Salcedo vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-42992.

August 8, 1935]

Ponente: DIAZ, J.

FACTS:
Attorney Vicente Francisco, representing the petitioner-appellant, inserted alleged contemptuous
paragraph in his motion for reconsideration read as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within out power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce,
as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice.

The court required him to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him
a period of ten days for that purpose. In his answer Atty. Francisco, far from regretting having employed
the phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion, reiterated them several times contending that they
did not constitute contempt because, according to him it is not contempt to tell the truth.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent-appellee is guilty of contempt.

HELD:
YES. Atty. Francisco ordered to pay a fine of P200.00 in ten days and reprimanded.

RATIO:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has
conferred upon him the high privilege, not right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he
now is.

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so
with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise
said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of
the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such guarranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

COBB-PEREZ vs. LANTIN

Facts
The respondent Ricardo P. Hermoso commenced civil case CFI Manila against thepetitioner Damaso P.
Perez and one Gregorio Subong, for the recovery of the principal sum of P17,309.44 representing unpaid
purchases of leather materials used in the shoe manufacturing business of the said petitioner. Because at
the hearing neither the defendants nor their counsel appeared despite due notice to the latter, Hermoso
was permitted to present his evidence ex parte.

On April 11, 1960 judgment was rendered ordering Perez and Subong to pay Hermoso jointly and
severally the sum of P17,309.44 with interest, attorney's fees and costs.

CA dismissed their appeal because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Certiorari was denied by
SC for lack of merit. Hermoso moved for execution of judgment, which was granted. Perez and Subong
filed apetition for relief from judgment, alleging excusable negligence. This petition was denied by the
respondent Judge. Perez interposed an urgent motion to stay execution, alleging that the levy on said
shares was highly excessive and unjust, considering that said shares have a total value of more than
P357,300 while the judgment debt was onlyP17,309.44. The respondent Judge suspended the sale on
execution pending resolution of the abovementioned urgent motion to stay execution. On September 29,
1961 the respondent Judge promulgated two orders: the first denied the appeal of Perez and Subong from
the abovementioned order of August 3, 1961rejecting their petition for relief from judgment, and
the second denied Perez' urgent motion to stay execution.

Second notice served by sheriff was cancelled by the Court of Appeals sustaining Perez' position with
respect to the extent of the levy at the same time that it upheld the denial of his motion to appeal.

The case was remanded for the second time to the court of origin the Sheriff published the third notice of
sale this time for only 210 shares of stocks, setting the public sale for January 24, 1963.

Then petitioner Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, the wife of Damaso P. Perez, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a complaint for injunction with ex parte writ of preliminary injunction against Hermoso,
the Republic Bank and the Sheriff of Manila (civil case 7532) wherein she contended that the levied
shares are conjugal assets which are not answerable for the judgment debt of Damaso Perez, an
obligation contracted not for the benefit or interest of their conjugal partnership. On the following day,
January 23, 1963, Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal granted the ex parte writ
of preliminary injunction, enjoining once more the respondent Sheriff from carrying out the execution
sale. However, on October 4, 1963, Judge Mencias lifted the writ, in obeisance to the doctrine enunciated
in Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-21719, October 31, 1960) to the effect that courts of first instance have no power
to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions. Incidentally, the abovementioned civil case 7532 was
dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon motion of the complainant herself.

A month before the aforementioned writ was lifted, or on September 3, 1963, Mrs. Perez filed in the
basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to recall or lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961,
alleging the same reasons she advanced in civil case 7532then pending in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, which are the self-same grounds upon which the herein petitioners anchor the petition at bar the
conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of the obligation of Damaso Perez.
Neither Mrs. Perez nor her counsel attended the scheduled hearings. On October 19, 1963 the respondent
Judge promulgated an order denying the motion on the ground that "Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez is not a
party in this case and that this (the motion to liftexecution) is not the remedy prescribed by the Rules of
Court in its Section 15 of Rule 39for the protection of her right."

The respondent Sheriff caused the publication for the fourth time of a notice of sale setting the execution
sale of 220 shares of stock.

Mrs. Perez filed with the respondent Sheriff a third-party claim over the aforesaid 220shares of stock, but
the latter was determined to proceed with the scheduled auction sale as he was protected by an
indemnity bond filed by the respondent Hermoso. On October 25, 1963 Mrs. Perez, assisted by her
husband, commenced civil case 55292,denominated an action to vindicate third-party claim with petition
for preliminary injunction, in Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by Judge
Federico Alikpala. As a consequence of the new action, projected execution sale was suspended for the
fourth time. On November 8, 1963 Judge Alikpala denied the preliminary injunction prayed for in the
aforesaid civil case 55292, on the grounds that (1) he has no power to interfere by injunction with the
judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction and (2) the remedy of plaintiff (Mrs.
Perez) is to lodge the third party claim filed by her with the court which issued the execution, "as it has
the inherent control of its ministerial officers and to do all things reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice." The aforesaid civil case 55292 was dismissed on March 20, 1964, upon
agreement of the parties after the institution of the petition at bar.

On the same day (November 8, 1963), Damaso Perez filed in the basic civil case 39407an "Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963 which denied his wife's motion to recall the
controverted writ of execution. In this latest motion, Perez adopted his wife's previous motion, and at the
same time offered in lieu of the levied stocks his alleged cash dividends in the Republic Bank in the sum
of P19,985. In the same motion he asked for the suspension of the fifth scheduled auction sale set for
November 11, 1963, which was granted ex parte.

On January 4, 1964, the motion for reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge. After the
respondent Sheriff had scheduled (for the sixth time) the execution sale of the levied 240 shares of stock,
the herein petitioners on January 10, 1965 interposed the present petition, which was given due course.

ISSUE:
WON that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recall the controverted
writ of execution despite their avowal that the levied 240 shares of stock belong to their conjugal
partnership and as such cannot be made to answer for a judgment debt which is a personal obligation
only of Damaso Perez

After a thorough review of the record, we hold that the respondent Judge acted correctly in refusing to
quash the writ in dispute.

It is conceded that courts have jurisdiction to entertain motions to quash their writs of execution because
every court has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial
officers and to control its own processes. However, the exercise of this power is well circumscribed. Thus,
the proper court may quash the writ only in certain situations, as when it appears that (a) it has been
improvidently issued, or(b) it is defective in substance, or (c) it has been issued against the wrong party,
or (d)the judgment debt has been paid, or (e) the writ has been issued without authority, or(f) there has
been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable, or (g) the
controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court, and therefore no judgment at all has
ever been rendered thereon. In the instant controversy, not one of these accepted grounds exists.

Significantly, the spouses have not questioned the intrinsic validity or regularity of the writ of execution.
They have alleged none of the circumstances earlier enumerated or other similar grounds which may
warrant the quashal of the writ in dispute.

In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are
unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of
the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in
which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent
issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the
protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and55292, only
to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction
of the judgment debt.

Are the respective shares conjugal property of the spouses and not liable for the payment of the judgment
debt? And WON the petitioners are now estopped?

Considering the antecedent facts, particularly CA-G.R. 29962-R, even the remedy indicated above must
fail, as Damaso Perez is now estopped from asserting that the levied shares are conjugal assets. All along
he has nurtured the impression that the said shares are his exclusive property, which representation was
enhanced by the fact that the same are registered in his name alone.

It bears emphasis that in CA-G.R. 29962-R, Damaso Perez practically asserted exclusive ownership of the
levied shares; although he challenged the legality and propriety of the levy with respect to its excessive
coverage, he never raised the question of the conjugal nature of the levied shares. Having represented
himself before the court a quo and in the Court of Appeals as the exclusive owner of the shares in
dispute, he is now precluded from asserting that the levied shares are conjugal assets, an assertion that
he should have advanced with expected alacrity when he first question the legality of the levy.

Coming now to the other petitioner, Mrs. Perez, although she was not a party in CA-G.R.29962-R, the
judgment therein similarly binds her for she stands in privity with her husband. Moreover, she cannot
feign utter ignorance of the affairs of her husband as to justify her delay in questioning the legality of the
levy on the ground afore stated in civil case 7532, which case was commenced only on January 22, 1963,
17 months after the original levy was made on August 23, 1961.

Even granting that the court a quo could properly take cognizance of the said motion to quash the writ
of execution, the movants-petitioners failed to subtantiate their claim that the levied shares are conjugal
assets and that the judgment debt is a personal obligation only of Damaso Perez.

Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal assets, the spouses Perez adduced not
a modicum of evidence, although they repeatedly invoked article 160 of the New Civil Code which provides
that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." As interpreted by this Court, the party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the
marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. Thus in Camiade Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano, it
was held that "according to law and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property." In the recent case of
Maramba vs. Lozano et al, this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated that "the presumption
under Article160 of the Civil Code refers to property acquired during the marriage," and then concluded
that since "there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired ... the fact that the title
is in the wife's name alone is determinative." Similarly, in the case at bar, since there is no evidence as to
when the shares of stock were acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the husband
alone is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to said spouse.

Conceding, however, that the shares in question are conjugal assets, they must still prove that their
ganancial partnership is not liable for the payment of the aforesaid judgment debt. This, they were unable
to do. Their contention that the judgment debt isa personal obligation of only one of them is devoid
of evidentiary foundation. It is, to say the least, a futile attempt to rebut the presumption that the
husband, as head of the family and administrator of the conjugal partnership, contracts obligations for
the benefit of his family or the partnership. The aforesaid obligation was contracted in the purchase of
leather used in the shoe manufacturing business of the petitioner husband. Said business is an ordinary
commercial enterprise for gain, in the pursuit of which Damaso Perez had the right to embark the
partnership. It is well-settled that the debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family, cannot be deemed to be his
exclusive and private debts.

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a
series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose
of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some
of the actions were file only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from
viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends
of justice.

ACCORDINGLY , the instant petition is dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
is hereby dissolved. Treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their
counsel.

Motion for reconsideration:

A motion for reconsideration was filed in relation to the observation made by the court in its decision
dated May 22, 1968. The court assessed treble costs against the petitioners to be paid by their counsels.
Attys. Baizas and Bolinao seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their
professional conduct and condemns them to pay the treble costs.

November 5, 1962 - Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez position with respect
to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses
were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an
execution long overdue.

The petitioners and their counsel chose to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion causing the
postponement of the projected execution sale six times. Perez spouses as represented by their counsel
sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case
39407 fromcourts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially orultimately
deny their prayer.

Issue:
WON Attys. Baizas and Bolinao used devices to delay the execution of the judgment? YES

Ratio:
Mrs. Perez and her counsel, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of
Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the
recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually
lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August
15,1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature
of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal

The circumstances relative to the motion for reconsideration clearly negates the avowal of the movants
that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted
with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." The Perez
spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the
lawful execution of a simple money judgment.

Attys. Baizas and Bolinao contends that if there was delay it was because they happened to be more
assertive, a quality of lawyers which is not to be condemned. The court replied that a counsel's
assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of
his client's position. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his clients if he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse
the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
propensity to litigate.

Decision: Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble
costs assessed against the petitioners.

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a
series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose
of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some
of the actions were filed only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from
viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert thevery ends
of justice.

In re: Almacen

FACTS:
Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title, filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in
protest against what he therein asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme
Court. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribual peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity. His clients he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Courts unjust
judgment, has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.

He ridicules the members of the Court, saying that justice as administered by the present members of
the Supreme Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb. He then vows to argue the cause of his
client in the peoples forum, so that people may know of the silent injustices committed by this court
and that whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated. He
ends his petition with a prayer that:
a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney
that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his client. On June
15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its
reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile,
onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, the trial
court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for
reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however,
was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for
reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

Santa Pangan vs. Atty. Ramos

FACTS
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed
because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was
checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that he used the name Atty. Pedro D.D.
Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such name because in his birth
certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos. D.D. stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being
his mothers surname. However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.

HELD:
No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who
are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in
the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he
will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of
truthfulness, candor and frankness. In representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead
of Dionisio D. Ramos, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The
Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar infraction will warrant
suspension or disbarment.

Berenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 210

FACTS:
Atty. Pedro B. Carranza was filed a complaint against his acts of deception practiced in the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon. The alleged deception was the introduction of an Affidavit of Adjudication and
Transfer of Title subscribed and sworn in Pasay City, which later turned out to be a falsity. Atty. Carranza
claimed that he took no part in the said falsified document. It was contested that due to the said
falsehood, whether or not a lawyer took part from, must still be held liable for lack of prudence and
meticulous take on the matter, and as it had caused unnecessary delays in the administration of justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Carranza should be held responsible of the said falsehood committed in court.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was reprimanded.

RATIO:
There was a finding that there was nothing willful in the conduct pursued by the respondent in
introducing the document that turned out to be false. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reminded that the
lawyers oath is one impressed with utmost seriousness and should not be taken lightly. In its decision to
issue reprimand, the respondent is warned that a more severe penalty will be imposed if the offense of the
same character is repeated again.

Occena vs. Marquez

FACTS:
OCCENA seek to nullify order of MARQUEZ:
a. In the matter of testate estate of William Ogan, in relation to OCCENAs claim for partial payment of
attorney fees P30,000 (November 2, 1966), fixing at P20,000 (covering March 1963-December 1965)
and directing its payment minus P4,000 previously received by petitioners.
b. Order denying motion for reconsideration and modifying Nov. 2 1966 order by deleting the phrase:
i. direct the said court to approve the release to them as attorneys fees amount P30,000
minus P4,000 already advanced to them by executrix
ii. allow petitioners to submit evidence to establish the total attorneys fees to which they are
entitled, in case no agreement thereon is reached between them and the instituted heirs

GROSS VALUE OF OGAN ESTATE IS P2,000,000.
1. OCCENA are the lawyers for estate executrix, Mrs. NECITAS OGAN OCCENA.
i. Have been representing since 1963
ii. Defended the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the estate.
3. EXPEDITE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE:
1. 7 instituted heirs compromised with claimants, including co-executor BINAMIRA, lawyers and wife.
i. Partial distributor of corpus and income made to heirs in total of P450,000.
2. Estate and inheritance taxes were settled by executrix (Nov. 6)
i. Requisite tax clearance and discharge from liability was issued by Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
4. OCCENA FILED MOTION FOR PARTIAL PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES (1965) to approve payment of
P30,000 as counsel since 1963; authorize executrix to withdraw amount from deposits of estate.
1. 3 heirs moved to defer consideration until total amounts of executrix fees and attorney fees are agreed
upon.
i. In July 1966, 5 of 7 heirs filed manifestation, no objection to release P30,000 as partial
payment and recommending approval of OCCENA petition.
2. First motion (Nov. 18, 1965) still unresolved, filed 2
nd
motion for release of P30,000.
i. Deferred by QUIJANO and ARROYO for remaining 2 heirs until all heirs have agreed in writing
on total attorney fees.
1. Filed for motion for reconsideration, payment of P30,000 would be chargeable against the fees they and
instituted heirs might agree to be their total fee.
a. MARQUEZ order fixing total fees from 1963-1965 to P20,000.
i. MARQUEZ denied motion for reconsideration and also modified lawyer fees to
P20,000.
5. OCCENA CONTEND THAT MARQUEZ ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION/ EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION:
1. Motion submitted for resolution was only for partied payment of attorney fees
i. Without prejudice to any agreement that might later be reached between them and instituted
heirs on question of total attorney fees, yet MARQUEZ resolved the question of total attorney fees.
2. Considering only question raised by OCCENA for courts determination was of partial attorney fees, they
never expected the court to make a ruling on the question of total attorney fees.
i. Consequently, OCCENA did not have the opportunity to prove to total fees to which they were
entitled.
ii. Hence, they were denied due process of law.
3. 5 of 7 heirs agreed to OCCENA motion for partial payment while remaining 2 did not oppose the motion.
4. MARQUEZ said he based the P20,000 on records of the case but amount of attorney fees cannot be
determined on sole basis of records for there are other circumstances that should be taken into
consideration.
5. Contrary to MARQUEZ opinion, the fact that one of OCCENA is the husband of executrix does not deny
them the right to fees to which they are entitled.
6. ONLY MARQUEZ IS NAMED RESPONDENT FOR ACCORDING TO PETITIONERS, NO PROPER PARTY IS
INTERESTED IN SUSTAINING THE QUESTIONED PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT.
7. MARQUEZ COUNTER-ARGUMENT:
1. OCCENA proper remedy is appeal and not special civil action, considering there is already a final order on
motion for payment of fees.
2. One of OCCENA is the husband of executrix.
i. Hence, pecuniary interest goes against pecuniary interest of 4 heirs he is representing in special
proceeding.
c. There are miscellaneous payments appearing in the compromised agreement and in the executrixs
accounting which cover expenses incurred by OCCENA for the estate- reason why MARQUEZ deleted
1963-1965 from November 2 order.
d. Co-executor BINAMIRA should be included as party respondent to comply with SEC 5, RULE 65 of
Revised Rules of Court.
e. Duty of MARQUEZ not to be very liberal to the attorney representing the executrix, who is the wife of said
counsel and is herself an heir to a sizable portion of the estate, for it is his duty to see to it that the estate
is administered frugally as economically as possible.
1. And to avoid a considerable portion of estate is absorbed in the process of such division in order that
there may be a worthy residue for the heirs.
f. As special defenses, MARQUEZ alleged that 7 instituted heirs are indispensable parties in this case;
mandamus cannot control the actuations of the trial court because they involved matters of discretion; no
abuse of discretion can be imputed to respondent Judge for trying his best to administer the estate
frugally.
8. Since SAMUEL OCCENA AND JESUS OCCENA are husband and father-in-law of executrix, NECITAS
OGAN OCCENA, JESUS OCCENA cannot oppose claim for attorney fees, thus leaving co-executor
(BINAMIRA) as the lone party to represent and defend the interests of estate.
a. BINAMIRA filed for motion for leave to intervene, granted in 1967.
i. OCCENA filed motion for reconsideration of AUG 9 1967 resolution and opposition to
BINAMIRAs motion for leave to intervene:
1. BINAMIRA ceased to be co-executor upon his resignation in 1965.
9. Intervenor (BINAMIRA) filed Reply to Executrixs Opposition and Opposition to Executrixs Motion for
Reconsideration; filed Intervenors Comments on Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
(AUG 9 1967).
a. OCCENA filed against BINAMIRA, Petition for Contempt asking to hold BINAMIRA in contempt of court.
i. Court required BINAMIRA to comment.
b. OCCENA filed Supplemental Petition for Contempt.
i. BINAMIRA responded, asking court to dismiss OCCENAs motion for indirect contempt and hold
them guilty of indirect contempt for gross breach of legal ethics.
1. Action deferred until case is considered on merits.
ii. Exchange of petitions for contempt between BINAMIRA and OCCENA.
1. Charge of false averments against BINAMIRA.

ISSUE:
WON the Court made a grace abuse of discretion upon modifying attorney fees?
Is there a conflict on interest on the testate proceedings considering one of petitioners is husband of
executrix?


HELD:
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI GRANTED. COURT A QUO IS DIRECTED TO HOLD A HEARNG TO
DETERMINE HOW MUCH TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO.
BINAMIRA, WHO APPEARED AS INTERVENOR, IS DECLARED GUILTY OF CONTEMPT AND
SENTENCED TO PAY COURT P500.
1. On BASIS PETITION OF ATTORNEY FEES:
1. GENERAL RULE: When lawyer rendered legal services to executor/administrator to assist in execution of
his trust, attorney fees may be allowed as expenses of administration.
i. Estate not directly liable for his fees.
ii. Liability of payment rests on executor.
iii. If executor/administrator pays, he may reimburse from the estate.
iv. In case of failure to pay:
1. File an action against him in his personal capacity and not as administrator
2. File a petition in testate or intestate proceedings asking court to direct payment of fees as expenses of
administration
v. *Whichever action chosen, heirs will have to right to inquire into the value, of the services of the
lawyer and on necessity of his employment.
2. NO AUTHORIZATION IN THE COURT to fix amount of lawyer fees entitled without according to lawyer the
opportunity to prove the legitimate value of his services.
3. IMPORTANCE OF RECORD IN DETERMINING ATTORNEY FEES:
1. Whatever attorney fees may have been approved by the Court were result of compromise and were the
written consent of all heirs and of all signatories. The record can reflect what an attorney has done.
2. However, in fixing attorney fees solely on basis of records of the case, without allowing OCCENA to bring
evidence to prove what is the proper amount of attorney fees they are entitled to, MARQUEZ has
committed a grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari. Other factors in assessing lawyer fees:
i. Amount and character of service rendered
ii. Labor, time and trouble involved
iii. Nature and importance of litigation or business services were rendered
iv. Responsibility imposed
v. Amount of money or value of property affected by controversy/involved in employment
vi. Skill and experience in performance of services
vii. Professional character and social standing
viii. Results secured
3. An attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.
4. BINAMIRA DELIBERATELY MADE FALSE ALLEGATIONS WHICH TEND TO IMPEDE OR OBSTRUCT
ADMINSITRATION OF JUSTICE:
1. Claimed to have duly executed mortgage which in reality is only a proposed mortgage not signed by
parties.
2. Record showed only a certain P50,000 loan and not P100,000 as he claimed against the petitioners.
3. Stated that SAMUEL OCCENA became president of Bohol Land Transport after making the P100,000
load. Corporate secretary of Bohol Land said otherwise.
4. Stated a certain income distributed to heirs when no income existed.
5. Said that executrix failed to state assets which are actually gifts or furniture payments to the executrix
personally.
6. Mentioned that petitioners and executrix did not pay him when there was a receipt signed.