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DOI: 10.1177/0973174113494541
2013 8: 139 JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
Saira Yamin
Global Governance: Rethinking the US Role in Afghanistan Post 2014
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Global Governance:
Rethinking the US Role
in Afghanistan Post 2014
Saira Yamin
Abstract
The research evaluates the progress towards security and stabilization in
Afghanistan as the country transitions towards a complete USNATO draw-
down in December 2014. It argues that the countrys propensity for civil war is
high given the weak state institutions, deep-seated ethnic fissures and bleak pros-
pects for political reconciliation in the near future. Building on this premise, the
article prescribes a rethink of US strategy as it hands over the responsibilities for
security and stabilization to the beleaguered Afghan state. Beyond Afghanistans
domestic security challenges, the article highlights regional sources of insecu-
rity and their significance for a durable stabilization process by drawing on the
Regional Security Complex theory from the field of International Relations. The
diffusion of insecurity to and from Afghanistan to Pakistan, in particular, and
the broader sub-regional dimensions are critical for a comprehensive analysis
of Afghanistans security landscape post 2014. In the final analysis, the article
explores opportunities for a US-led international process for executing change
in the security landscape. Recommendations include restoring Afghanistans
historical positioning as an international trade bridge by strengthening existing
regional frameworks and institutionsa prelude to stability.
Keywords
Global governance, regional economic integration, regional security, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India, USA
Introduction
This article evaluates the progress towards security and stabilization in Afghanistan
as it transitions towards a complete USNATO drawdown in December 2014. The
proposed termination of the longest US war will likely be a watershed moment in
its history, but Afghanistans own course leans heavily towards a resurgence of
Article
Journal of South Asian Development
8(2) 139163
2013 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/0973174113494541
http://sad.sagepub.com
Saira Yamin, Asia Pacifc Centre for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.
E-mail: sairayamin@gmail.com
at University College Cork on June 14, 2014 sad.sagepub.com Downloaded from
Journal of South Asian Development, 8, 2 (2013): 139163
140 Saira Yamin
civil war. In an assessment of the Afghan states capacity to effectively perform
the most fundamental functions of a state post 2014, good governance and the
provision of security emerge as primary concerns. State stabilization is contingent
first and foremost on the containment of violence and conflict prevention.
However, even in areas where the US and International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF) have made gains in security, the lack of effective governance presents
itself as fertile grounds for the return of the Taliban (Washington Post, 2013). In
an effort towards building Afghanistans capacity to provide security, NATO has
remained focused on training Afghan National Security Forces (Chu, 2012). But
without a realistic plan for good governance, this strategy does not provide a com-
prehensive vision for stabilization. Additionally, challenges such as the rise in
insider attacks and disproportionate representation of ethnic groups in the security
forces remain critical impediments to effectively building the capacity of Afghan
security forces. It would be fair to state that the cumulative effect of corruption,
weak state institutions, deep-seated politics of ethnicity, insurgency and an over-
arching focus on counter-insurgency by ISAF and the US have significantly
undermined the stabilization process.
Afghanistans security challenges are daunting and its future remains uncer-
tain. Arguably, political reconciliation at the domestic level is a prerequisite for
fostering security in the country. International experience in Afghanistan suggests
that this objective is amongst the most challenging ones. Given the elusive nature
of political reconciliation, the international community should consider exploring
alternatives that would create the political and economic space and incentives for
cooperation, hence indirectly facilitating the desired outcome. Thus, in pursuance
of a durable transformation of the Afghan security context, the international com-
munity led by the US must promote a regional economic integration process as a
key point of intervention.
This research draws on Buzan and Wvers (2003) Regional Security Complex
Theory (RSCT) to argue that Afghanistans turbulent domestic environment is
partly influenced by the regional security context, a subsystem of the global secu-
rity architecture, generating tensions in relationships between key political actors,
both state and non-state. The frame conceptualizes security as having a structure
generated in geographically clustered regions, wherein the security of each actor
interacts with the security of other actors. The analysis through this lens suggests
that the behaviour of conflict actors is partly driven by the pressures exerted within
the regional system which in turn is responsive to a larger system, the global envi-
ronment, a process dynamic generated in a multi-tiered conflict context.
Demonstrating the relationship between external pressures on Afghanistans
internal security dynamics with reference to the RSCT, the discussion is intended
to guide global policy, primarily led by the US, towards a stabilization process
that is both endogenous and exogenous. Such an approach would seek a transfor-
mation in regional and domestic interests and relationships that are fundamentally
in conflict or perceived as mutually incompatible such that they would have a
positive impact on Afghanistan. In exploring the means to generate cooperative
Rethinking the US Role in Afghanistan Post 2014 141
shifts in tenuous relationships across the regional security architecture, the article
makes recommendations for an internationally facilitated process that would help
guide, build and support Afghanistan as a land bridge boosting regional economic
trade and energy cooperation. Rethinking the US role, as a facilitator of the
regional approach, the article suggests strengthening existing regional frame-
works and institutions to support and accelerate planning and implementation of
existing trade and transit corridors and energy cooperation initiatives across
South, Central and South-West Asia, thereby widening the geographic space for
regional stability, growth and development. In making this recommendation, the
article subscribes to the liberal peace theory (Angell, 1911; Copeland, 1996;
Lieberman, 1996; Mansfield, 1994) maintaining that mutual economic interde-
pendence has the potential to serve as a precursor to peace.
I argue that a process for sustainable security can flow from regional economic
interdependence through practicable mechanisms and palpable incentives for
regional stakeholders. A globally led process facilitated by the US, promoting
cooperation among key players and across institutional networks, would posi-
tively influence attitudes and political willingness for regional economic interde-
pendence, thus transforming the regional security architecture. Fostering
interdependence among states would alter their security-driven motivations and
behaviour presently fuelling the deep-seated political and ethnic rivalries in
Afghanistan. Arguably therefore, economic reframing of the security interests of
regional state actors could potentially generate a stabilizing effect on Afghanistans
internal security dynamics and the regional security architecture.
Afghanistan: Heart of Asia or Graveyard of Empires?
The great British historian Arnold Toynbee describes Afghanistan as a round-
about of the ancient world with routes converging traffic from all quarters of the
compass and from which routes radiate out to all quarters of the compass again
(Toynbee, 1961, p. 2). With Afghanistan seated at the crossroads between Central
Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East, Toynbees lens pertains both to
the history of foreign conquest and global trade that have shaped its course through
centuries. Even today, the region is coveted as having immense potential for facili-
tating increased regional trade by linking South Asia, South-West Asia, Central
Asia and East Asia. Among hundreds of passages cutting through the Hindu Kush
mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the fabled Khyber Pass in the
Pakistani town of Torkhama winding 33-mile corridorhas historically been an
important trade route and gateway of invasions from the northwest. This mountain
passage, wrote M. Beardon (2001), perhaps more than any other, has witnessed
the traverse of the worlds great armies on campaigns of conquest to and from
South and Central Asiaall eventually running into trouble in their encounters
with the unruly Afghan tribals.
142 Saira Yamin
Great conquerors including Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and many a
Mogul emperors have unsuccessfully aspired to establish their control over the
area. In the nineteenth century the region became the fulcrum of the Great Game
between Britain and the Soviet Union competing for influence in Central Asia
and India. The Durand Line marking the 1,500-mile disputed boundary between
Afghanistan and Pakistan is a legacy of the Great Game. It demarcated the fron-
tier between British India and Afghanistan under the Durand Agreement of 1893
between Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary of the British Indian
Government, and Mir Abdur Rahman Khan, the ruler of Afghanistan. The
Durand Line, contested by successive Afghan governments since the inception
of Pakistan in 1947, defined the outer edge of former British India, giving it
control over the areas that now form the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and
Balochistan provinces of Pakistan.
When the erstwhile Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the country
turned into a proxy battleground for the main adversaries in the Cold War. The
supply of US arms and support, including the Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and
combat training, provided to the Afghan Mujahideen proved lethal, helping end
the decade-long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and hastening the collapse of
the Soviet empire (Courcy, 2002). Although Afghanistan has earned the meta-
phorical reputation of the Graveyard of Empires, the country and the region
have paid a heavy price for an unenviable history of engagement with foreign
invaders. If we trace Afghanistans recent history, when the Soviets withdrew
their last troops in February 1989, the country was in ruins socially, politically
and economically. More than a million Afghans were estimated to have been
killed in the fight against the Red Army (BBC, 2008). The BBC reports that
more than half the Afghan population was displaced, with a majority fleeing for
safety across the border to Pakistan and Iran (BBC, 2004). A period of civil war
ensued, followed by the tyrannous rule of the Taliban regime, ultimately dis-
mantled by a global coalition of forces commanded by NATO under US leader-
ship. This was a response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 on US soilcircumstances
still vivid in memory.
Tracing Afghanistans Security Trajectory: Post 9/11,
Post Cold War and Cold War Periods
Post 9/11, US military engagement in Afghanistan has become the longest war in
US history. But with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) now well in its twelfth
year, terrorist organizations that provided al-Qaeda safe haven in Afghanistan
continue to thrive, presenting a clear and present threat to security. Amongst them,
the potent Haqqani network, which most active in eastern parts of the country, is
believed to have increased its presence in areas surrounding Kabul, southern
Afghanistan and in the countrys north with the help of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), an al-Qaeda-affiliated organization (Dressler, 2012). Over the
years, the most influential of insurgent groups in Afghanistan, the Quetta Shura
Taliban (QST) led by Mullah Omar, the self-styled Amir ul Mumineen (supreme
leader of the faithful) ousted from political power post 9/11, has also made sub-
stantial gains in southern, western and northern parts of Afghanistan (Dressler &
Forsberg, 2009).
Post 9/11, both QST and the Haqqani network have shifted their base to Pakistan,
allegedly in the western city of Quetta, the capital of the troubled Balochistan prov-
ince, and North Waziristan located in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), respectively. Contiguous borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan have
provided non-state actors safe passage for decades. During the SovietAfghan war,
these border areas and ungoverned spaces were used by the Afghan and non-Afghan
Mujahideen as safe haven and training bases. Now, more or less the same groups,
morphed into the Taliban, continue to rely on the porous borders and adjacent safe
havens in their new jihad against Western forces. Whether the Pakistan gov-
ernment lacks the capacity or the willingness to deal with these terrorist outfits
operating with impunity in these largely ungoverned spaces adds another
complexity to the conundrum.
Pakistan governments alleged support to various terrorist groups has been a
core point of contention in its anti-terror alliance with the US. Given the Pakistani
spy agency Inter-Services Intelligences (ISI) historical reliance on these groups
as proxies during the SovietAfghan war, it seems possible that they would con-
tinue to engage them as a firewall against the threat of encirclement by a hostile
India. The protracted history of mistrust and animosity between India and Pakistan
adds yet another dimension to Afghanistans security equation. While Great Power
interest has played a predominant role in shaping Afghanistans security land-
scape, post 2014 it is likely to be dominated by regional security interests, particu-
larly as the South Asian nuclear archrivals remain locked in horns and intensify
their tug of war for greater influence in the country.
Contiguous borders have been a destabilizing factor both for Pakistan and
Afghanistan for more than three decades now. During the SovietAfghan war
the Mujahideen used the border areas between the two countries to set up their
base camps and conduct their operations. Sial (2009, p. 1) identifies a number
of these camps including the Maktab-ul-Khidmat (Services Bureau) in the north-
western city of Peshawar and Osama bin Ladens Maktab ul Ansar in the Kurram
Agency (FATA) in Pakistan. Further, he notes that a number of Mujahideen cen-
tres, such as, Ittehad-i-Islami Afghanistan, Hizb-e-Islami, Hizb-i-Islami (Khalis)
and Jamiat-e-Islami, were established only 10 miles across from the Pakistani
border (Ibid.). Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) used Waziristan (FATA) in Pakistan as
their base and crossed over to Afghanistan using the Ghulam Shah checkpost to
train at a camp set up by Jalalludin Haqqani at Chochi (Ibid.).
Madrassahs or religious seminaries played a key role in the recruitment and
training of these Mujahideen during the Soviet Afghan war and thereafter.
Students from these madrassahs from Pakistans FATA region in the KP province
144 Saira Yamin
(then known as the North-West Frontier Province) were also actively recruited.
The effort was heavily funded by Osama bin Laden while Jalaluddin Haqqani, the
ethnic Pashtun leader of the potent Haqqani network at the forefront in Afghan
jihad, and Fazlur Rehman Khalils Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (a Pakistani militant
organization operating primarily in Kashmir) trained the recruits from the Pakistan
side of the border (Sial, 2009, p. 1). Such is the intimate connection between mili-
tancy and instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan where a shared history of war-
fare against foreign intervention in the recent past and post 9/11, geographically
contiguous borders and tribal affiliations in the border region have served to dif-
fuse insecurity in the regional architecture.
During the SovietAfghan war to date, an economically fragile Pakistan has
also faced the burden of sheltering millions of refugees reported to be the largest
refugee community in the world. At its peak 5 million Afghans are believed to
have found refuge in Pakistan (UNHCR, 2012). The long, porous borders also
became a conduit for the illicit trafficking of narcotics and arms extensively across
Pakistan. Of note, a Kalashnikov culture evolved in Pakistan as a legacy of the
decade-long war next door, providing the tools for a visible increase in militancy
and violence at several societal levels. The causal relationship between contigu-
ous borders and instability in both countries has been significant.
Post 9/11, Pakistans security landscape has been further complicated by the
spillover of terrorist outfits from Afghanistan in Pakistans FATA in particular and
an associated rise in the incidence of terrorism (South Asia Terrorism Portal,
2012). The Afghan and Pakistan governments counter-terrorism campaigns in
alliance with Western forces provide ample justification for jihadist groups, breed-
ing in the region for decades, to actively recruit in furthering their al-Qaeda
inspired terrorist campaign. The incidence of terrorism has spread extensively
across Pakistan, manifest in the emergence and growth of the Pakistani Taliban
known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a number of affiliate militant
Islamist groups active in the South Asian sub-region. Prominent among them are
the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Harkat-ul Mujahideen
(HuM) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) all believed to have entered the fold of the
Al-Qaeda network. While these groups have been responsible for orchestrating a
wave of terrorist attacks in Pakistan in recent years, some of them are also actively
engaged in Afghanistan and the disputed Kashmir region. Of note, the LeT is
believed to have masterminded the deadly terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November
2008 killing 166 people in a three-day rampage.
The US Strategic Calculus Post Osama Bin Laden
In a relatively recent milestone associated with the GWOT, al-Qaeda supremo
Osama bin Laden was captured and killed in a US Navy Seal operation on 2 May
2011 in Abbottabad, a Pakistani garrison city-cum-hill resort not too far from the
capital, Islamabad. Ironically, despite the continuing threat of al-Qaeda inspired
terrorism in the Af-Pak region and other world regions including Southeast Asia, the
Middle East and Africa, for many at the helm-of-affairs in the US, Bin Ladens
elimination translates as mission accomplished. US war fatigue, domestic public
opinion, an ailing economy and growing fissures in the NATO coalition clearly also
figure in the strategic calculus. Nonetheless, many strategists and policy makers are
aware that a hasty military disengagement could potentially create the conditions
for a return to the rule of the Taliban or a state of civil war in Afghanistan as experi-
enced after US disengagement at the end of the SovietAfghan war. While the
Enduring Strategic Partnership between the USA and Afghanistan, signed on the
first anniversary of Bin Ladens assassination (2 May 2012), provides the US secu-
rity forces continued access for combating the al-Qaeda network and continuing to
train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (White House, 2012, p. 4), the
US and NATO envisage decreasing the military footprint significantly, from the
current strength of about 90,000 to about 20,000 post 2014 (Nagl, 2011). Given that
total direct US military and aid expenditure in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2013
is estimated at US$641.7 billion of which over 30 per cent (a little short of US$200
billion) will be spent between 2012 and 2013 (Cordesman 2012), the military cam-
paign is becoming increasingly unsustainable for the US economy in a significantly
longer term and the planned exit appears to be an inevitable choice.
But an Afghanistan minus USNATO forces in the near future begs the ques-
tion Is the state prepared to take charge of governance and security? Considering
that the Afghan state has hinged to a great extent on international support for well
over a decade, there is great risk in an international military drawdown without
ensuring that the country has the means and resources to address the challenges
ahead. This raises another question: Is the international community on the right
course in assisting Afghanistan towards the transition? In the following section, I
discuss the implications of the planned USNATO exit from Afghanistan and key
challenges to governance and security in the country. The challenges delineated
herein stem from domestic, regional and global influences and serve as a guide for
a theoretical analysis of the problem and potential solutions.
State-building in Afghanistan: Taking Stock of the US-led
International Engagement
This section identifies key challenges Afghanistan is likely to experience when
the USNATO complete their drawdown in December 2014. Specifically, they
relate to domestic instability and the pressures exerted by global engagement in
the country. The domestic security landscape can be further sub-divided into
three different components; examining the interplay among them is also impor-
tant. These include a history of war and violence, weak governance and deep-
seated ethnic divisions. The first pertains to the history of war and violence
spanning more than three decades and severely damaging its economic, political
and social infrastructure. In an accounting of the costs of the war and violence in
146 Saira Yamin
the country, one must also bear in mind environmental degradation, social psy-
chological trauma including the crisis of displacement affecting a significant
proportion of Afghanistans population and the associated loss of social capital,
expansion of poppy cultivation and its implications for Afghan society, and the
flow of arms perpetuating a culture of militancy, among other concerns. The
Humanitarian Profile of Afghanistan in Figure 1 illustrates that 13.5 million peo-
ple, a significant proportion of its population, have been adversely affected by
conflict, natural disasters and food insecurity over the years. The number of
affectees reported by UNOCHA represents almost 45 per cent of Afghanistans
present population estimated to be about 31,108,077 (CIA, 2013a).
The second component defining the domestic security landscape in Afghanistan
is weak, absent or ineffective governance during the long duration of war and
violence in the countrys recent history. Some analysts have argued that the writ
of the Karzai government, in place since June 2002, does not extend beyond
Kabul (Chhibber, 2009, p. 3). To be sure, the Karzai government continues to
struggle with the most fundamental functions of government including the provi-
sion of basic services: justice and security, law and order, education, health care,
humanitarian relief, regulation of markets, creation of social safety nets and build-
ing human capital. Most of these aforementioned functions are indicators of a
states capacity to deliver minimally, but they appear to be too heavy a burden still
for the transitioning Afghan state. On the issue of insecurity, according to a survey
of Afghan people conducted by the Asia Foundation (2011, p. 8), the number of
people who have expressed a concern with its rise has increased steadily since
2006. The survey also suggests a rise in the proportion of people reporting direct
violence or crime in all regions (except Central Afghanistan and Kabul since 2008
(Ibid.). Figure 2 charting the trends in security in Afghanistan between 2009 and
2011 validates the perceptions of the Afghan populace reflected in the survey.
The findings on the incidence of security are also confirmed in research produced
by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS, 2010) suggesting
that the security in Afghanistan has deteriorated steadily post 9/11 (refer to Figure 3).
Socio-economic development is another area where the government of
Afghanistan falters. The CIA World Factbook (2013b) reports that Criminality,
insecurity, weak governance, and the Afghan Governments difficulty in extending
rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic growth.
The analysis suggests that the governments main challenges include revenue
collection, corruption, building government capacity, poor public infrastructure and
providing employment opportunities (Ibid.) Because of the governments poor
capacity to create employment opportunities, the drug economy has emerged as a
substantial source of employment whereby 1.6 million Afghans (6.4 per cent of the
total population) were involved in opium poppy cultivation during the period 2008
2009 alone (Ahrari, Felbab-Brown, Shelley & Hussain, 2009, p. 4). Opium
production has multiplied manifold since 2001; consider that 7,700 tons of opium
were produced in 2008, a figure that is 40 times higher than production levels in
2001 (Gromov & Rogozin, 2010). Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that
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150 Saira Yamin
90 per cent of the worlds opium supply originates from Afghanistan while less than
2 per cent is impounded by Afghan and NATO forces on its way out of the country
(UNODC, 2009). Comparing the local and international security forces performance
in this domain to those of local authorities in Colombia (one of the main producers
of cocaine) as a measure of the security sectors effectiveness, this research notes
that Colombian security personnel are able to seize 20 per cent of cocaine traffic
(Ibid.), a considerably better performance. Afghanistan is also the second largest
producer of cannabis resin in the world (Ahrari et al., 2009, p. 24). Revenue
generated from the drug trade is a significant source of income for the terrorist
network in Afghanistan although estimates about the amount of drug money the
Taliban earn vary between US$70 million to US$500 million a year (Ibid., p. 13).
Despite billions of dollars in international development aid flowing in to the
country post 9/11, the state has not developed its infrastructural and institutional
capacity to cater to its requirements and is included amongst the poorest and least
developed countries of the world. The CIA World Factbook (2013b) reports that
between 2003 and 2010, the international community committed over US$67
billion for Afghanistans development in several donors conferences. Yet, the coun-
try ranks 172 out of 187 countries in terms of human development, a bleak global
positioning (UNDP, 2011). Public expenditure on health and education remains low
at less than 2 per cent in both areas, an indicator of the states poor prioritization of
investment in its human capital (Ibid.). Corruption is endemic and appears to be
getting worse; Transparency Internationals (2011) Corruption Perception Index
positions Afghanistans public sector as the third most corrupt in the world.
In addition to the lack of political willingness and commitment to steer resources
towards people-centred governance, the provision of social services in Afghanistan
remains heavily contingent on the states economic capacity. According to the World
Bank, in 2011 alone Afghanistan received US$15.7 billion in international assistance
accounting for more than 90 per cent of its public expenditure (Quinn, 2011).
Regrettably for Afghanistan, it is going to find itself in dire straits when its economic
growth rate begins to decline substantially as aid levels decrease over the next five
years. It is expected that the economic growth rate of the country will drop from
about 9 per cent to around half in 2014 (Pajhwok Afghan News, 2012). According to
the World Banks Vice President for South Asia, Isabel Guerrero, economic growth
could, in the long-term drop down to around 3 per cent (Ibid.). The official suggests
that the state may not be able to maintain the ANSF unless it cuts spending on other
economically beneficial activities. Rightsizing the military in favour of development
work is therefore critical for Afghanistans economic viability.
Training Afghan security forces remains central to NATOs mission and has been
described as the only strategy that makes sense by Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen (Chu, 2012). But without a clear plan to maintain a 350,000 strong force
(an ambitious, one-security-force-member-per-100-people ratio), the strategys suc-
cess remains elusive (Ibid.). Another challenge to the ANSF is posed by a rise in
insider attacks with local security personnel turning their weapons against NATO
forces (Ibid.). This points towards unrest and disunity in the security forces and is
also indicative of the potential failure of NATOs transition strategy for Afghanistans
security. Further, given the ethnic factionalization and perception of marginalization
in the Afghan National Army (ANA), one analyst notes that there is a risk of deser-
tions and fragmentation of the institution (Khattak, 2012). Therefore, it is not unrea-
sonable to expect that a drastic reduction in international military and economic
support in the near future could potentially result in state collapse.
The aforementioned problem of deep societal fragmentation along ethnic lines
presents the third important domestic component underpinning the security land-
scape in Afghanistan. Having borne the brunt of protracted conflict ranging from
civil warfare, terrorism, insurgency and heavy-handed foreign military interven-
tion over three decades, the country continues to demonstrate extreme levels of
social disequilibrium. It remains deeply divided ethnically and politically. The
political divisions in Afghanistan are generally along ethnic lines and can be traced
through its history. Its ethnic patchwork includes 42 per cent Pashtuns, 27 per cent
Tajiks, 9 per cent Hazaras, 9 per cent Uzbek, 4 per cent Aimak, 3 per cent Turkmen
and 2 per cent Baloch (Civil Military Fusion Center, 2011, p. 1). Other ethnic
groups form about 4 per cent of the population (Ibid.). Figure 4 shows the geo-
graphic distribution of various Afghan ethnic groups across the country (Ibid., p. 2).
Figure 4. Afghanistans Ethnic Map
Source: Map complied by Brian Wolly for PBS Online Newshour, based on data from U.S. State
Department and CIA World Factbook, 2010.
152 Saira Yamin
The Shifting Balance of Ethnic Political Power
Post 9/11, US-led international engagement in Afghanistan has sought to empower
the Northern Alliance, the political group led by the Tajiks but also representing
other minority groups. As an example, the ethnic balance in the ANSF has gener-
ally been disproportionately in favour of the Tajiks, a factor alienating the
Pashtunsthe largest ethnic group. The Brookings (2012) reports that in 2008 up
to 70 per cent Afghan battalion commanders were Tajiks although their represen-
tation had been reduced to about 40 per cent by summer 2012. Another research
study by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and the Royal United
Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) suggests that an over-
representation of Tajiks and under-representation of Pashtuns particularly in the
upper rankings of officials promotes a culture of impunity and lack of legitimacy
for the local police services (FPRI & RUSI, 2012).
Ethnic fissures in Afghanistans government and the deficit of trust between
ethnic groups have been a critical factor fueling insurgency in Afghanistan. Ethnic
loyalties have been exploited to form internal and external alliances with state and
non-state actors as indicated elsewhere in this article. These challenges, salient in
the domestic security landscape, make the threat of civil war a very likely scenario
post 2014. Given Afghanistans recent experience with civil war in the wake of
the SovietAfghan war, a repetition of the event is even more likely. The country
remains as deeply divided ethnically and politically today as it was then. It is an
important lesson from Afghanistans recent past that must be emphasized in any
assessment of its immediate future. A return to civil war would provide fertile
grounds for the resurgence of the Taliban and may facilitate their aspirations for
seizing political power, an outcome that does not bode well for Afghanistans
stability nor for its neighbours.
The Interplay between Afghanistan Domestic Security
and Regional Security Dilemmas
In envisaging the domestic security environment post 2014, the conditions
described earlier are likely to deteriorate as Afghanistan itself and its surround-
ing sub-region will experience a change in power dynamics. The expected
redistribution of power at the domestic and regional level shall have implica-
tions for the role played by non-state actors in defining security within
Afghanistan and beyond its borders. Regional pressures on Afghanistans
domestic security are critical, stemming from security dilemmas in the wider
Af-Pak region. While Afghanistans stability and security is closely intertwined
with and interdependent on Pakistans stability, the regional security dynamics
influencing Afghanistans stability extend beyond these two actors and their
borders. Some of these interactions (particularly between India and Pakistan)
were briefly described earlier; they shall be examined in greater depth in the
following section drawing upon the RSCT in particular. The surrounding
regional security architecture and the competing relationships that drive it are
important since powerful state actors possess the means and the motivations, the
perception of threat to be precise, to play an active role in pursuing their own
strategic interests in Afghanistan when USNATO presence wanes in the
region.
Given Indias growing partnership with Afghanistan, Pakistans fears regard-
ing encirclement by its archenemy are also on the rise. A significant redistribution
of their political influence in Afghanistan to Pakistans disadvantage would add
another complexity to the security dilemmas between the two nuclear archrivals
and adversely affect the regional security architecture. That being said, if the
interests of neighbouring state actors could be reframed to provide incentives for
cooperation, the region could transform into an alternative supply source for
Afghanistans ailing economy, potentially serving as a precursor to stability.
Noting that conditions of domestic insecurity are generated by endogenous and
exogenous sources and their interactions, I shall subsequently suggest ways to
transform these dynamics to generate conditions of constructive interdependence
through a process that is managed regionally, is economically sustainable and cre-
ates incentives for regional problem-solving. The viability of such a process dis-
cussed later in this article is guided by an identification and examination of the
aforementioned domestic and regional challenges.
The regional locus of security has not been acknowledged or examined suffi-
ciently in the academic literature on Afghanistan. Much of the scholarly and pol-
icy debate on Afghanistan approaches the problem from an endogenous perspective.
The regional level of analysis tends to be limited to a discussion of Pakistans
alleged alliances with terrorist outfits and ungoverned spaces in the FATA region.
The following analysis draws on RSCT from the field of International Relations
(IR) to deconstruct the problem from a broader lens. Thus, it sheds light on
Afghanistans internal security dynamics and the diffusion of insecurity to and
from Afghanistan to Pakistan, while also exploring and focusing on the broader
sub-regional dimensions critical for a comprehensive assessment of Afghanistans
security landscape post 2014.
The RSCT suggests that security in the post Cold War landscape is primarily
generated within a regional structure (although it does not reject the influence of
the global security architecture, relevant in this context). The framework defines
a regional security complex (RSC) as a geographically clustered set of units, oper-
ating in a larger system, with a structure of its own (Buzan & Wver, 2003, p. 27).
Research for this article builds on the RSCT to argue that the pressures affecting
Afghanistan are located at multiple levels including a combination of societal,
state, regional and global drivers and conditions. The RSCT provides a multi-
tiered systems analysis, helpful in identifying the endogenous and exogenous
drivers of conflicting relationships producing a complex regional security land-
scape, in other words an RSC. The applicability of the RSCT to the Afghan con-
text is discussed next in more detail.
154 Saira Yamin
Predicting the Regional Security Landscape Post 2014
Buzan and Wver (2003) suggest a number of variables to analyze the key com-
ponents of an RSC with an emphasis on the following: (a) historical factors, (b)
patterns of amity and enmity, (c) power distribution, (d) geographical proximity
and associated pressures and (e) fears and aspirations of interacting states stem-
ming from domestic security concerns. These variables must be confined within a
geographic cluster of units to distinguish the region as an RSC. The geographical
cluster is important owing to its bearing upon important security dynamics, such
as, conflict behaviour, threat perceptions, power imbalances, contiguous borders
and associated contagion of insecurity, factors related to the aforementioned vari-
ables. Essentially, it is the geographic space that links various states together so
closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from
one another (Buzan, 1991, p. 190). Buzan and Wver argue that national security
in itself is not a helpful unit of analysis in explaining an RSC because security
dynamics are inherently relational, no nations security is self-contained (Buzan
& Wver, 2003, p. 43).
In attempting to locate an RSC in Afghanistans environs, a geographic cluster of
three statesAfghanistan, Pakistan and India (hereinafter referred to as Af-Pak-
India)is identified for demonstrating a significant degree of interdependence
among the three units such that it may be qualified as a sub-system largely respon-
sible for generating its own security. Arguably, the regional security architecture
in the Af-Pak-India RSC is currently under the influence of the US and NATO by
virtue of their heavy military and diplomatic footprint. That being said, Pakistan
and Indias bipolarity in the region generates considerable tensions in the system
that could escalate post 2014 if the mutual perceptions of threat associated with
Afghanistan continue to rise. While Great Power engagement in the region has
been an influential factor shaping the security landscape of Af-Pak-India post and
even pre-9/11, the IndiaPakistan security dilemma (involving a history of war-
fare, nuclear standoffs, territorial disputes and allegations of terrorism) is likely to
emerge as the most dominant driver of state behaviour when the US and NATO
presence phases out from the region, particularly if it extends to Afghanistan as a
proxy battlefield. This prediction is in line with Buzan and Wvers (2003, p. 53)
proposition that transformation in internal (as well as external) dynamics could
open up the RSC to changes in its security configuration. Thus, the USNATO
exit strategy which foresees a more prominent Indian engagement in Afghanistan
particularly in the security sector opens up possibilities for increased levels of
engagement by proxy in Afghanistan by both India and Pakistan.
While the RSCT accepts the importance of the global level of influence in
RSCs, it emphasizes the importance of the regional level of analysis. That said, it
does not make assertions about which level (regional or global) might be more
dominant (Ibid., p. 51) in a particular context, thereby implying that both regional
and global influences can play an important role in guiding the behaviour of states
in RSCs. The global dimension in the Af-Pak-India context is significant and can
be traced in historical factors, a condition postulated by the RSCT. The historical
global influence highlights the legacies of old patterns of relationships observed
in the Cold War and pre-Cold War system (Ibid., p. 40). Hence, in this scenario,
the alliances formed with the Great Powers during the Cold War demonstrate a
relationship with the current regional patterns of amity and enmity, particularly
those formed by India and Pakistan with key political groups in Afghanistan.
Continuing to uphold these alliances, Pakistan aspires for Pashtun political pre-
dominance in Afghanistan, an ethnic group with whom its KP province shares an
ethnic affinity. Additionally, as a political entity the Pashtuns have traditionally
been friendly towards Pakistan. India, on the other hand, seeks to bolster the status
of the Northern Alliance as a politically preeminent force in the country, having
propped it along with Russia and Iran as a measure to counter the Pashtuns, and
sharing a history of alliance with the Soviet camp during the Cold War.
In continuing to trace the patterns of enmity and hostility through history, but
bringing the analysis to a regional level, it is important to remember that India and
Pakistan were born fighting and have had plenty to fight about since independ-
ence from British colonial rule in 1947. The two countries have engaged in two
high intensity wars and one limited armed confrontation (1947, 1965 and 1999
respectively) over the disputed territory of Kashmir; and they are perennially
engaged in border skirmishes. Kashmir and terrorism are core issues of contention
but there are many additional territorial, strategic and political issues that have
engaged the two countries in bitter rivalry, competition over resources and a con-
ventional and nuclear weapons arms race. A fourth full-scale war between the two
countries in 1971 led to the dismemberment of Pakistans former eastern wing
now known as Bangladesh. The nuclear dimension of their relationship has impli-
cations for the entire South Asian region, but particularly for Afghanistan where
Pakistan seeks a friendly security apparatus, potentially providing soft strategic
depth in the likelihood of an armed conflict with India.
While India and Pakistan have locked horns for well over half a century, his-
torical tensions also exist between Pakistan and Afghanistan, contributing to threat
perceptions and patterns of enmity between the two neighbours. Pakistani fears
stem partly from Afghanistans irredentist claim over the Pashtun tribal region
extending beyond the Durand Line. The region became part of Pakistan in 1947
when the country gained independence from British India and was partitioned.
Although it has been disputed and claimed by several Afghan governments who
have nurtured a vision for a united Pakhtunistan and a greater Afghanistan, the
proposal has not garnered visible support in KP province of Pakistan primarily
inhabited by the Pathans (the Pakistani Pashtuns).
On the other hand, Afghanistans threat perceptions are expressed in allega-
tions regarding the support provided by Pakistans ISI to the Taliban insurgency
in Afghanistan, terrorist safe havens and infiltration across its borders fueling the
insurgency and destabilizing Afghanistan. The largely unfenced contiguous bor-
ders between Afghanistan and Pakistan have provided passage to non-state actors
for decades. These include not only the Taliban of Afghan and Pakistani origin but
156 Saira Yamin
also foreign fighters from many regions. It is well known that al-Qaeda fugitives
in Waziristan located in the FATA region of Pakistan are mostly Arab, Tajik,
Uzbek and Chechen fighters who came through the border from Afghanistan post
9/11(Musharraf, 2006, p. 271). For the militants, the rugged terrain has become
home and has been of great strategic advantage. Besides being treacherous, the
inaccessible mountainous region is covered in snow for a great part of the year
making it a perfect hiding place.
The history of relational distrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan exacer-
bates Pakistans fears about Indias growing influence in Afghanistan and the pos-
sibility of encirclement by a hostile camp. Pakistan fears that India also provides
arms, ammunition and funds to the Baloch insurgency, a significant domestic
destabilizing factor. The deficit of trust between India and Pakistan is reciprocal.
India holds Pakistan responsible for its alleged support to terrorist outfits support-
ing militancy in the disputed Kashmir region as well those responsible for organ-
izing a string of terrorist attacks in Indias urban centres over the years. The
defence posturing of the hostile neighbours has resulted in a highly militarized
security environment at the expense of development. While Indias conventional
military and nuclear capabilities are partly driven by its historically tenuous rela-
tionship with China (in addition to the perception of threat from its western neigh-
bour), Pakistan has maintained very high levels of defence expenditure (Global
Security.Org, n.d.) including an escalating build-up of its nuclear arsenal now
viewed by many observers as one of the worlds largest (Sanger & Schmitt, 2011),
as a prime instrument of deterrence. While Pakistan cannot match Indias conven-
tional military power (the latter being the worlds largest importer of arms and
incurring one of the largest global defence expenditures [Global Security.Org,
n.d.]) the formers nuclear weapons programme gives it some level of strategic
parity with archenemy India.
In recent years, and particularly after 9/11, the tug of war between these two
countries has extended to Afghanistan where India is making significant inroads
through the provision of robust development assistance. With the US government
urging India to play a more active security role in Afghanistan (Wan, 2012),
Pakistans doctrine of strategic depth against India and aspirations for a friendlier
regime in Kabul are being challenged. Note that India and Afghanistan have also
signed a strategic partnership agreement involving security cooperation among
other forms of engagement (Government of Afghanistan, 2011). While Pakistan
governments former alliance with the ousted Taliban government was clearly a
means towards the vision of strategic depth in the event of a nuclear face-off with
India, some analysts suggest that Pakistan continues to provide safe haven to the
Taliban to further this doctrine.
The regional interplay of enmity and amity, the fears and aspirations of several
state actors that form part of the RSC, contiguous borders between these two
regional players, and their competition for greater power through territorial, mili-
tary and political means demonstrate that the security concerns of these states are
so closely intertwined that it may not be possible to realistically analyze their
national security concerns independently of each other. The global level of influ-
ence, both historical and current, continues to bind their processes of securitiza-
tion and desecuritization within this geographic cluster.
Rethinking Global Governance: A Mediating US Role
Post 2014
In seeking mechanisms to prevent or resolve the recurring patterns of conflict
behaviour and interactions discussed in the previous section, a transformation of
the regional structure of security should be considered, one that is reinforced by
global securitization processes. Such transformation may be possible by focusing
on and strengthening regional and global institutions and frameworks for regional
cooperation. Economic integration processes presently underway in the South
Asian RSC are opening up the space for the transformation towards cooperation
at the regional level, albeit very gradually. In recent months India and Pakistan
have experienced a sea change in economic relations, a promising development
for all actors in the region. While economic incentives for regional cooperation in
the Af-Pak-India sub-region exist, protracted security dilemmas continue to
impede the effort. The post-World War II era has seen the emergence of a number
of regional trading blocs in Asia, Africa, Europe and America. Their experiences
suggest that effective regional economic cooperation is a gradual process built on
incremental implementation accompanied with visible results. Such a process in
South Asia can only be possible with global leadership. The importance of global
governance in facilitating regional economic integration cannot therefore be over-
stated in this context.
The Rationale for Regional Economic Integration
While economic interdependence is sometimes viewed as undermining the sover-
eignty of nations, it is important to consider whether regional economies can com-
fortably sustain themselves without interdependence? Arguably, the dividends of
regional economic interdependence are often visible enough to compel states to
place contentious issues on the backburner. Possibilities for resolution of intractable
conflicts may also emerge with the passage of time as priorities change in view of
palpable economic gains and domestic development leading to stability. The poten-
tial of the transformation of the Af-Pak-India RSC is tremendous given the immense
potential for economic cooperation between key players.
Plans for trade and transit corridors connecting South Asia with Central, East
and south-west Asia; free trade agreements; energy cooperation; and cross-border
economic zones for investment activities open up a wealth of investment and
development opportunities. However, the lack of transportation corridors across
158 Saira Yamin
the Af-Pak-India region is the major obstacle impeding trade, commercial and
energy ties. For India, land routes to Central Asia through Pakistan and Afghanistan
would provide the shortest and most economical access points. Improved eco-
nomic cooperation between India and Pakistan would also benefit Afghanistan as it
relies on Pakistani ports as a hub for exports to India and other countries. Such coop-
eration would also promote Gawadar port in Pakistan as a transit hub for land-locked
Central Asia and Western China. India is currently negotiating land routes with
Pakistan for direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, thereby also providing a
corridor for export of Indian diesel to energy-deficient Pakistan (Zyck, 2012). These
are but just a few examples of how trade and transit corridors and energy cooperation
could benefit these actors. In the following, I discuss some regional mechanisms
available to support this transformation in the RSC.
Regional Frameworks for Cooperation: Rebuilding
Afghanistan as the Heart of Asia
In South and Southeast Asia sub-regional cooperation agreements such as BIMSTEC
(comprising Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand) have existed for
a while; however, it was not until the late 1980s that South Asian governments made
an explicit commitment towards promoting an economic agenda. A Committee for
Economic Cooperation (CEC) set up in 1991 to examine a proposal for a South
Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) was accepted by all member states of
the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1993, and SAPTA
came into formal operation in December 1995 with the ratification of the first round
of tariff concessions (Mohanty, 2003, pp. 13). SAPTA evolved into South Asia
Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2006. In a recent thaw in tensions between India
and Pakistan, both countries are now working towards a free trade partnership
within the next five years under SAFTA which may increase bilateral trade signifi-
cantly. If they are successful they would be setting a precedent for such cooperation
not just in the Af-Pak-India RSC but in the wider SAARC region.
Wider regional frameworks and institutions to improve collective dialogue for
economic integration are also in place. The Istanbul Process for regional coopera-
tion including 13 Asian countries was declared in November 2011 (Istanbul Process
Ministerial Conference, 2012). The Istanbul Process envisages Afghanistan as the
Heart of Asia, a land bridge between different sub-regions in Asia. Similarly, the
fifth meeting of the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan
(RECCA) held in Dushanbe in March 2012 views the importance of increased
regional cooperation towards enhanced security and economic development. Many
such regional and sub-regional processes and consultations seeking to develop and
support transportation links to Afghanistan are currently in the offing. They include
international and regional organizations and frameworks, such as, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC),
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA),
the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEC), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the United Nations
Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (UNSPECA) and the Central
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) (Ibid.).
All these institutions are committed to regional cooperation towards enhanced
security and economic development in the region (Istanbul Process Ministerial
Conference, 2012). Countries like India, Russia and Japan have been investing
billions of dollars in building transport corridors linking Afghanistan to many other
countries in the region either independently or collaboratively. Such initiatives pro-
vide reason for optimism in working towards a practicable transformation in the
Af-Pak-India RSC. Regional development and stabilization initiatives must be
encouraged and facilitated as much as possible as we explore sustainable and
viable approaches for global governance.
Opportunities for US Leadership beyond 2014
In anticipation of the USNATO exit from Afghanistan in December 2014, this
article suggests new ways for global governance. In view of the complexities in
the Af-Pak-India RSC, the role of global governance will remain fundamentally
important at two levels. First, the extent to which global key players including
global and regional state actors and multilateral organizations can work together
in building Afghanistan as a land bridge for regional and inter-regional trade will
be significant as it will provide a sustainable means for generating economic rev-
enue for Afghanistans development. This objective will be contingent on the sec-
ond and equally important role for global governance in moving towards the
resolution of regional security dilemmas in the Af-Pak-India region. Both of these
outcomes are inextricably intertwined and critical for the transformation in the
regional security architecture. The effort in fulfilling these challenging objectives
must be led by global and regional pathways to conflict resolution.
A positive example of global leadership is evident in the role played by the US
in supporting initiatives such as the New Silk Route. The vision for the New Silk
Route is important as a means for socio-economic development of the region and
is also helpful in mobilizing regional frameworks and institutions towards meet-
ing this objective. The proposed New Silk Route would connect a network of
trade routes across East Asia, South Asia, Western Asia, Central Asia, North Africa
and Europe. Given the prominent role of the US in this initiative, concerns have
been raised that regional key actors, such as, China and Russia, could potentially
emerge as spoilers unless the US actively involves them in planning and
implementation. This concern could be turned into an opportunity by the active
160 Saira Yamin
involvement of the SCO, thereby generating wider and necessary regional owner-
ship and stakes in the initiative. SCOs role in the project could be facilitated by
encouraging its collaboration with other regional institutions and multilateral
organizations already working on the project, such as, CAREC and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Such collaboration between regional institutions
would increase the economic and logistical viability of the project.
Additionally, if the initiative is able to move Pakistan and India towards an
agreement to construct trade and transit corridors for India through Pakistan, ben-
efitting both of them, it would be a significant step forward towards economic
integration in the RSC. It may also serve as process preventing conflict escalation
between India and Pakistan on various issues, and may serve as a durable confi-
dence building measure. The recent progress made by India and Pakistan on
SAFTA should facilitate trade, transit and energy cooperation and may also prompt
the SAARC leadership to consider playing a more active role in enhancing eco-
nomic cooperation, conceived as the basis for the organization.
Such an outcome would inevitably strengthen SAARCs otherwise constrained
role in regional governance opening up the window for a role in conflict preven-
tion and possibly even conflict resolution. Other opportunities for a shifting role
of global leadership in the region include the support of the US and the ADB
towards the proposed TAPI (TurkmenistanAfghanistanPakistanIndia) natural
gas pipeline. Another country in the region, Bangladesh, has also decided to join
the TAPI project. Bangladeshs entry in the project promises higher transit reve-
nues for both Pakistan and Afghanistan, in addition to serving their energy needs
and those of the fast growing economies in the region (Bhutta, 2012).
In the final analysis, as we rethink global governance in the Af-Pak-India RSC
we must consider opportunities for regional transformation through sustainable
approaches that would have an impact on the domestic securitization processes of
various actors and the interplay between these units at the regional level. Economic
integration offers pathways for achieving this end and can be realized by mobiliz-
ing and strengthening existing regional security mechanisms demonstrating a
commitment to this vision. The role of regional institutions and frameworks must
be central to this transformation and will generate greater stakes in the develop-
ment and stabilization of Afghanistan post 2014.
Conclusion
This research serves a fivefold purpose. It provides an assessment of US-led state
building and stabilization processes in Afghanistan post 9/11; identifies govern-
ance and domestic security challenges Afghanistan is likely to face post 2014;
explores the potential of the deterioration of regional security dynamics and the
destabilizing impact on Afghanistan when the USNATO engagement wanes; pro-
poses a regional approach for state stabilization centred on restoring Afghanistans
historical position as a global land bridge for economic cooperation; finally,
rethinking US engagement in the region, it offers new pathways to global govern-
ance. It emphasizes that a two-pronged globally led initiativeaddressing regional
security dilemmas and promoting economic integrationcould potentially pave
the way for a sustainable regional transformation process to Afghanistans benefit.
Given the complex nature of Afghanistans domestic security and the regional
security environment, sustained international engagement in the region is critical.
Hence, the article draws the attention of global policy makers, particularly those
responsible for the transition process in Afghanistan, to consider a regional
approach to securitization as a strategic point of intervention and a prelude to sta-
bility in the country post 2014.
Acknowledgements
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent those
of the United States Government.
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