64 East Asia / Winter 2004

EAST ASIA, Winter 2004, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 6482.

Regional Security Complex
Theory and Chinese Policy
towards North Korea
Tuva Kahrs
With the end of the bipolar rivalry of the Cold War, emphasis on the system
level power structure (dominant in international relations theory since the rise
of neorealism in the late 1970s) has declined. One of the most interesting
theoretical developments to have emerged in this context is Regional Security
Complex Theory (RSCT). Like neorealism, RSCT focuses on security. How-
ever, the rationale behind early Security Complex Theory was that for the
majority of states, the most relevant scale for conceptualising military and
political security functioned at the regional rather than the system level.
1
RSCT
has now opened the analysis to a wider range of sectorsincluding economic,
societal and environmental securityand the tendency to refer to units rather
than states acknowledges the importance of agencies other than the state in
terms of security. Nevertheless, the central idea remains that because most
threats travel most easily over short distances, security interdependence is
normally patterned into regionally based clusters, called security complexes.
This essay seeks to examine RSCT with reference to the region, or subre-
gion, of Northeast Asia, focusing on Chinese policy towards the Democratic
Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) after the Cold War. Northeast Asia is not
a straightforward area to look at, because of the difficulty in distinguishing
between the regional and the global levels. There is a heavy American mili-
tary presence, and three of the main actors with security interests in the re-
gionthe United States, China and the Russian Federationare nuclear
weapons states with permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council.
Nevertheless, Northeast Asia is an important area in terms of securitybe-
cause of the heavy concentration of military capability, high levels of tension,
the economic and technological capacity to support a hi-tech arms race and
the absence of a multilateral security frameworkand provides a worthwhile
context in which to assess the analytical applicability of RSCT.
The Korean peninsula features prominently in Northeast Asian security
concerns. China, Japan, Russia and the US all consider Korea to fall, to some
extent, within their own geo-strategic sphere, and all recognise that change on
Kahrs 65
the Korean peninsula could significantly alter the balance of power in the
region. With international concern about the DPRKs nuclear and missile
programmes, as well as the growing economic strength of the Republic of
Korea (ROK), the potential for Koreans to drive international events has in-
creased. Chinas role remains central, however, and the development of Chi-
nese security practice and foreign policy is itself an issue of regional and
global interest.
Beginning with a closer look at RSCT and its relevance as a tool for study-
ing security practice in Northeast Asia, this essay will consider Koreas piv-
otal position in regional security dynamics and the concerns of each of the
surrounding powers in relation to the peninsula. Chinas relationship with the
DPRK will be examined in greater depth, focusing on contemporary policy
issues and Chinese policy concerns. In conclusion, the possibility will be raised
that the current nuclear crisis is leading to change in Chinese policy, and that
this may have implications for the gradual emergence of a multilateral secu-
rity regime in Northeast Asia.
The Theoretical Framework
It is tempting to assume that because of the lack of significant multilateral
organisations for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, and because states
in the region themselves largely favour a realist outlook,
2
neorealism is the
theory most relevant to understanding and explaining international relations
in Northeast Asia. RSCT does not contradict the salience of certain features of
realism, but offers a more nuanced approach that also accommodates
constructivist concerns.
Unlike neorealism and other systemic theories, RSCT does not seek to im-
pose one dominant theory on the international system as a whole. To picture
global security accurately, it is argued, the regional and global levels must be
understood independently, as must the interaction between them. The re-
gional level is where the extremes of national and global security interplay, and
where most of the action occurs.
3
In prioritising a lower level of analysis than
more abstract systemic theories, RSCT offers a practical framework for security
analysis and a better chance of reflecting the real concerns of policy-makers.
In addition to emphasising the regional level, RSCT stands apart from
neorealism by incorporating social construction in its approach, thereby mak-
ing greater allowance for the potential for change in security dynamics and
structures. From the neorealist perspective, states operate in an anarchical sys-
tem where each must concentrate on strengthening its power and security
capabilities even if this induces insecurity in others. RSCT does not dispute
the anarchical structure, but assumes that within this structure the essential
character of a Regional Security Complex (RSC) is defined by a couple of
independent variables: the distribution of power and patterns of amity and
enmity in the form of geographically coherent patterns of security interdepen-
dence.
4
Security in Northeast Asia, for example, is affected by history both in
terms of durable enmities and a degree of shared culture, and cannotthere-
forebe considered only in terms of the distribution of power.
66 East Asia / Winter 2004
The internal dynamics of a security complex are located across a spectrum
according to whether the defining security interdependence is driven by am-
ity or enmity.
5
At the negative end lies conflict formation, in which interde-
pendence arises from fear, rivalry and mutual perceptions of threat. In the
middle lie security regimes, in which states still treat each other as potential
threats but have made reassurance arrangements to reduce the security di-
lemma among them. At the positive end of the spectrum lies a security com-
munity, in which states no longer expect or prepare to use force in their relations
with each other. Arguably, the discussion of regional security in terms of
complexes is a first necessary step in clearing the ground for a potential de-
velopment of security regimes or communities.
6
As Buzan and Waever note,
7
Northeast Asia remains a conflict formation even as Southeast Asia has evolved
to a security regime.
It should be mentioned that Buzan and Waever, in their pioneering work on
RSCT, do not consider Northeast Asia as an RSC. They do not deny that North-
east Asia conforms to their basic definition, as a set of units whose major
processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that
their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from
one another.
8
They argue, however, that in the mid-1990s Northeast Asia
and Southeast Asia began to merge into a single RSC, within which Northeast
Asia forms a subregional complex. According to them, with the establishment
of the ASEAN Regional Forum and Vietnams membership of ASEAN in the
mid-1990s, the point was reached at which the interregional dynamics of East
Asia overrode the regional ones.
9
This is debatable. The case for an emergent East Asian security complex
rests on three parallel developments: a shared concern throughout East Asia
about the implications of growing Chinese power, the creation of institutional
security connections, and the build-up of an East Asian regional economy.
While these claims are all correct, they arguably do not constitute something
greater than the sum of their parts. Concern about the implications of growing
Chinese power has long been shared by India, but according to Buzan and
Waever that does not mean that South Asia forms an RSC with Southeast and
Northeast Asia. Rather, Asia as a whole constitutes a supercomplex that also
encompasses Australia.
10
As for the institutional security connections between
Northeast and Southeast Asia, they are partial and fragile, as Buzan and Waever
admit.
11
With regard to the build-up of an East Asian regional economy, it is
significant for Northeast Asia but overshadowed by the economic interdepen-
dence within Northeast Asia and between Northeast Asia and the US.
This brings us to the definition of the Northeast Asian RSC itself. In Buzan
and Waevers scheme, China and Japan are members of the East Asian com-
plex, but Russia and the USA are not.
12
Instead, they are treated in terms of
penetration or overlay. Without suggesting that the US is a Northeast Asian
state, it would be possible to make the case that it is part of the Northeast
Asian security complex. This argument would be based on 1) the emphasis in
Northeast Asia on economic security and the economic interdependence be-
tween China, Japan and the US, and 2) Buzan and Waevers own definition of
security complexes as regions seen through the lens of security, which may or
Kahrs 67
may not coincide with more general understandings of what constitutes a re-
gion. With regard to the US, however, their explanation in terms of penetra-
tion is convincing. This mechanism occurs when outside powers make
security alignments with states within an RSC.
13
For Russia, on the other hand, the security interdependence of its eastern
provinces with the rest of Northeast Asia is self-evident, and likely to increase
with growing energy interdependence. For a start, Russia shares a border with
China of approximately 4,000 kilometres, not to mention boundaries with the
DPRK and Japan. As Buzan and Waever themselves argue with reference to
the concept of region: if it does not mean geographical proximity [it] does
not mean anything.
14
Naturally, if one treats East Asia as a whole as an RSC,
Russia appears peripheral. But, as Buzan and Waever write,
15
the USA or
Russia can decide whether or not to be in Southeast Asia in a way China
cannot. To paraphrase, the US can decide whether or not to be in Northeast
Asia in a way Russia cannot.
Until the East Asian complex is more strongly integrated, it would seem
more fruitful to treat Northeast Asia as a regional rather than a subregional
complex. It would no doubt become more manageable for East Asia to de-
velop into a coherent security complex if Northeast Asia converges with South-
east Asia on the conflict formation / security regime spectrum. In this essay, at
least, Northeast Asia and its particular security dynamics will be treated as a
Regional Security Complex.
In addition to the difficulty of defining the geographical boundaries of re-
gional security complexes, disagreement may arise over the basic definition
of an RSC, for example what actually constitutes a major process of
securitisation or desecuritisation, and how to determine whether the security
problems of a set of units can or cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved
apart from one another. Nevertheless, this essay argues that RSCT provides a
useful framework for the analysis of security issues in Northeast Asia.
A key reason for the applicability of RSCT in a study of Chinese policy
towards the DPRK is that it accepts the durability of power politics without
rejecting the possibility of international society. The view that both the distri-
bution of power and patterns of amity and enmity determine the character of
an RSC is highly relevant to a discussion of security in Northeast Asia. There
is not the scope in this essay to discuss the role of RSCs as a response to
globalisation. However, it is clear that RSCTs focus on the regional level
works very well in capturing the interplay between domestic and global secu-
rity dynamics, a key feature of Chinas policy towards the DPRK.
Korea in the Regional Security Complex
Situated where the interests of greater powers converge, the Korean penin-
sula plays a pivotal role in the politics of Northeast Asia. Historically per-
ceived by its neighbours as both opportunity and threat, Korea is strategically
important, positioned where shifts in the regional balance of power are played
out. The peninsula is also volatile; on several occasions conflict of interest
between powers seeking to influence or dominate Korea has led to war, and
68 East Asia / Winter 2004
change in Korea has the potential to alter the structure of the Northeast Asian
RSC. Against this background, a brief look at the concerns of Koreas
neighbours will help to understand the dynamics of the RSC and provide
context for the case study to follow.
In the longer term, the surrounding countries wish to prevent a reunified
Korea from tilting towards one of the other powers in the region. The degree
of external support for reunification would largely depend on the circum-
stances leading to unification and the nature of the process itself. Although
the situation for the last five decades has been very tense, there is awareness
that any attempt to force change could cause greater instability and would
entail the risk of war.
From the Chinese perspective, diversions from the drive for domestic eco-
nomic development are unwelcome. The preferable scenario in the DPRK is
gradual reform; not so major as to destabilise the ruling regime, but enough to
improve the DPRK economy and bring the country in line with international
norms. In brief, China is reluctant to see American control over the process of
change on the peninsula, seeks to maximise its influence in Northeast Asia
through its relationship with the DPRK, prefers a nuclear weapons-free Korea
and is concerned about the security of its northeastern border.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USSR was transformed from
diplomatic guarantor and economic supporter of the DPRK to recipient of
economic support from the ROK. The Russian relationship with the DPRK
has improved under Putin, providing the DPRK with a way to reduce its de-
pendence on China. Russian involvement in Korea can be seen as motivated
by relations with the US, development of the Russian Far East and a desire to
reassert Russian interests in Asia. However, compared with China, Russia at
present has limited influence and weak interests in Korea.
Through security alignments, the US continues to play a major role in the
security relationships of East Asian countries after the Cold War. At present,
the ROK hosts 37,000 or so American troops, and Japan an even greater num-
ber. This military presence enables the US to assert itself in the region, as in
the Taiwan straits in 1996, but upheaval or reconciliation on the Korean pen-
insula would necessarily lead to reconsideration of the basis for maintaining
the American security presence in Northeast Asia. It has been argued that the
outcome most threatening to American interests is a unified Korea aligned
with a hostile China.
16
The Japanese occupation of Korea and attempt to create the Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere left enduring patterns of enmity that continue to
influence Northeast Asian security dynamics. Notably, suspicion among Japans
neighbours about its militarist past is one reason why Japan is unable to assert
itself in East Asia today, for example by taking the lead in the development of
a regional security regime. The poor relationship with the DPRK remains an
obstacle for Japan in overcoming its colonial and wartime legacy. However,
the Japanese are wary of the bill they will be expected to foot for reconstruc-
tion in the North, and there is concern about the prospect of a reunified Korea
aligned with China. It has been suggested that even a reunified Korea that
stands equidistant between China and Japan would complicate Japans fu-
Kahrs 69
ture strategic position.
17
Certainly, reconciliation on the peninsula would call
into question the long-term viability of the American security presence and
Japanese subordination. It might also complicate relations with China, since
the DPRK currently provides formal justification for a number of security
initiatives involving Japan.
Considering Northeast Asias turbulent history, it is hardly surprising that
patterns of amity and enmity play a significant role in the regions security
dynamics. RSCTs recognition of these patterns is an important reason for its
utility in the Northeast Asian context. Nowhere is the effect of patterns of
enmity more obvious than between the two Koreas, which for over half a
century have interpreted their common history differently and refused for-
mally to recognise the legitimacy of the other state. Confucianism and other
cultural and historical links also ensure some amity-driven features in the re-
gion. On the other hand, as RSCT clearly recognises, material issues are also
fundamental. More tangible concerns that affect security in Northeast Asia
include several unsettled territorial issues and conflicting maritime claims.
These unresolved problems clearly have an impact on the dynamics of the
RSC.
China-US relations are critical, partly because they influence the nature of
the relationship between China and Japan. This triangle is the key to the char-
acter of the Northeast Asian security complex. However, the dynamics of this
triangle and each of its components, including the future role of the US in East
Asia, remain a source of uncertainty.
As Northeast Asias main crisis point, the DPRK intersects with China-US
relations and the regional security structure. Because of the dire state of the
DPRKs economy and infrastructure, reunification with the ROK under cur-
rent circumstances would probably mean absorption of the North by the South.
Not only is this an undesirable outcome for the DPRK regime, but it would
create an immense social and economic burden for the ROK. In other words,
the outcome of the Korean conflict depends not only on the political relation-
ship between the two Koreas, but also on reform in the DPRK. The recent
nuclear crisis has brought this question, along with the issue of nuclear prolif-
eration, firmly to the forefront of Northeast Asian security issues. In the ab-
sence of a multilateral security framework, the most important outside factor
for a viable resolution is arguably Chinese policy towards the DPRK. Accord-
ingly, this key relationship forms the basis of the following case study.
Characterising Chinese Security and Foreign Policy
Since the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asias security landscape has been
dramatically altered by the collapse of the USSR, the elevation of the US to
the position of sole superpower, and the growing weight of China. The local
and regional dimensions of security have become increasingly salient, but the
development of a more independent regional system is likely to be gradual
and its configuration may not become firm for some time to come.
18
With the regional security configuration in a state of flux, Chinas rising
power is of great international concern. But the degree of change and its sig-
70 East Asia / Winter 2004
nificance remain unclear, because of uncertainty both as to how Chinas enor-
mous domestic problems are to be addressed, and as to the extent to which
the Chinese will cooperate with their neighbours in approaches to regional
problems.
19
The inter-relatedness of these uncertainties reflects the interac-
tion of the domestic and international aspects of Chinas security concerns.
This is one of the reasons why RSCT, which emphasises the regional level as
the point of interaction between local and external influences, is a suitable
theoretical framework for the case study. It is also a reason why Chinas policy
towards the DPRK, which reflects both domestic and international Chinese
policy concerns, is an appropriate case study with which to test the practical
viability of RSCT.
Chinese security and foreign policy have been transformed from the ideal-
ism (lixiang zhuyi) or revolutionary internationalism of the first two decades
of the Peoples Republic to one of pragmatism (shiyong zhuyi). Gradually,
China has come to be seen as a system maintainer or system exploiter
rather than a system challenger.
20
Domestically, this change is illustrated by
the way in which the Chinese Communist Party has effectively tied its legiti-
macy to economic growth. Failure to improve peoples living standards would
almost certainly cause widespread social unrest, challenging the control of
the Party and the government. In other words, the legitimacy of the Party and
the regime no longer depends on its revolutionary credentials, but on its abil-
ity to deliver what it promises.
21
It is clear that Chinas overriding priority is economic development, for
which a peaceful and stable international environment is required. Despite
this, there is constant international speculation about whether China has really
become a socialised member of international society. It is widely suspected
that China follows a neorealist logic clothed in the rhetoric of global interde-
pendence.
22
In other words, China engages in international cooperation in
form but not in essence, in order to enhance its material strength. This relates
to the concept of comprehensive security, which emphasises the link between
national security and economic prosperity (security seen in terms of
quanfangwei, duocengci: all aspects, many levels), which RSCT is sufficiently
flexible to accommodate. From a constructivist point of view, on the other
hand, Chinas cooperation with international regimes will gradually become
internalised and substantial. Participation in multilateral organisations is a pro-
cess of acquiring new role identities, not just of creating external constraints
on the behaviour of exogenously constituted actors.
23
RSCT also allows for
this possibility.
While it is too early to say how China will come to use its growing material
strength, it is clear that the policy of comprehensive security introduced in the
early-mid 1990s invested China-US relations with greater significance. As a
result, China will not willingly put its trading relationship with the US in jeop-
ardy, and the Chinese government certainly has no intention of challenging
the US over the DPRK. Despite official rhetoric criticising the unipolarity of
the international order and American hegemony, China does not believe it
can change the present system, and perceives that any attempt to do so
would cost China dearly.
24
Kahrs 71
Chinas concept of comprehensive security also embodies the political.
Zhang argues that Chinas social experiences of revolution, war and reform
have accentuated the insecurity and vulnerability of the Chinese state and
regime.
25
In other words, Chinas concept of security is shaped by an insecu-
rity complex with an emphasis on internal security challenges. This is re-
flected in the focus on state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference
articulated by the Chinese government
26
and accentuated by Chinas current
development problems. These include rising expectations and inequality, high
unemployment, the lack of a welfare state, widespread corruption, issues of
administrative reform and mechanisms for dealing with local interests, and
financial sector reform.
Chinas concern with domestic stability is unsurprising, therefore, and is
linked with issues of territorial integrity. As an empire, China had ill-defined
borders, largely consisting of buffer territories with populations ethnically dis-
tinct from the Han Chinese. The Peoples Republic has gradually been con-
solidating its borders, but as a multinational state it is highly concerned about
separatism. China has 56 officially recognised nationalities, some of whom
may have a degree of attachment to a neighbouring country. That includes the
Korean minority, which exceeds two million. While Chinas focus on national
sovereignty may seem anachronistic, it is also part of what Buzan and Waever
describe as the new security agenda, which often focuses on concerns about
identity and migration,
27
again illustrating the relevance of RSCTs approach
combining traditional and more recent concepts of security.
Consideration of identity, national sovereignty and non-interference is con-
nected with the question of Chinas relationship to international society. The
membership criteria for international society have been changing, and to a
greater extent than before they have come to include solidarist rather than
pluralist conceptions of international society.
28
This makes it difficult for
China to conform to the expectations of international society: greater toler-
ance of, and sympathy for, the claims of ethno-nationalism manifested in the
international community constitutes a new challenge to Chinas management
of ethnic conflicts, which threaten the integrity of China.
29
On the other hand,
if China does not adapt to the new membership criteria for international soci-
ety, it will no doubt face negative consequences for failing to be a responsible
participant.
This may be one reason why China has been taking a more active role in
the Korean nuclear crisis since 2003, although clearly stability and domestic
security are Chinas primary concerns. Some would argue that Chinas rela-
tionship with the DPRK is driven, to a large extent, by a desire to enhance
Chinas regional and international standing. As You notes, the role of bridge
has serviced Sino-US relations well when they encounter difficulties in other
areas.
30
Certainly there is an element of maximising Chinas leverage as a
balancer and link between the DPRK and the US. In several respects, Chinas
North Korea policy is made to order for exploring the interplay between China
and the outside world.
31
It has even been suggested that Chinas support for
Pyongyang has to do with acquiring influence as the starting point for a
return to Pax Sinica in the region.
32
72 East Asia / Winter 2004
The argument that China has developed the strategic understanding that
any weakening of influence over the DPRK would degrade its strategic status
and interests in Northeast Asia in general
33
does make sense, because the
Korean peninsula is the key arena where China can play a global role. On the
other hand, the North Koreans rightly perceive that Chinese aid and diplo-
matic support are given in Chinese self-interest. Wielding the power of a weak
state, the DPRK has the potential to entrap China and its other neighbours in
a spiral of conflict escalation that these governments would rather avoid.
34
Therefore, Chinas security policy has to be carefully balanced. Before study-
ing Chinas current policy dilemma in greater detail, however, it is necessary
to consider Koreas significance in Chinese security policy.
China and North Korea
There is no doubt about the strategic importance to China of the Korean
peninsula, which is geographically close to the Chinese capital and the heavy
industries of the Northeast, as well as to major ports. When Korea is under
external control, Chinas heartland is threatenedas illustrated by events fol-
lowing Japans colonisation of Korea in 1910. Determining precisely how to
protect Chinas interests and ensure stability on the northeastern border is not
so straightforward, however. It is particularly difficult to achieve consensus
on how best to persuade the DPRK regime to give up its nuclear programme,
and to gauge how far China can or should pressure the DPRK regime to re-
form in order to make the situation more sustainable and any change less
threatening to stability.
Since the 1950s, the assumption among Chinese policy-makers has clearly
been that the survival of the DPRK regime is indispensable to Chinas national
security. Interviews with Chinese analysts indicate that this is still the domi-
nant view among the leadership, but it has been suggested that this assump-
tion should be reviewed in light of the DPRKs nuclear development
programmes. A leading Chinese academic published an article in early 2003
arguing that Chinas interests are best served by prioritising a nuclear weap-
ons-free Korea, and that if this goal cannot be achieved through diplomacy
alone, economic means of pressure should be considered in addition.
35
It is worth noting that while there are still a number of high level personal
connections linking the two Parties, militaries and governments, the genera-
tion of Chinese leaders that experienced the War to Resist America and Aid
Korea is passing. There is a lack of consensus on the best way to pursue
Chinese interests on the peninsula. Interviews suggest that among the younger
generation there is a tendency to view the DPRK as a liability that escalates
tension and that has failed to develop along with the rest of the region. The
Chinese leadership faces the question of whether it is possible to alter the
China-DPRK relationship from the current special relationship to a normal
relationship without losing the benefits that China derives from the leverage
associated with its relationship with the DPRK.
Despite the strategic realignments in Northeast Asia following the end of
the Cold War, maintaining the DPRK regime and ensuring stability on Chinas
Kahrs 73
periphery has remained Chinas major concern. When it took the step of
recognising the ROK in 1992, China also increased military cooperation and
economic aid to the DPRK. Upon the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, China
immediately recognised his son Kim Jong Il as the new leader of the DPRK,
presumably in the hope of helping to ensure a smooth transition of power in
the DPRK. By providing more aid in a wider variety of forms Beijing be-
came more deeply involved, playing a more active role (indeed every year a
crucial role) in the politics of regime survival.
36
It is widely assumed that without Chinese economic support, the DPRK
regimes control mechanisms would break down. (Some observers dispute
this, arguing that a loss of Chinese assistance would be offset by increased
reliance on the ROK.)
37
The exact terms and amount of Chinese aid to the
DPRK are not clear, especially with regard to military assistance, but esti-
mates generally range from half a million tons of grain and half a million tons
of fuel per year in recent years to over twice that amount,
38
orin monetary
termsfood and energy assistance worth approximately US$500 million an-
nually.
39
In addition, there is a substantial trade deficit, by one estimate amount-
ing to US$4.4 billion cumulatively since 1990.
40
One reason why the Chinese leadership is so reluctant to take action that
might lead to uncontrolled change in the DPRK, is concern that instability
could spill across the border to China and complicate the Chinese governments
relations with its ethnic Korean population. Chinese sources, in interviews,
suggest that the government is very sensitive about the potential for economic
problems to intersect with ethnic tensions, and such disturbances could have a
knock-on effect in other parts of China.
Despite the mutual strategic dependence between China and the DPRK, it
is not a smooth relationship. While the Chinese may be growing weary of
supporting the DPRK regime year after year without succeeding in arriving at
a more sustainable situation, the DPRK regime resents having to depend on
China for its economic and political survival. Tension is illustrated by actions
such as DPRK endorsement of Kaohsiung (in Taiwan) as a venue for the 2002
Asian Games after the establishment of China-ROK relations. More recently,
the DPRK attempted to establish a visa-free capitalist zone on the Chinese
border at Sinuiji without, apparently, securing Chinese blessing (the Chinese
promptly arrested Yang Bin, appointed by the DPRK to manage the zone).
The DPRK also announced its agreement to participate in multilateral talks in
August 2003 through Russian, rather than Chinese, diplomatic channels.
The 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is still
officially recognised, legitimising Chinas stake in North Korean security.
However, the Chinese have let it be known that China would not automati-
cally intervene in case of conflict and that assistance would not necessarily
mean deployment of Chinese troops.
41
Taking an ambiguous posture, Chi-
nese leaders are making it clear that the treaty commitment will be interpreted as
Chinese leaders see fit. Arguably, China has distanced itself from the DPRK stra-
tegically, while in some ways becoming more involved in its internal affairs.
The issue of how Korea features in regional security calculations has al-
ready been discussed. Dominance over Korea by an external power would be
74 East Asia / Winter 2004
construed as a threat to Chinas territorial integrity, and could facilitate the
emergence of an anti-China coalition in the region. The DPRKs nuclear ac-
tivities may lead to a strengthened US presence in the western Pacific. This is
a sensitive issue at a time when the US has improved relations with Russia and
Vietnam, strengthened cooperation with India and Pakistan (as has Japan),
established a new government in Afghanistan, altered the geopolitics of Cen-
tral Asia with its presence there, and is continuing with arms sales to Taiwan.
We have also seen how Chinas Korea policy is firmly tied to the key issue of
economic growth. This brings us to the dilemma China faces with regard to its
contemporary Korea policy.
Chinas Dilemma
Chinas Korea policy can be said to face two ways. On the one hand, it is
directed towards the DPRK: China wants a nuclear-free Korea. On the other, it
is directed towards the US: China wants to avoid military conflict. The nuclear
crisis that surfaced in 2002 brought urgency to Chinas dilemma: the nuclear
issue, if delayed for too long, could undermine regional stability.
42
China has
to avoid collapse of the DPRK regime, keep the peninsula nuclear-free and
prevent armed conflict.
While the DPRK needs to shift resources from the military sector in order to
improve its economy and attract international economic assistance, the re-
gime faces the dilemma of the security risks inherent in change and the dan-
ger of failing to improve the economy. Without serious reform and willingness
to open up, the DPRK can neither access nor absorb substantial financial re-
source flows, and lacks other resources required for economic restructuring
such as a functioning power grid and regulatory and management capacity.
Meanwhile, the DPRK is reluctant to give up its military assets, which are the
foundation of the regime, an important source of hard currency and a lever in
international negotiations. Since the DPRK was included in the Axis of Evil
in the 2002 State of the Union address by President George Bush, they have
also become crucial as a deterrent against American hostility.
Were the DPRK system to collapse, China would face chaos on its border
and an influx of refugees. Aside from the problem of managing such a situa-
tion (or sealing its border), an increased proportion of Koreans in Northeast
China could potentially lead to territorial claims by a future, reunified Korea.
It is no surprise, therefore, that China does not favour UN sanctions against
the DPRK. Furthermore, reunification through conflict or implosion of the
North under current conditions, would likely increase US influence over the
peninsula as a whole. In addition, there is concern about the destabilising
effects of the corruption and chaos that might result should the transition from
a totalitarian to a more accountable political system in the DPRK take place
too suddenly.
Interviews indicate consensus among analysts in Beijing that Chinas policy
is to avoid a dramatic collapse by continuing to supply the DPRK with aid
while giving the North Koreans time to stabilise their economy and develop
their governance from totalitarian to authoritarian. Chinese initiatives include
Kahrs 75
routinely inviting DPRK government officials to China for training in market
economics. Kim Jong Ils itinerary when he visited China in 2001 focused on
places, such as the Shanghai stock exchange, that illustrate the scope of Chinas
economic opening and development.
Although the Chinese have been careful to stress that the North Koreans
must do things in their own way and in their own time, there has also been
diplomatic pressure to reform. In 1997, the government-linked Beijing Re-
view published a rebuke concerning the DPRK food crisis:
A heavy military burden is using up much needed resources Ultimately its up to the
[North] Korean people themselves to resolve the grain crisis. It requires spirit and will
power to meet the challenge of such reforms as introducing foreign investment and
opening up, while maintaining a stable political situation. And Korea needs to be flex-
ible while carrying out diplomatic policies.
43
A more recent article in the same weekly urges the DPRK not to lose an-
other opportunity to strengthen itself by committing to reform and opening
up: after failing to follow the trend of regional economic growth in East Asia
after the Cold War ended, the DPRK may lose another historical development
opportunity of economic integration in East Asia.
44
While China does not favour any action that may lead to instability in the
DPRK, the Chinese also do not enjoy the prospect of nuclear weapons on the
peninsula. The current nuclear crisis has its roots in the 1994 Agreed Frame-
work. Under this agreement, the DPRK would freeze and then dismantle its
existing nuclear facilities in exchange for the construction of two prolifera-
tion-resistant nuclear reactors, better relations with the US, and a formal Ameri-
can assurance against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. While the US
treated the Agreed Framework as a non-proliferation initiative, the DPRK saw
it as a way to transform the US role from adversary to patron. It may be that
the North Koreans never intended to give up their quest for nuclear weapons,
or that they began to think the Agreed Framework would not deliver. In either
case, according to the CIA, the DPRK in the late 1990s began a covert
programme of highly enriched uranium (HEU), expected to be able to pro-
duce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for at least two bombs annually, pos-
sibly by mid-decade.
45
In late 2002 the DPRK also resumed its plutonium
programme, which is believed to have produced enough material in the early
1990s for one or two weapons (which may already have been completed). In
2003, the North Koreans claimed to have reprocessed the spent fuel extracted
from the reactor at Yongbyon,
46
which would be enough for up to six bombs.
In addition, they could extract enough plutonium from the reactivated reactor
to make one additional weapon per year.
47
Construction of two larger reactors
has also been resumed.
48
China remained critical of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) after signing,
because of the advantages the established powers derive from it.
49
In 1999,
then Premier Zhu Rongji reportedly declared that because the DPRK is a sov-
ereign state, it is none of our business whether North Korea develops a mis-
76 East Asia / Winter 2004
sile or whether it researches and develops nuclear weapons.
50
With the DPRKs
withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003, and its public drive to become
a nuclear power, however, Chinas situation changed.
Arguably, Chinas main concern is that an expanding North Korean nuclear
arsenal would increase the pressures on Japan and the ROK to develop their
own nuclear deterrents, possibly leading to a region-wide arms race. There is
deep psychological and political antipathy to nuclear weapons in Japan, but a
nuclear-armed and hostile DPRK might change that. Already, the unannounced
launch of a rocket over Japan in 1998 led Japan to cooperate more closely
with the US on missile defence. Samuel Kim wrote in 2002 that no single
event is said to have impacted and reshaped Japanese public opinion as much
as the North Korean Taepodong-I missile launch.
51
Even if the Japanese refrain from developing nuclear weapons, a nuclear
DPRK would complicate Chinas position in the triangle with Japan and the
US, because it would decrease Japans feeling of security. In other words, the
US would have to work harder to maintain Japanese confidence in the Ameri-
can security commitment, including great sensitivity in balancing US-China
relations with US-Japan relations. It could also lead the Japanese to expand
the role of their Self Defence Forces and introduce equipment, such as the
satellites launched in 2003, that might be used to assist Taiwan in the event of
conflict with China.
Foremost among Chinese concerns is the possibility that an arms race would
encourage Taiwan to reconsider the nuclear option. Both Taiwan and the ROK
have in the past begun nuclear programmes and abandoned them only under
American pressure, and the ROK revealed in 2004 that it has experimented
with uranium enrichment. Merely raising the possibility of nuclear weapons
development in Taiwan would complicate Chinas relations with the US. Even
excluding this possibility, the DPRK remains the formal justification for mis-
sile defence and other American security initiatives in East Asia that many
Chinese suspect are really aimed against China.
Furthermore, an arms race would be costly, and the Chinese clearly have
no intention of being led into Soviet style bankruptcy. The leader of Japans
Liberal Party is reported to have said in April 2002 that its possible for us to
produce 3,000 to 4,000 nuclear warheads. If were serious, well never get
beaten in terms of military power.
52
Should Japan and China enter into this
level of arms race, there would be global implications, not to mention a sig-
nificant economic impact on Northeast Asia.
A senior Chinese researcher has pointed out, in an interview, that change in
Chinese official wording urging the non-nuclearisation of Korea from wuhehua
to the stronger feihehua is reminiscent of Chinas moderation at the UN in
1994 from opposing economic sanctions to not favouring economic sanc-
tions, a signal that China might abstain rather than veto a sanctions resolu-
tion against the DPRK. There were also unconfirmed reports that China
interrupted oil supplies to the DPRK for three days in March 2003 (on a tech-
nical pretext) after the DPRK conducted short range missile tests. It seems
likely that China will gradually increase the pressure on the DPRK to end its
nuclear weapons programme, while supporting the DPRKs demand for some
Kahrs 77
form of security assurance, either from the US or through a multilateral ar-
rangement.
The scenario that China needs to avoid above all is military conflict in
Korea. The Axis of Evil speech, the threat of pre-emptive attack outlined in
the US 2002 National Security Strategy and the war against Iraq without UN
approval probably led the DPRK to conclude that nuclear weapons are not
only valuable as an asset to be traded but also essential as a deterrent.
In reality the US is unlikely to accept the costhuman, financial and in
terms of its security relationships in Northeast Asiaof war with the DPRK.
Over 1.5 million well-armed military personnel confront each other at the
38th parallel. While the North Koreans would be unable to defeat the US in
the event of war, they could inflict tremendous damage. US General Gary
Luck in the mid-1990s estimated that as many as one million people would be
killed in resumption of war in Korea, including up to 100,000 American sol-
diers. He also reckoned that war would cost over US$1 trillion for Northeast
Asia in terms of destruction of property and interruption of business activity.
53
On the other hand, while the US can contain a nuclear DPRK, it cannot
reliably prevent the sale of nuclear material. Already, the DPRKs sale of bal-
listic missiles and technology to Pakistan, Iran and others is said to have al-
tered military calculations in the Middle East and South Asia.
54
Chinese
policy-makers have no difficulty recognising the legitimacy of US fearas a
prime target of terrorismabout illicit trade in nuclear material, and are wor-
ried about the possibility of an American military reaction against this risk.
The Americans do not want to be seen to reward the DPRK for resuming
nuclear weapons development and are concerned about the potential for cheat-
ing on any new version of the Agreed Framework. A freeze on the HEU
programme would be particularly difficult to verify because it could be hid-
den in any of the DPRKs thousands of caves. For the North Koreans, mean-
while, one of the lessons from Iraq is that accepting weapons inspections
would not mean safety for the regime.
In this context, the utility of RSCT as a theoretical framework is demon-
strated by its capacity to reflect the real concerns of policy-makers at the inter-
section of power politics and constructivist aspects of security, both of which
are relevant in Chinese policy towards the DPRK. With the ongoing nuclear
crisis, China has become increasingly concerned about American and North
Korean perceptions of each other, and with the need to build mutual trust. A
major reason why there is anxiety in Northeast Asia about the possibility of
conflict between the US and the DPRK is the perception that the US leader-
ship assumes that the DPRK has an unchanging persona in world and do-
mestic affairs that cannot be altered unless the regime is eradicated.
55
Such
concerns are intensified by remarks such as those of John Bolton as US
Undersecretary of State, stating that the 38
th
parallel serves as a dividing line
between freedom and oppression, between right and wrong Change in the
Norths diplomatic, economic, and security posture is necessary, but not suffi-
cient.
56
Military escalation or war would negatively affect both the strategic and
economic situation in the region, and might create a long-term security prob-
78 East Asia / Winter 2004
lem for China. Chinese analysts, in interviews, have predicted that it would be
impossible for China to remain neutral in a conflict between the DPRK and
the USa diplomatic and strategic decision the Chinese want to avoid. Al-
though a nuclear-armed DPRK is against Chinese interests, China would be
extremely reluctant to support an American attack on the DPRK to rid it of
weapons of mass destruction. The Chinese have not discounted the possibility
that American intelligence is overestimating the DPRKs level of nuclear weap-
ons development. In particular, Chinese officials have expressed doubt about
the existence of a dedicated HEU programme.
57
Against this background, the Chinese became concerned about escalating
military tension. A think-tank linked to the Foreign Ministry published an ar-
ticle warning that the possibility of conflict as a result of loss of control can-
not be ruled out if confrontation between Washington and Pyongyang escalates
further and any clash could lead to large-scale military conflict.
58
The Chi-
nese realised that they must act in order to try to ensure a peaceful outcome,
and in July 2003 they began intense diplomatic activity to try to resolve the
crisis.
Although Chinese security policy is generally considered well-grounded in
realism, the process of trying to resolve the current crisis contains a constructivist
element, reconfirming the relevance of RSCT as an analytical tool in the con-
text of Chinese policy towards the DPRK. RSCT is compatible both with real-
ist thinking about the international system and with approaches that consider
regional systems to be dependent on the actions and interpretations of ac-
tors, not just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power
59
, as illus-
trated by Northeast Asias patterns of amity and enmity. In order to prevent
the nuclearisation of Korea, without resort to conflict, China is attempting to
get the DPRK to see that the outside world need not be threatening, that their
security issues can be resolved in cooperation with China and the US.
Competitive security systems are sustained by practices that create insecurity and dis-
trust. In this case, transformative practices should attempt to teach other states that ones
own state can be trusted and should not be viewed as a threat to their security.
60
This is what China is trying to get the US to do with the DPRK, apparently
hoping that a superficial security assurance may gradually, through mutual
confidence-building measures, lead to more substantial change. The Chinese
also seem to regard a lasting, peaceful outcome as more likely if rooted in a
multilateral framework. To ensure lasting stability and peace in the region,
an effective multilateral mechanism for security cooperation is needed.
61
Chinas conversion to multilateralism to try to stabilise the DPRK situation
may reflect the idea that a multilateral security institution would reduce the
China threat conceptions of others. If successful, this strategy may reassure
Japan about Chinas international behaviour without driving it deeper into the
alliance with the US. It may also reduce the perception in the ROK that China
is a rising power with ambitions and grievances that may conflict with vital
Korean interests.
62
Growing commercial and educational ties, as well as a
Kahrs 79
degree of anti-Americanism in the ROK, are helping China to balance US
influence in Korea. If China plays its hand well, it may succeed in translating
its role in the DPRK nuclear crisis into a regional security framework that is
not built on US-Japan relations, and ultimately to place itself in a position
where it can exert indirect political influence over the Korean peninsula. Gen-
erally, however, China remains preoccupied with domestic issues and is un-
likely, therefore, systematically to take a proactive regional or global role.
Conclusion
In employing a bottom-up approach using regional components to create a
global picture, RSCT is able to reflect real conditions in individual regions.
RSCTs receptivity to different sectors of security also means that it can easily
accommodate a policy of comprehensive security, making it an appropriate
framework for looking at the different aspects involved in Chinese policy
towards North Koreaincluding national identity and ideological security, as
well as more traditional concerns such as military and economic security.
This essay has attempted to get beyond the division between the traditional
security emphasis on material issues and what can broadly be grouped as
constructivist concerns with institutional norms and issues of identity and re-
gime survival. RSCT rightly emphasises the relational and interdependent as-
pects of security, and takes into account historical and cultural contexts. As
we have seen, Chinas concern with territorial integrity and national sover-
eignty are historically and culturally charged. Its former imperial status with
Korea as a tributary kingdom, the impact of Marxism, the emotional question
of PRC-Taiwan relations, and Chinas interdependent but enmity-influenced
relationships with Japan and the US are among the ideational factors that have
an impact on Chinas security policy. This, however, does not mean that we
can favour constructivism over realism in explaining Chinese security policy.
Realist elements are still very important and many analysts remain con-
vinced that Chinas greater participation in international institutions has to do
with maximising Chinese influence and avoiding being penalised for remain-
ing outside those institutions, rather than with genuine support for their val-
ues. Such views are reinforced by, for example, American criticism of lax
enforcement of missile proliferation controls by Chinese authorities, and vari-
ous cases of arms sales by Chinese companies to Iran and others in recent
years.
Not only does RSCT avoid a narrow theoretical focus. Concerned with the
interaction between the domestic, the regional and the global, it also encom-
passes multiple levels of analysis. Chinese policy towards the DPRK is driven
by security concerns at all of these levels, and to focus on any single level
would inadequately explain Chinas policy concerns and behaviour. Internal
vulnerabilities and international security concerns are deeply inter-related.
While Chinas domestic problems drive its regional and international security
policy, regional and global issuesincluding energy geopolitics and US se-
curity concernsin turn impact on Chinas security concerns and Chinese
policy toward the DPRK.
80 East Asia / Winter 2004
The significance of China in Northeast Asia means that Chinese security
policy will play an important role in determining where the region is placed
on the conflict formation / security community spectrum. In turn, a move
away from conflict formation in Northeast Asia would help China in its bid for
great power status at the global level.
Until very recently, the Chinese had not articulated a vision for the region
and showed no enthusiasm for development of a regional security commu-
nity. China has largely reacted to American ideas and developments at the
global and regional level that it perceives as having the potential to endanger
Chinese national interests.
63
It is too early to say whether Chinas recent change
in styletaking the initiative in the Korean nuclear crisis and promoting a
multilateral resolutionreflects a change in substance. A think-tank associ-
ated with the Foreign Ministry published an article in 2003 suggesting that the
countries concerned should cooperate to seek an effective security frame-
work in the region and that resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue with the
help of international mediation could set a precedent for establishment of a
security consultation mechanism.
64
Alagappa has also suggested that multi-
lateral talks on Korea reflect the sort of precedent on which it may be pos-
sible to build other concert-like structures tailored to particular subregions.
65
This is not to imply that change in Chinas style would be sufficient to
move Northeast Asia towards a security community. There is, so far,
no social and psychological foundation for establishing a more comprehensive and
stable security architecture in the Northeast Asian region, owing to the absence of com-
mon or shared identities, rules, norms, and governing procedures around which state
actors expectations could converge.
66
There is still a hostile regional environment, and military distrust over Tai-
wan makes it especially difficult to build viable institutions. Shi Yinhong ar-
gues:
Northeast Asian international relations are tragically not far from the classical type of
the 18th century, while Europe has entered the 21st. However, a peaceful resolution of
the DPRK crisis could provide a chance to move beyond pure power politics towards a
multilateral security regime somewhat resembling the 19th century Concert of Europe.
67
While it would be premature to be optimistic about the evolution of a North-
east Asian security regime on the basis of this particular stage in Chinas policy
towards the DPRK, it is not inconceivable that a cooperative mechanism to
deal with the conflicts that exist within the RSC may gradually emerge. With
an institutional framework for multilateral security cooperation, Northeast Asia
would be much better placed to move, in time, closer to the security commu-
nity end of the spectrum. For some time to come, power balancing and eco-
nomic growth will probably remain the main features of the Northeast Asian
RSC, but Alagappa may be right in suggesting
68
that a combination of mutual
interest in international stability for the sake of economic development and
Kahrs 81
increasing economic and social interaction will gradually give rise to a func-
tionally rooted international society.
Notes
1. Barry Buzan, Ole Wver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis (Boulder
and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 11.
2. See, for example, Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, IISS Adelphi Paper 295
(1995), 7.
3. Barry Buzan and Ole Wver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 43.
4. Buzan and Wver (2003), 49.
5. Buzan et al. (1998), 12.
6. Said Haddadi, The Western Mediterranean as a Security Complex, November 1999, [http://
www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp24.htm].
7. Buzan and Wver (2003), 173.
8. Buzan et al. (1998), 201.
9. Buzan and Wver (2003), 144.
10. Buzan and Wver (2003), 164.
11. Ibid.
12. Buzan and Wver (2003), 80.
13. Buzan and Wver (2003), 46.
14. Buzan and Wver (2003), 80.
15. Buzan and Wver (2003), 60.
16. Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard Ellings, eds., Koreas Future and the Great Powers (Seattle and
London: University of Washington Press, 2001), 323.
17. Michael Armacost and Kenneth Pyle in ibid., 127.
18. Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1998), 4-5.
19. Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London and New
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 1996), 285.
20. Rosemary Foot in Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, eds., Power and Responsibility in Chinese
Foreign Policy (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001), 28.
21. Zhang in ibid., 262.
22. Samuel Kim in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth, eds., China as a Great Power (Melbourne:
Longman, New York: St. Martins, 1995), 49.
23. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,
International Organization (Spring 1992), 417.
24. Kim in Harris and Klintworth (1995), 64.
25. Zhang and Austin (2001), 251-252.
26. See, for example, Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 76.
27. Buzan and Wver (2003), 23.
28. Foot in Zhang and Austin (2001), 22.
29. Zhang in ibid., 265.
30. You Ji, China and North Korea: a fragile relationship of strategic convenience, Journal of
Contemporary China 10:28 (2001), 392.
31. Samuel Kim in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., The Future of North Korea (London: Routledge, 2002), 105.
32. Hazel Smith, Chris Rhodes, Diana Pritchard and Kevin Magill, eds., North Korea in the New
World Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 56.
33. Kim and Lee in Samuel Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, eds., North Korea and Northeast Asia (Lanham
and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 132.
34. Ibid., 111.
35. Shi Yinhong, Lun ruhe renshi he duidai Chaoxian heweiji (How to understand and treat the
DPRK nuclear crisis), Ta Kung Pao, 15 January 2003.
82 East Asia / Winter 2004
36. Samuel Kim in David Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era
of Reform (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 387.
37. See, for example, Alexandre Mansurov, Giving Lip Service with an Attitude: North Koreas China
Debate, December 2003, [http://nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/multilateralTalks/
mansurov_DPRKChinaDebate.html].
38. See, for example, Liu Ming, Chinas Role in the Course of North Korea Transition, 13 July 2004,
[http://www.nautilus.org/archives/pub/ftp/napsnet/special_reports/Liu.pdf] and Kim in Akaha
(2002), 120.
39. Shi Yongming, interview, 29 July 2003.
40. Aidan Foster-Carter, Seouls Secret Successes, 21 November 2003, [http://nautilus.org/archives/
fora/security/0345_FosterCarter.html].
41. See, for example, Kim in Akaha (2002), 123 or Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Time to Act, China Tells N
Korea, 25 August 2003, [http://taiwansecurity.org/CNN/2003/CNN-082503.htm].
42. Sun Cheng, The Second DPRK Nuclear Crisis, International Studies (2003), 15.
43. Quoted in Akaha (2002), 121.
44. Shi Yongming, Chance Behind Crisis, Beijing Review, 7 August 2003, 44.
45. Quoted by Gary Samore, The Korean Nuclear Crisis, Survival (Spring 2003), 12.
46. DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman in DPRK to Continue Increasing Its Nuclear Deterrent
Force, 3 October 2003, [http://www.kcna.co.jp].
47. Steve LaMontagne, Dj Vu All Over Again: How Reliable is U.S. Intelligence on North Koreas
Nuclear Program?, February 2004, [http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/nuclearweapons/
DPRKNukeProgram.html].
48. Jon Wolfsthal, Getting Back to Go: Re-establishing a Freeze on North Koreas Plutonium Fuel
Cycle, 31 January 2003, [http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0236A_Wolfsthal.html].
49. James Cotton in Harris and Klintworth (1995), 210.
50. Charles Hutzler and Gordon Fairclough, The Koreas: China Breaks With Its Wartime Past, 7
August 2003, [http://taiwansecurity.org/News/2003/FEER-080703.htm].
51. In Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, eds., Korea Briefing 2000-2001 (New York: M. E. Sharpe:
2002), 132.
52. Ozawa Ichiro quoted by Selig Harrison in Beyond the Axis of Evil: What Price for a Nuclear-Free
Korea?, 10 May 2002, [http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/HarrisonRemarks.pdf].
53. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1997), 324.
54. John McLaughlin, North Korea: Engagement or Confrontation, 17 April 2001, [http://
69.44.62.160/archives/pub/ftp/napsnet/special_reports/McLaughlin_on_North_Korea.txt].
55. Hazel Smith, Bad, mad, sad or rational actor? Why the securitisation paradigm makes for poor
analysis of North Korea, International Affairs 76:3 (2000), 612.
56. Quoted by John Feffer, Responding to North Koreas Surprises, 1 November 2002, [http://
nautilus.org/archives/fora/security/0219A_Feffer.html].
57. See, for example, Ding Zhitao, Kim Drops In, Beijing Review, 29 April 2004, 12.
58. Sun (2003), 15.
59. Buzan and Wver (2003), 40.
60. Wendt (1992), 421.
61. Shi Yongming (2003), 44.
62. Eberstadt and Ellings (2001), 325.
63. Alagappa (2003), 75.
64. Sun (2003), 17.
65. Alagappa (2003), 203.
66. Kim in Kim and Lee (2002), 23.
67. Interview, 20 April 2003.
68. Alagappa (1998), 6.