CONSTITUTIONAL I

File No. 2

e. Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit Article XVI, Sec. 3,
CONSTITUTION
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
Gen. Rule : The State may not be sued without its consent.
Basis : Sec. 3, Art. XVI of the Constitution.

Reason : There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on
which the right depends.

When considered a suit against the State:

1. The Republic is sued by name;
2. Suits against an un incorporated government agency;
3. Suits is against a government official, but is such that ultimate liability shall
devolve on the government:

a. When a public officer acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority, he can be held personally liable for damages.
b. BUT: If he acted pursuant to his official duties, without malice,
negligence, or bad faith, he is not personally liable, and the suit is really one
against the State.

Application / Prohibition of the rule:

1. This rule applies not only in favor of the Philippines but also in favor of the
foreign states.
2. The rule likewise prohibits a person from filing for interpleader, with the State
as one of the defendants being compelled to interplead.

CASES

The Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) is part of the government being in fact an
office under the office of the President and therefore, cannot be sued without the
consent of the State. The consent to be effective must come from the State, acting
through a duly enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant RCA agreed to
had no binding force in the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his
authority (Republic vs. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470).

The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private
respondent sustained with regard to its goods. To permit private respondents claim to
prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the
Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which
ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been
converted technically into a suit against the State. The Bureau of Customs, along with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty,
namely, taxation (Farolan vs. CTA, 217 SCRA 298).

It is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or personal
capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official
functions, said complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the grounds
relied upon by the petitioners because as a consequence of the hypothetical admission
of the truth of the allegations therein, the case falls within the exception to the doctrine
of State immunity (USA vs. Reyes, GR 79233, March 1, 1993).

Feliciano was holding property title to which was evidenced by an informacion
posesoria. Proclamation no. 90 of President Magsaysay included it among properties
for subdivision and distribution. Feliciano sued the Republic, represented by the Land
Authority, to recover possession of the land. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic
as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land,
bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a
piece of property. The State pleaded immunity from suit. The suit against the State
which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the
State has consented to be sued. Informacion posesoria had not been shown to have
been converted into a record of ownership. It is nothing more than prima facie evidence
of possession. Feliciano must pursue to prove title. The consent of the State to be sued
must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State Immunity can only be made by
an act of legislative body (Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424).

Forms of Consent

1. Express consent
2. Implied consent


i) express consent

1. When the law expressly grants the authority to sue the State or any of its
agencies.
2. Examples:
a. A law creating a government body expressly providing that such
body may sue or be sued.
b. Art 2180 of the Civil Code, which creates liability against the State when it acts
through a special agent.

CASES

Respondent Singson cause of action is a money claim against the government for the
payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau
of Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, mandamus is
not remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State, but an ordinary
action for specific performance. The suit is against the State which cannot prosper or
be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. The respondent
should have filed his claim with the general auditing office under the provision of
comm..act 327 which prescribe the condition under which money claim against the
government may be filed (Sayson vs. Singson, 54 SCRA 282).

By consenting to be sued, the State simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in its favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives remedy to
enforce a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Subject
to its right to interpose any lawful defense. The Government of the Philippines is only
liable for the acts of its agents, officers, and employees when they act as special agents.
A special agent is one who receives a definite and fix order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official (Meritt vs. Government, 34 Phil
311).

By engaging in business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the
government divests itself of its sovereign character so as to render the corporation
subject to the rules governing the private corporations. Garnishment is a proper
remedy for a prevailing party to proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if
owned or controlled by the government. It is well settled that when a government enters
into commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated just
like any other corporation (PNB vs. CIR, 81 SCRA 314).

Under its charter (RA 1161, Sec. 4K) the SSS can sue and be sued. So, if assuming
that the SSS enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions
by virtue of the explicit provision of the enabling law, it can be sued. The government
must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not
thereby concede its liability (SSS vs. CA, 120 SCRA 707).

ii) implied consent

1. When the State enters into a private contract. The contract must be entered into by the
proper officer and within the scope of his authority. UNLESS: the contract is merely
incidental to the performance of a governmental function.

2. When the State enters into a business contract. UNLESS: The operation is incidental to
the performance of a governmental function (e.g. arrastre services). Thus, when the
State conduct business operations through GOCC, the latter can be generally be sued,
even if its charter contains no express sue or be sued clause.

Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued (US v. Guinto, 182
SCRA 6440;

Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No
implied consent (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487);

3. When it is a suit against an incorporated government agency
Unincorporated
a. Performs governmental functions: not suable without State consent even if performing
proprietary function incidentally.
b. Performs proprietary functions: suable.

4. When the State files suit against a private party UNLESS: the suit is entered into only to
resist a claim..

CASES

When the State files an action, it divests itself of the sovereign character and shed its
immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant (RP vs. Sandiganbayan,
GR 85384, February 28, 1990).

The claim for damages for the use of property against the intervenor dependant
Republic of the Philippines to which it was transferred cannot be maintained because of
the immunity of the State from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge against,
or financial liability to, the Government and consequently cannot be entertained by the
courts except with the consent of the government (Lim vs. Brownell, 107 Phil 344).

When the government enters into a commercial transaction, it abandons its sovereign
capacity and it is to be treated like any other corporation (Malong Vs. PNR, 138 SCRA 63).

National Irrigation Authority is a government agency vested with corporate
personality separate and distinct from the government (Sec .1, RA 3601), thus is
governed by the Corporation Law. Under Sec. 2, PD 552 NIA is allowed to collect fees
and other charges as maybe necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance, and
insurance and to recover the cost of construction, etc. NIA may also sue and be sued in
court. It is authorized to exercise the powers of a corporation under the Corporation
Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provision of NIA charter (Fontanilla Vs.
Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486).

The application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign
or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantel of State immunity cannot be
extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). If the contract was
entered into the discharge of its governmental functions, the sovereign State cannot be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit (JUSMAG vs. NLRC, GR 198813, Dec. 15, 1994).

Petitioner filed an action in the CFI of Zamboanga City for the revocation of a Deed of
Donation which he and his wife had made to the Bureau of Plant and Industry. He
claimed that the donee failed to comply with the condition of the donation. Ordinarily,
a suit of this nature cannot prosper. It would, however, be manifestly unfair for the
government, as donee, which is alleged to have violated the condition under which it
received gratuitously certain property, to invoke its immunity. Since it would be
against equity and justice to allow such defense in this case, consent to be sued could
be presumed (Santiago vs. Republic, 87 SCRA 294).

When the government takes any property for public use, which is condition upon the
payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it
submits to the jurisdiction of a court. The Court may proceed with the complaint and
determine the compensation to which the petitioner are entitle (Ministerio vs. CFI, 40 SCRA
464).

iii) Consent to execution

Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of judgment against it. Such
execution will require another waiver, because the power of the court ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment, unless such disbursement is covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law (Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84).

Rules Regarding Garnishment or Levy of Government Funds in Government
Depository:

General Rule: Government funds deposited with PNB or authorized depositories cannot be
subject to garnishment.

Exceptions:

1. where law or ordinance has already been enacted appropriating a specific amount
to pay a valid governmental obligation (Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, GR No.
L-61744, June 25, 1984).

2. funds belonging to government corporations which can sue and be sues that are
deposited with a bank (PNB v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595).

Rules Regarding Payment of Interests by Government in Money Judgments Against
it:

General Rule: Government cannot be made to pay interests;

Exceptions:

1. eminent domain;
2. erroneous collection of taxes; or
3. where government aggress to pay interest pursuant to law.

CASES

When a municipality fails or refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a
final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of
mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds
(Municipality of Makati vs. CA, 190 SCRA 206).

The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or
any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or
instrumentalities remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or
levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though
the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends
when the judgment is rendered. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. However, the rule is
not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that it, when there is a
corresponding appropriation is required by law. In such a case, the monetary judgment
may be legally enforced by judicial processes (City of Caloocan vs. Allarde, GR 107271, Sept. 10,
2003).

iv) Suits against foreign states / international organizations

CASES

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign
sovereign. The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established
by the memorandum and certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Where the
plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of
the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting the countrys foreign relations. Pursuant to the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the
civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to
private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the
envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission (Holy See vs.
Rosario, GR 101949, December 1, 1994).

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of
the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii. A state may be said to have descended to the level of
an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. The rule does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions and is not for commercial or business
purposes (USA vs, Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487).

International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity,
independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land
under Art. II, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued
without its consent is necessary consequence of the principles and independence and
equality of States. However, the increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental
functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the
restrictive theory, holds that immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or jure gestionis. Is
the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of business? If the foreign State is not
engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, or if the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii (Republic of
Indonesia vs. Vinzon, GR 154705, June 25, 2003).

Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime of defamation in the name of
official duty. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the commission of a crime is not part of
official duty (Liang vs. People, GR 125865, January 28, 2002).


3) CITIZENSHIP AND SUFFRAGE


a) Citizenship Article IV, CONSTITUTION

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unless by their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced
it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law.

i) Concept, distinguished from
nationality, kinds

Citizenship is a membership in a political community which is personal and more or less
permanent in character. It is the status of being a citizen, or of owing allegiance to a certain
State for the privilege of being under its protection.

Citizenship is political in character, nationality refers to a racial or ethnic relationship.

Who are citizens of the Philippines?

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

Note: The election must be made within a reasonable period
(within 3 yrs.) after reaching the age of majority.

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Caram Rule: Under the 1935 Constitution, those born in the Philippines of foreign
parent, who before the adoption of the Constitution had been elected to public office in the
Philippines are considered Filipino citizens.

FPJ Disqualification Case: The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ had seen
first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate (Tecson vs. Comelec, GR. No. 161434, March
3,2004).

Natural-born citizens:
1. Citizens of the Philippines from birth who do not need to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
2. Those who elect Philippine citizenship under Art. IV, Sec. 1(3) of 1987
Constitution.


CASES

The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution which prohibits alien to acquire private
agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese
citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question (Lee vs. Dir. Of Lands, GR 128195,
October 3, 2001).


ii) Modes of acquisition

1. By birth

a. Jus Soli acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
b. Jus Sanguinis acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relationship.

2. By naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
privilege of a native-born citizen.

Effects of naturalization:

1. On the wife:
Vests citizenship on the wife who might herself be lawfully naturalized. She need not
prove her qualifications but only that she is not disqualified (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Comm. Of
Immigration, 41 SCRA 292).

2. On the minor children:
i) if born in the Philippines automatically becomes a citizen;
ii) If born abroad before the naturalization of the father
a) residing in RP at the time of naturalization automatically
becomes citizens.
b) if not residing in RP at the time of naturalization considered
citizen only during minority, unless begins to reside permanently in the Phils.

iii) If born outside the Philippines after parents naturalization considered Filipino,
provided registered as such before any Phil. Consulate within 1 year after attaining
majority age and takes oath of allegiance.

3. By marriage:
Marriage of Filipino with an alien:
General Rule: The Filipino retains Philippine citizenship.
Exception: If, by their act or omission they are deemed under the
law to have renounce it.


CASES

The term natural-born citizens, is defined to include those who are citizen of the
Philippines. From birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Phil. Citizenship. Through the constitution history, four modes of acquiring citizenship
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata, jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two,
i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long.
With the adoption of the 1935 constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Sec. of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary
basis of citizenship by birth (Tecson vs. COMELEC, GR 161434, March 3, 2004).

Under Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, become ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines under Sec. 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippines
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided
that she does not suffer from any disqualifications under said Sec. 4. Ipso Facto as
here use does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens,
from the mere fact of relationship, necessary become such citizens also. Those who do
not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply
for naturalization in order to acquire such status. Under the second paragraph of Sec.
15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the
Philippine, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of
relationship concurs with the fact of a citizenship of his parent, and the time when
child become a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is able to prove that he
was born in the Philippines (Moya Lim Yao vs Commissioner, 41 SCRA 292).


iii) Loss and Reacquisition

How may one lose citizenship (C.A. No. 63)?

1. By naturalization in a foreign country.
2. By express renunciation of citizenship.
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to the laws or constitution of a foreign
country.
4. By serving in the armed forces of an enemy country.
5. By cancellation of certificates of naturalization.
6. By being a deserter of the armed forces of ones country.

How may one reacquire citizenship?

1. By direct act of Congress

RA 9225 Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Approved on August 29,
2003 provides that, on taking the oath of allegiance to the public:

a. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have
re-acquired Philippine citizenship and
b. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectively of the said RA
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

2. By naturalization

3. By repatriation

By RA 8171 is an act providing for the repatriation of:

a. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens and;
b. Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity.

Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Phils. and registration in proper civil registry and in Bureau of Immigration. The
Bureau of immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration
and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. It
allows the person to recover or return to his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship (Bengzon III v. HRET, GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001).

Derivative Citizenship The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon
effectivity of the said RA shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.


CASES

Sec 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Art. 5, Sec.1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose his
naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect
of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounce. At best, what might have happened as a result of a lose of his naturalized
citizenship was that he became a stateless individual. Qualifications for public office
are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure
(Frivaldo vs. Comelec, 174 SCRA 245).

Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-
time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-
born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. Philippine
citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the
purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e.,
no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country
or a unit of territory thereof. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification
distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also
stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification
(aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the
official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern. A
person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of
the modes recognized by law for the purpose (Frivaldo vs. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727).

The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring
to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence,that is, the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It
is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In the case at bar,
petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in
the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in
the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor
or as a resident alien. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived
either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring
Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As
an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under Sec 13 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus
waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine
citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former
Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act
of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status
as a non-resident alien (Coquilla vs. Comelec, GR 151914, July 31, 2002).

Art. IV, Sec. 1 (4) states that citizens are those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect the Philippine citizenship. A
minor who has not had the opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship, therefore, is still
an alien, his father being an alien. It is illogical that Delfin follow the repatriation of his
Filipino mother since he was never a Filipino, therefore he could not reacquire it. No
rule or right (even right of mother to retain custody of a minor child) should frustrate
government's action against violators of immigration laws (Villahermosa vs. Commissioner, 80
Phil 541).

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-
born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a
citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have
become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No.
473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation
when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not
left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has
not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1)
by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship
must possess certain qualifications 17 and none of the disqualifications mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces
of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States
at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and
economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists
of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering
said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides
or last resided.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of, Filipino citizens
which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2)
those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered
natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an
act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because
they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens:
(1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with
law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process
of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending
on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof (Bengson vs. HRET, GR 142840. May 7, 2001).


iv) Dual citizenship RA 9925, RA 7160 Sec.
40

Distinction between dual citizenship from dual allegiance

Dual Citizenship Dual Allegiance

Arises when as a result of the
concurrent application of the
laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously
considered a citizen of those
states.

Involuntary


Refer to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes by
some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states.



Is voluntary and illegal.
(Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630)


CASES

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result
of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered
a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution,
it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
The Court held that in including Sec. 5 Art. IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not on dual citizens per se, but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post,
Manzano elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. What the law prohibits is dual allegiance, and not dual citizenship (Mercado
vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630).

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia,
to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte,
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the
country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act
of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all
inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children were deemed to be Philippine citizens. By virtue of the
same laws, Telesforo's daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
likewise a citizen of the Philippines (Valles vs. Comelec, GR 137000, August 9, 2000).


b) Suffrage Article V, CONSTITUTION


Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they propose to
vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity
of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote
without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote
under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate
to protect the secrecy of the ballot.


i) Concept, qualifications,
occasions for exercise


Suffrage right to vote in elections.

Qualifications:

1. Citizen of the Philippines
2. Not disqualified by law.
3. At least 18 years old
4. Resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year.
5. Resident of the place wherein he/she proposes to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election.

Residency requirement under Art. V has 2 senses:

1. Domicile this is in reference to the 1 year residency requirement in the
Philippines.

The principal elements of domicile physical presence in the country and intention to
adopt it as ones domicile must concur.

2. Temporary Residence This is in reference to the 6 mos. Residency requirement
in the place where one wants or intend to vote. Residence can either mean domicile or
temporary residence.


CASES

The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost
significance. It is a right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in the
people becomes nugatory. It is a political right enabling every citizen to participate in
the process of government to assure that it derives its power from the consent of the
governed. The COMELEC is not empowered to decide questions involving the right to
vote. The power to determine whether or not a person can exercise or precluded from
exercising the right of suffrage is a judicial question, and the power to resolve such
question has been excluded from the Commission's power to be judge of election
contests (Pungutan vs. Abubakar, GR No. L-33541, Januray 20, 1972).

If the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view
that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of
unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the
Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been the
constant holding of the Court that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the
utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make
more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did,
in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this
constitutional right is directed. The power of decision of the Commission is limited to
purely 'administrative questions. It could not have been otherwise, that respondent
Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and
there is no higher law than the Constitution. There could be no justification then for
lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect
of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech (Mutuc vs.
Comelec, 32 SCRA 228).

The right to abstain from voting for a position deserves the same respect as the
exercise of the right to vote. To compel the COMELEC to conduct a special for the
position of congressman as demanded by petitioners would be to nullify the decisions of
the voters who cast their votes in the May 1992 elections (Caram vs. Comelec, GR No. 1052
14, August 30, 1993).


ii) Absentee voting Republic Act
9189

Sec. 4 of RA 9189 says: Sec. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad,
who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the
day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.

This rule applies to those who have not lost their domicile in the Philippines.

To whom does absentee voting apply?

1. Persons who have the qualifications of a voter but who happen to be temporarily
abroad.
2. Qualified voters who are in the Philippines but are temporarily absent from their
voting places.


CASES

Sec. , Art. V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised
by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least
eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and
in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. Under Sec. 5(d) of RA 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an
immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless
he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of
his/her registration under said act.

Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of an execution of an affidavit to
qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrant or permanent residents, to vote. He
focuses solely on Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional
infirmity to Sec. 5 (d) of RA 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2
empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad. It is
clear from the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission that they
intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young
Filipinos who reach voting age abroad who parents' domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. It is in pursuance
of that intention that the Commission provided for Sec. 2 immediately after the
residency requirement of Sec. 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, the strategic location of Sec. 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Sec. 1
with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same commission has in effect declared
that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even
though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Sec. 1, Article V of the
Constitution (Macalintal vs. Comelec, Gr No. 157013, July 10, 2003).