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Thesis Eleven
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DOI: 10.1177/072551369102800111
1991 28: 127 Thesis Eleven
Paul Raymond Harrison
Jrgen Habermas Und Die Rationalitaet Fremder Lebensformen
Habermas and the Problem of Archaic Societies: On Antje Linkenbach's Opake Gestalten Des Denkens,

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127
HABERMAS AND THE
PROBLEM OF ARCHAIC
SOCIETIES: ON
ANTJE
LINKENBACHS OPAKE
GESTALTEN DES
DENKENS,
JÜRGEN HABERMAS
UND DIE
RATIONALITAET FREMDER
LEBENSFORMEN
Paul
Raymond Harrison
There have been
many
books on Habermas and doubtless there will be
many
more.
However,
this work will
always
hold a
special place
in the
secondary
literature due to its unusual
perspective.
The book is
nothing
less than an
attempt
to
bring
Habermass
philosophy
and social
theory
into a critical dia-
logue
with the results of modern
anthropology.
t~abermass
theory
is itself an
attempt
at such a
dialogue,
so Linkenbachs work
is,
in
effect,
a
dialogue
on
the
dialogue
and a
dialogue beyond
the
dialogue.
This means that Linkenbachs work
is,
first of
all,
a work of immanent
criticism. It takes
up
Habermass own assertion that the test case for
any theory
of
rationality
is its
ability
to
clarify
&dquo;the
opaque
forms of
mythical thought&dquo;
in order to show both what we have learnt and unlearnt and demonstrates
that Habermass theoretical framework is
insufficiently open
to
pass
such a
test.
However,
Linkenbach also seeks to
go beyond
the level of such
purely
immanent criticism and outlines an alternative to the Habermasian
proposal
which rests on a
praxis-orientated displacement
of the
theory
of
rationality.
The
purpose
of such a line of
argument is, according
to
Linkenbach,
to make
a contribution to &dquo;the rehabilitation of
primitive
forms of life&dquo;
(p.
12).
Linkenbachs
approach can, therefore,
be
directly
located in some of
the
major
debates of the
past thirty years.
Over this time we have seen an
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128
ethnographic de-centring
of the modern scientific
self-understanding.
Once the
test case for
any theory
of
rationality
would have been its
ability
to
clarify
the
distinctness of the
highest
forms of human
rationality
embedded in
science,
but
even for a rationalist such as Habermas the task
today
is to
develop
a hermeneu-
tically open
and multi-faceted
theory
of
rationality. Yet,
Habermas still
places
reason at the centre of his
philosophy
and the notion of
processes
of rational-
ization at the centre of his social
theory.
It
is, therefore,
his
strong concept
of
reason and the use he
puts
it to in the
development
of a
theory
of socio-cultural
evolution which inhibits the realization of his
good
intentions. For
Linkenbach,
therefore,
it is Habermass
very
choice of reason which short-circuits his
project.
She seeks to
replace
it with a
project
that would look at
history
not in terms of
the
progressive deployment
of a notion of
reason,
but as a &dquo;dialectical
process
of
progress
and loss&dquo;
(p.
11).
Although
both
projects
do not
escape
their own
embeddedness in the lifeworld of
modernity,
she does claim for her
theory
a
greater categorical openness
and a
greater capacity
to theorize the
diversity
of social action and
thought.
Hers
is, therefore,
an
approach
which seeks
to
escape
from a
tendentially
unitarian
theory
of reason and unilinear
logic
of
evolution without
falling
into a
&dquo;post-modernist&dquo;
farewell to reason or textualist
subversion of
meaning
in
history.
Her
praxis-orientated approach
is an
attempt
not
only
to think
through progress
and
loss,
but also
identity
and difference.
Linkenbach
correctly
reads Habermass
project
as
centring
on the status
of reason. From his earliest
writings
Habermas has been concerned to criticize
one-sided reductions of reason. In this concern he has renewed the
Enlight-
enment notion of
rationality which,
as Wellmer has
pointed out,
involved both
a
cognitive
and moral
aspect (p. 45). However,
for Habermas the
problem
of
modernity
is that the
project
of
Enlightenment
is still
incomplete
insofar as the
moral
aspect
of the
project
(human dignity)
has not
kept pace
with its
cognitive
development
(scientific
knowledge).
At the level of social
theory, therefore,
Habermas is in search of a
theory
that will enable him to think
through
both
these aspects
in terms of a
developmental history
or
theory
of evolution in
which not
only
will the role of science and
technology
receive its
due,
but
also,
and more
importantly,
so will the role of
morals,
law and world-views.
There is no doubt that theories of evolution have
seriously
under-theorized
this latter
dimension,
but Linkenbach
objects
to evolutionism itself as a
project
because of its &dquo;reductionist
interpretation
of the historical
development
of the
species&dquo; (p.
54). Her reasons are
good
ones.
They are, firstly,
that such a
project
devalues human
creativity and, secondly,
that its results
always merely
reflect the initial theoretical
postulates.
The
key
initial
postulate is,
of
course,
provided by
discourse
theory;
and the
way
it
shapes
the
conceptual round-trip
that both
over-privileges discursivity
and never
escapes
from its own
premises
is
ably put by
Linkenbach as follows:
In that Habermas now understands
autonomy (Mtlndigkeit)
as
discursive reason and
regards
this as a
potential
laid down in
speech
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129
and, therefore, present
since the
beginning
of the
history
of the
species,
he can a) conceive the human
species
in its
totality
as
fundamentally
rational; b)
legitimate
discursive reason as the
highest
form of
rationality
and c)
interpret
social
development
as a
process
of rationalisation or
development
which has a direction that is
progressive. (p. 28)
This
privileging
of the
discursive,
and the
reading
of it back into
history and,
therefore,
of
history
itself as the
rendering explicit
of what was there
implicitly
is the fundamental reason for Habermass
inability
to do well on his own test.
Mythical thought
will not so much be made clear as made
redundant;
a victim
of a
stage theory
which will label it with the
epithet
of
immaturity.
The
key culprit
here is the notion of rational reconstruction which Haber-
mas borrows from
Piaget, along
with the latters account of
ontogenesis
which
Habermas will use to make
parallels
with in his account of
phylogenesis.
Hence, although
Habermass
key
concern is the Weberian one of the
process
of rationalization at the level of world
views,
his
programme
is a
strongly
evo-
lutionist one which resolves the ambivalences of Webers own
thought
in the
direction of universalism or unilinearism and
away
from theoretical
pluralism
or
perspectivism (p.
69). Linkenbach moves in the
opposite
direction. The con-
sequence
of Habermass choice for his
reading
of
pre-modern
societies is that
their
unlearnt,
or alternative
possibilities, go
unnoticed in a
stage-theoretical
conception
of the
pre-history
of
modernity
in which what is crucial is what has
been learnt. The conclusion of Linkenbachs detailed
analysis
of Habermass
account of archaic societies is that it is based on &dquo;two
questionable premises:
on the one
hand,
the
homology
drawn between
mythical cognitive
structures
and the
natural,
unconscious horizon of
experience
of the small child
and,
on the other
hand,
the thesis
concerning
the universal
mastery
of nature and
instrumental action as the
only cognitively
relevant
way
of
coming
to terms
with nature&dquo;
(p.
96). Linkenbach wants to
argue, therefore,
that archaic soci-
eties offer us the vision of another
way
of
appropriating
nature and that far
from
being
deficient in
rationality they
have the
reaching
of consensus at the
very
heart of their
political processes.
In an
attempt
to save what is
unique
to
archaic societies from the
homogenizing
universalism of Habermasian evolu-
tionism Linkenbach turns to the treatment of
mythical thought
in the work of
L6vi-Strauss and in the work of Winch.
However,
she finds neither structuralist
universalism nor the relativism of
language game theory satisfactory. Hence,
she wants to mark her distance from all three theories. In order to &dquo;relativize&dquo;
Habermass
theory
of
modernity
she
adopts
a two-fold
strategy. Firstly,
she
wants a more
open
and weaker
concept
of reason.
And, secondly,
she wants
to
&dquo;put
into
question
the
developmental logic
of the differentiation of reason&dquo;
(p.
150). In this
way
she
hopes
to
open up
&dquo;the
prospect
of a
dialogue
with
the other&dquo;
(p.
155).
Such a
strategy
involves the construction of new
concepts
which
escape
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130
the
unsatisfactory
dualisms of work and
interaction,
as in the
early Habermas,
and
system
and
life-world,
as in the late Habermas. These
concepts
would be
more dialectical in the sense that
they
would
try
to think
through
the
specificity
of archaic societies
relationally,
rather than think
past
their
specificity
in the es-
sentialist manner of Habermass evolutionism. The three
concepts
she
develops
are:
Ncaturbeziehureg, Gesellscbaftlicbung
or
Gesellscbaftlicbkeit,
and
,Subjek-
tivitaet or
Selbstbeziehung.
The notions of
&dquo;relationship
to
nature&dquo;,
&dquo;mode of
sociability&dquo;,
and
&dquo;relationship
of self are for Linkenbach dimensions of social
practice (gesellschcaftlicher Irc~xis).
She
argues, furthermore,
that
&dquo;every
form
of human existence is contained within the three levels of the
appropriation
of the
objective
conditions of
reproduction
(=
relationship
to
nature),
of the
relationship
to
society
and of the
relationship
to self&dquo;
(p.
177). For all three
concepts
she is indebted to the work
of Johann Arnason,
in
particular
his vol-
ume entitled Zzvischen Natur und
Gesellschaft.l however,
the use to which she
puts
these
concepts
constitutes one of the most
original
and
interesting parts
of
the book.
Through
the use of selected case studies she
analyses
the relation-
ship
of archaic societies to nature in terms of work (Arbeit) and
self-activity
(Selbst-betaetigung),
to the mode of
sociability
in terms of
equality, reciprocity,
power
and
authority, socio-ecological equilibrium,
and
gender relationships.
Only
the notion of
subjectivity
remains
relatively poorly developed.
In the final two
parts
of her book Linkenbach
begins
to
bring
the threads of
her alternative to the Habermasian
project together.
The alternative she seeks
to
develop
is a
theory
of
practice
or of social
practice (gesellschcsftlicher~ruxis).
In the
penultimate chapter
Linkenbach seeks to
develop
this notion
through
a
critique
of Habermass later work before
sketching
the alternative itself in
the final
chapter through
the use of ideas and
concepts
from the
philosophical
work of Karel Kosik and the more
sociologically-orientated
work of
Anthony
Giddens. Let me first of all outline this alternative before
suggesting
a line of
criticism in terms of two
missing figures, namely
Pierre Bourdieu and Cornelius
Castoriadis. For Linkenbach it is
only
a dialectical
concept
of
practice
that can
hold
together
what Habermas
splits apart
into the notions of life-world and
sys-
tem. The
concept
of
practice
both
integrates
and
goes beyond
both
concepts.
Linkenbach
argues against
Habermass notion of life-world on the
grounds of,
inter
alia,
his reduction of it to a &dquo;site of
understanding&dquo;,
rather than a &dquo;site of
structurating practice&dquo; (p.
210). She
argues against
Habermass notion of
sys-
tem on the
grounds of,
inter
alia,
its reductionist
re-interpretation
of the labour
process (p.
262). The
task, therefore,
is to
develop
a
concept
of
&dquo;society
as
an ensemble
(Zusammenspiel) involving
both the
appropriation
of nature and
social interaction
(practice)&dquo; (p.
265). This can
only
be done from the stand-
point
of a
theory
of
practice,
for
only
such a
theory
enables one to dialecti-
cally
mediate
activity
and relations. Both the notions of
lVaturbezichurtg
and
Gesellschc~ftlichkeit
are for Linkenbach dimensions of social
activity (sozialer
Taetigkeit)
which can become sedimented in social
relationships
(sozialen
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131
Verhaeltnisse) that in turn constrain social
activity (p.
294). The rehabilita-
tion of
siibjekliiJi1aet
is also
part
and
parcel
of a
practice-orientated approach.
Linkenbach
argues
that &dquo;the social
subject Q~~c~/i~c~r 5M~/e~)
(also the
subject
of
everyday
life
(Alltagssubjekt)) always already
lives and acts within
social
relationships,
and that these
relationships
are at the same time both
the
presupposition
and result of its
(reproductive
and transformative)
activity&dquo;
(p.
295). Such a
conception
enables one also to think
through
the
practical
nature of consciousness (a dimension which is neither unconscious nor dis-
cursively formulated);
and also to restore to the
subject
its
creativity
which is
defined in terms of its transformative
capacity.
For both these
points
she is
indebted to the work of Giddens in
particular.
My
reason for
mentioning
the two
missing figures
of Bourdieu and Cas-
toriadis has
nothing arbitrary
or churlish about it. Both are
pre-eminently
praxis-orientated
thinkers and
any attempt
to
develop
a notion of social
prac-
tice must come to terms with them both. Of
course,
both are
radically
different
thinkers.
Bourdieu, despite
his
protestations
to the
contrary,
is above all the
thinker of the
reproductive
character of social
praxis.
The structured and struc-
turing dispositions
which constitute a babitus seem to leave little room for a
truly
transformative
theory
of the
subject
as the
structuring
or
generative
struc-
tures are orientated to the
objective possibilities provided by
the field. On this
score,
as on
many others,
Castoriadiss
theory
seems the more
promising
as
the accent is
placed
on the creative
aspect
of social
practice
in the context of a
theory
where the realm of
world-views,
to use a Habermasian
term,
is
thought
through
in a
radically
non-evolutionist manner. This omission is all the more
surprising
in that a
recurring
theme of the book is the need to
give creativity
its due. And
yet
the one thinker who has done more than
anyone
else to think
through
this notion is not even mentioned in
passing.
In fairness to Linken-
bach it should be
pointed
out that in the context of a
critique
of Habermass
evolutionism it would be difficult to do much more than adumbrate an alter-
native
approach.
And that with
regard
to the main task she has set
herself,
which was to demonstrate that Habermass
evolutionary
universalism can not
make
good
on its own claim to show us what we have unlearnt in the course
of our
development,
her book succeeds
admirably.
Notes
1. See
J.P. Arnason,
Zwischen Natur und
Gesellschaft:
Studien zu einer kritischen
Theorie des
Subjekts
(Frankfurt u.a., 1976).
Antje Linkenbach, Opake gestalten
des
Denkens, Jürgen
Habermas und die
Rationalitaet fremder Lebensformen (München,
Wilhelm Fink
Verlag,
1986).
by Pepe Portillo on July 15, 2014 the.sagepub.com Downloaded from