LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS (Romero

1
,
199!
FACTS
The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City raised a complaint
with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA, seeking to stop the operation
of the City !overnment of Caloocan of an "#$ hectare open gar%age dumpsite in
Tala Estate, due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the pollution
of the surrounding water#
LLDA discovered that the City !overnment of Caloocan has %een maintaining the
open dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a re&uisite Environmental Compliance
Certificate from the Environmental 'anagement Bureau of the DE()# They also
found the water to have %een directly contaminated %y the operation of the
dumpsite#
LLDA issued a Ce"se "#$ Des%s& Or$er against the City !overnment and other
entities to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of
gar%age and other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite#
The City !overnment went to the )egional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file an
action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to %e
declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and
enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a %alanced ecology within its
territorial *urisdiction#
LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the +ollution Control Law that the
review of cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of Appeals and
not the )TC#
)TC denied LLDA,s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary in*unction
en*oining LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency of
the case#
The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA '"s #o
(o)er "#$ "*&'or%&+ &o %ss*e " ,e"se "#$ $es%s& or$er e#-o%#%#. &'e $*m(%#.
o/ ."r0".e#
The residents seek a review of the decision#
ISSUE
WoN the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect
was injunctive.
THEORY OF THE PARTIES
1
I love Justice Romero. Her decisions are so organised. <3
City !overnment of Caloocan- As a local government unit, pursuant to the general
welfare provision of the Local !overnment Code, they have the mandate to operate a
dumpsite and determine the effects to the ecological %alance over its territorial
*urisdiction#
LLDA- As an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and ad*udicatory
powers and functions %y )A (o# ."/0, it is invested with the power and authority to issue
a cease and desist order pursuant to various provisions in E1 (o# 234#
RULING
5E6#
7# LLDA is mandated %y law to manage the environment, preserve the &uality of
human life and ecological systems and prevent undue ecological distur%ances,
deterioration and pollution in the Laguna Lake area and surrounding provinces and
cities, including Caloocan#
8hile pollution cases are generally under the +ollution Ad*udication Board
under the Department of Environment and (atural )esources, it does not
preclude mandate from special laws that provide another forum#
9n this case, )A (o# ."/0 provides that mandate to the LLDA# 9t is mandated to
pass upon or approve or disapprove plans and programs of local government
offices and agencies within the region and their underlying
environmental:ecological repercussions#
The DE() even recogni;ed the primary *urisdiction of the LLDA over the case
when the DE() acted as intermediary at a meeting among the representatives
of the city government, LLDA and the residents#
3# LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order#
a# E<plicit in the law#
=., par# (> e<plicitly authori;es the LLDA to make whatever order may %e
necessary in the e<ercise of its *urisdiction#
8hile LLDA was not e<pressly conferred the power ?to issue an ex-parte
cease and desist order@ in that language, the provision granting authority
to ?make (! orders re&uiring the discontinuance of pollution@, has the
same effect#
%# (ecessarily implied powers#
Assuming ar"uendo that the cease and desist order@ was not e<pressly
conferred %y law, there is *urisprudence enough to the effect#
8hile it is a fundamental rule that "# "$m%#%s&r"&%ve ".e#,+ '"s o#1+
s*,' (o)er "s e2(ress1+ .r"#&e$ &o %& 0+ 1"), it is likewise a settled
rule that "# "$m%#%s&r"&%ve ".e#,+ '"s "1so s*,' (o)ers "s "re
1
#e,ess"r%1+ %m(1%e$ %# &'e e2er,%se o/ %&s e2(ress (o)ers3 1therwise,
it will %e reduced to a ?toothless@ paper agency#
9n #o$$ution Adjudication %oard vs &ourt of Appea$s, the Court ruled that
the +AB has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order on
prima facie evidence of an esta%lishment e<ceeding the allowa%le
standards set %y the antiApollution laws of the country#
LLDA has %een vested with sufficiently %road powers in the regulation of
the pro*ects within the Laguna Lake region, and this includes the
implementation of relevant antiApollution laws in the area#
UNION 4ANK v HLUR4 5 Gr%6o7A8*%#o 5 1999
FACTS:
9n 724>, 'artha David purchased from Bereit )ealty Development (B)DC a
condominium unit for +374C paya%le in $0 e&ual monthly installments
9n 724", B)DC, without David,s knowledge and without prior approval from (DA,
mortgaged the condominium pro*ect to Bancom (predecessor of Enion Bank
B)DC failed to pay its o%ligation# Conse&uently, Bancom foreclosed the mortgaged
o% ./ condominium units, including the unit of David
The 6heriff issued a certificate of sale in favor Bar East Bank since it was the
highest %idder
9n 72"2, David and Fua;on (who purchased David,s unit filed a complaint in the
DLE)B against Enion Bank and Bar East Bank to-
o Allow David and to consign the %alance of the purchase price to %e paid to
the %anks
o Annul the title of the two %anks over David,s condominium praying
The Banks filed a motion to dismiss and an Answer &uestioning DLE)B,s
*urisdiction
DLE)B denied the motion and said that the motion to dismiss will render nugatory
the summary nature of proceeding %efore the DLE)B
Enion Bank filed a petition for certiorari alleging the following-
o The complaint should have %een filed in the regular trial courts
o 6ince the DLE)B was created in 72"7, it has no *urisdiction over
contracts that took effect prior to 72"7
ISSUE: 8o( the DLE)B has *urisdiction to hear and decide a condominium %uyer,s
complaint for annulment of a real estate mortgage constituted %y the pro*ect owner
without his consent and without the prior consent of (DA
DECISION: YES
6ec# > of +D 2/4 vested (DA the EGCLE69HE *urisdiction to regulate the real estate
trade and %usiness while 6ec# 7" of the same decree prohi%ited the mortgage on
any unit %y the owner or developer 89TD1ET +)91) 8)9TTE( A++)1HAL from
(DA
6u%se&uently, +D 7>.. e<panded the *urisdiction of (DA to include the e<clusive
*urisdiction to hear and decide cases involving-
o Ensound real estate %usiness practices
o Claims filed %y condominium unit %uyer against the pro*ect developer
o 6pecific performance of contractual o%ligations filed %y condo %uyers
E1 $." transferred the regulatory and &uasiA*udicial functions of (DA to D6)C
(Duman 6ettlements )egulatory Commission and in 72"$, E1 20 changed the
name of D6)C to DLE)B
9( TD96 CA6E, B)DC,s act of mortgaging the condominium pro*ect to Bancom
without the knowledge and consent of David and without the approval of (DA (now
DLE)B was not only an unsound real estate %usiness practice %ut also highly
pre*udicial to the %uyer
TDE6, the case clearly falls under the *urisdiction of DLE)B
The *urisdiction of the DLE)B to regulate the real estate trade is %road enough to
include *urisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, or
annulment of the mortgage, of a condominium unit with damages
AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE VS3 FACTORAN
Ose" v3 Am0ros%o
CarpioA'orales, I# J April 4, 300$
FACTS
9n Iune 7227, +etitioner Edmundo 1sea and respondent Antonio Am%rosio
(Am%rosio entered into a Contract to 6ell a ?Douse and Lot Enit@ in a
su%division#
9n (ovem%er 7227, Edmundo and Am%orsio forged a Deed of 6ale, where
Edmundo agreed to %uy the same house and lot su%*ect of the Contract to 6ell#
9n accordance with the ?package deal@ provided in the Contract to 6ell, coA
respondent )odolfo +ere; was contracted %y Am%rosio to construct the house
of petitioner spouses with the specifications in the Contract to 6ell, Bill of
'aterials and Approved Building +lan %y the Building 1fficial of Fue;on City#
The house was completed on August 7227 and the spouses occupied it# A
2
month later, its front and %ack walls cracked# Am%rosio claimed that the cracks
were mere hairline defects in the ?pa$itada@ and filled them up with cement#
+etitioner Ligaya 1sea lodged a complaint with the 1ffice of the Building
1fficial of Fue;on City for violation of the (ational Building Code#
6u%se&uently, spouses filed a complaint for damages against Am%rosio and
+ere; %efore the )TC# )espondents &uestion the *urisdiction of the )TC,
contending that the complaint is within the e<clusive *urisdiction of the DLE)B#
The 1ffice of the Building 1fficial of FC found that the %uilding and occupancy
permits were validly issued and dismissed the complaint of the 1seas#
)TC granted the damages prayed for %y petitioners and held that respondents
deviated from the approved plan#
CA declared )TC,s decision as null and void for lack of *urisdiction as it is the
DLE)B that has e<clusive *urisdiction over the complaint for damages#
o The complaint is a necessary offshoot of the alleged violation of the
Building Code# The fact that petitioners filed a separate action for
damages instead of including it as an ancillary claim does not divest
the DLE)B of its *urisdiction and %ring it within the *urisdiction of
regular courts#
o This is a case that necessarily needs a determination of facts,
circumstances and incidental matters which the law has specifically
%estowed to the DLE)B#
ISSUES, ARGUMENTS ; HELD
81( DLE)B has e<clusive *urisdiction over the action for damages# YES, complaints for
%reach of contract or specific performance with damages filed %y a su%division lot or
condominium unit %uyer against the owner or developer fall under the e<clusive
*urisdiction of the DLE)B#
+etitioners contend that their action for damages is not 'ased on the deviation from the
approved su%division plan# The complaint for damages alleged a %reach of contract, for
failure to comply with the %uilding plans, which is a violation of the Civil Code#
)espondents argue that DLE)B has e<clusive *urisdiction as the controversy arose
contracts from contracts %etween the su%division developer and house and lot %uyer#
RATIONALE
!enerally, the e<tent to which an administrative agency may e<ercise its
powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating
or empowering such agency#
+D (o# 7>.. grants to the DLE)B *urisdiction in cases of- (a Ensound real
estate %usiness practicesK (% Claims filed %y su%division lot or condominium
unit %uyer against the developerK and (c Cases involving specific performance
of contractual and statutory o%ligations filed %y %uyers of su%division lots
against the developer#
+D (o# 2/4 provides that the DLE)B shall have e<clusive *urisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and %usiness#
E1 (o# 20 names DLE)B as the sole and regulatory %oard for housing#
The %usiness of developing su%divisions %eing im%ued with pu%lic interest and
welfare, any &uestion arising from the e<ercise of that prerogative should %e
%rought to the DLE)B, which has the technical knowAhow on the matter#

9n the
e<ercise of its powers, the DLE)B must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts# This
ancillary power is no longer a uni&uely *udicial function, e<ercisa%le only %y the
regular courts#
9n &.(. (orres v. )i'ionada, 6C affirmed the competence of DLE)B to award
damages although this is an essentially *udicial power e<ercisa%le only %y
courts of *ustice#
Ender the $o,&r%#e o/ (r%m"r+ "$m%#%s&r"&%ve -*r%s$%,&%o#, courts cannot or
will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the
e<ercise of sound administrative discretion re&uiring the special knowledge,
e<perience, and services of the administrative tri%unal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact#
DLE)B has the e<pertise to determine the %asic technical issue of whether the
alleged deviations from the %uilding plans and the technical specifications
affect the soundness and structural strength of the house#
+etitioners attempt to separate their rights to the lot, which they admit is within
DLE)B *urisdiction, and their rights to the house %uilt on the lot, which they
allege is enforcea%le in regular courts#
Both the Contract to 6ell and Deed of 6ale involve the sale and purchase of
the ?house and lot unit#@ There is a clear intent %y the parties that the house
"#$ lot %e treated as the single o%*ect of their contracts#
Allowing the splitting of a single cause of action would result in duplicity of
suits and possi%le conflicting findings %y 3 tri%unals on the same claim#
MATEO V3 CA
August 7., 722/ J I# +uno
F",&s
3
Epon complaint of some 'orong 8ater District ('18AD employees,
petitioners, all Board 'em%ers of '18AD, conducted an investigation on
private respondent Edgar 6ta# 'aria, then !eneral 'anager#
6ta# 'aria was then placed under preventive suspension and 6an Diego was
designated in his place# 6ta# 'aria was later dismissed on Ianuary 4, 722>#
Ianuary 7", 722> L private respondent filed a 6pecial Civil Action for Fuo
8arranto and 'andamus with preliminary in*unction %efore the )TC#
+etitioner moved to dismiss the case on 3 grounds-
o Court had no *urisdiction over disciplinary actions of government
employees which is vested e<clusively in the Civil 6ervice Comission
o Fuo warranto was not the proper remedy
'otion to dismiss and 'B) dismissed#
CA likewise dismissed petition and denied petitioner,s 'B)#
Iss*e
<oN &'e RTC o/ R%="1 '"s -*r%s$%,&%o# over ,"ses %#vo1v%#. $%sm%ss"1 o/
"# em(1o+ee o/ " 8*"s%7(*01%, ,or(or"&%o#3 NO
R"&%o
'18AD is a &uasiApu%lic corporation created pursuant to +D 72" (+rovincial
8ater Etilities Act of 724>#
D"v"o C%&+ <"&er D%s&r%,& v3 CSC: employees of governmentAowned or
controlled corporations with original charter fall under the *urisdiction of the
C6C#
The esta%lished rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of !1CCs are
governed %y the provisions of the Civil 6ervice Law and )ules and
)egulations#
+D "04, E1 323 and )ule 99, 6ec7 of 'emorandum Circular (o# .. series of
7220 of the C6C categorically provide that the party aggrieved %y a decision,
ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of
services may appeal to the Commission within 7/ days# Thereafter, private
respondent could go on certiorari to this Court under )ule $/ of the )oC if he
still feels aggrieved %y the ruling of the C6C#
M"#,%&" v3 4"r,%#"s: The C6C, under the constitution, is the single ar%iter of
all contests relating to the civil service, and as such, its *udgments are
unappeala%le and su%*ect only to the 6C,s certiorari *udgment#
'ancita however no longer governs for under the present rule, final resolutions
of the C6C shall %e appeala%le to the CA#
9n any event, whether under the old rule or the present rule, )TCs have no
*urisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees
covered %y the Civil 6ervice Law#
PAL v3 C%v%1 Aero#"*&%,s 4o"r$ (CA4! (Torres Ir, 7224
BACT6-
+rivate )espondent !randair applied for a Certificate of +u%lic Convenience
and (ecessity with the Board#
Accordingly, the Chief Dearing 1fficer of the CAB issued a (otice of Dearing
setting the application for initial hearing and directing !randAir to serve a copy
of the application and notice to all scheduled +hilippine Domestic operators#
!randAir filed its Compliance, and re&uested for the issuance of a Temporary
1perating +ermit
+etitioner +AL filed an 1pposition to the application for a Certificate of +u%lic
Convenience and (ecessity with one of the grounds as- (7 CAB has no
*urisdiction to hear his application until the latter has first o%tained a franchise
to operate from Congress %ut the CAB Chief 1perating 1fficer denied the
opposition
+etitioner +AL then opposed private respondentMs application for a temporary
permit since applicant didnMt possess the re&uired fitness and capa%ility and
applicant has failed to prove that thereMs a clear and urgent pu%lic need for the
services applied for
The Board approved the issuance of a Temporary 1perating +ermit for a
period of > months and it *ustified its assumption of *urisdiction over !randAirMs
application
upon motion %y private respondent !randAir, the temporary permit was
e<tended for $ months
Thus, this petition where petitioner +AL argues that respondent %oard acted
'eyond its powers and jurisdiction in takin" co"ni*ance of +randAir,s
app$ication for the issuance of a &ertificate of #u'$ic &onvenience and
Necessity and in issuin" a temporary permit since +randAir didn,t have a
$e"is$ative franchise to en"a"e in schedu$ed domestic air transportation- a
$e"is$ative franchise may on$y 'e "ranted 'y &on"ress as espoused in .ec. //,
Art. /0 and .ec. /, Art. 1 of &onsti
0
.
)espondent !randAir re$ies on its interpretation of 2A 331 which fo$$ows the
pronouncements of the &A in Avia 4i$ipinas v &A% and .i$an"an Airways v
+rand 5nt,$ Airways where &A uphe$d the authority of the %oard to issue such
authority in the a'sence of a $e"is$ative franchise which authority is derived
from .ec /6 2A 331
966EE6-
/. WoN &A% has jurisdiction over +randAir,s App$ication for a (emporary
7peratin" #ermit8 9:.
2
See page 546 footnote of case
4
0. WoN a $e"is$ative franchise is an a'so$ute re;uirement for the %oard to have
authority to issue &ertificates of #u'$ic &onvenience and Necessity8 N7
)AT91-
13 CAB has *urisdiction over !randAirMs Application for a Temporary 1perating
+ermit# 9n #AL v. &A% (/<1=!, it was esta%lished that )A 44$ e<pressly
authori;ed the Board to issue a temporary operating permit or Certificate of
+u%lic Convenience and (ecessity# T'e CA4>s "*&'or%&+ &o.r"#& "
&em(or"r+ (erm%& *(o# %&s o)# %#%&%"&%ve s&ro#.1+ s*..es&s &'e (o)er &o
e2er,%se s"%$ "*&'or%&+, eve# 0e/ore &'e (rese#&"&%o# o/ ev%$e#,e3
Assuming arguendo that a legislative franchise is a prere&uisite to the issuance
of a permit, %&s "0se#,e $oes#>& "//e,& &'e -*r%s$%,&%o# o/ &'e 4o"r$ &o 'e"r
&'e "((1%,"&%o#, 0*& &o11s o#1+ *(o# &'e *1&%m"&e %ss*"#,e o/ &'e re8*es&e$
(erm%&3
The power to authori;e and control the operation of a pu%lic utility is a prerogative of the
legislature# Dowever, Congress has granted administrative agencies the power to grant
licenses for, or to authori;e the operation of certain pu%lic utilities# I& %s .e#er"11+
re,o.#%=e$ &'"& " /r"#,'%se m"+ 0e $er%ve$ %#$%re,&1+ /rom &'e s&"&e &'ro*.' " $*1+
$es%.#"&e$ ".e#,+, "#$ &o &'%s e2&e#&, &'e (o)er &o .r"#& /r"#,'%ses '"s /re8*e#&1+
0ee# $e1e."&e$, eve# &o ".e#,%es o&'er &'"# &'ose o/ " 1e.%s1"&%ve #"&*re3 8ith this,
privileges conferred %y grant %y local authorities as agents of the state constitute as
much a legislative franchise as though the grant had %een made %y an act of the
Legislature#
The trend of modern legislation is to vest the +u%lic 6ervice Commissioner with the
power to regulate and control the operation of pu%lic services under reasona%le rules and
regulations and as a general rule, Courts will not interfere with the e<ercise of that
discretion when it is *ust and reasona%le and founded upon a legal right# Thus, &'e CA4
'"s &'e "*&'or%&+ &o %ss*e " Cer&%/%,"&e o/ P*01%, Co#ve#%e#,e "#$ Ne,ess%&+ or
Tem(or"r+ O(er"&%#. Perm%& &o " $omes&%, "%r &r"#s(or& o(er"&or )'o, &'o*.' #o&
(ossess%#. " 1e.%s1"&%ve /r"#,'%se, mee&s "11 &'e o&'er re8*%reme#&s (res,r%0e$ 0+
1")3
Congress, %y giving CAB the power to issue permits, has delegated to the
%ody the authority to determine the capa%ility and competence of a prospective
domestic air transport operator to engage in such venture# Co#.ress '"s se&
s(e,%/%, 1%m%&"&%o#s o# 'o) s*,' "*&'or%&+ s'o*1$ 0e e2er,%se$ %# RA ??@
0+ s(e,%/+%#. &'e re8*%reme#&s &o $e&erm%#e &'e ,om(e&e#,+ o/ "
(ros(e,&%ve o(er"&or &o e#.".e %# &'e (*01%, serv%,e o/ "%r &r"#s(or&"&%o#
"#$ &'e (ro,e$*re /or &'e (ro,ess%#. o/ "((1%,"&%o# o/ " Cer&%/%,"&e o/
P*01%, Co#ve#%e#,e "#$ Ne,ess%&+3
93 ThereMs nothing in the law nor in the Constitution that indicates that a legislative
franchise is an indispensa%le re&uirement for an entity to operate as a
domestic air transport operator# Although 6ec# 77 of Art# 73 recogni;es
CongressM control over any franchise certificate or authority to operate a pu%lic
utility, it doesnMt mean Congress has e<clusive authority to issue the same# 9n
6ec# 70
>
, Congress intended to delegate the authority to regulate the issuance
of a license to operate domestic air transport services#
#etitioner #AL ar"ues that a &ertificate of #u'$ic &onvenience and Necessity is
issued to a pu'$ic service for which a franchise is re;uired 'y $aw as
distin"uished from a >&ertificate of #u'$ic &onvenience? which is an
authori*ation issued for the operation of pu'$ic services for which no franchise
is re;uired 'y $aw.
The Court said that the terms ?convenience and necessity,@ if used together in a
statute, are usually construed together# +u%lic convenience and necessity
e<ists when the proposed facility will meet a reasona%le want of the pu%lic and
supply a need which the e<isting facilities do not ade&uately afford# 9t doesnMt
mean or re&uire an actual physical necessity or an indispensa%le thing# 9t is the
law which determines the re&uisites for the issuance of the certification and not
the title indicating the certificate#
ER4 vs3 Co*r& o/ A((e"1s
+angani%an, I# J 'arch 3/, 7222
BACT6-
- The mem%ers of the Association of 'indanao 9ndustries (A'9 are enterprises
which were among those granted direct connection facility %y the (ational +ower
3
See page 551 for the provision
5
Corporation ((apocor although operating within the franchise area of 9ligan Light
and +ower, 9nc# (9ligan#
- 9ligan filed with the Energy )egulatory Board (E)B a petition for the
implementation of the 72"4 Ca%inet +olicy )eforms in the +ower 6ector, praying
specificaly that the direct supply of power to industries within its franchise area
(i#e# A'9 %e discontinued %y (apocor#
- The Ca%inet +olicy )eforms provides, in part-
o ?Continue direct connectionsNuntil such time as the appropriate
regulatory %oard determines that direct connetion of industry to (apocor
is no longer necessary in the franchise areaN#with satisfactory
guarantees of nonApre*udice to industries##@
- 9n its petition, 9ligan alleged that it can meet, even surpass the set of financial
standards adopted %y the E)B pursuant to the policy guidelines set %y the
Ca%inet#
- A'9 filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the following grounds-
o L",A o/ -*r%s$%,&%o# o# &'e ("r& o/ ER4 &o 'e"r &'e (e&%&%o#
o Bailure to state a cause of action
o (onA*oinder of indispensa%le parties
- CA held that the core of the issue is related to the distri%ution and marketing of
energy resources and is hence within the *urisdiction of the Department of
Energy, pursuant to )A 4$>"#
966EE-
- 81( the E)B has *urisdiction to hear and decide cases involving direct
connection issues#
o 9ligan claims that )A 4$>" transferred to the D1E E)B,s nonAprice
regulatory powers and functions relative to the petroleum industry# This
argument was founded on the definition of ener"y source under the act#
DELD-
- (1# +ursuant to )A 4$>", it is now the Department of Energy (D1E that has
*urisdiction#
)AT91-
- The court cited the consolidated cases (7 (A+1C1) vs# CA and Cagayan Electric
+ower and (3 +hividec 9ndustrial Authority vs# CA and Cagayan Electric +ower,
where it was held that-
o The determination of which of the two pu%lic utilities has the right to supply
electric power to an area which is within the coverage of %oth is certainly
not a rateAfi<ing function which should remain with the E)B# 9t deals with
the regulation of the distri%ution of energy resources, which under E1 743
is a function of E)B# Dowever, with the enactment of )A 4$>", the D1E
took over such functions#
- 9t is now the D1E that has *urisdiction over the regulation of the marketing and the
distri%ution of energy resources# Although formerly %elonging to the E)B, )A 4$>"
transferred the nonArateAfi<ing *urisdiction power and functions of the E)B to the
D1E#
- The application for the (+C,s direct supply or disconnection of power involve
essentially the distri%ution of energy resources, and not %y any incident, the
determination of power rates# Dence, these applications must %e resolved %y the
D1E#
- Also, the argument that electricity is not an energy resource is wrong# E1 743
provides that-
o Energy )esource is defined as any su%stance or phenomenn which %y
itself or in com%ination with othersNemanates, or generatesNenergy#
o Electric power or electricity is defined as an impondera%le and invisi%le
agent producing light, hear, chemical decomposition, and other physical
phenomena#
- Endou%tedly, therefore, electricity, which produces energy, is an energy resource#
The regulation of its distri%ution is, therefore, among those functions formerly
%elonging to the E)B, which have %een transferred to the D1E#
UNILONGO VS CA
April 5, 1999; Kapunan, J.
FACTS: 6to# (ino de Cul de 6ac (eigh%orhood Association 9nc# (6(6(A9 was
incorporated and registered with the 6ecurities O E<change Commission (6EC %y
petitioners Enilongo !roup, comprising them as the original Board of Trustees# Dowever,
since no elections for a new Board of Trustees and for a new set of officers were held
from the time of its incorporation, the petitioners su%se&uently amended the 6(6(AMs %yA
laws %y changing the term of office of the Board of Trustees from 7yr to 3 yrs# Despite
amendments, elections were held %y private respondents Dino !roup, from where they
emerged as the new officers# Then again, the Enilongo group esta%lished 6to# (ino de
Cul de 6ac Domeowners Association 9nc# (CD6DA and registered the same with the
Dome 9nsurance !uarantee Corporation (D9!C# Brom this arise the controversy on who
should represent the homeowners and hold the offices and positions therefrom# +rivate
respondents, in their &uo warranto complaints, sought to ouster the Enilongo group from
the Board of Trustees of the 6(6(A9 and to dissolve the CD6DA and declare its
registration with the D9!C null and void for %eing in contravention of law and illegally
formed# 9n response, two pleadings, an answer with counterclaim and a motion to
dismiss on grounds of lack of *urisdiction over the su%*ect matter, were filed %y
petitioners# They contended that disputes involving homeowners association fall under
the e<clusive *urisdiction of the D9!C# The motion to dismiss was denied# Dissatisfied,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohi%ition with the Court of Appeals, which
6
was again denied for lack of merit# 1n appeal, petitioners contended that the regular
courts have no *urisdiction over intraAcorporate controversies#
ISSUE: 8hether or not the regular courts have *urisdiction over intraAcorporate
controversies#
HELD: NO3 D9!C has original and e<clusive *urisdiction over intraAcorporate
controversies# The *urisdiction of the 6EC over intraAcorporate matters concerning
homeowners association including their dissolution as found in +#D 203AA has %een
transferred to the Dome 9nsurance and !uarantee Corporation# 8hatever am%iguities
that may arise regarding *urisdiction over &uo warranto action against corporation or
person usurping corporate offices are classified and resolved %y the 7224 )ules of Civil
+rocedure, as amended# Fuo 8arranto actions against corporation or person using
corporate offices fall under the *urisdiction of 6EC, unless otherwise provided for %y law,
such as where the corporate entities involved are homeowners associations, in which
case *urisdiction is lodged with the Dome 9nsurance and !uarantee Corporation (D9!C#
De1&"ve#&*res Reso*r,es, I#,3 v3 C"0"&o J Fuisum%ing,I#
FACTS
LA 1legario rendered a decision finding that the la%orers of !reen 'ountain
Barms had %een illegally dismissed and that !reen 'ountain Barms, et al#
were guilty of Enfair La%or +ractice#
The la%orers filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of e<ecution %efore the
(L)C#
LA )ivera issued a writ of e<ecution, directing Deputy 6heriff Hentura to
e<ecute the *udgment against !reen 'ountain Barms, et al#
o 6hreiff Hentura proceeded to garnish personal properties of !reen
'ountain Barms, et al#, which were found to %e insufficient to satisfy
the monetary award#
o 6heriff Hentura proceeded to levy upon a real property, registered in
the name of )o%erto 1ngpin, one of the respondents#
Deltaventures )esources, 9nc# filed a &'%r$7("r&+ ,1"%m

0e/ore &'e NLRC,
asserting ownership over the property levied#
o LA )ivera ordered the suspension of the auction sale until the merits
of petitionerMs claim has %een resolved#
Dowever, Deltaventures /%1e$ " ,om(1"%#& /or %#-*#,&%o# "#$ $"m".es with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary retraining order against the 6heriff (on
the same grounds as the thirdAparty claim with the Re.%o#"1 Tr%"1 Co*r&#
o Deltaventures filed an amended complaint to implead LA )ivera and
the la%orers of !reen 'ountain Barms#
La%orers of !reen 'ountain Barms moved for the dismissal of the civil case on
the ground of the lack or *urisdiction of the )TCP!)A(TED#
ISSUE
<oN &'e RTC m"+ &"Ae ,o.#%="#,e o/ &'e ,om(1"%#& /%1e$ 0+ De1&"ve#&*res "#$
,o#se8*e#&1+ (rov%$e &'e %#-*#,&%o# re1%e/ so*.'&3BNO.

6tated differently, 8o( the acts complained of are related to, connected or
interwoven with the cases falling under the e<clusive *urisdiction of the La%or
ar%iter or the (L)C#P9:..
RATIO

The thirdAparty claim was filed %y Deltaventures %y reason of a writ of

e<ecution to enforce the (L)C,s decision issued %y 6heriff Hentura against a
property to which it claims ownership#
o And although the complaint %efore the )TC was for the recovery of
possession and in*unction, in essence it was "# ",&%o# ,'"11e#.%#.
&'e 1e."1%&+ or (ro(r%e&+ o/ &'e 1ev+, and was, in effect " mo&%o# &o
8*"s' &'e )r%& o/ e2e,*&%o# of a decision rendered on a case of
9llegal Dismissal and Enfair La%or +ractice, which was properly within
the *urisdiction of the La%or Ar%iter#
o And as the su%*ect matter of the third party claim is %ut an incident of
the la%or case, such is a matter %eyond the *urisdiction of the )TC#

'oreover, since the *urisdiction to try such cases pertained e<clusively to the
proper la%or official concerned under the Department of La%or and
Employment (i#e#, the (L)C, to hold otherwise would %e to sanction s(1%&
-*r%s$%,&%o# which is o%no<ious to the orderly administration of *ustice#

C*r%s$%,&%o# o#,e ",8*%re$ %s #o& 1os& *(o# &'e %#s&"#,e o/ &'e ("r&%es 0*&
,o#&%#*es *#&%1 &'e ,"se %s &erm%#"&e$3
o 8hatever irregularities attended the issuance and e<ecution of the
a$ias writ of e<ecution should %e referred to the same administrative
tri%unal which rendered the decision %ecause "#+ ,o*r& )'%,'
%ss*e$ " )r%& o/ e2e,*&%o# '"s &'e %#'ere#& (o)er &o ,orre,&
errors o/ %&s m%#%s&er%"1 o//%,ers "#$ &o ,o#&ro1 %&s o)#
(ro,esses3
o The power of the La%or Ar%iter to issue a writ of e<ecution carries
with it the power to in&uire into the correctness of the e<ecution of his
decision and to consider whatever supervening events might
transpire during such e<ecution#

Binally, the in*unction cannot prosper under Ar&%,1e 9D, which e<plicitly
(ro'%0%&s issuance of a temporary or permanent %#-*#,&%o# or res&r"%#%#.
or$er %# "#+ ,"se %#vo1v%#. or .ro)%#. o*& o/ 1"0or $%s(*&es %y any court
or other entity#
7
o +etitioner should have filed its thirdAparty claim %efore the La%or
Ar%iter, from whom the writ of e<ecution originated, %efore instituting
said civil case#

'oreover, the )TC, %eing a ,o7e8*"1 0o$+ of the (L)C, '"s #o -*r%s$%,&%o#
&o %ss*e "#+ res&r"%#%#. or$er or %#-*#,&%o# &o e#-o%# &'e e2e,*&%o# o/ "#+
$e,%s%o# o/ &'e 1"&&er3
9?
DISPOSITIVE
The order of dismissal %y Iudge Ca%ato are ABB9)'ED, and the records of this case
are here%y )E'A(DED to the (L)C for further proceedings#/@wphi/.nAt
C"."+"# E1e,&r%, Po)er vs3 Co11er" J +ardo, I# (3000
FACTS
A )espondents were customers of petitioner Cagayan Electric +ower and Light Company,
9nc#
A 6ince 7244, petitioner had %een collecting payments for electric consumption from
respondents under the soAcalled +ower Ad*ustment Clause without deducting the
discounts and other credit ad*ustments granted %y the (ational +ower Corporation#
A 9n 72"/, respondents tendered payments for their individual %ills less charges for power
cost ad*ustment, currency e<change rate ad*ustment and surcharge, which petitioner
refused to accept# Because of petitioner,s refusal, respondents consigned their payments
to the court#
A )espondents filed with the )TC a complaint against petitioner for un*ust enrichment,
recovery of sums of money#
A )TC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the court had no *urisdiction over the
su%*ect matter of the complaint which was within the *urisdiction of the Board of Energy,
now the Energy )egulatory Board (E)B under 6ection 2 (c, +D 730$#
A CA reversed the trial court, and remanded the case#
ISSUEES ; HELD:
8hether *urisdiction over the su%*ect matter of the complaint is vested with regular courts
or the Energy )egulatory Board# )TC#
RATIONALE
A The complaint does not charge any violation of either currency e<change rate
ad*ustment (CE)A or power cost ad*ustment (+CA# )espondents only allege that
petitioner charged them with the full rate of electric consumption despite a%sence of any
increases in the cost of energy#
A The regional trial court is a court of general *urisdiction# 1n the other hand, )epu%lic Act
(o# $74>, as amended %y +residential Decree (o# 730$ empowered the E)B to regulate
and fi< the power rates to %e charged %y electric companies# The power to fi< rates of
electric consumption does not carry with it the power to determine whether or not
petitioner is guilty of overcharging customers for consumption of electric power# This falls
within the *urisdiction of the regular courts#
A 8e have ruled that the &uestion of determining the %reakdown and itemi;ation of the
power ad*ustment %illed %y an electric power company to its customers is not a matter
that pertains to the E)B,s *urisdiction, %ut that of the )TC#
A +etitioner is a pu%lic utility company# 9f, indeed, petitioner used the deposits, discounts,
surcharges, +CA, and CE)A rates as instruments to o%tain undue profits, then
respondents may have causes of action against petitioner to %e litigated %efore the
regular courts and decided on the %asis of evidence which the parties may present
during the trial#
ARRANFA vs3 4F Homes
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs DOLEFIL AGRARIAN REFORM
4ENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE, INC3 (De Leon, 3003
FACTS
The Cooperative Development Authority (CDA received complaints from
disgruntled mem%ers of the Dolefil Agrarian )eform Beneficiaries Cooperative, 9nc#
(DA)BC9, an agrarian reform cooperative, alleging the mismanagement and:or
misappropriation of funds of DA)BC9,s incum%ent officers and mem%ers of the
%oard of directors#
9n response to these complaints, CDA issued-
7# An order free;ing the funds of DA)BC9 and creating a management committee
to manage the affairs of said cooperative#
3# A resolution directing the holding of a special general assem%ly of the
mem%ers of DA)BC9 and the creation of an ad hoc election committee to
supervise the election of officers and mem%ers of the %oard of directors#
8
The incum%ent officers:mem%ers of the %oard of director &uestioned the order and
resolution (which were issued on separate occasion with the ordinary courts#
9nvesta Land Corporation, who was dealing with DA)BC9 that time, also filed a
complaint to en*oin the CDA from enforcing its orders#
8hile the cases were pending, the mem%ers of DA)BC9, on their own initiative,
convened a general assem%ly and held an election effectively replacing the private
respondents (the complained officers#
The Court of Appeals, however, promulgated a decision on the case for prohi%ition,
ordering the CDA to perpetually cease and desist from the case and reinstating the
mem%ers of the %oard of directors who were ousted %y virtue of the &uestioned
1rders#
'otion for )econsideration was denied, instant petition to the 6upreme Court#
ISSUE
Whether or not the &ooperative Deve$opment Authority is vested with ;uasi-judicia$
authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes.
RULING
(o, the CDA is devoid of any &uasiA*udicial authority to ad*udicate intraAcooperative
disputes and more particularly disputes as regards the election of the mem%ers of the
Board of Directors and officers of cooperatives# The authority to conduct hearings or
in&uiries and the power to hold any person in contempt may %e e<ercised %y the CDA
only in the performance of its administrative functions under )A (o# $2>2#
The CDA invokes the power vested %y => of )epu%lic Act (o# $2>2 (the ena%ling
charter of the CDA# Dowever, after e<amination of all the powers, functions, and
responsi%ilities enumerated in the section, there is no provision providing for such
ad*udicative powers#
o The language of )A (o# $2>2 provides for purely administrative functions
which consist of policyAmaking, registration, fiscal and technical
assistance to cooperatives and implementation of cooperative laws#
o No)'ere %# &'e s"%$ 1") ,"# %& 0e /o*#$ "#+ e2(ress .r"#& &o &'e
CDA o/ "*&'or%&+ &o "$-*$%,"&e ,oo(er"&%ve $%s(*&es3
At most, it could facilitate mediation and conciliation of disputes, and =" of the same
Act e<pressly states that if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (>
months, a certificate of nonAresolution shall %e issued %y the commission prior to the
filing of appropriate action %efore the proper courts#
Being an administrative agency, the CDA has only powers as are e<pressly granted
to it %y law and those which are necessarily implied in the e<ercise thereof#
Looking into the legislative records of deli%erations for the said act, it is clear that
the Congressmen intended the ordinary courts to resolve disputes %etween
cooperatives#
o This is in line with the policy of government granting autonomy to
cooperatives and minimising intervention in their own disputes (that,s why
they encourage conciliation and mediation#
9