issued a resolution to granting the
petition and ordering that Simone be brought before the
said Court on May 26, 2006.
On June 8, 2006, after a series of hearings and
presentation of evidence, CA promulgated a decision
that granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes. (Assailed
Decision)
Agnes filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied for lack of merit.
Issue:
WON the CA commited grave abuse of discretion in
granting custody of the minor child to both parents.
Held:
Yes, the sole custody of the child should have been
awarded to the mother.
Ratio:
The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the The
Child and Youth Welfare Code, provides that in actions
concerning children, the best interests of the child must
be of primary consideration. The tender-age
presumption provided in Article 213 of the FC may be
overcome only by compelling evidence showing the
mothers unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to
have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction
with a communicable disease. Agnes did not fall under
any of these circumstances. Thus the sole custody of the
child must be awarded to her mother Agnes Gamboa.
-Mr. Santiago-

Sy v. CA
Wilson Sy, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, RTC Manila, Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy, respondents
Date: 27 Dec 2007
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari the decision and resolution of CA
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Facts:
19Jan94 Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus against Wison Uy and for custody of their
minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah. Wilson argued
against it alleging Mercedes abandonment, mental
instability and inability to care for the children.
14Dec94 RTC: Custody of children to Mercedes. Wilson
should provide monthly support of P50,000.
Wilson appealed to CA re custody and amount of
support.
CA:
1. Wilson was unable to prove Mercedes was unfit to
have custody.
Abandonment: Mercedes was driven away by Wilsons
family due to religious differences; her going to Taiwan
was motivated by her desire to earn money to reclaim
her children
Insanity: Mercedes praying outdoors in the rain is an
expression of her faith, and not evidence of insanity as
Wilson claims
Inability to care for her children: Mercedes has enough
financial ability to provide necessities for her children
2. Issue of support may be raised in proceedings
for writ of habeas corpus.
His ability to give support was determined by his
answers on his sources of income.
Judgment of support is never final and Wilson is free to
seek its modification.


Issues/ Held/ Ratio:
W/N CA erred in awarding sole custody to Mercedes.
It did not. In de facto separation, the court shall award
the care, custody and control of each child as will be for
his best interest. The law prefers the mother if she is a fit
and proper person, particularly since the minors involved
in this case are below age 7.

FC Sec. 213 In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
No children under 7 years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.

Rules of Court Sec. 6 Rule 99 Custody and Adoption of
Minors
Sec. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are
separated; Appeal. - When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately and apart from each other,
and the question as to the care, custody, and control of a
child or children of their marriage is brought before a
Regional Trial Court by petition or as an incident to
any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care,
custody, and control of each such child as will be for
its best interest, permitting the child to choose which
parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age,
unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of
the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty. If, upon such
hearing, it appears that both parents are improper
persons to have the care, custody, and control of the
child, the court may either designate the paternal or
maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother
or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take
charge of such child, or commit it to any suitable asylum,
children's home, or benevolent society. The court may in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code order
either or both parents to support or help support said
child, irrespective of who may be its custodian, and may
make any order that is just and reasonable permitting
the parent who is deprived of its care and custody to visit
the child or have temporary custody thereof. Either
parent may appeal from an order made in accordance
with the provisions of this section. No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless
the court finds there are compelling reasons therefore.

W/N CA had jurisdiction to award support in a
habeas corpus case. It did. Although FC Art. 203
provides that support would be paid only upon demand
of same, the issue may be treated as though it were
raised. There was implied consent from the parties
based on testimonies of Wilson and Mercedes,
regarding the need and ability to support, respectively.

Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize
presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if
they had been raised in the pleadings x x x

W/N the award of P50,000 support is arbitrary,
unjust, unreasonable and tantamount to a clear
deprivation of property without due process of law.
It was not. Both RTC and CA based the amount on
Wilsons representations regarding his familys wealth
and ability to provide for the children. In any case, the
amount may be modified according to the needs of the
other party and his means to provide support.
-by Ms. Hernandez-


Parental Unfitness

Feldman v. Feldman
Philip Feldman, respondent v Mady Feldman, appellant
Ponente: Benjamin, J.
Nature: Appeal by wife from an order transferring custody of two children from her to his ex-husband
July 15, 1974
Facts:
The lower court transferred from the mother to the
unmarried father the custody of their two children ages
six and nine who previously had continuously resided
with their mother since birth.
Parties were married in April, 1962
Wife(Mady Feldman) obtained a divorce decree based
upon the cruel and inhuman treatment of the husband,
and was awarded custody of the children
Subsequent to the divorce, wife started dating an
individual which she later found to be married but
nevertheless continued to socialize with
The former husband(Philip Feldman) on a visit to his
former wifes home had observed on her night table a
copy of SCREW magazine ( a publication of dubious
social values) and found letters (some with explicit
photographs attached)
In the lower court it was established that:
the mothers private sex life in no way involved or
affected the children(father acknowledged that the
children never saw or commented upon the offensive
materials)
It was also established that the children were well
provided for both emotionally and physically
The atmosphere of the mothers home was happy and
cheerful, premises are well-kept and comfortable
That the mother was sincerely concerned and devoted to
the children and bestowed upon them an abundance of
love and care
Issue:
WON the ex-wife is an unfit parent thus custody of the
children be transferred to the ex-husband
Held: No. Custody should remain to the ex-wife
Ratio:
Amorality, immorality, sexual deviation and aberrant
sexual practices does not ipso facto constitute
unfitness for custody
In the instant case sexually oriented literature should not
be considered as a determining factor against the wife
for the custody of the children
Although the contents of SCREW magazine may be
offensive to some, the courts are constitutionally
prohibited taking any punitive measure to inhibit or
restrict an individual from reading any matter in the
privacy of his own home
The right of a divorced woman to engage in private
sexual activities, which in no way involve or affect her
minor children, is within the penumbra of the right to
privacy
Courts should decide on the basis of best interests of
the children and not on a subjective evaluation of the
lifestyle of the parent
a change of custody should be made only if there is a
showing of the unfitness to continue as the custodial
parent, which in this case was not proven
Further, the traumatic psychological dislocation which
the two children of tender years would suffer from the
change of custody ordered by the trial court would
render tragic casualties. -Mr. Arnesto-


b. Role of the Childs Preference
Pizarro V. Vasquez (1938)
Keywords: Wifes adultery not proven, wins custody
FACTS:
This is a case of a wife whose commission of adultery
was not proven but her husbands cruelty and infidelity
were proven instead, entitling the wife for separate
maintenance and custody of her 3 minor children while
living separately from her husband.
1928 Wife and Husband got married and separated
in1933.
Wife (W) Maria Pizarro filed an action for support,
together with her 3 minor children against Husband (H)
Mario Vasquez due to his infidelity and cruelty. The H
argues however that they have a contract of separation
and it was his wife who committed adultery after such
separation.
Lower Court found for the husband on issue on adultery
and ordered custody of 3 minor children to be placed
with the husbands parents considering their right to
support.
Wife appeals.

ISSUE: WON W is guilty of adultery and therefore has
no right to separate maintenance and custody over
children.

RATIO:
No.
Facts show to the Supreme Court that:
1928 they got married
September 16, 1923 they executed contract of
separation (due to Hs infidelity and cruelty)

August 1938 (11 months after separation) youngest
third child Lorenzo was born. It is this due to this fact
that H contends that wife committed adultery for they
have been living separately since 1933 and had never
had intercourse with his wife. W contends that they has
a short-lived marital reunion after they met in a town
fiesta in November 1933 when husband promised to
behave in the future.
Marital reunion of H&W is not impossible or improbable
in November 1933. W therefore has prima facie
presumption of not committing adultery and Lorenzo
therefore has the presumption of legitimacy being born
in wedlock since parents were merely separated.
There were inconsistency in Hs allegations that he
discovered unchastity of wife only after birth of Lorenzo
but in his Answer (March 1934) filed 6 months before the
birth of Lorenzo, he already pointed out on his wifes
adultery. Court finds that he attempted to conceal such
knowledge to avoid inconsistency between his
knowledge of adultery in March 1934 and his act of
providing support in September and October the same
year. Wifes adultery therefore is not sufficiently
established.
Assertions of Hs cruelty and infidelity are also not
contradicted (despite allegation of his infidelity is only
based on wifes testimony).

HELD: W is entitled to separate maintenance and
custody of the children (and since such custody was also
stipulated in their contract of separation).
-Ms. Corpuz-


Goldstein V. Goldstein (1975)
Keywords: Both parents are fit to have custody, childs preference considered
FACTS:
This is a case 2 parents who are fit to have custody over
their child but since circumstances are nearly in state of
equipoise (Websters definition: balance, equilibrium) as
to make it difficult for the judge to decide, SC of Rhode
Island considers the childs preference.
1970 Family Court denied petition of wife Claire
Goldstein (W) for divorce and custody over child against
husband Edward Goldstein (H). H won custody rights
and W was granted visitation rights. However, H with 9
y.o daughter left Rhode Island to reside in Israel.
Wife appeals to Trial Court (particularly due to their
leaving for Israel).
1973 3 years later after the decision of family court
was rendered, proceedings for the appeal started (during
pendency of appeal, wife was given custody to
reestablish mother and child relationship).
At the trial court hearing the ff. among others transpired:
that both parents are fit to have custody and care for
childs needs, psychiatric evidence shows that child was
intelligent and was able to cope with burdens not usual
to children her age without giving her emotional damage.
In open court the child had difficulty revealing her
preference . Inside the chambers with the judge however
she revealed she loved her father more and wanted to
go to Israel with him. She also doesnt desire visitation
from her mother. The judge agreed with child though
with urgings thru fair bargain conditioned that she be
allowed to stay with her father but with visitation of her
mother during each summer.
Trial Court therefore ruled custody in favor of H, hence
W appeals.

ISSUE: WON custody must be give to H and not W.

RATIO: Yes.
Wife contends that TC allowed childs preference to
control its decision ignoring policy that mother are
preferred for custody on young children especially girls,
preference usually given to resident parent when both
equally fit and policy that minor can only elect a guardian
if atleast 14 y.o., and even needs Probate court approval
Supreme Court of Rhode Island looked into events that
transpired in the Lower Court that it affirmed.
SC says though TC failed to consider those factors, such
oversight is not controlling. Other considerations by TC
are also as relevant if placed on the same scale i.e.:
parties equal suitability, psychiatric evidence of childs
emotional stability and intelligence, TCs opportunity to
observe her demeanor, appearance, attitude, and
therefore arriving at the conclusion that her preference
on her father is not a mere whim and given substantial
weight.
SC also noted TC judges solicitude that child be a
willing participant of her mothers visitation rights and
custody and visitation will be reevaluated on the same
year TC gave the decision.
Since circumstances are nearly in state of equipoise
(Websters definition: balance, equilibrium) where both
parents are fit to have custody and care fore the childs
needs as to make it difficult for the judge to decide, SC
considers the childs preference.
-Ms. Corpuz-


Laxamana v. Laxamana
Reymond Laxamana, petitioner vs. Ma. Lourdes Laxamana, respondent
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J. Date: September 3, 2002
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC of QC

Facts:
Petitioner Reymond Laxamana and Respondent Ma.
Lordes Laxamana fights over the custody of their
three minor children.
During their marriage, petitioner (husband) became a
drug dependent. He underwent several treatment and
rehabilitation programs. On 1997, the court issued an
order declaring petitioner already drug-free.
Despite several confinements, respondent (wife) still
claimed that petitioner was not fully rehabilitated.
On 1999, respondent (wife) filed a petition for annulment
of marriage. Subsequently, petitioner (husband) filed a
motion seeking visitation rights over his children. After
the parties reached an agreement, the court issued an
order granting visitation rights to petitioner and
directing the parties to undergo psychiatric and
psychological examination.
FINDINGS OF THE PSYCH EXAM:
Reymond Laxamana [is not yet] completely cured even
though his drug urine test at Medical City for shabu
was negative.
Basing its decision on the psych exam findings, the RTC
ruled:
The children X X X are hereby ordered to remain under
the custody of the respondent. The visitation
arrangement as per Order of Dec 7, 1999 is hereby
incorporated and forms part of this Decision. X X X
Issue: WON the trial court considered the paramount
interest and welfare of the children in awarding their
custody to respondent (wife)

Held:
Instant case is REMANDED to the RTC for the purpose
of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of
petitioner and respondent to take custody of their
children.
Pending the final disposition of the case, custody shall
remain with respondent but subject to petitioners
visitation rights.
Ratio:
A child if over seven years of age may be permitted to
choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but
the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so
chosen is unfit.
Factors to be considered by the court: physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the child;
resources as well as social and moral situations of the
opposing parents
While petitioner has a history of drug dependence, there
is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to
provide the children with adequate support, education,
as well as moral and intellectual training and
development.
Re: Choice of children (TOPICAL ISSUE)
The court DID NOT ASCERTAIN THEIR CHOICE AS
TO WHICH PARENT THEY WANT TO LIVE WITH.
The trial court merely stated that: The children were
asked as to whether they would like to be with petitioner
but there are indications that they entertain fears in their
hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a
drug dependent.
The welfare of the children SHOULD NOT BE subject
to the parents say-so or mutual agreement alone.
-Ms. Beley-


c. Presumption for Primary Caretaker
GARSKA vs. McCOY
Michael Garska vs. Gwendolyn McCoy
Ponente: Neely, J.
Nature: Appellant McCoy, mother, appeals from an order of the Circuit Court which gave the custody of her son,
Jonathan McCoy, to the appellee, Michael Garska, the natural father.
Date: May 26, 1981
Facts
Appellant McCoy moved from her grandparents house
to live with her mother. McCoy was 15 years old and her
mother shared a trailer with appellee, Garska. McCoy
became pregnant by Garska. After 3 months, she
returned to her grandparents home.
McCoy received no support from Garska during her
pregnancy. After she gave birth to Jonathan, Garska
sent a package of baby food and diapers.
Jonathan developed a chronic respiratory infection which
required hospitalization. McCoys grandfather attempted
to have the hospitalization paid by his medical insurance
but he was informed that Jonathan was ineligible unless
adopted by the grandfather.
McCoy signed a consent to the adoption of Jonathan by
her grandparents. Upon learning of the adoption plan,
Garska visited the baby for the first time and sent money
weekly.
Grandparents filed a petition for adoption and Garska
filed a petition for habeas corpus to secure custody of
his son. The proceedings were consolidated for hearing.
Circuit court dismissed adoption petition upon finding
that Jonathan has not resided with his great
grandparents for the requisite 6 months before filing the
petition.
Circuit Court awarded the custody to the father for the ff.
reasons: natural father, relatively better education,
relatively more intelligence, relatively better ability to
provide financial support, relatively better socio-
economic environment, relatively better command of the
English language, relatively better appearance and
demeanor, and fathers motivation in his desire to have
custody while the mother had previously executed an
adoption consent.

Issue/Held
To whom should the custody of Jonathan be given?
Mother = McCoy
Should the tender year presumption be considered in
favor of the mother? No. Presumption in favor of primary
caretaker parent for children of tender years
Did the circuit court apply inappropriate standards to
determine relative fitness for custody? Yes.

Ratio
Award of custody should be based on the best interest of
the child and not on a presumption of as regards the
fitness of the parents. The father, by providing 15 dollars
a week child support, probably showed enough interest
to have standing to object to adoption. But there is no
evidence that the mother was an unfit parent. In this
case, there is no justification to remove custody from the
primary caretaker parent the mother. She mobilized all
resources at her command i.e., the regard of her
grandparents, to provide Jonathan with medical
attention. Fathers educational and economic position
pale in comparison to the mothers love, tolerance, and
willingness to sacrifice.
Loss of child is particularly terrifying to the primary
caretaker parent who was closest to the child. Sex roles
are becoming more flexible. Primary caretaker parent
may also be the father. Gender neutrality. Parent who is
not the primary caretaker is usually financially superior.
Child and primary caretaker parent are entitled to
support from the financially superior parent.
Practical considerations in setting child custody
solutions
Prevent issue of custody from being an abusive weapon
to affect level of support payments Solomon

syndrome: parent who is most attached to the child will
be most willing to accept an inferior bargain
Relative degrees of fitness requires precision of
measurement; judges cannot measure minute
gradations of psychological capacity presumption in
favor of primary caretaker parent if he/she meets the
minimum standard of being a fit parent regardless of sex
[caring and nurturing duties of a parent: meals,
grooming, clothing, medical care, arranging for social
interaction, alternative care such as babysitting, putting
child to sleep, disciplining, and education]
Urgent need in contemporary divorce law for a legal
structure upon which divorcing couple may rely on to
reach a settlement which was used by the court as
basis here in settling issues of custody and support
-Ms. Celso-

Flip of the Coin
Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy

CHILD-CUSTODY ADJUDICATION: JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS IN THE FACE OF INDETERMINACY
By Robert H. Mnookin
Themes of the Paper:
The determination of what is best or least detrimental for a particular child is usually indeterminate and speculative.
There is no clear-cut consensus on the standards to be used in determining what is best or least detrimental
Courts perform two very different functions in the resolution of custody disputes: private dispute settlement and child
protection.

Definitions:
PRIVATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT FUNCTION- involved when the court must choose between two or more private
individuals, each of whom claim an associational interest with the child.
CHILD PROTECTION FUNCTION- involves the judicial enforcement of standards of paternal behavior believed
necessary to protect the child. This function is consistent with the parens patriae power of the state to empower courts to
remove children from parental custody if necessary for their protection

FOUR STRANDS OF CUSTODY OF LAW:
Divorce Custody Law
The winner usually has less than all the rights included in custody with the ongoing two parent family
There can be joint custody with the child living periodically with each of the parents but more typically, only one parent has
custody, subject to the others right of visitation
Duty of support is often separated from the right of custody
Permits courts great flexibility in dividing the various legal elements of the parent-child relationship

Maternal preference standards are being displaced by neutral application of the best interest standard (deciding
according to the best interests of the child)
Guardianship Custody law
Who should be appointed as guardian of a childs person?
Contemporary legal standards reveal considerable judicial discretion and less automatic deference paid to the claims of
natural parents. The law in most (US) jurisdictions today permits the court to appoint some other person if the welfare of
the child would thereby be better served.
There is a trend towards more discretionary standards on the part of the court deciding.
Juvenile Court-Child Neglect Laws
There are statutes today allowing a court to assume jurisdiction over a neglected or abused child and to remove the child
from parental custody under broad and vague standards.
In neglect cases, juvenile courts today use highly individualized, discretionary standards to decide whether a child should
be removed from parental custody.
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights- Adoption
If the natural parents withhold consent, state laws provide for adoption without such consent under specified
circumstances.
Termination cases often involve child protection function: the state may initiate termination proceedings to free for
adoption a child already dependent of the juvenile system on the basis of allegations that the child has been neglected or
abandoned by his natural parents.
The legal standard for abandonment is becoming more discretionary and more child-centered: permitting children to be
freed for adoption when their parents manifest their disinterest or inattention, regardless of subjective attention to abandon
child

Since there are diminished differences among the different standards used to determine custody, there are calls
already for the uniformity of standards. There are three generalizations based on the study of these standards:
1. Substantial discretion is given to the courts. Controlling legal standards have become less specific
2. Standards are becoming neutral in applying the allegedly neutral application of the best-interests-of-the-child principle
3. The four strands of custody law are not doctrinally pure.

SUGGESTED STANDARD: LEAST DETRIMENTAL AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE
Any intervenor (state, natural parents or others) who wishes to alter a childs placement would have the burden of
establishing that the child is unwanted, and if so, that his current placement is not the least detrimental alternative. The
focus would be exclusively on the interests of the child and no preference would be given to the natural parent as such.

ANALYSIS OF PRESENT-DAY CUSTODY STANDARDS
How are custody disputes decided today? How is it different from traditional adjudication?

Custody Disputes: Person Oriented, not Act-Oriented Determinations. In determining custody based on the best
interests of the child principle, a court must evaluate the attitudes, dispositions, capacities and shortcomings of each
parent. Inquiry centers on what kind of person each parent is, and what the child is like
Custody Disputes- Predictions not Determination of Past Acts. In granting the custody of children to a parent or a
guardian, the court must consider with whom the child will be better-off in the near-future. But the problem is that in
practice, instead of making individualized predictions, courts formulate rules of thumb based on ascertainable facts of the
past.
Interdependence of Outcome-Affecting Factors. The probable interaction among the parties involved even after the
divorce and granting of custody must be taken into consideration because even as it may end the legal relationship, the
social and psychological relationship continue
Findings, Precedent and Appellate Review. Appellate courts are more hesitant to muddle with the decisions of the
lower courts since in the lower courts decisions, the character and disposition of the parties are ascertained by the judge
and these become factors on his decision as to who should be given custody. Estimates of character cannot be made by
those who have not seen or heard the parties. These estimates cannot be made solely on the basis of transcripts from the
lower court.
Participation by All Affected Parties. While the issue in a child custody case is what will become of the child, ordinarily
the child is not a true participant in the process. The child does not ordinarily define the interests himself.

Indeterminacy of Present-Day Standards
The judge should decide based on what he thinks will maximize what is best for the child. How he makes the decision can
be seen as a problem of rational choice. However, decision making under this model requires that 1) the decision maker
can determine possible outcomes for each course of action, 2) the utility measure that integrates his values and allows
comparisons among alternative outcomes, and 3) that the decision maker be able to specify the probability of an outcome
resulting from an action. The decision-maker should also be aware of the new information which can alter his calculations
Applying rational choice on the custody determination based on the best interests of the child principle, the judge should
be aware of the behavior of each parent in the past and how this behavior affected the child, and of the childs present
condition. In terms of prediction however, the task becomes difficult because more than one outcome is possible for each
course of judicial action and even psychiatrists and psychoanalysts conceded that their theories provide no reliable guide
in predicting what is likely to happen to a child. The judge must also determine what is in a childs best interests which
would be basis of determining the utility of each outcome. In some cases, the preference of the child is given weight but
people often lack confidence on the judgment of the child considering his capacity and level of maturity to determine his
own utility.
If there are decisions easily made, it is because while there is no consensus on what is best for the child, there is much
consensus on what is bad for the child. Thus, the judge can make short term predictions on the welfare of the child if
custody is to be granted to a parent

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF INDETERMINACY?
- Before analyzing policies concerning children, there are three basic starting points:
1. State paternalism: State has primary responsibility for children and ought to exercise full control over their lives,
except where delegation to the family is justified
2. Family Autonomy: Power and responsibility for children rests on private hands-the family, except in cases where
government rule can be justified

3. Agnosticism: No preference and instead approaches individual policy issues on their own merits
- Indeterminacy flows from our inability to predict accurately human behavior and from a lack of social consensus about
the values that should inform the decision.

-Would Rules Be Better? YES. Adjudication by a more determinate rule would confront the fundamental problems posed
by an indeterminate principle. The problem with and indeterminate standard is that:
(1) There is a risk of retroactive application of a norm of which the parties affected will have no notice;
(2) There is an obviously greater risk of violating the principle that like cases should be decided alike.
(3) Decision would depend much on who has the authority to decide what is best for a particular child and under what
circumstances.

-Consequences of Indeterminacy:
(1) There is little guidance for the identification of cases where state intervention to protect children is appropriate, giving
broad discretion to the judge. This is wrong because:
(a) the use of an indeterminate standard is inconsistent with the proper allocation of responsibility between the family and
the state;
(b) an indeterminate standard allows a court to evaluate parental attitudes and behavior on the basis of the judges
personal values;
(c) courts may underestimate the risks of removal, i.e., the psychological damage that may occur to the child in bring
him/her to foster care; and
(d) present legal standards fail to require judicial evaluation of alternatives to removal.

(2) There is also the risk that children after removal may never be able to come back to their families. Or, if they are put in
foster care, they may be destined to remain in limbo until adulthood, wards of a largely indifferent state. When under the
care of foster parents, they may find themselves in an awkward position, unable to locate themselves within the family set-
up.

SUGGESTED REMEDY:
-There should be standards for the decision to remove. Judicial discretion for the child-protection function should be made
much more limited. The standard should be made more objective and determinate.
-There should be three intermediate rules for private dispute settlement:
1. custody should never be awarded to a claimant whose limitations or conduct would endanger the health of the child
under the minimum standards for child protection described above
2. the court should prefer a psychological parent, i.e., an adult who has a psychological relationship with the child from the
childs perspective

3. natural parents should be preferred over others

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
Negotiation and Mediation: The childs existing and future relationship with his parents will be less damaged by a
negotiated settlement than by a court order where there is a winner and a loser

Informal Adjudication: It is a more intimate form of adjudication or arbitration that is highly desirable. In closely knit
communities, the adjudicator may be the patriarch, the matriarch, or the leader known to and respected by both parties.
The problem is this community set-up may be scarce by now and there is the possibility that the chosen adjudicator will
decline the task.

Random Selection: What if you already resorted to informal adjudication but the problem of custody is still not settled?
The solution is to FLIP A COIN. This would mean an acknowledgment of our ignorance and the equality of both parents. A
coin flip symbolically abdicates government responsibility for the child and symbolically denies the importance of human
differences and distinctiveness. However, many would disagree with this alternative because it would mean an abdication
for the search of wisdom. The repulsion of this suggestion by the people reflects an intuitive appreciation of the
importance of the educational, participatory, and symbolic values of adjudication as a mode of dispute settlement.

-Ms. Cerezo-

Other Rights and Duties in Exercise of Parental Authority
Salientes v. Abanilla
Marie Antoinette, Orlando, Rosario Salientes, petitioner vs. Loran Abanilla, Judge Sabundayo, RTC, respondent
Date: August 29, 2006
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari decision and resolution of CA

Facts:
Petitioner Marie and respondent Loran are the parents of
the 2-year-old minor Lorenzo and they lived with Maries
parents. However due to problems with the in-laws,
Loran suggested that they transfer to their own house.
Marie refused and so Loran left. He was thereafter
prevented from seeing his son.
Loran filed for Habeas Corpus and Custody. Trial court
gave order to petitioner Marie and her parents to
produce and bring before the court the body of the minor
Lorenzo and to show cause why said child should not be
discharged from restraint.
Petitioners filed for certiorari but CA dismissed petition
stating that the order of the trial court did not award the
custody of the child to anyone but was simply a standard
order issued for the production of restrained persons and
that a summary proceeding was still going to be
conducted.
Petitioners relied on Art. 213 of FC (no child under 7
shall be separated from the mother unless there is
compelling reason to do so) and contend that proper
remedy was simply an action for custody and not habeas
corpus since it is unavailable against the mother who
under the law has the right of custody of the minor.

Respondent contends that Art. 213 applies only to the
second part of his petition regarding custody and that
said article does not apply to a petition for habeas
corpus which pertains to his right as a father to see his
son. He asserts that habeas corpus is available against
any person who restrains the minors rights to see his
father and vice versa.
He also contends that he and the petitioner have a
shared custody and parental authority over their son.
Issue: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy to be
resorted to by the father

Held: YES.

Ratio:
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where
rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. Under Art. 211 of the FC, Loran and Marie have
joint parental authority over their son and consequently
joint custody.
Although the parents are separated de facto, since the
issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court
and in the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one
parent, BOTH parents are still entitled to the right to the
custody of their child. In the present case, respondents
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his
child as alleged in the petition and thus the remedy of
habeas corpus is available to him.
Furthermore, Art. 213 deals with judicial adjudication of
custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award
of custody by the court. It is not a basis for preventing
father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision
disallows father from seeing or visiting his own child
under 7 years of age.
-Ms. Carrasco-

CABANAS vs. PILAPIL
Melchora Cabanas, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Francisco Pilapil, defendant-appellant
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Cebu
Date: July 25, 1974
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Facts
Disputants in this appeal are the mother and the uncle of
a minor beneficiary of the insurance policy of her
deceased father.
Florentino Pilapil, single, and petitioner Melchora
Cabanas, married, are the parents of Millian Pilapil.
Millian was 10 years old at the time the complaint was
filed.
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and instituted Millian as
beneficiary with his brother, defendant Francisco Pilapil,
as trustee during Millians minority.
After Florentinos death, the proceeds were paid to
Francisco.
Melchora filed this complaint for the delivery of such
sum.

Issue/Held
Is it the right/duty of the mother to act as trustee of the
minor beneficiary? YES

Ratio
CC 320: The father, or in his absence the mother, is the
legal administrator of the property of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than 2 thousand pesos, the father
or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the
CFI.
CC321: The property which the unemancipated child has
acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by
any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and

in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is
under parental authority and whose company he lives.
The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary. The
minor beneficiary is under the custody of the mother.
The minor acquired the property through lucrative title.
Pursuant to the above provisions, the property belongs
to the minor and plaintiff is entitled to the possession of
said insurance proceeds.
The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted
provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. To protect the
rights of the minor, the plaintiff should file an additional
bond in the guardianship proceedings.
The paramount consideration is the welfare of the child.
The law recognizes the deep ties that bind the parent
and the child. The wording of the law is clear and the
intendment of the law is the protection of the interests of
the minor. Infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased
is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of
an uncle.
The appealed decision is buttressed by its adherence to
the concept that the judiciary, as agency of the State is
acting as parens patriae. It would be more in
consonance with the natural order of things and the
Philippine tradition for a parent to be preferred. The
State shall strengthen the family as a basic social
institution.
-Ms. Celso-

LIBI V. INTERNATIONAL APPELATE COURT
Petitioners: Cresencio Libi and Amelia Yap Libi v. Respondents: Hon. Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC), Felipe Gotiong,
Shirley Gotiong
Ponente: Regalado, J. Date: September 18, 1992
Facts:
Petitioners Cresencio Libi and Amelia Yap Libi are the
parents of Wendell Libi
Respondents Felipe Gotiong and Shirley Gotiong are the
parents of Julie Ann Gotiong
For more than 2 years before the deaths of Wendell and
Julie Ann, they were sweethearts until they broke up
their relationship. This is because Julie Ann found
Wendell to be sadistic and irresponsible.
A few weeks before their deaths, Wendell Kept on
pestering Julie Ann for them to reconcile but Julie Ann
refused. This prompted the former to resort to threats
against her.
In 1979, they both died, each from a single gunshot
wound inflicted with the same firearm. Julie Ann was 18
years old. Wendel was between 18 and 19 years of age.
The parents of Julie Ann believed that it was Wendell
who caused Julie Anns and his own death using the
said firearm. Consequently, they filed a civil case at the
CFI against Wendells parents (spouses Libi) to recover
damages arising from the parents vicarious liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
In the testimony of Mrs. Libi, Wendells mother, she said
that the spouses kept a gun in the safety deposit box.
She always had the key in her bag and that these facts
are known to Wendell. On the night of the killing, the gun
was no longer in the safety deposit box.
CFI dismissed the case. IAC reversed CFI decision and
sentenced the defendants Libi spouses as jointly and
solidarily liable to pay to the plaintiffs Gotiong spouses
moral and exemplary damages, etc. Hencem the
petition.

Issues/Held:
1. Whether it was Wendell who killed Julie Ann and
himself, and if in the affirmative. YES
2. Whether the spouse Libi exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family required by law in a parent and
child relationship. NO
3. Whether Wendells parents are subsidiarily liable or
directly and primarily liable for the crime committed by
their minor son. DIRECTLY AND PRIMARILY LIABLE


Ratio:
1. It was Wendell who killed Julie Ann and himself.
The Court did not sustain the theory that Wendell Libi did
not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming
evidence-testimonial, documentary and pictorial-the
confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of
Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of
his persistent pleas for reconciliation.

In terms of testimonial evidence, the Police Medico-
Legal Officer submitted his findings and opinions on
whether or not it was Wendell who killed himself. He
admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound, the
trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are
concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself.
He further clarified that the absence of black residue or
tattooing on the forehead of Wendell does not rule out
the possibility that he killed himself because there are
certain guns which are so made that would prevent
tattooing and they are called smokeless powder.

2. The Court cannot accept that the petitioner
spouses Libi exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun
away. The diligence of a good father of a family required
by law in a parent and child relationship consists of the
instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were
remiss in their duties as parents and not diligently
supervising the activities of their son despite his minority
and immaturity such that it was only during Wendells
death that they discovered that the gun was not in the
safety deposit box and that their son was a narcotics
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit
3. Wendells parents are directly and primarily liable
for the crime committed by their minor son.
SC has no objection to the doctrinal rule holding the
parents liable but the SC digressed from the respondent
IAC Court on its ratiocination of how the parents became
civilly liable for the crime committed by their son
Wendell. IAC stated that the parents were subsidiarily
liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of
the minor Wendell who was living in their company. IAC
further ratiocinated that the said subsidiary liability
determined and imposed by Article 2180 of the NCC and
Article 101 of RPC covers obligations from both quasi-
delicts and criminal offenses because to hold that Art.
2180 refers only to quasi-delicts would result in the
absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes, the father or mother may stand subsidiarily
liable, no liability would attach if the damage is with
criminal intent. For SC, the said liability of parents is
direct and primary.

SUPREME COURT:
If the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of
their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can
neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the
defense that they acted with diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damages. If the liability is direct
and primary, the ground of diligence would
constitute a valid and substantial defense.

The civil liability of the parents for quasi-delicts of
their minor children are direct and primary as
contemplated in Art, 2180. Applying Art. 2194, the said
article provides for the solidary liability of join tortfeasors,
the minor and the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother. This indicates that parental
liability is primary and not subisidiary. Also, the last
paragraph of Art. 2180 indicates that the responsibility
treated on this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.

The liability of parents for the felonies committed by
their minor children is likewise primary, not
subsidiary. This is shown by Art. 101 of RPC provides
that the civil liability for acts committed by minors shall
devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part. This is further
buttressed by Art. 2182 of NCC which states that if the
minor has no parents or guardian, the minor shall be
answerable with his own property in an action against
him where a a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.

RESULTING DOCTRINE:
The parents are and should be be held primarily
liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under

their legal authority or control, or who live in their
company unless it is proven that the former acted
with diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
such damages.

The primary liability in Article 101 of RPC shall be
imposed pursuant to Art. 2180 of NCC which states that
liability shall be effected against the father and in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother. Art. 2180 was further
amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which
added the guardian in case of death or incapacity of the
mother but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed
by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender.
However, under FC, this civil liability is now to be
executed against both parents or those who exercise
parental authority over the minor offender.

For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by
minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with
Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as modified.

Dispositive:
The instant petition is denied. The assailed judgment of
IAC/CA is affirmed.
-Ms. Cerezo-

Lindain v. CA
Elena, Celia, Oscar, Teresita, and Virgilio, all surnamed Lindain, petitioners vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, spouses
Apolina Valiente and Federico Ila, respondents
Ponente: Grio-Aquino, J. Date: August 20, 1992
The Facts of the Case
Dolores Luluqusin, mother and guardian of the
petitioners, sold a piece of land owned by the petitioners
when they were still minors to respondent spouses
Valiente and Ila.
Petitioners contend that sale is null and void because it
needed judicial approval.
Luluqusin and the defendants attorneys notarized the
deed of sale, stating that the land could be sold without
judicial authorization because it was less than Php 2000.
The right of petitioners to rescind the contract had also
already expired since they should have exercised their
right 4 years after attaining age of majority. The
youngest of the plaintiffs is now 31 y.o.
The CA found in favour of the defendants, applying the
ruling in Ortaez vs. Dela Cruz (A father or mother
acting as legal administrator of the property of a child
acting under parental authority cannot dispose of the
childs property without judicial authority if it is worth
more than Php 2000. But when under Php 2000, the
courts permission for the alienation may be dispensed
with.)

The Issue at hand
W/N judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the
minors property by their mother.
The Ruling
The Petition is granted.
On the Issue at hand:
Under Art 320 of the New Civil Code, a parent acting
as a legal administrator of the property of his minor
children does not have the power to alienate such
property without judicial approval. They only have
the powers of possession and management.
In Visayas, et al. vs. Suguitan, et al., it was held that in
compromises entered into by parents as legal
administrators, Court approval is indispensible
regardless of the amount involved.
In Badillo vs. Ferrer, it was held that the surviving
spouse had no authority to convey the undivided share
of her minor children as she should have first secured
approval of the court.
In Inton vs. Quintana, it was held


On the alleged prescription:
The action has not yet prescribed because Art. 1141
Civil Code states that real actions over immovable
objects prescribe after 30 years. It had only been 21
years.

Art 320, New Civil Code: Art. 320. The father, or in his
absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental authority.
If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos,
the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the
approval of the Court of First Instance.
-Mr. Chatto-

PEOPLE vs SILVANO
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs David Silvano, accused-appellant
Date: June 29,1999 Nature: Automatic review of a description of RTC
Ponente: Per curiam
FACTS
David entered 16 yr. old Sheryls (his daughter) room,
woke her up to scold her for being late and as
punishment, David raped Sheryl. (The punishment given
by David since Sheryl was 13 yrs old.)
Sheryl ran away, lived with her maternal grandmother,
and when asked to come back home, she eventually told
her mother and grandmother about the rape (thus they
filed a case against David)
Davids defense: 1) victim offered only a token
resistance when sexual acts were being done (rebuttal:
the failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance cannot
be construed as voluntary submission to Davids desire)
2) he couldnt have possibly raped her in the room
because that room was too small (rebuttal: rape could
occur anywhere) 3) if he did rape her, her two brothers
(who were sleeping in the same room) would have been
awakened (rebuttal: it was already nighttime and they
could have been sound asleep already and one of the
brothers was deaf; also, David started out by scolding
Sheryl so they might think that whatever noise that came
after was just part of the parental sanction and
discipline) 4) rape is implausible, improbable if not
impossible considering that the series of acts lasted for
40 minutes (rebuttal: trivial matter which doesnt deal
with whys and wherefores of the crime) 5) claims that
this is only a plot by his wife to sever their marital
relationship (rebuttal: no mom would use her daughter
for something like that; also, Sheryl, being a Filipina,
would publicly admit to being ravished unless that is the
truth for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.)
ISSUE W/N David is guilty of raping his own daughter
HELD/RATIO
YES. He is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The
following elements of rape were present: 1) sexual
congress, 2) with a woman, 3) by force and without
consent. In order to warrant the imposition of death
penalty, the additional elements were also found: 1) that
the victim was below 18 yrs. old at the time the rape was
committed, and 2) the offender is a parent (whether
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted).
When he was charged before the court, David denied
the accusation and prefaced the denial with the
assertion that he is giving her financial, material and
educational support. The fact that he supports her does
not give him license to rape her. It is his obligation to
support her as provided in Art.195 and 220 FC.
Although Art.220 FC recognizes the parents right to
impose discipline on their children, it does not authorize
them to force their offspring to copulate with them under
the mask of discipline, or invade their honor and violate
their dignity nor does it give them the license to ravish
the product of their marital union. It seems that Davids
act is not in the form of correction but of an insane
sexual gratification. Sex with ones child is per se
abhorrent and can never be justified as parental
punishment.
-Ms. Comsti-

Shields v. Gross
Brooke Shields, respondent-appellant v. Garry Gross, appellant-respondent
Simons, J.; 29 March 1983; Court of Appeals of New York
Facts:
In 1975, Brooke Shields was just 10 years old when she
obtained several modeling jobs with Garry Gross, a
photographer.
One of these jobs was a series of photographs financed
by Playboy Press and had Shields posing nude in a
bathtub.
The photos were intended for publication in Portfolio 8
(later named Sugar and Spice)
Teri Shields, Brookes mother and legal guardian
executed two consents in favor of Gross:
I hereby give the photographer the right and
permission to copyright and/or use, reuse, and/or
publish, and republish photographic pictures or portraits
of me I hereby waive any right to inspect or approve
the finished photograph or to the eventual use that it
might be applied.
Photos were used in other publications and printed
matter other than Sugar and Spice
In 1980, said photos appeared in a French magazine
and it seemed Gross intended to use it in other
publications, too.
In 1981, a 17 year-old Brooke Shields commenced
action in tort and contract and seeking compensatory
and punitive damages and an injunction to permanently
enjoin Gross from further used of the photos.
Issue:
Whether a minor (infant model) may disaffirm a prior
unrestricted consent executed on her behalf by her
parent pursuant to sec. 51 of the Civil Rights Law.
Held/Ratio:
NO.
Sec. 51 (remedial law) creates a cause of action on
behalf of injured party permitting relief by injunction or
damages in relation to Sec. 50 (penal) which provides
that a person that uses for advertising purposes, of
for purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any
living person without first having obtained the written
consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent
or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Meaning,
written consent must be obtained before publication and
as permitted by terms of contract.
Even though common law allows a minor to disaffirm
written consent, Legislature may abrogate this common
law right to disaffirm. Here, Sec. 50 provides for a
method of obtaining consent from a minor. Thus, Terri
Shields consent is binding on the minor Brooke Shields.
Sec. 3-105 of the General Obligations Law requires
court approval of infants contracts of performing artists,
such as actors, musicians, dancers and professional
athletes. Child models are not recognized as child
performers. This law is inapplicable, however, as it is
only to provide assurance to those required to deal with
infants that later, the infants will not disaffirm executory
contracts to the other partys disadvantage. Moreover,
this would be impractical for a child model who works
from session to session, sometimes for different
photographers. He/she cant possibly have all contracts
for such sessions be approved by the courts.
A parent who wishes to limit the publicity and exposure
of her child need only limit the use authorized in the
consent. Judgment modified striking injunction against
the use of the photographs for uses of advertising and
trade, and as so modified.

* Brooke Shields did not contend that the photos were
obscene or pornographic. They only embarrassed her.
The court did not deem to discuss the unenforceability of
certain contracts which violate public policy. Moreover,
the court did not find that they were obscene or
pornographic. A contract held to be unenforceable
because it violates public policy is void ab initio and,
thus, there is no need to consider whether or not it may
be disaffirmed.


Jasen, J., dissenting.
The interests of society and the State in protecting
its children must be placed above any concern for
trade or commercialism. The statute in question does
not abrogate the childs right to disaffirm a contract
entered into by the minor or by the minors parent on his
behalf. The right is founded in the legal concept that an
infant is incapable of contracting because he does not
understand the scope of his rights and he cannot
appreciate the consequences and ramifications of his
decisions. This also to afford protection against
exploitation by adults.
Sections 50 and 51 did not intend to abrogate this right.
The requirement of parental consent was granted in
order to afford the minor as much protection from
exploitation as possible. The assumption, of course, is
that the adult has the minors best interests at heart. But
otherwise, the child should be given the right to disaffirm
the parents consent. Moreover, there was no reference
of the common law right to disaffirm a contract indicates
that Legislature did not intend to affect that right.
Terri Shields failed to put the restrictions on the consent
and thus failed to protect her childs future interests.
There is no reason that the child must continue to bear
the burden of her mothers bad judgment.
If parents fail to protect their child, the State retains its
long-standing role of parens patriae in order to be able to
intervene by allowing the child to exercise his/her right to
disaffirm.
-Ms. Dunuan-

Silva vs. CA
Carlitos Silva, petitioner, vs. CA and Suzanne Gonzales
FACTS: Carlitos, a married businessman, and Suzanne,
an unmarried actress, cohabited (w/o marriage) which
resulted to them having 2 children. They parted ways
soon after. Suzanne refused to allow Carlitos to have the
children during weekends. Carlitos filed a case for
custody of the children, which was opposed by Suzanne,
alleging that Carlitos often engaged in gambling and
womanizing which she feared could affect the moral and
social values of the children. RTC ruled in favor of
Carlitos, Suzanne appealed. In the meantime, she got
married to a Dutch national and moved to Holland along
with the children. CA ruled in favor of Suzanne, hence
this case.
ISSUE: WON Carlitos should be granted visitation rights.
HELD/RATIO: YES.
Art 49 of the I provides for appropriate visitation rights to
parents who are not given custody of their children.
A few hours spent by Carlitos with the children could not
at all be that detrimental to the children.
The allegations of respondent against the character of
petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be taken as
sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The
fears expressed by respondent to the effect that
petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their
children once allowed to even temporarily associate with
petitioner is but the product of respondents unfounded
imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions
and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense
in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his
illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the deep
sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of
tender ages.
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private
respondent and their well-meant concern for the
children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner
would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than
a parents natural desire to be able to call on, even if it
were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court,
in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this
precautionary measure, i.e., in no case [can petitioner]
take out the children without the written consent of the
mother.
-Mr. Galon-

Are Parents Morally Obliged to Care for Their Children?
by John Eekelaar
(Body of the article rephrased the question to: Whether there are moral justifications for imposing social obligations
onparents to care for their children?)
SUMMARIZED CONCLUSION/ANSWER
Sources of duty to care for children:
Priori duty to promote human flourishing
Exist independently of the actual organization of any society
Moral duty binds everyone and is not specifically directed towards parents (although it will frequently fall primarily on them
for no other reason than their physical proximity to their children)
Social practices
Derivative from society itself
Does not create itself the duties towards children
When the duty to provide for the children falls back on all individuals, through the communal means constructed, or which
ought to be constructed, how then should the community deal with defaulters?
Attempt to maintain the responsibility- compel the defaulter to be responsible
Attempt to reinforce the rules of allocation of responsibility compel defaulter to contribute
Attempt to redress the imbalance
Not essential to fulfill duty to the children
This is for the other parent who fulfilled the role of the defaulter the community can endeavor to produce the mix of
social rules which best fulfills the obligation, remembering always that the goods of the adults must be respected as well

DETAILS
Preliminary Issues
An attempt may be made to derive an obligation to care for children from other duties
The article is not concerned with the empirical truth or otherwise of the claim that parents feel that they have the duty to
care for their children

John Boswell testifies from his investigation of the abandonment of children from late antiquity to the Renaissance
Abandonment was an informal method of transferring responsibility for the child care from the parents to others in the
community.

The Failure of Contractarian and Quasi-contractarian Theories

Hobes and Hume
-their ethical theories are grounded either in the idea that people should act with mutual restraint one towards another as
a basis for constituting a safer society or in the moral obligations generated by assumed agreements
-(The failure/criticism)
Author- The problem arises because these theories ultimately ground moral justifications in self-interest

J.L. Mackie - The approach (Hobbes and Hume) would provide no duties towards non-participants, and to assign no
rights to beings who do no need to be brought into a quasi-contractual scheme

-Mackie : Moral precepts of self-interest are not confined merely to restraining ones actions towards others, but include
general human well-being or the flourishing of human life
Author- This is not sufficient. Parents could simply hand their children over to the collectivity which might deem that
human life would continue to flourish if only a selected group of children were nurtured into a full life

Singer
-finds a basis for ethics in the rationalization of altruism (may make rational sense for the good of community) Principle of
Equal Consideration of the Interest of All
Author- It is evident that the actors in these constructions are self-interested adults, capable of inflicting harm on others
and of accepting restraints upon their own actions where this benefits the association of which they are part

John Rawls Theory of Justice
- Principles of justice are to be found by deducing those principles which a community of free and rational persons would
agree should govern their social life and institutions if they had to choose them from behind a veil of ignorance
Author: Still grounded on self-interest. Rawl assumes that the contractors would consent to a degree of paternalism which
would protect their interest

A Non-contractual Basis for Morality
John Finniss Precontractual Tradition
-developed Aristotles concept of human flourishing

-We are held to be capable of grasping the basic human goods: life, friendship, play, knowledge, aesthetic experience,
religion and practical reasonableness ( PN: These are the reasons for moving from self-interest to the respect for the well-
being of others)
-Finniss assertion that the parenthood may justify or even require the direction of duty towards certain persons seems to
rest upon the premise that parenthood implies dependence by another (the child) on the parent. Specific involvement in
the goods of another adult might arise through the dependence (emotional, economic) of the other. Dependency therefore
may arise from the operation of social norms as much as from brute fact.

-Mr. Hajim-

The Doctrine of Family Integrity: Protecting the Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers who have Substantial
Relationships with their Children.

I. Introductions
Main point: Author argues for unwed fathers with substantial relationship with their children to be accorded parental rights.
Unwed fathers should not be given rights just because they legitimated their children or because they have equal rights as
women, they should be given rights because they have been recognized as capable of good parent-child relationships
and that presuming they are not committed is contrary to the doctrine of family integrity.

II. The Family Integrity Doctrine

In general:
This chapter showcases how court decisions recognize that the state cannot substitute for family as primary nurturer of
children. The court would only intervene if statutes would weaken the family. Ultimately, the interest protected by the court
is of the a special bond:
blood-tie + meaningful psychological relationship = substantial bond
This bond should be the basis of court decisions on family related statutes.
Specifics:
Definition of Family Integrity doctrine:
It is the principle that limits the power of the states to regulate various aspects of family affairs. The doctrine seeks to
protect the substantial bond of mutual affection, care and concern formed between parents and children in day-to day
interaction. Parental rights, the right to raise children comes from the private sphere.

Statutes and how court decided:

Moore v. City of East Cleveland: An ordinance that limited the degree of relations that can stay in a house was deemed a
violation of due process. Court stated that enforcement of the ordinance would threaten day-to-day interaction which is
important in family integrity. (Ex. you can live in same roof as your son but not your first cousin)
Statues bias against illegitimate children: Ordinances that make legitimacy a basis for welfare benefits, intestate
succession and cause of action for mothers wrongful death have been held by the court as violative of equal protection.
Court has seen that family protection should extend to families not formed under marriage.

III. Rights of Unwed Fathers

Article showed how there are certain presumptions on which kinds parents are committed to a child:

Wed and unwed mothers: Presumed and Actual Commitment
Actual she carried and bore the child
Presumed after birth remains committed in welfare of child

Wed Fathers: Presumed Commitment
Presumed: living together with kids so he has day-to-day interaction.

Unwed fathers: No presumed commitment

Stanley vs Illinois:
State Statue that presumed the unfitness as parent of an unwed father was violative of due process and equal protection.
Court said that meaningful parent-child bonds can exist between an unwed dad and his child.
But it didnt say that unwed fathers were given equal presumption. They still had to prove that they had a substantial bond
with the children

Quilloin v. Walcott
Couple were unmarried and had a child. When they separated, the woman wanted the child to be adopted by her new
spouse. The Man protested. The court allowed for the adoption to take place.
The court argued that the unwed father did not present meaningful bond with the child. He barely visited and gave few
gifts.

Parham v. Hughes

Father had not legitimated a child so court denied him the right to sue for wrongful death. Court said that Statute made a
distinction on legitimate and illegitimate children parental relations.
Author argued that statutes do not showcase actual commitment of unwed fathers to their kids. Parental relations should
be based on the substantial commitment to the child. The father shouldve been allowed to give proof of meaningful
relation.

Caban v. Mohammed
Statute that only required consent of unwed mother for the adoption of the child.
Court held it unconstitutional due to equal protection based on gender. It also focused on acknowledging that the unwed
father has substantial bond with the child and therefore should also have the right to give or not give consent.
Stature also didnt give chance for unwed fathers an opportunity to show commitment, court should have said it violated
due process.

-Ms. Lim-

B. Substitute and Special Parental Authority

AMADORA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Topic: Substitute and Special Parental Authority Case: G.R. No. L-47745 [En Banc]
Date: April 15, 1988 Ponente: Cruz
Facts:
Alfredo Amadora, 17-years old, had gone to school after
the end of the semester (Colegio De San Jose-
Recoletos) to present his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to graduation. While in the auditorium to do
so, he was shot dead by a classmate, Pablito Daffon.
Amadoras parents are now asking for damages against
the high school principal, the dean of boys, the physics
teacher, and the school itself, on the ground that the
incident had happened while the deceased was under
their custody, and that they are responsible and liable for
the acts committed by Damon, who is also a student
under their custody.
Issue:
W/N the private respondents exercise substitute parental
authority over Damon by virtue of Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code, and thus, should be held liable for damages
because of his wrongdoings.
Held:
They cannot be held liable for damages.

Ratio: [The ones underlined are the important parts.
Forgive the excessive length. Its just to help those who
do not have time to read the case itself anymore. ]

Art. 2180. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices as long as they
remain in their custody.


The Courts evolving deliberations on this article can be
traced in 3 previous cases: (1) Exconde v. Capuno; (2)
Mercado v. Court of Appeals; and (3) Palisoc v.
Brillantes. Although the school in Exconde was not a
party to the case, in an obiter, the Court held that it
cannot be liable because it is not a school of arts and
trades. Justice JBL Reyes dissented, arguing that school
authorities should be held liable, as Art. 2180 should be
construed such that the qualifying phrase of
establishments of arts and trades should apply only to
heads, and not to teachers. Hence, (1) teachers in
general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in
particular may be held liable under Art. 2180.

In Mercado, Exconde was reiterated, although given that
the school was not impleaded, the pronouncement that
the school was not liable because it was not for the arts
and trades was only obiter. The Court also held that the
custody requirement was also not proved because the
situation in Art. 2180 apparently contemplated a situation
where the student lives and boards with the teacher
such that the control, direction, and influences on the
pupil supersede those of the parents.

In Palisoc [where the school was one for arts and
trades], the head and the teacher-in-charge were held
solidarily liable with the wrongdoer [who was of age and
was not boarding in the school]. The Court also clarified
that custody in Art. 2180 meant the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are in attendance in the school. Dissents
urged for the rule to apply only to torts committed by
minor students as the school would be acting only in
loco parentis, while Justice JBL Reyes stressed in his
concurring opinion that it should cover even students
already of age since they were equally under the
custody and discipline of the school.

In this case, however, the Colegio is an academic
institution of learning, not a school of arts and trades.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the provision
should apply to all schools, such that where the school is
academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of that
student; while if it is vocational or technical, it will be the
head who is held liable, as an exception to the general
rule that it is the teacher who is liable. This is in
conformity with Justice JBL Reyes dissent in Exconde.
Still, there seems to be a certain degree of unfairness
here because as long as a teacher can show that it is a
vocational school, the head will automatically be liable
and the teacher is automatically absolved. The Court
thus explained the rationale for Art. 2180, which was that
historically, the head of the school of arts and trades was
very involved in teaching the students, who usually
boarded with him and was under his direct control and
supervision. Hence, he has great influence over them
and is liable in part for their actions. And while it is true
that the situation in these modern times is different,
because the Court has to uphold the original mandate of
the legislature.

As for the duration of this responsibility, the Court held
that it is not coterminous with the semester, but rather,
exists as long as it is shown that the student is in school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective,
in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege. During these,
the teacher-in-charge must answer for his students
torts, in the same way that parents are responsible for a
child in their custody. It is not even required that at the
time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and
in a position to prevent it, because custody does not
mean immediate and actual physical control but rather,
the influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such influence.

However, the responsibility ceases if it can be proven
that the persons cited here prove that they exerted the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
damages. Also, with regard to the school, it may be held
to answer only for the acts of the teachers or even the
head as the respondeat superior, but can be exonerated
if it proves that it exercised the diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias.

Also, the teacher may invoke the defense that it is unfair
to hold him liable for damages as long as students are in
school premises and presumably under his influence. A
teacher cannot be held equally responsible as a parent
because their influence over the child is not equal. A
parent can expect more obedience from the child
because the child is more dependent on a parent than
on a teacher [re: support and sustenance]. Also, it
seems unfair that the teacher or head be liable for a

student or apprentice if the latter is of legal age, because
if a parent is no longer liable for a students acts upon
reaching majority, why should a teacher be liable then?

Thus, none of the private respondents can be held liable.
The rector, high school principal, and dean of boys were
not the teacher-in-charge. There was also no showing
that Celestino Dicon, the teacher in charge over the
wrongdoer, was negligent in enforcing discipline. And as
previously established, the school itself cannot be held
directly liable.

Note:

The dean of boys had previously confiscated a gun from
one of Daffons friends, but returned it afterwards and
did not report the incident. The gun might have been the
same used to kill Amadora. However, in the absence of
proof that it was the same gun which killed Amadora, the
dean cannot be held liable for the Amadoras death.

Separate Opinions [Melencio-Herrera]:

This Justice concurred, except re: the restricted meaning
given the term teacher in Art. 2180 as teacher-in-
charge, for the reason that this would limit liability to
those times where there are classes under the teacher.
The philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in loco
parentis will have the same duties and obligations as
parents whenever in such standing. Under the Civil
Code, [Art. 349, Par. 2 and 4], teachers and professors
and directors of trade establishments with regard to
apprentices, exercise substitute parental authority.
-Ms. Mendoza, Loraine-

St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos
St. Marys Academy, petitioner vs. William Carpitanos and Lucia S. Carpitanos, Guada Daniel, James Daniel II, James
Daniel Sr., Vivencio Villanueva, respondents.
Ponente: Pardo J. Date: Feb. 6, 2002
Facts:
St. Mary conducted an enrollment campaign, the
campaign included visitation of the schools were the
prospective enrollees are studying.
Sherwin Carpitanos a student of St. Mary was part of the
campaigning team.
Chad Villanueva, grandson of the owner of the jeep was
originally driving the jeep, allowed James Daniel II, 15 yr
old student of St. Mary, to drive the jeep. Sherwin and
other students are passengers of that jeep going to
another school for the campaign. The steering wheel
detached causing the accident. The jeep turned turtle,
Sherwin died as a result of the accident.
Parents of Sherwin filed a case against the school. RTC
held the school liable and ordered to indemnify the
Carpitanos, while Sherwin and the owner of the jeep
were absolved. The school filed an appeal hence this
case.

Issues & Held:
WON St. Marys should be held liable for the death of
Sherwin? NO
WON award for moral damages is appropriate?

Ratio:
Under Art 218 FC the school shall have the parental
authority and responsibility over minor under their
custody whether inside or outside school while Art 219
FC states that those exercising parental authority over
minors shall be held principally and solidarily liable for
the damages caused by the acts of minor. However, for

St. Mary to be liable, it must be shown that the act or
omission of the person exercising parental authority
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused. There was no evidence that St. Mary
allowed the minor to drive the jeep rather it was Chad
that allowed the minor to drive. Furthermore the
proximate cause of the accident was the detachment of
the steering wheel, hence St. Mary cant be held liable.
Moral damages can only be recovered to the party that
the proximate cause is attributable. As held in Aguilar vs.
Comm. Savings bank the registered owner of the
vehicle would primarily be responsible to the public or 3
rd

persons for injuries caused while the vehicle was being
driven on highways or streets.
-Ms. Mendoza, Mary-

Vancil vs. Belmes
Bonifacia P. Vancil, petitioner vs. Helen G. Belmes, respondent
Ponente: Vitug, J. Date: June 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Bonifacia is the mother of Reeder Vancil.
Reeder is a US Navy serviceman who had two children
by his common-law wife, Helen. When he died, he left
them (the children) with his death pension benefits with a
probable value of P 100,000.
Bonifacia commenced guardianship proceedings before
the RTC of Cebu, over the person and properties of the
two children (her grandchildren), Valerie and Vincent.
She was appointed as their guardian.
Natural mother of minors, Helen Belmes opposed
appointment, asserting that she is the natural mother in
actual custody of and exercising parental authority over
the said minors.
CA reversed decision of RTC on the grounds that the
Civil Code considers parents as natural guardians of
their minor children. Provision in the Civil Code and
subsequently the Family Code, art 225, confirms the
designation of parents as ipso facto guardian of their
minor children without need of a court appointment.
Valerie reached the age of majority, thus guardianship
proceedings proceeded only with respect to her younger
brother, Vincent.

Issue: Who should be the guardian of (the minor)
Vincent: his grandmother or his natural mother?

Held/Ratio:
MOTHER. CA decision should be upheld because Art.
211 of the Family Code states clearly that the father
and mother shall jointly exercise authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary, xxx.
Petitioner at the most, can only exercise substitute
parental authority in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of respondent. Considering the present
circumstances, the respondent is very much alive and
exercising parental authority over the minors. Petitioner
has not proffered convincing evidence showing that
respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent
(as Valerie is already of legal age).
Furthermore, petitioner Bonifacia lives outside the
country and her coming back just to fulfill guardian duties
is not certain. She is an American citizen and a resident
of Colorado and would obviously not be able to perform
the responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. The court also opines that she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not
qualify as a guardian. The Court has consistently held
in the past that the courts should not grant
guardianship to persons who are not within our
jurisdiction for they will find it difficult to protect the
wards.
Lastly, in Justice Vitugs concurring opinion, he said that
the law and jurisprudence recognizes the deep ties that
bind parent and child and that parents are thus placed
first in rank in matters of parental authority and that
substitute parental authority may only be exercised by

grandparents in case parents have died or are absent or
declared unfit and this order of priority in the exercise of
parental authority is not in any way affected by the
childs legitimacy. In fact, Article 176 of the Family
Code states that an illegitimate child shall be under
the parental authority of his mother who,
consequentially, should also be entitled to the
custody of the child.
-Ms. Milaor-

C. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority

Chua v. Cabangbang
PACITA CHUA, petitioner-appellant vs MR. &MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ET AL., respondents-appellees.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY CHUA SY ALIAS GRACE CABANGBANG FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing Pacita Chuas petition for habeas corpus.
Ponente: Castro, J.
Facts:
During her youth, Pacita Chua supported herself by
working in nightclubs as a hostess.
After sexual liaisons with a lot of men, she lived with
Chua Ben with whom she begot a child who died in
infancy. She then cohabited with Sy Sia Lay with whom
she had two children named Robert and Betty Chua Sy.
Betty was born on Dec. 15, 19567.
After separating from Sy, she became the mistress of
Victor Tan Villareal with whom she begot another girl.
They separated as well. Without means to support the
child, Pacita gave Betty away to a comadre in Cebu.
In May 1958, Mr. and Mrs. Cabangbang, a childless
couple, acquired custody of the child who was then
barely four months old. They had her christened as
Grace Cabangbang and raised her as their own.
Pacita avers that sometime in October of that same
year, Villareal took the child away and gave her to the
Cabangbangs in recompense for favors received. It was
only 3 years later when she learned of the whereabouts
of Betty. Mrs. Cabangbang rebutted said claim by saying
that she found the child wrapped in a bundle at the gate
of their residence.
On June 6, 1963, Pacita demanded the surrender of the
custody of the child to her. After failing to acquire the
same, she filed a petition for habeas corpus with the CFI
of Rizal which dismissed her petition and awarded
custody to the Cabangbangs.
She appealed directly to the SC and tenders for the
resolution of two issues namely 1) the CF erred when it
awarded custody to the Cabangbangs considering
Grace/Betty was below seven years of age and 2) it
deprived her of parental authority over her child.

Issue: Whether the CFI erred in not awarding the
custody of Betty/Grace to Pacita Chua.

Held: No, it did not. The decision of the court a quo is
affirmed.

Ratio:

Pacitas contention with regard to Art. 363 which
mandates that a child below seven years of age cannot
be separated from her mother is now moot and
academic due to the fact that Betty/Grace is now 11
years of age. However, her contention that the reasons

relied upon by the CFIthat she is not an upright
woman, among othersare not grounds in law to
deprive a mother of her child , is correct.
The lower court found that the child was given to the
Cabangbangs by Villareal with the knowledge and
consent of the petitioner. It cited that the petitioner did
not do anything at all to see the child or to secure its
custody.
Abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving
parents of the parental authority over their children as
stated by Article 332 of the Civil Code. Pacita
surrendered her custody of the child in 1958 and waited
until 1963 before she brought action. A mother who
really loves her child would go to any extent to be
reunited with her. Her normal reaction should have been
to move heaven and earth in order to recover her. Yet
she lifted not a finger.
Her inconsistent demands reveal that her motives do not
flow from the wellsprings of a loving mothers heart.
Firstly, she wanted the child back so that Sy Sia Lay
would resume giving her support and secondly, she
expressed to the Cabangbangs her willingness to forego
action on recovery provided that the latter would in
exchange give her a jeepney and some money.
Lastly, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. Petitioner failed to prove that she
is entitled to the rightful custody of Betty/Grace. Upon
shunning her legal and moral obligations towards the
child, she is deemed to have forfeited all her legitimate
moral and legal claim to her custody.
-Mr. Mislang-

Abiera vs Orin

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Ambos Camarines
Date: March 27, 1907 Ponente: Mapa, J.
Facts:
Vicenta Cacao, Mariano Cacao, and Petra Cacao are
siblings. When Vicenta died, her husband Miguel Orin,
Mariano Cacao (her brother), and Juan Abiera (husband
of Petra) entered into an agreement to dispose the
properties and animals acquired during the marriage of
Miguel Orin and Vicenta Cacao.
Mariano Cacao and Juan Abiera are acting as
representatives of their children, who are the only heirs
as well as the natural nephews of Vicenta Cacao.
The agreement is that Miguel Orin obligates himself o
deliver to his brothers-in-law, as guardians and fathers of
the heirs of Petra Cacao, the value of their inheritance.
Plaintiff Sebastian Abiera who is the special
administrator of the estate of the now deceased Juan
Abiera filed a complaint alleging that defendant Miguel
Orin failed to comply with the agreement and prays for
the court to compel his compliance.

Issue:
W/N plaintiff as administrator of the deceased Juan
Abiera has the right to ask for the compliance of Miguel
Orin with said obligation.

Held/Ratio:
No. The true interested parties in the obligation
contracted by the defendant are the children of Juan
Abiera for the simple reason that the obligation was
executed in their favor as the legal heirs of Vicenta and
not in favor of Juan Abiera who is simply representing
them.

An administrator has only the right to institute actions
pertaining to the estates he is administering, and no
other action dealing with those contracted in favor of
third persons. The right of representation is attached to
parental authority or guardianship. It is extinguished with

Juans death together with the parental authority. As an
exclusively personal right, it could not survive him nor
could it be transferred to his administrato
-Ms. Mo-

Cortes vs. Castillo and Herrera (1921)
MARIA CORTES, petitioner-appellant, vs. CANDIDA CASTILLO and ADRIANO HERRERA, respondents-appellees
Ponente: Malcolm, J.
Nature: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Facts: Maria Cortes and Alejandro Herrera are legally
married spouses blessed with 2 children, Acardio (6
years old) and Bernardo (4 years old). Alejandro
brought an action against his wife for adultery for which
she was sentenced to 3 years 6 months and 21 days of
imprisonment. He later condoned Maria, secured her
pardon, and went to live with her a second time.
However, not long after their reconciliation, Alejandro
again became suspicious of his wifes conduct which led
him to take with him their children when he went to live
in his mothers house. Alejandro instituted an action for
divorce. Unfortunately, his untimely death in the line of
duty terminated the proceedings. Candida Castillo, the
childrens paternal grandmother, continued to have
custody of the children.
The mother, through habeas corpus proceedings, sought
to obtain the return of her children but the trial court
dismissed the petition and named the grandmother as
guardian of the minors.
Issue: W/N the courts can deprive a mother of parental
authority over her children
Held/Ratio:
Yes. Art. 171 of the (Old) Civil Code provides that
parents who, by the example set by them, tend to
corrupt their offspring, may be deprived by the
courts of their parental authority. The law imposes a
discretionary power on the courts, which should be
made use of, with a primary regard for the welfare of the
minor. Both under civil law and common law, the
best interest of the child is THE paramount
consideration.
Respondents counsel insinuates that although the
mother may have instituted the action because of
maternal affection for her children, she might as well
have instituted it because of the sum of money gathered
for the support of the children (WTH?!). Testimony was
also introduced to show that the mother had insufficient
means to support the children. However all of this
may be, one fact remains and this is: that the mother
has been found guilty of adultery. Such unfitness on
the part of the mother has been shown so as to warrant
the trial court, in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion, to render judgment which placed the children
in the custody of their grandmother.
-Ms. Mopia-


E. Parents vs. Children- When Rights Clash
STRUNK v. STRUNK
Jerry Strunk, an incompetent represented through his guardian ad litem Morris Burton v. Ava Strunk, committee and
mother of Jerry
Osborne [1969].
Facts:
Arthur and Ava have 2 sons, Tommy and Jerry. Tommy
is suffering from chronic glomerulus nephritis, a fatal
kidney disease. Hes being kept alive by frequent
treatment on an artificial kidney, but such procedure
cannot be continued much longer.
Jerry meanwhile is an incompetent and has a speech
defect, committed to the Frankfort State Hospital and
School for the feebleminded. Jerrys IQ is 35,
corresponding to a 6-year old (hes already 27). Due to
the speech defect, his parents are not well acquainted
with him.
Tommy needed a kidney transplant in order to survive. A
cadaver source was hard to come by and probably
ineffective, so a live donation was indispensible. But no
one in the entire family was compatible as live donors,
except his brother Jerry. What legal recourse can the
parents use to procure a transplant from Jerry to
Tommy?
Mother Ava petitioned the county court to proceed with
the operation. The court found that the operation was
necessary, especially since the losses from the removal
of a kidney would be much less than the damage Jerry
will incur from the possible death of his brother, for Jerry
was greatly dependent on his brother emotionally and
psychologically. As found by the Department of Mental
Health in its recommendation to commence the
operation, Tommys life was vital to the continuity of
Jerrys improvement in the Frankfort State Hospital and
School.
The county court gave its approval, and the circuit court
affirmed. But Jerry was represented by a guardian ad
litem who continually questioned the power of the state
to authorize the removal of an organ from an
incompetent who is a ward of the state.

Issue: Does a court have the power to permit a kidney
to be removed from an incompetent ward of the state,
upon the petition of the mother, to transplant it into body
of incompetents brother dying of a fatal kidney disease?
Held: Yes. Circuit court judgment affirmed.
Ratio:
The doctrine recognizing the right to act on behalf of
incompetents (aka the doctrine of substituted
judgment) has been recognized in American courts
since 1844. In Kentucky, substantial powers have been
delegated to committees of persons with unsound mind.
A court of equity DOES have sufficient inherent power to
authorize the operation, and has full and complete
jurisdiction over the persons of those who labor under
any legal disability. (Reminiscent of parens patriae.)
Having found that the operation would be in the best
interest not only of Tommy but also of Jerry based on
substantial evidence, the circuit court judgment should
be affirmed.
JCs notes (the ratio was quite short, so Ill try to
expound and fit it with the topic) The clash between
the interests of the parent (over her child) and the child-
incompetent (as forwarded by the guardian ad litem) can
be reconciled by the county court (reminiscent of parens
patriae) for as long as the decision is for the childs best
interest.
Dissent by Steinfeld The life of the incompetent is not
in danger, but the surgical procedure proposed creates
some peril. As in Prince v. Massachusetts, parents may
be free to become martyrs themselvesbut it does not
follow they are freeto make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal
discretion.
The power give to a committee would NOT extend so far
as to allow a committee to subject his ward to the
serious surgical technique, UNLESS the life of his ward
be in jeopardy. Nor would the powers delegated to the
county court reach so far as to permit the procedure in
this case.

Perhaps we should not permit the removal of the
incompetents kidney, until its shown unequivocally that
it will really benefit the incompetent (which the evidence
at hand does not prove).
-Mr. Punongbayan-

Conservatorship of the Person of VALERIE N. MILDRED G., as Conservator, etc., et al., Petitioners and
Appellants, v. VALERIE N., Objector and Respondent
Ponente: Grodin, J.
Nature: appeal from a judgment of the Sta. Clara County Superior Court [California]
Facts:
Valerie N., 29 years old during the time of trial, has
Downs Syndrome, as a result of which she is severely
developmentally disabled. Although she has an
approximate IQ of 30, she has expressed her wish for
her parents, Mildred and Eugene G. (stepfather), to
continue caring for her.
She is exceedingly sexually aggressive toward men [-
she was not sexually active, but she would masturbate;
she approached men on the street, hugging and kissing
them, climbing on top of them, wanting to sit on their
laps], which caused Valeries parents to fear that she
might one day have a psychologically-harmful unwanted
pregnancy. Because of this, realizing that they will not
always be around to keep Valerie from indulging her
uncontrollable passions, they sought to be named
Valeries conservators in the Sta. Clara County Superior
Court, requesting that they be given additional powers to
have her undergo a Salpingectomy [tubal ligation] or
any other operation that will permanently sterilize
Valerie.
Named conservators of their daughter, they could make
her get an abortion should she get pregnant, or make
her take (e.g. ingest) birth control medication [which
Valeries parents already did, but discontinued because
they made Valerie ill], or take away her children from an
unwanted pregnancy in other words, have control over
many of Valeries reproductive rights. The probate court,
however, stated that they do not have the authority to
grant conservators the right to request that a non-
therapeutic sterilization procedure be performed on a
conservatee who could not herself consent to such
action.
Such sterilization without direct consent was barred by a
statute enacted to prevent eugenic sterilization, i.e. [in
this case] sterilizing people with hereditary mental
defects so as to prevent them from bearing children with
the same disability. Such sterilization used to be
performed in state mental institutions, under the
discretion of the hospital with the consent of the patient
(or her guardians/conservators), in accordance with law,
so as to prevent those who are committed therein from
bearing mentally-impaired children. With greater
understanding of the nature of mental and psychological
deficiencies, the authority to consent to sterilization was
placed squarely in the hands of the person that others
wish to be sterilized.
The guardianship/conservatorship law of California
empowers guardians/conservators to have their charges
undergo medical treatment should it be found that such
treatment is necessary, and that said charges are unable
to give consent to such treatment. The court was not
convinced that sterilization was necessary in Valeries
case.

Issue: W/N Valeries parents should be given the right to
determine if Valerie should undergo a non-therapeutic
sterilization procedure, or, W/N the California statute
barring them from having Valerie undergo tubal ligation
violates their (Valeries) 14
th
Amendment rights

Held: judgment remanded to lower court; facts
insufficient for judgment

Ratio:

The right to privacy as enshrined in the Constitution via
the 14
th
Amendment protects the right to sterilization (i.e.
a womans right not to bear children).
It is within the police power of the state to enact
legislation designed to protect the liberties of its
residents. The statute barring proxy consent to
sterilization restricts the exercise of other fundamental
rights by or on behalf of the incompetent. The state has
not asserted an interest in protecting the right of the
incompetent to bear children. Neither the involuntary
imposition of other forms of contraception, nor abortion,
has been banned. A conservator is permitted to exercise
his or her own judgment as to the best interests of the
conservatee in these matters, excepting only the election
of sterilization as a means of preventing conception.
Giving such power to authorize sterilization has been
subject to abuse in the past.
Denying a developmentally-disabled woman the choice
made on her behalf by her conservators, as she
cannot do so herself to undergo tubal ligation is the
same as denying women not so disabled the right to
make that choice. There is no compelling state interest
to restrict this right. The Court found that the statute is
overbroad.
The parents need to definitively establish that Valerie is
capable of procreation and that tubal ligation is
necessary, i.e. if it is indeed the appropriate remedy for
Valeries case, not other available means of
contraception
-Mr. Reyes-

GILLICK VS. WEST NORFOLK
Victoria Gillick, petitioner, vs. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and Department of Health and Social
Security, respondents.
Nature: Appeal from the Court of Appeal by the Department of Health and Social Security
Panel: Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Scarman, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, and Lord
Templeman
Majority: Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Scarman, Lord Bridge of Harwich
Dissent: Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Templeman

Facts:
By Section 1 of the National Health Service (Family
Planning) Act 1967, the Parliament empowered local
health authorities in England and Wales to make
arrangements for: (1) the giving of advice on
contraception; (2) the medical examination of persons
seeking advice on contraception for the purpose of
determining what advice to give; and (3) the supply of
contraceptive substances and contraceptive
appliances.
The Act of 1967 was repealed by the National Health
Service Reorganisation Act 1973 which replaced the
power of local health authorities and conferred the duty
for advice and treatment to the Secretary of State. It
is important to note that the contraceptive advice and
treatment provided by these laws was not subject to
any limitation upon the age of the persons to whom
such service was to be accorded.
May 1974 The Secretary of State made arrangements
in pursuance of his duty. The Department of Health
and Social Security issued an explanatory circular
concerning such arrangements, attached to it was a
Memorandum of Guidance. Section G (entitled The
Young) of the Memorandum explains:
Because of the fact that there were 1,490 births and
2,804 induced abortions among girls under 16, there
was a clear need for contraceptive services to be
made available and accessible to young people at the
risk of pregnancy irrespective of age

It was for the doctor to decide whether to provide
contraceptive advice and treatment
The Medical Defense Union had advised that the
parents of a child, of whatever age, should not be
contacted by any staff without his or her permission
(principle of confidentiality: abandoning this principle
might cause some not to seek professional advice at all,
exposing them to immediate risks of pregnancy and STD
as well as long-term physical, psychological, and
emotional consequences)
In a revised text of the Memorandum of Guidance, it
provides that in exceptional cases, the nature of any
counseling must be a matter for the doctor or other
professional worker concerned and the decision whether
or not to prescribe contraception must be for the clinical
judgment of a doctor. This implies that a doctor can
lawfully prescribe contraception to girls under 16
even without their parents consent.
January 21, 1981 Mrs. Victoria Gillick, a Roman
Catholic who has five daughters, all under the age of
16, wrote to the local health authority asking for a
written assurance that in no circumstances will any of
her daughters, while they are under 16, be given
contraceptive or abortion treatment without her
knowledge or consent.
January 27, 1981 In response to Mrs. Gillicks letter,
the Minister of Health thru the local health authorities,
emphasized that it would be most unusual to provide
advice about contraception without parental consent. It
even goes on to say that the final decision must be for
the doctors clinical judgment.
March 3, 1981 the previous response as well as further
correspondence with the local health authority did not
satisfy Mrs. Gillick. In her final letter, she formally
FORBADE any medical staff employed by Norfolk Area
Health Authority (AHA) to give any contraception or
abortion advice or treatment to any of her daughters
without her consent. She asked the Norfolk AHA to
acknowledge her letter but they never did.
August 5, 1982 Mrs. Gillick commenced
proceedings against the Norfolk AHA and the
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS),
claiming:
A declaration against the defendants, stating that the
notice (Memorandum of Guidance) had no authority in
law and gives advice which is unlawful and wrong, and
which adversely affects the welfare of her children and
her rights as a parent/custodian, and her ability to
properly and effectively discharge her duties as
parent/custodian
A declaration against the Norfolk AHA that no doctor
might give any contraceptive and/or abortion advice
and/or treatment to any of her children below the age of
16 without her knowledge and consent
The said action was dismissed. Mrs. Gillick then
appealed to the Court of Appeal. Her appeal was
allowed, stating that a girl under 16 was incapable of
giving a valid consent to medical treatment or of validly
prohibiting a doctor from asking the consent of her
parents. Aside from this, the Memorandum of
Guidance was held to be contrary to law because it
would be an infringement on the inalienable rights of
parents as regards to the custody and upbringing of their
children.
Hence, this appeal by the Department of Health and
Social Security.

Issues:
Whether or not a girl under the age of 16 has the
legal capacity to give valid consent to contraceptive
advice and treatment including medical examination
Whether or not a doctor giving such advice and
treatment to a girl under 16 without her parents
consent infringes on the parents rights
Whether or not a doctor who gives such advice or
treatment to a girl under 16 without her parents consent
incurs criminal liability

Held/Ratio:
YES. The National Health Service Legislation indicated
that Parliament regarded contraceptive advice and
treatment as essentially medical matters. There is no
statutory provision which states that a girl under 16
lacks the legal capacity to consent to contraceptive
advice, examination, and treatment provided that she
has sufficient maturity, understanding and
intelligence to know what they involve. The parental
right to determine whether or not their minor child below
the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates if
and when the child achieves a sufficient understanding
and intelligence to enable him or her to fully

understand the nature and implications of the
proposed treatment. It will be a question of fact
whether a child seeking advice has sufficient
understanding of what is involved to give consent that is
valid in law. Until the child achieves the capacity to
consent, the parental right to make the decision
continues save only in exceptional circumstances
(emergency, parental neglect, abandonment of the child,
inability to find the parent). In these exceptional
situations, the doctor is justified to proceed with the
treatment of the child even without parental
knowledge and consent.

NO. Parental rights to control a child do not exist for
the benefit of the parent. They exist for the benefit of
the child and they are justified only in so far as they
enable the parent to perform his duties towards the child.
Aside from this, it is a common practice that parents
relax their control over their child as he or she
develops and becomes independent. The degree of
parental control actually exercised over a particular child
varies according to his or her level of understanding and
intelligence. Indeed, it can be said that a parents
control over a child dwindles. The extent and the
duration of parental rights cannot be ascertained by a
fixed age, but it is dependent on the degree of
intelligence and understanding of the child, and his or
her welfare and best interests.
In exceptional cases, a doctor will be entitled to give
contraceptive advice and treatment to a girl under 16
without her parents knowledge and consent if he is
satisfied that: (a) the girl will understand the advice; (b)
he cannot persuade her to inform her parents or to allow
him to inform her parents that she is seeking
contraceptive advice; (c) she is very likely to begin or to
continue having sexual intercourse with or without
contraceptive treatment; (d) unless she receives
contraceptive advice or treatment, her physical or mental
health or both are likely to suffer; and (e) her best
interests require him to give her contraceptive advice,
treatment, or both without the parental consent.

NO. A doctor who gives contraceptive advice or
treatment with the intention to act in the best interest of
the girl is unlikely to commit an offense. The bona fide
exercise by a doctor of his clinical judgment must be
a complete negation of the guilty mind which is
essential in criminal offenses.

Dispositive: Judgment of the Court of Appeal set aside.
There is no infringement on parental rights.

Dissenting Opinions:
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook:
Making contraception available to girls under 16 is
unlawful, whether their parent know of and consent to it
or not
Moves to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal
Dismisses the appeal of the DHSS, with costs

Lord Templeman:
An unmarried girl under the age of 16 does not possess
the power in law to decide for herself to practice
contraception. Such a girl cannot be regarded as
sufficiently mature to be allowed to decide for herself
that she will practice contraception for the purpose of
frequent or regular or casual sexual intercourse.
Difficulties may arise when parent and doctor differ
the best interests of the girl should be considered
A doctor is not entitled to decide whether a girl under the
age of 16 shall be provided with contraceptive facilities if
a parent who is in charge of the girl is ready and willing
to make that decision in exercise of parental rights.
Moves to grant the relief indicated by the declarations
made by the Court of Appeal and would order that Mrs.
Gillicks costs be paid by the DHSS.
-Ms. Reyes-


Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth
Date: July 17, 1995
Ponente: Liacos, CJ.
Facts:
Lawrence Junior High School established a Condom
Availability Program.
Under this program, students could request free
condoms from the school nurse.
They could also get free counseling and HIV/AIDS
instructional pamphlets.
Parents opposed the program because it violates their
constitutional rights to family privacy, control of the
education and uprbringing of their children and free
exercise of religion.
In other words, they want to be the ones to teach their
children these things, in the manner that is appropriate
for them or their religion.
Parents also argue that being in the compulsory setting
a public school, their kids are compelled to join the
program.
Issue: Whether the Condom Availability program
violates parental rights.
Held:
No. The condom availability progam does not violate
parental rights.
The condoms, counseling and HIV/AIDS information
pamphlets are available to students who request them.
Students are not required to seek out and accept
condoms, counseling or read the literature.
Parents are free to instruct their children not to
participate.
Mere exposure to programs offered at school does not
amount to state intrusion.
On being compulsory: while the parents are required to
send their children to school, it does not mean that they
are required to make their children participate in the
program.
The program does not conflict with parents religious
teachings regarding premarital sex. The government is
not required to create programs in ways that conform to
religious beliefs of particular citizens.
Also, the distribution of condoms is not a medical service
that requires parental consent.
While it is the right and duty of parents to send their
children to school and direct their education, the children
also have the right to information regarding sex,
contraception and STDs and it is the schools duty to
provide them with the necessary information and
contraception materials.

-Mr. Rimban-


ROE V DOE
July 7, 1971
Ponente: SCILEPPI, Judge.
Facts:
Mary Roe is a student of University of Louisville of age
20.
Her family history was not good. Her mother died when
she was 3. Her father then remarried for several times
and the problems in the family made her fall into
academic probation, trying LSD and marijuana.
His father is a prominent attorney who despite
everything that has happened generously supports her.
Upon entering the University of Louisville, her father
decided that she should live in a college dormitory which
she did.
However, in April 1970, her father cut off all financial
support to her daughter upon learning that she had been
living with another female classmate in an off-campus
apartment.
He ignored what her father did and sold her automobile,
whose proceeds she used for her daily living and
studies.
She then enrolled for summer classes and afterwards,
stayed with the family of her classmate
She then sued for support alleging that the respondent
has refused and neglected to provide fair and
reasonable support.
the trial court rendered two separate orders, one order
that the father is required to remit a tuition payment for
the then-pending semester and to provide for reasonable
medical, dental, eye and psychiatric care and a final
order of support requiring the father to pay $250 per
month in support for the period from the time he cut her
off until she turned 21.
The following year, it was found out that the father failed
to comply with the first ordes and thus was committed to
be imprisoned for 30 days
He then appealed and the Appellate Division directed
that the father pay only those university and health bills
actually rendered prior to November 30, 1970 and
regarding the final order, it was reversed.
ISSUE
WON there is a duty to support when a child wilfully
leaves the parental home with the purpose of avoiding
parental control.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, though the right to custody of the parents and right
to support of the child are reciprocal, the parents may
still impose reasonable regulations for his child. Holding
otherwise would allow a child to go against the legitimate
mandate of his parents but nevertheless demanding for
support in her decision to go against her parents
effective control. The reason of the father for demanding
his daughter to live in campus is not unwarranted. His
daughter has the prerogative to disagree and disobey
her father but in doing so, she opens herself to the lawful
wrath of her father. By doing so, she forfeits her right to
support from the father.
Finally, the intrusion made by the family court was
unwarranted considering that it interfered with the
exercise of the delicate responsibility of the parents for
parental control.
-Mr. Santiago-


In re Edward C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law
Sta. Clara County Department of Social Services, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. Edmond C, et al., Defendants and
Appellants.
Facts:
Appelants (the parents) have three children: Eric,
Marlee, and Edward.
Dependency proceedings were instituted for Marlee
when she was 11 months old because she was
malnourished and had suffered probable concussion of
questionable origin. She was placed in the home of Mrs.
R., the maternal grandmother, who legally adopted her
later on.
Eric and Edward were placed in a protective custody
because there was no food in the home, the home was
in a disheveled condition, and Eric had received marks
due to excessive discipline by the father. The boys were
adjudged as dependents and were placed in a foster
home.
Appellants refused counseling and offered minimal
cooperation, and failed to maintain contact with the
probation department.
Later on, the maternal grandmother, believing that the
father had left home and hoping that the children could
be reacquainted, allowed Marlee to visit with her mother
and two brothers. When she came back, she observed
the father disciplining the three children by hitting them
with a leather strap. The father explained to the children
that he was doing it because God wanted him to and
that it was Biblically ordained.
The grandmother testified that Marlee was once beaten
during the night for wetting the bed. She was also made
to sleep in her underwear on a plastic sheet on the floor
with no bedding. The children were made to stand in a
corner for long periods and were lectured about God at
mealtime. Sometimes the children fell asleep without
eating. After school they were not allowed to go out.
After one severe beating when she wasnt able to recall
what she learned in church, the grandmother observed
blood on Marlees underpants. This prompted her to
remove the child from appellants household. Marlee had
numerous abrasions, bruises, and lacerations on her
buttocks, legs, and arms. She was taken into protective
custody. Petitions were also filed for Eric and Edward
after the probation officer observed the father strike Eric
while they were sitting on the lobby of the probation
department.
Upon interview, Eric and Edward told the investigating
deputy that they did not want to return to their parents
home because their father whipped them too much and
too hard.
The father admitted spanking the children, but denied
causing the said injuries. The mother did not testify but
informed the investigating officer that she supported her
husbands manner of discipline.
After the conclusion of the dependency hearing, the
children were adjudged to be dependents of the court
and were committed to the custody of the probation
officer for suitable foster or relative home placement.
The parents were also ordered to undergo counseling.
Issues:
WON there is substantial evidence of actual or
imminent harm to Eric and Edward to justify
intrusion into the appellants constitutionally
protected fundamental right to parenting.
WON the parents can justify the manner of upbringing of
their children using the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of religion.
Held:
YES. The appellants contend that evidence is
insufficient to support a finding that Edward and Eric
suffered any physical or psychological injury. To prove
the dependency of a child, preponderance of evidence is
needed.
The evidence at hand overwhelmingly supports the
findings that appellants home was an unfit place for
Marlee by reason of the fathers cruel and inhuman
corporal punishment of her. Such evidence is admissible
on appellants exercise of proper and effective control of
Eric and Edward. The court could reasonably infer that
the father, with Marlee removed, would turn his
excessive discipline measures to Eric and Edward
instead. The testimonies of the two boys also supported
this conclusion. It is also reasonable to infer that

continued exposure to the threat of physical force will
inhibit the healthy emotional development necessary to a
progression from childhood to independent manhood.
The parental preference and the childs best interests
standards are usually compatible, but when the rights
of the parents conflict with those of the child, the
legal system should protect the childs interests. Not
only is the child a helpless party but the parents should
suffer the consequences of their inadequacy rather than
the child.
NO. Mistreatment of a child is not privileged because it is
imposed in the guise of freedom of religious expression.
Whether discipline is excessive or a lifestyle is harmful to
the child must be measured in the light if an objective
standard of reasonableness under all circumstances.
**There was also a discussion on reunification plan for
the family. However, due to the fathers absence of
remorse and denial of abuse of children after three
dependency proceedings, and the support of the mother
on the fathers beliefs, as well as the refusal to
participate in any plan for counseling, a detailed plan for
reunification would have been useless.
NOTE: Dependent Child: This term generally refers to a
child who has been placed in the legal custody of either
the state or the county foster care system by the courts,
usually due to the abandonment, abuse or neglect of the
child by its parents or other caregivers.
[http://glossary.adoption.com/dependent-child.html
-Ms. Tiu-

PRINCE VS. MASSACHUSETTS
Facts:
Betty M. Simmons, a girl of nine years of age, is under
the legal custody of his aunt Mrs. Prince. Both are
members of the religious group Jehovahs Witnesses.
One night, Mrs. Prince permitted the children (her 2 sons
and Betty) to engage in the preaching work with her
upon the sidewalk. With specific reference to Betty, she
and Betty took position about 20 feet apart near a street
intersection to hand-out copies of religious
documents (Watch Tower and Consolation) for 5
cents per copy.
No one accepted a copy from Betty that evening, but in
other nights, Betty had received funds and had given out
copies.
Mr. Perkins, the school attendance officer, approached
Mrs. Prince regarding the activity that Betty was
engaged in. An argument ensued regarding
constitutional right of freedom of religion.
The State Court determined that Betty was engaged
in a sale or an offer to sell within sec 69 (cited
below) or was work within sec 81 (cited below).
Sec 69:
No boy under twelve and no girl under eighteen shall
sell, expose, or offer for sale any newspapers,
magazines, periodicals or any other articles of
merchandise of any description, or exercise the trade of
bootblack or scavenger, or any other trade, in any street
or public place.
Sec 81:
Any parent, guardian or custodian having a minor under
his control who compels or permits such minor to work in
violation of any provision of sections 60 to 74 shall for
first offense be punished by a fine, or by
imprisonment, or both
ISSUE: WON the statute, as applied in this case, is in
violation of due process (on parental right), freedom
of religion, and equal protection.
HELD: NO
RATIO:
Neither rights of religion nor rights parenthood are
beyond limitation. The state, as parens patriae, may
restrict the parents control by requiring school
attendance, regulating the childs labor and in many
other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because
the parent grounds his claim to control the childs course
of conduct on religion or conscience.
The state has a wide range of power limiting parental
freedom and authority in things affecting the childs

welfare. This includes, to some extent, matters of
conscience and religious conviction.
The states authority over childrens activities is
broader that over like actions of adults- peculiarly
true in matters of employment. Among evils most
appropriate for such action are the crippling effects
of child labor/employment, more especially in public
places, and the possible harms arising from other
activities subject to all diverse influences in the
street, even if in the presence of the parents or the
guardian.
There is no denial of EPC in excluding the children of
Jehovahs witness from doing in the streets what no
other children may do.

Justice Murphy, dissenting: Religious training and
activity are protected by the 14
th
amendment. The great
interest of state in shielding minors from the evils of early
life does not warrant every limitation on their religious
training and activities. The reasonableness that justifies
the prohibition of the ordinary distribution of literature in
public streets by children is not necessarily the
reasonableness that justifies such a drastic restriction
when the distribution is part of their religious faith.
Justice Jackson, dissenting: Limits begin to operate
only when the activities collide with liberties of others or
of the public. Religious activities which concern only
members of the faith are and ought to be free as
anything can be.
-Ms. Torres-

Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: Contraceptive Controversy

Complex issues:
1. Scope of the constitutional right of adults to obtain contraceptives remains somewhat uncertain
2. Courts have not yet articulated the special factors that determine how existing frameworks for analyzing the rights of
adults are to be applied to minors
3. The question of minors access to contraceptive involves a particularly complex mixture of the interests of minors,
parents, and the state.

I. Barriers Facing Minors Seeking Contraceptives
General Rule: Parental consent was required at common law as a substitute for the childs consent
Exception:
REASON: increasing sensitivity to the child as a person
Focus shifted from bodily integrity (emergency) to judicial recognition of de facto majority (emancipation) to concern
over the characteristics and mental capabilities of the minor (maturity)
Emergency exception:
Emergency exception a situation in which immediate steps are necessary to effect life saving measures or to begin
with medication in severe cases
Courts construe this narrowly and it is doubtful that a minors need for contraceptive services could qualify as an
emergency situation

Emancipated minors effectively consent to medical treatment if he is fully informed and capable of understanding the
consequences of treatment
Indications:
Marriage
failure of parents to meet legal responsibilities
living apart from parents, financial self-support
Mature minors understanding of the ramifications of treatment is sufficient
Factors:
Undertaken for minors own benefit rather than for that of 3
rd
party
At least 15 years old and had sufficient mental capacity to understand completely the nature and importance of the
treatment
Procedure was thought not to be major

II. Applicability of Privacy Rights to minors
Privacy Rights jurisprudence:
Griswold v Connecticut forbidding use of contraceptives by married adults violated right to marital privacy
Eisenstadt v Baird unmarried adults must be granted the same right to access
Roe v Wade privacy right is sufficiently broad to embrace both access and use

ABORTION v CONTRACEPTION:
If states interest during early gestation in safeguarding maternal health and protecting the fetus are not sufficient to justify
abortion, it seems even less likely that restraints on access to contraceptive can be justified
Health risks in contraception are less than those of abortion
Decision is made prior to the conception of potential life

CHILDREN in COMMON LAW
Did not distinguish between infant and the mature teenager, categorized both as minors and treated as the property if
their parents who could make the decisions affecting them
Court has recognized that minors are persons under the Constitution they possessed fundamental rights which the
State must respect
But no SC decision has explicitly held that the right of privacy is applicable to minors


ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVES
There is high incidence of teenage sexual activity and pregnancy, and liberalizing access to contraceptive could reduce
the number of undesired pregnancies
Access to contraception could also reduce problems accompanying forced marriage of immature couples and the often
acute anxieties involved in deciding whether to secure an abortion

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVES
For the childs best interest
It has some deterrent effect on sexual conduct.
However, substantial number of minors will engage in sexual activities despite bans
Fostering a particular moral climate
However, depriving minors does not appear significantly to alter sexual attitudes
Deter sexual activity to reduce the fiscal burden of supporting unwed mothers and illegitimate children, and protecting
minor from the increased risks of teenage childbearing
Argument is misleading: it is unlikely that the number of unwanted pregnancies that would be prevented when sex is
deterred by unavailability of birth control would substantially be greater than the number of illegitimate births that would be
prevented by easy access to contraceptives

III. Childs Interest In Contraceptives and The Familys Interest in Autonomy
Even if it is true that states have no right to ban access of minors under the 14
th
amendment, it does not necessarily follow
that the state may not enforce parental choices with regard to such access
The States regulation of access to contraceptives is not an instance of the state imposing its will on the children,
State is neutral as to whether the children ultimately obtain contraceptives
However, it is not neutral as to who makes the choice.
The states grant to parents of legal control over minors access to contraceptives constitutes state action
Parents interests should prevail are two implicit decisions underlying state choice:
1. The state must have decided that the family is an important social unit, support of which is a proper legal goal
2. It must have determined that permitting children

CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY under 14
th
amendment:
WON the states interest in the maintenance of the family structure outweighs the childs fundamental interest in access to
contraceptives.

WON states decision that enforcing parental choice as to contraceptives helps maintain the family structure - a
compelling interest.
Strong State and parental interest in maintaining the family:
maintaining family structure is a normative goal; its preservation is a goal that the state may legitimately pursue
family yields a variety of practical social benefit
Traditional analysis of family:
Family integrity = parental control
Parents view parental consent requirements as justifiable or even legal reinforcement of a natural right to make
fundamental decision on their childrens behalf.
However, it is a misconception to equate the preservation of family structure with reinforcement of parental control.
Maintaining the integrity of the family is not only a reflection of interests of parents
It mirrors a distinguishable, relational privacy interest
Safeguard from state encroachment the intimacy and autonomy of the family relationship

APPLICATION TO CONTRACEPTIVE ISSUE:
Individual interests of parent and child are likely to collide
Protection of their shared relational interest assumes independent importance and should be directed at reinforcing the
values of parents alone, which results when a parental consent requirement is imposed, but rather at fostering
autonomous intrafamilial resolution of controversies
Theres a conflict between: adolescents struggle for independence and guardianship of parents
If a minor already developed a sense of responsibility or where the family has established informal patterns of resolving
conflicts: the state policy may undermine viable dispute resolution
If the parent is placed in a very dominant position: they may exacerbate parent-child disagreement and induce
exaggerated response from minors
CONCLUSION
Importance of minors right to access of contraceptives and interest of family unit in freedom form state interference
appear to outweigh any state interests in restricting access.
Should be declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL

-Ms. Umali-


Recognizing adolescents evolving capacities to exercise choice in reproductive healthcare
- R. Cook, B.M. Dickens

Purpose of the paper: To explain governments legal duties to observe adolescents rights to healthcare services, and to
relate services to adolescents evolving capacities to make critical choices for themselves.

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires governments to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of
parents or others acting as parents in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. It sets a legal limit
on parental power to deny capable adolescents reproductive and sexual health services. Whether an adolescent is a
mature minor must be decided by health service providers independently of parental judgment.

1. Introduction
The widespread failure of national healthcare services to address the issue of adolescent pregnancy, childbirth and STIs
results from: (1) healthcare providers fears that local laws restrict their capacity to give contraceptives and other services
to adolescents who come to them unless they have parental consent; and (2) countries default in living up to the
international legal commitments they have made under human rights treaties to ensure that no child is deprived of his/her
right of access to healthcare services. Governments must: (1) determine whether their domestic law recognizes that
mature minors can obtain confidential services to protect their reproductive health; and (2) be encouraged to comply with
the international human rights commitments their countries have made to afford adolescents access to appropriate
healthcare services.

2. The Childrens Convention
A child is every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained
earlier. These persons are entitled to the Conventions protections. Some articles of the Convention provide that: (1)
States parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and (2) States parties
shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in
the exercise of his/her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.

3. Legal limits to parentalism
Parentalism regards mothers and father equally. It is also a policy of practice of acting to limit childrens freedom and
responsibility by well-intended regulations. The Convention requires that parents and other legal guardians of children act
consistently with the evolving capacities of persons under 18. It limits parental powers when adolescents develop their
own capacities, not only to make decisions, but also reasonably to anticipate and to bear responsibility for the
consequences of their decisions. It sets legal limits to inappropriate, obstructive and dysfunctional parentalism.

4. Reproductive healthcare decisions
Reproductive healthcare decisions affect others too: the child born of adolescents, the adolescents parents (may reflect
badly on their upbringing and jeopardize their childs future, termination of pregnancy may be shameful or unacceptable),
the adolescents themselves (abortion may endanger their lives or alienate them from their family and religious traditions),

and healthcare providers (adolescents may want to share their problems but do not want to disclose these to their parent,
posing problems of ethical and legal concerns for healthcare providers; also posing a problem is when professional codes
and local laws are in conflict with more liberal provisions countries have legally adopted).

5. Adolescent patients confidentiality
Healthcare providers have to inform parents about services to their children for which the parents are asked to pay fees.
Governmental and private health insurance plans should include provisions for payments for adolescents services that
preserve their confidentiality.

6. Reproductive health services
Adolescents should not be subjected to parental pressure either to forgo medically-conducted abortions they favor or to
terminate pregnancies that want to bring to term. Judges usually accept that parents cannot override competent
adolescent refusals of abortion.
Healthcare providers must be aware that, unless assured of their confidentiality, adolescents may choose to forgo
contraceptive protection, and risk pregnancy and the dangers of unskilled abortion. Denial of services or of confidentiality
may be a matter of an adolescents death, or severe and enduring injury.
Adolescents evolving capacities to cope with their own and their peers sexuality are often hampered by their lack of
reproductive and sexual health information and education. Therefore, there is a need for adolescents to be educated in
reproductive and sexual health. States should remove legal hazards that dissuade healthcare providers from educating
young couples in reproductive and sexual prudence and safety (also since states have accepted a duty under the
Convention to ensure that such education is available).

7. States duties to implement reproductive rights
a. The duty to respect rights of adolescents prohibits states from interfering with the protection and promotion of
reproductive rights; there is also the legal duty to ensure confidentiality
b. The duty to protect rights of adolescents requires states to prevent conduct by third parties that results in violations of
reproductive rights; requires that adolescents be spoken to and informed about all aspects of sexuality; duty to ensure
adolescents access to information necessary for protection of their reproductive health, and a related duty to remove
legal, regulatory and social barriers to essential information and care
c. The duty to fulfill rights of adolescents requires states to take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary,
judicial and other measures toward the realization of reproductive rights, consistent with their evolving capacities; states
should ensure that healthcare providers recognize their duty to assess whether adolescents who request assistance in
reproductive healthcare are capable of exercising reasonable judgment, and recognize their legal duty to treat those who
are capable as adults regarding both treatment and confidentiality; general rule: adolescents capable of freely choosing to
be sexually active without parental control are equally capable of receiving reproductive health counseling and care
without parental control

8. Adolescent reproductive health programs the Profamilia model

Colombias Profamilia runs youth centers and provides some services for adolescents. It provides adolescent reproductive
and sexual health information and services, provide sexuality education in schools, and train youth in advocacy for
adolescent reproductive rights.

-Ms. Veneracion-

F. Summary Procedure
Reyes-Tabujara vs. CA
July 20, 2006
Ponente: Chico-Nazario
Facts:
Ivy and Ernesto were married and had a son, Carlos
Inigo.
Their relationship soured which led Ivy and their son to
stay with the formers sister.
One day, Ernesto fetched the child from where Ivy was
staying and from then on he never returned the child. He
even hit Ivy while the latter tried to get the child back.
Ivy filed a petition for Habeas Corpus in the RTC basing
the petition on Art 213 (custody of children below 7years
old). The said court granted the petition and ordered
Ernesto to produce the child on the day of the hearing.
Ernesto failed to show Carlos.
Ivy then filed for an Urgent Ex-parte motion to Hear Writ
of Habeas Corpus before the RTC. Judge Bays
resolution however, stated that Carlos should stay with
Ernesto while the court was resolving the custody of the
child.
Judge Bay of RTC then was about to go on a leave, the
case was referred to Judge Gonzales-Asdala which
ruled that the child should be produced by Ernesto.
When Ernesto failed to do so, he was in contempt of
court and a warrant of arrest was issued.
Upon appeal, the CA ruled to restrain the
implementation of Judge Gonzales-Asdalas decision
(which in effect affirmed Judge Bays decision). Hence,
the petition of Ivy to the SC for its reversal of CA
decision allowing Carlos to stay with Ernesto.

Issue/Held:
W/N The SC can reverse the decisions of RTC and CA
and order the said courts to compel Ernesto to show
Carlos. NO.

Ratio:
Firstly, the SC discussed its jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases:
The rule with regard to jurisdiction over habeas corpus
was settled in In re Matter of Application for the Issuance
of a Writ of Habeas Corpus Richard Brian Thornton for
and in behalf of minor child Sequiera Jennifer which
ruled that the SC and CA retained their jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases despite the Passage of RA 8368
(Family Courts Act) which conferred upon family courts
the exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases.
This was so because conferring exclusive jurisdiction
over Family Courts would leave the families of people
who are seeking for their child to be helpless since they
cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are
enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. By saying Sc has jurisdiction over the
habeas corpus, the court can therefore decide upon the
petition.
Secondly, on reversal of RTC and CA decision:
The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition which
excluded all the other courts. Hence, the decision over
the writ of Habeas Corpus should be resolved by the
RTC, for once a jurisdiction has been acquired by a

court, it is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated.
If SC would decide upon the matter, it would overstep
the boundary laid down by law with respect to jurisdiction
over habeas corpus.
Also, to reverse the decision of the CA would be to risk
instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction might
have conflicting orders.
-Ms. Allarey-

Madrinan vs. Madrinan
Nature:Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Parties Involved: Felipe Madrinan, petitioner, vs. Francisca Madrinan, respondent
Ponente: Corona, J. Date: July 12, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Felipe Madrinan and respondent Francisca
Madrinan were married and had four children. After a
bitter quarrel, petitioner alledgedly left the conjugal
abode and took their three sons ( 2 of which are
minors) with him. Despite respondent's efforts to bring
the family back togethre, such efforts proved futile.
Respondent then filed a petition for habeas corpus of the
three children alleging that petitioner's acts of leaving
their home disrupted the ducation of the children and
deprived them of their mother's care. The Court of
Appeals decided in favor of the respondent.
Hence, petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the CA
oer the petition for habeas corpus and insists that
jurisdiction over the case is lodeged in the family courts
under RA 8369.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the
petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors
Held:
Yes, it has jurisdiction
Ratio:
RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the SC of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minor children. The provisions of 8369 must
be read in harmony with RA 7029 ( An Act Expanding
the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and BP 129
(The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)-that the
family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA
and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minor is at issue.
Furthermore, Section 20 on the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors states that ' the petition may likewise
be filed with the SC, CA xxx the writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines.
It must also be noted that petitioner moved from one
place to another covered by different judicial regions. In
this case, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be
left with no legal remedy if RA 8369 is to be applied
strictly.
A careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that
family courts are vested with original exlusive jurisdiction
in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. In other
words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the
custody pending before the family court.
RA 8369:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts- the family courts
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the ff. cases:
b) petitions for xxx habeas corpus in relation to the latter
(custody of children)
-Ms. Amantillo-

Civil Law 1 (B)

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B2013 | Persons and Family Relations | Prof.

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