PH-C-1_W-May05 C-1 Bookstore 7/8/14 3:51 PM Page 1

SPECIAL ISSUE
02313

PEARL HARBOR
THE JAPANESE

WAY OF WAR

SCOUT SQUADRON 6
PEARL HARBOR

Pearl Harbors
Little-Known

70th Anniversary

Heroes

USS UTAH S
FINAL MINUTES
COMBAT & CAPTURE ON

Wake Island
CAUGHT ON THE
GROUND

Onslaught in the

Philippines

DECEMBER 7, 1
941:

DAY OF
INFAMY!

PH-ToC_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 7/8/14 3:53 PM Page 2

CONTENTS

PEARL HARBOR
FEATURES
16 The Road to War
Tensions between the United States and Japan had been escalating for years
and eventually erupted into war with the attack on Pearl Harbor.
John Wukovits

26 Sunday Morning Shattered

Japanese planes attacked Pearl Harbor and other installations on the island
of Oahu and plunged the United States into World War II. Michael E. Haskew

38 Pearl Harbor Paradox

The target ship USS Utah, a memorial to the dead of December 7, 1941, exists
in relative obscurity. Richard Klobuchar

44 Scout Squadron at Pearl Harbor

DEPARTMENTS
04 Editorial
Pearl Harbor and World War II changed the life of Mitsuo Fuchida
in a remarkable way. Michael E. Haskew

06 Profile: Yamamoto
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto led the Imperial Japanese Navy to
war with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Michael Hull

On the morning of December 7, 1941, a flight of 18 dive-bombers from

the carrier USS Enterprise flew straight into the Japanese attack.
Richard L. Hayes

50 Caught on the Ground

U.S. forces in the Phillippines felt the brunt of Japanese military might
on December 8, 1941. Sam McGowan

58 Pearl Harbor: A Reassessment of

the Japanese Way of War
Presaging Pearl Harbor. Steven Weingartner

08 Profile: Nimitz

66 A Magnitude Never Imagined

A superb organizer, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was the architect

of naval victory in the Pacific. Michael Hull

The salvage operations that followed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
were an epic of skill, bravery, and ingenuity. Mike McLaughlin

10 Profile: Layton

76 Heroic Defense of Hong Kong

Intelligence officer Edwin T. Layton had Nimitzs ear, and guided

the way across the Pacific. Mike McLaughlin

A diverse assemblage of British, Canadian, Scottish, and Indian

troops made the Japanese pay dearly for the crown colonys
capture. David H. Lippman

14 Insight
Three trapped sailors perished at the end of a mighty struggle
to stay alive after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Don Haines

COVER: The battleships U.S.S. West Virginia (foreground) and

U.S.S. Tennessee burn after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
INSET: A Japanese plane flies over Oahu during the attack.

94 The Fight for Wake

In the opening days of the war, the heroic defense of a Pacific island gave
America hope. John Wukovits

Pearl Harbor (ISSN 1524-8666) is published by Sovereign Media, 6731 Whittier Avenue, Suite A-100, McLean, VA 22101-4554.
(703) 964-0361. Pearl Harbor, Volume 1, Number 1 2014 by Sovereign Media Company, Inc., all rights reserved. Copyrights to
stories and illustrations are the property of their creators. The contents of this publication may not be reproduced in whole or in
part without consent of the copyright owner.

PH-ToC_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 7/8/14 3:56 PM Page 3

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PH-Editorial_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 7/8/14 3:58 PM Page 4

EDITORIAL
Pearl Harbor and World War II changed the life
of Mitsuo Fuchida in a remarkable way.
When Lt. Cmdr. Mitsuo Fuchida led the air
assault on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
he did so out of a sense of duty to the Emperor
and to his country. It was the most thrilling
exploit of my career, he remembered.
In February 1942, Fuchida led a destructive
air attack against the harbor at Darwin, Australia, and in April he was again at the head of
a Japanese raid that struck British naval facilities on the island of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in
the Indian Ocean. As the decisive Battle of Midway unfolded in June, he was suffering from
appendicitis and unable to fly or fully participate in the planning of the Japanese offensive
to capture the strategically vital atoll just 1,100
miles from Hawaii.
During the catastrophic Midway defeat, four
Japanese aircraft carriers, all veterans of the
attack on Pearl Harbor, were sunk. Fuchida
escaped with his life as the flagship Akagi was
consumed by flames. Standing on the bridge,
he was among a group of officers whose avenue
of escape was blocked by a wall of fire.
Wracked with pain from his recent surgery,
Fuchida was among several who were compelled to climb down from the inferno by rope.
As he made slow, deliberate progress, an explosion tore his grip from the rope. He plummeted
to the deck below, shattering both his ankles.
The recuperation period was long and arduous. When he had sufficiently recovered,

Fuchida spent the remainder of World War II as

a staff officer. The day before the first atomic
bomb was dropped, he was in Hiroshima
attending a conference but a telephone call
from Tokyo required his immediate return to
the capital. The day after the Hiroshima bombing, he was back in that city to assess the
destruction at the request of the government.
Remarkably, every member of the delegation
that entered Hiroshima after the bomb had
been dropped later died of radiation poisoning
with the exception of Fuchida, who developed
no symptoms.
During the protracted postwar Japanese war
crimes trials, Fuchida was called to testify on
several occasions but was never charged with
any wrongdoing. By 1947, as Japanese prisoners of war were returning home from camps,
he was surprised to encounter Kazuo Kanegasaki, who had previously served as his flight
engineer. Fuchida was shocked to learn that
Japanese prisoners had not been tortured and
had actually been treated humanely by their
captors. He was overwhelmed to hear that a
young woman had been particularly caring
even though her parents, Christian missionaries, had been killed by Japanese troops in the
Philippines.
For Fuchida, the concept of kindness such as
this was illogical. It was a direct contravention
of the Bushido Code, by which Japanese war-

riors had lived for centuries. At a railroad station in Tokyo during the autumn of 1948,
Fuchida was given a pamphlet on the life of
Jacob DeShazer, one of the airmen who had
participated in the historic air raid on Tokyo in
April 1942 that was led by Lt. Col. Jimmy
Doolittle. The pamphlet told of DeShazers capture, imprisonment, and torture, as well as his
awakening as a Christian.
The story of his former squadron mate and
the chance encounter in the railroad station
convinced Fuchida that he should become a
Christian. For the next quarter century, until
his death in 1976, he worked as an evangelist.
In 1952, he coauthored a book on the Battle
of Midway from the Japanese perspective.
Two years later, he toured the United States
with the Worldwide Christian Missionary
Army of Sky Pilots, and in 1954 he wrote an
account of the Pearl Harbor attack for
Readers Digest. He traveled and preached
extensively in Asia.
Fuchida also told his remarkable story in the
book From Pearl Harbor to Calvary. In 1970
he wrote, I would give anything to retract my
actions of 29 years ago at Pearl Harbor, but it
is impossible. Instead, I now work at striking
the death-blow to the basic hatred which infests
the human heart and causes such tragedies.
Such a transformation is remarkable indeed.
Michael E. Haskew

PEARL HARBOR
Carl A. Gnam, Jr.

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PH-70th Yamamoto_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:00 PM Page 6

PROFILE

BY MICHAEL HULL

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto led the Imperial Japanese Navy

to war with the attack on Pearl Harbor.
COURAGEOUS, URBANE, AND COMPLEX,
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was Japans greatest naval strategist and the architect of one of
the most stunning achievements in the history
of war.
Fluent in English, he studied in the United
States and claimed many American friends. A
solid and respected man, he argued passionately for peace as fascism spread in Europe and
as the militarists in Tokyo called for aggressive
expansion. Yet, he was a patriot to the bone,
and when ordered to fight, waged war with a
vengeance.
But, initially, he was uneasy, and warned his
countrymen. Having studied briefly at Harvard
University and spent two years in Washington
as a naval attach, he both admired America
and was aware of its potential military strength.
Japan cannot beat America, he told a
group of Japanese school children in 1940.
Therefore, Japan should not fight America.
Yamamoto played no part in the militarists
decision for war; indeed, he was sent to sea to

put him out of range of would-be assassins

who regarded his antiwar views as unpatriotic. But, when the decision was made, he was
adamant on one point: the only course open
to Japan was to destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet
at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
When the Navy General Staff unanimously
opposed his plan, Yamamoto said, The U.S.
Fleet is a dagger pointed at our throat.
Should war be declared, the length and breadth
of our southern operations would be exposed
to serious threat on its flank. Only when the
commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet
threatened to resign and retire if his plan was
not approved did the Japanese General Staff
concede. If he has that much confidence, it is
better to let Yamamoto go ahead, said the
Navy chief of staff.
Believing that a preemptive strike to cripple
the U.S. Navy from the start was Japans only
hope against such a powerful opponent,
Admiral Yamamoto started planning the operation against Pearl Harbor early in 1940. He

U.S. Navy

A Japanese Zero fighter

aboard Akagi, photographed
prior to the attack on Pearl
Harbor.

PEARL HARBOR

was not optimistic. If you tell me that it is

necessary that we fight, he told the bellicose
high command in Tokyo in September 1940,
then in the first six months to a year of war
against the United States and England, I will
run wild, and I will show you an uninterrupted succession of victories; but I must tell
you that, should the war be prolonged for two
or three years, I have no confidence in our ultimate victory.
Inspired by the stunning carrier-based attack
on the Italian Fleet at Taranto on November
11, 1940, by Swordfish torpedo bombers of the
British Royal Navys Fleet Air Arm,
Yamamotos attack on December 7, 1941, executed by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumos strike
force, achieved strategic and tactical surprise. It
caught Admiral Husband E. Kimmels
anchored U.S. Pacific Fleet napping and thrust
America into World War II. The Combined
Fleet commanders final message to his carrier
crews and pilots echoed the rallying cry of the
commander of the victorious Japanese fleet at
the Battle of Tsushima against Russia 36 years
before: The rise or fall of our empire now
hinges on this battle.
Two waves of torpedo bombers, dive
bombers, high-altitude bombers, and fighters
from the carriers Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga, Shokaku,
Soryu, and Zuikaku swept in over Oahu and
sank the battleship USS Arizona, capsized the
Oklahoma, heavily damaged the California,
West Virginia, and Nevada, and damaged the
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Tennessee. A
total of 2,403 American servicemen were killed
and 1,178 wounded.
The attack electrified the Japanese people,
Yamamotos reputation soared, and he was,
indeed, free to run wild for several
months, with powerful Japanese fleets supporting thrusts against Hong Kong, Singapore, Guam, Wake Island, British Malaya,
the Dutch East Indies, the Solomon and
Philippine Islands, and New Guinea. But the
admirals doubts about the wisdom of his
empires strategy persisted. After the Pearl
Harbor attack, he confided, I fear all we
have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and

PH-70th Yamamoto_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:01 PM Page 7

U.S. Navy

fill him with a terrible resolve.

Born on April 4, 1884, Isoroku Yamamoto
(the name means base of the mountain) was
the seventh child of a cultured but impoverished primary school headmaster of the samurai class in Nagaoka on the bleak, isolated west
coast of Japans main island. He grew up in a
little wooden house, where rice was scarce and
life hard. Little Isoroku secured part of his early
education from Christian missionaries,
although he never became a Christian. A slender lad with a protruding lower lip and
thoughtful expression, he was often ill. He usually suffered from influenza during the harsh
Nagaoka winters.
He read the Bible, was exposed to English,
and gained an appreciation of things English
and American. Isoroku became a great admirer
of President Abraham Lincoln, mastered the art
of calligraphy, and would write poetry throughout his life. He and his family and friends took
box lunches to the playing fields around his
school and watched baseball games. The American national pastime was then becoming a
favorite Japanese sport. But Isorokus great love
was gymnastics, in which he excelled and
gained physical strength. In later years, he could
not resist showing off by doing headstands on
the rail of a ship or boat.
He referred to himself later in life as a country boy who became just a common sailor.
But he was actually far from common. He
stood second out of 300 applicants when he
entered the Japanese Naval Academy at the age
of 16, and graduated as seventh in his class
four years later. Through a process similar to
adoption, he was provided the opportunity to
attend the academy by a naval family wishing
to keep its tradition alive (his original surname
was Takano).
The young ensign went to sea with the Imperial Fleet and did not have to wait long for his
baptism of fire. As a gunnery officer, he served
aboard the cruiser Nisshin, which covered the
flagship of Admiral Heihachiro Togo in the
destruction of the Russian Baltic Fleet in the
Strait of Tsushima, between Japan and Korea,
on May 26, 1905. In the final action of the first
and last great fleet encounter of the ironclad
era, Ensign Yamamoto was wounded by shrapnel. His body was peppered by shell fragments,
and he lost an orange-sized chunk of his thigh
and two fingers from his left hand.
Soon after his wounds were healed,
Yamamoto went back to a gunnery school,

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto conceived the attack on

Pearl Harbor and believed the success of the undertaking would provide the only chance for a Japanese victory over the U.S. in World War II.

was promoted to commander, and served at

the Imperial Naval Headquarters in Tokyo.
His career moved into high gear when he was
appointed to the Naval Staff College in 1913.
After a brief courtship, Yamamoto married a
sturdy but pretty housemaid named Reiko in
August 1918. They would have two sons and
two daughters.
The couple had no sooner set up housekeeping than they were separated. Posted to
America for study at Harvard University,
Yamamoto sailed in April 1919 and adapted
smoothly to life in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Along with 70 of his fellow countrymen, he
studied economics and petroleum sources. He
was such a hardworking student that several
oil companies offered him jobs. He also developed a lively interest in naval aviation that was
to stand him in good stead.
Back in Japan, Yamamoto headed a new air
training base before being sent to Washington
as a naval attach for two years. He was a delegate to the London Naval Conference in 19291930, took command of the 1st Air Fleet in
1930, and was promoted to rear admiral in
charge of the Imperial Navys technical service.
Having learned to fly while a captain, he vigorously championed naval aviation, aware that
someday airplanes would relegate battleships
to a secondary role.
As the chief Japanese delegation at the 19341936 London Naval Conference, Yamamoto
forced the termination of a treaty that kept
Japans battleship fleet inferior to those of Great
Britain and America by a ratio of 5:5:3. He

returned home a national hero, became vice

minister of the Navy, and lobbied for the construction of aircraft carriers, whose key role he
had foreseen, as did the British, as early as
1915. He fought a program to build two gigantic battleships. These battleships will be as useful to Japan in modern warfare as a samurai
sword, he said. The carriers Akagi and Kaga,
already in service, were joined by faster and
more modern vessels, and long-range flying
boats and the formidable Zero fighter were
developed.
The Pearl Harbor attack made Yamamoto an
overnight hero, but, as he had predicted, the
euphoria was short-lived. Only six months
later, after the Doolittle Raid and the Battle of
the Coral Sea, in which both the American and
Japanese fleets took heavy losses, Yamamoto
suffered the first major Japanese naval defeat
since the 16th century. At Midway on June 46, 1942, the overconfident Japanese fleet was
outmaneuvered, lost four carriers, and was
forced to withdraw. Yamamoto had conceived
a sound strategy, but he failed to muster all
available force for the main effort, was not
positioned to control the action, and was careless about deploying reconnaissance and
screening forces.
The Nelson of Japan never recovered from
the shock of defeat, though he continued to
command fleet movements in the Solomons
campaign. But the Japanese fleet had suffered
great losses in pilots and aircraft which it would
never make good. Yamamotos last plan was
for a massive naval air counterstrike, codenamed I-Go, designed to smash Allied advances
in the Pacific in the spring of 1943.
The end came for Admiral Yamamoto in
April 1943, when U.S. Navy codebreakers
learned that he planned an inspection tour in
the western Solomons. Sixteen P-38 Lightning
fighters from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal
were waiting on April 18 when two Mitsubishi
Betty bombers carrying Yamamoto and his
staff approached Kahili. The two enemy planes
were shot down, and Yamamoto was killed.
The admirals ashes was recovered from
dense jungle and sent back to Japan aboard the
destroyer Yugumo. In Tokyo, Emperor Hirohito awarded Yamamoto the Grand Order of
the Chrysanthemum, first class, and promoted
him posthumously to fleet admiral. A state
funeral followed. German fhrer Adolf Hitler
made Yamamoto the only foreign recipient of
the Knights Cross with Swords.
70TH ANNIVERSARY

PH-70th Nimitz_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:02 PM Page 8

PROFILE

BY MICHAEL HULL

A superb organizer, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was the

architect of naval victory in the Pacific.
KEYNOTING THE COMMISSIONING OF
the 81,600-ton fleet aircraft carrier USS Nimitz
on May 3, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford
quoted the distinguished Professor E.B. Potter of
the U.S. Naval Academy.
He surrounded himself with the ablest men
he could find, and sought their advice, but he
made his own decisions. He was a keen strategist who never forgot that he was dealing with
human beings, on both sides of the conflict. He
was aggressive in war without hate, audacious
while never failing to weigh the risks.
The man in question, and for whom Americas second nuclear-powered carrier was
named, was Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz,
who had the biggest job in American naval history. He led the massive Pacific Fleet in World
War II and commanded thousands of ships
and aircraft and millions of men. He wielded
more military power than all commanders in
previous wars. The far-flung operations he
directed and, to a large extent, planned led to

the defeat of the Japanese empire.

Tall and vigorous, with a ruddy complexion,
silver hair, and piercing blue eyes, Nimitz was a
fighting, innovative admiral who became one of
the most widely respected figures in naval history. He shunned publicity, yet his inspired, softspoken leadership in 1941-1945 assured him a
niche in the pantheon of American heroes.
Chester William Nimitz was born on February 24, 1885, in Fredericksburg, Texas, the son
and grandson of settlers, two of whom had
been seafarers. Despite growing up fascinated
by tall tales of the sea, young Chester knew
many Army officers and set his sights on West
Point. But no appointment was available, so he
went to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis.
He graduated seventh in a class of 144 in 1905.
The young man was sent to the Philippines
and was commissioned an ensign in 1907 while
serving a tour of duty on the China station.
After commanding an old Spanish gunboat, the
Panay, he was put in command of the destroyer

USS Decatur at the age of 20. Nimitz was a

promising officer, but his experience aboard the
Decatur almost proved the undoing of his
career. On the dark evening of July 7, 1908, the
vessel went aground on a mud bank in the
poorly charted Batangas Bay in the Philippines.
A stunned Nimitz was court-martialed, but
because of the circumstances and his fine record
he was let off with a reprimand. He never forgot this, and in later years was lenient toward
subordinates who made one mistake.
In 1909, Nimitz was assigned to the Submarine Service. It was much to his distaste, but he
applied himself with energy and diligence. He
commanded the USS Plunger and other boats
and became the Navys leading authority on
undersea vessels. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1910, took the bridge of the USS Skipjack in 1912, and was given command of the
Atlantic Submarine Flotilla that year. The following year, the bilingual officer was sent to
Germany and Belgium to study advances in

U.S. Navy

A B-25 bomber takes off from the deck of the USS Hornet. The daring raid on
Tokyo by 16 B-25s electrified the world and made the strike leader, Lt. Col.
Jimmy Doolittle, a national hero. Scarcely four months after the disaster at
Pearl Harbor, U.S. planes bombed the Japanese capital.

PEARL HARBOR

PH-70th Nimitz_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:02 PM Page 9

U.S. Navy

diesel engines. After returning home, Nimitz

was largely responsible for the installation of
the new power plants in the U.S. Navys dangerous and noxious pig boats.
Nimitz was promoted to lieutenant commander in 1916, and during World War I he
served as chief of staff of the Atlantic Fleets submarine division. Promoted to commander in
1921, he studied at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island, and joined the staffs of
the Battle Fleet and the U.S. Fleet. Assigned to
the University of California from 1926-1929,
Nimitz pioneered a training division that
evolved into the Naval ROTC program. He
also introduced the concept of underway
replenishment that was to revolutionize operations at sea. Promoted to captain in 1927, he
commanded Submarine Division 20 for two
years, headed the San Diego destroyer base,
skippered the cruiser USS Augusta in 19331935, and served as assistant chief of the
Bureau of Navigation in 1935-1938.
The up-and-coming Texan was promoted to
rear admiral in 1938, commanded cruiser and
battleship divisions for a year, and was made
chief of the Bureau of Navigation in June 1939.
Then came World War II.
On December 16, 1941, shortly after the
Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, Nimitz
was notified by Navy Secretary Frank Knox
that he was to take over immediately as commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, replacing
Vice Adm. William S. Pye, who had stood in
for the disgraced Admiral Husband E. Kimmel.
Im the new commander-in-chief, a distressed
Nimitz told his wife Catherine. Youve wanted
this all your life, she reminded him. But,
sweetheart, he protested, all the ships are at
the bottom.
Delayed by bad weather, Nimitznow a 56year-old vice admiralarrived aboard a PBY
Catalina flying boat at Pearl Harbor on Christmas morning to learn that Wake Island had just
fallen. As a whaleboat carried him across the
harbor to the dock, he watched small craft
moving about searching for the bodies of
sailors. Corpses still rose to the surface from
the sunken battleships.
He took over as CINCPAC, with four stars,
on December 31. Disregarding the advice of
Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S. Fleet commander,
that he ought to rid Pearl Harbor of pessimists
and defeatists, Nimitz took only a flag secretary to Hawaii. Asking most of the old Pacific
Fleet staff to serve under him, he gave his

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz assumed command of

a Pacific Fleet in shambles and led the U.S. Navy to
victory in the war with Japan.

demoralized subordinates a new lease on life

and set about swiftly to rebuild the shattered
Pacific Fleet.
Early in 1942, Admiral Nimitz was established as commander of all Allied land, sea, and
air forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas, with the
north and central subareas under his direct
command. The south was under the command
of Admiral Robert L. Ghormley and later
Admiral William F. Bull Halsey. Nimitz
shared overall responsibility with Army General Douglas MacArthur, commanding the
Southwest Pacific Theater.
An outstanding strategist, Nimitz was
responsible for bringing the Pacific Fleet from
its weak and dejected situation after the Pearl
Harbor attack to a position of initiative and
offense within the first year of the war in the
Far East. He was a link and buffer between the
imperious, caustic Admiral King and his own
subordinates, strong-willed men like Bull
Halsey, Admiral Richmond Kelly Terrible
Turner, Marine Major General Holland C.
Howlin Mad Smith, and Admiral Frank
Black Jack Fletcher. Nimitz quietly and
patiently molded them into one of the most
effective fighting teams in history.
Ordered by King to launch carrier raids
soon after assuming command, Nimitz
directed Halsey to take a task force built
around the USS Enterprise to hit the Marshall
Islands, while Fletcher, aboard the USS Yorktown, attacked the nearby Gilbert Islands.
Although the strikes caused minimal damage,

they were a valuable start. Nimitz furnished a

series of nasty surprises for the Japanese, starting with the famous Doolittle raid on Tokyo,
which was launched from the USS Hornet in
April 1942.
Through such subordinates as Halsey,
Turner, Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, Admiral
Raymond A. Spruance, and Admiral Marc A.
Mitscher, Nimitz, a great believer in amphibious operations as a way to attack Japanese
positions by leapfrogging beyond the main
enemy lines, directed several campaigns as the
Pacific Fleet gathered strength after the epic
Battle of Midway on June 4-6, 1942. Halsey
moved up the Solomon Islands chain in support of MacArthurs troops, while Central
Pacific forces took Tarawa and Makin in the
Gilberts in November 1943. Then followed the
crucial actions at Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Saipan,
Guam, Tinian, the Philippine Sea, the Palaus,
Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.
Headquartered in Pearl Harbor with a small
staff, Admiral Nimitz frequently visited forward positions, initially Guadalcanal and Midway, and met every other month with King. He
worked hard to improve relations with the
autocratic MacArthur and to smooth ArmyNavy disagreements over strategy. He was promoted to the newly created five-star rank of
admiral of the fleet in December 1944. The war
ended for Nimitz when he signed the Japanese
surrender documents on behalf of the United
States aboard his flagship, the battleship USS
Missouri, on September 2, 1945.
Nimitz succeeded King as U.S. Fleet commander on December 15 that year, served as
special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy,
and retired in December 1947. Two years later,
he was chosen to supervise the United Nations
plebiscite in Kashmir. In 1952, Nimitz resigned
from the United Nations and became a regent at
the University of California at Berkeley. He and
his wife lived quietly there until the summer of
1963, when they moved to Navy quarters near
San Francisco. After a severe fall, the admirals
health deteriorated, and he died on February 20,
1966. He was buried under a regulation headstone in the Golden Gate National Cemetery.
The self-effacing Admiral Nimitz, who had
resisted becoming good copy for war correspondents, wrote no memoirs, but he collected
his papers and had them deposited in the operational archives of the Naval History Division
in Washington. His memory lives on at the
Nimitz Museum in his hometown.
70TH ANNIVERSARY

PH-70th Layton_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:03 PM Page 10

PROFILE

BY MIKE MCLAUGHLIN

Intelligence officer Edwin T. Layton had Nimitzs ear,

and guided the way across the Pacific.
knew where. Yet Nimitzs previous command
was the Navys Bureau of Navigation, which
kept the records of the men at Pearl. He knew
what they were capable of and he set out to
restore their faith. He needed it. When he was
chosen, President Roosevelt had said, Tell
Nimitz to get the hell out to Pearl and stay there
until the war is won.
Commander Edwin Thomas Layton was the
Fleet Intelligence Officer. His colleagues had
regarded him as alarmist. He had been convinced the Japanese would attack the oil-rich
Dutch East Indies and then, to protect the left
flank of their sea lanes, would also strike the
U.S. forces in the Philippines. This they did,
hours after bombing Pearl. Later that day, one
officer said, Heres the man we should have
listened to all along.

Layton assumed his intelligence career was

finished and requested command of a destroyer.
Nimitz had good reasons to disagree. Layton
had been Assistant Naval Attach in Japan, and
he spoke excellent Japanese. He knew the
Japanese Navys chief strategist, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, and the leader of the Pearl
Harbor attack, Admiral Chuichi Nagumo.
I want you to be the Admiral Nagumo of
my staff, Nimitz told him. I want your every
thought, every instinct as you believe Nagumo
might have them. You are to see the war, their
operations, their aims, from the Japanese viewpoint and keep me advised what you are thinking about, what you are doing, and what purpose, what strategy, motivates your operations.
If you can do this, you will give me the kind of
information needed to win this war. Layton

U.S. Navy

ON THE MORNING of December 31, 1941,

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz assumed command
of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The service took place
at the submarine base at Pearl Harbor. The
mood was grim. More than two thousand men
had been killed in the Japanese attack on
December 7. The Battleship Force had been
wrecked, and most of the Army and Navys
planes were destroyed on the ground.The fleet
commander had been Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel. The Navy replaced him, temporarily,
with Admiral William Pye.
Fearing further damage to the fleet, Pye canceled a mission to rescue the besieged Marines
on Wake Island. When Nimitz replaced Pye,
morale was so low he worried if it could ever
be raised. Every officer present feared blame for
the disaster, and reassignment to God only

10

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U.S. Navy

took the challenge. He later wrote, I was not

so sure about his conclusion. But my respect
for his enthusiasm and determination to restore
the reputation of the fleet was fired up.
Born in 1903 in Nauvoo, Ill., Layton had a
lifelong ambition: a career at sea. Battleships
and the U.S. Naval Academy were his favorite
writing subjects in high school. He applied to
Annapolis in 1920 and was accepted.
The Naval Academy stressed navigation,
gunnery, and tactics used during World War I.
Radio interception and code-breaking were off
the path to flag rank. Despite this, Layton was
fascinated by codes and ciphers and saw their
value in naval strategy.
In January 1924 the Office of Naval Communication (ONC) established a cryptographic
research department in Washington, D.C.
Headed by Lieutenant Laurence Safford, the
unit consisted of himself, two analysts, and a
typist. As Safford set up shop, Edwin Layton
was finishing his last year at Annapolis.
Upon graduating, Layton was assigned to
the battleship West Virginia. In January 1925
the West Virginia sailed to San Francisco to
join a ceremony for Japans naval cadet training squadron. Layton met his counterparts
from the naval school at Etajima. They were
amiable, enthusiastic men who spoke fluent
English or French. Not one U.S. officer could
speak Japanese.
Layton urged the Navy to start a Japanese
language program. He learned that such a program existed, and that only two officers a year
were accepted. Layton applied and waited.
After five more years of battleship and
destroyer duty, he was accepted.
En route to Japan in 1929, he met Lieutenant
(j.g.) Joseph Rochefort. Rochefort had worked
with Safford at the ONC crypto unit, now
called OP-20-G. Layton and Rochefort became
good friends. Their friendship would be invaluable in the years ahead.
In Tokyo, Layton received a no-nonsense
briefing from the naval attach. You have only
two duties to perform: One, study and master
the Japanese language. Two, stay out of trouble. If you fail in either, Ill send you home on
the next ship.
Laytons instructors stressed basics that
Japanese children already knew by their first
day of school. He had to learn the sounds of the
language, and then the grammar and vocabulary. Then he began transcribing Japanese
newspapers into English. He attended plays and

ABOVE: Captain Edwin Thomas Layton in 1944.

OPPOSITE: Layton helped win the great carrier battles
of Coral Sea and Midway by determining where the
Japanese were headed for attack.

operas. Revenge is the central theme of our

drama, one teacher told him. Never forget
that. He studied Japans national character
and learned the depth of their outrage when the
United States barred Japanese immigration in
1924. The insult was double-edged because it
also placed them in the same category as Koreans, Chinese, Indonesians, and Indians.
Always remember, his teacher said, that in
the Japanese mind we are a superior race.
In June 1936 Layton transferred to Washington as the new head of the translation section OP-20-GZ. Through his work there, he
learned that the Japanese Navy was refurbishing one of its older battleships, the Nagato, and
that her rebuilt turbines could reach 26 knots.
The U.S. Navy had believed she could only
reach 23 1/2 knots, and with that in mind had
planned the new North Carolina class of battleships. Laytons discovery prompted the Navy
to improve the class so it could exceed 28
knots. Afterward, Safford declared, This paid
for our peacetime radio intelligence organization a thousand times over.
After two more years in Japan as assistant
naval attach, Layton took command of the
destroyer Boggs in 1939. That summer, he ran
across an old friend, Captain Ellis Zacharias,
the intelligence chief for the Eleventh Naval
District (San Diego). Over drinks, he asked,
How would you like to be fleet intelligence
officer? Layton was surprised, yet interested.
Thinking about it later, he wrote, Whoever

got the job would be the busiest man on the

staff when the inevitable conflict broke out.
By 1941, Commander Saffords research
department had become the Security Intelligence
wing of the ONC. It had three stations: Negat
(Washington), Cast (the Philippines), and Hypo
(Pearl Harbor). By then, hundreds of men and
women, military and civilian, were applying
themselves to deciphering Japanese messages.
Japans diplomatic code was nicknamed
Purple. There were several versions of the
military code, beginning with Red in the
1920s, then Blue. By 1941, the Japanese
naval code was JN-25. It was composed of tens
of thousands of five-digit numbers. Each number represented a ship, unit, person, or place.
All messages included a fixed value that was
added to each code number. With it was an
instruction for the receiver to use a particular
number to subtract from each number in order
to decipher the message.
The codes were periodically changed.
Decryption required both intuition and a memory for countless details. Some changes were
subtle. Other, more complex changes took
thousands of man-hours to evaluate. Success
was never total.
Opportunities came in different ways. One
happened in 1920. An Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) team broke into the New York
office of the Japanese vice-consul, who was a
naval officer. They cracked his safe and photographed his code book. The photos were
transcribed into a red, leatherbound book. This
became the Red code book, a keystone for the
ONCs analysis.
Layton became Fleet Intelligence Officer in
December 1940. He worked for Admiral
James O. Richardson, and then his successor,
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. Layton gave
daily briefings on Japanese military activity
throughout the Pacific. This reunited him with
Station Hypos boss, his old friend Commander Joseph Rochefort.
Washington frequently disagreed with Pearl.
Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations,
often doubted if the Japanese would make any
aggressive moves at all. The Atlantic was consuming Washingtons attention because German U-boats were savaging Allied merchant
shipping.
In June 1941, Negat (the Washington station)
accused Hypo (the Pearl Harbor station) of
withholding information regarding a Japanese
buildup in its Mandated Islands, Pacific Islands
70TH ANNIVERSARY

11

Stan Stokes

PH-70th Layton_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:06 PM Page 12

Layton intercepted Japanese Admiral Yamamotos itinerary. Army P-38s rose to shoot down the admirals plane on a
inspection tour of Bougainville in 1943.

transferred to Japanese control after World War

I. Stunned, Layton pointed out that the information came from Station Cast (the Philippines) and had been sent to Negat, with a copy
to Hypo; a Negat officer simply hadnt appreciated the messages significance. The incident
illustrated OP-20-Gs decentralized structure.
Six months later, the structure would be shown
to be tragically flawed.
Hypo saw only Japanese naval messages.
Lacking Purple decryption equipment to read
diplomatic traffic, they depended on Negat for
that information. Hypos problems grew worse
when JN-25 was changed for the second time
that year, on December 1.
By late November, Negat believed that Admiral Nagumos carriers were operating in the
western Pacific, with some cruising to
Indochina. But Nagumo was already heading
east to Pearl, under radio silence so enforced
that the transmitter keys had been removed
from his ships radios.
When Nimitz took command, he wasnt
impressed with Hypo. If they were so good,
why didnt they foresee the attack? It was an
agonizing question that reverberated through
the Navy for years. It triggered many investigations, caused endless finger-pointing, and
permanently stained Kimmels reputation. Layton stressed that if the Japanese had broadcast
anything about the attack, they used a code he
knew nothing about. Nimitz came around.
Every day, Layton and Rochefort laid out
dozens of intercepts on plywood tables. Each
12

PEARL HARBOR

message listed the sender and the recipient. It

was a puzzle with many missing pieces, but
enough fit to give an idea of the picture. An
Allied base mentioned with weather reports
and increased Japanese air patrols often pointed
to an impending attack.
In the weeks that followed the travesty of
December 7, Layton briefed Nimitz every
morning at 8 AM. If vital information came in,
Nimitzs door was always open to him. The
Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CincPac) Operations room had a huge map of the Pacific, with
tracing paper laid over it. Every night, Laytons
men wrote on it the latest information about
Japanese units.
Through the winter and spring, Nimitz sent
his carriers to raid the Marshall and Gilbert
Islands. While these raids didnt slow the Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies and the
Philippines, they did much to boost morale for
the United States. So did the Doolittle raid on
Japan in April 1942. The raids also alarmed the
Japanese high command.
ONC suffered a shakeup in February 1942.
The Navys commander-in-chief, Admiral
Ernest J. King, dismissed Negats long-time
commander, Laurence Safford. It was part of a
plan for better administration, but slashed a
vital personal link between Hypo and Negat.
Admiral King was also the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nimitz worried about
Kings Europe first view. Washington, over
five thousand miles to the east, saw the Japanese threat in a different light. Nimitz recalled

the Texas saying, The nearest rattlesnake is

always the biggest. He valued Hypos work
over Negats. He told Layton and Rochefort,
Tell me what the Japanese are going to do,
and I will then decide if its good or bad, and act
accordingly.
By late April 1942, Layton was convinced
that the next Japanese target was the Allied base
at Port Moresby, New Guinea. Nimitz agreed,
and sent Admirals Aubrey Fitch and Frank Jack
Fletcher with the carriers Lexington and Yorktown to counter the threat.
The Battle of Coral Sea followed, from May
4 to May 8. By the 8th, U.S. planes had sunk
the light carrier Shoho and damaged the heavy
carrier Shokaku. The carrier Zuikaku came
through unhurt but lost many of its planes. The
Japanese struck back, sinking Lexington and
damaging Yorktown. Despite this, the Japanese fleet retreated north, canceling the invasion.
Soon another invasionMIwas in the
works. Layton and Rochefort had come across
a recurring designator, AF. Japanese patrol
planes used two-letter designators beginning
with A when discussing the Hawaiian Island
chain. When Rochefort learned that Japanese
planes were advised to avoid AFs fighter cover,
he came to believe that AF was Midway. Washington felt that the next attack would be elsewhere. Rochefort devised a simple trick to settle the question. Layton pitched it to Nimitz.
Nimitz approved.
Using their underwater cable between
islands, Pearl Harbor ordered Midway to
radio-transmit in plain language that its fresh
water condenser was broken. The Midway station did so. The Japanese station at Kwajalein
intercepted it, then reported: AF needs fresh
water. That settled it. Midway was the target.
Even Washington came around. The break happened just in time. The JN-25 code was
changed again, and it would be weeks before
Hypo could evaluate the changes.
The miraculous victory occurred a week later.
Nagumos carriers approached northwest of
Midway, just as Hypo said they would. American dive-bombers attacked, flying from Admiral Raymond Spruances Enterprise and Hornet
and from Fletchers Yorktown. All of Nagumos
carriers were sunk. Again, the American cost
was high, too. Yorktown and the destroyer
Hammann were sunk, and hundreds of Navy
and Marine airmen were killed. But once more,
Nimitzs men stopped an invasion.
Layton contributed to the victory in another
way. In March, Japanese seaplanes flew scouting missions over Oahu. When one dropped

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U.S. Navy

bombs near Pearl, Nimitz asked how it was

possible. Layton recalled an article called Rendezvous, written by a friend of his, which
described how a PBY Catalina was refueled by
a submarine at a remote atoll. Layton figured
the Japanese had done just that at French
Frigate Shoals. Nimitz sent ships to guard the
shoals. As a result, the Japanese canceled a
reconnaissance mission. Nagumo steamed to
Midway without knowing where the U.S. carriers were.
After Midway, the Japanese Navy lost the
offensive. Despite this, Nimitz had limited
resources to fight with. He would get new carriers, battleships, and more in 1943, but until
then, he had to make do. The desperate fight
for Guadalcanal consumed his energies for the
rest of the year.
That autumn of 1942, Hypo took a hard
blow. Negat had long viewed Hypo as a rogue
outfit. Rochefort, who had loudly disdained
Negats work, was ordered to report to Washington for temporary consulting work. Im
not coming back, Rochefort told Layton. He
was right.
In early November, Admiral King wrote to
Nimitz, Now that I have taken care of
Rochefort, I will leave it up to you to take care
of Layton. Nimitz showed Layton this dark
note. Youve got an enemy there, Nimitz
said. Layton wondered again if he should
return to commanding a destroyer.
But he did not. Over the next two years,
CincPacs intelligence staff expanded to nearly
50 times its original size. At first, Nimitz was
opposed to this. He liked small outfits, straight
lines of contact, and no red tape. But with the
ongoing campaigns stretching toward Japan,
Layton needed a larger department. Thus, his
handful of men expanded to nearly two thousand by the wars end. Marine, Coast Guard,
and Army intelligence men worked with the
Navy. They composed the Joint Intelligence
Command Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA).
Layton studied enemy logistics. Japanese unit
commanders sent housekeeping reports about
the amount of rations consumed in a month
and the number of men fit for duty. Reading
this helped the Marines and Army understand
what they would face when they went ashore.
During invasions, JICPOA men seized documents and interrogated prisoners to assess
enemy defenses. JICPOA also tracked Japanese
merchant convoys and relayed the information
to U.S. subs, which began sinking Japanese
transports in increasing numbers.
Layton read one particularly powerful inter-

Laytons longtime friend Commander Joseph Rochefort.

cept on April 14, 1943. It was the travel itinerary for an inspection trip by Admiral
Yamamoto. Nimitz stared hard at it, then
looked at his map. Yamamoto would be within
range of fighters from Guadalcanal. Nimitz
asked, Do we try to get him?
During his time in Japan, Layton had known
Yamamoto. Within the limits of duty, Layton
considered him a friend. But that was six years
earlier. Yes, Layton answered. We should.
Hes unique among their people. If hes shot
down, it would demoralize the navy. It would
stun the nation. Nimitz replied, What concerns me is whether they could find a more
effective fleet commander. The two men discussed the senior commanders of the Japanese
Navy. Finally, Layton said, You know, Admiral, it would be just as if they shot you down.
There isnt anybody to replace you. Nimitz
smiled. All right. Well try it.
On April 18, 1943, Army P-38 fighters shot
down Yamamotos plane. Japans greatest military mind was killed.
Through the war, Layton often had to challenge the claims of men whod been closer to
the action. In July 1943 he incurred the wrath
of Admiral Walden Ainsworth, whod reported
that his forces had sunk two enemy cruisers in
a night battle. Layton denied it. Ainsworth flew
to Pearl to report to Nimitz, and to shake his
finger in Laytons face. How can you sit here
on your fat ass, thousands of miles from the
action, and make such a statement! Layton
replied that his mission was to evaluate enemy
radio traffic. No enemy cruisers had been
reported lost. I have no stake in this matter
personally, Layton said. But I have a stake in
the war. Later, he was vindicated when a captured Japanese sailor confirmed his analysis. It
had been unpleasant, but Nimitz needed hard

facts. Layton was a man who could keep his

head and report bad news as well as good.
Two years of bitter fighting remained. With
every invasion, the ferocity of resistance
increased. Surrenders were few. Kamikaze
attacks at Iwo Jima and Okinawa inflicted massive casualties on U.S. ships.
When briefed on the Manhattan Project,
Layton believed it offered Emperor Hirohito a
face-saving way to end the war. To his way of
thinking, nothing less would work. That supposition has been debated ever since. But the
Japanese did come to terms directly after the
atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
On August 15, Layton received the Japanese
message accepting the terms of surrender. He
raced it to Nimitz, who held up a similar sheet
and said, I just got one from Admiral King.
The next day, Nimitz put the word out: Suspend all operations.
Nimitz invited Layton to accompany him on
a visit to Yokosuka Naval Base. Youd better
bring a Marine, Layton warned him.
They wouldnt attack me, Nimitz said, surprised.Theyd attack MacArthur. Layton disagreed. They know it was our naval power
that brought them to their knees.
Are you a good shot? Nimitz asked.
Together they drove to Nimitzs personal shooting range and practiced for several days. When
they went to Yokosuka, Layton didnt need the
pistol. Their visit was a quiet one.
On September 2, Layton watched his boss sign
the Japanese surrender on the deck of the Missouri. They had crossed half the world and
waited four years to reach this moment. And
while the Pacific War produced many great
admirals and generalsHalsey, Spruance,
Fletcher, Mitscher, Burke, Vandegrift, Smith, and
moreone man alone, Chester W. Nimitz, was
responsible for them. To make sound decisions
when giving orders to these men, Nimitz needed
solid information. Layton gave it to him.
For this, Layton won a Distinguished Service
Medal, plus many other decorations. But none
of them matched what Nimitz gave him, in the
fall of 1942, when Laytons worries were grave.
Nimitz had taken a photo of himself from his
desk and signed it. To Commander Edwin T.
Layton, he wrote. As my intelligence officer,
you are more valuable to me than any division
of cruisers.
Mike McLaughlin is a freelance writer and military historian. His work has been published by
AMVETS magazine, American Veteran and
The Boston Tab newspaper.
70TH ANNIVERSARY

13

PH-70th Insight_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:19 PM Page 14

INSIGHT

BY DON HAINES

Library of Congress

Three trapped sailors perished at the end of a mighty struggle

to stay alive after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

As the USS West Virginia burns, sailors disregard the possibility of further explosions to fight the flames started by
Japanese torpedoes and bombs. The ship sank, trapping three sailors, who survived until their air ran out.

When Nathan and Jane Olds of Stanton, N.D;

Ralph and Vera Endicott of Aberdeen, Wash.;
and Effie Costin of Henryville, Ind., were
informed by the U.S. Navy in December 1941
that each of their families had lost a son during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, they
were heartbroken.
Clifford Olds, 20; Ronald Endicott, 18; and
Louis Buddy Costin, 21, had been sailors on
the battleship USS West Virginia, which had
been hit by a series of bombs and torpedoes.
The telegrams merely stated that the three
young men died at their duty stations.
But during the ensuing years another story
began to emergeone so horrible that family
members who learned the truth decided not to
tell the parents in order to prevent them from
suffering further.
Harland Costin, younger brother of Buddy,
14

PEARL HARBOR

found out in 1942 when a chance meeting with

a crew member of the now refloated West Virginia told a sad tale that by now has become
legend. It was a story of three young men who
had survived for what must have been 16 hellish days in the dark pump room of a battleship
sitting on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Costin,
Olds, and Endicott had not died easily or willingly, as attested to by witnesses who remember.
It was worse at night, said Marine Corps
bugler Dick Fiske. Youd hear bang-bangbang, then stop, then bang-bang-bang from
deep in the bow of the ship. It didnt take long
to realize that men were making that noise.
To this day Fiske chokes up when he tells the
story. Pretty soon nobody wanted to do guard
duty, especially at night when it was quiet. It
didnt stop until Christmas Eve.
Bob Kronberger, who was a crewman on the

West Virginia, says he knew all three of the

young sailors. I didnt know them well because
I was of a higher rank and couldnt fraternize,
but it was an awful way to die. Kronberger is
a good example of the fortunes of war. His
brother and father were also part of the West
Virginia crew. All three survived the attack.
It was not hard for Harland Costin to make
the decision not to tell his family about the true
circumstances of Buddys death. His family had
already suffered much. A brother had died
young of an infectious disease. The father had
died in a fight. To tell his mother how Buddy
must have suffered might have been too much
for her to bear. He would keep his secret until
the 1990s, when newspapers began to report
the story.
Duke Olds found out about his brothers
struggle to live from a relative who worked at
the shipyard in Bremerton, Wash., where the
West Virginia had been taken for repairs. Olds
told his brother and two sisters but not his par-

PH-70th Insight_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:19 PM Page 15

Both: Authors Collection

ents. It would have been really hard on my

father. He and Cliff were real close. It was best
to let it be. It would be many years before
Duke would find out that what he thought had
been a well-kept secret had been revealed to his
mother not long before she died. They say she
took it really hard.
Jack Miller, a buddy of Clifford Olds, says
he knew his friend was one of those making the
noise that was coming from the bow section.
Olds had often invited him into the pump room
for conversation. Just for laughs, they would
close the hatch and scream all manner of epithets in the airtight space, knowing no one on
the outside could hear them. The night before
the attack, Olds, Miller, and another buddy had
gone to a Honolulu nightspot together. They
had said no thanks to a barmaid who had taken
their picture and offered to sell it to them.
Miller could not know that the morrow would
change their lives foreverand how much that
photo would come to mean.
Ronald Endicott had joined the Naval Reserve
at age 17, mainly because he wanted to emulate
his father who had served earlier. He had been
on active duty for 10 months when the Japanese
rained death on his ship and he found himself
entombed in Pump Room A-109 with Olds and
Costin. Velma Lawrence, now of California, was
Endicotts childhood sweetheart and says his parents left Aberdeen in 1956. She knows they never
knew how their son died.
No doubt the main reason for the state of
anguish among the sailors topside stemmed
from the fact that they knew rescue was impossible. Olds, Costin, and Endicott were sitting
on the bottom of Pearl Harbor, surrounded by
water. The ships commander, Captain Mervyn
S. Bennion, had been killed in the early
moments of the attack, but quick thinking by
a young lieutenant who was also the fire-control officer ensured the West Virginia would
sink on an even keel.
It is somewhat ironic that the three men
were doomed; the young officers action saved
hundreds but ensured their deaths. Had the
WeeVee, as the ship was affectionately known,
capsized like the battleship Oklahoma, the
three might have been rescued by cutting
through the hull. Not that rescue would have
been guaranteed, as the Oklahoma rescuers
discovered. Many men on that ship died of
asphyxiation when air rushed out as soon as
the hull was breached.
Those topside on the WeeVee also knew that

TOP: Young Louis Buddy Costin poses at Pearl Harbor as he prepares for guard duty. ABOVE: Seaman
Clifford Olds (right) enjoys the company of two buddies on the evening of Dec. 6, 1941. Six hours later, he
was trapped in pump room A-109 aboard the USS West
Virginia fighting for his life.

rescue from below the waterline by drilling a

hole through the hull would result in a
blowout, killing the diver. Added to this was
the realization that the United States had been
plunged into war, and many things had taken
precedence over three enlisted men at the bottom of Pearl. Those above knew it was not a
question of whether Olds, Costin, and Endicott
could be rescued. It was only a question of how
long they would last.
The three entombed young men, who had
only three years of service between them, probably did not know they were doomed. They
wanted to live, and they had more on their side
than their comrades knew. They had emergency food rations, access to the fresh water
compartment, flashlights to enable them to see,
and two other thingsan eight-day clock and
a calendar. And so they banged. At the end of
each 24-hour period, they marked their calendar. No doubt they wondered, Does anybody
up there hear us?

Despite all the remembrances, the story of

the three trapped sailors might never have been
released to the public without the salvage report
filed by Commander Paul Dice during bodyretrieval efforts in May 1942.
While many of the 106 deaths on the West
Virginia were from drowning when compartment hatches had to be closed on those trying
to escape, Dice immediately noticed that Pump
Room A-109 was completely dry. Three bodies
were found huddled together on the storeroom
shelf. Then Dice saw flashlights and batteries
strewn about, along with empty food ration
cartons. The manhole cover to the fresh water
tanks had been removed. Then salvage workers saw the eight-day clock and the calendar
with a red X marked through each day through
December 23. With this discovery, grown men
broke down in tears.
The three sailors were buried in a mass grave
with 22 others. That is what officials told Harland Costin when he journeyed to Honolulu in
1945. In 1949, when the National Memorial
Cemetery of the Pacific was opened, the bodies
were disinterred and given separate burials.
Clifford Oldss remains were shipped home to
Stanton, N.D. Costin and Endicott are buried
in the National Memorial Cemetery in Honolulu, which is commonly referred to as the
Punch Bowl. The three stones are identical
and have death dates of December 7, 1941.
There is unanimous agreement that the death
date is unfair in view of the heroic struggle
waged by the three young sailors to stay alive.
When Jack Miller (who died in 2002)
returned to Honolulu after sea duty, he understood that the photo taken by the barmaid was
one of the last snapped before the world fell
apart. He retrieved the negative and kept it for
the rest of his life. It shows three carefree young
men out on the town and was the last happiness
Clifford Olds would ever know.
World War II Navy lore is full of courageous
yet sad stories that have been fully told. Yet the
story of three young sailors and their heroic
struggle to stay alive on the bottom of Pearl
Harbor lives only in a few newspaper columns
and the memories of some shipmates, most of
whom have now passed away. Louis Buddy
Costin, Clifford Olds, and Ronald Tubby
Endicott deserve more than a Purple Heart and
an incorrect date on their tombstones.
Don Haines is a freelance writer and Cold War
Army Veteran who lives in Woodbine, Maryland.
70TH ANNIVERSARY

15

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Tensions between the United States and Japan had been escalating for
years and eventually erupted into war with the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Road to War

By John Wukovits

In a lightning strike to capture the oil fields of Sumatra, Japanese paratroopers with weapons at the ready begin
advancing toward their objectives as comrades continue to plummet earthward. The oil fields, seized from the Dutch
on Sumatra and the neighboring island of Borneo, were vital to the Japanese war machine, as were other natural
resources of the Dutch East Indies.
16

PEARL HARBOR

PH-Road to War-NEW_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:10 PM Page 17

DMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY HAD

never seen such destruction. What made
matters worse, the harm had been
inflicted on his beloved Navy inside one of its
strongholdsthe Pacific bastion of Pearl Harbor. As he steamed into the harbor aboard the
aircraft carrier Enterprise on December 8,
1941, and obtained a firsthand view of what
the Japanese had done, he gritted his teeth.
Sadly, he noticed, the battleship Utah lay sunk
at its berththe same berth Halsey would have
occupied with his carrier had he been in port
that fateful December 7 morning.
The sight of mangled ships and floating bod-

U.S. Army Art Collection

ies chagrined the old warrior. An officer nearby

watched the admiral scan the harbor in silence,
then mutter in an emotion-filled voice, Before
were through with em, the Japanese language
will be spoken only in hell!
Although what Admiral Halsey witnessed
was a stunning surprise, the burning vessels and
shattered aircraftto say nothing of the
charred bodies that littered the harborwere
the culmination of a string of events that started
years before.
As early as the late 1800s, American politicians proclaimed that it was the nations manifest destiny to expand beyond its continental

borders into the Pacific. They viewed with lusty

eyes the lucrative natural resources in the Orient and intended to implant and maintain an
economic presence in the region. American
manufacturers also wanted to have a ready
market for the vast amount of goods their factories churned out.
Following the successful conclusion of the
war with Spain in 1898, the United States
gained possession of the Philippine Islands.
Standing 1,400 miles southwest of Japan, the
Philippines offered numerous rich products,
such as oil and rubber, as well as superb sites for
military bases. The United States dispatched a

70TH ANNIVERSARY

17

garrison army to occupy the subjected nation,

and without openly declaring so, conveyed to
Japan through her actions that the United
States, and not Japan, would achieve mastery in
the Pacific.
In December 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt increased the American presence in the
Pacific by ordering the United States Navy to
steam through the region as part of its circumnavigation of the globe. In doing so, he
intended to send a message to Japan that the
United States would defend its Pacific interests,
especially the Philippines. Unfortunately for
Roosevelt, once the Navy left Pacific waters, he
had no military tool with which to stop any
aggressive Japanese moves. Congress was reluctant to start an expensive arms race and
declined to approve the money needed to add
ships that could be stationed in the area. Until
the time came when the country expanded its
navy, United States policy in the Pacific existed
without the means to enforce it.
Japans role in the Pacific and Far East was
more complex than that of the United States. In
the eyes of many Japanese, a leading position
guaranteed the nations survival, while to
accept an inferior status would relegate her to
the backwaters of world rankings.
Unlike the United States, which enjoyed spacious land into which her population could

spread, Japan existed inside a tiny area framed

by water. The more her population increased,
the less space became available. Approximately
80 million people lived in Japan in the 1920s.
The countrys total area was comparable to the
state of Montana, but that U.S. state had a population of under one million. If she were to
grow, Japan, the most crowded nation on earth,
had to seek land beyond her borders. When
expansionists studied the nearby areas, most
eyes turned west toward the Asian mainland
and China.
As an island nation, Japan had to import
much of her raw materials and food products.
Her people could cultivate only a certain percentage of the national need, and to fill the rest
the nations leaders had to look elsewhere.
Almost 70 percent of the countrys supply of
zinc and tin came from outside, 90 percent of
its lead, and all of its cotton, wool, aluminum,
and rubber.
When they sought raw materials from Asia,
Japanese leaders crashed head-on with European interests. Japan needed rubber, tin, and
bauxite from Burma and Malaya, but those
nations were controlled by Great Britain.
Indochinas vast rubber plantations contained
valuable material, but France held sway in that
country. The most eagerly sought product, oil,
existed in bountiful amounts in the East Indies,

Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection

BELOW: In this Japanese artists conception of the Battle of Tsushima, sailors of the Imperial Navy fire their
weapon at vessels of Czarist Russias Baltic Fleet. The Japanese victory at Tsushima stunned the world and
emboldened the island nation to continue asserting its preeminence in Asia. ABOVE RIGHT: In Tokyo, a Japanese
soldier hangs a banner emblazoned with patriotic slogans. Imbued with the code of Bushido, the Japanese military
displayed an intense martial spirit.

18

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PH-Road to War-NEW_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:11 PM Page 18

but the Dutch maintained a stranglehold on the

region. Everywhere Japan turned, a European
nation appeared to block the path to her future.
Japan yearned to be the dominant nation in
the Pacific and Far East. She, not Great Britain
or any other European country, deserved preeminence in the area because she was an Asian
land. Besides, she had already built a potent
military and asserted her interests in the region.
In 1894 she fought a war with China over
supremacy in Korea. Even though her welltrained soldiers easily defeated the Chinese,
Japans interest in gaining more living space on
the mainland was thwarted by Russia, which
brokered a peace agreement that gave Japan
the tiny island of Formosa, off Chinas coast.
Ten years later Japan exacted revenge on
Russia. The Czarist-led country tried to expand
its influence into Manchuria, a region north of
Korea, by building a railroad through the country. Japan countered this threat to her interests
in Korea and Manchuria by unleashing a surprise naval attack on the Russian Far East
Squadron as it lay at anchor in Port Arthur,
Manchuria, on February 8, 1904. Japanese
troops then landed and swept north to seize the
city of Mukden.
The rest of the world took notice in May
when the Japanese Navy soundly defeated the
Russian Baltic Fleet at the Battle of Tsushima.
For the first time an Asian nation had bested a
European power, and both Great Britain and
the United States realized that Japan could pose
a threat to their own interests.
The successes reinforced the idea that Japans
destiny lay in the Pacific and on the Asian mainland. Japanese leaders masked their intentions
by proclaiming that, as the only Asian nation to
rise to the status of world power, she, not the
European nations or the United States, had an

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Japanese soldiers rapidly advance through a rubble-strewn street in the city of Toh-an, China. Locked in close combat with Chinese troops, the Japanese pushed toward Kiukang,
the terminus of the Nannsun Railway.

inherent right to rule in the region. This attitude placed Japan in direct opposition to similar interests expressed by the United States.
The decade of the 1920s saw both a reduction in military weaponry and an escalation of
harsh feelings between the United States and
Japan. The isolationist attitudes that swept the
United States caused government leaders to
support arms limitations even though they
remained uneasy about Japans aggressive
stance in the Pacific.
Money drove the worlds major naval
nations to Washington in 1921 to discuss
restraints on building ships. Most countries
could not afford an escalating naval arms race,
and over a three-month period they formulated
an agreement to halt naval construction. The
documents final version stipulated that Great
Britain would retain 22 capital ships (battleships and cruisers) and the United States 18
keeping them virtually equal in powerwhile
Japan reduced its battle fleet to 10. A 10-year
hiatus in naval construction meant that the
superiority given the United States and Great
Britain would remain in force for an entire
decade, but Japanese leaders, facing world support for the conference, acceded to its demands.
The Washington Naval Conference slowed

the arms race, but it embittered the Japanese,

who believed that the United States and Great
Britain only wanted to keep Japan in an inferior
position in the Pacific and excluded from status as a world power. They departed Washington determined to address the wrongs inflicted
on them.
Other events in the United States contributed
to growing resentment toward that country
inside Japan. Although built on the principles
of equality and fair play, the United States government had a deplorable history of bigotry
toward the Japanese and Japanese-Americans.
In 1907 the school board in San Francisco, California, refused to allow Japanese children to
attend school. Six years later the California
state legislature passed a law prohibiting Japanese from owning land, and in 1924 Congress
passed a biased immigration law. Japan was so
enraged by this 1924 law that on the day it took
effect in the United States, the Japanese government declared a national day of humiliation.
Japanese rumblings in the Pacific unnerved
people in the United States, who had frequently
referred to Asians as the yellow peril. At first
the Chinese, and then the Japanese, were seen
as threats to the white-dominated rule that had
existed in the Pacific and throughout the world.

The Japanese were not to be trusted, and their

desire to expand beyond their borders was to be
viewed with alarm.
Other actions in the 1920s bothered the
Japanese military. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of
1928 condemned war as a course of action,
which to the Japanese meant that those in controlGreat Britain and the United States
would remain in control. Two years later the
London Naval Treaty forbade the construction
of any new battleships before 1937, which the
Japanese viewed as another step by Western
powers to retain superiority. People in Japan,
especially younger, more radical Army officers,
considered the different peace agreements as a
betrayal of Japans interests by moderate politicians. They looked to their military to correct
the situation.
The military commanded enormous respect
from the population in Japan in the 1920s and
1930s. When a young man reached the age of
17, he entered his two years of service with a
party hosted by the residents of his hometown.
School children collected coins in a drive to
finance the construction of a battleship, and it
was deemed an honor to serve the emperor.
Rigorous training instilled discipline and an
aversion to surrendering. Instructors taught
19

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Both: National Archives

trainees that loyalty to ones unit, faith in commanding officers, and spirit would defeat any
foe, no matter how well-armed it might be.
Attacking, even in circumstances that produced ghastly casualties, was preferred to surrendering or pulling back. Men trained 14
hours a day, six days a week, under the watch
of dictatorial officers who answered complaints with punishment. Soldiers would
embark on marches of 25 miles wearing gear
that weighed two-thirds of their own body
weights, then run the final mile to prove they
still had reserves of strength.
A soldiers life belonged to the emperor, and
to suffer defeat or surrender was considered an
insult to the emperor and brought shame to the
soldiers family. His behavior was governed by
the ancient samurai tradition known as
Bushido, which meant Way of the Warrior.
The samurai were honored fighters in Japans
history, and soldiers of the Imperial Army were
expected to emulate them. Duty is weightier
than a mountain, while death is lighter than a
feather, reminded one dictate. A soldier could
attain no higher glory than to die in battle.
Japanese militants who urged immediate
expansion onto the Asian mainland were held
in check by more moderate forces and by the
fact that the Japanese economy depended heavily on the United States for products. The stock
market crash of 1929, which ushered in the
Great Depression, altered the situation. Military extremists castigated moderates for giving
away too much military might in the 1920s
peace accords and for refusing to exploit China.
They clamored for a new policy that would

20

emphasize conquest and expansion.

The Japanese military held such immense
power because it controlled the fates of those
factions in power. The Army and Navy each
had one minister in the Japanese cabinet, and
if they did not agree with current policy they
could hamstring a government by recalling
the ministers and bringing the regime to a
standstill.
From early 1936 on, militarists gained more
influence. Politicians justifiably feared for their
lives if they supported a position unpopular
with the Army or Navy. In the 1930s, four government officials were assassinated by the military and two coups were attempted.
An alarmed American ambassador to Japan,
Joseph Grew, warned Washington that the
Japanese militarists were gaining strength every
day and that they intended to expand into
China and other areas of the Pacific. He told his
superiors, Whatever way it falls out, one thing
is certain and that is that the military are distinctly running the government and that no step
can be taken without their approval.
The Army and Navy supported diverse plans
for expansion. The Army wanted to focus on
Russia and northern Chinaland targets
while the Navy claimed a water advance into
Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, and Pacific
islands would be better because of the rich natural resources available. Faced with two radically different plans from groups that could easily dissolve the government, in 1936 Japans
cabinet refused to take a stand and gave permission for both plans. This decision set in
motion a chain of events that could only result

ABOVE: During the horrific Rape of Nanking in December

1937, a Japanese soldier bayonets a Chinese civilian,
whose lifeless body will soon roll into an adjacent pit.
BELOW: Crossing the Central Mountain Belt in Chinas
interior, elements of a Japanese tank corps roll forward
accompanied by well equipped infantrymen. The Japanese Army did not typically employ armored units in
large numbers.

in conflict with either Great Britain or the

United States, or with both.
The initial aggressive moves that culminated
in World War II in the Pacific occurred on September 18, 1931, when a bomb exploded along
the Japanese-controlled South Manchuria Railway near Mukden, Manchuria. Units of the
Japanese Army had been stationed in Korea
since the Russo-Japanese War to protect Japanese interests. Officers of the Kwantung Army,
as it was called, immediately launched an invasion to overrun all of Manchuria, which they
quickly gobbled up and renamed Manchukuo.
The Army command ignored orders from the
Tokyo government to halt the invasion, partly
because they believed the civilian officials had
meekly given away so much military might in
the 1920s peace accords with European
nations.
Once the government officials realized the
Kwantung Army was easily overrunning
Manchuria, many of them adopted a different
stance. They praised the military for its performance and encouraged Japanese citizens,
plagued by crowded conditions in the home
islands, to emigrate to the area.
Other nations, including the United States,
condemned the invasion. When the League of
Nations refused to recognize the puppet state of
Manchukuo, Japan withdrew from the organi-

PH-Road to War-NEW_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:12 PM Page 21

zation in 1933 and continued to exploit her

new possession. Since many nations were in the
midst of battling economic problems stemming
from the 1929 Wall Street crash, they did not
consider using military force to halt the aggressive moves. Japan, as well as German dictator
Adolf Hitler and Italian leader Benito Mussolini
in Europe, noticed this refusal to take action
and embarked on bolder courses of action as
the decade unfolded.
A more serious incident occurred on the
Asian mainland on July 7, 1937, when Japanese soldiers opened fire on Chinese troops at

bitter enemies, battling for control of their

homeland, united in the common cause of
repelling the invading Japanese.
The Japanese reacted swiftly and brutally.
Although their forces stalled at Shanghai, where
Chinese forces fought for three months and
inflicted 40,000 casualties, the Japanese Army
quickly overran other major cities. Peking,
Tientsin, Hankow, Chenchow, and Canton fell
one after another, with angry Japanese exacting
brutal vengeance at each site, where soldiers
raped and killed civilians by the thousands.
The worst carnage had unfolded in December 1937, at Nanking, where Japanese troops
embarked on an orgy of killing and rape. Soldiers used thousands of civilians for live bayonet practice, set afire whole groups of men,
women, and children, and raped old and young
alike. A war crimes tribunal after the war determined that 20,000 women between the ages of
11 and 76 had been raped, and more than
200,000 Chinese murdered.
One American who was present wrote on
Christmas Eve that Nanking is a city laid
waste, ravaged, completely looted, much of
it burned. The victorious army must have its
rewardsand those rewards are to plunder,
murder, rape, at will, to commit acts of unbelievable brutality and savagery. In all modern
history surely there is no page that will stand
so black as that of the rape of Nanking. It has

been hell on earth.

The United States protested these criminal
acts against a nation with which they shared
sentimental bonds, developed by American missionaries who had long worked in China. Since
no nation was willing or able to mount military action to deter the Japanese, the critical
words achieved nothing. The Japanese continued to plunder China at will.
In Japan, American Ambassador Joseph
Grew cautioned President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the nation rode a risky path by
attacking Japan verbally without appropriate
military force to back up the words. Like Winston Churchill warning the democracies in
Europe about the rise of Hitler, Grew urged his
nation to build a military machine capable of
maintaining order in the Pacific. Otherwise,
Grew added, one side or the other would
eventually have to eat crow. Roosevelt agreed
with his ambassador, but embroiled in rescuing the devastated American economy from the
Depression, he unfortunately could do little to
stop the Japanese.
The events in China pushed the United States
and Japan further apart. The Japanese believed
that the United States had no right to interfere
in Asian matters, and the United States was
stunned at the brutality with which the Japanese treated fellow Asians. More and more, the
two viewed each other as bitter foes.

the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking, China.

Who fired first is unclear, but the Japanese
Army used the incident as justification to
unleash a huge offensive against Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-sheks Chinese Army. Within weeks
the Japanese Army had pushed Chiangs poorly
trained and under-equipped forces toward the
interior of China, leaving many key Chinese
coastal cities open to the Japanese.
The Chinese leader steadfastly refused to
negotiate with the Japanese, even though his
troops were faring poorly. In October 1938, he
withdrew farther into Chinas vast interior,
moved the countrys capital from Peking to
Chungking, and created an alliance with his
communist opponent, Mao Tse-tung. The two

All: National Archives

BELOW: Chinese soldiers, ill equipped and poorly led, were squandered during the early fighting in Burma against
well-disciplined units of the Japanese Army. LEFT TOP: Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew served as U.S. Ambassador to Japan during the difficult years preceding World War II. LEFT BOTTOM: The gunboat USS Panay sinks after
being hit by Japanese bombers on the Yangtze River. The Japanese government claimed the incident was a case of
mistaken identity even though the vessel was clearly marked as American.

21

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PH-Road to War-NEW_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:13 PM Page 22

Japanese Marines roll a field gun forward to deal with a pocket of stubborn Chinese resistance that has held up their
advance through Shanghai. The Japanese captured a number of major Chinese cities and effectively controlled much
of the vast nations coastline.

Relations between the United States and

Japan worsened in December 1937 when
Japanese aircraft attacked the U.S. gunboat
Panay. The gunboat was removing the last of
the American embassy staff from the besieged
town of Nanking when a squadron of Japanese
aircraft bombed the small boat. The American
commander ordered everyone over the side of
the burning craft into lifeboats, which sought
the shelter of high reeds along the Yangtze
River. Although the sinking Panay was clearly
marked by American flags as belonging to the
United States, the Japanese pilots continued
their assault. Two American sailors and one
Italian journalist were killed in the attack,
which was filmed by a news reporter.
Politicians and citizens in the United States
reacted angrily to the news, and for a moment
the two nations appeared on the verge of warfare. Franklin Roosevelt knew that he could do
little to assert American power in China, and
thus did not want to start hostilities. The Japanese government, embroiled in China and fearful that the U.S. would cut off shipments of
valuable scrap iron and oil to Japan, hoped to
avoid conflict with the United States at any
cost. With neither side eager for fighting, a
peaceful solution emerged. Roosevelt
demanded that Japan offer a public apology
and pay more than $2 million in damages.
Tokyo agreed, and Roosevelt accepted the
explanation that the Japanese pilots had incorrectly identified the Panay as a Chinese boat.
22

Although both sides deflected hostilities at this

time, the affair soured relations between Japan
and the United States.
Even before the Panay incident, Roosevelt
had enough evidence to convince himself that,
sooner or later, his nation would be engaged
in war with either Germany or Japan. Beset
with economic problems and leading a nation
that wanted to avoid overseas entanglements,
Roosevelt had to adopt a cautious approach in
which he could gradually awaken his fellow
countrymen to the existing dangers and in
which he could slowly build Americas military might.
The Panay incident handed him justification
for stepping up his efforts, though. One month
after the gunboat sank, Roosevelt asked for and
received from Congress a 20 percent increase in
funds for the Navy so it could build enough
ships to station a fleet in both the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. At the same time he requested
that American munitions and aircraft manufacturers stop bargaining with Japan, and he
reduced the amount of important products,
such as scrap iron, oil, and cotton, sent to Japan
from the United States.
In October 1939, Roosevelt changed the
Pacific Fleets home base from San Diego, California, to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Roosevelt
intended that this series of moves would send
a message to the Japanese that the United States
opposed their actions in Asia and would react
even more strongly in the future.

When Hitler overran Western Europe in the

spring of 1940 and threatened to knock Great
Britain out of the war, Congress appropriated
more money for the military. Shipbuilders
increased their output, and aircraft manufacturers strove to produce 50,000 aircraft. In September 1940, Congress passed the first peacetime draft in the nations history in an attempt
to expand the armed forces.
The United States also reexamined its military strategy in light of recent events. For years
the nation had been guided in the Pacific by
War Plan Orange, which assumed the Japanese
would strike the United States in the Philippines. The plan called for U.S. troops stationed
in the Philippines to hold out until the American fleet could arrive. Since the military did not
yet possess enough men or ships to maintain
simultaneous operations in both the Atlantic
and Pacific, Roosevelts top military advisers
concluded that the greater threat to American
security came from Hitler and recommended
that most efforts to build the military focus on
the Atlantic. Should war erupt, American forces
in the Pacific would try to hold onto American
possessions until Hitler had been defeated.
Then the focus would switch to Japan. Even if
they lost the Philippines, the U.S. leaders
believed they had to first meet the challenge
posed by Hitler.
Roosevelt had one more reason to implement
this Germany first strategy. He feared that
German scientists were close to perfecting an
atomic bomb, a concern that worsened when
German forces defeated France and gained possession of a famed French nuclear physics lab.
Should Hitler attain an atomic bomb before the
United States, he could act almost at will.
One officer argued against abandoning the
Philippines. General Douglas MacArthur, a distinguished soldier from an eminent military
family, claimed that given sufficient time, he
could build American and Filipino forces to the
point where they could successfully repel a
Japanese attack. The former Army chief of staff
contended that by spring 1942 he could field
200,000 trained Filipino troops bolstered by
one American division. His optimistic opinion
swayed his superiors, who named him commander of forces in the Philippines in July
1941. From then on, MacArthur engaged in a
race to construct a potent military presence
before the Japanese struck.
Most military strategists dismissed the
notion that the Japanese would launch an
attack against the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. Although they developed a plan to cover

PH-Road to War-NEW_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:13 PM Page 23

France to allow them to place troops in

Indochina. While the Japanese claimed that
the forces were necessary to protect their
southern flank in China, Japan was actually
interested in obtaining Indochinas vast natural resources and possessing a base from
which to push southward against British-held
Burma and Malaya.
When Japanese troops moved into Indochina
in July 1941, President Roosevelt cut off all
trade with Japan, including the flow of oil. He
promised to maintain the embargo until Japan
withdrew from both China and Indochina and
renounced the Tripartite Pact. Japanese Prime
Minister Hideki Tojo replied, We sent a large
force of one million men, and it has cost us well
over 100,000 dead and wounded, their
bereaved families, hardship for four years. He
answered that they could not now repudiate
such sacrifices.
In light of Roosevelts order to stop the flow
of oil, Japanese leaders could follow one of
two paths. They could reach a settlement with
the United States and reopen the supply line
from that nation, or they could continue their
present policy of overseas expansion and risk
war with the United States. Since they held
only enough oil and supplies to last for 18 to
36 months of war, the leaders had to determine which course to adopt and how best to
implement it.
The Japanese military then had to settle a dispute between the Army and Navy over which
direction any possible attack would go. The
Army wanted to mount an invasion to the
north against long-time enemy Russia. The

Navy, needing a continuous supply of oil to fuel

the fleet, hoped to swing southward toward the
oil-rich Dutch East Indies. When the German
Army pushed deep into the Soviet Union and
tied up millions of Stalins forces, the Japanese
government decided that they had enough time
to hit south, consolidate their new possessions,
and still be ready for a spring 1942 offensive
against the Soviet Union. The plan was to
sweep down the Malay Peninsula and attack
Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, Singapore, and
the Dutch East Indies, while other segments
invaded American forces in the Philippines.
Japan assumed that the only military force
of significance in the Pacific, the American
Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, would
steam toward the relief of the soldiers fighting
in the Philippines. The Japanese Navy planned
to station submarines along the route to attack
as the U.S. Navy passed by, then destroy the
remnants in the Philippines area in a great naval
slugfest between opposing battleships.
Japanese military leaders never intended to
completely subdue the American foe. Instead,
they hoped to set up such a potent defensive
perimeter around their new acquisitions that the
United States, rather than engage in a protracted
Pacific struggle at a time when Hitler posed a
serious threat, would negotiate for peace. As
Tojo said, America may be enraged for a while,
but later she will come to understand.
Japan believed she had the necessary military
might to pull off such a complex operation
spread out over long distances. About 350,000
British, American, and Australian troops, many
poorly trained, manned outposts in the Pacific.

Preparing to assault Chinese defensive positions guarding the city of Changsa, Japanese soldiers await the order to
advance. The Chinese Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and their Communist adversaries, under Mao Tse-tung,
formed an uneasy alliance against their common enemy.

National Archives

the eventuality, few believed it would occur.

Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall told Roosevelt in May 1941 that Pearl
Harbor was the strongest fortress in the
world. Enemy carriers, naval escorts and transports will begin to come under air attack at a
distance of approximately 750 miles. This
attack will increase in intensity until within
200 miles of the objective, the enemy forces
will be subject to all types of bombardment
closely supported by our most modern pursuit.
An invader would face more than 35,000
troops backed by coast defense guns and antiaircraft artillery. This optimistic evaluation
would shortly be tested and found wanting.
Although small numbers of American troops
filtered to various U.S. possessions in the
Pacific, the country did not possess enough
forces to pose a deterrent to the Japanese. Only
400 Marines and Navy personnel defended
Wake Island; the same number guarded Guam.
Most of the Navys 347 warships steamed in
Atlantic waters. Should Japan attack, it was not
likely that American troops could do anything
but fight as long as they could, and then surrender. A glimmer of hope emanated from the
Philippines, but MacArthur needed until at
least early 1942 to be adequately prepared.
Top American military planners held one ace
in their hands. Army and Navy codebreakers
had cracked Japans diplomatic code. From
1935 to 1939 they intercepted and read most
of the messages that passed from Tokyo to
overseas embassies. The Japanese switched
codes in March 1939, but American codebreakers, aided by the theft of secret material
from the Japanese embassy in Washington,
D.C., cracked the new code and learned of
Japanese intentions before they acted. This
codebreaking operation, called Magic, provided valuable information throughout the
duration of the war and helped influence the
outcome of some of the most crucial battles.
Magic intercepts informed the United States
of Japans advance into French Indochina. Since
Hitler had defeated France and the Netherlands
and appeared about to knock Great Britain out
of the war, Japan saw an opportunity to seize
European possessions in the Pacific and gain
control of their valuable resources. In September 1940, the Japanese signed the Tripartite
Pact with Germany and Italy. The agreement
bound each party to declare war on any nation
that joined the war against one of the three. The
three hoped this alliance would deter the United
States from entering the conflict.
Japan then applied pressure on a weakened

23

National Archives

PH-Road to War-NEW_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:14 PM Page 24

Japanese machine gunners pause during their pursuit of a retreating Chinese infantry unit. Moving with incredible speed, the Japanese conquered large amounts of Chinese territory in a relatively short period of time.

Ninety warships and 1,000 aircraft supported

them. Japan could count on 2.4 million welltrained troops, many of whom had been battle
tested, supported by 7,500 aircraft and 230
warships.
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, however,
insisted that the only hope of victory against an
industrial giant such as the United States lay in
a successful preemptive strike at the U.S. Pacific
Fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.
Yamamoto prevailed, and on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Japanese aircraft fell upon the
unsuspecting fleet at Pearl Harbor and hit other
Navy and Army Air Corps installations on the
island of Oahu, inflicting tremendous damage
and loss of life. The fighting capability of the
U.S. armed forces in the Pacific was crippled.
On December 8, in Washington, D.C., in
words that have resonated through the years,
President Roosevelt asked Congress to declare
war on Japan. Yesterday, December 7, 1941,
a date which will live in infamy, the United
States of America was suddenly and deliberately
attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire
of Japan. When Congress overwhelmingly
passed the resolution, the United States was at
war. For the first time in many months, Winston Churchill thought that victory lay within
the Allies grasp and went to bed and slept the
24

sleep of the saved and the thankful.

The American military tried to rebound from
catastrophe. Eight congressional and military
boards concluded that the Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Kimmel, and Army Commandant Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, had been
negligent in their duties. The two were quickly
relieved of their posts. In an effort to raise
morale, a Navy message to troops at Pearl Harbor said, You will have your revenge. Recruiting stations are jammed with men eager to join
you.
At the same time Japanese aircraft blitzed
Pearl Harbor, other Japanese units advanced
toward Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and
other Pacific islands. In the first of three huge
military operations, the Japanese Army planned
to move through Malaya, then split into two
groups and swing west into Burma and east
toward the Dutch East Indies. From Formosa,
other units would strike American forces in the
Philippines, while the Japanese Navy steamed
in the Pacific to seize control of Guam, Wake
Island, and the Gilberts. Once they accomplished these moves, the Japanese intended to
construct a defensive barrier behind which they
could exploit the resources of Asia and the
Pacific. By the time the United States recovered
sufficiently from Pearl Harbor to mount a

counteroffensive, which the Japanese predicted

would take at least 18 months, their forces
would be so firmly ensconced behind the defensive barrier that they could not be dislodged.
On December 9, Japan quickly took Tarawa
in the Gilbert Islands against minor opposition.
The next day, 5,400 Japanese attacked the 427
U.S. Marine Corps and Navy personnel stationed at Guam, 1,500 miles east of Manila.
Although the men battled heroically, they were
forced to surrender within one day.
Five hours after Pearl Harbor, more than 200
Japanese aircraft approached American military installations in the Philippines. Since news
of the Pearl Harbor attack had already flashed
around the world, the Japanese aviators
expected stiff resistance from American fighters
and antiaircraft guns.
In a surprise even more astonishing than
Pearl Harbor, they encountered very little.
Delighted fliers dove on American bombers and
fighters neatly arranged in rows and inflicted a
second major blow to American forces stationed in the Pacific. The commander of Allied
forces in the Philippines, General Douglas
MacArthur, lost much of his air capability in a
matter of minutes.
MacArthur, one of the American militarys
most heralded officers, now scrambled to

assemble a defensive stance with which to

confront the inevitable Japanese land assault.
He commanded over 100,000 soldiers, but
less than one-third were experienced veterans. The remainder were newcomers to the
Philippines or Filipino soldiers who had
received little training.
MacArthur predicted that the Japanese
would land at Lingayen Gulf 120 miles north
of Manila. He intended to place most of his
men along the southern shore of Lingayen Gulf,
fight as long as possible, then withdraw to the
south into the Bataan Peninsula and wait for
reinforcements to arrive from the United States.
On December 22, a force of 43,000 Japanese
soldiers under Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma
landed at Lingayen Gulf, but farther to the
north than MacArthur expected. Meeting little
opposition, the Japanese Army raced behind
MacArthurs surprised soldiers and began closing in from the rear. At the same time, a second
invasion force landed 70 miles south of Manila
at Lamon Bay and headed toward the capital.
Caught in this predicament, MacArthur had no
choice but to order a hasty retreat into the
Bataan Peninsula to avoid being trapped by the
two forces.
Barely 20,000 soldiers were healthy enough
on Bataan to oppose the Japanese. When
Homma renewed his offensive, the Americans
and Filipinos could not hold on for long.
After a five-hour bombardment on April 3,
fresh Japanese reinforcements, backed by
artillery and armor, punched holes all along the
thin American defensive line. The Americans
and Filipinos maintained the line long enough
to evacuate 2,000 men and 104 nurses to the
island of Corregidor in Manila Bay, but continued resistance was futile. On April 9, roughly
12,000 American and 63,000 Filipino soldiers
on Bataan lay down their arms on orders from
Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr.
The Western powers, who had only six
months previous ruled much of the Far East
and the Pacific, were now reduced to the
trapped garrison on Corregidor. Japan had triumphed everywhere else, and she would soon
add one more conquest.
For one month Japanese artillery bombarded
Corregidor around the clock to weaken the
defenders for the final attack. During the night
of May 5-6, Japanese forces crossed over from
Bataan, fought through the minor resistance
existing at the beaches, and spread throughout
the island. Realizing that the end had come,
Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright surrendered his forces. When the Japanese threatened

National Archives

PH-Road to War-NEW_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:14 PM Page 25

As their wary captors look on, American and Filipino soldiers display the white flag of surrender. In the spring of
1942, the last organized resistance to the Japanese in the Philippines came to an end on Corregidor.

to continue the killing unless Wainwright

ordered the surrender of all American troops
in the Philippines, not just those on Corregidor,
Wainwright issued the directive. He feared that
unless he agreed the Japanese would exact their
anger on the wounded and the nurses in Malinta Tunnels hospital. Some Americans stationed elsewhere in the Philippines complied
with Wainwrights order, but many fled into the
jungle to continue resisting.
Moments before the surrender, Army Signal
Corps Private Irving Strobing sent a radio message that was recorded at Pearl Harbor and
aired three weeks later on a radio program.
The jig is up. Everyone is bawling like a baby.
They are piling dead and wounded in our tunnel. I know now how a mouse feels. Caught in
a trap waiting for guys to come along and finish it up. My name is Irving Strobing. Get this
to my mother, Mrs. Minnie Strobing, 605 Barbey Street, Brooklyn, N.Y. My love to Pa, Joe
[brother], Sue [sister], Mac, Garry, Joy and
Paul. Tell Joe, wherever he is, go give em hell
for us. God bless you and keep you.
Wainwright added his own touching message. On May 6, he cabled his commander in
chief, President Franklin Roosevelt: With broken heart, and head bowed in sadness but not
in shame, I report to Your Excellency that today

I must arrange terms for the surrender of the

fortified islands of Manila Bay. With profound
regret and with continued pride in my gallant
men, I go to meet the Japanese commander.
Good-bye, Mr. President.
With the collapse of resistance in the Philippines, the Japanese controlled the Pacific from
Hawaii to the Far East. Only in Australia did
the Allies maintain a slim hold.
The American Navy had been manhandled at
Pearl Harbor, the American Army had been
forced out of the Philippines, and the American Marines had surrendered at Wake Island
and Guam. The British lost much of their fleet
as well as their two major possessions in the
Far East, Singapore and Hong Kong. After 300
years, the Dutch lost the Indies. The only news
that energized the American public, the electrifying defenses at Wake Island and Bataan,
resulted in additional defeats.
Just when things seemed their worst, events
in the first week of May 1942 cast a glimmer
of hope. The U.S. Navy, aided by radio intelligence, started to turn the tide. At the Battle of
the Coral Sea, a Japanese invasion force was
turned back from Port Moresby on the island
of New Guinea. Weeks later, the epic Battle of
Midway would change the balance of power in
the Pacific permanently.
25

PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:20 PM Page 26

SUNDAY MORNING

SHATTERED
AT 9PM

on the evening of December 6,

1941, Vice Admiral Chuichi
Nagumo of the Imperial Japanese Navy called all hands
aboard the aircraft carrier Akagi to attention.
Addressing the assembly, Nagumo read a message from
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the
Combined Fleet. The rise or fall of the empire depends on
this battle. Everyone will do his duty to the utmost.
Just before sunrise on Sunday, December 7, the six aircraft carriers under
Nagumos direct commandthe flagship Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu,
Shokaku, and Zuikakuwould turn into the wind and launch a powerful
aerial striking force, 353 planes, in two waves. The target of the First Air Fleet
was the anchorage of the U.S. Navys Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on the
island of Oahu in the territory of Hawaii. Other installations of the U.S.
Navy and the ArmyHickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field, Ewa
Marine Corps Air Station, and the naval air stations at Kaneohe and on Ford
Island in the heart of Pearl Harborwere to be hit as well. Other Japanese
forces were to strike the Philippines, Wake Island, Midway Atoll, and Malaya.
For Japan, the road to war with the United States had been long and virtually inevitable. Since the turn of the century, the island nation had exerted growing political influence in the Pacific. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905,
its armed forces became the first Asians to vanquish the military of a traditional
European power, inflicting a humiliating defeat on czarist Russia. Since 1910,
Japan had exercised rule over Korea by mandate. Following World War I, former German possessions in the Pacific, including the islands of the Marshalls,
Carolines, and Marianas, came under Japanese administration as well.
Since the early 1930s a wave of militarism had gained influence in the halls
of Japans government. Though subservient to Emperor Hirohito, the virtual
God-Man who sat on the Chrysanthemum Throne, the militarists led by
General Hideki Tojo held sway in the political arena. Touting Asia for
Asians, the militarists intended to eject Western influence from the Pacific
and the Asian mainland.
Referring to their initiative as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere, the Japanese interpretation of Asia for Asians was better understood as Asia for the Japanese. In 1931, the Kwantung Army invaded
northern China and took control of the region of Manchuria, renaming it

BY MICHAEL E. HASKEW
26

This painting by James

Dietz captures the magnitude of destruction
inflicted on the U.S. fleet
at Pearl Harbor by the
Japanese airborne
attack. The American
flag flying at lower right
reminds the viewer that
this was not the end, but
rather the beginning of
Americas involvement
in the war.

PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:21 PM Page 27

Painting James Dietz

Japanese planes
attacked Pearl
Harbor and other
installations on
the island of Oahu
and plunged the
United States into
World War II.

27

PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:21 PM Page 28

Manchukuo and installing a puppet government friendly to Japanese interests. By 1940,

negotiations with the Vichy government of
France allowed Japanese troops to occupy
northern Indochina, positioning them dangerously close to the resources of oil, rubber, and
tin in the Dutch East Indies.
Secretly, Japan continued to expand its military capability during the 1930s, contravening
the Washington Naval Treaty of 1923 and
eventually repudiating its terms by the end of
1934. The treaty limited U.S., British, and
Japanese naval tonnage and the ratio of warships each country could build to 5:5:3 respectively. Ostensibly, this was because the United
States and Britain were responsible for greater
expanses of the worlds oceans. The Japanese
considered the treaty an affront to their preeminence in the Pacific.
Meanwhile, in May 1940, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt ordered the Pacific Fleet to relocate from its primary base in San Diego, California, to the anchorage at Pearl Harbor, an
obvious indication to the Japanese that the
United States would respond to continued

aggression with force if necessary. On July 19,

Congress passed the Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act in response to the Japanese threat and
the real possibility that Great Britain, standing
alone, would succumb to Nazi Germany. The
legislation authorized the U.S. Navy to construct 18 fleet aircraft carriers, 11 battleships,
six battlecruisers, 27 cruisers, 115 destroyers,
and 43 submarines. These were to complement
the existing 358 surface and submarine units
already active as well as an additional 130 vessels under construction at the time. It was an
ominous development for the Japanese.
The United States countered continuing
Japanese expansion with a series of economic
sanctions. In the summer of 1940, an embargo
on shipments of aviation fuel and scrap iron to
Japan was imposed. On September 27, Japanese diplomats signed the Tripartite Pact, joining
the Axis powers of Nazi Germany and Fascist
Italy. Following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet
Union on June 22, 1941, the Japanese occupied
all of Indochina. President Roosevelt froze
Japanese assets in the United States. Sanctions
were escalated with embargoes of other mate-

FLIGHT DECKS VIBRATED WITH THE ROAR OF

AIRCRAFT ENGINES WARMING UP. NOW A GREEN

U.S. Navy

LAMP WAS WAVED IN A CIRCLE. TAKE OFF!

28

rials such as steel, copper, bronze, machinery,

and oil; Japan imported at least 80 percent of
its oil from the United States.
Soon after, the U.S. demand that Japan withdraw its forces from China and Indochina placed
the government of Tojo, who ascended to the
office of prime minister in October 1941, at a
crossroads. Withdrawal from the Asian continent meant loss of face and the surrender of all
territorial gains the Japanese had won since
1937. Moderates in the government were muzzled. For the militarists, the only option was war.
Yamamoto, the principal architect of the Pearl
Harbor operation, was well aware of the risks
posed by such an offensive action. At 57, he had
lost two fingers on his left hand at the great
naval Battle of Tsushima in 1905, earned his
naval pilots credentials at the age of 40, and
trained airmen for the Imperial Navy. He had
traveled to the United States in the 1920s as a
naval attach and studied at Harvard University. He had seen the tremendous industrial
capacity of the United States and warned that a
prolonged war would almost certainly have
unfavorable consequences for Japan.
Candidly, Yamamoto once told colleagues,
If I am told to fight regardless of the consequences, I shall run wild for the first six months
or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for
the second or third year.
Although the staff of the Combined Fleet
began planning in earnest for a strike against
Pearl Harbor in January 1941, the premise had
been discussed, tested during war games, and
shelved several times during the years between
the world wars. Lt. Cmdr. Minoru Genda, perhaps the best known and most respected aviator in the Japanese military, had observed
American carriers operating cooperatively in a
single strike force and attended war games in
1936 during which a Pearl Harbor attack scenario had played out negatively. Nevertheless,
Genda was one of a few officers who saw the
potential for a carrier task force to deliver a successful blow against an enemy fleet at anchor.
In November 1940, the attack by British
Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers against the
Italian naval anchorage at Taranto bolstered
Japanese confidence. The 21 antiquated British
biplanes had sunk one Italian battleship and
damaged two others in the harbor.
As Japanese aircraft carrier strength reached
sufficient levels to support a Pearl Harbor
attack, Yamamoto instructed Admiral Takajiro
Onishi, chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet,
to order Genda to evaluate the potential for
success with special attention to the feasibil-

ity of the operation, method of execution, and

the forces to be used.
By August, the basic plan had been approved.
The six aircraft carriers of the First Air Fleet
were to be accompanied by an armada of two
battleships, two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser,
nine destroyers, three submarines, and eight
tankers, a total of 31 vessels, sailing from
Hitokappu Bay in the Kurile Islands on
November 26. The fleet was to take a northerly
course in order to avoid well-traveled trade
routes and merchant shipping, maintain strict
radio silence, and launch its aircraft in two
waves from a point 230 miles north of Oahu on
December 7. A cordon of fleet submarines was
positioned around Oahu to attack any U.S.
ships that might be at sea near the harbor, and
five midget submarines were to be launched
from their mother submarines hours before the
aerial attack with the hope of infiltrating the
harbor and launching torpedoes at anchored
vessels of the Pacific Fleet.
Training was exhaustive. As Japanese pilots
executed mock torpedo, level-bombing, and
dive-bombing attacks against stationary targets, there were two significant ordnancerelated issues to overcome. The standard level
and torpedo bomber of the Japanese Navy, the
Nakajima B5N Kate, had to be modified to
carry and deliver the 1,760-pound Type 5
armor-piercing bomb, adapted from a 16-inch
naval artillery shell, while the principal-dive
bomber, the Aichi D3A1 Val, was refitted to
carry the 550-pound Type 99 bomb. Further,
the waters of Pearl Harbor were shallowin
some areas the depth was less than 40 feet.
Therefore, the Kates standard 1,750-pound
aerial torpedo could be expected to plunge into
the mud of the harbor before stabilizing to run.
This problem was solved with the addition of
wooden fins to allow the torpedoes to quickly
stabilize and run at a more shallow depth.
Early in September, senior Japanese officers
convened at the Naval War College in Tokyo and
finalized plans for the attack. The following
month, senior pilots were informed of the target
against which they had been training so strenuously. Combined Fleet Top Secret Operational
Order No. 1 was issued on November 5, followed 48 hours later by Order No. 2, authorizing the fleet to sortie at the end of the month and
to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor.
When the fleet set sail, Admiral Kichisaburo
Nomura and special envoy Saburo Kurusu were
in Washington, D.C., conducting last-ditch
negotiations with Secretary of State Cordell Hull
and President Roosevelt. In the event that these

Both:U.S. Navy

PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:22 PM Page 29

TOP: Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto studied at Harvard after

World War I and later had much to do with the Pearl Harbor attack. ABOVE: Admiral H.E. Kimmel at right confers
over maps with his operations officer, Captain Walter
DeLany, on December 2. OPPOSITE: Japanese airmen
ready their bombers and torpedo planes for the attack.

negotiations failed, specific orders to launch the

attack would be issued to Nagumo at sea, while
the emissaries were instructed to deliver a message to the U.S. government officially terminating the negotiations and essentially declaring
war a half hour before the Japanese aircraft
appeared in the sky above Pearl Harbor.
For the United States, the coming of war with
Japan was the culmination of a steady stream of
provocative moves on the part of the upstart
Asian nation. Not only had the Japanese conquered vast areas of China, a country whose sovereignty the United States had served as something of a self-appointed guarantor for half a
century, but they had also bombed and sunk the
gunboat USS Panay on the Yangtze River in
1937. A half-hearted apology and reparations

payments did little to improve relations between

the two countries. The signing of the Tripartite
Pact and occupation of all of Indochina were followed by a series of Japanese demands delivered
by Nomura and Kurusu on November 17, 1941.
To maintain the tenuous peace, the Japanese
would require that the United States recognize
the state of Manchukuo; allow a free hand for
Japan to move militarily, diplomatically, or
both against the Dutch East Indies and its natural resources; pledge to refrain from interference with Japanese operations in China; end its
military and civilian aid to the Chinese; recognize the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere; and lift the damaging trade embargo
imposed against Japan.
Nine days later, as Nagumo sailed from
Hitokappu Bay, the U.S. response was predictable. American demands were forthright.
The Japanese were to repudiate the Tripartite
Pact, recognize the Nationalist Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek, agree to a nonaggression pact among the nations of the Pacific,
withdraw their armed forces from China and
Indochina, guarantee the territorial integrity of
China, and agree to abide by the rules of international law in their foreign relations.
On November 30, following a final conference in Tokyo that rejected the U.S. terms
issued four days earlier, a message was sent to
Nomura and Kurusu. Reading, East Wind,
Rain, it was coded instruction for Japanese
diplomats to destroy their sensitive or classified
documents. On December 1, the irrevocable
order confirming the attack on Pearl Harbor,
Climb Mount Niitaka, was received by
Nagumo. A personal appeal from Roosevelt to
Hirohito went unanswered.
Neither of the Japanese envoys realized that
they were merely pawns in their governments
march toward war. They had requested an
audience with Secretary Hull at 1 PM on
December 7 to dutifully deliver a note rejecting
the American demands. Hull agreed to receive
them at 1:45, and they arrived 20 minutes late.
They waited another 15 minutes before entering the secretarys office. When they handed
Hull the note, he was already aware that the
attack on Pearl Harbor was under way and
delivered a blistering response.
I must say that in all my conversations with
you during the last nine months, he roared, I
have never uttered one word of untruth. This is
borne out absolutely by the record. In all my 50
years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous
falsehoods and distortionsinfamous false29

hoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I

never imagined that any government on this
planet was capable of uttering them.
Dumbfounded, Nomura and Kurusu were
shown the door.
When Admiral Joseph Richardson, commander of the Pacific Fleet, opposed Roosevelts
order to relocate his warships from San Diego
to Pearl Harbor, he was relieved in February
1941. His replacement, Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, was a veteran of nearly 40 years service with the U.S. Navy. Kimmel commanded
an imposing force of three aircraft carriers, the
Lexington, Enterprise, and Saratoga; nine battleships, Arizona, California, Nevada, Maryland, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and
Colorado, which was being overhauled at the
Puget Sound Navy Yard in Washington at the
time of the attack; 12 heavy cruisers, nine light
cruisers, 53 destroyers, and a complement of
submarines and auxiliary and service vessels.
Kimmel was faced with the daunting task of
supply and security in a confined harbor that
required some smaller warships to be clustered
together. Ships in need of complicated repair
were obliged to return to the West Coast, and
the logistical lifeline from the mainland of the
United States was long.
Kimmels Army counterpart, Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, had been appointed in February
and was responsible for the islands air defenses.
His greatest concern was sabotage, particularly
since a large percentage of the population of
Oahu was of Japanese ancestry, and he ordered
the 230 Army aircraft across the island to be
parked wingtip to wingtip so that they were
more easily guarded against Japanese sympathizers who might take up arms.
Both Kimmel and Short were held responsible for the debacle at Pearl Harbor, and no
fewer than eight commissions conducted hearings into the performance of the commanders
prior to the attack. The most prominent of
these, the Roberts Commission, convened in
late December 1941 and found both men guilty
of dereliction of duty. Forced into retirement,
they spent the remainder of their lives attempting to clear their names. Even after their deaths,
family members continued the battle in the halls
of Congress. Finally, on May 25, 1999, Kimmel
and Short were exonerated by the U.S. Senate
in a 52 to 47 vote.
The controversy continues to this day, and
defenders of the maligned commanders assert
that neither was fully informed as to the steady
deterioration of the negotiations with the
Japanese. Neither was allowed access to the
30

Both:U.S. Navy

PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:23 PM Page 30

ABOVE: A Val goes down in flames as the Americans

fight back with determination. TOP: A Japanese Val
releases one of its bombs in the attack to put the U.S.
fleet out of action as a force in the Pacific Ocean.

decrypts of Japanese diplomatic messages,

which U.S. cryptanalysts had been intercepting
and reading for some time. The interpretation
of some orders had been considered to reference the threat of sabotage rather than defensive measures against a full-scale enemy attack.
At best, the orders from Washington, D.C., had
appeared at times to be contradictory.
Detractors maintain that both Kimmel and
Short knew or should have known that their
commands were vulnerable to Japanese attack.
In January 1941, Secretary of the Navy Frank
Knox had written to Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson in reference to Hawaii, If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that
hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack
upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The dangers envisaged in their order of
importance and probability are considered to be:
(1) Air bombing attack, (2) Air torpedo plane
attack, (3) Sabotage, (4) Submarine attack, (5)
Mining, (6) Bombardment by gunfire.
A copy of the Knox letter and subsequent
communications were delivered to both the
commanders on Oahu. Still, many believed that
the Japanese would strike first in the Dutch East
Indies, Singapore, or the Philippines.
On the morning of December 7, an urgent
telegram from General George C. Marshall,
U.S. Chief of Staff, warning of the breakdown
in negotiations, was being delivered by RCA to
Pearl Harbor through normal commercial
means. Atmospheric interference had prevented

the message from being delivered through military channels. As the courier pedaled a bicycle
toward the military base, the hour approached
8 AM local time, 2 PM in Washington, D.C.,
Japanese planes were already poised to drop
their deadly cargoes.
Lieutenant Commander Mitsuo Fuchida,
commander of the air groups of the First Air
Fleet, was assigned the task of allocating aircraft to specific targets, organizing the two
waves of planes to coordinate their strikes, and
providing fighter protection against any American aircraft that might make it into the sky to
give battle. Fuchida placed 185 aircraft in the
first wave. It consisted of 49 Kates carrying
armor-piercing bombs, 40 Kates with aerial torpedoes, 51 Vals with general-purpose bombs,
and 45 superb Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero fighters.
Armed with a pair of 20mm cannons and twin
7.7mm machine guns, the highly maneuverable
Zero was arguably the finest aircraft of its type
in the world and dominated the skies early in
the Pacific War.
While the Kates hit the warships anchored in
Pearl Harbor, 25 Vals were detailed to strike
the primary American fighter base at Wheeler
Field. Seventeen more Vals targeted Ford
Islands patrol plane and fighter base, and nine
were to strike American bombers based at
Hickam Field. The Zeros of the first wave were
to provide fighter cover and strafe targets of
opportunity. The second wave included 54
Kates armed with 550- and 125-pound bombs
to strike the airfields, 80 Vals with 550-pound
bombs to attack the warships in the harbor, and
36 marauding Zeros.
Fuchida recalled an intelligence message
received on the day before the attack was
launched. Tinged with both optimism that the
element of surprise would be achieved and disappointment that the three aircraft carriers were
not present at the anchorage, it read, No balloons, no torpedo defense nets deployed around
battleships in Pearl Harbor. All battleships are
in. No indications from enemy radio activity
that ocean patrol flights being made in Hawaiian area. Lexington left harbor yesterday. Enterprise also thought to be operating at sea.
The Lexington was headed to Midway Atoll
to deliver a squadron of Marine bombers.
Delayed by a storm, Enterprise was returning
to Pearl Harbor after delivering supplies to
Wake Island. The third aircraft carrier, Saratoga,
was steaming into the harbor at San Diego as
the Pearl Harbor attack got underway.
Just before dawn, the first Zero fighter rose
from the deck of Akagi. Fuchida watched the

PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:23 PM Page 31

Ward fired two 4-inch shells. The first, from

Turret No. 1, missed, directly overshooting the
conning tower. The second, from Turret No. 3,
scored a direct hit. This was followed by a pattern of depth charges.
An oil slick was observed, and at 6:45 Outerbridge sent a message to the Commandant of

the Fourteenth Naval District that read, We

have attacked, fired upon, and dropped depth
charges on a submarine operating in defensive
sea areas. The message was delayed for 23
minutes during decoding, and it was not distributed in time to provide any appreciable
warning of the impending attack. Ironically,

BELOW: The Japanese caught most of the American planes on the ground and made short work of turning them into
twisted hulks. BOTTOM: The USS Shaw explodes in a fierce and roiling fireball, the USS Nevada nearby.

Both: National Archives

scene unfold. The battle flag was now flying

at each masthead, he later wrote. There was
a heavy pitch and roll that had caused some
hesitation about taking off in the dark. I
decided it was feasible. Flight decks vibrated
with the roar of aircraft engines warming up.
Now a green lamp was waved in a circle. Take
off!. Within 15 minutes 183 fighters,
bombers and torpedo planes had taken off
from the six carriers and were forming up in
the still dark sky, guided only by the signal
lights of the lead plane. After circling over the
fleet formation, we set course due south for
Pearl Harbor. The time was 6:15 AM.
Two Zeros of the first wave were lost early
in the operation. One crashed on takeoff, and
the other aborted with engine trouble.
On the evening of December 6, 1941, the
band of the battleship USS Arizona performed in
the Pacific Fleet competition at Pearl Harbor.
Military personnel frequented the bars, restaurants, and other establishments rendering hospitality in Honolulu. Officers and their wives
dined and danced. The moon glistened on the
calm waters lapping the beach at Waikiki. Soothing island music streamed across the airwaves
from radio station KGMB, heard by both those
on the island of Oahu and the Japanese naval
personnel aboard warships surging through
rough seas. The large clock at the height of Aloha
Tower ticked away the last hours of peace.
Moored along Pearl Harbors Battleship Row
at the eastern end of Ford Island were the battleships Maryland inboard of the Oklahoma,
Tennessee inboard of West Virginia, Arizona
inboard of the repair ship Vestal 200 feet from
the stern of Tennessee, and Nevada astern of
Arizona. Just to the west lay the battleship California. The Pennsylvania was in Drydock 1
along with the destroyers Cassin and Downes.
On the western side of Ford Island were
moored the old target battleship Utah, the light
cruisers Detroit and Raleigh, and the seaplane
tender Tangier. Altogether, 96 warships of the
U.S. Navy were present in Pearl Harbor.
At about 3:45 AM on the fateful morning of
December 7, the destroyer USS Ward, on routine patrol outside the entrance to the harbor,
was informed by the minesweeper Condor that
a submarine had been sighted. The destroyer
responded but found nothing. Three hours later,
the cargo ship Antares approached the entrance
to Pearl Harbor with a barge in tow. The watch
aboard Antares spotted a conning tower and
periscope and summoned the Ward once again.
This time, the destroyers skipper, Lt. Cmdr.
William Outerbridge, ordered an attack. The

31

PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:23 PM Page 32

instead of the Japanese, it was a U.S. destroyer

that fired the first shots of the Pacific War, and
the first casualties were the two Japanese sailors
aboard the midget submarine.
A scant 15 minutes after the Ward sent news
of its encounter with the Japanese midget submarine, two soldiers were operating a new
radar station at Opana above Kahuku Point on
the north shore of Oahu. Rather than shutting
down at their appointed time of 7 AM, the soldiers reportedly continued to operate the radar
for a few more minutes. Suddenly, a collection
of blips appeared on their screen. One of the
soldiers later recalled that collectively the formation was much larger than anything he had

ever seen. The first wave of Japanese attackers

had been discovered.
The contact was reported to Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, the duty officer at the aircraft tracking center at Fort Shafter. Tyler was aware that
a flight of Boeing B-17 bombers was due to
arrive from California that morning and
assumed that the radar blips were these
friendly aircraft. It was Tylers second day on
the job, and the only soldier with him in the
center that morning was a private operating
the telephone switchboard.
I knew the equipment was pretty new,
Tyler said in a newspaper interview years later.
In fact, the guy who was on the scope, who

SUDDENLY A COLOSSAL EXPLOSION OCCURRED

IN BATTLESHIP ROW. A HUGE COLUMN OF
DARK RED SMOKE ROSE TO 1,000 FEET, AND A

National Archives

STIFF SHOCK WAVE REACHED OUR PLANE.

32

first detected the planes, it was the first time

hed ever sat at the scope. So I figured they were
pretty green and had not had any opportunity
to view a flight of B-17s coming in. Common
sense said, Well, these are the B-17s. So I told
them, Dont worry about it.
A board of inquiry cleared Tyler of any wrongdoing on December 7, 1941, and he served in
the U.S. Air Force another 20 years, retiring with
the rank of lieutenant colonel. He died in 2010
at the age of 96, haunted for decades by the
events of that morning. Regardless, had anyone
realized that the radar contact was an approaching hostile force, there would have been precious
little time to alter the course of events.
At 7:40 AM, the north shore of Oahu came
into Fuchidas line of sight. He signaled to
Nagumo, Tora! Tora! Tora!confirming
that complete surprise had been achieved. He
fired a pistol flare, indicating that the torpedo
bombers should attack first; however, the divebombers were confused and began their
attacks, their leader, Lt. Cmdr. Kakuichi Taka-

PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:24 PM Page 33

hashi, climbing to 12,000 feet. The torpedo

planes of Lt. Cmdr. Shigeharu Murata
descended to make their runs against Battleship
Row. Fuchida and the level bombers moved
west to south in a great arc toward the harbor.
Zero fighters under Lt. Cmdr. Shigeru Itaya
opened the Japanese attack, strafing Kaneohe
Naval Air Station at 7:48. Seven minutes later,
Ford Island and Hickam Field were under
attack by the dive-bombers. At 7:57, the first
torpedo planes released their weapons. The
level bombers attacked the harbor at 8:05.
As the Japanese attack roared across Oahu,
sailors aboard ships in Pearl Harbor were
preparing to raise their colors. Sunday morning
church services were about to get under way,
and awnings had been stretched across the
decks of some ships to provide relief from the
morning sun. Within moments, chaos reigned.
Torpedo-laden Kates under Lieutenant Jinchi
Goto, flying as low as 50 feet, lined up on the
Oklahoma and slammed three torpedoes into
her port side. Almost immediately, the battleAntiaircraft fire mingles with
smoke from burning U.S. ships.
The attack on the fleet at Pearl
Harbor was a shock that had
enormous repercussions. It drew
the United States into war and,
eventually, world leadership.

ship began to list to 45 degrees. Two more torpedoes found their mark, and the great vessel
rolled over and capsized, trapping a number of
sailors below decks. The West Virginia was
struck by a total of seven torpedoes and also
began to list; however, alert counterflooding
allowed the ship to settle to the bottom of the
harbor on an even keel. On the other side of
Ford Island, the Utah took two torpedoes and
capsized. A third torpedo hit the Raleigh below
the bridge, flooding its forward engine room.
When it was apparent that the West Virginia
was sinking, two torpedo planes veered southward and scored hits on the California, which
began to blaze and take on water. The destroyer
Bagley shot down one Kate making a torpedo
run against the Nevada, but a second succeeded
in hitting the battleship forward near its main
14-inch gun turrets.
Fuchida watched the growing carnage and
remembered, As my group made its bomb
run, American antiaircraft from shipboard and
shore batteries suddenly came to life. Dark gray
bursts blossomed here and there until the sky
was clouded with shattering near misses that
made our plane tremble. The counterattack
came less than five minutes after the first bomb
had fallen.
Suddenly a colossal explosion occurred in
Battleship Row. A huge column of dark red
smoke rose to 1,000 feet, and a stiff shock
wave reached our plane. Studying Battleship
Row through binoculars, I saw the big explosion had been on the Arizona. She was still
flaming fiercely, and since her smoke covered
the Nevada, the target of my group, I looked
for some other ship to attack. The Tennessee
was already on fire, but next to her was the
Maryland. I gave an order changing our target
to this ship.
As the lead bombardier dropped his bomb,
the pilots, observers and radiomen in the other
planes shouted, Release! and down went all
our bombs. I lay flat on the floor to watch
through a peephole. Four bombs in perfect pattern plummeted like devils of doom. They grew
smaller and smaller until they looked like
poppy seeds and finally disappeared just as tiny
white flashes appeared on and near the ship.
From a great altitude near misses are much
more obvious than direct hits because they create wave rings in the water which are plain to
see. Observing two such rings and two tiny
flashes, I shouted, Two hits!
The catastrophic explosion Fuchida witnessed had indeed taken place aboard the
32,500-ton Arizona. One of the best known

ships in the U.S. Navy, she had been featured in

the 1934 Warner Brothers film Here Comes the
Navy, starring James Cagney. Several Japanese
bombers attacked the Arizona, scoring two
hits. The first bomb damaged air intakes and
caused a shaft of smoke to rise from the stack.
The second bomb struck the ship slightly aft of
Turret No. 2, passing through the main and second decks, crew quarters below, and exploding
on the third deck directly above the powder
magazines for the 14-inch main batteries. This
deck was armored with five inches of steel.
Some conjecture continues to surround the
horrific explosion that doomed the Arizona. A
report by the naval Bureau of Ships concluded
three years after the attack that the magazines
had been detonated through a series of unfortunate events. It surmised that ruptured oil had
seeped from the forward tanks and ignited
around the turrets. Five hatches led to the magazines from the third deck, and one of these contained 1,075 pounds of black powder that was
used to operate the catapults for the battleships
three scout planes. Apparently, the fire ignited
the black powder through one of the five
hatches that had not been secured. That initial
explosion in turn touched off six magazines,
each stuffed with 10 tons of powder for the 14inch guns, and three magazines, each with 13
tons of powder, for the forward 5-inch guns.
Within seconds, more than 1,100 men were
killed or mortally wounded. Twenty sailors
were trapped for a few harrowing moments
inside one of the Arizonas 14-inch turrets. With
only a single flashlight to pierce the dark in the
smoke-filled space, one sailor found a ladder to
a hatch. When it was opened, these fortunate
few spilled onto the shattered deck and made
their way toward Ford Island. A single heroic
officer returned to the holocaust several times,
helping to rescue badly burned sailors.
Of the 50 or 60 men manning the station
where I was, I think only about six of us survived, remembered Seaman Don Stratton. I
was burned over 60 percent of my body. The
Vestal, a repair ship that was tied up alongside
us, threw us a line and we went across hand
over hand, 45 feet up in the air.
In the space of a few minutes, more than
2,000 Americans were dead. Among them was
Captain Mervyn Bennion of the West Virginia.
Calmly directing the damage control and antiaircraft efforts of his crew, Bennion was seriously wounded by shrapnel from a bomb blast.
He refused to be evacuated and continued to
issue orders while holding his wound closed
with one hand. Bennion eventually bled to
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PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:24 PM Page 34

death and was awarded a posthumous Medal

of Honor for his gallantry.
Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, commander of
Battleship Division One, and Captain Franklin
Van Valkenburgh, commander of the Arizona,
each received a posthumous Medal of Honor
for heroism on December 7. Kidd stood on the
signal bridge of the Arizona and issued orders
until he was killed in the devastating magazine
explosion. Although his body was never found,
Kidds ring from the U.S. Naval Academy class
of 1906, fused by the searing heat to one of the
battleships steel bulkheads, was later located by
Navy divers. Van Valkenburgh reached the navigation bridge and was quickly urged by a junior
officer to move to the conning tower, away from
intense Japanese strafing. The captain refused.
A single man survived the violent explosion that
raked the navigation bridge with debris, and
Van Valkenburghs ring from the Naval Academy class of 1909 was later recovered.
As the first bombs fell on Ford Island Naval
Air Station, Lt. Cmdr. Logan Ramsey, the operations officer of Patrol Wing Two, ordered the
radio room to send the plain language message:
Air Raid Pearl Harbor. This Is No Drill. One
hangar took five bomb hits, and others were
damaged. At Hickam Field, 35 men were killed
while they were eating breakfast when a Japanese bomb smashed the mess hall. More than 20
others were killed as they readied bombers for
training flights. A large barracks and other
installations were utterly destroyed. At Wheeler
Field, where most of the island of Oahus
fighter strength was stationed, 25 Vals followed
by strafing Zeros destroyed most of the 140 aircraft parked in neat rows rather than in earthen
revetments designed to protect them against
bombs and machine-gun fire.
The 36 Consolidated PBY Catalina seaplanes
at Kaneohe were shredded by a dozen Zeroes in
an attack that lasted only eight minutes. Only
three planes at Kaneohe escaped damage from
the two attack waves. Bellows Field was strafed
by a single Zero at about 8:30, following a
warning by one enlisted man that Kaneohe had
been blown to hell! Most of the 48 planes at
Ewa Marine Corps Air Station were Douglas
SBD Dauntless dive-bombers and Grumman
F4F Wildcat fighters. Twenty-nine of these were
destroyed by a flight of 21 Zeros that strafed
for more than 20 minutes. Lt. Col. Claude
Larkin, the base commander, was wounded by
shrapnel when his car was strafed by a Zero as
he dove into a ditch for cover.
Although nearly 400 military aircraft were
stationed on Oahu, only 38 were able to get
34

airborne during the attack. Ten of these were

shot down. However, a handful of American
fighter pilots scored aerial victories. Among
them were Lieutenants Ken Taylor and George
Welch of the 47th Pursuit Squadron based at
Wheeler Field. The two pilots had attended a
dinner and dance the previous evening and had
gotten into an all-night poker game. They had
slept less than an hour before the sound of gunfire and distant explosions woke them. Taylor
phoned the auxiliary fighter base at Haleiwa,
10 miles away, and ordered two Curtiss P-40
Tomahawk fighters readied for action.
The pair then jumped into Welchs new Buick
and drove nearly 100 miles per hour as they
streaked toward Haleiwa. They were quickly
airborne, and in the ensuing melee shot down or
damaged three enemy planes. With more
ammunition and fuel, they made a second sortie. Taylor had been wounded but refused to
stay out of the fight. When they landed again,
still wearing their mess uniforms from the night
before, they had shot down at least six Japanese planes between them and damaged others.
Official records credit Welch with four kills and
Taylor with two.
By the time the Japanese aircraft of the first
wave headed back toward their carriers, most of
the military installations on Oahu were a shambles. The attackers had lost only three fighters,
a single dive-bomber, and five torpedo planes.
The 170 Japanese planes of the second wave
were 45 minutes behind the first and reached
Pearl Harbor just before 9 AM. Eighty Vals, led
by Lt. Cmdr. Takeshige Egusa, attacked Pearl
Harbor. The Japanese pilots observed a scene of
incredible destruction. The crew of the Tennessee was working feverishly to fend off flaming oil that had leaked from the torpedoed West
Virginia. The Arizona was a blazing hulk.
Finding the holocaust of Battleship Row
shrouded in smoke, the aircraft of the second
wave concentrated on the Nevada, the only battleship to get under way during the attack. She
had sortied at 8:50, and as many as 15 bombs
exploded near the ship, five scoring hits. The
Nevada was also down by the bow from a torpedo hit suffered at 8:10 during the first wave,
and the Japanese hoped to sink her and block
the entrance to the harbor in the process. Eventually, the battleship was beached at Hospital
Point with 50 dead and 109 wounded.
In the floating drydock, three bomb hits
ignited the forward magazines of the destroyer
Shaw, which erupted in a spectacular explosion
that blew off the ships bow just behind the
bridge. A bomb hit on the battleship Pennsyl-

The Japanese caption to

this picture read, Alas,
the spectacle of the
American battleship fleet
in its dying gasp.

vania killed 15 sailors and wounded 38. Several

near misses rattled the cruiser Helena, which
had already taken a torpedo during the first
wave. The cruisers Honolulu and St. Louis, the
destroyer Cummings, and the repair ship Rigel
were damaged by near misses. The destroyers
Cassin and Downes, in drydock with the Pennsylvania, were severely damaged by bombs.
Raleigh, listing from a torpedo hit suffered in
the first wave, was struck by a bomb aft, and
two more bombs missed the Detroit by a scant
30 yards. The seaplane tender Curtiss took a
bomb hit near its No. 1 crane, and moments
later a flaming Val crashed into the ship.
Aboard the Raleigh, Seaman First Class Nick
Kouretas manned an antiaircraft gun. A lot of
times planes were coming at us from all
angles, he remembered. Id try to concentrate
on one target. Theyd say, Get this guy! you
know, and Id lead him, hoping I could get him.
I know I was scared as hell.
The Kates and Zeros of the second wave
attacked the air installations on Oahu again. At

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PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:25 PM Page 35

Hickam Field, Hangars 13 and 15 were heavily

damaged by 550-pound bombs, and repair
shops, armament buildings, and the steam plant
were damaged. Kaneohe was hit by Kates that
destroyed a hangar and four seaplanes. Fighters
strafed the field twice more, and Japanese pilot
Fusata Iida attempted to crash into the base
armory when he realized his plane was hit and
that he would not be able to return to his carrier. Instead, riddled with machine-gun fire, his
Zero crashed into a hillside.
Wheeler Field was spared a major attack during the second wave when Zeros that had hit
Kaneohe and then flown on to strafe Wheeler
were intercepted by six American P-40s and
scattered. At Bellows, nine Zeros strafed the
field for 15 minutes, destroying or further damaging the 12 Curtiss P-40s of the 44th Pursuit
Squadron. Three P-40s were shot down as they
attempted to take off to defend Bellows.
The second wave had encountered substantial antiaircraft fire from defenders on full alert
and had to contend with a few American

fighter planes. When they finally turned toward

their carriers, the raiders had lost six Zeros and
14 Vals. A total of just 29 Japanese planes were
shot down during the raid.
Around 9:45 AM, the cruiser St. Louis
neared the open sea after a Herculean effort to
raise steam and escape the confines of Pearl
Harbor. Just outside the harbor mouth, the
wakes of two torpedoes were spotted bearing
down on the ship, running straight and true.
However, a coral outcropping saved the vessel from serious damage, exploding the torpedoes harmlessly. A lookout spotted the conning tower of a Japanese midget submarine at
a range of 1,000 yards. Two hits from the
cruisers 5-inch guns dispatched the submarine quickly.
Each of the five Japanese midget submarines
deployed against Pearl Harbor came to grief.
Aside from those sunk by the Ward and St.
Louis, a third was rammed and sunk by the
destroyer Monaghan inside the harbor. The story
of a fourth midget submarine may never be fully

known. It has been speculated that the sub

entered the harbor, fired its two torpedoes at
American warships, and was then scuttled in the
harbors West Loch. Its remains were found in
2009, three miles south of Pearl Harbor amid
the debris dredged and removed from the harbor
following an explosion that occurred in 1944.
The fifth midget submarine experienced
problems with its gyroscope and was grounded
at Waimanalo Beach, near Bellows Field. One
crewman, Kyoshi Inagaki, drowned. The other,
Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki, attempted to destroy
the submarine with explosives. When the
charges failed to detonate, Sakamaki was rendered unconscious trying to fix the problem.
Fortuitously, he was washed up on shore, captured, and became the first prisoner of the
United States during the war.
The nine midget submariners who perished
were memorialized in a fanciful rendering, their
portraits surrounding a scene of the harbor
under attack. Sakimakis portrait is noticeably
absent. He had been expected to give his life for
35

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the emperor. For him, survival meant dishonor.

After the war, Sakimaki went to work for Toyota and became the head of the auto manufacturers Brazilian operations in the late 1960s. He
died in Japan in 1999 at the age of 81.
As the last Japanese planes sped away from
the wreckage of Oahu, Fuchida lingered to
assess the mornings work before ordering his
pilot away to the northwest and a rendezvous
with Akagi. The damage was horrific. A total
of 2,403 were dead, 68 of them civilians.
Nearly 1,200 were wounded. The majority of
the Navy casualties were sustained during the
explosion aboard the Arizona and the nine
minutes it took the battleship to sink. The
greatest loss of Army personnel occurred at
Hickam Field. More than 100 Marines were
killed at Ewa and aboard the naval vessels.
Some of the civilian casualties occurred as
errant shells exploded or rained shrapnel on
residential areas. One islander lost his home
when a Japanese plane crashed into it, setting
the structure ablaze.
The Arizona and Oklahoma were sunk, total
losses. California and West Virginia were sunk
but later repaired. Nevada, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Tennessee had each sustained significant damage. The Utah was sunk and never salvaged. The destroyers Cassin and Downes were
damaged beyond repair, while the Shaw was
eventually returned to service. The cruisers
Raleigh, Honolulu, and Helena were damaged
but repaired. The repair ship Vestal and seaplane tender Curtiss survived with heavy damage. The aged minelayer Oglala, sunk by the
concussion of a torpedo that passed under her
keel and struck the Raleigh, was raised and
repaired. A total of 165 U.S. aircraft were lost,
including four Wildcat fighters from the Enterprise that were shot down by friendly fire in the
confusion of gathering darkness as the painful
day came to an end.
Four years later, during the Battle of Leyte
Gulf, the guns of the California, Tennessee,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia
thundered in Surigao Strait, exacting a measure
of revenge by decimating a Japanese task force
intent on ravaging the U.S. landing beaches in
the Philippines.
Rescue and salvage efforts were under way
even before the Japanese departed. Garbage
lighters, tugboats, and small launches played
water hoses on the fires aboard West Virginia
and other ships and plucked badly burned men
and those swimming for their lives from the
water. Individual acts of heroism were commonplace. Aboard the Oklahoma, Seaman
36

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific

Fleet, pins the Navy Cross on Doris Miller, Steward's
Mate at a ceremony on board a U.S. Navy warship in
Pearl Harbor, May 27, 1942.

First Class James Ward steadily held a flashlight inside a turret. While others escaped the
potential tomb, Ward died when the battleship
capsized. He was awarded a posthumous
Medal of Honor.
Cook Third Class Doris Miller was collecting laundry aboard the West Virginia when the
attack began. He picked up the severely
wounded Captain Bennion in an attempt to
carry him to safety. When Bennion refused to
leave the bridge, Miller went to a .50-caliber
machine-gun position and fired at Japanese
planes until he ran out of ammunition. For his
heroism, Miller became the first black sailor to
receive the Navy Cross. He was killed in
November 1943 when the escort carrier Liscome Bay was torpedoed off the Gilbert Islands.
Aboard the Oklahoma, sailors with acetylene torches cut through the upturned hull, trying desperately to reach those trapped beneath.
Thirty-two men were freed. Others, however,
tapped forlornly on the hull for several days
before they succumbed. More than 400 perished aboard the ship.
Immediately after landing on Akagi, Fuchida
was summoned to the bridge. Reporting to

Nagumo, he urged another strike against Pearl

Harbor, informing the admiral that a number
of targets remained. Nagumo, however, was in
no mood to press his luck and ordered the First
Air Fleet to retire at high speed. News of the
successful attack was relayed to Tokyo, and
great celebrations were held.
Although Pearl Harbor was a tremendous
tactical victory for the Japanese and had crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet, a thorough examination of the raid renders sobering facts. True
enough, ships and planes were destroyed or
heavily damaged and there had been great loss
of life. However, the three American aircraft
carriers were not touched. Lexington and
Enterprise would carry the fight to the Japanese at Coral Sea and Midway months later.
Though Lexington was lost at Coral Sea, planes
from the deck of Enterprise were among those
that sank four of Japans Pearl Harbor carriers,
Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu, during the
Midway battle in June 1942.
The Japanese raiders had failed to destroy
stockpiles of oil and aviation fuel. Machine
shops and other repair facilities at Pearl Harbor
were largely left intact. The submarine base had
escaped serious damage. Therefore, the pace of
the American recovery was quickened.
Despite the apparent magnitude of the victory,
Admiral Yamamoto brooded. In his book, The
Reluctant Admiral, author Hiroyuki Agawa
asserts that in January 1942, just days after the
Pearl Harbor attack, Yamamoto wrote to an
optimistic fellow officer, A military man can
scarcely pride himself on having smitten a sleeping enemy. It is more a matter of shame, simply,
for the one smitten. I would rather you made
your appraisal after seeing what the enemy does,
since it is certain that, angered and outraged, he
will soon launch a determined counterattack.
Yamamoto did not live to see his nations
final defeat; he was shot down in flames by
American fighters over the island of
Bougainville in 1943. However, he was well
aware by that time that the tide of war had
turned inexorably in favor of the United States.
A resilient people, stirred to action, remembered December 7, 1941, and the long road to
victory ended four years later in Tokyo Bay.
Author Michael E. Haskew is the editor of
WWII History magazine. He has written and
contributed to numerous books on the topic of
military history, and his latest offering, DeGaulle:
Lessons in Leadership from the Defiant General,
was recently published by Palgrave Macmillan.
He resides in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

PH-Pearl Attack_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:26 PM Page 37

Selfless acts of bravery saved lives in the wake

of the Japanese attack.
DURING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
both Utah and Oklahoma capsized after suffering multiple torpedo hits. Utah had been
converted to a training ship, and to the
Japanese pilots, her modified deck resembled
that of an aircraft carrier.
As the attack raged, Fireman Second Class
John Vaessen stayed at his post in the ships
forward distribution room, maintaining
power for the ship as long as he could. His
work kept the lights on and allowed many of
the crew to find their way up and out. But
when Utah had rolled 80 degrees to port,
Vaessen was wounded and trapped. With a
flashlight and a wrench, he moved to the very
bottom of the ship on the starboard side and
started banging on the hull.
Men who had swum from the ship to
nearby Ford Island heard him. A search party
led by Machinist S.A. Szymanski returned to
the ship. The crew of the cruiser Raleigh lent
them equipment to cut into the hull. Syzmanskis team eventually reached Vaessen and
brought him out. Sadly, he died of his injuries
shortly after being rescued.
Oklahoma had been preparing for an
inspection, which was to take place on the
morning of Monday, December 8. As a result,
many doors and hatches were wide open when
the Japanese attack came. She was hit by at
least four torpedoes on her port side. She had
flooded so quickly that when the word came to
abandon ship, not every man could.
Stephen Bower Young was one of them. He
had joined the Navy in the summer of 1940,
hoping to go to the Naval Academy. Less than
five minutes after the attack began, Young and
10 of his friends were trapped in a compartment beneath the No. 4 gun turret, which,
now inverted, was beneath the harbors surface. They remained there for 25 hours, with
no power, diminishing air, and rising water.
Praying someone would hear, they took turns
banging on bulkheads with a wrench.
The real effort to free us began sometime
after 0100 on 8 December, Young later
wrote. Sailors from Oklahoma and other
ships and civilian workers from the Navy
Yard brought in air compressors, pumps,
chipping tools and torches alongside the part
of the hull above water. It would be some

The hull of the capsized

battleship USS Oklahoma.
Visible behind is the
USS Maryland.

time before [we] could hear their efforts to

free [us]. We had no knowledge that any
attempt at rescue was even being made until
the first sounds of the air hammer were heard
as dawn came over the islands.
It was mostly a Navy Yard effort, said
Young. They had brought the blueprints and
most of the equipment, and they knew what
they were doing. Twenty men from Yard
Shop 11 began the exhausting job of cutting
through bulkheads in different parts of the
ship. In charge was Leading Man Julio
DeCastro, a Honolulu native. He and two
other men worked their way down toward
Young and his friends. At each breakthrough,
DeCastro listened for the sound of the banging wrench to determine their proximity to
the trapped men.
A full day after the ship capsized, Yard
worker Joe Bulgo cut through to sailors in
the No. 4 radio compartment. Theres some
guys trapped in there, one sailor said, pointing to the wall behind him. Well get em,
said DeCastro.
Young yelled to the rescue team on the
other side. DeCastros calm voice came
back, promising he would get them out. But
he was worried about air pressure. Cutting
through the bulkhead would release air from
Youngs compartment, and water inside
would rise. There was no choice. DeCastro
drilled a hole, and air hissed through.
Hurry up! Burn us out! one sailor

screamed. We cant. Youd suffocate in

there, DeCastro told him. Jesus, well
drown if you dont!
Youngs friends scrambled to close a waterproof hatch as Bulgo slashed into the bulkhead with the chipping hammer. As the rectangular cut grew, the water rose higher. The
racket was staggering. The sailors gritted
their teeth, trying to stay calm. Bulgo was 21
years old and strong as an ox, but this was
the toughest pace he had ever set. After 60
agonizing minutes, he finished the third side
of the cut. The water streaming through had
reached his knees. By then, the Oklahoma
men were ready to tear the metal away with
their fingers. Look out for your hands,
boys, Bulgo said. With a sledgehammer he
pounded in the section of wall. The sailors
scrambled through and were guided up and
out by DeCastros men.
It was a beautiful day, recalled Walter
Bayer, one of the thousands of civilians who
worked in the Navy Yard. And these poor
guys had been down in that black hole. Completely entombed. And when the workers got
them out, you shouldve seen it. It was just
wonderful. There they were, out in the bright
sun and fresh air. It was just like a new life.
In all, 32 Oklahoma sailors were saved. For
the rest of their lives, they had only praise for
their rescuers. When asked 60 years later what
kind of man Julio DeCastro was, Young said
simply, He was a leader of men.
37

PH-USS Utah_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:30 PM Page 38

Pearl Harbor
P A R A D O X
The towering geyser of an aerial torpedo
striking home is evident in this image of
Battleship Row at Pearl Harbor under
attack by Japanese aircraft on the morning
of December 7, 1941. A Japanese plane is
also visible as it banks away from the
unfolding holocaust. The former battleship
USS Utah was moored on the other side of
Ford Island that fateful morning.

ery few among the throngs of

visitors to Pearl Harbor on the
island of Oahu are aware of an
anomaly, but it definitely exists.
On the east side of Ford Island
in the middle of the harbor lies one of the
worlds most visited tourist attractions. A
gleaming white, architecturally unique
memorial straddles the submerged hulk of
the U.S. battleship Arizona. The memorial
was constructed in 1962 to honor the Arizonas 1,177 sailors who died when the ship
exploded during the surprise attack by

V
38

Japanese aircraft on December 7, 1941. Visitors to the Arizona Memorial from around
the world number over a million annually.
On the western shore of Ford Island, a scant
mile away, is a second memorial. This, too, honors the dead members from the crew of a U.S.
battleship, sunk during the same attack, and
almost to the minute of the USS Arizona. Both
ships rest on the harbor bottom with part of their
superstructure exposed, and both still entomb
many of their deceased crew within their hulls.
However, the contrast between the elegance
of the Arizona Memorial and the starkness of

the open concrete platform and walkway of the

other memorial could not be more profound.
Although U.S. Navy launches carry hordes of
visitors to the Arizona Memorial daily, the general public does not enjoy similar access to the
second memorial. Most visitors to the Arizona
Memorial are not even aware that there is
another memorialthe USS Utah Memorial
in Pearl Harbor.
Therein resides the paradox of Pearl Harbor.
The USS Utah (BB-31) enjoyed a noble
career that spanned more than three decades
and included considerable international service.

The target ship USS Utah, a memorial to the dead

of December 7, 1941, exists in relative obscurity.
Like other U.S. battleships of the early 20th
century, its design was greatly influenced by the
first all-big-gun British battleship, HMS Dreadnought, which revolutionized naval warfare.
The Utah, one of the two-ship Florida class,
was laid down on March 9, 1909, at the New
York Shipbuilding Yard in Camden, New Jersey.
It was an imposing design for its time, with a
length of 521.5 feet, a beam of 88.2 feet, a displacement of 21,825 tons, and a speed of 20.75
knots. It was comparable to any battleship in the
world and could operate on either coal or oil.
Although designed for 14-inch main batter-

ies, because of supply problems it was fitted

with 10 12-inch/45 guns. Secondary armament
consisted of 16 5-inch/51 guns and two 21-inch
torpedo tubes.
Utah was launched on December 23, 1909,
with Mary Alice Spry, 18-year-old daughter of
Utah Governor William Spry, christening the
ship. The Utah was completed in 1911, and after
sea trials off the coast of Maine, was commissioned on August 31, 1911. Utah then took her
place in the battle line of the U.S. Navy.
After several years of maneuvers, exercises,
and midshipman cruises, Utah participated

BY RICHARD KLOBUCHAR

National Archives

PH-USS Utah_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:31 PM Page 39

in her first major action in 1914. With a revolution sweeping Mexico, President
Woodrow Wilson embargoed arms and military supplies to the countrys dictator, General Victoriano Huerta. When Germany
agreed to furnish arms to Huerta, a task force
including Utah was ordered to Vera Cruz to
intercept the shipment.
With Utahs contribution of 384 officers and
men, a task force brigade landed at Vera Cruz
on April 21. In spirited fighting, this force captured vital warehouses and forced the rebels to
surrender. Eventually, General Huerta fled to
39

PH-USS Utah_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:31 PM Page 40

U.S. Navy

Germany and the revolution ended.

Utah continued to operate in Atlantic and
Caribbean waters until the United States
entered World War I in 1917. Fearing German
attacks on Atlantic troop convoys, a squadron
of U.S. battleships was dispatched to Bantry
Bay, Ireland, in August 1918. With Utah as
flagship and leading Nevada (BB-36) and
Oklahoma (BB-37), this force provided protection for convoys approaching the British
Isles until wars end.
Utah continued in the Atlantic Fleet until
1931, taking part in a number of important
diplomatic missions to Europe and South
America by carrying top government officials.
Her days as a battleship ended on July 1, 1931,
when, under the terms of the 1930 London
Naval Treaty, she was designated to be converted to a noncombatant ship. Her 12-inch
guns and other armament were removed, but
her huge, empty turrets remained. She was also
fitted with modern electronics and other equipment for her new role as a fleet target ship. She
was recommissioned in that configuration as
AG-16 on April 1, 1932.
For the following nine years, Utah operated
with the Pacific Fleet, usually based at Long
Beach, California. Her new equipment
allowed her engines and steering gear to be
operated either manually or by remote control from another ship. In this role, Utah provided realistic training for the fleets pilots in
dive-, torpedo-, and high-level bombing.
All bombs and torpedoes used were inert,
water-filled projectiles. However, even small
inert bombs dropped from high altitudes could
cause damage to the Utahs deck and other features. Large 6-inch by 12-inch timbers were laid
on the deck, giving it a foot of added protection. Crewmen who remained on the ship during target practice found refuge below deck or
in the armored conning tower near the bridge.
Utah also provided practice for the fleets big
guns. She towed target sleds, which allowed
battleship and cruiser batteries to hone their
skills at long range using live ammunition.
In 1935, Utah became even more versatile. In
recognition of the new threat posed by modern
aircraft, the Navy established a fleet antiaircraft
school on the ship. The fleets most experienced
machine gunners were assigned to the Utah as
instructors for the course. Utah provided .50caliber training for the first year and added
quadruple 1.1-inch mounts the following year.
By 1941, the mainstay of the fleet antiaircraft
weaponry had become the 5-inch gun, and during an overhaul in Bremerton, Washington,
40

Naval Historical Center

TOP: Chief Water Tender Peter Tomich is seen in the only

photograph of him known to exist. Tomich sacrificed his
life while securing the boilers aboard the USS Utah as
the ship began to keel over. ABOVE: Converted to a target ship in 1930, the battleship USS Utah is shown during World War I in a camouflage scheme intended to
confuse enemy range finders.

four 5/38 and four 5/25 guns were added in single mounts.
Utah was now not only a mobile target ship,
but the primary fleet antiaircraft training ship
as well. When the ship was in target mode, its
cranes placed steel housings over the 5-inch
guns to protect them from damage during
bombing practice. Smaller guns were moved
below deck.
Utah was ordered to Hawaii in September
1941 to help train the Pacific Fleets antiaircraft
gunners and carrier bomber pilots. On December 4, the target completed a three-week assignment and returned to Pearl Harbor for routine
maintenance and replenishment. Docked at
berth Fox 11 on the west side of Ford Island, the
ship occupied a berth usually reserved for an aircraft carrier. Her crews worked on December 5
and 6 to unfasten the huge timbers so they could

be offloaded in the Navy yard the following

week. She would never reach the Navy yard.
Utah was still berthed at F-11 on the morning of Sunday, December 7, her crew anticipating a leisurely day. She had company along
the west side of Ford Island, including the seaplane tender Tangier immediately astern and
cruisers Raleigh and Detroit directly ahead.
Like most men of the Pacific Fleet, few of
Utahs crew thought that war would come to
Hawaii. It was too isolated for attack from the
air, and Pearl Harbors destroyers and battleships were capable of dealing with any submarines or surface ships foolish enough to
approach the islands. The harbor thus appeared
safe from any threat.
Just before 0800, men on deck noticed aircraft circling over the south end of Ford Island.
Although Sunday morning exercises were not
common, they did occur. Even when explosions
were heard, Utahs observers assumed that the
exercises were simply a bit more realistic that
morning. That assumption evaporated at 0755,
when a roar out of the southwest shattered the
stillness of the new day.
Sixteen aircraft flying extremely low in
squadrons of eight approached the Utah. The
planes were Kate torpedo bombers from the
Japanese aircraft carriers Hiryu and Soryu.
Their pilots had been alerted before takeoff that
they were to attack only battleships and aircraft
carriers and that none were expected to be
moored on Ford Islands west side.
Nevertheless, six of the Soryu pilots misunderstood the orders and attacked. Two
launched their torpedoes at Utah, two at
Detroit, and two at Raleigh. Both torpedoes
aimed at Detroit missed and buried themselves
in the mud of Ford Islands shore. Raleigh was
hit by a single torpedo and began to list immediately. Both missiles directed at Utah hit amidships, only seconds apart at 0801, and ripped
open her hull. Without watertight integrity,
Utah began to list within minutes. At 0805 the
list reached 40 degrees, and it was apparent that
the ship would soon capsize.
The attacking aircraft were part of a force of
350 planes from six Japanese aircraft carriers,
striking Oahus military installations in two
waves an hour apart. Many of the first-wave
bombers congregated on the east side of Ford
Island where the fleets eight battleships, their
principal targets, were moored. Within minutes, most of these had taken multiple torpedo
or bomb hits and were settling on the harbor
bottom or blazing from fires fed by the fuel and
ammunition stored within them.

PH-USS Utah_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:32 PM Page 41

noticed the red spot forming on the hull from

the acetylene torch. He knew it would be a
close race to see which reached him firstthe
water or the rescuers. Minutes later, the men
outside completed the cut and knocked the circular remnant through the hole. As they pulled
Vaessen out, battered and burned but still alive,
water was licking at his heels. He was the only
crewman rescued through the hull.
Not every crewman caught below deck when
the torpedoes struck chose to seek safety topside.
Chief Water Tender Peter Tomich recognized
that if cold water reached the hot boilers, they
would explode, endangering everyone still
aboard the ship. Someone had to stay behind to
secure the boilers. As the Utah began to roll over,
Tomich knew what he had to do. He ordered all
boiler room personnel to leave at once.
Get out, now. Leave immediately! he yelled.
He then ignored his own order and began to
work. As his men turned one last time to watch

United States citizen. Ten days after discharge in

1919, he enlisted in the U.S. Navy and served
continuously for the next 22 years. He became
one of the most proficient men at his position in
the entire Pacific Fleet. Except for a cousin in
New York, his only family was the sailors he
served with, and the Navy his only home.
For his actions in knowingly sacrificing his
life to save others, in 1942 Tomich was
awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor. A letter sent to his cousin, John Tonic, announcing
the award was returned stamped address
unknown. Tonic had returned to Europe 20
years earlier.
For the next 64 years, Tomichs medal was
displayed in a number of locations, including
the USS Tomich, a new destroyer-escort named
after him in 1943; the Utah State House; a
Navy museum in Washington, D.C.; and
Tomich Hall, a new academic building at the
Senior Enlisted Academy in Newport, Rhode

While serving as a target ship off Long Beach, California, on April 18, 1935, the USS Utah lies at anchor. The aging
warships armament had been previously removed to comply with the terms of the London Naval Treaty.

him, he was already turning valves and setting

gauges. The ship continued to roll as he worked,
and he knew that by the time he completed his
task, escape would be impossible. That thought
did not deter him, and he continued with his lifesaving efforts even though he realized that his
own death was now only minutes away.
Tomich was an extraordinary man. Born Peter
Tonic in 1893 in Prolog, a small village in what
is now Herzegovina, he emigrated to the United
States at age 20. He served in the U.S. Army for
18 months, and while in the service became a

Island. There it served as an inspiration to the

hundreds of chief petty officers who attended
the school annually.
A lengthy search through the years for a
Tomich relative bore fruit in 1997, when representatives of the New York Naval Militia visited
Croatia. There they located Srecko HercegTonic, a retired lieutenant colonel in the Croatian Army. Tonic was the grandson of Tomichs
cousin, John Tonic. A nine-year bureaucratic and
legal battle ensued over the proposal of the New
York Naval Militia to have the Tomich medal

U.S. Navy

On the west side of Ford Island, the torpedo

hits triggered a variety of reactions from Utahs
crew. Those on deck knew quickly that the ship
would turn over, and their decision to leave was
hastened by machine-gun bullets slamming into
the ships deck. Many, like Radioman 3rd Class
William Hughes, dove off the ship and swam to
nearby concrete mooring quays where they
found refuge. Others, like Pharmacists Mate
2nd Class Lee Soucy and Electricians Mate 3rd
Class Warren Upton, slid down the barnacleencrusted hull, swam to shore, and dove into a
newly excavated utility trench. Even though he
had left his first-aid kit on the ship, Soucy spent
most of the day treating wounded men.
Below deck, Electricians Mate 3rd Class
Dave Smith, one of the ships crane operators,
heard the roar of aircraft engines and glanced
out of a porthole in time to see the red circles
on the aircraft that had just dropped torpedoes
at Utah. I suddenly realized that we were
being attacked by Japanese planes, he
explained. When the torpedoes hit and the
ship began to list, I scrambled up to the main
deck, climbed down the starboard side, and
swam to shore.
Seaman John Vaessen also felt the torpedo
hits below deck and the ship beginning to list.
He stopped to secure fans and other electrical
equipment and turn on emergency lighting. As
the ship capsized, Vaessen was forced to evade
a rain of dislodged equipment that now became
deadly missiles. As the ship settled in the mud,
Vaessen was still alive, but trapped in a dark,
frightening, upside-down world.
He knew that his only chance of survival was
to reach the bilges, since they would be above
water in the shallow harbor. He headed for the
nearest bilge hatch using the light from a flashlight that he had been working on when the torpedoes hit. As he reached the hatch, he was
blessed with another miracle when he discovered that the huge wrench needed to loosen the
cover was still hanging in its place.
Crawling through the hatch, Vaessen could
see water rising behind him. Upon reaching the
hull, he began rapping with the hatch wrench
he kept for that purpose. He continued rapping
even after painful blisters formed on his hand.
The water was now only eight feet behind him
and still rising when he heard rapping and
voices outside the hull.
Crewmen on shore had heard Vaessens rapping and returned to the hull to locate the noise.
Taking a launch to the Raleigh, they returned
with a cutting torch and operators. The water
was only three feet from Vaessen when he

41

PH-USS Utah_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:32 PM Page 42

2011 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

presented to Herceg-Tonic.
In 2006, the knotty issue was finally resolved
when the U.S. Navy agreed to relinquish the
medal. In an hour-long ceremony aboard the
carrier USS Enterprise (CVN-65) in Split,
Croatia, on May 18, Enterprise sailors and a
contingent of its chief petty officers witnessed
Admiral Henry Ulrich, Commander, U.S.
Naval Forces in Europe, presenting Peter
Tomichs Medal of Honor to a beaming Srecko
Herceg-Tonic.
Peter Tomich is one of only 39 chief petty
officers in all naval history to receive the Medal
of Honor, explained Enterprises Command
Master Chief, Paul Declerq. Hes one of us.
Like Tomich himself, the medal finally found a
permanent home.
Although 54 Utah crewmen are still interred
in the hull, in 2000 the amazing discovery was
made that there are actually 55 sets of remains
on the ship. Mary Wagner Kreigh, daughter
of former crewman Albert Wagner, revealed
an incredible story she had kept hidden for
almost 60 years. She told the world that the
ashes of her twin sister, Nancy Lynne Wagner,
had been buried within the Utah since the ship
sank in 1941.
Nancy had died at birth in 1937 at Makati
in the Philippines; Mary, although hospitalized
for several months, survived. Wagner had
Nancy cremated and later brought the urn
aboard the Utah. He intended to have her
ashes scattered at sea when a chaplain was
assigned to the ship. That day never came.
Burials at sea were a tradition in the Wagner
family. In 1936, while serving aboard the battleship USS Pennsylvania (BB-38), he had such
a burial for another daughter, Helen, who had
also died at birth.
Divers inspecting the Utah several weeks
after it sank tried to enter the quarters of Chief
Yeoman Wagner to retrieve Nancys urn. They
were unable to penetrate the wreckage. It
would remain there for eternity and serve as the
burial at sea that Chief Wagner had intended
for his daughter. Although Mary kept the secret
of Nancys ashes for decades, she made many
trips to the Utah to visit her sisters grave. Since
1990, she has visited it annually.
Finally, on December 6, 2003, 66 years after
she died, Nancy received a formal burial. Mary,
her daughter Nina, friends, and reserve and
active duty Navy personnel attended a service
at the Utah Memorial overlooking the ship.
Mary felt relieved that a huge burden had
been lifted from her shoulders. As she put it,
For 62 years the courageous crew of the Utah
42

ABOVE: Moored across Ford Island from Battleship Row,

the USS Utah was struck by Japanese torpedoes during
the opening moments of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
OPPOSITE: The simple memorial constructed at the
grave of the USS Utah in 1972 commemorates the 54
sailors who lost their lives aboard the vessel on December 7, 1941.

has watched over a tiny copper urn in my

fathers locker. Nina and I are so grateful that
my twin sister has finally received Gods blessing in the presence of men and women of the
United States Navy. Our tears are tears of joy,
not sadness. One day I hope to join her aboard
our beloved ship.
Mary has remained active in the USS Utah
Association, has hosted its recent reunions, and
is currently its public relations director.
Utahs crew numbered just over 500 at the
time of the attack. When it was over, 58 crewmen had been killed by strafing, flying timbers,
or drowning within the hull. Only the battleships Arizona, California, West Virginia, and
Oklahoma (which also capsized) suffered a
greater number of fatalities. Four of the dead
were recovered and buried ashore, leaving 54 to
serve their eternal watch within the Utah.
Efforts to salvage the sunken ships began
within days of the attack. Most of the effort
centered on the east side of Ford Island where
four battleships and several other ships had
sunk. Little was done on the Utah until 1943
because of the low potential for returning the
ship to useful service. The Oklahoma was
righted that same year, floated, and moved to a
drydock to make her seaworthy.
The complicated derrick system used to right
the Oklahoma was then installed on the Utah
after her guns, fuel oil, and other upper works
were removed to lighten the ship. A righting
operation began in February 1944 and was
only partially successful. It did pull the hulk
closer to shore and away from the shipping
channel, but instead of righting, the hull merely
slid along the bottom and settled deeper in the
mud. Righting operations then ceased. When

another attempt to free the anchorage location

was rejected in 1956, the Navy declared Utah
to be a permanent grave site.
For over a decade, nothing further occurred
at the Utah site. At the Arizona site, however,
the Navy erected a wooden platform in 1950 to
allow a daily flag raising to honor her 1,177
dead. A commemorative plaque at the base of
the flagpole served as a memorial. On May 30,
1962, after years of planning and fundraising,
a permanent memorial constructed over the
Arizonas hull was dedicated.
This gleaming white structure draws thousands of visitors daily and has become the focus
of activities honoring all who died at Pearl Harbor. On October 10, 1980, a $4.5 million Visitor Center complex was opened on Pearl Harbors shore to service the crowds of Arizona
Memorial visitors. On that day, operations of
the Arizona Memorial and Visitor Center were
turned over to the U.S. National Park Service.
Commemorative activities at the Utah were
much more austere. A bronze plaque was
attached to Utahs deck in 1950. Its simple message was, In MemoryOfficers and Men
USS UtahLost in Action7 December
1941. Since visitors did not have access to the
ship, no one could actually read this plaque. A
readable second plaque was then placed on a
wharf just to the north of the ship.
The plaques served as the principal memorials until 1972, when a permanent memorial
was finally constructed. It consisted of a 15- by
40-foot concrete platform connected to shore
by a 70-foot walkway. Neither the platform nor
the walkway touches the Utah. A flagpole in a
corner of the platform allows a daily flag raising. The memorial was formally dedicated on
May 27, 1972.
The Utah Memorial remained basically
unchanged until 2005, when a $900,000 Navy
construction project provided needed structural
repairs to the memorials foundation, as well as
other improvements.
Both Utah and Arizona were destroyed in the
same action and sank within two minutes of
each other. Both still have crewmen entombed
within them and are the only ships in the harbor remaining from the attack on December 7.
On May 5, 1989, both were designated as
national historic landmarks, which provides
them with special consideration for preservation. Like the Arizona, survivors of the Utah
are now permitted to have their ashes interred
within their ship when they die. Five have chosen to do so.
In spite of these similarities, comparisons

PH-USS Utah_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:32 PM Page 43

an active military installation. Civilians are

allowed on the island only with a formal permit. Although this is possible, the visitors to the
Utah Memorial in recent years have numbered
only in the dozens annually, a far cry from the
million and a half who visit the Arizona Memorial. Most visitors to the Arizona Memorial are
not even aware of the existence of the Utah
Memorial less than a mile away.
Ironically, if the Navy had been successful in
removing the Arizonas hull in 1942, Utah
would have been the sole attack victim remaining in Pearl Harbor. It, then, would have been
the recipient of the public attention and the
focus of efforts to establish a permanent
memorial there.
It is not envy that prompts Utah survivors to
seek increased public awareness of their ships
existence. They fully understand the relationship between the two ships and are supportive
of the attention given to the Arizona. They are,
however, interested in seeking changes to current operations within the harbor to permit visitors to at least view Utahs remains. This
would be a logical first step in increasing public knowledge of the ships fate on that terrible
Sunday in December 1941.

A modest expansion of the Utah Memorials

platform and allowing direct visitor access to it
appear to be feasible and fundable solutions.
Access could be provided either by water or by
land using shuttle buses like those carrying visitors to the battleship USS Missouri (BB-63),
moored near the Arizona Memorial. Visitors
would then be able to view both national historic landmarks and both burial sites in Pearl
Harbor.
An additional step to improve access to the
Utah would be to transfer the Utah Memorial
to the National Park Service, thus placing both
memorials under the umbrella of the same federal jurisdiction. The income generated by the
visitor center could then be used to support
both memorials. Then, the Utah might no
longer be known as the other memorial, and
the paradox of Pearl Harbor could finally cease
to exist.
Richard Klobuchar is the author of the books
Pearl Harbor: Awakening a Sleeping Giant,
which is sold at the Pearl Harbor Visitor Center, and USS Ward: Operational History of the
Ship That Fired the First American Shot of
World War II, published in March 2007.

Mark Else

between the two ships are usually one sided.

Utah was not sunk by a spectacular explosion
as was Arizona; it capsized over a period of 11
minutes. While Arizona was a principal target
of the attack, Utah was attacked by mistake.
Arizona lost 1,177 men, about 85 percent of the
crew on board during the attack. Utahs death
toll of 58 was 12 percent of her on-board crew.
Approximately 1,002 of Arizonas crew are still
on board, while 54 of Utahs crew still remain.
These statistics should not belittle the lives or
achievements of the Utah or her crew. They
fought as gallantly as men on any ship in the
harbor on that morning. The sight of the
incredible explosion as Arizonas forward magazine blew up, and the huge and instantaneous
death toll rightfully focused the worlds attention on that ship. It properly became the symbol of the day of infamy.
That symbolism was eventually responsible
for creating the magnificent structure and
shore facilities at the Arizona site. The greatest frustration of Utah survivors and their
families is that the public has no similar direct
access to the Utah Memorial.
No Navy launches stop there, and access may
be gained solely from Ford Island, which is still

43

PH-Scout Squadron_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:34 PM Page 44

SCOUT
SQUADRON6
at Pearl Harbor

A pair of Douglas SBD Dauntless

dive-bombers depart a carrier in the Pacific as
they embark on a mission in late July 1944.

44

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PH-Scout Squadron_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:34 PM Page 45

On the morning of December 7, 1941, a flight of

18 dive-bombers from the carrier USS Enterprise
flew straight into the Japanese attack.

any people have heard of the six

American Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk
fighters that actually got off the
ground and contested the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Some know
about the 11 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress
bombers winging toward Pearl Harbor from
California unarmed and out of gas. A few are
aware of the six obsolete Curtiss P-36 Hawks
that were able to take off. However, almost no
one knows the story of 18 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers from the aircraft carrier
Enterprise that arrived over Pearl Harbor simultaneously with the Japanese. These were the
planes of Scouting Squadron Six.
Three U.S. aircraft carriers were operating in
the Pacific that day. The Saratoga (CV3) was
being overhauled in San Diego. The Lexington
(CV2) had just left Pearl Harbor to deliver 18
Vought SB2U Vindicator dive bombers to Midway. The Enterprise (CV6) was just returning
from a similar delivery of 12 Grumman F4F Wildcats to Wake Island. She was due back at Pearl on
December 6. Fortunately, a storm loomed, so
Halsey reduced speed and the ship did not actually reach port until the 8th.
Halsey knew war was imminent. Drills had been
conducted regularly over the past few months, the
most recent on November 27. When Halsey was
given his orders to reinforce Wake, he had deliberately asked, How far do you want me to go?
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of
the U.S. Pacific Fleet, replied, Use your own common sense.
That was all Halsey needed to hear. In his
famous Battle Order Number One, the first item
read, The Enterprise is now operating under war
conditions. When his operations officer challenged this order, Halsey replied, Ill take
[responsibility]. If anything gets in the way, well
shoot first and argue afterwards. He intended to
bomb anything on the sea and shoot down anything in the sky.
It was ironic. Unlike the rest of the Navy on
December 7, the Enterprise fliers saw the enemy

first. Their guns were loaded. Their crews were

trained. But still, like everyone else, they did not
quite expect an attack at home. They were looking for submarines. When they arrived, they
thought the smoke was from burning sugar cane
fields. They thought the shell fire was just a drill.
They thought the stacks of green aircraft belonged
to the Army. Only when they saw the antiaircraft
blossoms over Pearl did they realize the truth.
Both the Japanese and American forces had
launched aircraft at first light. At 0615 on December 7, the Japanese carriers sent their first attack
wave aloft 250 miles north-northwest of Oahu.
At exactly the same moment, the Enterprise
launched what was thought to be a routine patrol
directly in front of the ships advance. As usual,
the patrol would search a hemisphere of 180
degrees directly ahead of the task force. The flight
consisted of nine pairs of SBD-2 Dauntless divebombers, mostly from Scout Squadron Six, but
including a few planes from Bomb Squadron Six.
Each pair of aircraft would conduct a zigzag
search in an arc 150 miles long and approximately
10 degrees wide. Instead of returning to the ship,
they would then continue on to land at Ford
Island, thus getting a jump on shore leave.
At 0645, the destroyer USS Ward fired on and
sank a Japanese midget submarine operating
within the defensive perimeter of Pearl Harbor.
Seventeen minutes later, the Army radar station
at Opana Point picked up the first wave of Japanese attackers. Thirteen minutes later, the second
Japanese wave was launched. At 0748, Kaneohe
Airfield was strafed and bombed. At 0752, Lt.
Cmdr. Mitsuo Fuchida, tactical commander of
the first wave, sent the message, Tora, Tora,
Tora, meaning that surprise had been achieved.
At the same time Scouting Six planes began to
arrive over Oahu.
To maintain radio silence, Halsey had not
informed Pearl Harbor of his location or of his
reconnaissance patrol. When news of the attack
reached him, his first thought was, My God,
theyre shooting at my own boys!
One of the first two-plane sections to arrive was

BY RICHARD L. HAYES

45

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PH-Scout Squadron_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:35 PM Page 46

ABOVE: Flying in formation, a squad of Dauntless divebombers from Scout Squadron Six return to the USS
Enterprise. OPPOSITE: Pilots and crewmen from Scout
Squadron Six pose for a group photo. Several of these
airmen fell vicitm to friendly or enemy fire during the
attack on Pearl Harbor.

aircraft 6-S-16, piloted by Frank A. Patriarca

with a gunner named DeLuca, and 6-S-15,
piloted by Ensign W.M. Willis with gunner
Fred J. Ducolon. They almost made it to Ford
Island. The two had passed Barbers Point,
rounded Ewa Field, and were actually lining
up on their landing approach when the attack
began. They noticed the antiaircraft fire, but it
was not until a Japanese Aichi Val divebomber winged over and flashed the rising sun
insignia that Patriarca knew something was
very wrong. At the same instant, tracers began
whizzing past his plane.
Immediately, Patriarca opened throttle, diving back toward the coast. He had decided to
try and make it all the way back to the Enterprise when he realized he was alone. After
searching for 6-S-15, his fuel was low, so he
landed at Burns Field on Kauai. Willis and
Ducolon were never found, although Mitsubishi Zero fighters led by Lieutenant Masaji
Suganami from the carrier Soryu would later
claim three SBDs.
At about the same time, S-B-3 and S-B-12
approached Pearl Harbor. Ensign Manuel
Gonzalez and gunner Leonard J. Kozelek were
in S-B-3, and S-B-12 was piloted by Ensign
Frank T. Weber with a gunner by the name of
Keany. Their segment of the search had finished 20 miles north of Kauai, whereupon they
46

turned and headed toward Oahu and Pearl

Harbor. No one knows exactly what happened
to Gonzalez that day, but when the two planes
were about 25 miles off Oahu, Weber noticed
a group of 40 to 50 planes he thought belonged
to the Army circling at about 3,500 feet.
Although he had been flying just 500 feet
above and behind S-B-3, when Weber looked
back Gonzalez was gone.
Gonzalezs last message, which several other
aircraft heard, was something like, Do not
fire. We are American aircraft, or words to
that effect. Moments later, Gonzales was calling to his gunner to break out the rubber raft.
Nothing else was heard from them, and no
trace was ever found.
It seems incredible that an aircraft could
have shot down Gonzalez and missed Weber,
but such may well have been the case, since
Weber innocently began a search of the area
and performed four or five slow S turns
looking for his comrade. It was just Webers
bad luck that he had told his radioman to
change frequencies and get some homing practice on the approach into Pearl, thus missing
Gonzalezs last message.
Still unaware of the attack and unable to
spot S-B-3, Weber continued on toward Pearl
until he noticed an aircraft about 2,000 feet
directly ahead of him. Thinking it was Gonzalez at last, he increased speed and attempted
to form up on him when the unknown plane
suddenly turned 180 degrees and approached.
Weber performed a slow, wide turn to help
close on the approaching aircraft. Only when
it was close off his starboard bow and finally
made a flipper turn was Weber able to see the

red circles that identified it as Japanese. He

immediately increased speed and dove to an
altitude of 25 feet.
The Japanese pilot did not follow, and
Weber flew on to Barbers Point where he
formed up on 6-S-10, piloted by Lieutenant
W.E. Gallaher, and began circling a few miles
off the coast as other Enterprise planes were
arriving.
Weber described the Japanese plane as
resembling a German Junkers Ju-87 Stuka type
dive-bomber. Such a description would seem
to describe the Japanese Val dive-bombers
operating over Pearl Harbor. A Japanese report
confirms that Vals from the aircraft carrier
Shokaku were returning to sea after bombing
Hickam Field and were 20 miles off Kaena
Point when they shot down an SBD.
At about 0820, 6-S-14, piloted by E.T. Deacon with gunner Audrey G. Coslett, and 6-S9, flown by W.E. Roberts with gunner D.H.
Jones, arrived off Kaena Point. There they
noticed about 30 aircraft in a long column at
an altitude of 100 feet and only 400 feet away.
Roberts saw their green camouflage and
assumed they were U.S. Army aircraft. One
plane came so close that the Japanese pilot
even waggled his wings as he flew by. The significance of the red circles on the wings did not
occur to me until later, said Roberts.
The column of planes did not attack, and
neither did the Dauntlesses. At the same time,
the Dauntless pilots noticed the large amount
of smoke and geysers of water produced by
coastal antiaircraft guns. Dauntlesses 6-S-14
and 6-B-9 kept flying toward Ford Island until
they heard the Dont shoot call of Ensign
Gonzalez. Then they charged their guns and
climbed to 1,000 feet, observing about 20
Japanese fighters over Pearl Harbor. Worse,
coming straight toward them were 25 divebombers that had just completed their dives.
Both Deacon and Roberts dove to the water
and headed for Hickam Field, flying directly
over Fort Weaver.
When the American pilots were just overhead at an altitude of 200 feet, Army gunners
opened fire on them with 20mm cannon and
.50-caliber machine guns. Beginning to sputter and trail smoke, 6-S-14 turned back toward
the water. Two hundred yards past the beach,
Deacon splashed down in two feet of water.
The fliers were still under rifle and machine
gun fire when Coslett was hit in the right arm
and neck. Deacon was nicked in the thigh, and
another shot cut through his parachute harness. Stumbling out of the swamped Navy

PH-Scout Squadron_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:35 PM Page 47

glanced off his wings.

Closing on Young, the Japanese pilot opened
fire at close range. Young remembered that the
cascade of bullets was instantaneous with his
realization that Pearl was under attack. He
immediately dove away and zigzagged. Again
there was no damage. Two American divebombers flying straight and slow had been
attacked at close range by a veteran Zero
fighter pilot who missed.
Young and Teaff remained together. Since it
was obvious they would be fired on no matter
what direction they went, they continued
toward Ford Island. At about 0835, both
planes landed safely. Even though they had
their wheels down and flashed recognition signals, they endured heavy antiaircraft fire all
the way. Young recalled, I was under fire until
my wheels touched the ground on Ford
Islandsome of the guns being not more than
50 yards distance from me.
Even more incredibly, no one was injured,
nor was either plane seriously damaged,
although Teaffs took a few .50-caliber slugs
in the tail and the hydraulic system was hit.
Since the Enterprise was still under radio
silence when the men hopped out of their aircraft, the commander of Ford Island, Captain
George Shoemaker, rushed to the pilots and
shouted, What the hell goes on here?
Only then was Young

able to disclose the location of the Enterprise,

the presence of the 18 SBDs, and their mission.
The next planes to make contact apparently
were 6-S-4, piloted by Lieutenant Clarence E.
Dickinson with gunner William C. Miller, and
6-S-9, piloted by Ensign John R. Bud
McCarthy with gunner Mitchell Cohn. At
about 0825, they were approaching Barbers
Point when they saw thick smoke from what
turned out to be the stricken battleship USS
Arizona. Then they saw splashes in the water.
Like the others, Dickinson thought the smoke
was from burning cane fields and the splashes
were just an Army gunnery drill. The firing
was so wild that he thought, Just wait.
Tomorrow the Army will certainly catch hell
for it. Finally, he realized the harbor was covered with antiaircraft blossoms.
Dickinson immediately ordered his wingman to close formation and climb to 4,000
feet, where McCarthy was attacked by two
fighters. Together, the SBDs dove back down
to 1,000 feet where four more fighters
attacked. Looking aft, Dickinson saw
McCarthys plane catch fire from the right
side of the engine and the right main tank. It
lost speed and dropped about 50 yards astern
and to the left. I could see it still attempting
to fight as it slowly circled to the
left losing altitude.
The plane lost speed and
crashed. Dickinson saw only one
parachute. McCarthy had managed to get out, although he broke
his leg, presumably after hitting the rear

National Archives

plane, he used a radio cord to tie off Cosletts

wound and broke out the life raft to escape.
After paddling about 100 yards from their
plane, the two were picked up by a rescue boat.
Meanwhile, aboard 6-S-9, Roberts and
Jones had also noticed the tracers streaming
upward but were able to land at Hickam even
though their left wing was streaming gasoline.
They stayed there until the second wave of
Japanese attackers arrived. Jones fired his
rear-mounted guns until all his ammunition
was expended.
Lieutenant Commander Howard L.
Brigham Young, commander of the Enterprise air group, was flying with Lt. Cmdr. Bromfield B. Nichols, one of Halseys tactical officers,
in the gunners seat. Youngs wingman was 6-S2 piloted by Ensign P. L. Teaff with a gunner by
the name of Jinks. When they neared Barbers
Point, they too saw a large column of Army
planes and gave them a wide berth, continuing
toward Ford Island.
Teaff was above and behind Young, watching attentively as one of the Japanese planes
winged over and attacked. Although he saw
the fighters approaching from behind, he
made no effort to maneuver. At a range of 75
yards, one of them opened fire. Teaff pulled to
the right, allowing Jinks to get off a short
burst as the plane passed them by and
concentrated on Young. Neither
Teaff nor Jinks was hit, but their
plane was liberally sprinkled with
slugs. Teaff even noted that a few were
shot at such an angle that some of them

47

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PH-Scout Squadron_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:36 PM Page 48

ABOVE: Aircraft prepare to launch from Shokaku to attack Pearl Harbor. OPPOSITE: A Japanese B5N torpedo bomber
from the carrier Kaga in flight over Hawaii, December 7, 1941.

stabilizer on the way out. Cohn did not make

it.
Meanwhile, Dickinson was still under
attack by as many as five Zeros. As he dove,
his gunner returned fire and said, Mr. Dickinson, I have been hit once, but I think I have
got one of those sons of bitches. When Dickinson glanced rearward, he saw a Japanese
plane on fire losing altitude and speed. It was
the first Navy aerial victory of the war. A few
minutes later, Miller reported that all six cans
of his ammunition were gone ... and then he
screamed.
As the attacking fighter sped past, Dickinson was able to get in two short bursts from his
forward guns, but they had little effect. The
attacks continued, and he could only watch
helplessly as holes began appearing in his
wings. Amazingly, he was not hurt, but his
ankle was nicked and there were horizontal
cuts in his sock. Soon, his left fuel tank was on
fire, he lost all control of his plane, and it
began to slip to the right. As it started to spin,
Dickinson called for Miller to bail out and then
jumped at an altitude of 800 feet. He landed
alone and unhurt near Ewa Field.
On the ground, Dickinson was able to catch
a ride with an elderly couple in a blue sedan
who had not quite realized what was going on.
They were going to a picnic and did not want
to be late. How unfortunate that the military
was causing all this fuss. They finally figured
things out when a van just ahead of them was
48

rocked by machine-gun and cannon fire.

Moments later, it careened off the road on flat
tires, coming to rest covered in dust and peppered with holes.
The couple dropped Dickinson off at Ewa
Field where the sentries told him that some
Japanese planes were so low they had thumbed
their noses at them as they flew by. Another
had clasped his hands together over his head in
a victory salute. Be that as it may, Dickinson
kept going until he got to Pearl Harbor, just in
time to see the destroyer USS Shaw go up in a
ball of flame. A bomb had penetrated the forward magazine and blown off the ships bow.
Lieutenant Commander Halstead L. Hopping was piloting 6-S-1 with a gunner named
Thomas, while 6-S-3 was piloted by Ensign
J.H.L. Vogt with Sidney Pierce as gunner.
While on their patrol, Hopping spotted a ship
and left Vogts company to investigate. When
he returned, he was unable to locate 6-S-3 and
continued alone. Landing at Ford Island during the dive-bombing attack, 6-S-1 endured
heavy friendly antiaircraft fire. Miraculously,
his aircraft was only hit once, a bullet in a battery that did not have any effect.
Vogt, having been left by Hopping, continued alone and ran into a flight of Zeros probably led by Lieutenant Yoshio Shiga from the
aircraft carrier Kaga. Eyewitnesses near Ewa
Field stated that Vogts SBD attacked and clung
tenaciously to the tail of a Zero, firing constantly until it pulled up and stalled, causing

Vogt to slam into it. The two planes fell entangled to the earth. Some say the action was a
simple collision, but others remember it as a
twisting dogfight. This is a particularly interesting version of a combat sequence, given the
mismatch of the relatively slow SBD and the
highly maneuverable Zero.
Ensign Carlton T. Misty Fogg was piloting 6-S-11 with a gunner named Dennis, and
6-S-8 was piloted by Ensign E.J. Dobson with
a gunner by the name of Hoss. They tried to
land at Ford Island, but realizing it was under
attack, they returned to Barbers Point and
joined up with the other circling Enterprise
planes for about 45 minutes. At that time, they
all tried to land at Ford but were met with such
heavy antiaircraft fire that the formation scattered. Fogg turned back, while Dobson actually made it in. Having landed at Ewa, Fogg
kept watch with a field phone from inside the
metal scoop of a steam shovel during the second attack wave.
Dauntless 6-S-7, piloted by H.D. Hilton with
a gunner named Leaming, and 6-B-5, piloted
by Ensign E.J. Kroeger with a gunner by the
name of Chapman, arrived off Barbers Point at
about 0845. They could not see the attack at
Pearl but did notice two large groups of aircraft. They circled with the others for a while
and then tried to land at Ewa Field where definite evidence of the attack was first noted.
They were immediately waved off for fear they
would draw strafing Japanese planes, and the
SBDs headed for Ford where they met heavy
antiaircraft fire. Both planes broke off and
returned to Ewa where they were refueled and
loaded with 500-pound bombs.
Dauntlesses 6-S-10, piloted by Lieutenant
Gallaher with a gunner named Merritt, and 6S-5, piloted by Ensign W.P. West with a gunner
named Hansen, also passed over Kauai as they
approached Oahu from the northwest. Ensign
West noticed approximately 10 monoplanes
marked in bright colors but mistook them for
Army observation planes. These Dauntlesses
also continued along until they reached Barbers Point and saw what they thought were
burning cane fields. Only when they got closer
to Pearl did they realize the truth. With the others, they landed at Ewa and then left immediately for Ford Island.
Enemy planes circled above Barbers Point at
3,000 to 4,000 feet. About 10 miles further out
to sea, even more Japanese planes formed up
and waited. In all, seven of the Enterprise
planes gathered and eventually tried to land at
Ewa but were waved off by the ground crew

PH-Scout Squadron_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:36 PM Page 49

and flew on to Ford Island. The formation

which included Gallaher, West, and Dobson
actually managed to land, while the others
broke off and returned to Ewa where this time
they were refueled and rearmed.
By now, the Japanese had retired completely, and at 1030 Hopping took off alone
from Ford Island to investigate a report of two
Japanese carriers 25 to 40 miles west or southwest of Barbers Point. He returned at 1145.
He met with light antiaircraft fire both on
takeoff and landing.
At 1115, Hilton, Kroeger, and Weber were
ordered to accompany an attack flight of
Army bombers from Hickam Field. After
receiving some antiaircraft fire at takeoff, the
three approached Hickam and found no
Army bombers to join with, so they returned
to Ford Island.
Other sightings abounded. Both the heavy
cruisers Minneapolis and Indianapolis, operating separately, were identified as Japanese
carriers. Even the Enterprise herself was rightly
identified as a carrier, but wrongly attacked.
Army Captain Brooke E. Allen, having saved
his B-17 from destruction by taxiing it away
from the flight line at Hickam, rose alone into
the afternoon sky with orders to search to the
southwest. There he found this beautiful carrier that opened fire on him. Accordingly, he
began a bombing run but, God had a hand on
me, because I knew this was not a Jap carrier.
Thirteen Enterprise planes were launched
from their new land base at 1210: nine planes
in three flights to search to the north and four
planes to search south. The northern search
consisted of Hopping, Teaff, and Kroeger; Gallaher, West, and Dobson; Dickinson, Hilton,
and Weber searching an area from 330 to 030
degrees and extending 200 miles north of
Oahu. No contacts were made, and the flight
returned at 1545.
A search patrol from the Enterprise to the
south included Ensign C.R. Bucky Walters
and Ensign Ben Troemel of Bomb Squadron
Six. Walters made contact with what he
described as a Soryu-class Japanese carrier. As
he investigated the ship, he found an enemy
plane closing on my starboard quarter. The
plane was a silver twin-engine monoplane carrying two vertical stabilizers. Attack was
evaded by applying full throttle and diving to
within 25 feet of the water. He then spotted
a Japanese cruiser of the Jintsu class, which he
followed for some time until ordered to return.
No Japanese ships or aircraft were in that area,
and what he actually saw is unknown.

The two ensigns were unable to return to

the ship and headed for Kauai and then on to
Oahu to land at Kaneohe Naval Air Station
after dark. The field had been badly shot up
in the morning and was now blacked out.
Walters and Troemel managed to land successfully but had to maneuver violently to
avoid hitting all the vehicles that had been
deliberately parked on the runway. Troemel
came to rest directly beneath a boom crane,
while Walters almost ran into a cement mixer.
The base commander explained that he had

ghost of a chance Another witness stated,

You could read a newspaper by the light of
the tracers.
When the guns opened up, one of the Wildcats radioed, What the hell is going on down
there? To which the tower replied succinctly,
Turn off your lights and beat it.
Wildcat pilot Ensign James Daniels tried a
novel defense when the firing started. Upon
seeing the tracers, he headed his plane directly
toward the antiaircraft gunners, hoping that
the glare of his landing lights would momen-

National Archives

put the vehicles there to prevent the Japanese

from landing and was a little upset that the
two SBDs had managed to do so.
It was not until 1700 that a viable attack force
was organized by the Enterprise. Eighteen Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers; the
remaining six Dauntlesses of Bombing Six,
which were fitted with smoke generators to
mask the torpedo planes; and an escort of six
Wildcats were launched to attack a force supposedly 100 miles southeast of the Enterprise
and her escort vessels, which were still west of
Hawaii. Nothing was located, and the Devastators and SBDs returned to the Enterprise.
By this time it was dark, and the Enterprise
did not turn on landing lights. Instead, the
Wildcats were ordered to land at Pearl Harbor. Although both the Army and Navy had
been informed several times about the six
approaching Wildcats, the night sky tragically
filled with tracers.
One sailor noted, Everything in Pearl Harbor opened up on them. They didnt have a

tarily blind them. It worked. The firing became

erratic, and Daniels was able to circle around,
turn off his lights, and land on Ford Island in
the dark. However, Ensign Gayle Herman took
a 5-inch round in his engine. Miraculously
unhurt, he bailed out over a golf course. Ensign
David Flynn kept out of range until his plane
ran out of gas and then parachuted into a cane
field. Ensign Herbert Menges, Lieutenant Francis Hebel, and Lieutenant Eric Allen, Jr., all
died. Allen was shot out of his parachute.
As December 7, 1941, passed into history,
the consequences and mistakes of the day
would be evaluated many times, but the men
of Scouting and Bombing Squadron Six had
reason to be proud of their role in the days
events. They reacted well to a confusing situation, fought hard, and then persevered under
heavy fire, most of it friendly.
Richard L. Hayes is a freelance writer from
Chicago. He has been published in numerous
military history magazines.
49

PH-Caught_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:40 PM Page 50

U . S . F O R C E S I N T H E P H I L I P P I N E S F E LT
T H E B R U N T OF J A PA N E S E M I L I TA RY
MIGHT ON DECEMBER 8, 1941.

IN

the popular history of World War II,

the assertion that the United States was
caught unprepared in Hawaii and the
Philippines has become widely accepted
as fact. However, in the case of the
Philippines, the proper word should be underprepared, as
this term more accurately represents the true situation that
existed in the Philippine Islands in the early morning hours of
December 8, 1941.
While neither the War Department nor the U.S. Navy
expected the Japanese to attack the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, for several months before the day that President Franklin
Roosevelt prophesied would live in infamy, authorities in
Washington, D.C., had been planning for war to break out in
the Pacific. When it did, they fully expected that the Philippines would be involved, so preparations were being made to
defend the islands. Unfortunately, the Japanese attack came
before the preparations had begun in earnest. The allegation
has also often been made that General Douglas MacArthur
facilitated the destruction of the Army Air Corps in the Philippines through indecision. This is also more myth than fact.
In 1941, the Philippine Islands were a possession of the
United States and had been for four decades. The islands had
come into U.S. hands as a condition of the treaty with Spain
that ended the Spanish-American War in 1898. Since that time
there had been mixed emotions on the part of the Filipino
people. While many had come to love the United States, which
was a benevolent master in comparison to Spain, they also
yearned for independence. Located just off the Asian main-

land and stretching from the northernmost island of Luzon to

Mindanao, the islands were the United States westernmost
possession in the Pacific. The Japanese-owned island of Formosa lay some 450 miles to the north of Manila, the Philippine capital, while portions of mainland China that had been
occupied by the Japanese were only a few hundred miles further, but to the west. The oil-rich East Indies lay to the south.
During the years between the world wars, the United States
developed a series of contingency plans in the event of war
with one or more foreign powers. These contingency plans
were known as the Rainbow series. Planning for a potential
war in the Pacific was found in the Rainbow No. 5 war plan,
which basically called for the United States to fight a defensive war against Japan while concentrating the main effort on
an offensive in Europe.
Under the provisions of Rainbow No. 5, the Philippines
would be written off and abandoned to the enemy, while all
U.S. forces would withdraw to a defensive line running from
Alaska through Hawaii. Rainbow No. 5 was approved in
the spring of 1941, but the plan was revised as the threat of
war intensified. Because of their proximity to Japanese territory in the Pacific, the War Department decided that the
Philippines was revised to one of strategic importance in the
defense of the region.
Prior to 1941, the War Department paid little attention to
the Philippines except for maintaining the garrison forces at
Fort Stotsenberg and cavalry and infantry troops made up of
Filipinos led by American officers. The Navy maintained
facilities at Cavite on Manila Bay, where a few destroyers

Caught
on the
G
BY SAM MCGOWAN

Fred Bamberger

50

PH-Caught_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:40 PM Page 51

t
Ground

National Archives

The attack on the Philippines

is starkly depicted in this
captured Japanese painting.
OPPOSITE: U.S. forces in the
Philippines received the
Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk
fighter as a replacement
for the aging P-26.

51

PH-Caught_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:40 PM Page 52

and PT boats were based, along with a seaplane

squadron equipped with Consolidated PBY
Catalina flying boats. As late as the spring of
1940, Army Air Corps assets in the islands consisted of a few obsolete open-cockpit, fixed
landing gear Boeing P-26 pursuit planes, a
handful of B-10 bombers, and three more modern Douglas B-18s.
Things began to change in the Philippines in
the late summer of 1941 as American relations
with Japan deteriorated. When Japanese forces
occupied French Indochina, President Franklin
Roosevelt responded with an embargo on the
sale of oil and other products to Japan, in keeping with previous economic sanctions against
the country. The move precipitated worsening
relations, and it soon became apparent that war
in the Pacific was inevitableand that the
Philippines would be in the line of the Japanese
advance southward toward the oil fields in the
Netherlands East Indies.
The United States began to build up its
Philippine-based forces, and former U.S. Army
Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur,
who had retired in the Philippines where he
served as field marshal of the Filipino military,
was recalled to active duty to take command
of all military forces based there. Several U.S.
Army air and ground units were alerted for
movement to the Philippines.
The buildup of air strength in the islands was
crucial to the new American plan. New Curtiss
P-40 Tomahawk fighter planes were sent to
replace the outmoded P-26s, along with two
squadrons of Seversky P-35s. While the P-35s
were of a more recent design than the open-cockpit P-26s, they were already obsolete by 1941
standards. Additional B-18s were sent to replace
the antiquated B-10s in the 28th Bombardment
Squadron. By August 1941, Air Corps strength
in the Philippines consisted of one squadron of
P-40s, two squadrons of P-35s, and two
squadrons of B-18s. One Filipino squadron was
still equipped with P-26s. The B-10s had also
been transferred to the Philippine Air Force.
More modern aircraft were on the way; the
newly created Army Air Forces Headquarters
believed that the presence of a large force of
heavy bombers would serve to secure the islands
and perhaps deter Japanese threats to the region.
The theory would soon be proved unfounded,
but in 1941 four-engine Boeing B-17 Flying
Fortresses and the newly developed Consolidated B-24 Liberators that had been designed
as their replacements were believed to be capable of destroying powerful naval forces while
the ships were still at sea.
52

Map 2011 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

Additional fighter planes were authorized for

delivery direct from the factories to the Philippines, with others to be taken from operational
units in the United States. War Department
plans for the Philippines called for four heavy
bomber groups with 272 operational airplanes
and an additional 68 in reserve along with two
pursuit (fighter) groups of 130 airplanes to be in
place by April 1942.
In May, elements formerly with the 19th Bombardment Group arrived at Hickam Field,
Hawaii, for duty with the Hawaiian Air Force.
At that time, they were the only U.S. heavy
bombers stationed outside the United States. In
late July, the Army Air Corps relocated the entire
group to the Philippines, with a provisional
squadron from the Hawaiian Air Force making
the initial move. On the morning of September
5, 1941, nine Flying Fortresses with 75 air and
ground crew members aboard left Hickam for
Midway Island on the first leg of a journey that
would take more than a week to complete.
From Midway, Major Emmett Rose
ODonnell led the flight of B-17s on to Wake
Island, then south to Port Moresby on Papua,

New Guinea. This leg of the flight brought the

bombers over territory that belonged to Japan
by mandate. The flight departed Wake at midnight so the bombers would be over Japanese
territory during the hours of darkness to avoid
detection. Their final stop before proceeding
northward to their destination at Clark Field
in Central Luzon was Darwin, a town on the
north coast of Australia.
The arrival of the B-17s reassured the senior
officers in the War Department in Washington
that the Philippines could, in fact, be reinforced
by air if need be. Impressed by the flight, General MacArthur authorized the establishment of
refueling sites in New Guinea and Australia in
preparation for future movements.
Plans were made for the transfer of additional Army Air Forces groups to the islands. In
November, the Rainbow No. 5 plan was
revised somewhat in that military strength in
the Philippines was to be increased substantially, including a major buildup of air power.
By the end of the month, the U.S. Army in the
Philippines was to receive an additional 26 B17s to fill out the complement of the 19th Bombardment Group. In addition, the 27th Bombardment Group (Light) was to arrive aboard
ship, with its complement of 52 Douglas A-24
dive-bombers to follow.
Although the United States military was
strapped for personnel and equipment, the
defense of the Philippines was given the highest
priority. The War Department scraped the bottom of the barrel to find units to deploy, while
additional air assets and ground troops were
being trained for movement to the islands. Since
the Wake Island-to-Moresby route came in close
proximity to Japanese territory, a new South
Pacific ferry route was considered. Plans were
also made for a route over which fighters could

PH-Caught_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:41 PM Page 53

National Archives

It was a burdensome system made even more so

by the primitive Filipino communications. During early tests, it took nearly an hour for word
of spotted aircraft to reach the interceptor command post at Nichols Field.
Iba was not the only airfield that the Far East
Air Forces elected to develop in its plan for the
defense of the Philippines. Members of Brere-

National Archives

35th Pursuit Group, although that groups headquarters was still at sea when the Japanese
attack came. By the end of November, all of the
pursuit squadrons had been equipped with
either P-40Bs or Es, except for the 34th Pursuit
Squadron, which was still flying P-35s.
To protect Luzon, the fighter squadrons were
dispersed with the 17th and 21st squadrons

National Archives

be delivered to the Philippines from assembly

points in Australia.
After the initial deployment of the 14th Bombardment Squadron, the entire 19th Bombardment Group was alerted in mid-October for
movement to the islands. The groups remaining
26 Flying Fortresses departed Hamilton Field,
California, and had arrived at Hickam by October 22. By November 6, barely a month before
the outbreak of the war, 25 B-17s had arrived at
Clark. One airplane was temporarily grounded
at Darwin but arrived within a few days.
Only two squadrons of the 19th Bombardment Group made the trip to the Philippines. The
28th Bombardment Group, which had been in
the Philippines for more than a decade, joined
the unit along with the 14th Bombardment
Squadron, which had arrived from Hawaii in
September. Personnel from the 28th gave up their
twin-engine B-18s and joined the 19th to fly B17s. The B-18s were reassigned to liaison duty.
With the arrival of the additional B-17s, U.S.
heavy bomber strength in the islands was up to
35 airplanes and more were scheduled to make
the trip. Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton was sent
to Manila to take command of all air units in the
islands and assume a place on General
MacArthurs staff. On November 16, the Far
East Air Force (FEAF) was activated under
Breretons command. Authorization had been
given for the establishment of the Fifth Air
Force, but the headquarters had not been activated before the war broke out, although the
bomber and pursuit commands were. The new
FEAF included V Bomber Command under Lt.
Col. Eugene L. Eubank and V Interceptor Command under Brig. Gen. Henry B. Claggett.
In early November, an order was put out that
all modernized B-17s would be sent to the
Philippines. Additional heavy bomber squadrons,
including some that were set to be equipped with
the new B-24 Liberator, were also ordered to the
islands. The 7th Bombardment Group was on
its way to Clark Field, with the ground components setting sail from San Francisco on November 21. The first flight of B-17s was scheduled to
depart California in late November and early
December. Additional B-17s and B-24s would
follow as they were delivered from the factories.
While the arrival of the heavy bombers would
give the American forces in the Philippines the
power to strike at Japanese positions on Formosa and in parts of China, the increase in pursuit capabilities would provide protection from
air attack. In early October, the Air Corps activated the 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines.
A month later it was joined by elements of the

ABOVE, LEFT to RIGHT: Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank; Lieutanant Joseph H. Moore (pictured as Lt. Gen.); Maj. Gen.
Lewis H. Brereton. OPPOSITE: Several American pilots pose at Clark Field in August 1941. Standing left to right are:
Carl Gies, Max Louk, Erwin Crellin, and Varian Kieler.

operating out of Nichols Field outside Manila

and the 20th at Clark Field. The 3rd Pursuit
Squadron was based at Iba, a small grass field
on the China Sea across the 2,000-foot Zambales Mountains from Fort Stotsenberg and
Clark. Iba Field was barely large enough to
accommodate the 18 Curtis P-40Es that made
up the 3rd Pursuit Squadron, but it was the closest fighter airfield to the approach routes to the
American military installations around Manila.
Previously, Iba had been used primarily as an
advanced field for gunnery training on the
ranges in the nearby Zambales.
Along with the basing of the 3rd Pursuit
Squadron at Iba, General Brereton stationed an
aircraft early warning radar team there, although
the technology was still new and the operators
were just learning their trade. Because of its location, Iba was a logical choice for a radar site. In
all, seven radar sets had arrived in the Philippines
by early December, but Iba was the only one
operational. Another at Manila was in the
process of being set up when war came.
General MacArthur borrowed from the Chinese practice of establishing a rudimentary aircraft warning system that depended on Filipinos
stationed at crucial locations and connected to V
Fighter Command by telephone and telegraph.
Information received from the sites would then
be transmitted to a plotting center at Clark Field.

tons staff felt that a heavy bomber base in the

Southern Philippines on Mindanao was needed,
a proposal that was initially opposed since the
Rainbow No. 5 plan did not call for ground
forces to be used to defend that particular island.
But the soil on Mindanao was ideally suited for
all-weather runways, a factor that weighted the
argument in favor of a southern base.
Until a new airfield could be constructed, a
temporary base was set up at the airstrip on the
islands Del Monte pineapple plantation. On
December 5, two squadrons from the 19th
Bombardment Group, half the heavy bomber
strength then in the islands, deployed to Del
Monte Field. Breretons operations plan called
for the bombers to be based on Mindanao but
to stage through Clark on missions against
Japanese positions on Formosa if war came. The
Fifth Air Base Group arrived at Manila aboard
the transport ship USS Coolidge in early December and was sent immediately to Mindanao by
island steamer to support the B-17s.
The United States initially based its buildup in
the Philippines on a timeline that would see war
with Japan beginning sometime in the spring of
1942. However, a worsening diplomatic situation was leading to an increase in the potential
for hostilitiesto the point that by November
it was apparent that war could break out at any
moment. In early November, the War Depart53

PH-Caught_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:41 PM Page 54

MORE FIGHTERS WOULD

BE LOST IN THE BATTLE
FOR THE PHILIPPINES
TO ACCIDENTS AND
MECHANICAL FAILURE,
OR SIMPLY RUNNING
OUT OF FUEL, THAN
TO COMBAT.
In late November, in response to a British suggestion, the War Department notified General
MacArthur that two long-range B-24 Liberators equipped with photographic equipment
would depart for the Philippines by November
28. Their mission would be to photograph
Japanese installations in the Marshall Islands
and the Carolines.
As it turned out, the departure of the modified Liberators was delayed and the first arrived
in Hawaii on December 5. It was held at
Hickam Field for armament modifications and
would become the first American aircraft loss of
the war when Japanese planes struck Hickam
on December 7.

The Air Corps intensified its preparations for

war in early November, and General Brereton
ordered all of his commanders to be prepared
for any emergency. Aircraft were to be dispersed and kept on an operationally ready status, with their crews on two-hour alert day and
night. The 19th Bombardment Group was
ordered to maintain one squadron for reconnaissance and bombing missions at all times,
while the 24th Pursuit Group was to have three
planes from each squadron on alert from dawn
until dusk. The orders were put into effect on
November 10, nearly a month before war
broke out. Within less than a week, all pursuit
aircraft in the islands were placed on constant
alert, with the airplanes fully armed and the
pilots on a 30-minute alert. Some fighter pilots
slept by their airplanes.
Early December saw an increase in the effort
to beef up American air strength in the Philippines. While only 35 heavy bombers had arrived
in the islands, others were on the way, along with
52 A-24 dive-bombers for the 27th Bombardment Group and 18 additional P-40s that were
bound for the islands aboard ship. On December 1, Army Air Corps commanding general
Henry H. Arnold notified the commander of the
Hawaiian Air Force, We must get every available B-17 to the Philippines as soon as possible.
On December 6, a flight of 13 B-17s left
Hamilton Field for Hickam on the first leg of
their journey to Clark. Their arrival at Clark
would have continued the buildup of the heavy
bomber force that was expected to be at full
strength by April 1942. Unfortunately, time was
running out at a rate much faster than expected.
Even though new aircraft were arriving in the
Philippines on a regular basis, that did not mean
they or the men who flew them were operationally ready. The fighters arrived in crates and
required assembly and maintenance before they
were combat ready. Engines had to be broken in
and slow-timed, while guns had to be bore

A Boeing B-17D Flying Fortress sits on the tarmac at Clark Field

in 1941. B-17s and other heavy bombers gave U.S. forces the
ability to strike targets in China and Formosa.

54

sighted. Many of the fighters were still not operationally ready when war broke out. A major
problem for the fighter pilots was the lack of a
source of oxygen in the islands, which restricted
the P-40s to sustained operations at altitudes of
15,000 feet and below.
The pilots themselves were inexperienced,
which was a factor in what happened when war
came. Most were fresh from pilot training and
had very little experience in the P-40s they were
to take into combat. More fighters would be
lost in the battle for the Philippines to accidents
and mechanical failure, or simply running out of
fuel, than to combat. Their radio equipment was
primitive, and everyone in the islands used the
same frequencies. Even though the P-40s were
first-line fighters, one squadron, the 34th Pursuit, was still equipped with obsolete P-35s.
During the more than 60 years since December 7, 1941, many historians have concentrated
on the lack of decisiveness on the part of General MacArthur during the first hours of the
war. They have given the impression that no
action was taken by the air forces in the Philippines, that the Japanese caught the air force on
the ground and destroyed it within minutes. In
reality, nothing could be further from the truth.
The American forces in the Philippines
learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor within an
hour after it started, not through timely notification by the War Department, but through a
local radio station that picked up a broadcast
from a Honolulu station and contacted the military. The Navy already knew of the attack but
had failed to inform MacArthurs headquarters
in Manila. Upon receiving the news, MacArthur
immediately informed his subordinates that the
country was at war and instructed them to take
appropriate action.
The Army Air Forces squadrons were
informed. They were already on a status of high
alert and had been for several weeks. On the
evening of December 7, the officers of the newly
Robert F. Dorr collection

ment sent a message to commanders in the

Pacific advising that war with Japan was imminent but that it was extremely important for the
Japanese to carry out the first hostile act.
Apparently, the leadership in Washington
believed the American public would be more
likely to support a war if the Japanese attacked
first. General MacArthur apparently interpreted
this letter to include any action that could be
considered hostile and forbade reconnaissance
missions over Formosa even when unidentified
aircraft were reported around and over Luzon.

PH-Caught_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:41 PM Page 55

Questions linger concerning the

deployment of U.S. heavy bombers
on the first day of World War II.
Ever since word of the disaster in the Philippines reached the rest of the world, there has
been much speculation about what would have happened if the B-17s had been launched
against the Japanese airfields on Formosa immediately after word of the attack on Pearl
Harbor reached the islands.
Many, including his biographer, William Manchester, have accused General Douglas
MacArthur of being personally responsible for the failure to mount an attack. But those who
make the accusations fail to consider the true situation of the bomber force in the Philippines
on December 8, 1941. For one thing, only half of the 35-plane heavy bomber force was on
Luzon that morning. Two squadrons had been transferred some 500 miles south to Mindanao.
Even if all of the B-17s at Clark had been able to take off for a mission against the Japanese
airfields, they would have made up too small a formation to effectively defend themselves
against the hordes of Japanese fighters they would have likely encountered over Formosa. The
two squadrons at Del Monte would have had to fly to Clark or San Marcelino to refuel and take
on bombs and ammunition for their guns before they could fly a mission.
Another consideration is the weather that lay over the Japanese airfields. The same fog
that kept the Japanese naval aircraft on the ground until
midmorning would have also prevented the American B-17 crews from finding the airfields
and the bombardiers from successfully bombing the targets. Furthermore, all of the B-17s
at Clark had been ordered into the air in the early morning so they would not be caught on
the ground by the inevitable Japanese attack. In fact, it was the decision to recall them to
refuel and rearm for an attack on Formosa that caused them to be on the ground when the
Japanese bombers and fighters struck Clark.
The gift of hindsight indicates that the best course of action would perhaps have been to
send the bombers south and keep them aloft until after the attack. They could have then
been recalled to Clark, along with the two squadrons that were at Mindanao, for a night or
early morning attack on the Japanese airfields on Formosa. Or, the bombers could have
been held in reserve at Clark to attack the Japanese invasion fleet when it came.
Still, either action would have merely prolonged the inevitable. The U.S. Pacific Fleet was
in such disarray after the attack on Pearl Harbor that reinforcement of the Philippines had
become impossible. It is unlikely that the B-17s could have done anything to change the
eventual outcome.

arrived 27th Bombardment Group, which still

had no airplanes, threw a party for General
Brereton at the Manila Hotel. Brereton was
called out of the party for conferences with
Admiral W.R. Purnell, the senior naval officer in
the islands, and General Richard Sutherland,
chief of staff for MacArthur, who informed him
of a message from Washington advising that
war could break out at any moment.
Brereton notified his air units and canceled a
training operation for the B-17s that was scheduled for the next day. Within an hour after the
party broke up at 2 AM (December 8, Philippine
time) word reached the Philippines that Hawaii
was under attack.
Within 30 minutes after the first word of the
attack reached Manila, the Army Air Forces
radar site at Iba picked up a large formation of
unidentified airplanes about 75 miles offshore

and plotted their track toward the island of Corregidor. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron dispatched
its fighters to make the intercept, and they were
tracked by radar as they flew toward the
unknown formation. The radar operators saw
the blips merge on their scope, but the fighter
pilots never saw the unknown aircraft in the
predawn darkness. Apparently, they had flown
beneath the Japanese. After failing to locate the
unidentified aircraft, they returned to Iba and
breakfast. What the Japanese did is unclear,
since the first attacks were still several hours
away. Apparently, they were on a reconnaissance flight.
The U.S. forces in the Philippines were officially notified at 5 AM Manila time that Pearl
Harbor had been attacked. At this point the
record becomes confused. Air Force historians
Wesley Craven and James Cate point out that

no real record exists of the events of December

8, 1941, as they took place in the Philippines.
What records were kept were lost during the
coming events in the islands, while unit histories were written after the fact and were possiblyeven probablyconsiderably contrived.
At the request of General Arnold, author and
historian Walter D. Edmonds eventually took
over a project, which had begun in 1942,
involving interviewing participants in the battles for the Philippines and Java. Edmonds
interviewed dozens of airmen and carefully
scrutinized diaries and combat reports. He published the results in the book They Fought With
What They Had, which was originally published in 1951.
Edmonds believes that the official records
were compiled after the fact and were sometimes doctored so they agreed with the positions of certain senior officers. General Brereton published his Brereton Dairies right after
the war, and General MacArthur promptly
denied some of the information contained
therein. General Arnold claimed that he never
really knew what happened in the Philippines
on December 8 even though it was widely
known that a detailed report was sent to him
within days of the event.
Many historians focus on the Japanese 11th
Air Fleet being grounded at its airfields around
Tainan on Formosa due to a thick fog. While
the Japanese naval aircraft did not launch until
the fog lifted, Army bombers were not hampered by the weather. A formation of twinengine bombers attacked Baguio at around
9:30. Accounts differ as to when Iba was
attacked. Although most historians record that
the field was attacked simultaneously with
Clark, other reports indicate that Iba was first
struck at daybreak, shortly after the 3rd Pursuit
Squadron returned from its attempted interception of the Japanese formation just before dawn.
Based on reports from those interviewed by
Edmonds, the Iba attack came shortly before
the attack on Clark.
At 5 AM General Brereton was at General
MacArthurs headquarters at Manila. The Air
Corps commander wished to gain permission
from MacArthur for a strike on the Japanese
airfields on Formosa, or so he said in his memoir. According to legend, General Richard K.
Sutherland, MacArthurs chief of staff, kept
Brereton from meeting with his boss.
MacArthur claimed that he was never consulted
about an attack and that he would not have
approved it anyway, as it would have been
futile. Whether MacArthurs observation was
55

PH-Caught_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:42 PM Page 56

based on the reality of the time or came through

the gift of hindsight, it was pretty astute.
Regardless of what really happened, at 10:14
Brereton reported that he received a phone call
from MacArthur authorizing him to carry out
an attack on Formosa in late afternoon at his
discretion. A few minutes before the phone call,
Lt. Col. Eugene Eubank, the commander of V
Bomber Command, left for Clark with orders to
dispatch a reconnaissance flight over the Japanese airfields on Formosa in preparation for a
strike. There is reason to believe that Brereton

UNFORTUNATELY,
THE EFFORT OF THE
AMERICAN P-35 AND P-40
PILOTS WAS TOO LITTLE
AND PERHAPS TOO LATE.
THE DEVASTATION TO
THE AIR CORPS AT CLARK
WAS OVERWHELMING.
received authority, possibly from Sutherland, to
mount an air strike against Japanese installations on Formosa as early as 8 AM.
Instead of taking no action, as so many have
asserted, the Army Air Forces in the Philippines
were very active from the moment they were notified of the attack on Pearl Harbor and Hickam,
and even earlier in the case of the squadron at
Iba. Fighter patrols were in the air within an hour
of the notification that war had come. Around 8
AM, at the insistence of Colonel Harold George,
the chief of staff of V Fighter Command, all of the
B-17s at Clark were ordered to take off so they
would not be caught on the ground by an
expected Japanese attack. The detachment at
Mindanao was notified to prepare to return to
Clark for a bombing mission.
At 9:23, Colonel George reported that two
formations of multiengine bombers were over
northern Luzon. The 20th Pursuit Squadron
was directed to make the interception, but the
Japanese turned east and struck the Filipino
summer capital of Baguio instead of continuing
south toward Clark Field or Manila as expected.
Other Filipino cities were reportedly bombed
during the morning hours, including Tarlac, a
town just north of Clark Field, and Tugegararo,
a city in northern Luzon. American P-40s from
the 20th Pursuit Squadron had expected to
56

intercept the Japanese fighters over Rosales, a

town south of Baguio, but failed to make contact with the enemy.
By all indications, Iba was the first Air Corps
field to be attacked. Some have written that the
tiny airstrip was attacked shortly after dawn as
the P-40s from the 3rd Pursuit Squadron were
returning from their predawn attempted interception over the China Sea. Such, however,
apparently was not the case. Nor were all of the
3rd airplanes destroyed on the ground. In fact,
only one was on the ground when the Japanese
bombers appeared overhead. The rest were still
airborne. Edmonds reports that the telephone
line between Iba and Clark went dead at 11 AM,
leaving radio contact as the bases only means of
communicating with other units. Thirty minutes
later, the Iba radar picked up a large formation
about 100 miles out to sea. The 3rd Squadron
commander, Lieutenant H.G. Thorne, ordered
his pilots to start their engines, but to remain on
the ground since the Japanese seemed to be
milling around over the ocean.
Shortly after the 3rd Pursuit pilots manned
their aircraft, they received an order from Interceptor Command headquarters to take off and
climb to 15,000 feet and to remain over Iba.
All 18 airplanes took off, in three flights of six
airplanes each, but they never assembled as a
squadron, apparently due to the difficult communications from the radio clutter on the
fighter frequency. At the time, there were fighters in the air all over Luzon, and all were trying to obtain instructions.
One flight from Iba headed for Manila in
hopes of receiving explicit instructions. After circling over Nichols Field for a while and receiving no orders, the flight commander led them
back toward Iba as their fuel supply began to
dwindle. They arrived over Iba to discover the
field under attack. The P-40s dove into the
Japanese and broke up a strafing attack before
it got started, but their fuel was low and they
had to get on the ground. Four were shot down
while trying to land at Iba; one pilot crashlanded in the sea just off the airfield, and one
flight went to Clark and joined the combat
there. Several 3rd Squadron airplanes found
safety at Rosales, a strip near Lingayen Gulf.
Even though the P-40s broke up the Japanese
strafing attack, the level bombers hit the field
with pinpoint accuracy, destroying the radar
site, killing the operators, and hitting the few
buildings on the field. Casualties were reported
as 50 percent either wounded or killed, and the
airfield was rendered useless. The flight surgeon,
Lieutenant Frank Richardson, rounded up as

many trucks as he could find and loaded them

with wounded. He then set out down the coast
for Manila.
Lieutenant F.C. Roberts, the pilot who crashlanded on the beach, organized the uninjured
survivors and led them on a march through the
mountains toward Clark. Failing to find a cart
track leading toward Fort Stotsenburg, many of
the men got lost and wandered in the junglecovered mountains for several days.
After receiving approval to launch an attack
on Formosa, Brereton recalled the bombers to
Clark to refuel and rearm. He ordered Eubank
to have the B-17s armed with 100- and 300pound bombs and to have the crews briefed for
an attack on Japanese airfields in southern Formosa late that evening. He also sent word to
Del Monte ordering the two squadrons of B-17s
that were there on deployment back to Luzon in
preparation for an attack the next morning, but
to use an emergency strip at San Marcelino
rather than Clark itself. They were to be prepared to fly a mission at daybreak the following
morning. Two B-17s were dispatched on reconnaissance missions over Formosa. It was not
until 11:30 that the last bomber landed.
Although it is commonly believed that the
attack on Clark came without warning, in fact
the radar report from Iba of a large formation
over the China Sea had been sent to Fighter
Command. The target was believed to be
Manila, and the 17th Pursuit Squadron was
ordered into the air to patrol over Manila Bay.
The 34th Pursuit was supposed to take off and
cover Clark but failed to get the word. When
Japanese planes appeared over Clark, the 21st
Pursuit took off to intercept them but was
diverted to patrol over Cavite. The 20th Pursuit
was on the ground at Clark refueling after its
fruitless mission over northern Luzon in the
morning. The 19th Bombardment Group B-17s
were in the process of refueling and rearming.
Some of the crews had gone to the mess tent for
the noon meal.
The first attack on Clark came from a 54plane formation of level bombers, which flew
over at 18,000 feet. The bombs impacted across
the field diagonally, and most of the buildings
were hit. The flight line where the B-17s were
parked received very little damage from the
attack, but most of the P-40s were hit. When
the bombs began falling, Lieutenant Joseph H.
Moore led a four-plane formation of P-40s off
the ground. Ten others were behind them
preparing to take off. They were caught in the
bomb pattern, and most were destroyed without
getting off the ground.

National Archives

Lloyd Stinson via Robert F. Dorr

PH-Caught_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:42 PM Page 57

TOP: Built for Sweden but diverted to U.S. forces after a 1940 embargo on overseas sales, P-35s of the 20th Pursuit
Squadron fly over Clark Field in the summer of 1941. ABOVE: A Mitsubishi Ki-51 Type 99 Sonia dive-bomber, comparable in size and performance to the German Stuka Ju-87 photographed after a raid against targets on Luzon.

At this point, the B-17s were still largely

undamaged, but the bombing was followed several minutes later by a vicious strafing attack by
Japanese fighters that came right down on the
deck, pouring cannon fire into the parked
bombers. The Japanese were not unopposed.

The first flight of Zeros was intercepted by Joe

Moore and his three wingmen. Lieutenant Randall D. Keator promptly shot down a Zero and
was awarded the Silver Star for the first
recorded American victory of the Southwest
Pacific War. Moore got two more.

The P-35s of the 34th Pursuit took off from

Del Carmen for Clark and were promptly intercepted by Japanese fighters. Although the victories could not be confirmed, 34th pilots
claimed to have shot down three of the Japanese fighters. Another interception was made by
the six P-40s of C Flight from the 3rd Pursuit
which had rushed to Clark after receiving word
that it was under attack. Unfortunately, all six
airplanes were low on fuel and one pilot bailed
out when his engine quit. He was strafed by
Zeros while he hung in his parachute. One P-40
flew into the side of Mt. Ararat, a huge volcano
just east of Clark Field. Lieutenant Herbert Ellis
had to bail out of his burning airplane, but not
before he shot down three Japanese fighters.
Unfortunately, the effort of the American P35 and P-40 pilots was too little and perhaps
too late. The devastation to the Air Corps at
Clark was overwhelming. All of the B-17s on
the ground were severely damaged in the strafing attack, but three would be repaired. Damage to the fighter force was equally great,
although many of the fighters were lost to
causes other than enemy action. Several ran out
of fuel and others crash-landed due to engine
trouble because they had not been properly broken in. Nearly every airplane on the ground at
Clark was destroyed, with the most serious
losses being the B-17s and the 10 P-40s that
were caught in the bomb pattern before they
could get off the ground.
The disaster at Clark was not caused so much
by a lack of preparedness on the part of the military as by a combination of factors that stacked
up against the U.S. forces. Had the B-17s
remained aloft or been sent south to Mindanao
until the Allied force could get organized, they
would have been spared. Had the fighters from
Nichols Field continued to Clark, they might
have broken up the strafing attack as the 3rd
Pursuit P-40s did at Iba. The loss of the 10 P-40s
from the 20th Pursuit was more a matter of timing than anything else. The airplanes were refueled, armed, and ready to go, but they started
taking to the air a few minutes too late.
Regardless of the reasons, the Air Corps at
Clark had suffered grievously. The remaining
pilots would fight gloriously over the next few
weeks and months, but the ultimate fate of the
Philippines had been determined long before the
first bombs fell at Clark Field.
Sam McGowan is the author of The Cave, a
novel of the Vietnam War. He has also written
extensively on the subject of air power during
World War II.
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P R E S A G I N G

hen Lt. Cmdr. Matsuo

Fuchida, commander of
the Japanese strike
force at Pearl Harbor,
arrived over the naval
base on the morning of December
7, 1941, the sight that greeted
himenemy battleships resting
placidly at anchorput him in
mind of an earlier war. Have these
Americans never heard of Port
Arthur? he thought, just before
sending an encoded radio transmission (Tora! Tora! Tora!)
informing his superiors that Japan
had achieved surprise at the
beginning of this war as well.
Military historians analyzing
the Pearl Harbor operation in the
larger context of a Japanese way
of war owe Fuchida a debt of
gratitude for his observation. In
referencing the incident that
kicked off the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-1905, Fuchida

National Archives

BY STEVEN WEINGARTNER

58

P E A R L

greatly simplified the historians

job of establishing historical links
needed to legitimize and explain
the idea of a Japanese way of war.
Nevertheless, the Port ArthurPearl Harbor analogy is pretty
obvious, so much so that
Fuchidas acumen would be open
to question had it escaped his
notice. But here the obvious tends
to obscure what is truly important. Port Arthur specifically, and
the Russo-Japanese War generally, presage Pearl Harbor and the
Pacific War in ways that Fuchida
(and most historians) failed to
detect. Fuchida is to be pardoned
for this failure: he was, after all,
busy at the time. Otherwise it
might have occurred to him to
ask the same question from the
Japanese perspective: Have we,
the Japanese, never heard of Port
Arthur? The answer, fully considered, should have given him and
his countrymen pause.
First, one must consider the
political context of the Port

H A R B O R
Arthur attack. On February 2,
1904, Vice Adm. Heihachiro
Togo, commander of the Japanese battle fleet, received a
telegram from his Navy chief of
staff informing him that a formal
declaration of war could come
only after the attack on the Russian naval installation had been
executed. On February 6, two
days before the attack, diplomatic
ties between the two countries
were severed, producing a de
facto state of war. (Formal declarations of war would not be
issued until February 10.) The
shooting war actually began in
the harbor of Chemulpo
(Inchon), north of Port Arthur, at
about 2:30 PM on February 7,
when Russian gunboat Koreetz
exchanged fire with attacking
Japanese warships. On the morning of the 8th, Japanese warships
engaged and sank Koreetz,
cruiser Varyag, and Russian merchantman Sangori in an action
that concluded around noon.

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EARL
HARBO
:
P
R
A

R E A S S E S S M E N T

O F

T H E

JAPANESE WAY OF WAR

The USS West Virginia, Tennessee, and

Arizona smolder and smoke in the
aftermath of the surprise aerial attack
by a fleet of Japanese aircraft carriers.

59

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National Archives

Togos fleet did not strike Port Arthur until

about 11 PM that same day, more than 12
hours after the first major naval engagement of
the war and some 19 hours after the first shots
had been fired.
Hence the operation at Port Arthur was a
tactical surprise but not a diplomatic surprise.
When the attack came, the two belligerent
nations were in an acknowledged and real
state of war.
It is important to grasp that the Port Arthur
operation achieved little of substance. Serious
damage was inflicted on Russian cruiser Pallada and battleships Retvizan and Tsarevitch;
all were grounded, all were raised and repaired
and would participate in subsequent engagements with Togos ships. The Japanese coup de
main failed to deliver the knockout blow they
had sought. The Port Arthur squadron survived
the Japanese surprise attack, and in so doing
helped prolong Russian resistance in the siege
that followed, thus extending the war as well.
The tactic of surprise had proved to be a nonstarter. Yet it would remain a key element of
the Japanese way of war, so much so that it
would be elevated from the tactical to the
strategic level, becoming a cornerstone of
Japanese strategy formulations for the Pacific
War of 1941-1945.

Rashness in war is prudence, Admiral Sir

John Fisher declared, prudence in war is imbecility. This is the sort of oratorical broadside
for which Britains habitually colorful First Sea
Lord (1904-1910) was famous. One scarcely
knows what to make of it. When Fisher wanted
to make a point he was liable to say anything.
Some paid more attention than others. The
Japanese, for instance: Fisher was their prophet
of naval warfare, his utterances accepted as
gospel. In practice during the Russo-Japanese
War the rashness as prudence policy provided
the Japanese Navy with a measure of overall success. But only a measure: although the defeat of
the Tsars navy in Far Eastern waters was nearly
total, it was not timely and, at Port Arthur, it was
not even achieved by the Japanese fleet. The
destruction of the Port Arthur squadron was
achieved by the Japanese Army, specifically by
the Armys big siege guns. Curiously, the bombardment that ended the squadrons existence
began on December 7, 190437 years to the
day before Fuchida and his fellow aviators
appeared in the skies over Pearl Harbor.
The subsequent annihilation of an entire
Russian fleet in the Straits of Tsushima was
60

National Archives

A LACK OF PRESCIENCE

TOP: Japanese soldiers in the 1904-1905 war against the Russians. They relied a great deal on aggressiveness.
ABOVE: A Japanese officer, hand on sword, leads infantrymen against the Chinese. The samurai mystique pervaded
the armed forces. OPPOSITE: Japanese leadership in the late 1930s. Emperor Hirohito is at right front, Hideki Tojo
second row middle.

stunning, and Togos maneuverings in the battle could certainly be interpreted as rash. Anyway, by then the war had been pretty much
decided. And though Japan was the undeniable victor, the war was not decided entirely in
her favor.
Nor could it be. In Manchuria, of which Port
Arthur was a southern port, Japan had won but
she had not conquered. By wars end, her manpower reserves were dwindling; she was running out of materiel (particularly battleships)
and money, along with nations and banks willing to provide more of both; and Russian forces

in Manchuria remained, quite improbably and

despite multiple defeats on the battlefield and
revolutionary ferment on the home front, a
threat to Japanese interests in Asia.
Here one would point out that the European
great powers and the United States were unanimous and quite enthusiastic in their support for
Japan; they were all to varying degrees hostile to
Russia and quite favorably disposed to the
Japanese. In the months leading up to the outbreak of war, Europe and the United States did
not even bother to conceal their favoritism: All
wanted to see the plucky Japanese (an oft-

PH-Reassess_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:45 PM Page 61

National Archives

used term at the time) defeat Russia. Indeed from achieving what would have been a deci- were unfavorable, at least seemingly so to the
Japanese in light of what they thought and
Japan would not have dared go to war against sive victory against the Japanese Army.
The Japanese were quite cognizant of the sit- what their own propaganda told them was a
Russia unless she had previously secured the
approval of the United States and Europe, Great uations grim potentialities. In fact, they had comprehensive victory against Russia. This
Britain in particular. If Great Britain had told gone to war worried that this was the course it prompted bitterness among Japanese military
Japan that the latter should forbear from hos- would take, more or less. Just days before the elites and nationalists, who subsequently protilities, there would have been no Russo-Japan- attack at Port Arthur, the Japanese government moted the canard that they had been ill-served
ese War. But Great Britain was then hostile to had arranged for a diplomat to be sent to the by a willfully malevolent United States.
Coming to terms at Portsmouth, however,
Russia and so gave the Japanese the green light. United States. And so, even before the outbreak
Given that this was the case, it should come of hostilities, the Japanese were anticipating may have been the wisest strategic move Japan
as no surprise that the Japanese obtained much that they would not win the war decisively, that made in that war. It was predicated by the
of their wartime financing in the form of loans a negotiated settlement, brokered by President recognition of eventual failurethe failure to
provided by Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, a New Theodore Roosevelt, would be needed to end beat Russia decisively. The Japanese knew they
York City banking firm headed by Jacob Schiff. the fighting. The diplomat had been sent ahead did not have the resources to fight a long war
Securing these loans while the war was ongoing to represent Japanese interests and otherwise against a determined foe and had planned their
was vital for the Japanese, who had run out of lay the groundwork for a favorable settlement. war-termination strategy accordingly. Japans
When the peace conference convened in 1941 leadership lacked such prescience. Nor
money and would have been unable to purchase
arms, munitions, and related materiel on the Portsmouth, NH, on August 8, 1905, the was the option of a negotiated settlement brointernational market without the monies they Japanese were desperate to bring it to a swift kered by a Western power available to them.
provided. The Japanese had gone to war in conclusion. Of course the terms they received The nations that had been most sympathetic to
the Japanese in 1904 (notably, Britain
expectation of gaining a swift victory
and the United States) became her
over Russia, despite the fact that
main enemies in 1941. Unfortunately
nobody ever achieves a swift victory
for Japan, her war-fighting capabiliover Russia. They had planned for a
THE JAPANESE HAD GONE
ties remained, in relative terms,
short war that would not cost too
unchanged from 1905. She still
much. They had neither the resources
TO WAR EXPECTING A SWIFT
lacked the resources to fight a long
nor the finances to fight the sort of
VICTORY OVER RUSSIA,
war against a determined foe.
war in which they soon found themThe Japanese would not admit to
selves embroiled. As it happened,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT
this deficiency. It was more imporhowever, Jacob Schiff and his coltant, in 1905, to claim victory over a
leagues were Jews who were eager to
NOBODY EVER ACHIEVES A
Western power. Thus they did not
see the virulently anti-Semitic Russian
and would not come to grips with
empire humbled by the Japanese. The
SWIFT VICTORY OVER RUSSIA.
fundamental flaws in their thinking
Easter Sunday 1905 massacre of Jews
about the way wars could and should
in Kishniev (near Odessa), which was
be fought. A pattern was set: a patconducted by civilians but tolerated
tern of rashness as prudence, pruby the police, gave the bankers further
dence as imbecility. The Japanese
motivation to provide additional
would try it again, first at Pekings
funding to the Japanese, even though
Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937, then
it was obvious that Japan would have
at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
a hard time making good on the
The result in the short term would be
loans. When the funding dried up, the
victory; in the long term, defeat.
Japanese sought an end to the war.
Why did the funding dry up?
Because the Japanese were not
PREDICTIONS
achieving decisive results in
AND PESSIMISM
Manchuria, such results being the
In the Russo-Japanese War, and again
condition for securing further loans.
in the euphemistically termed 1937
One may well argue that Russia
China Incident, and finally in the
would have won the war had it conPacific War, Japans limited resources
tinued for another six months. The
imposed restrictions on her military
military situation in Manchuria was
strategy and on the thinking used to
turning against Japan and it was only
devise strategy. Japanese strategy for
domestic upheavals far to the West in
fighting the Pacific War was worse
European Russia that prevented the
than unimaginative; it was virtually
Russian military, which was eagerly
nonexistent. The Pearl Harbor operdisposed to the wars continuation,
ation has been often described as a
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bold and daring stroke. It was not. To be sure,

Japanese aviators displayed skill and daring in
their actions. And the cross-ocean movement,
in secret, of the Japanese strike force was a
nervy endeavor, executed to near perfection.
But the attack itself was essentially a repeat performance of the 1904 operation at Port Arthur,
where tactical surprise was gained and little of
substance was achieved.
At Port Arthur the Japanese used tactical surprise to achieve what they hoped would be a
strategically decisive victory. Pearl Harbor is a
different matter. It is difficult to ascertain precisely what the Japanese hoped to achieve with
a surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The
historical record is not helpful in this regard.

Japanese; but, as British military historian H.P.

Willmott has observed in communications
with this author, a third strike on December 7
or in the two days following was never seriously contemplated because it was beyond
Japanese capabilities:
Regarding criticism of [the Japanese] for not
ordering a follow-up strike against the shore
installations of Pearl Harbor, writes Willmott,
there are three points to be made. First, not
enough aircraft were available for a follow-up
strike. Second, such a strike was rendered
impracticableconsider the question of timing
of such a strike in light of the relative lateness
of the hour when the Japanese carriers completed the recovery of aircraft and the state of

WHAT DID THE JAPANESE COMMANDERS

OF THE PEARL HARBOR FORCE THINK
THEY HAD ACCOMPLISHED UPON THE RETURN
OF THEIR SECOND WAVE?
Nor could it be. A study of the period and
events leading up to the outbreak of the Pacific
War reveals no clear sense among the Japanese
of the strategic purpose for the attack.
The tactical objectives are not in dispute: The
Japanese wanted to sink ships, destroy aircraft
and infrastructure, and thereby incapacitate the
Pacific Fleet for a limited period, during which
they might carry off their conquests of the
Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, and the
American Philippines with minimal interference
from Allied naval forces. But to what ultimate
end? The Japanese could not answer this question even to their own satisfaction. Their war
aims were uncertain; they were not sure what
the war should or could accomplish. They had
no real plan for winning the war, much less ending it. Their strategy was tautological: They
wanted to fight a war to gain oil in order to
fight a war.
That being the case, the Pearl Harbor operation may be seen as little more than a means
for the Japanese to effect an advantageous start
to the war. In this they were successful, but the
advantages gained thereby were not impressive. Two strikes against Pearl Harbor proved
insufficient to neutralize American power in
the Pacific for an indefinite period. A third
strike would have bought more time for the
62

the escorting destroyers with regard to oil. [By

then the destroyers would have needed refueling.] Third, and most importantly, despite various claims and the account of proceedings that
have been written, a follow-up or third strike
was never considered in the Akagi once the
recovery of aircraft was completed. . . . The various claims that have been made to the effect
that on 8 December 1941 the Imperial Navy
had an opportunity, that never again presented
itself, to inflict telling strategic damage on the
United States by means of a third strike bears
precious little accord with the reality of losses
incurred in the course of the two attacks of the
morning of December 7, 1941. The task force
as a whole must have incurred a considerably
higher number of damaged aircraft overall.
According to Willmott, in two strikes the
Japanese suffered damage to as many as 112
aircraft, of which 65 were the potent Val divebombers. Given that American antiaircraft fire
that greeted the second-wave attack prompted
the decision that any follow-up attack [i.e., a
third strike] would not include Kate torpedo
bombers, the whole question of another attack
really must have been problematic. The figures
would suggest that 15 Vals were lost and 65
were damagedfrom a total of 135. This
would mean that the number of aircraft that

could have been made available for a third

strike would be relatively few.
At Pearl Harbor the U.S. Pacific Fleet was
crippled but the damage to it was by no means
irreparable. The Japanese should have known
going in that this would be the result: It was one
of the lessons they should have learned at Port
Arthur. Ships sunk in shallow harbor waters can
usually be repaired, refloated, and restored to
active duty. (At Pearl Harbor Arizona was the
exception that proved the rule: She blew up,
probably because a bomb exploded in one of
her magazines. Hers was an unusual fate. In the
modern era most battleships lost in combat sank
without first blowing up.) The lack of intent by
the Japanese to launch a third strike indicates
both strategic shortsightedness and tactical
rigidity. As well it implies a lack of confidence
in their ability to achieve their tactical aims. One
therefore wonders what, precisely, the Japanese
thought to accomplish at Pearl Harbor other
than the sinking of some battleships (and, they
hoped, aircraft carriers) plus the destruction of
a few score aircraft.
At this juncture it is well to recall Admiral
Isoroku Yamamotos famous prediction about
the possible course of the war. On September
12, 1941, Yamamoto, meeting with Prince
Fuimaro Konoye (then prime minister of Japan)
at the latters home in Tokyo, told his host that,
in the event of war, Japanese forces could be
expected to run wild for a year or a year and
a half. An optimistic assessment, to be sure.
But it came with an ominous disclaimer: I cannot guarantee anything after that.
Implicit and obvious in Yamamotos remark
is a deep-seated pessimism. It would seem that
the so-called architect of Japanese strategy
feared that the edifice of victory he designed
could not withstand the storms of war that
would eventually rage against it.
The reason for his pessimism was not apparent in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor operation. The raid on the naval base posted results
that were deceiving to attackers and defenders
alike. Initially, the crippling of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet, along with the attendant loss of life and
destruction or damage to port facilities, aircraft,
and assorted materiel, suggested to almost everyone on both sides of the newly begun conflict
that the Americans had suffered disaster. Events
in the six months that followed seemed to confirm this viewand Yamamotos prediction.
From December 7, 1941 through May 1942, the
Japanese inflicted a series of defeats on Allied
forces from the Hawaiian Islands in the east to
Burma in the west. Then came the battles of

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Coral Sea and Midway, reverses in New Guinea,

and the American landings on Guadalcanal.
It was much as Yamamoto had foreseen,
except that the bad times for Japan began much
sooner that he anticipated. By the summer of
1942 he could not guarantee anything and
achieved nothing of importance. In April 1943,
he was killed when American fighters shot
down the bomber in which he was a passenger.

THREE STRIKES AND OUT

This brings us back to the subject of the nonoccurring third strike at Pearl Harbor. If the
Japanese never intended to launch a third
strike, even if the opportunity to do so had presented itself and even if a third strike would
have yielded important results, then it would
seem reasonable to surmise that many of
Japans military leaders shared Yamamotos
pessimism, either consciously or otherwise.
The Pearl Harbor operation was an audacious undertaking but evidently the Japanese
were not audacious enough. In fact, they played
things very safe. One might say that their nerve
failed them in both the planning and the attack

stages of the operation. This seems to be a common theme in Japanese military operations.
They often conceived bold and risky operations
but did not execute them past a certain point
where greater risk would have been encountered and, by the same token, where truly great
results might have been achieved.
What did Japanese commanders of the Pearl
Harbor force think they had accomplished
upon the return of their second wave? Did they
really believe they had inflicted a shattering and
possibly strategic defeat on the Americans? If
so, what was the basis for their belief? And if
they were unclear about what they had accomplished, why did they not try to determine the
extent of the damage? Did they even consider
such an undertaking (presumably through aerial reconnaissance and signals intelligence), or
were they so wedded to the notion of two
strikes and out that they did not give it a first,
much less a second, thought? The Japanese did
not keep good written records, so it is impossible to answer these questions with certainty.
If, indeed, the destruction of Pearl Harbors
oil-storage facilitiesthe presumptive target of

a third strikemight have accomplished something on the order of a strategic victory, then it
takes ones breath away to realize that the
Japanese war-fighting system was too inflexible
to take advantage of the circumstances. One
may well regard this inflexibility as a sign or
manifestation of pessimism. Yamamoto was
not alone in this regard. When one makes reference to a war-fighting system one is talking
about the many rather than the few, or the solitary. It is evident that a number of Japanese military and civilian leaders harbored the same or
similar forebodings as Yamamotos; that the
pessimism Yamamoto felt must have been deepseated and endemic in the Japanese ruling and
military castes. So much so that their war plans
and the execution of those plans were negatively affected on every level of warfarethe
tactical, operational, and strategic.
Yamamoto did not offer a scenario for the latter stages of the war: He did not guarantee anything, neither victory nor defeat. To offer
specifics would have been out of character for
the Japanese. Such opinions were best expressed
elliptically. Which is not to say that Yamamoto

National Archives

Japanese airmen take to their planes for the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese fleet sailed through storm and fog across the North Pacific and away from the normal sea
lanes to arrive undetected two hundred miles away from Hawaii on the morning of December 7.

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was obfuscating. His meaning must have been

clear to his peers and colleagues. His prediction
was an admission of the likelihood of defeata
sense that Japan was doomed from the start. His
refusal to directly and unequivocally articulate
this dire assessment is mirrored on a broader
scale by the failure of Japanese military leaders
to articulate anything like a strategy for winning
the war, much less to adequately prepare for a
prolonged conflict.
This is a telling failure, one that reveals much
about what could be termed the Japanese way
of war. The Japanese knew or suspected before
Pearl Harbor that they would enjoy early victory but suffer ultimate defeat. That being the
case, the decision to go to war becomes irrational, even insane, and victory at Pearl Harbor
becomes the harbinger of disaster, hence an integral part of the catastrophe it helped to create.
The attack on Pearl Harbor had within it the
makings of a disaster, not for the Americans but
for the Japanese. The Japanese went to war like
gamblers to a gaming table, willing to bet all
their money on a few throws of the dice, knowing that the odds were heavily against them
knowing that, in the end, the house always
wins. It is said that compulsive gamblers have
a deep-seated desire to losethat their gambling is an addiction, a sickness, a form of
insanity. The same symptoms might well be
applied to a description of the Japanese way of
war. Pearl Harbor was not the first time the
Japanese gambled at war; rather, it marked the
beginning of the end of a long string of victories at the roulette wheel of war. In the end, the
house always wins: In the Pacific War of 19411945, the house won; the gambler was finally
busted out.

RACISM AND THE JAPANESE

WAY OF WAR
In lieu of strategy the Japanese had racism. The
Japanese plan for winning the war was based
on a racist assumption; that is, that they would
give Westerners (Americans and British especially) and the Chinese such a beating at the
start that we would not want to fight on to the
bitter end. It thus bears repeating: At its core the
entire Japanese plan for fighting and winning
the war was based on the assumption of their
racial and cultural superiority over Caucasians
and Chinese. In particular they were counting
on the fact that Americans and their Allies didnt have the will or the fortitude to further contest the victories the Japanese would certainly
achieve in the first six months or so after Pearl
Harbor. Whether they truly believed that this
64

would prove to be the case is a question well

worth asking but certainly unanswerable. At
the risk of indulging in dime-store psychologizing, one might say that they were collectively,
as a nation and a people, in a deep state of
denial about the true nature of their enemies
and how they were likely to react.
Did this same mind-set also contribute to the
failure of imagination evident in their belief that
battleships sunk in the shallow waters of Pearl
Harbor would stay sunk? Or that the destruction of several score of mostly obsolescent aircraft at Hickham Field constituted a big victorythat American industry could not quickly
make good these losses?
H.P. Willmott speculates, purely for the sake
of argument, that the Japanese might have
achieved better results with a two-strike attack
on the shore facilities that would leave the ships
untouched. Of course, an untouched U.S.
Pacific Fleet would have left the Japanese more
vulnerable to a counterstrike. But what if the
Japanese had incorporated the expectation and
realization of such a counterstrike into their
operational planning? In other words, strike
first at the base facilities and thereby achieve
strategic aims of destroying reserve oil supplies,
repair facilities, and the like; then lure the
American fleet into open waters and there
engage it in a decisive battle employing surface
warships and aircraft carriers.
Had the Japanese been truly daring they
would have devised a plan to lure the U.S.
Pacific Fleet out of Pearl Harbor in order to
engage and annihilate it in the old-fashioned
and decisive Tsushima-style battle that most
senior commanders in the Japanese Navy (and
the U.S. Navy as well) truly desired. Was it not
prewar doctrine for both Japan and America
to decide a war between the two nations with
a climactic mid-Pacific fleet encounter? Why
did the Japanese not attempt this instead of
resorting to the safer course of sinking American ships in the shallows of Pearl Harbor? Can
one not surmise that Japanese civilian and
senior military commanders lacked confidence
in the Japanese Navys ability to achieve victory in such a fleet-to-fleet encounter?
Another question bears asking: Why did the
Japanese not seek a decisive fleet-to-fleet
encounter with the Americans, if not immediately after Pearl Harbor then in the weeks following the attack? A possible answer is that the
Japanese themselves, by the temporary damage
they inflicted to the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor,
ensured that there would not be an American
fleet to fight, at least for the time being. But if

this were the case, why did they not adopt a forward offensive policy in the Eastern Pacific, that
is, in the zone between Pearl Harbor and the
West Coast? Why did they not undertake subsequent operations against Pearl Harbor
before Midway? Would not the possible success
of such an approach have also led to the isolation and capture of the vital Dutch East Indies?
In sum, one may well ask whether there were
alternative strategies that the Japanese might
have pursued in the first weeks of the war that
would have proved more successful to their war
effort in the long run.
The Japanese in the Pacific War have always
been portrayed as bold gamblers, yet the truth is
they were anything but. They hedged their bets
and this trait played a major role in their downfall. Their real recklessness lay in their decision
to go to war absent the will to prosecute the war
in a manner that would achieve something at
least resembling success. Thus, in the final analysis, Pearl Harbor was more of a publicity stunt
than a military victory. The aforementioned lack
of will is evident in their failure to plan for a third
strike. And this failure is in turn emblematic of
the bankrupt nature of Japanese war plans and
execution. It would seem that deep down the
Japanese never believed they would or could
win. Underlying their sense of cultural and racial
superiority was a sense of inferiority. The war
was to be a death ride.
One would therefore contend that the Pearl
Harbor operation, a tactical victory with favorable results in the short term, was the beginning of a disaster in the long term: in other
words, a disaster in the making. One would further contend that the flawed nature of the Pearl
Harbor operation, so reminiscent of previous
wars fought by Japan, was symptomatic of the
Japanese way of war.
Note: The author wishes to thank H.P. Willmott for contributing his insights, ideas, and
information to this discussion. Any flaws in the
interpretation of Willmotts remarks are the fault
of the author. Willmott is the author of numerous books on the military history of World War
II, notably Empires in the Balance: Japanese and
Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942, and The
Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese & Allied Pacific
Strategies, February to June 1942.
Steven Weingartner is editor of the Cantigny
Military History Series and author and editor
of books and articles on military affairs and
related topics, including Lalas Story: A Memoir of the Holocaust (Northwestern University
Press, 1997).

PH-Reassess_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:46 PM Page 65

Remembering Pearl Harbor:

Where Conspiracy Theories go to Die
States had several warnings and
indications, we refused to believe
that it could happen.
A closer look at the attack reveals
the following: Roosevelt did not
line up the airplanes bumper to
SEVENTY YEARS HAVE PASSED
bumper so that they could be
since the Japanese attack on Pearl
destroyed. He did not open the
Harbor. In the perspective of hisantisubmarine nets at Pearl Hartory, the span of 70 years is only a
bor so that Japanese subs could
flash, but it is a long time in the life
sneak in. He did not spot the
of an individual. Those today who
Japanese airplanes on radar and
remember Pearl Harbor as a direct
mistake them for his own planes.
experience have attained senior
He did not allow scout planes to
citizen status, yet the subject continues to fascinate them and others. The Japanese midget sub of Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki was damaged during the attack fly over Pearl Harbor two hours
and washed ashore near Bellows Field. Sakamaki was the first Japanese captured by
before the attack and report that
Instead of clarifying the subject,
the United States.
Pearl Harbor slept. He was not
however, the years have comresponsible for the failure to do
pounded it and, as Admiral Kimanything about the midget submarine sighting
the attack and let it happen so that the United
mels lawyer once told me, Pearl Harbor
and sinking just before the attack. He did not
States could enter the war on the side of the
never dies and no living person has seen the
Allies; and that the two commanders, Admiral order the carriers out to sea, nor did he
end of it.
change the alert system to the confusion of
Husband Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter Short,
Many questions were raised then. How
the leaders in Washington. All these changes
were sacrificial lambs for the president.
could it have happened? How could the
and errors were made by and under the comHence, instead of concentrating on the
Japanese sail more than 4,000 miles across
mand at Pearl HarborAdmiral Husband
attack itself and what could be done to prethe Pacific without being detected? How
Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter Short.
vent such an attack from happening again,
could they have developed a torpedo that
It is true that FDR wanted to get into
authors have tended to write about the conwould not sink in the mud of Pearl Harbor,
World War II, but he wanted to fight in
spiracy theory. Thus a spate of books have
which was less than 40 feet deep? How could
Europe, not Asia. Hitler did him the favor of
been written about Pearl Harbor indicating
they have developed a bomb that would pendeclaring war on the United States four days
that FDR and his staff knew the attack was
etrate the decks of American battleships?
after Pearl Harbor.
coming and let it happen.
In short, how could they come into the
In the coming years, papers will be released
Along with my mentor, Gordon W. Prange,
very heart of the great American Navy, sink
from the British archives that may shed new
and my assistant, Katherine V. Dillon, I have
or damage eight battleships, kill more than
light on this important subject, but after 70
been studying the Pearl Harbor attack for
2,400 people, wound 1,178 more, destroy
years there is no proof that FDR knew the
more than 50 years and nowhere could we
164 aircraft, damage another 128, and lose
Japanese attack was coming. However, there
find one document that actually implicates
only 29 aircraft and 59 men, one large subare still many unanswered questions. Doubt
FDR. What we have found are generalities
marine, and five midget subs, and not be
will probably always linger. It does keep peosuch as would have, could have,
caught?
ple interested, and it does sell books.
Where were the U.S. aircraft carriers? What should have, must have, and might
In the military, the man in chargethe one
have. We have read every telegram, every
about the U.S. radar? How much did Presion the bridgeis the one responsible. It may
document, and every message we could find
dent Roosevelt know? Was there a third
not be fair, but thats the way it is. Kimmel
on the attackall to no avail at uncovering
wave? Why didnt the Japanese finish off the
and Short were not the only ones who bear
any conspiracy.
Americans when they could have? How
responsibility. There were others who
What we have found is several messages
about the breaking of the Japanese code?
that indicated the Japanese might attack Pearl dropped the ball, but Kimmel and Short were
Most important: Could it happen again?
the ones in charge.
Harbor, but they were either entered into the
After 70 years, these and many other quesIn the final analysis, like the attack on the
record late or translated after the attack. In
tions remain. Deriving from these questions
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001,
short, using an old sports adage, if we had
were the myth and theory, which still exist
the enemy caught us asleep and, unfortuknown Sunday what we knew Monday, we
today, that the Japanese could not have possinately, At Dawn
would have thrown the ball to the tight end
bly launched the attack without being
We Slept.
detected; that President Roosevelt knew about and won the game. Even though the United
BY DONALD M. GOLDSTEIN
Professor of History Emeritus,
University of Pittsburgh, and coauthor of At Dawn We Slept.

65

PH-Pearl Salvage_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:52 PM Page 66

The battleships
U.S.S. West Virginia
(foreground) and U.S.S.
Tennessee burn after
the Japanese attack in this
famous colorized photo.

National Archives

66

PH-Pearl Salvage_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:52 PM Page 67

THE SALVAGE OPERATIONS THAT

FOLLOWED THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON
PEARL HARBOR WERE AN EPIC OF
SKILL, BRAVERY, AND INGENUITY.

MAGNITUDE
NEVER IMAGINED

THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER

presented the U.S. Navy with a sobering question: how to recover? More than 2,000 men had
died. Nearly half as many were wounded. Eighteen ships were damaged or sunk. The scene to
the newcomer was foreboding indeed. There
was a general feeling of depression throughout
the Pearl Harbor area when it was seen and
firmly believed that none of the ships sunk
would ever fight again. This was a haunting
sentiment from Captain Homer Wallin, the man
who would lead the salvage effort.
Admiral Chester Nimitz, named Commanderin-Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) days
after the attack, flew to Hawaii to take command. He landed in Pearl Harbor on Christmas
Day. His briefings had prepared him, or so he
thought. Awestruck, he remarked, This is terrible seeing all these ships down. The ceremony
installing Nimitz as CINCPAC was held on the
deck of the Grayling, a submarine he had once
commanded. Cynics commented that it was the
only deck fit for the ceremony.
The days of the Battleship Navy were over. The
Japanese made the point again on December 10,
sinking the British battleship Prince of Wales and
the battlecruiser Repulse off Singapore. Nimitzs
aircraft carriers were now the heart of his strategy. Yet with proper escort, the battleships could

still be effective weapons. If they could be saved,

Nimitz would give them work.
The salvage effort began on December 7
when crews manned hoses to fight the fires
while the attack was still under way. These firefighters were aided by boats, tugs, and even a
garbage hauler. Men from the fleets base force
brought pumps to battle the flooding. Rescue
teams searched for sailors trapped in the capsized battleships Oklahoma and Utah.
On January 9, 1942, Captain Wallin took
charge of the Salvage Division, itself a new
branch of the Navy Yard. A native of Washburn, ND, Homer Wallin had spent half his life
training for this. Like many men raised far from
the sea, he sought a naval career. He went to the
U.S. Naval Academy in 1913, then served
aboard the battleship New Jersey during World
War I. He joined the Navys Construction Corps
in 1918, and studied naval architecture at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After
completing his master of science degree in 1921,
he spent the next 20 years in the New York,
Philadelphia, and Mare Island Navy Yards, as
well as at the Bureau of Construction and
Repair in Washington, DC.
Wallins Salvage Division had three clear
goals: Rescue the men who were trapped
aboard the ships, assess the damage to each

BY MIKE MCLAUGHLIN
67

U.S. Naval Historical Center

PH-Pearl Salvage_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:53 PM Page 68

ABOVE: In dry dock, the hull of the battleship West Virginia shows the gaping hole blasted by a Japanese torpedo
during the Pearl Harbor attack. OPPOSITE: In January 1942, the destroyers Cassin and Downes lie stripped of equipment in Dry Dock Number One.

ship, and repair as many as possible. The task

was to fix each enough to be able to travel to
the larger yards on the West Coast for complete restoration.
The Japanese would come to regret leaving
two vital areas of the harbor intact. The first
was the fleets fuel supplyover 4.5 million gallons. The other was the Navy Yard, whose
shops had a vast capacity to fix or build almost
anything. They built liberty boats, 25-foot
motor whaleboats, any kind of harbor craft,
recalled Walter Bayer. They could overhaul a
14- or 16-inch gun. Just pull them around on
those big cranes, and handle them like they were
toothpicks in those big buildings. They were
enormous buildings. They still are.
Bayer grew up on the Hawaiian island of
Kauai. In 1940, he became a civil service
employee and went to work in the compressed
gases plant in the Navy Yard. He was an assistant supervisor by December 1941. After the
attack, demand for his services soared. When
68

they organized to cut through the bottom of the

Oklahomashe had a double hullthe
welders came to us to get acetylene and oxygen
for their cutting torches. And theyd use it like
water. It would just go in no time.
The new commandant of the yard was Admiral William Furlong. He and Nimitz were in the
same class at Annapolis. Until December 25,
1941, Furlong had been Commander
Minecraft, Battle Force. His flagship, the mine
layer Oglala, had been sunk off the yards main
pier, 1010 Dock. Furlong gave Wallin everything he needed: personnel, equipment, and
waterfront work space. With a fleet of small vessels roaming the harbor, Wallin could send men
and machinery wherever he needed them. He
had experts to remove ammunition and ordnance materiel. He had divers trained to operate inside sunken ships. Plus he had the Pacific
Bridge Company, whose men were contracted
to build Navy facilities across the Pacific.
One Navy diver was Metalsmith First Class

Edward Raymer. He had joined the service to

escape the quiet life in Riverside, Calif. In 1940,
he trained at the diving school in San Diego.
His work clothes were rubberized coveralls
with gloves, a lead-weighted belt (84 pounds),
lead-weighted shoes (36 pounds each), and a
copper helmet attached to a breastplate. Above
water, the suit was awkward. Submerged, the
weights counteracted the suits buoyancy, permitting the diver to move fairly easily. An air
hose ran from the helmet to a compressor monitored by men on the surface. The diver carefully moved the hose with him while working
within sunken ships. He often worked in total
darkness. He took directions from the surface
via telephone cable and needed heightened
senses of touch and balance to work with welding torches and suction hoses.
On December 8, 1941, Raymers team flew to
Pearl. Welcome to the Salvage Unit, a tired
warrant officer told them. You will be attached
to this command on temporary additional duty,
which may not be temporary from the amount
of diving work you see before you.
The teams first assignment was to determine
if men were trapped below the water level in the
battleship Nevada. To accomplish this,
Raymer remembered, we lowered a diver from
the sampan to a depth of 20 feet. Swinging a
five-pound hammer, he rapped on the hull three
times, then stopped and listened for an answering signal. We took turns for hours. No answering signal was ever heard. Frustrating as this
was, other search parties successfully freed men
from the Oklahoma and Utah. The last of them
were brought out by December 10.
Lesser damaged was the term applied to
the condition of the battleships Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and Tennessee; the cruisers Honolulu, Helena, and Raleigh; the repair ship
Vestal; the seaplane tender Curtiss; and the
destroyer Helm.
Pennsylvania was in Dry Dock Number One
during the attack, behind the destroyers
Downes and Cassin. One bomb hit the battleship, damaging a 5-inch gun and passing
through two decks before exploding. The blast
wrecked bulkheads, hatches, pipes, and wiring.
Her hull and power plant were sound, though.
On December 12, she went to the Navy Yard.
The damaged gun was replaced with one from
the West Virginia, whose decks were awash
after she settled into the mud on the bottom of
Battleship Row, the victim of several Japanese
torpedoes. On December 20, the Pennsylvania
sailed for Puget Sound, Wash.
A bomb had struck the pier beside Honolulu.

PH-Pearl Salvage_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:53 PM Page 69

pumped from the ship. Divers placed explosive

charges on the quays. These were detonated on
December 16, finally freeing Tennessee from
her trap. She spent two months at Puget Sound
and eventually returned to duty on February
29, 1942.
Outboard of Arizona was Vestal. Two bombs
found her, falling from a thousand feet or higher,
smashing straight through her, and exploding
underwater. The flooding made her list to port
and settle heavily at the stern. To escape the
burning Arizona, the Vestals captain backed his
ship away. Vestal was 33 years old, and her
watertight integrity was not enough to keep her
afloat. Two tugboats guided her east to shallow
water, beaching her at Aiea Shoal.
Being a repair ship, Vestal had the resources
for crew to begin mending her, but she had to
wait her turn for dry-docking. It came two
months later. Vestal returned to duty on February 18.
A torpedo flooded Raleighs engine room. A

bomb ripped through three decks and out her

side. It exploded uncomfortably close to a compartment storing aviation fuel. When the
cruisers captain ordered counterflooding to
balance the ship, several doors failed. The tugboat Sunnadin and a barge were tied to her port
side to save her from sinking.
Men from repair vessels helped the crew
rebuild the decks and transfer fuel and water
from the Raleigh. She went into Dry Dock
Number One on January 3. Running on one
engine, she sailed for Mare Island on February
14. After receiving a new engine and electrical
parts, she returned to duty on July 23.
Curtiss had no armor and suffered for it. One
bomb hit. Three missed, but not by enough. A
damaged Japanese plane struck her starboard
crane and exploded. Smoke from burning cork
insulation made it more difficult for the crew to
fight the fires.
Dry-docked from December 19 to 27, Curtiss had to vacate early, making way for higher

U.S. Naval Historical Center

The blast bent in 40 feet of hull on the port side,

causing shrapnel damage and flooding. Yard
workers began patching the hull, while Honolulus crew worked within.
With them was Seaman First Class Stephen
Young from Methuen, Mass. Young had just
transferred from the Oklahoma. He had
endured 25 hours trapped in the battleship.
Having survived that, he was impressed by his
new job, helping to remove damaged powder
cases from the cruisers magazine. Shrapnel had
punctured many of them, spilling explosive
powder on the decks. Why they never went
off, I dont know, Young recalled.
Honolulu moved to Dry Dock Number One
on December 13. On January 2, she went to the
yard for further work. Ten days later, she
returned to service.
Helena took a torpedo on her starboard side,
flooding an engine room and a boiler room. On
December 10, she entered Dry Dock Number
Two, which was still under construction. Pacific
Bridge personnel borrowed wooden blocks
from the yard for the ship to rest upon. After 11
days, she moved to the yard. On January 5,
Helena left for the Mare Island Navy Yard in
San Francisco.
Maryland was moored inboard of Oklahoma and had escaped torpedoes, but one
bomb hit her forecastle. Another struck her
port side at water level. No dry dock was available, so repairs were performed at the quays.
The yards workshops built a wood and metal
patch for the rupture in the hull. A bargemounted crane lowered the patch into the
water, and divers fitted it in place. The water
was pumped away, and repairs continued inside
the ship. On December 20, she left for Puget
Sound. Her final repairs were completed there
on February 26, 1942.
Tennessee was inboard of West Virginia.
Multiple torpedo hits had sunk the outer ship,
trapping Tennessee against the concrete mooring quays. A direct hit to the battleship Arizonas magazines had sunk that vessel and
thrown burning debris on the Tennessees
decks. Arizonas burning oil spread across the
water, engulfing Tennessees stern. Crewmen
fought with hoses to keep the fires away. Her
forward magazines were flooded to keep them
from exploding. The ships propellers were
turned at speeds up to 10 knots in an effort to
keep flaming oil away. The crew was forced to
abandon her.
Men from the yard and the repair ship
Medusa welded Tennessees heat-warped stern
plates. A total of 650,000 gallons of oil was

69

PH-Pearl Salvage_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:53 PM Page 70

priority jobs. She could not return until April

26, and was substantially repaired by May 28.
Helm had escaped the harbor, but while
searching for submarines she was bracketed by
two bombs. The shock caused flooding forward and tripped circuit breakers. With the dry
docks full, Helm went to the yards marine railway on January 15. There she was hauled out
of the water for welding and patching. At the
end of the month, she left for San Diego.
Each accomplishment brought another part
of the Pacific Fleet to life. But these successes
were modest compared to what lay ahead. Six
battleships, one cruiser, three destroyers, and a
mine-laying ship had received severe attention
from the Japanese.
Destroyers were desperately needed to protect Allied merchant shipping from enemy submarines. Commander John Alden, himself a
submariner, wrote, In addition to the mere
urgency of obtaining ASW [antisubmarine warfare] vessels, other factors added weight to the
balance. One was the fact that of all the material needed to build new destroyers, most critical and hard to obtain were main propulsion
plants. In the effort to break the bottleneck,
DEs [destroyer escorts] and frigates were
designed around every conceivable type of
power plant but there was no substitute for
the steam turbine in destroyers.
In addition to the catastrophic loss of the
Arizona, one of the most spectacular of the
December 7 victims was the destroyer Shaw.
She had been on blocks in Floating Dry Dock
Number Two. Three bombs struck the ship,
rupturing fuel tanks. Fire swept through the
ship to her magazines. A tremendous blast
wrecked her entire forward section. Twentyfive men died, and 15 more were injured. Five
bombs hit the dry dock. To protect it, workers
submerged the dock, and the tugboat Sotoyomo sank with it.
To casual observers, Shaw seemed a total
loss. Her bridge was destroyed, and her bow
was literally gone. But her engineering machinery was intact. She was towed to the marine
railway on December 19. Hull repair experts
took measurements and set to building a temporary bow.
Navy divers sealed more than 150 holes in
the hull of the dock. It was raised on January
9, and ready for service on January 25. Six
months later, so was Sotoyomo. Shaw was the
first ship back into the dry dock. The next day,
her new bow was attached along with a new
mast and a temporary bridge. This made her
look more like an overgrown PT boat than a
70

destroyer, but it worked. On February 4, Shaw

left the harbor for power trials. Five days later,
with cheers shouted from all over Pearl, she left
for Mare Island. A permanent bow awaited her
there. Of the badly wounded ships, Shaw was
the first to return to sea.
The destroyers Helm and Henley escorted
Shaw eastward. Seaman First Class Arthur
Schreier from Watertown, Conn., was on Henleys No. 4 gun mount. He spent many hours
watching Shaw plow through the waves. I felt
so sorry for those guys, Schreier recalled,
because without a bow, you knowthey had
this little stubby thing welded on. Boom. Boom.
Boom. Every wave, for six days.
Fireman First Class Alfred Bulpitt from Centerdale, RI, was aboard the Shaw. Manning the
port engine throttle, he knew she was traveling
at only a third of her top speed. It took us
quite a while. We only had one fire room and
one screw working. And we had a reduced
crew. But I dont remember anyone saying we
wouldnt make it.
They did make it, arriving at Mare Island on
February 15. Waiting for Shaw was another dry
dock and her new bow. She was ready by July,
returning to duty as an escort for convoys to
Pearl. By the fall, she headed west to join the
fight for Guadalcanal.
Destroyers Downes and Cassin had similar
troubles. They had gone through every kind of
ordeal which ships could be subjected to,
Wallin wrote. From bomb hits to severe fires,
to explosions, to fragmentation damage, etc.
These vessels were the only ones of the Pearl
Harbor group that suffered all the kinds of
damage enumerated.
A bomb had ripped through Cassin to
explode on the floor of Dry Dock Number
One. Two more hit the dock, one on each side
of the ships. A fourth blasted Cassin again. A
fifth destroyed Downes bridge. Fragments
punctured fuel tanks on both ships. Fire spread
through the dock, detonating fuel and ammunition on Downes. Part of a torpedo landed 75
feet away.
Without power or water, no one could fight
the fires, which now threatened the neighboring Pennsylvania. Her captain ordered the dock
flooded, but as the water rose, so did the
flames. Cassin came afloat at her stern and
finally collapsed onto Downes.
Both destroyers remained in the dock for two
months. Other ships came in for repairs. Each
flooding and draining made the destroyers
sway and roll, hurting them more. On February 5, Cassin was carefully reset on her blocks.

The next day, Downes was towed to the Navy

Yard. Cassin followed 20 days later.
The destroyers hulls were ruined, but their
propulsion machinery was sound. Nimitz, the
Bureau of Ships, and the Chief of Naval Operations debated the question: repair them or
scrap them? On May 7, the Bureau of Ships
found the solution. Recommend new hulls be
built at Mare Island. The Bureau considers that
sufficient of the original Cassin and Downes
material can be worked into the [new] hulls to
thoroughly justify the retention of the original
names for the new ships.
Through the spring and summer, nearly
1,000 tons of useful equipment was removed,
carefully catalogued, and shipped to Mare
Island. By August, what remained of Downes
was scrapped. The Cassin followed suit by
October, but the hearts of both vessels, including the 37-ton stern sections bearing their
names, were saved. On May 20, 1943, Downes
was relaunched. So was Cassin on June 21.
There was no precedent for this in Navy history. Never had a ship been launched twice. In
both cases there was a minimum of fanfare,
Alden wrote. Like a quiet ceremony with discreet minimized publicity for a bride being led
to the altar for the second time.
Of the battleships, only Nevada had been
able to run for the sea. However, she took hits
from a torpedo and at least seven bombs. One
smashed her forecastle, blowing a 25-foot triangular hole on the port side. Another crashed
through the shippiercing a gasoline tank
without igniting itand detonated beneath her.
Flooding was too heavy to be stopped.
Watching from Oglala, Admiral Furlong
ordered two tugboats to move Nevada to the
shallows at Waipio Point above the harbor
entrance, where she was beached. Her bow settled until the deck was nearly awash.
Admiral Nimitzs inspection of Nevada was
a grim one. The ship had been wrecked by
blasts and fire and fouled with oil and polluted
water, but her men were determined to win.
Nimitz consented.
Using measurements from Nevadas sister
ship, Oklahoma, yard shipwrights built a patch
to cover the holes. It was a huge piece of craftsmanship, 55 feet long, 32 feet deep, and curved
to fit the ships bilge.
The divers had a frustrating time securing the
patch. The explosions had warped the hull, and
it was impossible to seal the patch completely.
It had to be discarded. The alternative was to
gamble on the strength of Nevadas bulkheads.
Divers tightened every door and hatch in the

U.S. Naval Historical Center

PH-Pearl Salvage_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:54 PM Page 71

Members of the salvage team assigned to the battleship California discuss their next move. Captain Homer N. Wallin
is fourth from the left.

ruptured compartments and bolted patches

over smaller holes in the hull.
Removing water from the ship was a
headache, too, given the number and types of
pumps available. The strongest could pump
4,000 gallons a minute, but there were not
enough of them. Some could draw water up
about 15 feet, but no higher. To compensate,
engineers arranged them so that the smaller
ones brought water to areas where the stronger
pumps could move the water up and out of the
ship. This was done with care. If one section
drained much faster than others, Nevada could
list or capsize. Although the pumps gradually
moved water out faster than it came in, the ship
remained in danger until dry-docked.
The drying compartments sobered the most
hardened men. The filth was appalling. A mixture of oil, mud, paper, clothes, and rotting
food filled every part of the ship. And there
were the bodies of men who had died in the
attack. They were taken to the naval hospital
for identification and burial. Then work parties brought in hoses and sprayed every object
and surface with sea water, followed with
Tectyl, a cleaning chemical that absorbed water
from anything it touched.
To increase buoyancy, Nevadas crew transferred the remaining stored oil from the ship.
Wreckage was cleaned away. Guns, ammunition,
electric motors, and auxiliary equipment were
brought out. Much of it was salvable, despite

being submerged for nearly three months.

The optimism of the salvage crew was tempered by the discovery of hydrogen sulfide, an
odorless toxic gas created when oil and polluted sea water are mixed under pressure. On
February 7, one man opened a gas-filled compartment and collapsed from a fatal dose.
While trying to rescue him, five more sailors
were also overcome. Only four recovered.
Increased ventilation became top priority. No
man was permitted on the ship without a gas
mask and a litmus paper badge to indicate if
the gas was present.
One week later, Nevada was afloat. A last
inspection was made of every bulkhead and
hatch. Any serious leak would send the battered
battleship to the bottom. On February 14, two
tugs brought the Nevada to Dry Dock Number
Two. Nimitz and Furlong were with the cheering crowd that welcomed her. On April 22,
1942, she left Pearl Harbor for Puget Sound
Navy Yard for final repairs and modernization.
California posed greater problems. She had
been hit by two torpedoes and one bomb and
jarred by several near misses. Arizonas burning
oil had forced Californias crew to abandon her.
She took three days to sink to the bottom, settling with a list to port. Her main deck was 17
feet beneath the surface.
The Yard Design Section feared that patching
and pumping out the ship would fail. As she
regained buoyancy, the weight of the water

above her decks might collapse them. One

option was to build a cofferdam around the
ship. A barrier of pilings driven into the harbor
bottom would permit men to drain the water
within and effect repairs. It was a good plan,
but expensive and complicated.
An alternative was found: build two cofferdams attached to the ship to enclose her forecastle and quarterdeck. Barge cranes lowered
huge wooden planks along the ships sides.
Pacific Bridge divers bolted them to the hull and
sealed them with lengths of hose filled with sawdust and oakum (hemp mixed with tar). The
planks were 30 feet high and varied in width
and thickness. They were weighted down with
sandbags and reinforced to endure external
water pressure as the interior was pumped out.
The divers plugged more holes. One needed
a 15-by-15-foot patch. As with Nevada, the
pumps eventually caught up to the leaks, then
passed them. Oil was skimmed from the surface and transferred from the bunkers to a
barge alongside. Eventually, over 200,000 gallons were recovered.
By the end of March, California had risen to
a nearly even keel, but on April 5 an explosion
blew out the hull patch. She began settling at
the bow. Gasoline vapors had leaked from a
fuel tank and ignited. The patch was ruined,
and there was no time to build another.
Another battleship was coming in for repairs,
and California had to meet the tight schedule
for dry dock time. Raymers team contained the
flooding on the ships third deck. The men took
turns welding a warped hatch shut. After 12
hours, it was secured and the flooding stopped.
Four days later, California entered Dry Dock
Number Two. She was on time.
Californias electric drive engines had suffered
heavily from the saltwater. The job of rewrapping miles of wire called for specialists not available at Pearl. A team of engineers flew in from
the General Electric Company in Schenectady,
NY. Through the summer they concentrated
their efforts on one alternator and two motors
just enough to get the ship to Puget Sound. They
finished in the autumn. California headed for
Puget Sound on October 10, 1942.
West Virginias problems were even worse.
Two bombs and at least seven torpedoes sank
her, killing over a hundred men. She, too, had
electric drive. Her steering system was ruined,
and her rudder was blown off. Over 200 feet of
her port hull was wrecked. Raymer wrote, Raising West Virginia would be far more difficult than
either the Nevada or the California had been. It
would test the ingenuity and salvage expertise of
71

PH-Pearl Salvage_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:54 PM Page 72

ABOVE: The hulk of the capsized USS Oklahoma is shown while operations to right her were under way on March 19,
1943. BELOW: Divers pose in front of a decompression chamber during salvage efforts at Pearl Harbor.

every faction involved in the operation.

Yard craftsmen came through again, building
14 hull patches in sections 13 feet long and over
50 feet wide. Curved at the bottom to fit the
ships bilge, they straightened to climb the sides
to high above the surface. Like the walls of a
fortress, each was made of metal beams and
12-by-14-inch timbers, with four-inch planking beneath. Several had access doors so divers
could enter the hull. To counteract its buoyancy, each was weighted with lead. After each
section was fitted in place, the lead was
removed. Divers filled the seams with 650 tons
of underwater concrete. Since this added more
weight than the hull could endure after drydocking, the divers finished by welding steel
reinforcing rods to the hull.
After the patches were secured, the pumps
lowered the water within by a few feet, but no
more. No further headway was made in
dewatering, Raymer recalled. Most of the
leakage was found to occur in the areas contiguous to the patches from leaking seams,
72

shrapnel holes, and loose rivets. Every hole

mattered. Raymers men sealed all they could
find with smaller patches or wooden plugs.
Salvage crews moved deeper into the ship,
mindful of the hydrogen sulfide threat. A medical officer worked with them, maintaining a
bulletin board showing which compartments
were safe. They brought out more oil, ammunition, and machinery along with the bodies of
66 men who had died in December.
The bodies of three sailors were found in a
dry storeroom. With them was a calendar. The
days from December 7 to December 23 were
crossed off. The men had food and drinking
water, but their oxygen had run out. The discovery of these three men in an unflooded compartment caused a profound sense of anguish
among our divers, Raymer said. Especially
shaken were Moon and Tony, who had
sounded the West Virginias hull on December
12 and reported no response from within the
ship. The men had been in the starboard side,
hard against Tennessees port side. It had been

impossible for divers to reach that area.

Recalling his part in the salvage, Electricians
Mate Second Class Claude Miller wrote, This
consisted mainly of endless days of chipping the
years of paint coats from the bulkheads. This
paint was in many places a full one inch thick
or more, and shattered like cement when chiseled by air-driven chipping hammers. A native
of Trenton, Mo., Miller had traveled far with
the Navy, with no shortage of work. He had
been with the aircraft carrier Yorktown at the
Battles of Coral Sea and Midway. After his carrier was sunk, he and many of his friends were
reassigned to Pearl to assist with the recovery
work there.
We worked in very hot and sometimes toxic
spaces in half-hour shifts, he added. Then we
would go up to topside for about half an hour,
for fresh air and pineapple juice. Later on I was
assigned to clean, rewind, and restore small
electric motors, and also manage the engineers
tool room.
On May 17, West Virginia rose from the bottom. Work continued over the next three weeks
to reduce her draft. Finally, it was down to the
required minimum, 33 feet. She just fit into Dry

PH-Pearl Salvage_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:54 PM Page 73

with steel. Pumping above and from within the

ship resumed. On June 23, Oglala floated.
On the night of June 25, several pumps
became fouled with debris, and Oglalas bow
sank. Her stern followed. The pumps were
cleared, and the vessel was refloated once more
on June 27. She sank a third time on June 29
when the cofferdam failed again. By then Oglala
had earned the nickname the Jonah ship. She
was returned to the surface again by July 1.
Fire broke out aboard Oglala that night
when a technician spilled gasoline on a pumps
exhaust manifold. He then dropped the burning gas can into the water, igniting the oil on the
waters surface. It took 20 minutes for men

from Ortolan and the Navy Yard Fire Department to extinguish the blaze. To their weary
relief, the salvage men found that damage to
the cofferdam was superficial.
On July 3, Oglala entered Dry Dock Number Two. To Wallin, the ship looked like Noahs
Ark without a roof. Despite her troubles, her
hull was in better shape than expected. She
eventually returned to service as a repair ship,
aiding many other vessels throughout the war.
The remaining victims of December 7 were
beyond saving. Arizona had suffered several
bomb hits. She had sunk with the loss of more
than 1,100 men. One bomb hit had detonated
her forward magazines and broken her back.

ABOVE: The twisted superstructure of the battleship Arizona shows the effects of the giant blast that killed more
than 1,100 members of her crew. BELOW: Divers pose in front of a decompression chamber.

Both: National Archives

Dock Number One on June 9. She went to the

yard a few days later and stayed for 11 months.
In April 1943, as Miller put it, The old warrior finally was made ready to move on her
own, and we sailed to Bremerton Navy Yard
for the balance of the restoration.
Oglala came last. On December 7, a torpedo
had passed beneath her to strike the inboard
Helena. Since the ships were tied together, the
explosion ruptured Oglalas bilge. Two hours
later she capsized to port. Only her starboard
side amidships remained above water. This led
to the cynical joke that when she saw Helena
get hit, Oglala died of fright.
Originally a coastal steamer, Oglala had
joined the Navy in World War I. She was 34
years old, and her compartments were not
designed to endure battle damage. The merits
of raising her seemed thin. She was blocking
valuable pier space, and scrapping seemed the
best option. However, since demolition experts
and equipment were unavailable, men from the
yard and the repair ship Ortolan set out to rescue her, employing three elements.
The first was a set of 10 submarine salvage
pontoons. Each was a giant metal cylinder that
could be flooded and sunk, then attached to
massive chains placed under the hull by divers.
When pumped out, each pontoon would exert
nearly 100 tons of lifting power. Second was a
barge with winches to haul cables attached to
Oglala. The third was compressed air, pumped
into the hull to displace some of the water
within. This required extreme care, given the
hulls weakened condition.
On April 11, bridles linking the chains to the
pontoons broke. The pontoons floated free.
They were resunk and new bridles were
attached. Another attempt was made on April
23. Oglala rolled up to rest on her bottom with
a 20-degree port list. Further work reduced this
to 7 degrees, but her bow remained 6 feet below
the surface and the stern was 19 feet deeper.
Cofferdamming came next, using wood and
steel from the California salvage. Divers
secured the sections and patched the port bilge,
where the worst shock damage was. They cut
free the wooden deck house, and a barge crane
hoisted it away.
The cofferdam was completed in June, and
pumping began. After the water had dropped
seven feet, a section of the dam failed. Captain
Wallin dryly noted, This was not a design failure, but resulted from the action of some practical men. The men in question had substituted
12-inch-square timbers for the steel H-beams
specified in the designs. The wood was replaced

73

PH-Pearl Salvage_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:55 PM Page 74

Her armament and fuel were taken ashore, and

Arizona was left where she sank. More than 20
years passed before the famed memorial was
built above her.
Many torpedoes had struck Oklahoma. I
can vouch for five, Young recalled. The blasts
disintegrated much of her port hull. Fifteen
minutes after the attack began, she capsized.
She stayed that way for nearly six months.
When men and resources were finally available,
the most spectacular chapter of the Fleet salvage began.
The man responsible for leading the staggering effort to raise the Oklahoma was Commander F.H. Whitaker. Born and raised in Tyler,
Tex., Whitaker was a naval construction expert
who, like Wallin, had graduated from Annapolis and M.I.T. Whitaker and his staff spent
months running tests to determine the most
effective method to raise the ship. Experiments
with a 1/96 scale model of the battleship in
Pacific Bridges laboratory in San Francisco
demonstrated that the Oklahoma could be
gradually rolled into an upright position.
Divers placed pontoons at key points where
the superstructure was buried in the mud. They
also tested the strength of the mud. It had to be
hard enough, or the ship might drag along the
bottom as the winches turned. Fortunately, it
was. The divers placed an additional 4,500
cubic yards of coral soil along the inshore side
of the ships bow. Twenty-one concrete foundations were poured near the waters edge on
Ford Island. Seated in them were electric

winches. With a system of hauling blocks and

pulleys, the winches combined strength could
exert a titanic 345,000 tons of pulling force.
Forty-two miles of one-inch wire ran from the
winches, through the blocks, out over a row of
40-foot A-frame towers built on Oklahomas
hull, and finally to pads welded to the ship.
It looked like something from Gullivers
Travels, but the objective was to free a giant,
not restrain it. The righting began on March 8,
1943. With a lurch and a groan the Oklahoma started her slow but steady rotation,
Raymer wrote. Everyone was jubilant. They
cheered lustily as they observed the ships
movements, drowning out for the moment the
sounds of metal being crushed and torn. Inexorably, almost invisibly, the ship began her roll
to starboard. Turning at a snails pace, the
winches reeled in cable for more than three
months. Finally, on June 16, the battleship
reached an upright position, listing only 3
degrees to port.
Pacific Bridge divers placed cofferdam patches
over 200 feet of the Oklahomas hull. They
sealed them with 2,000 tons of underwater concrete and added four more pontoons to offset
the weight. Tragically, this led to the deaths of
two men. Rusting inside one pontoon had
removed the oxygen from the air. While working alone inside it, a Navy chief collapsed and
died. A Pacific Bridge diver drowned when the
wake from a passing boat drove another pontoon against Oklahoma, severing his air hose.
Dewatering revealed the remains of the

National Archives

ABOVE: The heavily damaged destroyer Shaw floats in dry dock on December 8, 1941. OPPOSITE: The Arizona Memorial sits astride the sunken vessel where hundreds of her crew are entombed.

74

sailors who had died a year and a half earlier.

Identifying them was impossible. Bringing out
what remained of over 400 men was unquestionably the salvage teams hardest job.
Oklahoma was refloated on November 3,
1943. On December 28, she entered Dry Dock
Number Two. After moving to the yard, she
was stripped of every useful piece of equipment.
Whitaker later wrote a detailed study of the
project for The Society of Naval Architects and
Marine Engineers. Outlining in detail the full
extent of this fantastic achievement, he concluded with what it meant for America. All of
us felt, I believe, that aside from the practical
aspects, the salvage of the Oklahoma was symbolic of the Navys and the countrys recovery
from the treacherous Japanese attack.
On September 1, 1944, the Oklahoma was
decommissioned. The hull was sold for scrap
a year later. On May 10, 1947, two tugboats
brought her out of Pearl, heading for the West
Coast. She sank in a storm the following
week. The men who had served in her were
pleased. It was a better end than being cut to
pieces for scrap.
Utah fared no better. She had capsized at her
berth on the west side of Ford Island, and 58
men had perished. Over 30 years old, she had
been converted to a training vessel for gunnery
and aircraft exercises. The Navy deemed her a
nonessential ship occupying nonessential space.
The effort to right her was delayed until
November 1943. The result was a shadow of
the work done for the Oklahoma. By March
1944, the Utah had been partly righted, listing
47 degrees to port and almost completely submerged. Further work being too costly, the
Navy left her as she was. Utah remains there
today, a training site for divers.
During their time in the West Coast yards, each
ship received not only final repairs but modernization. They emerged with sleek superstructures,
better armor and armament, especially antiaircraft guns. Some underwent more than one refit
and upgrade of their armament and other systems. They had the latest radar and radio equipment. Their power plants were greatly improved.
They went on to exact a measure of revenge
against the Imperial Japanese Navy.
The revitalized ships distinguished themselves
in countless ways. Cassin, for instance, earned
six battle stars for carrier escort and invasion
support duty in the Philippines and at Iwo Jima.
Shaw won 11 stars, fighting from the Santa
Cruz Islands to the Philippines. On January 7,
1945, Shaw and the destroyers Ausburne, Russell, and Braine sank a Japanese destroyer off

Luzon. It was the last surface action of the

war, Bulpitt noted. We were there at the
beginning, and we were there at the end.
Vestal repaired ships in the Solomons. This
was incalculably important. By contributing to
the repair of other vessels when the future of the
Pacific War was still in doubt, she paid many
times over for the effort to save her at Pearl.
Nevada, Tennessee, and Raleigh joined the
Aleutian Islands operation of 1943, reclaiming
Attu and Kiska from the Japanese. Nevada
went east to join the Atlantic Fleet, supporting
the invasions of Normandy in June 1944, and
then southern France in August.
Tennessee joined West Virginia, California,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania to participate in
the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944. The
Japanese had summoned the majority of their
dwindling naval forces to attempt to disrupt the
American landings at Leyte in the Philippines.
It was the largest naval campaign in history and
marked the end of the Japanese Navy as an
effective fighting force.
In a series of torpedo attacks, American
destroyers ambushed a Japanese battleship
force on the evening of October 25 at Surigao
Strait. Using their new fire-control radar, Tennessee, West Virginia, and California followed
up, firing more than 220 rounds from their
main batteries. Marylands older radar system
could track where the rounds fell, and with that
she added 48 shots of her own.
By dawn, two Japanese battleships, Fuso and
Yamashiro, had been sunk, along with three
destroyers. The badly damaged cruiser Mogami
was finished off by American torpedo planes.
Surigao Strait was the last surface action fought
between opposing battleships. Having waited
almost three years for it, the veterans of Pearl
Harbor savored the victory to the fullest. It
was a matter of great satisfaction to many
Americans, Wallin wrote. And it must have
been a bitter pill for the Japanese.
Helena fought in the battles of Cape Esperance and Guadalcanal. During a night action,
she fought off Japanese warships that were
shelling Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. On
September 15, 1942, she rescued survivors
when the aircraft carrier Wasp was sunk, but
her luck did not last. Helena was torpedoed during the Battle of Kula Gulf on July 6, 1943. She
broke apart and sank. Approximately 170 men
died with her.
The other ships served to the end of the war.
Following the Japanese surrender, California,
West Virginia, and Tennessee remained on station in Japan. But by the autumn of 1945, the

National Park Service

PH-Pearl Salvage_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:55 PM Page 75

U.S. Navy was the largest in the world, and the

most expensive. Peace meant shrinking military
budgets. All but one of the ships that rose from
ruin at Pearl Harbor were decommissioned and
consigned for scrapping by 1947. Only Curtiss
endured. She served in the Korean War. As a
science vessel, she took part in nuclear weapons
tests in the Central Pacific and research work
off Antarctica. She was decommissioned in
1957 and finally broken up in 1972.
It all seemed heartless, and still does, to the
men who lived and fought on these ships. Still,
financial considerations aside, the ships were
old. Despite their upgrading, it was becoming
difficult for them to keep pace with newer ships
coming into service, let alone those on the
drawing boards. They had done their work.
Over 30 years after the Pearl Harbor attack,
Ed Raymer retired from the Navy. Looking
back, he readily acknowledged that he was part
of a tremendous accomplishment. In 1996,
Commander Raymer wrote, Navy divers and
Pacific Bridge civilian divers formed one leg of
a salvage triad; salvage engineers and the Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard comprised the other
two. One leg needed the assistance and support
of the other two to be effective.
Vice Admiral Homer Wallin retired in 1955,
finishing a career spanning 40 years. He had
left Hawaii in July 1942 for a new assignment.

During an awards ceremony on the deck of the

aircraft carrier Enterprise, Admiral Nimitz presented Wallin with the Distinguished Service
Medal. As Wallin wrote, Admiral Nimitz read
the citation for the work performed by the Salvage Organization and ended by adding, for
being an undying optimist. The Medal was
accepted by me in the name of the organization
which I had the honor to head.
Wallin meant it. He knew the value of every
man who helped him. Enough cannot be said
in praise of the salvage crew, he asserted.
They worked hard and earnestly. They soon
saw that the results of their efforts exceeded the
fondest hopes of their supporters and they were
urged on by their successful achievements.
Without question, the Pearl Harbor salvage
operation was the largest in naval history. The
men behind it lived up to their creed: We keep
them fit to fight.
Mike McLaughlin lives with his wife Geralyn,
a Boston public school teacher, in Winthrop,
Massachusetts. He interviewed several New
England men who participated in the Pearl
Harbor salvage effort. He was assisted by the
Pearl Harbor Survivors Association and Pearl
Harbor Historical Associates. In addition to
WWII History, Mike also writes for American
Veteran, American Heritage, and Maxim.
75

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:58 PM Page 76

A DIVERSE ASSEMBLAGE OF BRITISH,

CANADIAN, SCOTTISH, AND INDIAN
TROOPS MADE THE JAPANESE PAY DEARLY
FORTHE CROWN COLONYS CAPTURE.

HEROIC
DEFENSE
OF HONG KONG
With rhythmic tread, the Canadian soldiers marched behind
the bagpipers of the Royal Scots up Nathan Road. All along
Kowloons main shopping street, European and Chinese civilians cheered and applauded the Canadians. Hong Kongs Chinese and European population knew that the two battalions
would be more than enough to protect them from Japanese
invasion. It was November 16, 1941, 40 days before Christmas, and 40 days from defeat and surrender to the Japanese.
BY DAVID H. LIPPMAN
Hong Kong, cut off from China by Japanese
forces, had a population of 1.2 million, including more than a million Chinese refugees from
the Sino-Japanese War. The 20,000 Britons
who administered Hong Kong or dominated its
commerce lived in luxury in Victoria and the
Peak, with servants, restricted clubs, new airconditioners, and garden parties.
Down below the Peak, Chinese residents lived
in poverty, doing backbreaking jobs. Many were
illiterate, living 12 to a room, or even on the
streets. Every morning, one-ton government
76

trucks rolled through grubby neighborhoods in

Wanchai or Kowloon to empty public outhouses
or pick up the bodies of refugees who had died
of illness, starvation, or violence.
Nonetheless, how Britains obligation to
defend Hong Kong was to be met was a
source of controversy in Whitehall. In early
1941, Prime Minister Winston Churchill
decided that Hong Kong was impossible to
hold and suggested that its defenses be
reduced to a symbolic level, saying: We must
avoid frittering away our resources on unten-

able positions.
A 1938 assessment by the General Officer
Commanding, General A.C. Bartholomew, was
equally harsh: The chances of effecting a prolonged resistance even in the best circumstances
seem slight.
But Bartholomews successor, Maj. Gen.
A.E. Grasett, disagreed. He believed the Japanese forces that sealed off Hong Kong to the
north were inferior to the British forces. When
he flew back to London in September 1941,
after being replaced by Maj. Gen. Christopher

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:58 PM Page 77

Maltby, Grasett convinced the War Cabinet

that Hong Kong could be held if it was reinforced with two battalions of infantry, possibly
Canadian units.
At the time, Hong Kongs defenses consisted
of two Indian infantry battalions (the 5/7th
Rajputs and the 2/14th Punjabis) and a British
infantry battalion, the 2nd Royal Scots. The 1st
Middlesex, a machine-gun battalion, backed
them up. The defenders also fielded the Hong
Kong Volunteer Regiments reservists, two regiments of fixed coast artillery, and the Hong Kong

and Singapore Artillery Regiments mobile guns.

The 2nd Royal Scots had served the Crown
since 1633, but the regiments best men were
serving in England. Most of the 2nd Battalion
suffered from malaria. The 5/7th Rajputs and
the 2/14th Punjabis were also veteran outfits,
but their best men had also been milked for
Indian forces in the Middle East. Some 40 percent of the Rajputs had just joined the battalion. Some Punjabis had yet to see even a 3-inch
mortar, let alone fire one.
The Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps

manpower reflected Hong Kongs cosmopolitan nature, with companies of Free Frenchmen,
Russians, Portuguese, Scandinavians, and
Americans. There was even a company of men
aged over 55. The best unit in Hong Kong was
the 1st Middlesex, The Die-Hards of Peninsular fame, which had spent 10 years overseas.
Well trained and full of Old Sweats from
Londons East End, it was equipped with Vickers machine guns.
The Volunteers were a colorful outfit, under
Colonel Henry Rose, a 30-year veteran and one

U.S. Army Center of Military History

From the vantage point of

the high ground in Kowloon,
Japanese artist Hoshun
Yamaguchi painted Victoria
under attack in December
1941 from sketches he did
there during the Occupation.

77

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:59 PM Page 78

of the few surviving Old Contemptibles of

1914, and Regimental Sgt. Maj. Wacky
Jones. Playing at soldier was great fun and a
means of social climbing for the Volunteers.
The key to holding Hong Kong was a string
of pillboxes and trenches along the hills just
north of Kowloon, named the Gindrinkers
Line for its terminus at Gindrinkers Bay in the
west. The strongpoint of this line was the Shing
Mun Redoubt at the southern end of the Jubilee
Reservoir, which overlooked the bottleneck of
roads that led to Kowloon. The redoubt consisted of several bunkers and observation posts,
connected by trenches, tunnels, and staircases
covered with concrete, all named for London
streets such as Haymarket and The Strand.
Shing Muns five pillbox embrasures were so
constructed that it was impossible to depress a
Bren gun low enough to cover the hills steep
slopes. The craggy terrain offered attackers
numerous ravines for cover and prevented the
pillboxes from giving each other covering fire.
Shing Mun was designed to be held by a full
rifle company for at least a week.
Shing Mun was no Maginot Line, but Grasett
said it didnt have to be. With three infantry battalions, Hong Kong could be held against attack
from the north. Two more infantry battalions
and the machine-gun battalion would man
defenses on Hong Kong Island to prevent
seaborne invasion. Maltby shared Grasetts
view, and the War Cabinet was sold. On September 15, 1941, Churchill agreed to a proposal
by the Chiefs of Staff that Canada provide two
battalions and a brigade headquarters.
So far Canadas Army had seen no action,
and there was political pressure to get them into
the fight. With all first-line Canadian battalions
earmarked for Europe, the only outfits available were those that had not been fully trained.
Two of these were the Royal Rifles of Canada,
a French-speaking outfit from Quebec, and the
Winnipeg Grenadiers. The Royal Rifles had
spent most of the war patrolling Newfoundland to prevent Nazi U-boats from landing
spies and saboteurs. The Winnipeg Grenadiers
were in Jamaica, guarding a POW camp. Many
of the men in the two battalions had never fired
a mortar or thrown a grenade. But there were
no other available battalions in Canada.
To fill the battalions up, Canadian authorities
assigned them 436 reinforcements, which
included 16- and 17-year-olds with less than six
weeks service. Captain Wilfred Queen-Hughes,
a Grenadier transport officer, was shocked. We
got the odds and sods. Literally the sweepings of
the depots. Men no other command had wanted
78

and rejected. There was even a hunchback! The

two battalions were shipped by rail to Vancouver.
The Royal Air Force at Hong Kong had only
three ancient Vildebeeste torpedo bombers
(which flew at less than 100 mph) and two Walrus amphibians.
The Royal Navy had withdrawn most of the
China Squadron, leaving behind Commodore
George Collinson commanding the old (1918)
destroyer HMS Thracian, the eight gunboats of
2nd Motor Torpedo Boat Flotilla, and four river
gunboats. The MTBs could do 32 knots but
leaked, were cramped, and had no torpedoes.
Instead they were armed with machine guns.
Eight fixed 9.2-inch guns and 15 6-inchers
prevented seaborne invasion, but the mobile
artillery was outdated. On paper, Hong Kong
was to have 32 heavy and 30 light antiaircraft
guns, but only 14 heavy and two light were on
hand, with no radar.
In Canada, Colonel John Lawson, a decorated World War I veteran, was promoted

WHILE HUNDREDS OF
BRITISH, CANADIAN,
AND INDIAN TROOPS
YANKED ON THEIR
KHAKI UNIFORMS
AND RAN TO THEIR
STATIONS, 48
JAPANESE BOMBERS
BEGAN HONG KONGS
PORTION OF THE
WAR AT 7:57 AM.
brigadier and appointed to command the force.
Lawson, who had risen from private in the
101st Edmonton Fusiliers to field rank, was a
51-year-old who studied military history. Lawson did not share his superiors contemptuous
view of the Japanese. He believed that they
were a powerful force.
He was right. British intelligence believed the
Japanese had only 3,000 men over the frontier.
They actually had closer to 25,000 attackers in
the 23rd Army, under Lt. Gen. Takashi Sakai,
a 52-year-old factory workers son with six
years experience in China. The attack was
assigned to the reinforced 38th Infantry Division, under Lt. Gen. Sano Tadayoshi.

The 38th Division was organized in September 1939, in Nagoya. It was backed up by all
of the 23rd Armys artillerythe 1st Siege Regiment with 150mm howitzers, the 20th Independent Mountain Artillery Battalion, the 21st
Independent Mortar Battalion, two antitank
battalions, and the 38th Engineer Regiment.
Air cover consisted of a squadron of Ki-43
Nate fighters, another of Ki-36 Ida light
bombers, and one of Ki-48a Lily attack planes.
The Japanese consulate in Hong Kong provided useful information on the location of pillboxes and guns. When British counterintelligence pulled the plug on them, the Japanese
turned to more romantic means of spying, such
as Wanchai prostitutes a Japanese jeweler in
the Queens Arcade an Italian waiter at the
Peninsula Hotel and the Japanese barber at
the Hong Kong Hotel. The Japanese also infiltrated hundreds of Chinese fifth columnists, with
orders to commit acts of sabotage and sniping.
Sakais plan to take Hong Kong was simple.
The 38th Division would cross the border on
X-day. The 230th Infantry Regiment was to
swing right and hit the Shing Mun Redoubt.
The 228th Regiment would hit the center of the
Gindrinkers Line and grab Kai Tak Airfield.
The 229th Regiment on the left would cross
Tide Cove in sampans, break through the
defenses, and reach Kowloon Bay.
Speed was the vital factor. As soon as Hong
Kong was secured, the 38ths next destination
was the Dutch East Indies and its vital oil fields,
by Christmas Day.
While the Japanese planned, the Canadians
sailed for Hong Kong, leaving Vancouver on
October 27 on the transport Awatea and the
escorting cruiser HMCS Prince Robert.
Awatea could not accommodate Lawsons
212 vehicles, which included 104 trucks, 57
Bren carriers, and 45 motorcycles. The vehicles
were loaded on the American freighter Don
Jose a week later. It reached Manila in the
Philippines on December 12, when the vehicles
were stranded by the outbreak of war. General
Douglas MacArthur requested the vehicles for
his command, and the defenders of Bataan
wound up using them.
On Sunday, November 16, Awatea sailed
into Hong Kong, greeted by three RAF planes
and five MTBs.
After that, the Canadians settled in. By day,
they dug trenches, manned pillboxes, attended
lectures, and square-bashed (performed closeorder drills). Private George Merritt of the Winnipeg Grenadiers bought a Chinese girl from
her family for $10 a month. She did his laun-

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PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 4:59 PM Page 79

dry, shined his shoes, and shaved him in her

family home, while her mother cooked dinner.
Grenadier Private Ted Schultz and his buddies
got drunk in bars and slugged it out with Royal
Rifles, to the dismay of the Military Police.
Grenadier Corporal Sam Kravinchuk read
Asian history in Hong Kong libraries, while
Corporal Lionel Speller attended nightly prayer
meetings run by the Plymouth Brethren at the
Duddell Street Gospel Hall. Private Barron was
surprised to see people pulling cement mixers
by hand and shocked to see people defecating
in the street.
Meanwhile, Maltby struggled to keep his
men focused and battled the British hierarchys
complacency. When he wanted to mobilize the
2,000 men of the Hong Kong Volunteer
Defence Corps, an executive of the Hong Kong
and Shanghai Bank said, Dont be ridiculous.
Most of our male employees are Volunteers.
The bank would have to close. There is no war,
sir, and there never will be. The Japanese have
more sense than to attack a British colony.
An irritated Maltby retorted, If my guess is
right, it will be a long time before any bank in
Hong Kong opens again.
Still, Maltby tried. With his senior officers, he

Indian soldiers man a coastal defense gun at Hong Kong. The city was well equipped for an attack by water, but did
not have the resources to defend against a land invasion.

tramped the length of the colony, studying

geography, inspecting defenses, siting positions.
On Saturday, December 6, the Royal Scots
band performed at the Happy Valley Racetrack. While betters checked racing forms and
big shots drank whiskeys and soda, military
policemen went through the crowds, advising
troops to return to barracks immediately. At
the Royal Navys home away from home, the
China Fleet Club, sailors hoisted beer and
played Tombola.
Sunday, December 7, began with a church
parade at the Church of England Cathedral
near Victoria Barracks, the Fortress Headquarters in the city center. The Royal Scots bagpipes and Middlesex band led the men out of
their colonial-era barracks to the services.
Catholic, Muslim, Jewish, and atheist Tommies
attended services rather than spend the morning peeling spuds. Maj. Gen. Maltby read from
the Book of Matthew.
While British troops sang Praise my Soul,
the King of Heaven, Sakais 60,000 attackers
moved into position. A patrol of Punjabis on
the frontier spotted the Japanese and reported

it up the chain of command to Maltby in his

pew. The service had not even reached the
Prayers for Peace. The Punjabis say there are
at least 20,000 soldiers in the area, perhaps
even more, an aide told Maltby.
They must be exaggerating, Maltby said.
Our intelligence people are certain there are
only 5,000 at the most.
But Maltby summoned his senior officers
outside individually and told them to alert the
whole garrison. By 5 PM every one of Hong
Kongs 14,000 defenders8,919 Britons and
Canadians, 4,402 Indians, and 660 Chinese
was at his post.
Maltbys plan divided his six battalions into
two ad hoc brigades. The Mainland Brigade
under Brigadier Cedric Wallis comprised the
Royal Scots, the Rajputs, and the Punjabis,
whose job was to hold the Gindrinkers Line as
long as possible. The Royal Scots occupied the
main position atop Golden Hill at the Shing
Mun Redoubt. Lawsons Island Brigade comprised the two Canadian battalions and the 1st
Middlesex. Their job was to fend off a seaborne
invasion of Hong Kong Island. Lawson set up
79

his headquarters at Wong Nei Chong Gap in

the center of the island, the only road connecting its north and south sides. The Volunteers
were divided between the two commands to
carry out demolitions and guard against sabotage. Maltby ordered his senior officers to
spend the night at headquarters at Victoria Barracks Flagstaff House, the Kiplingesque headquarters in central Hong Kong.
At the Peninsula Hotel, night clerk Harold
Bateson talked with a Swiss businessman, puzzling out two mysteries: the two Japanese cleaning girls who normally worked the late shift at
the Peninsula had called in sick, and the Japanese-owned Matsubara Hotel was closed.
The answer came at 4:45 AM on Monday,
December 8, when Major Charles Boxer, the
senior intelligence staff officer, relieved Royal
Marine Major Monkey Giles as duty officer.
Boxer, who spoke fluent Japanese and even lectured on Japanese history, turned the radio set
to Tokyos frequency and heard the announcer
break in to the program to read an Imperial
Rescript: Japan had declared war on the United
States and the British Empire. Boxer woke
Giles, saying, Get up, theres a war on!
I know, Giles answered. With a chap
called Hitler. Shocking type.
Were at war with Japan, Boxer said. Giles
shot upright and answered, Its out of the
question. Im playing golf this afternoon. Anyhow, I havent got a tin hat.
Giles immediately phoned Maltbys aide,
Lieutenant Iain MacGregor, to spread the word.
MacGregor was junior partner in the familys
wine and spirits trading firm, and thus knowledgeable about Hong Kongs social worldcritical for a peacetime aide-de-campbut no fool.
He started hammering on doors throughout
Flagstaff House, to alert the top brass.
Soon everybody got the word. Captain
Christopher Man, who commanded 1st Middlesexs Z Companyan ad hoc outfit of
cooks, bandsmen, buglers, drummers, drivers,
and mess waiterswas lying in bed with his
wife of six months, Topsy Marr. Mans reaction was to jump out of bed and into his
clothes. With his orderly present, there was no
time for a romantic good-bye, so he just said,
Put your tin hat on. He didnt see Topsy
again for three years and eight months.
While hundreds of British, Canadian, and
Indian troops yanked on khaki uniforms and
ran to their stations, 48 Japanese bombers
began Hong Kongs portion of the war at 7:57
AM, as a dark smear of Ida and Lily attack
bombers roared over the New Territories. The
80

National Archives

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:00 PM Page 80

After landing in Hong Kong in November 1941, Canadian troops march to join the garrison.

Japanese swooped down on Kai Tak, defended

by four machine guns, and blasted the airfield.
The remaining bombers turned on Sham Shui
Po Barracks. Most of the Canadian troops
based there were gone, but Father F.J. Deloughery was giving morning Mass, and Sergeant
Routledge and Signalman Fairley became the
first two Canadian soldiers to be wounded by
enemy action in the war.
The Japanese ground attack fell on Major
George Grays C Company of 2/14th Punjabis
on the border, who provided covering fire for
Volunteer engineers, busily wiring bridges over
the Sham Chun River. At 9 AM, the bridges blew.
Gray withdrew, and the Japanese began building
replacement bridges. Chinese fifth columnists
acted as guides, leading Japanese troops up
mountain tracks and around obstacles.
Sakais men advanced through Hong Kongs
hills and villages, delayed by demolitions and
British patrols. As the Japanese advanced, they
looted and raped, as was their practice earlier
during the Sino-Japanese War. Captain Khan

Sherin of the Punjabis was astounded to see

Japanese troops advancing toward his position,
prodding Chinese civilians ahead of them as
human shields. He asked Gray what to do, and
the major said to open fire. Will I also kill the
women, major? Sherin asked.
Its their bad luck. Now, get on with it.
Sherins men opened fire. After delaying the
enemy, they continued to withdraw. At 6:30 PM,
Royal Engineers blew up the railway tunnel
south of Tai Po. The Punjabis dug in for
ambush and saw the Japanese advancing in the
bright moonlight. While the Punjabis machinegunned the advance, 150 more Japanese landed
behind them. Gray withdrew again. In all, the
Punjabis covered 16 demolitions and killed
more than a hundred Japanese that day.
The gunboat HMS Cicala was sent to Castle
Peak Bay to use her 6-pounder guns to support
troops ashore. Cicala came under repeated air
attack by Japanese seaplanes, starting at 11 AM.
Her one-armed skipper, Lt. Cmdr. John
Boldero, skillfully navigated the gunboat and

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:00 PM Page 81

avoided all the bombs. It was a frightening,

but at the same time, an intensely exhilarating
experience, he said.
The repeated bomb blasts left a shoal of dead
fish floating around Cicala, and the cooks
hauled them in. Think yourself bloody lucky
them Japs come over, Able Seaman Wilkinson
told his shipmates. If they hadnt, wed be eating tinned stew and beans. Nonetheless,
Cicala found no surface targets that day.
On Hong Kong Island, an emergency hospital was set up at Happy Valley Racetrack to care
for victims of the mornings bombings. It faced
bizarre shortages. Canadian nurse Kay Christie
had to boil tongue depressers and re-use them.
Chinese fifth columnists and bandits sniped
at passing British vehicles. One sniper put a bullet through the windshield of a 1936 Ford truck
delivering supplies in urban Victoria, narrowly
missing Corporal Ed Bergens head. His frightened Chinese driver floored the accelerator, and
the truck roared through the narrow street at
50 miles an hour.
By dawn on Tuesday, December 9, the British
were dug in on the Gindrinkers Line, while
Sakais men were advancing on it, delayed by
British demolitions.
The Japanese also kept attacking Cicala, to no
avail. The gunboat spotted a Japanese bus and
truck near Brothers Point and set them ablaze.
Japanese bombs also rained down on the drydocked Tern, whose crewmen broke out the gunboats Lewis guns to answer the attackers.
On the night of December 9, Shing Mun was
held by No. 8 Platoon of the Royal Scots under
Lieutenant Potato Thompson, its men all
weakened from malaria. That afternoon,
Colonel Teihichi Doi, commanding the 228th
Regiment, surveyed the valley with his field
glasses and figured it was lightly defended. His
orders were to pressure the British by night to
wear them down and attack at dawn. He was
short of artillery and his men were tired from
long marches.
Doi sent his 3rd Battalion up the hill in rubber-soled shoes, through the rain, in single file.
At 11 PM, the 3rd Battalion went in from the
northeast, using satchel charges to blast holes
in ventilating shafts. The Japanese charged into
the tunnels and sealed off the northernmost pillboxes. Hand-to-hand fighting raged in the
trenches and tunnels. The Scots shot up 3rd
Battalions HQ with machine-gun fire, but it
wasnt enough. The Japanese overwhelmed the
scattered pillboxes and hurled grenades down
ventilation shafts. Then they surrounded the
command post and silenced its defenders with

more grenades.
With the exception of Pillbox 402, which
held out for 11 hours before a British shell
caved it in with a direct hit, Shing Mun
Redoubt was cleared by 3:30 AM. Lt. Col. Gerald Kidd, commanding the Punjabis, asked
Wallis for permission to counterattack. Weve
got to get that hill back! It gives the Japs command of the whole valley!
Forget it, Wallis answered. If you send

AS LONG AS
THEYVE GOT
THEIR FAGS,
THEYLL HOLD THE
BLOODY ISLAND
FOR YEARS.
your men up there, it will only weaken the Gindrinkers Line somewhere else. We cant afford
to lose another key position.
Dois men, victorious, charged after the Indians behind the Scots and raised the Rising Sun
over Shing Mun. When Doi saw the flag go up,
he radioed Sakai to announce his victory.
Incredibly, Sakai was angry. Dois regiment had
crossed into the 230th Regiments zone of operations and disobeyed orders to attack at dawn,
and in the tradition-bound Japanese army, disobedience was a major offense. More importantly, Sakai was afraid that other officers
might launch half-cocked attacks with disastrous results.
Doi, however, refused to retreat. Soon the
two officers were swapping angry messages
back and forth, and court-martial threats were
exchanged before dawn. Finally, Sakai agreed
to let Doi stay on the hill provided that no other
officer launched an attack without express permission.
Meanwhile, the British struggled to react.
Maltby sent his reserve, Winnipeg Grenadiers
Company D, across to Kowloon by Star Ferry
to cover evacuation if necessary. Company D
hiked up to a road junction three miles south of
Shing Mun and started digging trenches; they
were the first Canadian ground troops to see
combat in the war.
On the 10th, the Japanese continued to jab
at the Gindrinkers Line. They sent two sampans full of troops in Chinese dress to attack
Tide Cove, and the sampans were machinegunned. When the 228th Regiment attacked

the 5/7th Rajputs, Captain Bob Newtons company held out. Newton told his men, Now
then, whos going to win the Victoria Cross?
Stand fast and shoot straight. There will be
much killing to be done soon.
The Japanese hit Newtons men with a
frontal assault, believing the Indians to be no
better soldiers than the Royal Scots. But Newtons men, backed by the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery, gunned down the
attackers and sent them fleeing.
Having defeated the Japanese, the defenders
made rude jokes about the Royal Scots poor
performance, with tales of frightened Scots
loaded with ammo fleeing all the way to
brigade headquarters. It was a sorry page for
the British Armys oldest regiment, with the
First of Foot being known as the Fleet of
Foot in the battle. The fact that the outfit had
a hundred men in the hospital with malaria and
most of its others were untrained recruits made
no impact. Major Stamford Burn, the secondin-command, was so upset by the stories that he
shot himself.
Also having trouble with the heavy barrage
of Japanese bombs and shells were the Canadian battalions, most of whom were squatting
in pillboxes and trenches on Hong Kong Island.
It was their first exposure to war. Royal Rifleman Sidney Skelton wrote in his diary, Two of
our boys have gone crazy in the head. The
bombing has snapped their minds.
At sunset, the Royal Scots were ordered to
withdraw to a position in front of Golden Hill.
The Scots struggled up the hill, loaded with
equipment, weakened by malaria, to prepared
positions, finding them to be three-year-old
weapons pits surrounded by rusted barbed
wire. Cold, hungry, and disgusted, the Royal
Scots dug in to await the enemys night attack.
The 230th Regiment advanced on Golden
Hill fully camouflaged. A Royal Scot said, You
couldnt see a Jap until he was on the end of
your bayonet. The Japanese gave the Royal
Scots sniper fire, mortar rounds, and colorful
invective to keep them jumpy. Dois plan was to
break through the Royal Scots and cut off the
two clearly tougher Indian battalions.
At dawn on the 11th, the 230th Regiment
assaulted the Royal Scots position supported
by heavy mortar fire. Bayonets fixed, the Japanese swarmed all over the Royal Scots in waves.
They killed more than 60 men. C Company
was cut from 35 to 10 men.
The Royal Scots fought hard, determined to
regain their reputation, killing hundreds of
Japanese. Wallis told the Royal Scots com81

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:00 PM Page 82

manding officer, Lt. Col. Simon Scram White,

that the battalions good name was at stake. A
counterattack was an absolute necessity. Whites
men could not comply. He pleaded with Wallis
to cancel the order, and Wallis agreed.
But the order to cancel did not reach Captain David Pinkerton and D Company, the
Royal Scots reserve, which had not yet been
engaged. He told his men, Were going to get
those bastards. Golden Hill belongs to us. The
Japanese had more men and weapons, but
Pinkertons company stormed to the top.
Pinkerton personally led the assault, hurling
grenades, firing his revolver, and shouting
insults at the Japanese. He survived a mortar
explosion, a bayonet lunge, and a bullet that
grazed his temple. A soldier tied part of his shirt
around Pinkertons head to stop the bleeding,
and the company regained Golden Hill. Pinkerton was awarded the Military Cross.
When Sakai heard of the rout, he told his
officers that the price of defeat by an inferior
enemy was hara-kiri, but the reward for victory was eternal glory. The officers got the message. The Japanese launched another fanatical
charge on Golden Hill, and this was too much
for Pinkertons band. At 10 AM, the Japanese
had retaken Golden Hill.
The Japanese could now swing in from
behind the Rajputs and the Punjabis and
destroy them in detail. At noon, Maltby
ordered withdrawal from the mainland. The
evacuation order was given on regrettably short
notice but was unavoidable owing to the rapidity with which the situation deteriorated,
Maltby wrote in his official dispatch.
The Rajputs and Punjabis would withdraw
east to Devils Peak Peninsula, where HMS Thracian would cover their evacuation. All other units
would fall back to Kowloon, where Star ferries
and every available launch would be ready.
Brigadier Wallis told all this to a lieutenant
commanding a unit of 50 Indians. The lieutenant looked excited and had a strange look in
his eyes, the brigade diarist wrote. He spoke
somewhat incoherently and said, Are you sure
this is necessary? The Brigade Commander
noticed the lieutenants hand creep to his
revolver. From the look in his eyes Wallis realized this young officer was about to shoot him.
He rushed the lieutenant who was drawing his
pistol, knocked it from his grip, and ordered
him to hospital.
With the withdrawal ordered, the Royal Engineers and Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps
set demolitions and blew up the cement works,
the China Power and Light Station, the railway
82

terminal, the Kowloon docks, and all remaining

British merchant ships, including a Swedish vessel. At HMS Tamar, Chinese crewmen from
HMS Cicala deserted, so the crew and guns from
the drydocked HMS Moth were removed for
Cicala. The drydock was flooded, and HMS
Moth was scuttled. Also cutthe Eastern Telegraph Cable Companys links to the outside
world. Tamar herself was also scuttled.
At the ferry terminals, panic reigned. British
officials and Hong Kong police struggled to
issue channel-crossing permits to mobs of frenzied Chinese. White residents of Kowloon
shoved fistfuls of money at sampan owners to
float them across to the island. The roar of
explosions added to the din and fear.
Meanwhile, the infantrymen withdrew. The
Royal Scots and D Company of the Winnipeg
Grenadiers fell back on Sham Shui Po. When
the men formed up, buses took them to the
ferry pier, where launches and Star ferries
waited. We looked across the water, usually
ablaze with the lights of the island, wrote a
Royal Scots officer. That night there was nothing but darkness ahead. By 10:30 PM, the
Royal Scots were back in Victoria Barracks.
Three hours later, D Company reached the Star
ferry terminal, finding no ferries.
Captain Allan Bowman, commanding D
Company, phoned Captain Wilfred QueenHughes on the opposite bank to report stationary ferries in Victoria. Queen-Hughes
stomped up to a ferryboat and ordered the Chinese captain to make the crossing. He refused.
Queen-Hughes shoved his pistol in the captains
face, and the ferryman cranked up his engine.
A few minutes later, D Company shoved its
way onto the ferryboat, along with hundreds of
fleeing Chineseincluding a funeral cortege
with a black hearse.
All night long, the ferries ran back and forth
between Victoria and Kowloon. At the Victoria docks, the Chinese launch crews deserted,
and many boats were damaged by shells. British
and Canadian troops worked with civilian volunteers to man the gaggle of launches. Among
them was a Canadian who claimed to be the
Class A dinghy champion of Montreal.
The Indian battalions, exhausted from the
fighting, hauled their gear over mountain
tracks. Some of their mules, laden with food
and water, took fright and ran off.
The Indian troops entered Kowloon a few minutes ahead of the Japanese. HMS Thracian, battle ensigns snapping and 4-inch guns blasting,
oversaw the evacuation. Indian troops rowed,
waded, or swam out, clutching their rifles. Thra-

cian Petty Officer Peter Paul was awed by the

Rajputs discipline in the face of disaster.
When the Punjabis reached the ferry, they
refused to leave until the last civilians had been
withdrawn. They set up a rear guard under Lieutenant Nigel Forsyth to hold the enemy off until
the last ferry. Forsyth himself was the last man
off, jumping into the boats stern. With his Indian
gunners, he kept up rapid fire on the advancing
Japanese, some of whom even tried to jump into
the ferry from quayside. They missed their footing, and Forsyths men machine-gunned them as
they fell into the water.
The British withdrawal left anarchy behind.
Looters attacked ruined and blasted shops,
even taking wooden shelves, doors, window
frames, and floorboards to use as firewood now
that the gas mains were gone. British homes
were stripped bare. Chinese fifth columnists put
sand in rice and kerosene in fire buckets.
At 9:20 AM on the 13th, HMS Thracian took
off the last Rajputs. Two Indian soldiers were
cut down by Japanese rifles as they raced
toward the destroyer. Thracian sailed for the
back-up base at Aberdeen, where Maltby him-

A famous photograph
shows Japanese
infantry charging
into Hong Kong.

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:01 PM Page 83

Sakais letter to Major Boxer. I have a letter for

your governor [Sir Mark Young], Tada said.
We wish you to surrender. I will wait for a
reply. Failure to surrender would unleash a
massive artillery bombardment.
Boxer drove off with the letter while Tada
unloaded his hostages. One was Mrs. MacDonald, Russian and pregnant, who was allowed to
leave for the hospital. The other was Mrs. C.R.
Lee, accompanied by her two dachshunds, Otto
and Mitzi. The wife of Governor Youngs secretary, she was being kept to assure the truce boats
safe passage. Mrs. Lee handed her dogs over to
a British soldier. Captured the night before, Mrs.
Lee had been ordered into the party.
Dew asked interpreter Othsu Dak what the
terms of surrender were. Equable terms for
both sides and safe conduct for all, he replied
ambiguously.
Fifteen minutes later, Boxer returned with
Youngs answer. It was one word: No.
Tada said, It would be a pity if we have to
level this beautiful city. Then he stepped back,
saluted, and returned with Mrs. Lee to his boat.
Sakai was more impressed. I am amazed

the governor has so much courage, he wrote

in his diary. Then he ordered a merciless twoday bombardment.
Maltby reorganized his defenses. The Mainland and Island Brigades became the East and
West Brigades. The Royal Rifles and Rajputs
were placed in East Brigade under Wallis, with
the Winnipeg Grenadiers and Punjabis into the
West. Lawson was annoyedyears later both
he and the Canadian official historian viewed
splitting up the Canadians as a mistakebut
he set up Brigade HQ at the Wong Nei Chong
Gap, the notch in Hong Kongs hills that
enabled the main road to go from Victoria to
Aberdeen. The Middlesex men still held their
pillboxes under Fortress Command. Five batteries and seven rifle companies of Volunteers
were the reserve. The East Brigade set up shop
in the Tytam Gap, on the road from Sai Wan
Hill to DAguilar Peak and Stanley.
The Japanese began their bombardment with
a variety of heavy guns, 4-inchers and 9-inchers and 150mm and 75mm field pieces. Forced
coolie labor carried the ammunition, and those
who did not keep up the pace were shot.

National Archives

self congratulated the Rajputs in Hindustani.

Another general was using strong language
that morningSakai. He was having all kinds
of troubles: badly cooked prawns had given
him a migraine headache. The white horse
rounded up for the victory parade was gray and
flea-bitten, and his orderly had not properly
polished his samurai sword.
More importantly, his invasion of Hong
Kong was not moving as quickly as planned.
British battalions that were supposed to be
destroyed were slipping away in the dark.
Casualty lists were frightful. However, the
British were on the run. One good psychological shove might be enough to convince the
weak Westerners to surrender.
At 9 AM, Sakai sent a launch with three officers, an interpreter, and two female hostages
under a white flag and a white banner that read
Peace Mission on the bow.
British troops cordoned off the Victoria Pier
with bayonets, and senior officers came to greet
the emissaries, joined by Detroit News correspondent Gwen Dew. In a flurry of salutes and
protocol, Colonel Tokuchi Tada presented

83

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:01 PM Page 84

Japanese shells rained down on Victoria and

Wanchai, blasting apart buildings, starting fires.
The north shore was covered with black smoke,
and the firefighters were overwhelmed. Dead
bodies and garbage lay heaped in the streets.
Sanitation crews tried to burn the refuse and
haul off the corpses. One shell blasted a 9.2inch gun on Mt. Davis on the northwest shore.
Another Japanese 9-inch shell entered the
Fortress HQ plotting room but failed to
explode. Sappers dislodged the shell to find it
stamped clearly, Woolwich Arsenal, 1908.
Other shells landed amid the hospital set up
at the Happy Valley Racetrack, though it was
clearly marked with the Red Cross, killing and
wounding doctors, medics, patients, and horses
alike. Japanese guns also shredded mansions on
The Peak, ripping up 50 years of British power
with a few well-aimed shells.
Emily Hahn hid in the basement of the Selwyn-Clarke villa with her infant daughter Carola and other local residents, listening to shellfire and a BBC radio newscast voice saying,
The gallant fortress of Hong Kong is holding
up well against the enemy assault.
The BBCs morale-boosting rhetoric was
echoed in London by Fleet Street, whose newspapers spewed out stories saying Hong Kong
was dug in to withstand a six-month siege and
extolling Youngs defiance.
December 13 became December 14. Late in
the day, HMS Thracian finished refueling at
Aberdeen and sailed back into Kowloon Bay,
hoping to make a hit-and-run raid on the
Devils Peak. One mile short of her target, the
old destroyer ran aground in the moonless
night, hitting offshore rocks with a shuddering crash. They pierced her forward compartment. Lt. Cmdr. Pears, the skipper, backed
out, but as he was about to head home for
repairs, his lookouts saw two large motorized
junks jammed with Japanese troops dead
ahead. Thracians guns opened fire and
exploded the first junk immediately; the second one sank minutes later. The battered
destroyer steamed home. Next day, the Japanese answered Thracians impertinence by
bombing her at Aberdeen, which required her
to be drydocked.
Young grappled with hysteria, shelling, and
food shortages. Many key Chinese workers had
deserted gun emplacements and hospital jobs.
Panicking refugees raided private kitchens,
sometimes killing the occupants. Armed robbers worked through the air-raid shelter tunnels. Others robbed refugees sleeping on the
streets and British civilians going in and out of
84

government buildings. Even essential businesses

closed down rather than face armed robbery.
Shells knocked out the electrical power and
that in turn shut off air raid sirens. Hour-long
queues for free rice were subject to bombing,
shellfire, and random strafing. A Japanese shell
fell on a long queue of people waiting for their
rice issue, the shrapnel cutting them down
where they stood.
Young imposed a 7:30 PM to 6:30 AM curfew

WE SHOWED THAT
THE ENEMY
COULD NOT KEEP
JAPANESE
SOLDIERS OFF THE
ISLAND. THEY
WERE TOO FAT, TOO
DECADENT. THEIR
DESTRUCTION
WAS INEVITABLE.
and ordered the police to round up suspected
fifth columnists, and even asked the leading
Chinese TriadsHong Kongs version of organized crimeto crack down on the youthful
hoods causing chaos. The Triads were happy
to do so. They saw the street gangs as upstarts
threatening to take over their lucrative prostitution, opium, and gambling operations. Looters were shot.
That evening, 300 Japanese soldiers in rafts,
sampans, a motorized junk, and inflatable rubber boats started crossing the Lye Mun Strait.
The men sent over were not the 38th Divisions
best: Sakai used his sad sacks, theorizing that if
they could establish a beachhead, then the 7,500
men behind would roll over the British. Besides,
it was a cheap and effective way to rid himself
of the incompetents that plague any army.
The Japanese believed the Lye Mun barracks
were deserted and the coast defenses devastated. They were wrong. The British had
observed the preparations and reinforced the
Royal Rifles and Rajput defenders with three
platoons of Volunteers and two searchlights.
Soon the British heard the junks motor. The
Volunteers flipped on the searchlights and
caught the Japanese. The Volunteers 6-inch
howitzers blasted the junk, while the Rajputs
and Canadians opened up with Bren gun and

rifle fire, massacring the enemy. Japanese soldiers tumbled out of rafts and sampans and
drowned. Japanese artillery knocked out one
searchlight.
At 2:45 AM, the Japanese tried again, and the
surviving searchlight caught them once more.
The Japanese again took a beating, but did not
shell the searchlight. There was a bizarre reason
for that.
Lieutenant Minoru Okada, a 32-year-old
martial arts master who had written two novels on samurai heroes and was a 1936 Olympic
athlete, was to lead four swimmers across the
bay and destroy the searchlight at close range.
Okada theorized that if the Japanese simply
shelled the searchlights, the British would
replace them. But if his team destroyed the
searchlight up close, they could kill the crew,
destroy the position, and the British would be
too demoralized to replace the light.
The Japanese commander valued samurai
spirit over military logic and gave Okada and
his volunteers the go-ahead. Swimming in
underwear through the straits with bundles of
dry clothing, grenades, and explosives on their
backs, the five made it to the island. There, they
pulled on their Chinese coolie outfits and
crawled through barbed wire, past a snoozing
Volunteer in a truck.
At 4 AM, Okada reached the searchlight, and
his group hurled grenades over the sandbags at
the target. They blew up everything but the
searchlight. The defenders opened fire and killed
one Japanese soldier. Okada and the rest ran
back to the sea and swam back to the north side.
The searchlight was of little significance,
Okada wrote in 1954. What mattered was
the deed. We showed that the enemy could not
keep Japanese soldiers off the island. They
were too fat, too decadent. Their destruction
was inevitable.
Sakai was less impressed by Okadas bravado,
but he reasoned that the British had to be short
of ammunition and supplies. Furthermore,
lantern signals from fifth columnists on the
island were giving wildly inflated casualty counts
for the British. One spy reported British losses as
1,500 dead and 2,000 wounded. Actually it was
55 dead, 95 wounded, and 65 missing.
Sakai figured one more surrender offer might
do it. He decided to shell the British on Tuesday
(December 16), demand surrender on Wednesday (December 17), and storm ashore with all
three regiments on Thursday, December 18.
The bombardment went on. The defenders
were very tiredat Bowen Street Hospital the
medical staff had slept about seven hours in

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:01 PM Page 85

National Archives

Japanese soldiers watch from Kowloon

as their shells fall on Victoria.

four days. The wards were overflowing. There

was little cheer elsewhere, the pillboxes being
methodically destroyed and now even water
was short. Young rationed water, opening the
mains from 6 AM to 9 AM and 3:30 PM to 6:30
PM daily. Civil defense workers and firefighters
scoured Hong Kong Island to find wells.
Next, Young banned sales of petrol to private
car owners, requisitioned all buses, and shut
down the 40-year-old streetcars, which had been
grinding along Queens Road from sunup to
sundown since the war started. Even rickshaw
drivers abandoned their jobs. With the gasoline
shortage, garbage drivers could not go out, and
people dumped their refuse openly. Also deadlined were trucks that picked up excrement from
public lavatories, which created health hazards.
Yet life went on. A Chinese tailor hiked up
the Peak to deliver a suit. A civil servant bawled
out his secretary for arriving to work 20 minutes late. The British-American Tobacco Company presented 1st Middlesexs C Company
with 25,000 cigarettes, which prompted one
soldier to say, As long as theyve got their fags,
theyll hold the bloody Island for years.
At 11 AM on Wednesday morning, Sakai and

his naval counterpart, Vice Adm. Masaichi

Nimii, sent another Peace Mission boat to
Victoria. Colonel Tada, in his dress uniform,
and interpreter Othsu Dak, in his black suit,
led the four-man party. No hostages this time,
and both got directly to the point: Sakai wanted
a British surrender by 4 PM. There would be a
cease-fire until then.
Once again Boxer took the letter. He told Tada
to return at 2:30. At that time, everyone reassembled to read Youngs response. Boxer read
sonorously, The Governor and Commander-inChief, Hong Kong, declines most absolutely to
enter into any negotiations for the surrender of
Hong Kong and he takes this opportunity of saying he is not prepared to receive any further communications on this subject.
The Japanese were stunned. Sakai could not
believe the British were such masochists. He was
supposed to have led the victory parade on
December 17; now he would lose face in Tokyo.
Japanese generals who failed were not expected
to outlive their failures. Fortunately, Tokyo
showed sense. Since the British were fighting on,
Sakais deadline was extended until New Years
Day. The 38th Divisions role in the invasion of

Java was pushed back until February.

Maltby was also cheered. He believed two
Japanese surrender demands in four days
meant the Japanese were afraid of attacking the
island, were suffering pressure in their rear
from the Chinese, and were reluctant to attack.
His belief was echoed in the British and Canadian press.
Youngs reply to the Japanese should be read
in every public place and school throughout the
Empire, gushed The Times of London. Hong
Kong, braced and exhilarated by the roar of her
great guns, tersely rejected a second Japanese
request to discuss surrender terms, said the
Daily Mail. The Canadian press talked up a Chinese breakthrough, reporting savage attacks.
Actually, they were guerrilla raids. Chiang Kaisheks forces were not attacking anyone.
Sakai, however, had had enough. H-hour
would be 10 PM on December 18. Shojis 230th
Regiment would embark from a point north of
Kai Tak and land 400 yards east of North Point.
Dois 228th Regiment would embark from east
of Kai Tak and land in the center at Braemar.
Tanakas 229th Regiment would embark from
Devils Peak and land at Sau Ki Wan. Each reg85

iment would attack in two waves: the first in

14-man collapsible rowing assault boats, the
second and the rest in powered landing boats.
Each regiment would send in two battalions,
leaving three battalions in reserve. The bridging
engineers were to provide the landing craft.
With one hour to get the first wave across,
speed and surprise were essential. Once ashore,
the Japanese would grab Mount Nicholson,
Wong Nei Chong Gap, Jardines Lookout,
Mount Butler, and Mount Parker.
On Thursday, December 18, the skies
opened, drenching both sides with rain. Rain,
fog, and smoke from the burning Anglo-Persian oil refinery and paint factory cut visibility
on the north shore to nil. The Japanese battered
the waterfront defenses with shellfire, closing
down the main road from Causeway Bay to
Shau Ki Wan. Blasted trolleys, wrecked trucks,
and shredded and live power cables made
movement impossible.
The ceaseless shelling was having its impact
on the defenders. This day has been the worst
yet. Our position has become a living hell,
wrote Sydney Skelton. My nerves are on edge.
I could eat a horse. Shell landed 30 feet from
where I was standing. One fellow got shrapnel
in the side. My head swam and my nerves seem
to be all gone. More lads were wounded again
today. The sky is as red as blood. Some Canadians had not had a hot meal for 24 hours.
Father DeLoughery, the chaplain, visited the
men by day and hospitals by night, offering
Holy Communion and comfort.
As 2nd Battalion/228th clambered into its
assault craft, Skelton wrote, Huge fires are
raging in Victoria. The bombardment is still on.
This is one day I shall never forget. Tomorrow
will tell another story.
At 7 PM, 3,500 Japanese troops moved out in
junks, sampans, rubber boats, and anything
that could float. Another 4,000 Japanese troops
waited to go over in the second wave.
The defense opened up with machine-gun
and artillery fire, which broke up the Japanese
attack order and flipped boats in the air and
their human cargo overboard. Oars broke and
men rowed with rifles and entrenching shovels
through smoke, haze, and rain.
When the 228th reached their beaches, company and platoon leaders were cut down by
British fire. The Japanese reacted in samurai
tradition: They fixed bayonets and charged the
enemy. As soon as the first wave landed, the
second wave moved across. They hit the beach
and were pinned down.
Shojis and Tanakas regiments fared little
86

Map 20011 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:01 PM Page 86

The Japanese breached the Gindrinkers Line, pushed the Commonwealth defenders toward evacuation,
landed at several points on mountainous Hong Kong Island to the south, and eventually wore down the
remaining British, Canadian, Scottish, and Indian troops defending the Crown Colony.

better. Shoji captured British pillboxes but was

soon pinned down by artillery. Tanaka, under
Rajput machine-gun fire, told his men to take
no prisoners.
Tanakas men also stormed Sai Wan Hill,
held by the Volunteers 5th AA Battery. The 29
defenders were surrounded and outnumbered.
A Japanese officer shouted in English, Surrender and we will save you! Come out all men,
and you will be released.
The British, Chinese, Eurasian, and Portuguese defenders came out, hands up, one at
a time. The nearest Japanese soldier bayoneted
the first man then the next man and the
next. One Volunteer who saw what was hap-

pening tried to run and was cut down by rifle

fire. The rest of the men were tied up and held
for two hours in a small room. Then they were
led out, flung on the ground, and used for bayonet practice. The Japanese hurled the dead and
dying into a nearby pit. Only two survived
gunner Chan Yam-kwong and bombardier
Martin Tso Hin-Chiby hiding among the rotting bodies for three days, before escaping
when a Japanese guard turned his back.
There was horror at Captain Martin Banfills
first-aid post at the Salesian Mission in Shau Ki
Wan, too, when Tanakas men stormed up. A
Japanese patrol kicked in the front door and
rounded up the 25-member staff. The women

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:02 PM Page 87

were not harmed, but a Japanese officer

ordered the men to hand over their watches,
rings, and wallets to the invaders. Then the men
were marched 200 yards down the highway,
where Banfill, as the CO, had his hands tied
and a rope around his neck.
We are medical personnel, Banfill said,
Noncombatants.
Soldiers first, medical second, retorted the
Japanese officer, a Lieutenant Honda. We
have instructions from our commander-inchief. You must die. They shot five doctors,
sparing Banfill. I will kill you later. First you
are to be questioned, Honda said. He took
Banfill away, while his troops bayoneted and
beheaded the remaining medics. Incredibly,
Corporal Norman Leath of the Royal Army
Medical Corps and Dr. Osler Thomas survived
the bayonets, living to give testimony that sent
Tanaka to the scaffold. Leath, in pain from his
wounds, survived for eight days, walking across
Hong Kongs hills and drinking muddy water
from streams, before stumbling into an internment camp.
Meanwhile, Honda took Banfill over the hills
to a Japanese encampment. En route they spotted a wounded Rajput lieutenant and bayoneted him. At the camp, a senior officer interrogated Banfill and found out he knew nothing
about the defenses. The doctor wound up in a
POW camp.
Chinese fifth columnists grabbed Fort Sai Wan
and started spraying the Royal Rifles encampment with captured Lewis machine guns. Major
W.A. Bishop called Fortress Headquarters to ask
them to fire artillery on the fort, and they refused.
We have it down on paper that friendly troops
occupy the fort. We cannot shell it.
Well, they sure as blazes arent acting in a
friendly manner, retorted Bishop. Meanwhile,
Japanese troops entered the Lye Mun barracks,
meeting up with the Royal Rifles. Bishop
grabbed a Tommy gun and went off with
another officer to find out what was going on.
He bumped into a Japanese patrol. Bishop cut
loose with his Thompson, killing seven Japanese and earning a Distinguished Service Order.
All along the north shore the Japanese invasion stormed. Tanakas men, between beheadings, clambered up Mount Parker and Mount
Butler. Captain Bob Newtons D Company of
Rajputs, down to a hundred men, faced Shojis
regiment with valor and determination. The
Rajputs had enjoyed only one nights sleep since
the battle began. Worse, fifth columnists had
cut the Rajputs barbed wire. Nonetheless, the
Rajputs gave the Japanese a warm greeting with

mortar and machine-gun fire and then

launched a bayonet charge in the smoke and
rain. But the Japanese rolled grenades down
ventilation shafts into pillboxes. Newton himself was cut down by enemy fire while shouting
encouragement to his men. When Newtons
body was found, his revolver was empty, and he
was surrounded by six dead enemy soldiers.
Once Newton died, the Rajputs began to
waver and had to withdraw at 2:30 AM. The
slaughtered company numbered only 35 men
and was ordered to join Company B at Leighton
Hill, northeast of Happy Valley Racetrack.
Shojis regiment climbed up the hills, heading
for the summit of Jardines Lookout, two miles
from their beach, which overlooked the Wong
Nei Chong Gap. By 3:30 AM, Shoji himself had
caught up with his 3rd Battalion on the Lookouts northeast slopes, which were held by two
platoons of Volunteers.
Another roadblock to Shojis advance was
the power station at North Point, held by the
Hughes Group, under Lt. Col. H. Owen
Hughes, in peacetime the chairman of the
Union Insurance Company of Canton.
The Hughes Group was composed of men
too old to qualify for normal service, all 55 and
over. What they lacked in youth they more than
made up for in morale, enthusiasm, and
weapons accuracy. A total of 72 Hughesiliers
were assigned to hold the Power Station against
saboteurs, under Major The Honorable J.J.
Paterson, a colorful legislator and social lion
who held a private box at Happy Valley. He
was also a veteran of the African Camel Corps
in 1917. The defenders included T.A. Pearce,
the 67-year-old secretary of the Royal Hong
Kong Jockey Club; Private Sir Richard Des
Voeux, secretary of the powerful Hong Kong
Club; Pop Hingston, head chef of the Hong
Kong Hotel; and the jaunty, aristocratic Free
French Captain Jacques Egal, who had been
wounded and captured in World War I.
Hingston had fought with the Canadians at
Vimy Ridge.
The Hughesiliers were reinforced by a platoon of Middlesex men and 30 British technicians from the Hong Kong Electric Company.
At 1:45, the power station and its motley
defenders were surrounded. Paterson told his
men, By rights, half of you ought to be dead
now. If a man cant stay in his position alive,
hell stay in it dead. Those are your orders; now
give em hell.
The exhortation worked. The slow-moving
and myopic defenders of the Power Station
held off repeated bayonet charges by the

Japanese, who had a 20:1 manpower advantage. At dawn, the Hughesiliers gaped at
masses of sprawled Japanese bodies lying
around them, and the enemy was gone. It
reminded R.G. Burch of the Boer War: The
Boers had a nasty trick. Theyd pretend they
were gone and then come at you with everything they had. These chaps could be doing the
same thing.
Des Voeux answered, Its quite possible, all
right. But Ill tell you one thing. Id sooner die
here fighting than rot in a lousy prison camp.
Anyway Im threescore and 10 and living on
borrowed time now.
Sure enough, the Japanese launched a mortar barrage five minutes later, smashing the
concrete walls, killing Des Voeux. The Japanese charged through the barrage and smoke,
tossing grenades through windows and holes.
Tam Pearce, seeing that the building was on
fire, pointed at a wrecked double-decker bus
nearby, and said to Paterson, If its all right
with you, Id prefer dying there than being
roasted alive.
Paterson said, My dear fellow, theres a
great deal to what you say.
Pearce and five Hughesiliers took up position
in the bus and held it for two hours against bayonet charges. Finally, the Japanese brought up
three machine guns and shredded the defenders,
killing everyone but Private C.E. Geoghan, who
drove off an enemy attack singlehanded, killing
an officer and four men with five rounds before
the Japanese shot him, ending The Battle of
the Bus.
In the power station, Paterson and his crew
hung on. Unbelievably, the last 12 ancient warriors fought on until 4 PM, when they ran out
of ammunition and surrendered. The Japanese
roped up the old men and marched them off.
The delay the force imposed was very valuable to me, Maltby wrote later in his report.
As the Japanese advanced, the war came
closer to Hong Kongs Central District.
Wounded Chinese civilians filled the Jockey
Club, which had been converted into a hospital. Bowen Road Hospital took 111 hits during
the siege. Wounded victims were wheeled in
assembly-line fashion into surgery, where doctors worked for 36 hours straight.
With most Royal Navy ships out of action,
there were a lot of sailors without jobs. They
were organized into 30-man combat groups,
issued rifles and tin hats, and sent to fight as
infantry. Royal Marine Major Monkey Giles
was given command of sailors from the naval
base, one of whom was a clerk whose rifle was
87

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:02 PM Page 88

filled with dirt. Youll have to clean that before

you start fighting, Giles said.
Yes, sir. Please, sir, how? the clerk answered.
Meanwhile, as December 19 advanced, so
did the Japanese on Wong Nei Chong Gap and
its police station at the gaps summit. Corporal
Sam Kravinchuk and the Winnipeg Grenadiers
A Company, under Major A.B. Granny Gresham, were sent to take and hold Mount Butler and the Tai Tam Reservoir. Drenched from
pouring rain, the Grenadiers occupied the high
ground. At dawn, the Japanese attacked.
Kravinchuk and his company fixed bayonets
and drove the Japanese back. A sniper killed
Gresham. The company held on, as Company
Sgt. Maj. John Osborn personally killed six
Japanese with his bayonet and tossed live
enemy grenades back at the Japanese. Volunteer Corporal M.S. Lau and three men held on
until 7:30 AM when all but Lau were killed.
But the Grenadiers had to retreat. During the
withdrawal, Kravinchuk had to escort two
wounded pals to a first-aid post in a pillbox.
When the three Canadians reached it,
Kravinchuk rapped on the door, saying, Hello,
anybody home? The door flipped open, and
two Japanese soldiers shoved bayonets at him.
The Japanese prodded the three Canadians
across the clearing to a shack full of other
Canadian and British prisoners.
By dawn on Friday, December 19, the Japanese were nearly halfway across the five-mile
Hong Kong Island. Their objective was the
islands reservoirs in the center. That would cut
the defenders in two and cut off their water
supply. The Rajputs were nearly obliterated,
and Japanese forces were on the move. Victory
seemed near.
Lawson probably agreed. He burned his code
books and radioed Ottawa: Situation very
grave. Deep penetration made by enemy.
Maltby, however, said, Japanese will undoubtedly try to ferry more men over tonight and
continue infiltration, but I hope to be in a position to launch a general counter-attack tomorrow morning.
Maltby, seeing that East Brigade was down to
the Royal Rifles, two companies of Volunteers,
and some Middlesex machine guns, ordered it
to withdraw to the south coast, holding Stanley Fort. There it would regroup and counterattack, backed by the forts mobile guns. Lawsons West Brigade would withdraw from
Wong Nei Chong Gap.
Maltby gave the message to Corporal Lionel
Speller, who fired up his BSA 500 motorcycle
for the five-mile trip. Speller had been on the go
88

all morning. His previous vital mission was

to deliver a package of dog food to a British
colonel in a pillbox. Speller, a keen motocross
driver, struggled through sniper fire to reach
Lawsons Tac HQ by 8 AM, earning a Military
Medal for his valor. At 9 AM, he went back to
Fortress Headquarters.
At 10 AM, the Japanese attacked Lawsons
HQ, surrounding it. Two truckloads of beached
sailors from the now grounded HMS Thracian
under Lt. Cmdr. Pears were rushed up, but were
caught in an ambush. Most of the Thracian
sailors were cut down as they jumped out of
their trucks. Petty Officer Peter Paul rolled
down the slope and hooked up with some
Royal Scots eight hours later. Four sailors held
out in a house against Japanese fire for two
hours. When their ammo was gone, they waved
a white handkerchief. The Japanese took them
out and bayoneted three of them. The fourth,
Able Seaman Ronald Mattieson, yanked the
rifle out of a Japanese soldiers hands and dived
head-first over a cliff. He fell 50 feet, broke his
collarbone, and landed next to a cave, which he
hid in for the next 30 days.
Under heavy machine-gun fire in his pillbox,
Lawson phoned Maltby to say, Theyre all
around us. Im going outside to fight it out.
Lawson and his staff officers ran out of the pillbox, and Sergeant Bob Manchester saw Japanese machine guns cut them all down. When
Shoji heard that a British brigadier was among
the bodies at Wong Nei Chong, he ordered the
body wrapped in a blanket and temporarily
buried on the battleground on which he had
died so heroically.
Captain Allan Bowman died rushing a
Japanese patrol, firing his Thompson. Captain
Bob Phillips, an eye knocked out, fought on
until his ammo ran out. Lieutenant Len Corrigan saw a Japanese officer advancing brandishing his samurai sword, wrestled him to the
ground, and strangled him to death.
Up on Mount Butler, Osborn led 35 men of A
Company of the Grenadiers down from the
heights, with hundreds of Japanese in pursuit. A
career soldier, father of five, and devoted family
man, Osborn was cool and efficient. His platoon
struggled down a slope into a ravine, seemingly
having avoided the Japanese. Suddenly a Japanese soldier tossed a grenade into the group that
landed three feet from Osborn. The sergeant
major yelled Clear out! and flung himself on
the grenade, absorbing the full blast.
The platoon, stunned by Osborns self-sacrifice, ran on. Private Stanley Baty tripped and
fell on his facewhich saved his life. When he

hit the ground, Japanese rifles and automatic

weapons opened fire, killing everyone near
Baty. He and 14 survivors broke out their rifles
and Bren guns and shot back. After 20 minutes,
the Grenadiers decided to surrender. One of
them waved a white handkerchief. He was shot
down. Weve had it boys, Baty said. Those
buggers are aching to do us in.
They fought on as long as the ammo lasted
10 more minutesand then ripped out their
rifle breeches. Then they all stood up, expecting
to be shot. The Japanese rose, bayonets pointed.
An officer pointed a sword at a man near Baty.
Two soldiers grabbed the Canadian, hauled him
off, and bayoneted him to death. The message:
Everyone else would suffer the same fate unless
they did what they were told. The Japanese
stripped the Canadians of their rings, watches,
and wallets and marched them north.
By dusk, Baty and his pals were jammed in a
one-room building packed with British, Canadian, and Indian POWs. There was no food,
water, or sleep. They endured The Black Hole
of Hong Kong for 20 hours.
Osborns body was never identified. His
name was chiseled on the memorial to the missing at Sai Wan. When the Canadian government learned of his deed after the war, he was
awarded a posthumous Victoria Crossthe
only one of the battle.
The Royal Navy was in action, too. MTB-7
and MTB-9 were ordered to sail into Hong
Kong Harbor at 8 AM and shoot up enemy vessels with machine guns and grenades. Lieutenant R.W. Ashby, skipper of MTB-7, laconically reported, I opened fire on the enemy
landing craft with all my guns at 100 yards
range with excellent results, and passed down
the leading string at a distance of about five
yards, firing continuously. I dropped two
depth-charges which failed to explode. I then
came under machine-gun, howitzer, and light
artillery fire from both shores and also from
cannon and machine-gun fire from aircraft. The
boat was hit several times and a cannon shell
exploded in the engine room putting my starboard engine out of action and killing my Leading Stoker my speed was reduced to 22
knots. However, I turned and attacked a second bunch of landing craft with machine-gun
fire at point-blank range with most satisfactory
effect. Ashby received the Distinguished Service Cross.
MTB-7 lost its port engine to shellfire, and
the third one later. MTB-9 towed its sister to
safety. MTBs 11, 12, and 26 were less lucky, all
being sunk. Lieutenant D.W. Wagstaff of MTB-

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PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:02 PM Page 89

26 ignored the signal to withdraw, and the boat

was last seen stopped dead off North Point, her
Lewis gun blazing away. MTB-18 took a direct
hit that wrecked her propeller. At top speed,
she shot into the Kowloon seawall and
exploded. There were no survivors.
The Punjabis and the Royal Scots tried to
counterattack at 3 PM, with little success. The
Royal Scots had a lot to prove after the fiasco
at Shing Mun. They had not slept or eaten
proper food in days, but were angry and
insulted. Captain David Pinkerton, recovered
from his Golden Hill wounds, again led the
assault. The Scots advanced against heavy
machine-gun fire and got nowhere. Pinkerton
was wounded again on the steps of the police
station and had to be removed from the battlefield, cursing horribly. Casualties were immense,
and command devolved on four subalterns.
Of the 500 men who went into Wong Nei
Chong Gap, only 175 returned after the battle.
The Royal Scots had regained only their reputation. This is the worst day my men had in all
the Hong Kong fighting, and as an officer in
battle the worst day I ever experienced, wrote
a Royal Scots subaltern.
The British tried again with two Volunteer
armored cars and a hundred Indian artillerymen who had lost their guns. They reached the
police station but could not hold it. In control
of the gap, the Japanese beat and bayoneted the
wounded defenders they captured.

ABOVE: A formation of Japanese planes flies over Causeway Bay and heavily populated areas along Hong Kongs
northern shore. Mount Parker can be seen in the background.

By dusk on the 19th, the wrecked East

Brigade had fallen back to Stanley. Royal Engineers blew up the two 6-inch guns at Collinson
and the two 9.2-inchers at Cape DAguilar. The
soldiers were tired and dispirited from days of
bombardment and had neither the strength nor
training for cross-country operations.
As night fell, both sides gasped for breath.
Shoji scribbled out his report to Sakai, apologizing for the loss of 800 men to the Winnipeg
Grenadiers. The stout defense by the green,
scattered, and poorly supplied Canadians lifted
Maltbys spirits, but he could not counterattack
yet. The Japanese were pressing on Repulse Bay
Hotel and the Aberdeen dockyards. They
would have to be held. He placed Colonel
Harry Rose in charge of what was left of the
West Brigade.
Early on the 20th, Wallis ordered the Royal
Rifles to move along the south shore by Repulse
Bay to counterattack toward Wong Nei Chong
and hook up with West Brigade. Backed by his
only two mobile 3.7-inch howitzers, A Company shuffled off to take Violet Hill, only to find
the Japanese 3rd/229th had beaten them to it.
In peacetime, Repulse Bay Hotel offered its
guests five-course meals, sandy beaches on a
crescent-shaped bay, and beautifully tended
gardens. It stood on the edge of a cliff and the

foot of a mountain slope.

The three-day battle for the hotel began in
bizarre fashion. At 7:40 AM, four Japanese officers in white gloves and pressed uniforms
turned up at the end of the driveway, staring at
the terrain. Hotel guests eating breakfast on the
terrace stared back in amazement. The officers
vanished, replaced by 25 soldiers, who took
over the hotels gas station and captured six
Royal Navy sailors.
Fortunately, the hotel also had 200 British,
Canadian, and Indian troops among its guests,
soldiers who had been sent there for a few days
rest from battle. They dug in immediately.
The civilian guestspaying 10 a daywere
less prepared. They included the ubiquitous
Gwen Dew, Baron and Baroness Guillaume,
American author L.C. Arlington, Peak society
matrons, and a collection of Swiss, French,
Russian, German, and Chinese families. The
socialites disliked the Chinese and complained
about them to manager Marjorie Matheson,
demanding they be put in the basement.
Instead, Matheson put civilians in the basement while the battle raged. British and Japanese soldiers traded rifle fire between the gas
station and the hotel. Lieutenant Peter
Grounds, commanding the defenders, led an
attack to capture the gas station. He was killed
89

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:03 PM Page 90

leading it, but the sailors were freed, tied up

but unhurt.
The siege continued. The defenders slept in
the ping-pong and card rooms, rifles beside
them, while the civilians huddled in the basement with rationed water. The hotel nurse, Elizabeth Mosey, tended shrapnel and stomach
wounds. Luckily she had done that precise job
in World War I. The senior staff cook and the
female guests kept a flow of soup, coffee, sandwiches, and biscuits to the troops, holding back
the caviar and lobster for a victory party.
By nightfall, the hotel battle was a stalemate,
but Wallis was determined to recapture the
Wong Nei Chong Gap. With rain drenching
down, he decided to wait until dawn.
Next morning, Sunday, December 21, Major
Robert Templer of the 8th Coast Artillery, a 20year veteran, was sent to take over the Repulse
Bay Hotel. Theres a hell of a mess down
there, Maltby told Templer. Try and clean it
up, will you.
With two Rifles platoons, Templer marched
into the battered hotel to find the highest ranking officer hiding in the hotel bar, drunk,
singing The Maple Leaf Forever.
Templer ordered all defenders to shave immediately and moved HQ to the hotel lobby. He
restored order and boosted morale with personal leadership. Then he took two truckloads
of Rifles up to attack a Japanese encampment,
but found the enemy too numerous. That
evening, Templer sat down for some turtle
soup, supreme of turbot, and filet mignon,
when Bombardier Harry Guy reported, Sir,
them bloody Japs are in the West Wing.
The devil they are, Templer retorted.
Come on. He and a group of defenders
went over with as many hand grenades as they
could find.
A Japanese patrol had set up a machine gun
at the end of a long, red-carpeted corridor, and
were blazing away at the walls. Templer and
his men rolled grenades down the floor to
destroy the machine gun. The few guests left
bailed out through the windows.
The battle for Wong Nei Chong Gap raged
on. Grenadier Companies B and D, reinforced
by some Royal Scots, Punjabis, and beached
sailors, were sent to take back the police station. It took 10 hours to cover half a mile.
Major Ernie Hodkinson led from the front,
shouting, hurling grenades, and firing his
revolver. When two armored cars came up to
support the attack, Japanese mortars and
machine guns shredded them. The platoon was
halfway up the steep slope when the Japanese
90

attacked from the crest, hurling grenades and

screaming. Hodkinson was hit and blacked out.
When he woke up, he was in Queen Mary Hospital, and he knew the attack had failed.
The Japanese continued their advance. Dois
troops captured Mount Nicholson, breaking
the defense line.
HMS Cicala was sent to Deep Water Bay to

DEATH AND BLOOD

ALL AROUND ME.
NOISE ALL AROUND.
THEY ARE COMING
CLOSER. OH, GOD, IT
DOESNT SEEM
THAT I CAN STAND
IT ANY LONGER.
provide fire support. She came under enemy
mortar fire and silenced the mortars with 6pound shells. No more trouble from that
quarter, Boldero observed.
But the Japanese came back with six
bombers, and Cicalas luck finally ran out.
Bombs blasted her open. She was sinking by
the stern when more bombers came streaking
in. Boldero signaled MTB-9 to ask what to do,
and was told to drop depth charges and make
sure she sinks. Boldero was the last man onto
the Carley floats. The depth charges blew up,
and HMS Cicala sank at last. The sailors rowed
back to Aberdeen, where they were issued rifles
and tin hats. Four hours later, they were fighting as infantrymen on Bennetts Hill.
Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Kidd personally
led his Punjabis to fight their way through from
Aberdeen to Repulse Bay. With only 25 Sikhs
and a dozen sailors, Kidd attacked Shouson
Hill, which was topped by a mansion belonging to Sir Shouson Hill, a Chinese millionaire.
Captain Alastair Thompson and Lieutenant
Nigel Forsyth led their men into action, which
was fought at close range. A Sikh sergeant bayoneted three Japanese and hurled their bodies
over his shoulder like sacks of hay. Another corporal killed five with a single Thompson burst.
Two sepoys held off 20 Japanese with their
rifles until they were killed.
But the hill had no cover, and the British had
no artillery support. The attack failed, and Kidd
lay among the dead. Thompson was also
wounded, but Forsyth emerged unscathed. The

surviving eight Sikhs pulled out for tea and rum.

All day the Canadians launched piecemeal
counterattacks, taking heavy casualties. They
were joined by all the rear-echelon men Western armies rely on. All failed.
No help was coming. Chiang Kai-shek
radioed that he could not attack toward Hong
Kong for another 10 days, if at all. The War
Office ordered Maltby to destroy all installations. Volunteers set the Texaco, Shell, and
Royal Navy oil tanks ablaze, covering Victoria
in blue flame and smoke. Grenadier Sergeant
Howard Donnelly was ordered to destroy a
liquor warehouse, and he didbut not before
stuffing his tunic with bottles.
The battle of the Repulse Bay Hotel resumed
on the 22nd. Guests volunteered to help. Millionaire Henry Marsman slapped on a tin hat
and went out with two Chinese bellboys in red
caps and gold-buttoned uniforms to dig in the
garden to fill sandbags. Hong Kongs best
jockey, Victor Needa; British businessman D.A.
Baker-Carr; and Canadian oil executive W.M.
Wilson drove a bullet-riddled car half a mile to
the Lido Beach Club to pick up a British ammunition cache. Miraculously, all three survived.
The hotel itself was now a messfull of broken walls and floors, shattered glass, falling
plaster, wrecked silverware, and bullet-riddled
furniture. The Japanese cut off water and
power, and Templer rationed water to a cupful
per day. Dew and Moseythe latter in her old
uniformwashed bandages in the same water
over and over again.
Hearing about this situation by radio,
Maltby ordered Templer to withdraw the
troops and leave the guests and wounded men
to surrender. Maltby feared that if any more
fighting took place in the hotel civilians would
die needlessly. Templer was appalled. It was
the most terrible order I have ever had to give
the order to abandon women and children to
the Japanese. But I realized that Maltby had
been right: Stanley was hardly the place for 200
unexpected civilian guests. He had to repeat
his orders in Hindustani for the Indians and
French for the Canadians.
The troops destroyed the liquor stores and
withdrew during the night of the 22nd. They
said nothing, to prevent panic, but some of the
civilians came to see them off. Businessman
Andrew Shields told Templer, Youve got to
go. We all realize that. Only men with rifles are
important in Hong Kong now. Templer nodded, turned on his heel, and gave the order:
Ready to move. The men slipped down the
drain tunnel to the beach, then south along the

U.S. Army

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:03 PM Page 91

Major General Christopher Maltby (standing with surrender flag) and Sir Mark Young, Governor and Commander in Chief of Hong Kong (seated at right), surrender to Japanese
General Takashi Sakai (at left with glasses) in the Peninsula Hotel ballroom, December 25, 1941.

road to Stanley Fort, sneaking past a patrol of

20 Japanese. Every man took off his heavy hobnailed boots to reduce the noise, and all made
it to Stanley.
At dawn on the 23rd, guests awoke to see a
white pillowcase fluttering from the garden
flagpole that had flown the Union Jack. The
Japanese arrived three hours later through the
back windows, suspecting a trap. Businessman
Andrew Shields said in poor Japanese, There
are no soldiers here, soldiers gone.
Six Japanese pointed their bayonets at the
cocktail bar where 40 men lay wounded. Mosey
looked up from a dying Alberta soldier who was
talking lucidly of his family back home. She
snarled, Go away. These are sick men. If you
want to kill them, youll have to kill me first.
The Japanese retreated. Thats better, she said,
returning to the Canadian. There were no
killings at the Repulse Bay Hotel.
The British were pulling out of the Ridge,
south of Wong Nei Chong Gap, as well. Lt.
Col. MacPherson was holding the place with a
collection of Royal Army Ordnance Corpsmen.
They spoke in French to prevent listening
Japanese from understanding the orders. Again,
the British left their wounded behind, but when
the Japanese stormed into the house, they tore
down the white flag, bayoneted the interpreter,

and sprayed a room full of 30 wounded men

with machine-gun fire and grenades, killing
most of them. Six days later, the bodies were
found, heaped in a pile like rubbish.
The same day, 53 Rifles and British POWs
were marched to a seaside cliff near the Repulse
Bay Hotel. There the Japanese bound the men,
and then shot, bayoneted, and beheaded them
in groups.
Fifth columnists led Japanese troops to the
Happy Valley Racetrack. There, 50 defenders
were assembled to hold the valley, including
civilian police. Thirty-five Middlesex men and
seven Volunteers held Leighton Hill with rifles
and machine guns, taking all the artillery the
Japanese could muster in Kowloon. They only
withdrew on Christmas Eve. In Wanchai,
Royal Scots and Volunteers fought for four
hours to hold Jimmys Beer Kitchen, a fourstory building that was normally the troops
favorite bar.
All along the mountains the fighting raged on.
Doi was stunned by the Canadian ferocity. He
thought he was up against 400 men in one fight,
when the Grenadiers only numbered 100. Dois
men took 40 percent casualties and ran out of
ammunition. They hurled rocks at the Canadians. The Grenadiers, also short of ammunition,
threw packing crates and machinery back.

As the casualties mounted, organization disintegrated. Japanese shellfire blasted the phone
lines. Runners got lost and shot. With food and
ammunition short, Canadians jumped enemy
sentries to steal their food. Grenadiers went
three or four days without eating.
Winston Churchill was worried, too. From the
battleship HMS Duke of York, taking him to a
conference in Washington, he signaled Hong
Kong on the 21st: Every day that you are able
to maintain your resistance you help the Allied
cause all over the world, and by a prolonged
resistance you and your men can win the lasting
honor which we are sure will be your due.
Strong words, but the Japanese had taken
three reservoirs and bombed the fourth, cutting
off the water. Victorias 1.7 million residents had
only wells and rooftop tanks. Enterprising Chinese sold jugs of dirty water for $10 a bottle.
Grenadier Sergeant Howard Donnelly grabbed
a gasoline tanker to bring water from a well to
his Peak depot and used the water to cook food.
The eggs tasted of gasoline, but he touched a
match to them and they didnt catch fire.
Victoria itself was a nightmare. Refugees
lined up for food amid rubble and the bodies of
shot looters, left by police as a warning. Black
marketeers sold flashlights, blankets, and food.
Women guarded their homes with guns, and
91

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:04 PM Page 92

white residents carried the bodies of relatives

and friends killed in the shelling up slopes,
looking for somewhere to bury them.
With Victoria collapsing, Doi hurled his men
at the center of the British line, Mount
Cameron, on the night of the 23rd. One thousand men of the 228th Regiment stormed a hill
held by a hundred Grenadiers. The Canadians
were scattered, but regrouped. The Royal Scots
also fought hard, losing 390 of 500 men in the
center of the island.
At Stanley peninsula, the Volunteers and
Royal Rifles held on against Tanakas 229th
Regiment. Middlesex 2nd Lt. Charles
Cheesewright held his pillboxes until midnight
on the 22nd, when he was ordered to withdraw.
Incredibly, his No. 11 Platoon did not suffer a
single casualty.
Major Rusty Forsyth led No. 2 (Scottish)
Company of the Volunteers in a fierce stand
against Japanese troops and tanks. He was
wounded twice but continued to fight. Above
the din of battle came the sound of bagpipes as
Pipe Major Alexander Mackie skirled away.
The company was ordered to withdraw, but
nobody obeyed the orders. Forsyth was killed,
and Mackie played on. The Japanese yelled,
Surrender, Englishmen!
The Scots yelled back, Englishmen be
damned! The next round of Japanese gunfire
killed Mackie.
The Royal Rifles were exhausted, too. Some
Canadians were passing out and falling asleep
where they stood, oblivious to bombardment.
Issued new entrenching tools, they were too
tired to dig.
The Rifles lost Stone Hill, Palm Villa, and
Sugar Loaf Hill. Stanley Mound changed
hands three times. Private Sidney Skelton
wrote in his diary: Death and blood all
around me. They just got Jack next to me. We
were talking when suddenly a shell made a
mess of him. Today Mothers birthday. I wonder if shes thinking of me. Noise all around.
They are coming closer. Oh, God, it doesnt
seem that I can stand it any longer. Skelton
was wounded soon after, and taken to St.
Stephens College in Stanley, which was being
used as a hospital.
At 10 PM on Christmas Eve, Rifles CO Lt.
Col. Home radioed Maltby to ask for a 48hour stand-down for his exhausted battalion.
Home told Maltby he could not answer for his
battalion without a break. Maltby consented.
The Rifles staggered into Stanley Fort and collapsed in the barracks.
At 2:30 AM on Christmas Day, Maltby
92

ordered Home to have his men occupy the

high ground overlooking Stanley village. The
Japanese were about to break through. Home
woke up men who had the most sleepthree
or four hoursand they double-timed to the
700-foot-wide point that joined Stanley to the
island. Three Japanese tanks were advancing
against a Volunteer antitank gun. The gun
destroyed the first two and damaged the third,
sending it packing.
The Japanese attacked again, this time with
infantry, and stormed the village. The battle
raged amid a police station, post office, soccer
field, and tennis court. Two Scottish platoons
were slaughtered and half the Rifles. The
British forces withdrew slowly, inflicting hundreds of casualties. Tanaka brought up
flamethrowers. The British pulled back to the
fort for a last stand.
On Christmas morning, 200 Japanese soldiers moved on St. Stephens College, which
was being used as a hospital for 95 wounded
Britons and Canadians. The advancing Japanese had apparently raided a Stanley bar and
were drunk. Dr. George Black, the ancient civilian in charge of the hospital, waved a white bed
sheet at the front entrance, saying: This is a
hospital. You mustnt come in. Leave us in
peace. A Japanese soldier shot Black in the
forehead. Then the Japanese ran in and bayoneted 56 wounded men in their beds.
Sidney Skelton, lying in a classroom with 20
other wounded men, had just received preoperation anesthetic and was losing consciousness. He saw 12 Japanese soldiers storm
into his room and start bayoneting men. Skelton threw himself onto the floor, feigning
death. The Japanese dragged him out and
kicked his face. He didnt move. They figured
he was dead, and left him. Skelton bandaged
his arm and lay among the corpses for half an
hour. At that time, a British voice said, They
say anyone who can get to the front door will
be spared.
Skelton crawled to the front door. There he
saw a Japanese soldier grab a Volunteer from a
line of POWs and bayonet him for still having
his knife. An officer took Skeltons wristwatch,
slapped him in the face with his sword, and sent
Skelton upstairs to a windowless room with 40
male captives.
All day long, the Japanese pulled men out of
the room and bayoneted them. Then they went
to the room where they were holding the
women, and raped and bayoneted three English
and four Chinese nurses. The rest were gangraped. A British lieutenant asked a Japanese

captain if he could see his wife. The captain led

the Briton to a pile of bodies in the bushes.
There, he saw his wife among the corpses.
It was a dreadful Christmas all across the
island. The South China Morning Post put out
a one-page edition, headlined Day of Good
Cheer. Three Grenadier privates, in a villa
owned by the Dutch consul, found the kitchen
fully stocked, but that was all the food to be
had. Maltby shared asparagus and a halfempty bottle of wine with McGregor. Captain
Bill Price of the Royal Rifles ate tinned beer
and bully beef and biscuits with Captain
Charles Pope of the Royal Engineers. Dr. Gordon Grey passed out some fruitcake his
mother had given him to patients at the
Bowen Street Hospital. Grenadier Bob Lyttle
caught a pig, but they could not cook it, so
they ate it raw.
Gwen Dew and the Repulse Bay captives,
held in a paint factory, were given three cans of
beer and a box of soda crackers by a Japanese
officer who said, Merry Christmas. A Middlesex platoons roasting chickens were
destroyed by a shell before they were ready to
eat. Australian Major Arthur Dewar, leading a
group at Little Hong Kong, was too busy to
eat. His group of sailors inflicted massive casualties on the enemy, but they ran out of mortar
bombs and machine-gun ammunition.
At 9 AM, two civilians caught at Repulse Bay,
Andrew Shields and Charles Manners, arrived
at Fortress Headquarters under a white flag.
Sakai was offering a three-hour cease-fire so
Maltby could consider surrendering.
Maltby discussed the situation with his aides.
The Japanese were moving in on Peak mansions. The Aberdeen naval yard defenders were
down to 60 rounds of ammo. There were only
six mobile guns left, with 150 rounds between
them. The last radios had been destroyed. The
defenders were exhausted and short of water,
food, and ammunition. But nobody wanted to
surrender. Maltby told the messengers the offer
was rejected.
After they left, however, Maltby had second
thoughts. At 2 PM, he phoned Stewart, the Middlesex commander, and asked how things were
for the men in the North Point pillboxes. How
long do you think they can hold out?
That was tough for Stewart. He wanted to
say As long as I tell them to. But he couldnt.
One hour at the outside, Stewart answered.
Do you have any reserves at all?
No, Maltby answered. He had gone to
Young at Government House at 3 PM, and said,
Its a hopeless situation, Mark. Once the pill-

PH-Hong Kong_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:04 PM Page 93

boxes are gone, the enemy will flood into Victoria. We havent the strength to stop them.
Young had no choice. At 3:15 PM, he ordered
his men to ground arms and give themselves up
at the nearest Japanese position. The battle of
Hong Kong was over. Communications were
so bad, isolated British and Canadian platoons
did not know about the surrender, and some
went on fighting for days. In Victoria, mothers
hid their daughters in closets, consular and government officials went on a frenzy of burning
documents, and black marketeers sold homemade Japanese flags to welcome the invaders.
At Aberdeen, the China Fleet Club passed
out 50,000 cigarettes to the troops and began
to destroy its store of liquor: 500 cases beer, 75
cases brandy, 75 cases whisky, 100 cases gin,
75 cases sherry, and 70 cases rum were all
smashed, in an orgy of destruction that took
12 hours.
At St. Stephens College, the Japanese opened
the storeroom door and ordered their POWs
out to cremate the corpses. Quebec-born priest
James Barrett wanted to bury the 70 dead, but
the Japanese refused.
Corporal Lionel Speller buried his revolver
beneath an elm tree outside Fortress Headquarters and walked off with a white sheet to
surrender. The 1st Middlesex and 2/14th Punjabis buried their colors on the grounds of
Flagstaff House, and nobody ever found
themeven a detachment of Royal Engineers
armed with metal detectors in 1978.
Howard Donnelly and his unit smashed their
rifles. James Bertram and his Volunteers
marched into captivity, whistling Tipperary.
Wallis, cut off from Maltby, did not learn of the
surrender until the 26th, so his men endured
more bombardment, which wounded Wallis.
The British were driven back to within 100
yards of the fort. Just after midnight, one of
Maltbys staff officers reached Stanley under a
white flag with the message. Wallis surrendered
at 1:45 AM.
When surrender neared on Christmas Day,
Collinson signaled his MTBs, Go all boats,
and the five surviving MTBs rendezvoused
west of Aberdeen Island and sailed at 22
knots toward the Chinese mainland. Another
group of 83 Chinese and British refugees, led
by Vice Adm. Andrew Chen Chak, sailed off
in a commandeered motor launch. Chen
Chak was the president of the Southern
Kuomintang and a colorful seadog, complete
with artificial leg.
The Japanese caught Chen Chaks launch
and sank it, but the MTBs reached the scene

Japanese troops march on Queen's Road, Hong Kong led by Lieutenant General Takashi Sakai and Vice Admiral
Masaichi Niimiin in December 1941, shortly after the British surrender.

and saved 67 refugees, including Chen Chak,

who unscrewed his useless leg before jumping
overboard.
The MTBs sailed on to Mirs Bay, where they
were scuttled. Chen Chak, knowing the local
terrain and guerrillas, led the sailors and
refugees through 80 miles of enemy territory in
72 hours, reaching free China. Boldero and his
Cicala survivors were less fortunate. They were
taken prisoner.
The Japanese troops declared all Chinese
girls to be prostitutes and went on an orgy of
rape and looting. They robbed stores and seized
fountain pens and watches.
Sakai got his parade, too. On the 27th, he
rode his stallion through downtown Victoria,
beneath 62 planes. Thousands of Chinese lined
the streets, waving their black market banners,
giving fake smiles.
The Canadians lost 23 officers and 267 other
ranks in battle. Twenty-eight Canadians and
465 other ranks were reported wounded. The
British, Colonial, and Indian forces lost about

955 dead and 659 missing. The 2nd Royal

Scots were slaughtered: out of 500 men, the
battalion had only four officers and 98 other
ranks at the surrender. The Japanese claimed to
have lost 675 killed and 2,079 wounded, but
their losses were probably higher.
But these events were far from Maltby and
Youngs minds on the evening of December 25,
1941. As their troops destroyed guns, armored
cars, artillery, and equipment, Maltby and
Young sailed across the harbor in an MTB
under a white flag. All around them lay
wrecked ships, ferryboats, and junks. General
Sakai was waiting for them in the Peninsula
Hotels ballroom, and by candlelight, Maltby
and Young signed the documents that surrendered Hong Kong to the Japanese.
Author David H. Lippman writes a day-byday history of World War II for a Web page
from his Newark, N.J., home. He visited Hong
Kongs battlefields in 1992 and 1994 as part of
his research for this article.
93

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:09 PM Page 94

In the opening days of the war, the heroic

defense of a Pacific island gave America hope.
mid-December 1941, the 400 U.S. Marines who called the
island outpost of Wake home stood a lonely sentinel in the
watery Central Pacific wilderness, like a cavalry fort in an oceanic
version of the Western frontier.
As the Japanese juggernaut spread the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere to the farthest reaches of the Pacific Ocean, most
of Americas Pacific battle fleet, the backbone of the nations power
in the hemisphere, rested on Pearl Harbors muddy bottom along
with almost 2,000 young American sailors. Marines on Guam
and British infantry in Malaya were fighting futile holding actions
against swarms of enemy troops. In the Philippines, Japanese
bombers demolished General Douglas MacArthurs air force
before it lifted from the ground, and Japanese infantry forced his
troops into a disastrous retreat toward the Bataan Peninsula.
Hong Kong and Singapore were poised to fall, and the crowning blowthe destruction of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales
and the battle cruiser HMS Repulse at the hands of Japanese
planes off Malayacaused British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill to lament, Over all the vast expanse of waters Japan
was supreme, and we everywhere were weak and naked.
Barely 600 milesless than two days steaming time or four
hours flying timefrom the closest Japanese base, Wake was next
on Japans timetable of conquest. Wake, a coral atoll comprising
three islands, whose highest point was barely 20 feet above sea
level and whose vegetation consisted of scrubby trees and brush,
covered four square miles of total land area. Yet, even this tiny real
estate, with 10 miles of beach, offered too much territory for the
tiny garrison to cover. Should the Japanese crash ashore in one of
the numerous gaps between gun emplacements, the Americans
would be swiftly overrun. A desperately needed radar system had
not yet arrived.
Fearing that he could not withstand even the feeblest of assaults,
Major James P.S. Devereux, the Marine commander, asked his
superiors what he should do if Wake were actually attacked. He
received the disconcerting response, Do the best you can.

IN

94

THE FIGHT

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:09 PM Page 95

Painting John D. Shaw, www.libertystudios.us

In this painting, The

Magnificent Fight, by
John Shaw, F4F Wildcats
of VMF-211 prepare for
battle on Wake Island. In
the cockpit of one of the
only four flyable aircraft
available, Capt. Hank
Elrod confers with fellow
pilots John Kinney and
Frank Tharin, before
embarking on a mission
December 11, in which he
inflicted damage sufficient to sink the enemy
destroyer Kisaragi.

BY JOHN WUKOVITS

FOR WAKE

95

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:10 PM Page 96

Why would one of the wars most noble

actions occur at a minuscule Pacific wasteland
more suitable for rodents than humans? It
boiled down to the airstrip, which dominated
the V-shaped group of three small islands. Control of that airstrip loomed more crucial with
the deteriorating Japanese-American relations
before Pearl Harbor. In U.S. hands, Wake posed
a threat to the Japanese wall of defenses, which
stretched across the Central Pacific. In Japanese
hands, it offered a convenient home base for
aerial reconnaissance of Hawaii, Midway, and
other U.S. possessions.

Before the war, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,

the Pacific Fleet commander, sensed a chance to
engage Japans fleet in the waters off Wake if an
invasion force attempted to overrun the islands
defenders. To hold the enemy in the area,
though, Wakes feeble defenses had to be
strengthened. Kimmel ordered in a Marine
defense battalion under Devereux, and more
than a thousand civilian construction workers
converged on the desolate outpost to erect barracks, level roads, and fortify the island.
On October 12, 1941, when Major Devereux
stepped onto Wake Island, he brought addi-

Seeking Fortune, They Found Fame

Foreshadowing the citizen
soldier armies that would so
ably augment the regular
armed forces and fuel the
American military to victory
in World War II, the civilian
construction workers played
a key role in the Wake story.
Benjamin Franklin Comstock, Sr. and his son, Ben,
Jr., Iowans raised in the
heartland of America,
futilely scoured the Midwest
and West in search of carpentry work. In early 1941,
the struggling pair read an
ad in an Omaha newspaper
seeking construction workers for Pacific island military projects. The promise
of $200 per month plus
overtime enticed the Comstocks to sign a standard
nine-month contract, even
though it meant they would
have to leave the United
States.
Hans Whitneys path also
led to Wake. Born in 1911, he
hopped trains as a teenager
to see the United States. He
saw the relatively brief stint
at Wake, with its attractive
wages, as the vehicle for
achieving his hopes.
I dreamed of being an
independent citizen,
depending on the whims of
no man for a job, claimed
Whitney. I had visions of a
96

young businessman driving

to work. Saw his wife and
kids in a good home, well
dressed and well fed, enjoying life to the full. Wake
would be his ticket to the
great American dream.
The Comstocks and Whitney gathered in San Francisco, where they boarded a
luxury liner for Hawaii. A
leisurely cruise across the
Pacific offered food and
entertainment on a scale
with which none were
accustomed, and they
received more of the same
in Hawaii. This is the life!
proclaimed Whitney of
those magical days.
The three construction
workers heard in Hawaii
that Wakes hot, rainy climate taxed the endurance
of most men, but they dismissed the negative chatter.
I figured I could stand nine
months of it, Whitney
explained. Then, a little
business of my own and
maybe get filthy rich.
A slow 2,000-mile trip to
Wake ended on October 12,
1941, less than two months
before wars opening. The
dismal-looking island presented little of the enchantment provided by Pacific
isles of lore, with their
sandy beaches, gorgeous

palm trees, and exotic birds.

Wake offered sandy
beaches, but instead of
exotic birds, the island
resounded to the movement
and noise of land crabs and
gooney birds. Instead of
palm trees, scrawny scrub
trees rose no more than 20
feet high. Suffocating heat
greeted the men with an
oppressive stickiness.
Suckers! Suckers! Suckers! yelled a reception
party of civilians already at
Wake. Whitney wondered
what he had walked into,
then again reminded himself, Oh well, I can stick it
out for nine months, to heck
with them.
Whitney relaxed when he
noticed the amenities provided for the workers. A
mess hall dispensed the
finest of foods, including all
the steaks, potatoes, and
ice cream a man desired. A
fine hospital, a theater, and
decent living quarters
offered a modicum of comfort.
When rumors of Japanese
aggression filtered in, the
workers ignored them. Their
world abruptly changed
when the Japanese military
suddenly unleashed its
potent assaults.
John Wukovits

tional reinforcements to join the original group

of five officers and 173 enlisted men who had
arrived August 19. A larger Marine force meant
increased contact and inevitable friction with
the construction workers.
Not that fighting erupted or jealousies lingered. The two groups blended together relatively well, for, after all, as Marine Corporal
Franklin D. Gross said, We were Marines and
we were disciplined and knew what we were
supposed to do and what not to do. But each
day the Marines emerged from their Spartan
tents to gaze across the lagoon at the more luxurious civilian quarters. While Marines supped
on potatoes, civilians feasted. Marines chafed
at the obvious differences.
Devereux turned to his task with a fury,
intending to transform this first line of defense
in the Pacific into a bastion that could punish
any approaching force. When Devereux came
out there, all hell broke loose! declared Gross.
He evidently had orders to get those guns in,
so we worked seven days a week. Before that,
Im not sure we even worked on Saturday.
The wiry major, who so meticulously
planned details that a fellow officer said, Hes
the kind of guy who would put all the mechanized aircraft detectors into operation and then
station a man with a spyglass in a tall tree,
quickly had his men laboring 12-hour days,
seven days a week.
Intentions are noble, but they must be backed
with men, weapons, and supplies, and here Devereux suffered. The U.S. Congress had allocated
money to improve Wake, but the work did not
begin until early 1941. Shelters to protect aircraft from bombs lay incomplete. Devereuxs 3and 5-inch guns equaled the impact of a
destroyer, but he commanded enough Marines
to man only half the 24 machine guns situated
about Wake. Instead of radar to give advance
warning of attack, a man with a pair of binoculars on an observation post atop a water tower
served as the islands early-warning system.
Communications wire connected different
outposts, but since much of it was old and
frayed, no one knew how it would stand up to
a heavy bombardment. In the most extreme situations, when soldiers and Marines had little
else with which to fight, they could always
count on using their rifles. Not at Wake. At least
75 men lacked weapons because the military
had failed to ship enough to the outpost.
Devereuxs air arm offered minimal help. The
12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighters failed to
arrive until four days before the war started.
Since the ground crews and aviators had been

National Archives

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:10 PM Page 97

A Japanese artist created this image of his comrades moving warily forward on Wake Island.

working with biplanes instead of the fighters,

they were unfamiliar with the capabilities of the
aircraft. Mechanics rummaged through the
crates of supplies that accompanied the planes
for instruction manuals, but could find none.
Someone at Pearl Harbor had forgotten to pack
them. Spare parts for the aircraft were practically nonexistent, which meant that even minor
damage could knock them out of the fighting.
In the frontier wilderness of the Pacific, a damaged aircraft was as good as a destroyed aircraft.
By late November 1941, although still far
from complete, Wake had been bolstered sufficiently to earn the designation of naval air station. Commander Winfield Scott Cunningham
arrived to assume overall command, with Devereux in charge of the Marines.
Most Marines and civilians on Wake believed
that war, if it occurred, would start elsewhere in
the Pacific, probably closer to the Philippines or
East Asia. When they learned on December 7
that Pearl Harbor, far to Wakes rear, had been
bombed, they reacted in disbelief.
Devereux, expecting to be attacked at any
moment, ordered each man to his post. Even
with the precautions, wars arrival on Wake
shortly before noon on December 8 (December
7 in Pearl Harbor) came swiftly and suddenly.
Construction worker Hans Whitney looked skyward to see a group of aircraft heading toward
Wake. He mistakenly assumed they were American planes and said to a companion, Look! Let
the Japs come! We even have bombers, now!

Without radar to give early warning, the tiny

Marine garrison had barely 15 seconds notice,
hardly enough time to ready their antiaircraft
guns and jump into aircraft. Still, they replied.
Grosss position at the eastern end of Wake,
called Peacock Point, sported four machine
guns. I was standing on top of my dugout talking to Colonel Hanna when 18 to 19 planes
dropped out of a hole in the clouds. I said,
Whats this coming in? We thought they were
B-17s, because they had been coming in for the
last few months and wed gas them. Suddenly
these bombs fall out, and a runner near me
started shooting, but we only got off 18 rounds.
Then the planes were gone.
In that brief span the Japanese inflicted
heavy damage and shock to Wakes Marines.
Four Marine aviators rushed toward their aircraft intent on offering resistance to the 36
Japanese twin-engine bombers that riddled
Wake, but not one reached his plane. Bomb
fragments fatally tore into Lieutenant Frank
Holden as he sprinted onto the runway, while
Lieutenant Henry G. Webb fell with lethal
wounds to the stomach and feet. Lieutenant
George Graves had climbed into his aircraft
and prepared for takeoff when a direct hit
engulfed him in flames. Lieutenant Robert
Conderman evaded the bullets that spit into
the coral airstrip until he reached his aircraft,
then bomb fragments tore into his body. Fellow Marines rushed to his aid, but the dying
Conderman pointed to other wounded

Marines lying about the area and said, Let

me go. Take care of them.
Benjamin F. Comstock, Sr. and his son, Benjamin, Jr., were working on a two-story, steel
framework building when the Japanese aircraft
suddenly appeared. In an action symbolic of the
sacrifices to be made by millions of sons around
the nation to protect their families, the son
quickly tackled his father, shoved him behind a
stairway in the unfinished building, then covered him with his body. The planes were so
close you could see the gunners teeth, recalled
Comstock, Jr.
Bomb craters 50 feet apart spotted the ground
with surgical precision, except for the airstrip.
It remained untouched so the Japanese could
use it after their conquest. Seven precious Wildcat fighters lay in smoldering ruins amid the lifeless bodies of 23 Marine aviation personnel. The
Japanese blasted gasoline storage tanks, strafed
the islands Pan American Airways hotel, and
peppered Pan Ams huge flying passenger boat
Philippine Clipper with 23 bullet holes.
As if to add insult to injury, as the enemy aircraft completed their runs, The pilots in every
one of the planes was grinning wildly. Every one
wiggled his wings to signify Banzai, mentioned
a defender.
Marines and civilians emerged from foxholes
and half-completed construction projects and
quickly tended to the wounded and dying. Billowing smoke blotted out the sun and burning
wreckage littered the landscape, but the men put
97

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:10 PM Page 98

aside their thoughts and focused on the job at

hand, which was preparing for the inevitable
invasion. They repaired severed communications lines, camouflaged and sandbagged gun
positions, cleared the runway, and dug revetments to protect the few remaining aircraft.
Civilians parked heavy construction equipment on the airstrip to prevent Japanese
landings, while a Navy lighter was filled with

U.S. Navy

WHEN DEVEREUX
CAME OUT
THERE, ALL HELL
BROKE LOOSE!
HE HAD ORDERS
TO GET THOSE
GUNS IN, SO WE
WORKED SEVEN
DAYS A WEEK.

98

concrete blocks, dynamited, and anchored in

the center of Wilkes Channel to prevent small
boats from entering the lagoon. Since they had
little time to spare for burials, Marines stored
the dead civilians and Marines in a large freezer
room in one of the civilian buildings.
The citizen soldier army, so heralded in contributing to victory in Europe and the Pacific,
made its first appearance at Wake as 200 volunteers dropped their shovels or stepped down
from bulldozers to stand side by side with the
400 Marines. They had traveled to Wake for
monetary reasons, not to fire weapons, but
when the chips were down they answered the
call of duty like their Marine compatriots. Most
were sent to undermanned batteries and given
speedy instructions on how to fire the weapons.
Hans Whitney was stationed at an antiaircraft
gun, where he filled sandbags and waited for a
renewed attack.
Apprehension frayed nerves and exhausted
even the sturdiest of men, who never knew
when the main Japanese assault would come.
Some believed the U.S. Navy would charge out
of Pearl Harbor to their rescue, but others wondered if it even could. How severely had it been
wounded on the wars first day? Was Wake to
be sacrificed by an impotent Navy, or would a
rescue force save them?

In those perilous days immediately after

December 8, Marine Pfc. Verne L. Wallace
remembered a letter from his girlfriend back
home that he had stuffed unread into his pocket.
In a few quiet moments, he sat down and looked
at the letter. The girl had sent it before December 7, and thinking that Hitler posed the real
threat to American servicemen, she wrote, As
long as you have to be away, darling, Im so
very, very happy you are in the Pacific, where
you wont be in danger if war comes.
The irony of the situation did not escape
Wallace, sitting in the middle of a Japanesecontrolled ocean, for danger crept closer as he
read the note. In the predawn moments of
December 11, the Japanese, invigorated by the
list of triumphs already under their belts, commenced their first attempt to overrun Wake.
Confident of victory over what they assumed
was a ragtag group of civilians and a few
Marines, the Japanese stepped into a trap cunningly devised by Major Devereux. Devereux
outfoxed the enemy commander, Admiral
Sadamichi Kajioka, into thinking he had surprised Wake. Since the Japanese force sported
much larger guns than those on Wake, Devereuxs only hope was to hold his own fire and
lure the enemy ships within range of his smaller
5-inch guns.

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:11 PM Page 99

peared beneath the waves until veteran Platoon

Sgt. Henry Bedell turned their minds back to
business by yelling, Knock it off, you bastards,
and get back on the guns! What dya think this
is, a ball game?
When the Marines landed hits on three more
destroyers and on a transport, Kajioka ordered

Admiral Kajioka absorbed a humiliating defeat

at the hands of a vastly outnumbered foe. He lost
two ships and at least 340 killed and 65 wounded
against one Marine death. The Japanese limped
away from the gunfight, while the United States
celebrated its first victory of the war.
Marines registered three firsts on Wake
that day. For the first and only time in the war,
an invasion had been repulsed by shore batteries. The first Japanese surface warship had
been sunk. Most important, for the first time
since the war started,

Map 2011 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

Admiral Kajioka, in the flagship Yubari, cautiously led three light cruisers, six destroyers,
and 450 soldiers in transports and old destroyers toward Wake. Optimistic reports from the
returning bomber pilots and a lack of activity on
Wake as his ships neared the island bolstered
Kajiokas confidence that taking Wake should
be a breeze.
Lookouts on Wake first spotted the Japanese
at 3 AM. Kajioka swung west when his ships
drew within 7,000 yards, opened fire at 5:30,
and systematically raked the island as the
flotilla boldly steamed along its coastline.
When the Japanese ships reached
Wakes westernmost point, Kajioka
reversed course, closed the distance,
and again steamed offshore with
guns booming. The lack of American return fire convinced
Kajioka that he had caught the
enemy by surprise.
Marines at two gun batteries
impatiently awaited Devereuxs
order to fire as they watched the
enemy shells inch alarmingly close and
felt the vibrations from nearby explosions.
A corporal manning Devereuxs phone
spurned pleas to open fire by shouting, Hold
your fire till the major gives his word. One
Marine, dodging mounds of earth shaken loose
from bombs, griped, What does that dumb little bastard want us to do? Let em run over us
without spitting back?
Devereux coolly waited for another 30 minutes. When the unsuspecting Kajioka drew into
point-blank range, he ordered all batteries to
commence firing. Like Wild West gunslingers
glaring at their foes, his gunners on batteries A,
B, and L poured accurate salvos into the Japanese ships barely 4,000 yards away. Shells
smashed Japanese hulls, and shrapnel felled
Japanese sailors. The enemy attempted to fire
back, but the Marines continued to pummel the
attacking ships.
The only thing more stunning than the cascading Marine fire that broke the darkness was
the look of dismay on Kajiokas face as he realized he had been lured into the Marine guns. An
initial salvo screamed over the Yubari, and as
destroyers hurriedly spread covering smoke to
shield the flagship, a second salvo straddled the
ship. Marine gunners pumped four successive
shells into the hapless cruiser, enveloping one
side in fire and smoke.
Three shells from a second battery sent the
destroyer Hayate and its crew of 168 to the bottom. Marines lustily cheered as the ship disap-

ABOVE: The first Japanese assault on Wake ended in

an embarrassing repulse. However, the attackers
returned days later. OPPOSITE: Photographed in the
spring of 1941, this aerial view of Wake was taken
from the northeast.

his force to retire. Major Paul A. Putnam, commander of Wakes air squadron, now jumped
into the fray. Putnams Wildcats pounced on the
retreating Japanese ships in a series of attacks.
Captain Henry Freuler damaged a transport,
while Captain Henry Elrod and Captain Frank
Tharin scored hits on the cruisers Tenryu and
Tatsuta. Another aircraft machine-gunned the
Yubari, barely missing Admiral Kajioka.
The destroyer Kisaragi, which lagged behind
the rest of Kajiokas force, paid the highest price.
Her tardiness in leaving proved to be her undoing when a bomb, attributed to Elrod, hit the
destroyers quarterdeck and ignited the ships
depth charges. Explosions ripped apart the
destroyer, which sank within minutes.

the Japanese had been

stopped in their desire to gain an objective.
The defenders on Wake erupted in joy, dumping water on each other and behaving like
schoolboys. Cunningham later compared the
celebration to a fraternity picnic. War whoops
of joy split the air. Warm beer was sprayed on
late arrivals without regard to rank. At the end
of the day Devereuxs radio operator remarked,
Its been quite a day, Major, hasnt it?
But their reaction was nothing compared to
the reaction back home, where victory-starved
civilians, still in shock over Pearl Harbor,
received the news with elation. People had
already begun wondering where the U.S. Navy
was, since it had not made an appearance since
the December 7 debacle, but they at least knew
where the U.S. Marines stoodon a tiny Pacific
99

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:11 PM Page 100

speck where American military forces repelled

the seemingly invincible Japanese. Headlines
proudly proclaimed, MARINES KEEP
WAKE, and compared its gallant defense to
the valiant stand at the Alamo.
They took heart in the news of Wakes
heroic stand, for if such a small garrison on a
barren isle could perform that well, what
might the Japanese expect once the United
States sent its vast, well-supplied armies into
conflict? Americans finally had something to
cheer about, and while they hated to think of
loved ones being killed or wounded, they

Every Marine on Wake knew that the Japanese would return for a second assault, this time
with enough men and ships to avoid another
setback. The only question was when the attack
would occur. The Pacific was fast turning into
a Japanese ocean, with Japans only challenges
coming from a weakened U.S. Navy and from
Wake. With each passing day, the garrison
became more isolated from the rest of the world.
Over the next 12 days the men, already weary
from the strain of war, turned spectral from the
constant state of vigilance and from daily Japanese air raids. Not knowing when an invasion

and dead, and prepared for the next wave of

bombing. Diarrhea afflicted many. The islands
huge native ratsbothered by the bombings
swarmed into shelters and foxholes, while innumerable dead birds had to be buried for sanitation purposes. Supplies dwindled with each raid.
Devereux called this period the foggy blur of
days and nights when time stood still, when men
ached for laughter and one decent nights sleep.
The days blurred together in a dreary sameness
of bombing and endless work and always that
aching need for sleep. I have seen men standing
with their eyes open, staring at nothing, and they

National Archives

Photographed after Wake Island fell to the Japanese on December 23, 1941, these U.S. Wildcat fighter planes of Squadron VMF-211 were disabled during the fighting.

knew that once their sons were organized and

marched to war, momentum would swerve to
the United States.
Immediately after the battle a Japanese Naval
officer assessed Kajiokas performance against
the garrison at Wake. He concluded that Wake
proved to be one of the most humiliating
defeats our navy ever suffered.
Wakes defenders had taken Round 1. Round
2 was about to begin.
100

force might suddenly loom offshore, Marines

and a handful of civilians had to remain around
the clock at their gun positions, where hot food
and a chance to relax were luxuries from a past
that had disappeared. No man could catch more
than a few moments rest, since daily waves of
fighters and bombers gave them little respite
from combat conditions. Like automatons,
exhausted men emerged after each raid, hastily
repaired what they could, removed the wounded

did not hear me when I spoke to them. The only

thing that counted was survival.
Marines and civilians rose from their shelters
after each bombing, looked around at the new
devastation, then permitted a small smile to
briefly appear. It was like a great weight lifting
from your chest, wrote Devereux. You
wouldnt die today.
Through these weary days of mind-numbing
bombing, the men on Wake displayed a remark-

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:12 PM Page 101

able resilience and self-sufficiency. They bided

by the old Marine saying, which warned,
Maybe you oughta get more, maybe you will
get more, but all you can depend on getting is
what you already got. Devereux again outwitted his opponents by moving the antiaircraft
guns almost every night. He correctly assumed
the Japanese bombers would mark the gun
emplacements for subsequent attacks, so following each raid he ordered his tired Marines to
shift the guns. When the next attack occurred,
bombs usually fell on the abandoned positions.
Marine mechanics worked marvels to keep
the four remaining fighters aloft, trading engines
from one plane to another, stripping crashed aircraft for parts to build a hybrid version, and
once even pulling a precious engine from a stillburning aircraft.
Some civilians added their own contributions.
Dan Teters, a World War I veteran, organized a
delivery system that shuttled food to the men at
their posts. Appreciative Marines fondly labeled
it Dan Teters Catering Service. In the absence
of a military chaplain, a Mormon lay preacher
named John ONeal visited foxholes or comforted the wounded. Others carried ammunition to gun positions. Earl Row took his turn at
the nightly beach patrols, a duty he called the
most hair-raising thing I have ever done in my
life. Row, battling a mixture of fear and weariness, imagined lifelike forms in every rock, but
he kept reminding himself not to fire at what he
hoped were only illusions.
Teters excused 186 men to fight with the
Marines while keeping them on the payroll of
Morrison-Knudsen, the civilian contractor that
had hired them, and more than 400 civilians
the citizen soldiers of 1941ultimately
helped in one form or another.
Meanwhile, citizens back home closely followed the Wake saga. Men jammed enlistment
centers to join the military, including five Waterloo, Iowa, brothers named Sullivan, who later
died together on the same stricken ship off
Guadalcanal. In its December 22 issue TIME
magazine trumpeted Wakes feats, stating, They
had been there since the first day of war, beating
off attack after attack by the Jap, shooting down
his planes, sinking his surface ships, probably
knocking the spots out of his landing parties.
Then came one of those moments that elevated Wake to heights few battles attain and
contributed to the legend that formed. As
reported in TIME magazine on December 29,
1941, From the little band of professionals on
Wake Island came an imprudently defiant message phrased for history. Wakes Marines were

Dan Teters Ably

Led the Civilians
at Wake
Major Devereuxs counterpart in the civilian construction camp cast as large a
shadow among his men as Devereux did
among his. Nathan D. Dan Teters built a
reputation as one of the most organized,
demanding foremen for Morrison-Knudsen, the civilian firm handling most of
Wakes construction. Born in Ohio in 1900,
Teters joined the Army in World War I and
helped build airstrips. After the war he
earned an engineering degree from Washington State College in 1922, then
embarked upon a career in construction
that lasted until 1960. Among the projects
in which he participated were the construction of the Boulder and Grand Coulee
dams in the 1930s.
The man was used to giant-sized challenges in out-of-the-way places, and Wake
qualified on both accounts. Using a combination of firmness and common sense,
Teters quickly had the 1,100-man force on
Wake humming with efficiency. The workers
knew he could be tough His word was
law, said onebut they also saw instances
in which Teters went to extraordinary measures to make their lives on desolate Wake
more bearable. He could be a stern
taskmaster, but he cared enough to know
every man by name. He demanded
accountability, but made sure that everyone received overtime bonuses, even the
cooks and mess attendants. Teters so
impressed the Marines that one officer
claimed Teters was a tough, hard man who
would be good to have along in a fight.
Those who survived the battle and
endured the ordeal in prison camp until
wars end owed their lives to Devereux
and Teters, who brought the same
indomitable spirit to their captivity that
they had shown on Wake Island. Devereux
insisted on maintaining discipline just as if
the men were in any Marine camp, and
Teters followed in similar fashion with his
construction workers. Through the
lengthy confinement Devereux and Teters
acted as the anchors that steadied the
men, as the moral fibers that cemented
their bonds and pulled them through.
John Wukovits

asked by radio what they needed. The answer

made old Marines chests grow under their campaign bars: Send us more Japs.
The phrase was precisely the tonic needed by
a country weary of defeat. Patriotic pride and
enthusiasm bubbled over these words, supposedly uttered by Devereux when asked by Pearl
Harbor what they could do for him.
In fact, those words had never been spoken.
They were simply added as padding at both
ends of a coded radio transmission to confuse
Japanese cryptanalysts. Someone at Pearl Harbor extracted the phrase and turned it into the
national rallying cry it became. American citizens learned after the war that Devereux had
never used the words, but by that time the
impact had long had its effect.
While citizens in the United States cheered the
phrase, Marines on Wake jeered when they
learned of the incident. We heard about the
quote, Send us more Japs, while we were on
Wake, explains Private Ewing E. Laporte. We
didnt like it at all. The last thing any Marine
wanted was more of the enemy.
What they needed was more aircraft. On
December 22, the final two fighters were
destroyed in combat. With their air umbrella
gone, the Marines became the sole line of
defense. Without ships, without planes, without
relief, the Marines stood in the middle of the
Pacific Ocean, surrounded by an enemy that
burned with a desire to seek vengeance for
December 11.
From behind the sandbags of his hastily fashioned gun emplacement, Marine Corporal
Ralph Holewinski wondered how he and his
buddies would turn back a well-equipped
Japanese task force. In the movies he watched
back home, the good guys always won. But at
that moment he asked himself, Wheres the
cavalry now?
Hopes that the Navy would speed to their rescue alternately soared then plummeted during
these 12 days. Each time the cycle unfolded
without help arriving, the sense of isolation
gripped Wake more tightly.
Wakes Marines expected the Navy to come
to their aid. After all, that is what fellow servicemen do. Commander Cunningham wrote,
We felt good, almost cocky. Surely, help would
come from Pearl Harbor any day now, and
meanwhile we could wait it out.
In fact, at Pearl Harbor, Kimmel had already
prepared a daring plan to relieve Wake, centering on the aircraft carrier Saratoga. In the aftermath of December 7, however, Kimmel was
quickly replaced by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.
101

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:12 PM Page 102

Until Nimitz arrived from Washington, Vice

Adm. William S. Pye, a man as cautious as
Kimmel was daring, held the reins. Pye
dreaded losing any more of the battered Pacific
Fleet before Nimitz assumed command and
thus acted with reticence toward anything that
might endanger the ships. However, he reluctantly permitted the relief expedition, carrying
200 Marines, 9,000 rounds of 5-inch shells,
and a squadron of aircraft, to steam out of
Pearl Harbor on December 12.
Back on Wake, Marines impatiently watched
and waited. Why the hell doesnt somebody
come out and help us fight? Captain Elrod
asked Major Devereux. Many civilians, certain
that the Navy would evacuate them before the

National Archives

NOW THE CHIPS

WERE DOWN FOR
THE LAST ROLL OF
THE DICE, AND
THEY KNEW IT, AND
THEY KNEW THE
ODDS WERE ALL
AGAINST US.

102

Japanese arrived in force, made plans to depart.

Their optimism seemed justified on December
20, when Ensigns James J. Murphy and H.P. Ady
landed a seaplane in Wakes lagoon and brought
news that the relief expedition, due to arrive
Christmas Eve, was already heading toward
Wake. Every Marine brimmed with confidence
that they could hold out for four more days.
Meanwhile, Murphy and Ady prepared to fly
out. Since Major Walter Bayler had orders to
proceed to Midway at the earliest possible time,
he joined the ensigns on the outward flight.
Before leaving, Bayler told the other men he
would forward any letters they cared to write to
loved ones.
Men penned letters to wives or parents,
informing them that they were well and not to
worry. To Mrs. Luther Williams, of Stonewall,
Mississippi, wrote one Marine. Solon is OK.
Tough fightbut OK.
Cunningham wrote his wife, You know I am
waiting only for the time of our joining. Circumstances may delay it a little longer, but it
will surely come.
Others declined. We got the word to write a
letter if we wanted to, and our corporal said
hed take them down from our station,
explained Laporte, but I dont think anybody
there wrote a letter. I think a lot of us didnt
know what to say.
On December 22, Pye, concerned that Japanese carriers might be in the area and worried
that he might lose the few remaining ships of
the Pacific Fleet, recalled the relief expedition.
The recall produced angry outbursts among

Marine and Navy personnel aboard the ships at

sea, who urged superiors to ignore the order and
continue on to rescue their fellow fighters.

THE

language grew so inflammatory on

the bridge of the Saratoga that Rear
Adm. Aubrey Fitch stormed off so he would not
hear possibly mutinous talk and be forced to
take action. One Navy officer aboard the carrier
Enterprise dejectedly wrote, Its the war
between two yellow races. Even in Japan, propagandist Tokyo Rose ridiculed the Navy by
sarcastically asking in a broadcast, Where, oh
where, is the United States Navy? The order
stood, however, and the task force reluctantly
turned away from Wake.
Wakes defenders were now completely alone.
They did not learn of the recall until much later,
though, for they were now heavily occupied
with problems of their own. On that same day,
Japan launched the second landing attack.
Admiral Kajioka took few chances this time.
Four heavy cruisers escorted 2,000 men, and
the aircraft carriers Soryu and Hiryu, returning
from their victory at Pearl Harbor, provided air
support. To avoid the damage sustained in the
prior attack, Kajioka ordered his ships to
remain beyond the range of Wakes accurate
shore batteries.
Devereux spread his mixture of Marines,
Navy personnel, and civilians throughout a 4.5mile defense line that ran along Wake Islands
southern shore. Machine-gun crews dug in at
each end of the airfield, while other defenders
manned their positions and waited for the
attack to begin. In case the Japanese broke
through the line, Devereux organized the only
reserve force he could muster, eight Marines and
four machine guns in a truck.
In the early-morning stillness of December 23,
the Americans gazed seaward with a fierce
determination that had outlasted the tortuous
days of bone-rattling bombing. I noticed a
strange thing, wrote Devereux. It was an
unspoken thing, intangible, but it was as real as
the sand or the guns or the graves. My men were
average Marines, and they had bitched and
griped among themselves like any soldiers. Now
their nerves and bodies had been sapped by two
almost sleepless nights. Now the chips were
down for the last roll of the dice, and they knew
it, and they knew the odds were all against us,
but now they were not grumbling. There seemed
to grow a sort of stubborn pride that was more
than just the word morale.
Ewing Laporte sensed a difference as well. As
the surf crashed against Wakes shores and a stiff

Both: USMC

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:12 PM Page 103

ABOVE LEFT: For his heroic actions in defense of Wake, Marine Captain Henry T. Elrod was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. ABOVE RIGHT: Japanese troops pay respect
to a fellow soldier killed in action on Wake. OPPOSITE: A Japanese pilot recounts his experience in aerial combat over Wake.

ocean breeze wafted the smell of salt water

among the anxious defenders, the Marines
waited with a new attitude. There was that
look on their faces. They werent the same guys
anymore. It wasnt a desperation look, but a
look you got when you knew you had to do
something. Of course, there was some fear
involved, but every damn one of em was ready
to do his duty.
While many civilians sought shelter from the
fighting in the brush, some hardy souls lent their
assistance. John P. Sorenson, a large, hard-edged
construction worker over 50 years old, led a
group of 22 civilians to a command post to offer
assistance to the Marines. The officer, touched
by their willingness to fight, knew their chances
of surviving combat were slim and declined their
offer. Sorenson smiled and replied, Major, do
you think youre really big enough to make us
stay behind?
As usual, a pre-invasion bombardment tore
into the thin lines on Wake. Platoon Sgt. Johnalson E. Big Wright, an immense man weighing
320 pounds whose ability to down copious
amounts of beer was legendary, stood in the open
as bombs exploded, tightly clutching in his hands
the lucky silver dollar he had carried for years.
Other men begged him to seek shelter, but Wright
counted on his lucky dollar to pull him through.
Just as he was again telling the men to shut up,
an explosion engulfed him. The dead Marine lay
on the beach, still cradling the silver dollar.
Around 2 AM Japanese soldiers landed in three
places on Wake Island and the adjoining Wilkes

Island. They rushed forward with fixed bayonets, determined to shove the defenders out of
their places and overrun Wake. Devereuxs communications with his outposts quickly broke
down, due either to faulty wire or to being cut
by the enemy. In the dark and without communications, Devereux could obtain no clear picture of the fighting, but he correctly guessed the
location of the main thrust and ordered his small
reserve force to the middle sector.
Marines and civilians fired their weapons
until the Japanese were on top of them, at which
time they resorted to bayonets and bare hands.
Major Paul A. Putnam, knocked to the ground
in the melee, fired his .45 pistol at two Japanese
soldiers at such close range that one slumped
dead across him. A Japanese soldier saw one
Marine blaze away with a machine gun from
his hip as they do in American gangster films.
Two civiliansPaul Gay and Bob Bryan
were killed alongside of me, explained Ralph
Holewinski, still touched by the heroism of men
who were not on Wake to fight. As the Japanese moved closer to our gun emplacement
within 20 feet, close enough that when I hit one
he spun around and the blood spurted out, just
like in the moviesBryan kept lobbing grenades
from a box he tightly clutched. After the battle, 30 Japanese bodies lay sprawled around the
position defended by Holewinski and his civilian comrades.
John Sorenson and his men fought side by side
with the Marines in another foretaste of the citizen soldiers who would shortly be entering the

service to augment the regular military forces.

The killing and maiming occurred from close
quarters as opponents smacked into each other,
clutched throats, bit hands, screamed in pain,
and died with sudden violence. As Japanese soldiers advanced toward Sorensons position, bullets spitting from their rifles and hand grenades
plopping into foxholes, Sorenson ran out of
ammunition. Without hesitation he rose from
his position, ran toward the enemy, and hurled
expletives and rocks until felled by bullets.
Marine aviator Captain Henry T. Elrod had
earlier distinguished himself by sinking a Japanese destroyer on December 11, but his actions
on December 23 earned the career officer a
posthumous Medal of Honor. Reporting as a
combat soldier after all the aircraft had been
destroyed, Elrod stood with his fellow defenders as the Japanese swarmed toward them.
Accurate American fire cut down swaths of
enemy soldiers, but more quickly took their
place. Marines and civilians died amid a hail of
bullets and grenades, some grappling with their
foe in brutal hand-to-hand combat.
Looking like the classic image of Davy Crockett surrounded by Santa Anas troops at the
Alamo, Elrod stood up in the midst of the fighting, shouted Kill the sons of bitches! and
blasted away with his Thompson submachine
gun. When that weapon ran out of bullets,
Elrod picked up a Japanese machine gun and
continued to fight. Finally, with Japanese bodies piling up at his feet, Elrod was killed as he
prepared to toss a hand grenade.
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The Defenders of Wake Island

Received High Praise
The eleventh day of December 1941 (the date of the first Japanese assault on Wake)
should always be a proud day in the history of the Corps, wrote Samuel Eliot Morison in
his History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Never again, in this
Pacific War, did coast defense guns beat off an amphibious landing. God knows America
needed a victory before Christmas 1941.
It was at Wake the Marines showed us how to fight, said Commander William Masek,
the Naval officer in charge of the operation to re-occupy Wake in 1945. They have held
the fort and kept Old Glory flying, stated The New York Times on December 13, 1941.
They may be annihilated, but they have fought gallantly. Enlistments in the Marine
Corps soared, and Wake Up! became a national call to arms. The United States had
struck back, the first in a lengthy series of triumphs that ended with ships bearing
American flags steaming into Tokyo Bay.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt paid homage to the battlers of Wake when he spoke to
the nation in early 1942, shortly after the Marines and construction workers had been
taken to prison camp. Some of these men were killed, and others are now prisoners of
war. When the survivors of that great fight are liberated and restored to their homes,
they will learn that 130 million of their fellow citizens have been inspired to render their
own full share of service and sacrifice.
John Wukovits

In numerous spots, other fighters recorded

unheralded deeds. Gunner Clarence B. McKinstry rallied his small group by shouting, Get
going, move on! You dont want to stay here
and die of old age! As the men rushed forward,
McKinstry tossed hand grenades passed to him
by an accompanying civilian. When he saw a
supposedly dead Japanese soldier rise from the
sand and kill an American, McKinstry bellowed, Be sure the dead ones are dead!
Marine Corporal Alvey A. Reed and a Japanese
attacker charged headlong in the melee, simultaneously plunged their bayonets into each
other, and slumped to the ground, locked in a
deadly stillness as the noise and fury continued
about them.
In spite of the valor, the small group of
defenders could only hold on for so long against
the much larger enemy force. Although cut off
from forward positions since communications
lines had been severed, Devereux knew the
defense was being overwhelmed. When a civilian rushed inside, screeching in terror, Theyre
killing them all! Devereux decided to establish
a last-ditch defensive line near his command
post and manned it with clerks and communications personnel.
With the battle deteriorating, Commander
Cunningham realized that further resistance was
futile. At 5 AM he had sent a message to Pye, stating, Enemy on IslandIssue in Doubt. Now,
two hours later, he turned to Devereux and muttered, Well, I guess wed better give it to them.
104

Cunningham then headed to his room, shaved

and washed his face, put on a clean uniform, and
headed out to meet the enemy.
For one of the few times in Corps history, a
group of Marines was surrendering to an enemy.
The end of the fighting, just as the beginning,
was orchestrated by Major Devereux, who
stepped forward to arrange the surrender details.
The heavy burden showed on the career officers
face, and Sergeant Bernard Ketner consoled him
at the command post, Dont worry, Major. You
fought a good fight and did all you could.
Devereux walked out into the open to pass
the order along to different units. When one
Marine questioned him, Devereux snapped,
Its not my order, damn it!
At Peacock Point, Franklin Gross at first
refused to believe the fight had ended. We were
raised up in the school that Marines never surrender and the Japs would never take us prisoners. I sent one of my men over to the 5-inch
guns, and he climbed up in the observation
tower and he couldnt see any Japs.
We took off down a path there, about 12
men. One of the guys found a can of pineapples, and we were eating it when we heard a
shot. I dont know whether this guy shot into us
or over our heads, but I looked up and here
were these Japs wearing all this camouflage and
these hats. We had a white flag with us. They
took us a little farther up and stuck us in the
brush and made us sit down. They set up a
machine gun in front of us, and knowing what

I had heard and read about the Japs all these

years I knew they were going to kill us.
I stared at the gun barrel and knew as well
as I was going to take another breath that they
were going to kill us. I looked right at that barrel and thought, Well, Im going to see you spit
your fire.
I didnt say a prayeryou were beyond
praying. You had to rely on yourself. If anyone
was going to help you, it had to be you.
Meanwhile, Ewing Laporte endured his own
little hell. He watched Major Devereux and
another officer, holding a mop to which was
attached a white rag, walk over and order
Laportes group to surrender. After the fighting
and dying, the shouting and the bombs, now
the men were to lay down their weapons.
I didnt believe that we were surrendering. I
threw the bolt of my rifle away to make it useless for the Japs, then saw some Japanese on the
road. It was the shock of my life to see them.
They jerked our clothes off, took our rings, tied
us up. They were small, but it dont matter what
size you are as long as you got a rifle.
We hated this. Can you imagine! Our creed
was supposed to be you dont surrender, but we
had the order. It was hard to take.
After completing the exhausting duty, which
was more difficult for Devereux than any he had
carried out in his career, he collapsed to the
ground in despair. Just then a haggard group of
Marine prisoners trudged by, guarded by Japanese soldiers. One Marine, Sergeant Edwin F. Hassig, spotted his commander and barked to his
men, Snap outta this stuff! Goddamn it, youre
Marines! The Marines quickly straightened up
and marched by Devereux in perfect formation.
Heartened by the sight, Devereux regained his
composure and stood at the head of his Marine
contingent. Some of the other men checked
impulses to charge at the Japanese, who by now
were running all about the camp, ransacking
barracks and cheering in delight. When one
Japanese soldier climbed the tower to lower the
American flag, a few Marines took a step forward, but Devereux nipped any foolhardy
actions. Hold it. Keep your heads, all of you!
In angry silence, they glared at the solitary enemy
soldier who tore down the Stars and Stripes.
They had no reason to be ashamed, for the
defenders of Wake exacted a high price for the
island. Forty-nine Marines, three Navy personnel, and 70 civilians died in the melee, while the
Japanese lost two ships and seven aircraft and
suffered at least 381 dead.
The Japanese tied each mans hands high
behind his back, with a wire looped around the

PH-Wake Island_Layout 1 7/8/14 5:13 PM Page 105

the steady American advance through the

Pacific. Supplies ran out, forcing the Japanese
to eat grass for sustenance, and daily bombing
made life miserable on Wake. People in the
United States never forgot Wake Island and the
valorous deeds performed there, but Japanese
civilians and military officials gave little notice
to the soldiers garrisoned on the island.
The Japanese suffered quietly, ignored by their
own government, until wars end, at which time
the United States returned and reclaimed the
land. Partly out of a spirit of vengeance, on
October 7, 1943, the hundred civilian construction workers still on Wake were bound,
blindfolded, led to the beach, and machinegunned to death.

to Midway about 30 days. They had to go back

and regroup, and it took them 16 days to take
Wake, so it slowed their timetable. It was quite
a feat, but any other bunch of experienced
Marines would have done the same.
Gross may be right, but the Wake Island
defenders, military and civilian alike, were
extraordinary individuals. In times of stress they
turned to one another, leaned on each other, and
maintained faith that each would do his duty.
They also clutched tightly to another faith. At
a reunion 40 years after the attack, the author
asked LeRoy Schneider what made him survive
prison camp when others did not. The imposing
Wake Marine, still muscular and dignified after
all these years, answered with a few simple, yet

National Archives

neck. Any lowering of the arms tightened the

wire, so each man battled pain and the sun to
keep his arms elevated. After a few agonizing
hours, the Japanese cut the bindings and ushered the men to the airstrip, where they detained
them without food and water. We got no food
or anything for a while, mentioned Laporte.
Christmas dinner was bread and jam. December 26 we had some food and we were marched
into the barracks.
Admiral Kajiokas chief of staff approached
Devereux to ask where the hidden gun positions
rested. When Devereux replied there were none,
that the only gun positions on Wake were the
visible ones, the Japanese officer refused to
believe that so few guns had inflicted such dam-

In captivity at Shanghai, Marine Major James P. Devereux (center), commander of the American garrison on Wake, poses with other prisoners. The radios were presented as a
propaganda ploy and rigged to receive only Japanese broadcasts.

age. Another Japanese officer asked Cunningham if Wake had actually sent the famous message, Send us more Japs! When Cunningham
replied in the negative, the officer answered,
Anyhow, it was damned good propaganda.
On January 12, 1942, all the Americans,
except for a group of civilians who remained on
Wake as laborers, boarded transports for the
long voyage to Asian prison camps. Before the
transports reached their destination, the Japanese selected five Marines, led them on deck, and
beheaded them as retribution for the fighting on
Wake. Similar angry actions would become all
too commonplace for the Wake defenders.
After seizing Wake the Japanese stationed on
the island were cut off from their homeland by

Four hundred Marines, five Army and 65

Navy personnel, and 1,076 civilians eventually
left troop transports and slowly marched
through the gates of Asian prison camps that
were to be their homes for the next three and a
half years. While they endured misery and hardship after performing bravely in the battle, the
Wake defenders do not think they are heroes.
At Wake and in prison camp they simply did
their jobno more, no less.
People always say were heroes, and to most
Wake Islanders its embarrassing, explained
Gross. You know, any other group of Marines
with the same amount of experience would have
done the same thing. Its no small thing we did,
because we probably delayed the Japanese going

moving, words. He reached into his pocket and

pulled out a well-worn Rosary that looked as if
it had been used thousands of times.
It was this, he said to me as he nodded
toward the string of beads, the same one he had
used in prison camp. Each Sunday a group of
us, including Major Devereux, gathered
together, got down on our knees, and said the
Rosary. As tears welled in the aged warriors
eyes, Schneider added, Thats what got me
through.
A graduate of the University of Notre Dame,
John Wukovits has published numerous articles
and books about the Pacific theater, including a
biography of Admiral Clifton A.F. Sprague.
105