Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 55, No.

3, March 2007 ( 93 )
On vijnanaparif}ame in Trirrzszkakarika
MATSUOKA Hiroko
0. In the first verse of his Vasubandhu states: ii.tmadharmopacii.ro
hi vividho ya!; pravartate I vijnii.napari!Jii.me 'sau pari!Jii.mal; sa ca tridhii. (TrKl
[Ll3.3-4]). This verse is well known as expressing the core of the Yogacara doctrine
accepted by Vasubandhu. Thus, a correct interpretation of the verse is crucial to a
proper understanding of Vasubandhu's doctrine. This paper will examine two inter-
pretations of the verse: one commonly adopted by modern scholars, such as Unebe
and another put forth by the commentator Sthiramati. In fact, Sthiramati anticipates
the interpretation of modern scholars and presents an argument to reject it. This ar-
gument is also presented below.
I. To begin with, let us see what Unebe says.
Unebe[2004:137.6-13]: "According to him (Sthiramati), the verse (pada abc) means that
various verbal expressions such as "atman" or "jiva" for human beings and "dharma" or
"ayatana" for other constituents of this world are used among people (!aka) as well as in
the scientific system (sastra), but they refer to the transformations of consciousness (vijna-
na-pari!Ji'ima) in reality and, therefore, they are mere secondary applications (upacara)."
The important point to note here is that Unebe takes vijnii.napari!Jii.ma as the refer-
ent of a 'verbal expression' (upacara). According to Unebe [2004:137.3-5], the ex-
pression upacii.ral; pravartate vijnii.napari!Jii.me is a construction of the type
fobdal;pravartate arthe 'A certain word occurs in the domain of a certain meaning',
.
so that it means 'A verbal expression refers to vijnii.napari!Jii.ma'.
It is debatable, however, whether the expression in question can be a construction
of the type described above. I think that it is difficult to establish a signifier-signif-
icand relation between upacii.ra as a verbal expression and vijnii.napari!Jii.ma.
2.1. Sthiramati introduces the following arguments made on the assumption that the
term upacii.ra means a metaphorical expression.
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( 94)
On vijiiiinapari1Jiime in (H. MATSUOKA)
"It is not proper to have a metaphorical expression (upacara) when there do not exist at-
man and dharmas as primary referents (mukhya). For, a metaphorical expression must
meet three conditions: the primary referent of the word, the actual referent resembling the
primary one, and a common quality existing between the two." (TrBh[Ll7.7-9])
The point made here is this: Suppose that the word ii.tman refers to the self which
really exists. If the same word is used to refer to a thing which is not atman and
similar to it, this use of the word ii.tman is called upacii.ra or secondary. In this case
it is also said that the word ii.tman has two meanings: primary and secondary
(gaw:ia).
2.2. Sthiramati denies such a distinction:
"There is also no primary referent for a word since the essence of that [i.e., the primary
thing] goes beyond the scope of thought(Jiiana) and language (abhidhana). For, it is only
to grasp and to convey an [unreal] secondary aspect (gw:iarupa) that a cognition and a
verbal expression occur, because they do not touch the essence of the primary thing. Oth-
erwise [a cognition and a verbal expression, which are related only to] an [unreal] second-
ary aspect, would become useless. Indeed, there is no means of determining the essence
of the primary thing other than a cognition and a verbal expression. Thus it is to be
understood that there cannot be any primary referent since there is no cognition or verbal
expression to grasp or to convey it." (TrBh[Ll7.23-27])
Sthiramati argues that a cognition and a verbal expression do not touch the very es-
sence of a primary thing but its unreal secondary aspect, which amounts to saying
that they do not occur with reference to the ultimate reality but to the conventional
reality. It is clear that he intends to imply here that the use of any word is second-
ary (upacii.ra), so that no essential distinction can be made between the use of a cer-
tain word with reference to a certain thing and that of the same word with reference
to another similar thing.
Thus we may say that to take the term upacii.ra as meaning a metaphorical ex-
pression as opposed to a primary expression carries us too far away from the origi-
nal intention of Vasubandhu.
3.1. We have to consider what Sthiramati states in his comments on the verse, to
see how he understands Vasubandhu's statement pravartate vi-
jnii.naparil}ii.me.
"In that [vijiianapari1Jama] (tatra) there arise from storehouse consciousness (alayavij-
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On vijiiiinapari!Jiime in TrimS!kiikiirikii (H. MATSUOKA) ( 95)
iiiina) the conceptual cognition ( vikalpa) in which [a thing such as] iitman (the self) ap-
pears (nirbhiisa) and the one in which [dharmas (constituent factors of experience) such
as] a material factor (rupa) appear, on the basis of the full development (paripo,rn) of the
impression (viisanii) left by the conceptualization of iitman and the like and on the basis
of the full development of the impression left by the conceptualization of a material factor
and the like.
Although iitman and dharmas do not exist externally, there occur the conceptual con-
struction (upaciira) of [such a thing as] iitman and that of [such dharmas as] a material
factor, which arc beginningless, by means of thinking of the appearance of [a thing such
as] iitman and the appearance of [dharmas such as] a material factor as if they were enti-
ties outside the conceptual cognition, and clinging to them." (TrBh[Ll6.2-6])
Here it is pointed out that in the vijniinapari!Jiima there arise from iilayavijniina the
conceptual cognitions in which iitman and dharmas appear and that when such con-
ceptual cognitions are produced, the conceptual construction, which I think is
meant by the term upaciira here, of iitman and dharmas occur. Thus Sthiramati
shows that the expression upaciirah pravartate vijniinaparif}iime does not admit of
Unebe's interpretation.
3.2. Then we have to determine exactly what is meant by the locative ending in the
word vijniinapari!Jiime. Sthiramati says:
"Moreover, [it must be said that] when x does not exist in y then x is conceptually con-
structed in y (yac ca yatra nii.sti tat tatropacaryate); for instance, [when the cause for the
use of the word] go [does not exist in a Bahika then] it is conceptually constructed in the
Bahika.
Similarly, because ii.Iman and dharmas exist neither in the [transformation of] conscious-
ness itself nor outside of it, ii.tman and dharmas are just conceptual constructs (parikalpita)
and do not exist from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth (paramii.rthatas). Therefore, the
one-sided view should not be accepted that as a cognition ( vijiiiina) exists as a real entity
(dravyatas ), so also does something to be cognized ( vijiieya).
Since no conceptual construction can take place without a locus (iidhii.ra), it should nec-
essarily be accepted that the vijiiiinapari1Jiima, in which occurs the conceptual construction
of iitman and dharmas, exists as a real entity ( vastutas ). Therefore, it is not reasonable to
accept that as something to be cognized is simply conventionally real and not ultimately
real (samvrtitas), so is also a cognition. For, the undesirable consequence would follow
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( 96)
On vijniinapariJJiime in Trimslkiikiirikii (H. MATSUOKA)
that the cognition does not exist even at the conventional level. Indeed it is not proper to
say that a conventional reality has no basis (nirupiidiina)." (TrBh[Ll6.6-l I])
The point to note here is that the vijniinaparitJiima is described as the locus in
which the conceptual construction of iitman and dharmas occurs. According to
Sthiramati, iitman and dharmas are simply conceptual constructs (parikalpita; TrBh
[Ll5.20-2ll: iitmii dharmiis ca upacaryanta ity iitmadharmopaciirah), whereas the vijn-
iinaparitJiima exists as a real entity. It is patent that he takes the locative ending in
vijniinaparitJiime as signifying a locus. If the vijniinaparitJiima serves as locus in
such a conceptual construction, it is properly to be said to be the cause of the con-
ceptual construction.
Thus we may say that there obtains a causal relation between vijniinaparitJiima
and upaciira as a conceptual construction.
4. The following points have become clear:
(I) The term upaciira in iitmadharmopaciira is to be understood as signifying con-
ceptual construction or a conceptual construct, leading to conventional discourse,
rather than a metaphorical expression.
(2) The locative ending of the word vijniinaparitJiime signifies the locus (iidhiira) in
which occur the conceptual construction (upaciira) of iitman and that of dharmas.
This shows that the vijniinaparitJiima is the cause for the occurrence of the concep-
tual constructions.
Unebe cannot be justified in saying that various verbal expressions (upaciira) refer
to the transformation of consciousness. According to the Yogacara doctrine, the vij-
niinaparitJiima exists as a real entity and hence cannot be referred to by any verbal
expression. Rather, what can be the referent of a verbal expression is simply iitman
or dharmas, which are just conceptual constructs.
Thus the verse (piidas a-c) is to be translated as follows:
"Indeed, the different kinds of conceptual construction (upaciira) of iitman and dharmas,
which occur in everyday life (loka) and in theoretical discourse (siistra), occur in the trans-
formation of consciousness."
(References) TrBh[L]: Trimsikiibhii(fya (Sthiramati). See TrK[L]. TrK[L]: T r i m ~ i k i i k i i r i k i i
(Vasubandhu). Sylvain Levi ed., Vijnaptimiitratiisiddhi: deux Traites de Vasubandhu: Vim-
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On vijnanapari1Jame in Tril'flsikakarika (H. MATSUOKA)
( 97 )
fotika (la Vingtaine) accompagnee d'une Explication en Prose et Trimsika (la Trentaine)
avec le commentaire de Sthiramati, Paris: Librarie Ancienne Honore Champion Press,
1925. Unebe, Toshiya [2004): "The "Grammarian's Objection" in Sthiramati's Trif!lsikii.-
bhii.$ya and Bhartrhari's Argument on the Secondary Application of Words," in Three
Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof Musashi Tachikawa's Felicitation Volume, Delhi: Mo-
tilal Banarsidass.
(Key Words) TrilJ1sikii.kii.rikii., upacii.ra, vijnii.napari1Jii.ma
(Graduate Student, Hiroshima University)
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