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This paper examines impediments to arbitrage in equity markets using a sample of 82 situations between 1985 and 2000. Pure arbitrage exists only in perfect capital markets; imperfect information and market frictions make arbitrage both capital intensive and risky. As leverage is important on both the return and the risk, the results are presented under three leverage leves: Textbook, Regulation T and Conservative.
This paper examines impediments to arbitrage in equity markets using a sample of 82 situations between 1985 and 2000. Pure arbitrage exists only in perfect capital markets; imperfect information and market frictions make arbitrage both capital intensive and risky. As leverage is important on both the return and the risk, the results are presented under three leverage leves: Textbook, Regulation T and Conservative.
This paper examines impediments to arbitrage in equity markets using a sample of 82 situations between 1985 and 2000. Pure arbitrage exists only in perfect capital markets; imperfect information and market frictions make arbitrage both capital intensive and risky. As leverage is important on both the return and the risk, the results are presented under three leverage leves: Textbook, Regulation T and Conservative.
Presented by Igor Miranda, Yiqi Li and Muhammad Shahid Group 2 Agenda 1. Motivation for the research 2. Why arent these arbitrage opportunities always explored? 3. Research I. Data Description II. Measuring Investment Returns III. Fundamental Risk IV. Financing Risk V. Conclusion 2 Motivation for the research This paper examines impediments to arbitrage in equity markets using a sample of 82 situations between 1985 and 2000, where the market value of a company is less than that of its ownership stake in a publicly traded subsidiary. These situations suggest clear arbitrage opportunities... 3 Why arent these arbitrage opportunities always explored? Pure arbitrage exists only in perfect capital markets. In the real world, imperfect information and market frictions make arbitrage both capital intensive and risky
Main Reasons 1. Uncertainty over the economic nature of an apparent mispricing 2. Path to convergence may be long and bumpy 4 Research A. Sample Selection Criteria
Two differentes methods to determine with the stub values are negative:
I. Data Description 5 Research B. Sample Construction All Initial Public Offerings where another publicly traded firm owned the IPO shares prior to the offering (1985-2000) Rule 1: 70 parents/subsidiary Rule 2: 82 parents/subsidiary
High concentration in the technology sector I. Data Description 6 Research C. Shares Outstanding and Short Rebates
Shares Outstanding: Quarterly Financial Reports
Short Rebate Definition: Rate paid to investors on the proceeds obtained from short selling a stock
I. Data Description 7 Research A. Investment Criteria and Thresholds
II. Measuring Investment Returns 8 Research B. Investment Capital and Financial Leverage
Theoretically, the long position would be fully financed by the proceeds from the short position. This does not work in real markets because the investor must post collateral for both long and short positions.
As leverage is important on both the return and the risk, the results are presented under three leverage leves: Textbook, Regulation T and Conservative.
1. Textbook: more aggressive, no margin calls. 2. Regulation T: 25% long / 30% short 3. Conservative: Preclude all margin calls ex post
II. Measuring Investment Returns 9 Research C. Assessing Invest Performance
To ensure that the portfolio is at least partially diversified, it was imposed a diversification constraint which allows no more than 20 percent of the portfolios equity to be initially invested in any one negative-stub-value transaction.
II. Measuring Investment Returns 10 Research
In this paper, fundamental refers to the possibility that the negative-stub-value trade is terminated before prices converge to fundamental values.
Rule 1: 66/70 terminated by December, 2000 18/66 of the deals (27.3%) the mispricing was not eliminated Rule 2: 77/82 terminated by December, 2000 27/77 of the deals (35.1%) the mispricing was not eliminated
III. Fundamental Risk 11 Research III. Fundamental Risk
12 Research
With 27.3% (Rule 1) and 35.1% (Rule 2) of the stub-value investments terminating before the mispricing is eliminated, it is clear that fundamental risk exists and that these investments are far from risk-free arbitrage opportunities
III. Fundamental Risk 13 Research Horizon Risk Increasing the length of the path reduces the arbitrageurs return Margin Risk If the arbitrageur faces a margin call, he will be forced to post additional collateral or partially liquidate Ex: Creative Computers (parent) x Ubid (subsidiary) Buy-in Risk When owners of the stock demand that their loaned-out shares be returned
IV. Financing Risk 14 Research IV. Financing Risk
Horizon Risk
15 Research IV. Financing Risk
Margin Risk B.1 Creative Computers / Ubid Example
16 Research IV. Financing Risk
Margin Risk B.2 Full Sample Results for Individual Investments
The Creative Computers / Ubid example suggests that ignoring margin requirements results in overestimation of returns from negative-stub- value investments. For that reason, we estimate returns for each NSB in the sample using the three leverage levels.
17 Research IV. Financing Risk
Margin Risk B.3 Portfolio Results
18 Research V. Conclusion Market forces are working hard to keep prices at fundamental values, but the effectiveness of these efforts is sometimes limited
19 Bibliography Mitchell, M., Pulvino, T., Stafford, E., 2002, Limited Arbitrage in Equity Markets