December 2010 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure

Posted on January 17, 2011 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Posted in Criminal Law,
Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged alibi, conspiracy, damages, dangerous drugs,
evidence, information, mandamus, murder, rape, treachery
Here are selected December 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal
law and procedure:
CRIMINAL LAW
1. Revised Penal Code
Civil liability if death results. When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. In People vs. Tubongbanua, interest at the rate of 6%
was ordered to be applied on the award of damages. This rule would be subsequently applied by
the Supreme Court in several cases such as Mendoza vs. People, People vs. Buban, People vs.
Guevarra, and People vs. Regalario. The rule was likewise adopted in this case. Thus, interest of
6% per annum should be imposed on the award of civil indemnity and all damages, i.e., actual or
compensatory damages, moral damages and exemplary damages, from the date of finality of
judgment until fully paid. People of the Philippines vs. Jose Pepito Combate, G.R. No. 189301,
December 15, 2010.
Death of accused; criminal and civil liability extinguished. Death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. In this regard, Justice Regalado opined: [T]he death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. Dante
Datu y Hernandez vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 169718, December 13, 2010.
Death of accused; civil liability survives if separate civil action can be filed. Corollarily, the
claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, quasi-delicts. Where the civil liability
survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above. Dante Datu y Hernandez vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 169718,
December 13, 2010.
Death of accused; civil liability survives if separate civil action can be filed. Finally, the private
offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Dante Datu y
Hernandez vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 169718, December 13, 2010.
Murder; treachery. The Supreme Court agreed that treachery attended the commission of the
crime. The accused lulled the victim into believing that he was being pursued by
somebody. Believing in the tale being spun by the appellant, the victim even offered appellant
the security and protection of his house. However, accused reciprocated the victims trust and
hospitality by suddenly hacking him on the head and stabbing him on the waist. The settled rule
is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal, as long as the attack is sudden and
unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or to defend himself. What is decisive is
that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from an unarmed victim, made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. People of the Philippines vs.
Rodriguez Lucero y Paw-as alias Kikit, G.R. No. 17904, December 6, 2010.
Rape; damages. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages in favor of the victim is in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. However, in
addition, AAA is entitled to an award of exemplary damages. The qualifying circumstance that
appellant was the common-law spouse of AAAs mother was duly established during trial
although it was not properly alleged in the Information. Although appellant may not be
convicted of qualified rape, said circumstance however may be taken into account in the award
of exemplary damages. Jurisprudence dictates that exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 be further awarded to AAA. People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Awil Pojo,
G.R. No. 183709, December 6, 2010.
Rape; damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeal (CA) with regard
to the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded. The amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, despite the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant from death to
reclusion perpetua, was sustained by the Supreme Court. In People v. Victor, the Supreme Court
explained that the award does not depend upon the imposition of the death penalty; rather, it is
awarded based on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Supreme Court also found proper the CAs
ruling increasing the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Moral damages
are awarded without need of proof for mental, physical and psychological suffering undeniably
sustained by a rape victim because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral
injuries entitling her to such award. However, the Supreme Court increased the amount of
exemplary damages awarded from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter. The Supreme Court, in People v. Lorenzo Layco Sr., awarded
exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt
the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse. People of the Philippines vs. Gilbert
Castro y Aguilar, G.R. No. 188901, December 15, 2010.
Rape; penalty. The trial court correctly imposed upon him the penalty of death since a rape
committed while the victim was still under 18 years of age by an offender who is her parent
merits no less than the imposition of capital punishment under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code. It is clear from the birth certificate of AAA that she was only 14 years old when
she was ravished by the appellant, her biological father. In view, however, of the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the penalty of death, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, should be imposed. Thus, appellant was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole for each count of rape. People of the
Philippines vs. Felipe Nachor y Omayan, G.R. No. 177779, December 14, 2010.
Rape; penalty when victim is mentally challenged. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if
the crime of rape is committed when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional
disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime. The information in this case alleges that AAA is a mental retardate and such fact was
known to the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime. These allegations were duly
established by the prosecution during trial. The trial court which had the opportunity to observe
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses during the trial was convinced that indeed herein
accused had carnal knowledge of AAA, an 18-year-old woman with a weak mind that her mental
age was only that of a five and a half (5 ) year old child. Her abnormality as a retardate was
known to their neighborhood, including the accused, an immediate neighbor. With the enactment
of R.A. 9346 on June 24 2006, however, the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited.
Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the property penalty to be imposed on appellant is reclusion
perpetua. RA 9346 should be applied even if the crime was committed prior to the enactment of
the law in view of the principle in criminal law that favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. In
addition, appellant shall not be eligible for parole. Under Section 3 of RA 9346, persons
convicted with reclusion perpetua, or those whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of the Act, accused shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. People of the Philippines vs.
Gilbert Castro y Aguilar, G.R. No. 188901, December 15, 2010.
Rape; penalty when committed in the presence of parents. Under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, when rape is committed in full view of the parent, the penalty to be imposed is
death. Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution
was able to sufficiently prove the qualifying circumstance that the accused raped AAA in full
view of her mother. It is indisputable that when the accused raped AAA, he committed such act
in full view of BBB, AAAs mother. Hence, the RTC was correct in imposing upon the accused
the penalty of death as it found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
rape. However, although the crime of qualified rape is punishable by death under the Death
Penalty Law, Republic Act No. 9346, which took effect on June 24, 2006, prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty. Under this Act, the proper penalty to be imposed upon Flores in
lieu of the death penalty is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. People of the
Philippines vs. Montano Flores y Paras, G.R. No. 177355, December 15, 2010.
Rape; principles in review of judgments of conviction. In reviewing rape cases, the Court is
guided by the four well-established principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility; (2) it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (3) [considering] the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and, (4) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Thus, the
primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of the
private complainants testimony. People of the Philippines vs. Eminiano Barcela y Medina,
G.R. No. 179948, December 8, 2010.
Rape; proof of age of victim. The Supreme Court ruled that AAAs age was not proven with
certainty. For minority to be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape, it must
not only be alleged in the Information, but it must also be established with moral certainty.
People of the Philippines vs. Montano Flores y Paras, G.R. No. 177355, December 15, 2010.
Rape; proof of age of victim. Noting the divergent rulings on the proof required to establish the
age of the victim in rape cases, People vs. Pruna set out the following guidelines in appreciating
age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance: (A) The best evidence to
prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party. (B) In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age. (C) If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have
been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances: [i] if the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old; [ii] if the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; [iii] if the victim is alleged to
be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. (D)
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims
mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. (E) It is the prosecution that has
the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. People of the Philippines vs.
Montano Flores y Paras, G.R. No. 177355, December 15, 2010.
Rape; proof of age of victim. In the case at bar, not only did the prosecution fail to present
AAAs birth certificate, but BBB, the victims mother herself, gave contradictory statements on
the true age of her daughter. At one time she said that AAA was 13 years old, and yet when
asked about the year of AAAs birthday, she declared that it was 1982. AAA herself did not
know the exact year she was born. The Certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
General Luna, Quezon that both parties offered as evidence of AAAs age has no probative value
because it was not a certification as to the true age of AAA but as to the fact that the records of
birth filed in their archives included those registered from 1930 up to the time the certificate was
requested, and that records for the period of 1930 June 23, 1994 were razed by fire. People of
the Philippines vs. Montano Flores y Paras, G.R. No. 177355, December 15, 2010.
2. Special Laws
BP 33. A single underfilling constitutes an offense under BP 33, as amended by PD 1865, which
clearly criminalizes these offenses. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading,
adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general
description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the DOE Circular No.
2000-06-010 merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated,
namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight
markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number,
no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG
cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These
specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to
curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants. The Court made it clear that a
violation, like underfilling, on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase of any act as mandated
under Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended. Ineluctably, the underfilling of one LPG cylinder constitutes
a clear violation of BP 33, as amended. The finding of underfilling by LPG Inspector Navio of
the LPGIA, as aptly noted by Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Catalo who conducted the
preliminary investigation, was indeed not controverted by petitioners. Arnel U. Ty, et al vs.
National Bureau of Investigation Supervising Agent Marvin E. De Jemil,et al, G.R. No. 182147,
December 15, 2010.
Dangerous Drugs; proof of sale of illegal drugs. To successfully prosecute an accused for selling
illegal drugs, the prosecution has to prove: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.
People of the Philippines vs. Efren Ditona y Montefalcon, et al, G.R. No. 189841, December 15,
2010.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Evidence; alibi. Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi. To establish alibi, the
accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. In this case, accused Webb supported his alibi
by presenting documentary and testimonial evidence showing that he was in the U.S. at the time
of the perpetration of the crime, i.e., among others, his travel preparation to the U.S., details of
his U.S. sojourn, and several immigration records. The courts below held that, despite his
evidence, Webb was actually in Paraaque when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in
the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he
actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the
Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of
the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this
ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only acceptable
alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm. If one is
cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his fathers
connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his
passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since
there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a
foreign airlines passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the
U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigrations record
system those two dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly
departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return
there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these questions. Antonio
Lejano vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al,
G.R. No. 176389/G.R. No. 176864, December 14, 2010.
Evidence; alibi. The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the
accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of
departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for
Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit
the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26,
1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve
to fourteen hours. If the Supreme Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it
might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or
speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the
presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption
can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence
to impeach the entries in Webbs passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.
immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The prosecutions rebuttal
evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower courts minds. Antonio Lejano vs.
People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al, G.R. No.
176389/G.R. No. 176864. December 14, 2010.
Evidence; conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all accused acted in
concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it was shown by such acts that they had
the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently
established. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the records clearly prove that there was
conspiracy in the commission of the crime. The initial hacking by the accused followed by the
multiple stabbing by his co-accused proves that they acted in concert at the time of the brutal
killing. The fact that each one of them carried a deadly bladed weapon shows that they acted
pursuant to the singular purpose of killing the victim. It is not important who delivered the fatal
blow. In conspiracy, it matters not who among the accused actually killed the victim. The act of
one is the act of all. Each of the accused is equally guilty of the crime committed. People of the
Philippines vs. Alex Lingasa, et al, G.R. No. 192187, December 15, 2010.
Evidence; corpus delicti in drug cases. To successfully prosecute an accused for selling and/or
possession of illegal drugs, the State has to prove as well the corpus delicti, the body of the
crime. It must be shown that the suspected substance the police officers seized from the accused
is the same thing presented in court during the trial. Thus, the chain of custody rule is essential
to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring
and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic
chemist, and finally to the court. The witnesses should be able to describe these movements to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and that no one who did not
belong in the chain had access to the same. People of the Philippines vs. Efren Ditona y
Montefalcon, et al, G.R. No. 189841, December 15, 2010.
Evidence; credibility of testimony. The Supreme Court ruled that Jessica Alfaros testimony as
eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying accused Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is not entitled to belief.
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people
will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.
First, in her (Alfaros) desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart,
who were supposed to be Webbs co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that
Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice,
they (including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his
proposal. But when they got to Carmelas house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro
entered the house. Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around
Alfaros car, which was parked on the street between Carmelas house and the next. Some of
these men sat on top of the cars lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street
light to anyone who cared to watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking
party in a nearby house. Obviously, the behavior of Webbs companions out on the street did not
figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.
Second, Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and
his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webbs messenger,
using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated
Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his friends? They were practically strangers
to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to
gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as
a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she was not yet an
asset then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just
followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a
drug-free mind can?
Third, when Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that
she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro
returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to
Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmelas
boyfriend. Alfaros trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense
since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for
Webb to freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.
Fourth, according to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmelas house the third time around
midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left
open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gangleader who decided what they were going to
do. He decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmelas house and gang-rape
her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no
role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no
sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did
not see.
Fifth, Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman
exclaimed, Sino yan? On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went
to her car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than
Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked
away because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was
supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business. But if that
were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the
house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So
that is what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on
the floor of the masters bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and her
young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got
scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave
her a meaningful look. Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to
them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she
testified that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela,
was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a
witness who was confused with her own lies. Antonio Lejano vs. People of the
Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al, G.R. No. 176389/G.R.
No. 176864, December 14, 2010.
Evidence; credibility of witness. Truth-telling witnesses are not expected to give flawless
testimonies, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. The Court has
stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of witnesses do not detract from
their essential credibility as long as their testimonies on the whole are coherent and intrinsically
believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not
been rehearsed. Instead, they may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any
suspicion that their testimonies have been fabricated or rehearsed. People of the Philippines vs.
Alex Lingasa, et al, G.R. No. 192187, December 15, 2010.
Evidence; credibility of witness. Etched in Philippine jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim
of a savage crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of
every lurid detail of a frightening experience a verity born out of human nature and
experience. This is especially true with a rape victim who is required to utilize every fiber of her
body and mind to repel an attack from a stronger aggressor. It is only human for AAA to not be
able to readily narrate the exact details of her experience when questioned. People of the
Philippines vs. Rene Celocelo, G.R. No. 173798, December 15, 2010.
Evidence; credibility of witness. The Supreme Court has in the past observed that it would not
really be unusual for one to recollect a good number of things about an eventful incident but
what should be strange is when one can put to mind everything. This error cannot impair the
credibility of AAA especially since first, the imputed inconsistency or incredible testimony was
later explained and clarified by no less than the RTC itself, and second, the RTC, who was in the
best position to determine if AAA were indeed credible, believed her to be so. The Supreme
Court once again reiterate the time-honored maxim that the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect. People of the Philippines vs. Rene
Celocelo, G.R. No. 173798, December 15, 2010.
Evidence; failure to present DNA evidence. Accused Webb filed a motion before the Supreme
Court asking his outright acquittal given the governments failure to produce the semen
specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would
prove his innocence. In his motion, Webb cited the case of Brady vs. Maryland, contending that
he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the
States failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the
semen specimen taken from Carmela. The Supreme Court ruled that Webb is not entitled to
acquittal solely for the reason that the State failed to produce the semen specimen at this late
stage of the proceedings. For one thing, the ruling in Brady vs. Maryland that he cited has long
been overtaken by the decision in Arizona vs. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held
that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be
useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or
the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the
specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test. For, another, when
Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did
not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet
recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure
even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither
Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
accused. They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error
committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a
motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their
appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such
test. Considering the accuseds lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be
deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at
some future time. Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs.
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al, G.R. No. 176389/G.R. No. 176864, December 14, 2010.
Evidence; inadmissibility. Acting on a tip from a concerned citizen that a pot session was being
conducted in the house of one of the accused, the police officers raided the house and arrested
the accused herein. However, the Court acquitted the accused on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt, one of the principal reasons being that the evidence against the
accused were inadmissible as they proceeded from an illegal warrantless arrest. The Supreme
Court ruled a warrantless arrest based solely on an informers tips is insufficient to support
probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest since the instant case did not involve a buy-bust
operation or drugs in transit. The apprehending officers should have first conducted a
surveillance considering that the identity and address of one of the accused were already
ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause,
then a search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. It has been
held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. The arrest
being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the
occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of
a poisonous tree and should be excluded. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
thus inadmissible. The drug, being the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the
accused. People of the Philippines vs. Arnold Martinez y Angeles, et al, G.R. No. 191366,
December 13, 2010.
Evidence; inconsistency of testimony with physical evidence. The Supreme Court did not give
much weight to the alleged inconsistency between the physical evidence and AAAs version of
the rape incident. The Supreme Court noted that Dr. Edao was able to examine AAA only on
December 10, 2001, two days after the rape. During cross-examination, Dr. Edao explained
that the two old lacerations she found on AAAs vagina could have happened several weeks or
days before the examination. Hence, the old lacerations could still have been caused by and is
not irreconcilably inconsistent with the rape of AAA two days earlier. As the Court of Appeals
observed, the improbabilities or inconsistencies cited by accused-appellant refer to minor details
that do not directly pertain to the elements of the crime of rape or to the identification of
accused-appellant as the rapist; and do not detract from the proven fact that accused-appellant
had sexual intercourse with AAA through force, intimidation, and grave abuse of authority.
People of the Philippines vs. Andres Fontillas alias Anding, G.R. No. 184177, December 15,
2010.
Evidence; use of evidence obtained through a search warrant in another. The Rules of Court
provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. Thus, a
search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicants personal knowledge and his or
her witnesses. Accordingly, petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of
the search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified
Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident. Romer Sy Tan vs. Sy Tiongs, et al,
G.R. No. 174570, December 15, 2010.
Information, motion to quash. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy
were rendered incomplete after respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the trial
court believed would negate the allegation in the Information that there was a first valid
marriage, i.e., the respondent presented proof that he later obtained a judicial declaration of
nullity of the first union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage. According to the
Court, the motion to quash filed by respondent was a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged
in the Information for which reason, thus the trial court cannot consider allegations contrary to
those appearing on the face of the information. The documents showing that: (1) the court has
decreed that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void from the beginning; and
(2) such judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact
contrary to that alleged in the Information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time
the respondent contracted a subsequent marriage. These should not have been considered at all
because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. Myrna P. Antone vs. Leo
Beronillar, G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010.
Judgment; when rendered by judge other than the original trial court judge. Accused contends
further that the judge who penned the appealed decision is different from the judge who heard
the testimonies of the witnesses and was, thus, in no position to render a judgment, as he did not
observe firsthand their demeanor during trial. The Supreme Court did not agree ruling that the
fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case, does not
render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support
its conclusion. The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who
heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a
cursory perusal of the Decision would show that it was based on the evidence presented during
trial and that it was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as
questions from the Court carefully passed upon. Further, the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial were extant and complete. Hence, there was no impediment for the judge to
decide the case. People of the Philippines vs. Ricky Alfredo y Norman, G.R. No. 188560,
December 15, 2010.
Mandamus; filing of information. The Rules provided that mandamus will lie if (1) any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; or unlawfull excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled; and (2) there is no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
mandamus being invoked. In the present case, petitioners insist that mandamus is proper since
Villordon committed grave abuse of discretion by unreasonably refusing to file an information
despite the fact that the evidence indicates otherwise. The Supreme Court disagreed with
petitioners. The matter of deciding who to prosecute is a prerogative of the prosecutor. In Hipos
v. Judge Bay, the Supreme Court held that the remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ,
lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Mandamus
will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon
him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act,
because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. The only time the
discretion of the prosecutor will stand review by mandamus is when the prosecutor gravely
abuses his discretion. Ernesto Marcelo, Jr. and Lauro Llames vs. Rafael R. Villordon, Assistant
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, G.R. No. 173081, December 15, 2010.