In re of Dolores Coronel, deceased.

LORENZO
PECSON, applicant-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN
CORONEL, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
FACTS: On November 28, 1922, the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the
last will and testament of Dolores Coronel. The
probate of this will is impugned on the
following grounds: First, that it was
improbable and exceptional that Dolores
Coronel should dispose of her estate by
excluding her blood relatives; and second, that
if such will not expressed in fact, it was due to
extraneous illegal influence.
ISSUE: W/N the decedent can exclude her
blood relatives in the disposition of her estate.
HELD and RATIO: YES!
The Civil code provides that:
Any person who was no forced
heirs may dispose by will of all his
property or any part of it in favor of
any person qualified to acquire it.
Even ignoring the precedents of this legal
precept, the Code embodying it has been in
force in the Philippines for more than a quarter
of a century, and for this reason it is not
tenable to say that the excercise of the liberty
thereby granted is necessarily exceptional,
where it is not shown that the inhabitants of
this country whose customs must have been
take into consideration by the legislator in
adopting this legal precept, are averse to such
a liberty.
We find, therefore, nothing strange in the
preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her
blood relatives, nor in the designation of
Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary.
Furthermore, although the institution of the
beneficiary here would not seem the most
usual and customary, still this would not be
null per se.
In the absence of any statutory
restriction every person possesses
absolute dominion over his property,
and may bestow it upon whomsoever
he pleases without regard to natural
or legal claim upon his bounty. If the
testator possesses the requisite
capacity to make a will, and the
disposition of his property is not
affected by fraud of undue influence,
the will is not rendered invalid by the
fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable,
or unjust. Nothing can prevent the
testator from making a will as
eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust
as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can
dictate. However, as has already been
shown, the unreasonable or unjustice
of a will may be considered on the
question of testamentary capacity.
(40 Cyc., 1079.)

Pascual COSO, vs.
Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al.,
G.R. No.L- 16763,December 22, 1921
FACTS:
The testator, a married man, became
acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit
relations with her for many years. They
begot an illegitimate son. The testators will
gives the tercio de libre disposicion to the
illegitimate son and also provides for the
payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros
to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement
for expenses incurred by her in talking care
of the testator when he is alleged to have
suffered from severe illness. The will was
set aside on the ground of undue influence
alleged to have been exerted over the mind
of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no
doubt that Rosario exercised some influence
over the testator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the influence exercised
was of such a character to vitiate the will.
RULING:
Mere general or reasonable influence
over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a
will; to have that effect, the influence must
be undue. The rule as to what constitutes
undue influence has been variously stated,
but the substance of the different statements
is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the
influence exerted must be of a kind that so
overpowers and subjugates the mind of the
testator as to destroy his free agency and
make him express the will of another rather
than his own.
Such influence must be actually exerted
on the mind of the testator in regard to the
execution of the will in question, either at the
time of the execution of the will, or so near
thereto as to be still operative, with the
object of procuring a will in favor of particular
parties, and it must result in the making of
testamentary dispositions which the testator
would not otherwise have made.
And while the same amount of influence
may become undue when exercise by one
occupying an improper and adulterous
relation to testator, the mere fact that some
influence is exercised by a person
sustaining that relation does not invalidate a
will, unless it is further shown that the
influence destroys the testators free
agency.
The burden is upon the parties
challenging the will to show that undue
influence existed at the time of its execution.
While it is shown that the testator
entertained strong affections for Rosario
Lopez, it does not appear that her influence
so overpowered and subjugated his mind as
to destroy his free agency and make him
express the will of another rather than his
own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is
not undue influence and does not invalidate
a will.
Influence gained by kindness and
affection will not be regarded as undue, if no
imposition or fraud be practiced, even
though it induces the testator to make an
unequal and unjust disposition of his
property in favor of those who have
contributed to his comfort and ministered to
his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily
made.
Icasiano v. Icasiano Digest
Icasiano vs. Icasiano
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964


Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the
probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and
for his appointment as executor thereof. It
appears from the evidence that the
testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She
executed a will in Tagalog, and through
the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in
duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.

2. On the day that it was subscribed and
attested, the lawyer only brought the
original copy of the will while the carbon
duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan.
One of the witnesses failed to sign one of
the pages in the original copy but admitted
he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously
instead when he signed the will.
Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was
signed by the testator and other witnesses
in his presence.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of one
of the subscribing witnesses to affix
his signature to a page is sufficient to
deny probate of the will

RULING: No, the failure to sign was
entirely through pure oversight or mere
inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore
the required signatures, this proves that
the omission was not intentional. Even if
the original is in existence, a duplicate
may still be admitted to probate since the
original is deemed to be defective, then in
law, there is no other will bu the duly
signed carbon duplicate and the same can
be probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally
interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
account of the inadvertence of a single
witness over whose conduct she has no
control of. Where the purpose of the law is
to guarantee the identity of the testament
and its component pages, and there is no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed.

Note that this ruling should not be taken
as a departure from the rules that the will
should be signed by the witnesses on
every page. The carbon copy duplicate
was regular in all respects.