Appendix D

Bacon and Descartes

Descartes is remarkably united with Sir Francis Bacon in his logic of discovery.
They both doubted and rejected the ancient systems of knowledge and the
unexamined evidence of the senses. The human mind, said Bacon in The New
Organon, (Hereinafter, B) is beset by idols of four kinds: Idols of the Tribe, Idols
of the Cave, Idols of the Marketplace, and Idols of the Theater. The Idols of the
Tribe represent general human failings in virtue of humanity's mental make-up;
Idols of the Cave represent failure owingto the peculiarities of the individual;
Idols of the Marketplace reflect the poor choice of language that obstructs the
understanding; and finally, Idols of the Theater represent the various outmoded
ancient and modern philosophical systems. The mind had to be purged of these
idols in order that true inquiry could begin.
But one also has to cast out the old logic:
As the sciences which we now have do not help us in findingout new works, so
neither does the logic which we now have help us in finding out new sciences.
(B, 41)
Again:
The logic now in use serves rather to fix and give stability to the errors which
have their foundation in commonly received notions than to help the search after
truth. So it does more harm than good. (B, 41)
So learned disputations had to be replaced by experiments. Experiments must
be performed that are of no use in themselves but simply serve to discover
causes and axioms (B, 96). These experiments are called Experimenta lucifera,
experiments of light, which are to be distinguished from Experimenta fructifera,
experiments of fruit. The experiments of light will give us a collection of the first
particulars ; however, the understanding must notbe allowed to jump and fly
from particulars to axioms (B 98). It should move cautiously and carefully.
But then, and then only, may we hope well of the sciences when in a just scale
of ascent, and by successive steps not interrupted or broken, we rise from
particulars to lesser axioms, and then to middle axioms, one above the other;
and last of all the most general. (B, 98)
Both Bacon and Descartes wanted to create a new system of knowledge on well-
founded truths: Bacon began with simple, careful observations and experiments,
Descartes with simple, powerful intuitions. The generalizations and higher
generalizations came later, emphatically not before. What role did the syllogism
play in Bacon's logic of discovery? Not much.
The syllogism is not applied to the first principles of science, and is applied in
vain to intermediate axioms, being no match for the subtlety of nature. It
commands assent therefore to the proposition, but does not take hold of the
thing. (B, Aphorism 13, p.41)
The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are
symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the
matter) are confused and over hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no
firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction.
(B, Aphorism 14, p. 41)
What we find in Bacon is remarkably parallel to what we find in Descartes. The
first principle in Descartes' terminology, the first item of knowledge is not to
be founded on a syllogism. To take hold of the thing, one needs to directly
experience it. To rely on a syllogism is ultimately to rely on words, and words
are often confusing, whence the Idols of the Marketplace. On such a foundation
one cannot erect a superstructure of knowledge. Bacon concluded that the way
to search for and discover truth is to derive axioms from the senses and
particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the
most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried. (B, 43)
Descartes concluded likewise: It is certain that if we are to discover the truth
we must always begin with particular notions in order to arrive at general ones
later on (CSM II, 271; AT VII, 206). There is simply too much similarity in the
structure of their respective enterprises. Perhaps, then, these are powerful
historical reasons to conclude that the cogito was not intended by Descartes to
be an argument. If it were, then it would not be the first item of knowledge.
-286-
Publication Information: Book Title: Descartes' Cogito: Saved from the Great Shipwreck.
Contributors: Husain Sarkar - author. Publisher: Cambridge University Press. Place of
Publication: New York. Publication Year: 2003. Page Number: 286.