Magbanua vs Uy

Magbanua vs Uy
G.R. No. 161003. May 6, 2005

Facts:
As a final consequence of the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court which
affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC, hearings were conducted to determine the
amount of wage differentials due the eight petitioners. The petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution. Rizalino Uy filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be terminated and
closed, stating that the judgment award as computed had been complied with to the satisfaction of
petitioners. Said Manifestation was also signed by the eight petitioners. Together with the
manifestation is a Joint Affidavit dated May 5, 1997 of petitioners, attesting to the receipt of payment
from respondent and waiving all other benefits due them in connection with their complaint. On
October 20, 1997, six of the eight petitioners filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be
considered closed and terminated as they are already satisfied of what they have received from
respondent. Together with said Manifestation is a Joint Affidavit in the local dialect, of the six
petitioners attesting that they have no more collectible amount from respondent and if there is any,
they are abandoning and waiving the same.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court could be subject to
compromise settlement;
2. Whether or not the petitioners affidavit waiving their awards in the labor case executed without the
assistance of their counsel and labor arbiter is valid.

Held:
1. There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was entered into
after final judgment. The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites
and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into. Petitioners voluntarily entered into the
compromise agreement. Circumstances also reveal that respondent has already complied with its
obligation pursuant to the compromise agreement. Having already benefited from the agreement,
estoppel bars petitioners from challenging it.
2. The presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does not determine its validity.
There is no law requiring the presence of a counsel to validate a waiver. The test is whether it was
executed voluntarily, freely and intelligently; and whether the consideration for it was credible and
reasonable. Where there is clear proof that a waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or a gullible
person, the law must step in to annul such transaction. In the present case, petitioners failed to present
any evidence to show that their consent had been vitiated.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 87297 August 5, 1991
ALFREDO VELOSO and EDITO LIGUATON petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, NOAH'S ARK SUGAR CARRIERS AND
WILSON T. GO,respondents.

CRUZ, J .:p
The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees who are inveigled or
pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal
responsibilities. On the other hand, there are legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary
settlement of laborer's claims that should be respected by the courts as the law between the
parties.
In the case at bar, the petitioners claim that they were forced to sign their respective releases
in favor of their employer, the herein private respondent, by reason of their dire necessity.
The latter, for its part, insists that the petitioner entered into the compromise agreement
freely and with open eyes and should not now be permitted to reject their solemn
commitments.
The controversy began when the petitioners, along with several co-employees, filed a
complaint against the private respondent for unfair labor practices, underpayment, and non-
payment of overtime, holiday, and other benefits. This was decided in favor of the
complainants on October 6,1987. The motion for reconsideration, which was treated as an
appeal, was dismissed in a resolution dated February 17, 1988, the dispositive portion of
which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned
Order affirmed with the modification that the monetary awards to Jeric
Dequito, Custodio Ganuhay Conrado Mori and Rogelio Veloso are hereby
deleted for being settled. Let execution push through with respect to the
awards to Alfredo Veloso and Edito Liguaton.
On February 23, 1988, the private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
recomputation of the amount awarded to the petitioners. On April 15, 1988, while the motion
was pending, petitioner Alfredo Veloso, through his wife Connie, signed a Quitclaim and
Release for and in consideration of P25,000.00,
1
and on the same day his counsel, Atty. Gaga
Mauna, manifested "Satisfaction of Judgment" by receipt of the said sum by Veloso.
2
For his
part, petitioner Liguaton filed a motion to dismiss dated July 16, 1988, based on a Release and
Quitclaim dated July 19,1988 ,
3
for and in consideration of the sum of P20,000.00 he
acknowledged to have received from the private respondent.
4

These releases were later impugned by the petitioners on September 20, 1988, on the
ground that they were constrained to sign the documents because of their "extreme
necessity." In an Order dated December 16, 1988, the Undersecretary of Labor rejected their
contention and ruled:
IN VIEW THEREOF, complainants Motion to Declare Quitclaim Null and Void
is hereby denied for lack of merit and the compromise
agreements/settlements dated April 15, 1988 and July 19, 1988 are hereby
approved. Respondents' motion for reconsideration is hereby denied for
being moot and academic.
Reconsideration of the order having been denied on March 7, 1989, the petitioners have
come to this Court oncertiorari. They ask that the quitclaims they have signed be annulled
and that writs of execution be issued for the sum of P21,267.92 in favor of Veloso and the
sum of P26,267.92 in favor of Liguaton in settlement of their claims.
Their petition is based primarily on Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. v. Court of
Industrial Relations,
5
where it was held:
... while rights may be waived, the same must not be contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law. (Art. 6, New Civil Code) ...
... The above-quoted provision renders the quitclaim agreements void ab
initio in their entirety since they obligated the workers concerned to forego
their benefits, while at the same time, exempted the petitioner from any
liability that it may choose to reject. This runs counter to Art. 22 of the new
Civil Code which provides that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the
expense of another.
The Court had deliberated on the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the
petition must fail. The exception and not the rule shall be applied in this case.
The case cited is not apropos because the quitclaims therein invoked were secured by the
employer after it had already lost in the lower court and were subsequently rejected by this
Court when the employer invoked it in a petition for certiorari. By contrast, the quitclaims in
the case before us were signed by the petitioners while the motion for reconsideration was
still pending in the DOLE, which finally deemed it on March 7, 1989. Furthermore, the
quitclaims in the cited case were entered into without leave of the lower court whereas in the
case at bar the quitclaims were made with the knowledge and approval of the DOLE, which
declared in its order of December 16, 1988, that "the compromise agreement/settlements
dated April 15, 1988 and July 19, 1988 are hereby approved."
It is also noteworthy that the quitclaims were voluntarily and knowingly made by both
petitioners even if they may now deny this. In the case of Veloso, the quitclaim he had
signed carried the notation that the sum stated therein had been paid to him in the presence
of Atty. Gaga Mauna, his counsel, and the document was attested by Atty. Ferdinand
Magabilin, Chief of the Industrial Relations Division of the National Capitol Region of the
DOLE. In the case of Liguaton, his quitclaim was made with the assistance of his counsel,
Atty. Leopoldo Balguma, who also notarized it and later confirmed it with the filing of the
motion to dismiss Liguaton's complaint.
The same Atty. Balguma is the petitioners' counsel in this proceeding. Curiously, he is now
challenging the very same quitclaim of Liguaton that he himself notarized and invoked as the
basis of Liguaton's motion to dismiss, but this time for a different reason. whereas he had
earlier argued for Liguaton that the latter's signature was a forgery, he has abandoned that
contention and now claims that the quitclaim had been executed because of the petitioners'
dire necessity.
"Dire necessity" is not an acceptable ground for annulling the releases, especially since it
has not been shown that the employees had been forced to execute them. It has not even
been proven that the considerations for the quitclaims were unconscionably low and that the
petitioners had been tricked into accepting them. While it is true that the writ of execution
dated November 24, 1987, called for the collection of the amount of P46,267.92 each for the
petitioners, that amount was still subject to recomputation and modification as the private
respondent's motion for reconsideration was still pending before the DOLE. The fact that the
petitioners accepted the lower amounts would suggest that the original award was exorbitant
and they were apprehensive that it would be adjusted and reduced. In any event, no
deception has been established on the part of the Private respondent that would justify the
annulment of the Petitioners' quitclaims.
The applicable law is Article 227 of the Labor Code providing clearly as follows:
Art. 227. Compromise agreements. Any compromise settlement, including
those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of
Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor
Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues
involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima
facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation or coercion.
The petitioners cannot renege on their agreement simply because they may now feel they
made a mistake in not awaiting the resolution of the private respondent's motion for
reconsideration and recomputation. The possibility that the original award might have been
affirmed does not justify the invalidation of the perfectly valid compromise agreements they
had entered into in good faith and with full voluntariness. In General Rubber and Footwear
Corp. vs. Drilon,
6
we "made clear that the Court is not saying that accrued money claims can
never be effectively waived by workers and employees." As we later declared in Periquet v.
NLRC:
7

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable
settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul
the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making
the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing,
and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this
case.
We find that the questioned quitclaims were voluntarily and knowingly executed and that the
petitioners should not be relieved of their waivers on the ground that they now feel they were
improvident in agreeing to the compromise. What they call their "dire necessity" then is no
warrant to nullify their solemn undertaking, which cannot be any less binding on them simply
because they are laborers and deserve the protection of the Constitution. The Constitution
protects the just, and it is not the petitioners in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so
ordered.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76427 February 21, 1989
JOHNSON AND JOHNSON LABOR UNION-FFW, DANTE JOHNSON MORANTE,
MYRNA OLOVEJA AND ITS OTHER INDIVIDUAL UNION MEMBERS, petitioners
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS, AND OSCAR PILI, respondents.
Rogelio R. Udarbe for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Manuel V. Nepomuceno for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
The sole issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether or not the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the private respondent is entitled to the
financial aid from the compulsory contributions of the petitioner-union afforded to its
members who have been suspended or terminated from work without reasonable cause.
The provision for the grant of financial aid in favor of a union member is embodied in the
petitioner-union's Constitution and By-laws, Article XIII, Section 5, of which reads:
A member who have (sic) been suspended or terminated without reasonable
cause shall be extended a financial aid from the compulsory contributions in
the amount of SEVENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P0. 75) from each member
weekly. (p. 18, Rollo)
On May 6, 1985, the private respondent, a member of the petitioner-union was dismissed
from his employment by employer Johnson & Johnson (Phil.) Inc., for non-disclosure in his
job application form of the fact that he had a relative in the company in violation of company
policies.
On July 1985, a complaint was filed by the private respondent against the officers of the
petitioner-union docketed as NRC- LRD-M-7-271-85 alleging, among others, that the union
officers had refused to provide the private respondent the financial aid as provided in the
union constitution despite demands for payment thereof The petitioner-union and its officers
counter-alleged, in their answer, that the said financial aid was to be given only in cases of
termination or suspension without any reasonable cause; that the union's executive board
had the prerogative to determine whether the suspension or termination was for a
reasonable cause or not; and that the union, in a general membership meeting, had resolved
not to extend financial aid to the private respondent.
While the grievance procedure as contained in the union's collective bargaining agreement
was being undertaken, the private respondent, on August 26, 1985, filed a case for unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal against his employer docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No.
6-1912-85.
On September 27, 1985, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin issued an order dismissing for lack
of merit the complaint of the private respondent against the petitioners for alleged violation of
the union constitution and by-laws.
On appeal, the then public respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano, on April 17, 1986,
rendered the decision assailed in this petition. The dispositive portion of the said decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of complainant Oscar Pili is
hereby granted and the Order appealed from is hereby set aside. Appellees,
therefore, are hereby ordered to pay the complainant the sum of P0.75/week
per union member to be computed from the time of the complainant's
termination from employment to the time he acquired another employment
should his complaint for illegal dismissal against the company be resolved in
his favor; provided, that if his complaint against the company be dismissed,
appellees are absolved from paying the complainant anything. (p. 115,
Records)
Both parties moved for reconsideration. The petitioners reiterated that since the private
respondent's termination was for a reasonable cause, it would be unjust and unfair if
financial aid were to be given in the event that the latter's case for illegal dismissal is decided
against him. The private respondent, on the other hand, prayed for the amendment of the
dispositive portion in order that the grant of financial aid be made without any qualifications.
On June 16, 1986, a Manifestation and/or Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the petitioners was filed by the private respondent stating that he was being discriminated
against considering that one Jerwin Taguba, another union member, was terminated for
dishonesty and loss of confidence but was granted financial aid by the petitioners while
Taguba's complaint against the company was still pending with the National Labor Relation
Commission.
The public respondent separately resolved the above motions. On June 26, 1986, an order
was issued denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. On August 19, 1986, the
public respondent modified its decision dated April 17, 1986 and its aforestated order as
follows:
Considering that complainant Pili is similarly situated as Jerwin Taguba
coupled with the need to obviate any discriminating treatment to the former, it
is only just and appropriate that our Decision dated 17 April 1986 be modified
in such a manner that respondents immediately pay the complainant the sum
of P0.75/ week per union member to be computed from the time of his
dismissal from the company, without prejudice to refund of the amount that
shall be paid to Pili in the event the pending case is finally resolved against
him.
WHEREFORE, and as above qualified, this Bureau's Decision dated 17 April
1986 and the Order dated 26 June 1986 are hereby modified to the extent
that the respondents are directed to immediately pay complainant the sum of
P0.75/week per union member to be computed from the time of his
termination from his employment until his case against the employer
company shall have been finally resolved and/or disposed. (p. 53, Rollo)
Meanwhile, on July 25, 1986, a motion for issuance of a writ of execution was filed by the
private respondent in order to collect from the petitioners the amount of financial aid to which
the former was entitled.
On September 1, 1986, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the public
respondent's resolution dated August 19, 1986 on the grounds that Taguba's affidavit cannot
support the private respondent's claim that he is also entitled to the financial aid provided in
the union's constitution and that the union cannot be compelled to grant the said aid in the
absence of a special fund for the purpose.
On October 28, 1986, the public respondent through Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration stating that Article XIII, Section 5 of the union's
constitution and by-laws does not require a special fund so that all union members similarly
situated as the private respondent must be entitled to the same right and privilege regarding
the grant of financial aid as therein provided.
On December 18, 1986, a writ of execution was issued by the public respondent in the
following tenor:
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby directed to proceed to the premises of
Johnson and Johnson (FFW) located at Edison Road, Bo. Ibayo, Paranaque,
Metro Manila to collect from the said union through its Treasurer, Myrna
Oloveja or to any responsible officer of the union the amount of Twenty
Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Pesos (P20,520.00), more or less
representing financial assistance to complainant under the union's
constitution and by-laws. In case you fail to collect said amount in cash, you
are to cause the satisfaction of the same on the union's movable or
immovable properties not exempt from execution. You are to return this writ
within fifteen (15) days from your compliance hereby together with your
report thereon. You may collect your legal fees from the respondent union.
(p. 55, Rollo)
On December 24, 1986, the instant petition was filed with prayer for a preliminary injunction.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Chief Justice on December 24, 1986 was
confirmed in our resolution dated January 7, 1987.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are as follows:
A. THAT THE DECISION/ORDER IN QUESTION IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
B. THAT RESPONDENT OFFICIAL ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
C. THAT WITH RESPECT TO PETITIONING MEMBERS, THEY HAVE
BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW. (P. 13, Rollo)
We find unmeritorious the contention of the petitioners that the questioned decision and
order are contrary to law for being tantamount to compelling the union to disburse it funds
without the authority of the general membership and to collect from its members without the
benefit of individual payroll authorization.
Section 5, Article XIII of the petitioner-union's constitution and by-laws earlier aforequoted is
self-executory. The financial aid extended to any suspended or terminated union member is
realized from the contributions declared to be compulsory under the said provision in the
amount of seventy-five centavos due weekly from each union member. The nature of the
said contributions being compulsory and the fact that the purpose as stated is for financial
aid clearly indicate that individual payroll authorizations of the union members are not
necessary. The petitioner-union's constitution and by-laws govern the relationship between
and among its members. As in the interpretation of contracts, if the terms are clear and leave
no doubt as to the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of the stipulations shall control.
(See Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 311 [1986]).
Section 5, Article XIII of the said constitution and by-laws is in line with the petitioner- union's
aims and purposes which under Sec. 2, Article II include
To promote, establish and devise schemes of mutual assistance among the
members in labor disputes.
Thus, there is no doubt that the petitioner-union can be ordered to release its funds intended
for the promotion of mutual assistance in favor of the private respondent.
We likewise find untenable the argument of the petitioners that the public respondent, in
granting financial aid to the private respondent, in effect, substituted the decision of the
petitioner-union to do otherwise and that in so doing, the public respondent gravely abused
its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The union constitution is a covenant between
the union and its members and among the members. There is nothing in their constitution
which leaves the legal interpretation of its terms unilaterally to the union or its officers or
even the general membership. It is noteworthy to quote the ruling made by the public
respondent in this respect, to wit:
The union constitution and by-laws clearly show that any member who is
suspended or terminated from employment without reasonable cause is
entitled to financial assistance from the union and its members. The problem,
however, is that the constitution does not indicate which body has the power
to determine whether a suspension or dismissal is for reasonable cause or
not. To our mind, the constitution's silence on this matter is a clear
recognition of the labor arbiter's exclusive jurisdiction over dismissal cases.
After all, the union's constitution and by-laws is valid only insofar as it is not
inconsistent with existing laws. ... . (BLR decision, p. 2; p. 115, Records)
An aggrieved member has to resort to a government agency or tribunal. Considering that
quasi-judicial agencies like the public respondent's office have acquired expertise since their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matter, their findings of fact in connection with their rulings
are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if supported by substantial
evidence. (See Manila Mandarin Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission,
154 SCRA 368 [1987]) Riker v. Ople, 155 SCRA 85 [1987]; and Palencia v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 153 SCRA 247 [1987]. We note from the records that the petitioners
have conflicting interpretations of the same disputed provision one in favor of Jerwin Taguba
and another against the private respondent.
On the ancillary issue presented by the petitioners whether or not the petitioning union
members have been deprived of their right to due process of law because they were never
made parties to the case under consideration, we rule that the fact that the union officers
impleaded since the inception of the case acted in a representative capacity on behalf of the
entire union's membership substantially meets the requirements of due process with respect
to the said union members. Moreover, the complaint filed against the union involves the
interpretation of its constitution favoring an aggrieved member. The members are bound by
the terms of their own constitution. A suit to enforce a union constitution does not have to be
brought against each individual member, especially where several thousand members form
the membership. If there is any violation of the right to due process in the case at bar it is as
regards the private respondent since the petitioners-union has dispensed with due process in
deciding not to extend financial aid to the private respondent in the absence yet of a ruling by
the labor arbiter on whether his dismissal was for a reasonable cause or not.
The remedy of the petitioners is to strike out or amend the objectionable features of their
constitution. They cannot expect the public respondent to assist them in its non- enforcement
or violation.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED in the
absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent. The
decision of the public respondent dated April 17, 1986 as modified in a resolution dated
August 17, 1986 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
December 24,1986 is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Case Digest - Labor Law
GRN 131235 NOVEMBER 16, 1999
UST FACULTY UNION VS BITONIO / BLR
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Marinio et al were duly elected officers of UST faculty. The union has a 5-
year CBA with its employer and is set to expire on May 31, 1998. On October 5, 1996 various
UST club presidents requested a general faculty assembly thus union and non-union faculty
members convened. New set of officers were elected, violative of the CBL and that the GA was
held with non-union members present. Union officers were served with a notice to vacate the
union office, and CBA was ratified by an overwhelming majority. Med-Arbiter declared the
election violative of the CBL while BLR director Bitonio upheld the decision with a ruling that the
CBL which constituted the covenant between the union and its members could not be
suspended during the general assembly of all faculty members, since it ha not been authorized
by the union.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
recognize the officers elected during the general assembly.
RULING:
Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor
Code.Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor
union.Therefore, to become a union member, an employee must not only signify the intent to
become one, but also take some positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union
membership is usually embodied in the unions CBL. An employee who becomes a union
member acquires the rights and he concomitant obligations that go with the new status and
becomes bound by the unions rules and regulations.
GRN 80587 FEBRUARY 8, 1989


G.R. No. 131235 November 16, 1999 UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU) et al
petitioners, vs.

Dir. BENEDICTO ERNESTO R. BITONIO JR. of the Bureau of Labor Relations et al.
respondents Facts: Petitioners are duly elected officers of USTFU and have a
subsisting five-year CBA with the employer UST. The Sec-Gen then posted a notice
addressed to the members of USTFU announcing a general assembly and informed
them of the constitution on committee on elections to oversee the election.
Appellants then filed a separate petition directed against appellees and members of
the comelec. The petition alleged that the COMELEC was not constituted in
accordance with USTFU's constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been
issued to govern the conduct of the election. A TRO was then issued enjoining the
conducting of election. However, on Oct. 4 1996, in the general assembly, appellants
were elected as new set of officers. Appellees then filed for the nullification of the
election. Appellees alleged that the holding of the same violated the temporary
restraining order. Accusing appellants of usurpation, appellees characterized the
election as spurious for being violative of USTFU's CBL and that there was a
violation of 10-day notice rule and the supposed elections were conducted without a
COMELEC being constituted by the Board of Officers. Thereafter, Bitonio ruled that
election could not be legitimized by the recognition of the newly "elected" set of
officers by UST or by the alleged ratification of the new CBA by the gene
ral membership of the USTFU. He stated,
The privilege of determining who the union officers will be belongs exclusively to
the members of the union. Said privilege is exercised in an election proceeding in
accordance with the union's CBL and applicable la
w.
Issue: WON respondent Bitonio committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
recognize the officers "elected" during the October 4, 1996 general assembly. Held:
NO. Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Philippine
Constitution and the Labor Code. Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join,
affiliate with or assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a union member, an
employee must, as a rule, not only signify the intent to become one, but also take
some positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union membership is
usually embodied in the union's constitution and bylaws. An employee who
becomes a union member acquires the rights and the concomitant obligations that
go with this new status and becomes bound by the union's rules and regulations. A
union election is held pursuant to the union's constitution and bylaws, and the right
to vote in it is enjoyed only by union
members
. A union election should be distinguished from a
certification election, which is the process of determining, through secret ballot, the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit, for purposes of collective bargaining
. Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is to ascertain whether or not a
majority of the employees wish to be represented by a labor organization and, in the
affirmative case, by
which
particular labor organization. In both elections, there are procedures to be followed.
Thus, the October 4, 1996 election cannot properly be called a
union
election, because the procedure laid down in the USTFU's CBL for the election of
officers was not followed. It could not have been a certification election either,
because representation was not the issue, and the proper procedure for such
election was not followed. The participation of non-union members in the election
aggravated its irregularity

Ferrer vs. National Labor Relations CommissionG.R. No. 100898July 5, 1993Facts:
Petitioner Ferrer and other employees were regular and permanent employee of the
Occidental FoundryCorporation (OFC) in Malanday, Valenzuela, Metro Manila under
the management of Hui Kam Chang. They hadbeen in the employ of OFC for about
ten years at the time of their dismissal in 1989.On January 5, 1989 theSAMAHAN
and OFC entered into a CBA which would be effective for the period of 3 years.
Article 2 of the CBAprovides for a Union Security Clause. On May 16 1989, petitioner
Ferrer and the SAMAHAN, filed in theDepartment of Labor and Employment a
complaint for the expulsion of its officers headed by Genaro Capitle(President). The
complaint was founded on the ground that the officers alleged inattentiveness to the
economicdemands of the workers. However Ferrer and company withdrew their
petition. The petitioners also conductedan election of officers of the union. On
September 11, 1989 the union SAMAHAN expelled Ferrers group fromthe Union.
Ferrer and his group filed a complaint sent a letter to Federation of Democratic
Labor Unions (FEDLU)and volunteered to be admitted as members of the FEDLU
and requested that they be represented("katawanin") by said federation before the
DOLE in the complaint which they intended to file against the union(SAMAHAN), the
FFW and the company for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, and other benefits in
accordancewith law. Thereafter, on various dates, petitioners sent individual letters
to Hui Kam Chang professing innocenceof the charges leveled against them by the
SAMAHAN and the FFW and pleading that they be reinstated. Theirletters appear to
have elicited no response. Thus, contending that their dismissal was without cause
and in utterdisregard of their right to due process of law, petitioners through the
FEDLU, filed a complaint for illegaldismissal and unfair labor practice before the
Labor Arbiter against Hui Kam Chang, OFC, M.S. Velasco (asrepresentative of the
FFW), the FFW, and the SAMAHAN officers headed by Capitle. The Labor Arbiter
dismissedthe Petition and ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was an exercise
of legitimate managementprerogative which cannot be considered as an unfair labor
practice. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC. NLRCaffirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Hence this petition.
Issue:
WON termination of employment pursuant to union security clause is valid without
due process of laws.
Held:
NO.Dismissal under union security clause must be effected after prior notice and
hearing.In the case at bar, it is true that the CBA between OFC and the SAMAHAN
provided for the dismissal of employees who have not maintained their
membership in the union but the manner in which the dismissal wasenforced left
much to be desired in terms of respect for the right of petitioners to procedural due
process. Theunion has a specific provision for the permanent or temporary
"expulsion"

of its erring members in itsconstitution and by-laws ("saligang batas at alituntunin")
but no hearing ("pandinig") was ever conducted bythe SAMAHAN to explain their
side for the ousting Capile. The petitioners actions might have causeddivisiveness,
disloyalty to the union but still they should have the opportunity to explain their
grievance andside.What aggravated the situation in this case is the fact that OFC
itself took for granted that the SAMAHAN hadactually conducted an inquiry and
considered the CBA provision for the closed shop as self-operating that, uponreceipt
of a notice that some members of the SAMAHAN had failed to maintain their
membership in goodstanding in accordance with the CBA, it summarily dismissed
petitioners. To make matters worse, the laborarbiter and the NLRC shared the same
view in holding that "the matter or question, therefore, of determiningwhy and how
did complainants fail to retain Membership in good standing is not for the company
to inquire viaformal investigation."The need for the company investigation is
founded on the consistent ruling of this court that the twinrequirements of notice
and hearing which are essential elements of due process must be met in
employment-termination cases.The Decision appealed from is hereby set aside and
private respondents are hereby ordered to reinstatepetitioners to their former or
equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and with full back
wages,inclusive of allowances and other benefits.