Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO
PERECHE, SR.,Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P.
GIMENEZ, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the
issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order
1
of
April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them for libel,
and Joint Resolution
2
of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez
3
(Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the
Yuchengco Family ("in particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee
(Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan),
4
a criminal complaint,
5
before the Makati
City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova
Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph
Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio
Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter
Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the
accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans,
Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by
the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased traditional pre-need
educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI,
due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments
before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI
sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under
their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a
blogspot
6
under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-
group
7
at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the public or by
anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates
from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13],
maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory
statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and
particularly, Malayan."
8
He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on
August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal
aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is
the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC
AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to
air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga
investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do
the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who
joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT
BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO
KILL US NA. x x x
9
(emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,
10
the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict
the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations
11
charging them with libel. The accusatory
portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to public
respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking
the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance
Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for
further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article
imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in
the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had
successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is
attached as Annex "F" of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article
are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the
accused are the ones responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the
article in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the
complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
12

Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to
the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,
13
reversed the finding of probable
cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice
Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be
charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.
14

Petitioners, as co-accused,
15
thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a
Motion to Quash
16
the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law
since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective
for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,
17
petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular
place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or
that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed
and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,
18
the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed,
quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.
19
It found that the Information lacked any
allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the commission of
the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in
Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,
20
insisting that the Information
sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban
21
which
held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous publication was "printed and first
published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of which
Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was
deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since
venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction
is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment.
22

By Order of March 8, 2007,
23
the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for
reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the
defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007,
24
the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public
conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the
honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further
purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice
or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory
article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information
25
which, they alleged, still failed to vest
jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were
"printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the
venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the
Amended Information to be sufficient in form.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration
26
having been denied by the public respondent by Joint
Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting
the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT
PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS
CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF
CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.
27

With the filing of Gimenezs Comment
28
to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners
violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave
abuse of discretion attended the public respondents admission of the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,
29
as a rule, requires
that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court.
30
A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter
should be filed in the Court of Appeals.
31
The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain
exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts
do not involve factual but purely legal questions.
32

In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority,
by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of
law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC whether the
Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the
requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the
same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in
this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however,
That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the
time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended
parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.
33
This
principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically
provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,
34
the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo
35
which laid out
the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate
our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the
complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was
committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually
residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and
first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the
circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue
of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited
to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the
second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite
allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati
becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA
No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals
36
explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel,
following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written
defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the
place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the
public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any
jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written
or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the
injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel
case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio
Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace
court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to
the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from
inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote
municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional
Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303,
311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or
arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish
nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation
becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses
influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended
party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported
by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers,
magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its
printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn
the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It
hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the
websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending
website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of
Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to
the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or
capable of being accessed.1avvphi1
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are
unduly oppressive, the Courts pronouncements in Chavez
37
are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing
that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first
publication, or at the complainants place of residence. We would also have to abandon the
subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet.
There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel
actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file
the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no
need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and
first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to
quash the Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint
Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br.
149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and
DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.











Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 189301 December 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSE PEPITO D. COMBATE a.k.a. "PEPING," Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J .:
The Case
This is an appeal from the January 30, 2008 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB
CR-H.C. No. 00294 entitled People of the Philippines v. Jose Pepito D. Combante a.k.a. "Peping,"
which affirmed with modification the July 2, 2003 Decision
2
in Criminal Case Nos. 95-17070 & 95-
17071 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50 in Bacolod City.
Accused-appellant Jose Pepito D. Combate stands convicted of the crime of Murder and Homicide,
as defined and penalized under Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
respectively. He was sentenced to suffer the penalties of reclusion temporal and reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
The charge against accused-appellant stemmed from two Informations:
Criminal Case No. 95-17070
That on or about 16th day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a firearm, with treachery, with intent to kill and taking advantage of nighttime,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot on EDMUND
PRAYCO y OSABEL, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the body of the latter which caused the
death of the said victim.
Contrary to law.
3

Criminal Case No. 95-17071
That on or about 16th day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a firearm, with treachery, with intent to kill and taking advantage of nighttime,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot on LEOPOLDO
GUIRO, JR. y PEREZ alias "Nene" thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the body of the latter
which caused the death of the said victim.
Contrary to law.
4

On November 28, 2001, the trial court ordered the consolidation of the two cases. When arraigned
with assistance of counsel, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" to both charges. Thereafter, a
joint trial ensued.
During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Shenette Guiro, the wife of the deceased
victim Leopoldo Guiro; Jose Tomaro; Rebecca Montino Apdo; Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)
Rolando Salamisan; Inspector Jose Labuyo; Police Inspector William Senoron; PO1 Rommel Pregil;
Dr. Jimmy Nadal; and Dr. Emmanuel Bando. On the other hand, the defense presented as its
witnesses Magno Montinola and accused-appellant.
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
On March 16, 1995, at around 9 oclock in the evening, Tomaro parked his passenger jeepney at the
garage of Leopoldos mother, Patria Guiro, located at Purok 2, Barangay Minoyan in Murcia, Negros
Occidental. He then proceeded to the house of Leopoldo where he usually sleeps after driving the
jeepney owned by Leopoldos parents.
Upon entering the gate, Tomaro met Leopoldo and Edmund Prayco, who were on their way out.
Leopoldo invited him to join them in drinking liquor but he declined saying he was already tired. He
continued on his way and was about to ascend the stairs when he heard a gunshot. He rushed back
to the road and there he saw accused-appellant pointing a gun at the fallen Leopoldo. When
Edmund was about to intervene, accused-appellant also shot Edmund at a very close range. After
shooting Edmund, accused-appellant turned his attention back to Leopoldo and shot him for a
second time.
Tomaro then rushed to help Leopoldo and pleaded for his life. Instead of heeding his plea, accused-
appellant pointed his gun towards Tomaro and pulled the trigger but the gun did not fire. At that
instant, Tomaro jumped on accused-appellant and was able to grab the gun. Tomaro tried to shoot
accused-appellant but the gun still did not fire. Hastily, accused-appellant fled to the direction of
Bacolod City.
Leopoldo and Edmund were later brought to the Bacolod Sanitarium and Hospital. Edmund was
declared dead on arrival, while Leopoldo died the following day.
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellants defense, on the other hand, was confined to a denial, to wit:
In the evening of March 16, 1995, accused-appellant was in his house drinking liquor when
Montinola, a close friend, arrived to fetch him. He was told to report to the barangay hall and to
render duty as a tanod. Before leaving, Montinola also partook of a small quantity of liquor.
On their way to the barangay hall, they passed by the house of Leopoldo, who was drinking liquor by
the side of the street fronting his house, along with Tomaro, Edmund, and someone else who
accused-appellant could not identify. He and Montinola were walking on the left side of the street
going towards the direction of the Mambucal Resort, while Leopoldo and his group were on the right
side. Accused-appellant then extended a greeting to Leopoldo, who responded with a sarcastic
remark. Accused-appellant and Montinola ignored the rudeness thrown their way and just continued
walking.
They, however, soon noticed Leopoldo crossing the street and started to follow them. Edmund
likewise also followed them but on the other side of the street. Suddenly, accused-appellant saw
Leopoldo pull something out from his waist. He then heard a gunshot and saw Leopoldo fall to the
ground. He pushed Montinola aside and they ran away.
After a few moments, he heard more gunshots coming from the direction of where Leopoldo and his
group were situated. He was stricken with fear so he went home. Later, he learned that he was the
suspect in the killing of Leopoldo and Edmundo. Thus, to avoid trouble, he fled to Victorias City,
Negros Occidental where he was arrested by the Murcia police on October 13, 2001.
The story of accused-appellant was corroborated by Montinola.
Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of its July 2, 2003 Decision
reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Combate, Jr. y
Dallarte alias Peping, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE in Criminal Case
NO. 95-17071 as Principal thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall serve a prison term of Eight (8) Years and One (1)
Day of Prision Mayor to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal.
By way of civil liability, the accused is condemned to pay the heirs of the late Leopoldo Guiro the
following:
1. The sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
2. The sum of P932,712.00 as compensatory damages and;
3. The sum of P56,319.59 as reimbursement for the burial expenses.
In addition, the accused is ordered to pay Shenette Guiro the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The accused is also declared GUILTY of MURDER for the death of Edmund Prayco as charged in
the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-17070 as Principal thereof. There being no modifying
circumstances, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is
condemned to pay the heirs of the late Edmund Prayco the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity
and the sum of P30,000.00 as compensatory damages.
5

Ruling of the Appellate Court
On January 30, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court and modified the award of
damages. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial court, Branch 50 of Bacolod
City dated 2 July 200[3] is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The award of compensatory
damages in both cases is deleted, and in lieu thereof, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 is awarded
to the heirs of Leopoldo Guiro and another P25,000.00 to the heirs of Edmund Prayco. In all other
respects, the assailed decision is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
6

The Issue
Hence, this appeal is before us, with accused-appellant maintaining that the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crimes of homicide and murder, despite the fact that his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Factual findings of the trial court should be respected
In his Brief, accused-appellant says that the trial court failed to consider several inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. First, as to Tomaro, who directly implicated accused-
appellant, his testimony was unsubstantiated and did not conform to the physical evidence.
According to Tomaro, Edmund was shot at close range yet no powder burns were found around the
entry wound. Second, as to the testimony of Shenette Guiro, accused-appellant harps on the fact
that she never mentioned Tomaro being present at the scene of the crime and that she only heard
one gunshot while the other witnesses heard three or four. Lastly, as to the testimony of SPO1
Salamisan, accused-appellant points out that SPO1 Salamisan testified that he only saw one spot of
blood when there were two victims.
To accused-appellant, the inconsistencies thus described erode the credibility of the witnesses when
taken as a whole.
We do not agree.
Time-tested is the doctrine that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to
great weight, sometimes even with finality.
7
The Supreme Court will not interfere with that
assessment, absent any indication that the lower court has overlooked some material facts or
gravely abused its discretion.
8

Complementing the above doctrine is the equally established rule that minor and insignificant
inconsistencies in the testimony tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses, for
they show that the testimony is not contrived or rehearsed.
9
As the Court put it in People v. Cristobal,
"Trivial inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the witness rests, but
enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming."
10

A careful review of the records shows that the RTC, as well as the CA, committed no reversible error
when it gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as opposed to accused-
appellants bare denials.
Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not merely on its
truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts
and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by
witnesses, everything stated by them on direct, cross, and redirect examinations must be calibrated
and considered.
11
It must be stressed in this regard that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in an
answer to one question may be supplied or explained as qualified by the answer to other question.
The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied to this jurisdiction.
12
As explained
in People v. Osias:
It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when witnesses are
found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of
their uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief
may be credited.
The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the scene of the crime and
that he positively identified [the accused] as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged x x
x.
13
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, we agree with the trial court that the alleged inconsistencies merely refer to minor
details which do not affect the witnesses credibility. In disregarding the alleged inconsistent
statements, the trial court explained:
The inconsistencies are more imagined than real. The inconsistencies, like the ownership of the
passenger jeepney, whether said jeepney is owned by Guiro or his mother, are so trivial and does
not at all affect credibility.
The accused also makes much fuss about the fact that Shenette Guiro heard only one (1) shot while
the other prosecution witnesses as well as the accused and his witness Magno Montinola, heard
three (3) to four (4) shots. The accused conveniently forgot that Shenette Guiro was asleep when
the shooting took place. She was awakened by the shot she heard and that shot might have been
the last shot.
The accused flays the testimony of Jose Tomaro as incredible and unbelievable when the said
witness testified that he ran and cradled Guiro in his arms after the latter was shot. The accused
asserts that it is unnatural for a person to unnecessarily expose himself to danger.
The argument need not detain the Court. It is a settled rule on evidence that witnesses to a crime
react in different ways. (Pp. vs. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615).
"There is no standard behavior when one is considered with a strange, startling or frightening
situation." (Pp. v. De Leon, 262 SCRA 445)
Moreover, Jose Tomaro has no quarrel with the accused. He has every reason to expect that he will
not be assaulted as he was not making any aggressive move against him.
14

Likewise, we are not persuaded as to the alleged inconsistency of Tamaros testimony that Edmund
was shot at close range but the physical evidence revealed that there were no powder burns around
the entry wounds. In his testimony, Tamaro described the incident as follows:
COURT:
Q: Now according to your testimony, the next time around, Combate was pointing his gun at Prayco?
WITNESS
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He pointed his gun to Prayco and fired his gun. At the time he fired his gun, how far was he from
Prayco?
COURT
Witness indicating a very short distance where the Court Interpreter is situated which is less than
(1) meter away.
15
(Emphasis supplied.)
As aptly held by the CA, such testimony is in fact consistent with the lack of powder burns on
Edmunds body, viz:
The distance from which a shot is fired affects the nature and extent of the injury caused on the
victim. In close range fire, the injury is not only due to the missile but also due to the pressure of the
expanded gases, flame and other solid products of combustion. In contrast, distant fire usually
produces the characteristic effect of the bullet alone. A shot fired from a distance of more than 60 cm
or about two (2) feet does not produce the burning, smudging or tattooing typically present in loose
contact or near fire, short range fire and medium range fire.
Powder burns is a term commonly used by physicians whenever there is blackening of the margin at
the entrance of the gunshot wound. The blackening is due to smoke smudging, gunpowder tattooing
and, to a certain extent, burning of the wound margin.
In this case, the fact that there were no powder burns found in EDMUNDs body indicates that the
shots were fired at a distance of more than two (2) feet which is consistent with Jose Tomaros
testimony that Edmund was shot at about less than 1 meter away from appellant.
16

Defense of denial cannot prevail over positive identification
For his defense, accused-appellant wants this Court to believe his innocence and offers his version
of the facts wherein he did not commit the crime. This Court is not persuaded.
Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial.
17
Accused-appellant was
positively and categorically identified by the witnesses. They have no reason to perjure and
accused-appellant was unable to prove that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any
consideration other than to see that justice is done. Thus, the presumption that their testimonies
were not moved by any ill will and bias stands, and, therefore, their testimonies are entitled to full
faith and credit.
18

Lest it be overlooked, accused-appellant fled to Victorias City, Negros Occidental right after the
incident, an act that is evidence of his guilt. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is
competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which
an inference of guilt may be drawn.
19
Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the
innocent are as bold as lion.
20

Award of damages
This Court will now endeavor to end, once and for all, the confusion as to the proper award of
damages in criminal cases where the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua or death.
As a rule, the Court awards three kinds of damages in these types of criminal cases: civil indemnity
and moral and exemplary damages. We shall discuss all three.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party,
in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual
damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.
21
This award
stems from Art. 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable."
Civil liability ex delicto may come in the form of restitution, reparation, and
indemnification.
22
Restitution is defined as the compensation for loss; it is full or partial compensation
paid by a criminal to a victim ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition for
probation.
23
Likewise, reparation and indemnification are similarly defined as the compensation for
an injury, wrong, loss, or damage sustained.
24
Clearly, all of these correspond to actual or
compensatory damages defined under the Civil Code.
25

The other kinds of damages, i.e., moral and exemplary or corrective damages,
26
have altogether
different jural foundations.
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in
nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals explained the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such
as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not
punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury
suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it
is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such
injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219
27
and Article 2220
28
of the
Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages
awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong."
29
They may also
be considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and
vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailants conduct, as well as the factors of
provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex
of the victim, [and] mental distress."
30

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon:
"[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted."
31

And lastly, the Court awards exemplary damages as provided for in Arts. 2229 and 2230 of the Civil
Code, viz:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Clearly, as a general rule, exemplary damages are only imposed in criminal offenses when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, be they generic or qualifying. However,
there have been instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the lack of an
aggravating circumstance. This led the Court to clarify this confusion in People v. Dalisay, where it
categorically stated that exemplary damages may be awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender, to wit:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded
exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not
alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the
promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not
alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if
an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary
damages. x x x
x x x x
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary
damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not
been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the
Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application
of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape,
dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of
Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both
been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v.
Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the
Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and
People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the
Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the
difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after
the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
x x x x
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary
damages taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are
awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to
account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory
being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendant associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to
those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence
of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230
prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision,
lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary
damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually
abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on
account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a
pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the
Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court
awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and
corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article
2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in
her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, "[t]he application of Article
2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying
public policy behind the award of exemplary damages to set a public example or correction for the
public good."
32

Before awarding any of the above-mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the
penalty imposed by law. Under Republic Act No. (RA) 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty
on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the
penalty of death under certain circumstances.
For a full appreciation of the award on damages, it is imperative that a thorough discussion of RA
7659 be undertaken. Each crime will be discussed as well as the proper amount of damages for
each crime.
Under RA 7659, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in
general,
33
mutiny on the high seas,
34
and simple rape.
35

For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified
piracy;
36
qualified bribery under certain circumstances;
37
parricide;
38
murder;
39
infanticide, except
when committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the
maternal grandparents for the same purpose;
40
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
certain circumstances;
41
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under certain
circumstances;
42
destructive arson, except when death results as a consequence of the commission
of any of the acts penalized under the article;
43
attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is
committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder;
44
and carnapping, when the driver or occupant
of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof.
45

RA 7659 imposes the penalty of death on the following crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when
the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped,
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or
homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is
under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full
view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when
the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
Nevertheless, all these must be taken in relation to Art. 63 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes
a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance,
the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is
no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act,
the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number
and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding
rules, according to the result of such compensation.
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has
the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in
crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either
reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
But with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of
the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.
46

As a result, courts now cannot impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to impose reclusion
perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in
People v. Salome
47
and People v. Quiachon,
48
is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the
offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender."
49

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of death
were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,
50
that the
award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death should be PhP 75,000. We
reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the
incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."
51
Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes
found in RA 7659.
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,
52
PhP 50,000
was awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is
recognized that the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime
of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.
53
Subsequently, the amount was increased to
PhP 75,000 in People v. Soriano.
54

As to exemplary damages, existing jurisprudence has pegged its award at PhP 30,000,
55
despite the
lack of any aggravating circumstance. The reason, as previously discussed, is to deter similar
conduct and to serve as an example for public good.
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the
imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be
used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.
On the other hand, when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, the Court has ruled that the proper amounts should be PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity,
PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
56
lavvphi1
Accordingly, in Criminal Case Nos. 95-17070 and 95-17071, the exemplary damages awarded by
the CA in the amount of PhP 25,000 should be increased to PhP 30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.
Moreover, the deletion of the award of compensatory damages for unearned income by the CA in
Criminal Case No. 95-17071 is proper. This Court pronounced in People v. Mallari:
57

The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence provided that there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-
employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the victims line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
In this case, neither of the exemption applies. The earnings of Leopoldo at the time of his death were
above minimum wage set by labor laws in his respective place at the time of his death.
58
As testified
to by his wife, Shenette Guiro, Leopoldo was earning between PhP 200 to PhP 300 per day. This is
more than minimum wage. Hence, absent any documentary evidence, the award of compensatory
damages must be deleted.
Likewise, the deletion of the award of compensatory damages by the CA in Criminal Case No. 95-
17070 is proper for lack of any basis. The trial court did not discuss why it awarded compensatory
damages to the heirs of Edmund.
Interest on damages
When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for
the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.
59
In
People v. Tubongbanua,
60
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) was ordered to be applied on the
award of damages. This rule would be subsequently applied by the Court in several cases such as
Mendoza v. People,
61
People v. Buban,
62
People v. Guevarra,
63
and People v. Regalario.
64
Thus, we
likewise adopt this rule in the instant case. Interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be
imposed on the award of civil indemnity and all damages, i.e., actual or compensatory damages,
moral damages and exemplary damages, from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00294 finding
accused-appellant Jose Pepito D. Combate guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, the ruling of the trial court should read as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Combate, Jr. y
Dallarte alias Peping, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE in Criminal Case
NO. 95-17071 as Principal thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall serve a prison term of Eight (8) Years and One (1)
Day of Prision Mayor to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal.1avvphi 1
By way of civil liability, the accused is condemned to pay the heirs of the late Leopoldo Guiro the
following:
1. The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
2. The sum of P56,319.59 as reimbursement for the burial expenses.
In addition, the accused is ordered to pay Shenette Guiro the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The accused is also declared GUILTY of MURDER for the death of Edmund Prayco as charged in
the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-17070 as Principal thereof. There being no modifying
circumstances, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is
condemned to pay the heirs of the late Edmund Prayco the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be applied to the award of civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages from the finality of judgment until fully paid in
the two (2) aforementioned criminal cases.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee
his appearance before any court as may be required,
1
is the answer of the criminal justice system to
a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the
"dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?
2
Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in
assuring the accuseds presence at trial.
3

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin
serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail.
4
An accused not released on
bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An
erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has
never owed.
5
Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail
pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case
and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.
6
On the other hand, society has a compelling interest
in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time.
7
Other recognized societal interests in the denial of
bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from court custody, the protection
of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment.
8
Under what
circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the
interests of society and those of the accused.
9

Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to
those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided
by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with
laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in
fact convicted by the trial court.
10

The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
11

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.
12
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.
13
It invoked the bedrock principle in the
matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should
be exercised "with grave caution and only for strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence,
it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care
outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of
[petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he
clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.
14

For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed pending
appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary
evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason
substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
15

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed
by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.
The Issue
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable
to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the
Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically be
granted.
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. While
the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only
where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
16

Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions
to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the
prosecution,"
17
however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted
with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground
that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly
declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case
such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not
simply an error in judgmentbut it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
18
Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility.
19
It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law.
In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
20

Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeals
exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or
imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the
exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not
unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. By
making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail, the court
also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question.
The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings
of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and interpretation of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.
21
In this connection, Lee
v. People
22
is apropos:
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would
at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be
assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory
orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will
also unduly burden the courts.
23
(emphasis supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioners Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on
the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the
circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual
delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon;
circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of
retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the
following rules:
x x x x x x x x x
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in
Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any
other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court
(Sec. 5); x x x
24
(emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same
thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.
25
(emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate
court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied
even if the bail-negating
26
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In
other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion,
that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound
discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice;
27
on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts
stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of
the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail.
This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or
revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the
less stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are
governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic
treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy
governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail
pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination
of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is
that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted
pending appeal.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely filling out
the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where
the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six
years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by
requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice."
28
Choice occurs where, between "two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker."
29
On the other hand, the
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion.
30
Thus, by severely clipping
the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications
for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant
is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision
that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on
applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of
the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its
appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter.
31
In view of the
grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the
accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed.
32
It should also give
due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the
record, character and reputation of the applicant,
33
among other things. More importantly, the
discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the
very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of
law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court.
34
In other words, a threshold
requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended
for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.
35
This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will
be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a
lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong
presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound,
36
specially
since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the
Court of Appeals except for substantial error.
37

Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those
expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius
38
rule in statutory
construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts
the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision
categorically refers to "the following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules,
similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may
be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be
granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in
cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in
cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in
cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of
the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed
does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more
accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious
crimes?
Petitioners Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal
Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the
provisions on bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. After
judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the
defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. After
conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the
discretion of the court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a capital
offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988
to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated
January 20, 1992 as follows:
The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases
before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity
of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he
may be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal,
unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of
Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser
offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the
preceding paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement
pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal before
his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from
notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of
surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru
the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending
resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his
bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken
by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994
which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may
admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same
bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice
to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach
to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending
appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by
the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988
amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail
before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion
perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the
action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.
39

The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent
rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court
has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular
situations. More importantly, it reiterated the "tough on bail pending appeal" configuration of
Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction.
40
Under the
present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on
bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or
revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as
conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal? What
is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which
favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due
consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels
the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural
provisions on bail emanated.
41
While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows
that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is
anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail
should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.
42
In fact, it has even
been pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting
bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5."
43

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted
only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that
uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a
person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior
applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From
another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on
bail than before conviction.
44
(emphasis supplied)
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in
Yap v. Court of Appeals
45
(promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that
denial of bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise discretion."
A Final Word
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)1avvphi 1
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends.
46
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At
the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail
pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds
strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the
accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may
destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at
the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely
to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite
of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal
justice system and court processes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.


















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 172476-99 September 15, 2010
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari
1
seeking to annul the 5 April 2006 Resolution
2
of
the SandiganbayanFourth Division in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45. The assailed Resolution denied
petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment on 26 February 2006 pending resolution of his
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to 27 July 1998.
3

During petitioners term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved
the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as
housing projects.
4

On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-
fact of the 12 individual vendors,
5
executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject
property, at the agreed price ofP10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the
payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter of the
property.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The
unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the
actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter. On 24 September 1997, Flaviano presented
the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the basis of the
transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
6

On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of
South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-
affidavit
7
against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public
funds or property through falsification of public documents. The case was docketed as Case No.
OMB-3-98-0020.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999 Resolution,
8
found petitioner
probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the following crimes
were committed and that respondents, whose names appear below, are probably guilty thereof:
x x x x
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO, conspirators for twelve (12)
counts of falsification of public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;
x x x x
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. WILFREDO PABALAN, and NILO FLAVIANO twelve (12) counts of
violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the government in the correct amount of
taxes due for the sale of Lot X to AFP-RSBS;
9

On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations
10
for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations
11
for falsification of public documents against petitioner
and several other co-accused.
Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999,
12
with a supplemental
motion dated 28 May 1999,
13
of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. In its 11
June 1999 Order,
14
the Sandiganbayan disposed of petitioners first motion for reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to evaluate its evidence
and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and
supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal and to inform this Court
within the said period as to its findings and recommendations together with the action thereon of the
Ombudsman.
In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP)
recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal
Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated 18 December 2001, recommended the contrary,
stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral
deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject
property.
15

The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). In a memorandum dated 21 August 2002, the OMB-Military
adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of petitioners name from the
informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB-
Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the
Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioners first motion for reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors
16
was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough review, the
panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the
contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the
purchase of the property at the price ofP10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors
posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale,
which indicated the false purchase price of P3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors
concluded that probable cause existed for petitioners continued prosecution. In its 19 December
2005 memorandum,
17
the panel of prosecutors recommended the following:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following:
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside
and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal (petitioner) be DENIED;
2. Another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 be filed against Ramiscal and
all the other accused for causing damage to the government when it caused the payment of
the amount of Php 10,500.00 per square meter for the subject lots when the actual amount
should only be Php 3,000.00 per square meter.
18
(Emphasis supplied)
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of
prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final findings of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the
arraignment of petitioner.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration
19
of the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him.
On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea,
the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner filed a
motion to set aside his arraignment
20
pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioners second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan
explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of
the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit
petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
21

The Issue
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to set
aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him?
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from the informations. He
claims lack of probable cause to indict him considering the prior findings of the Ombudsman
recommending the dropping of the cases against him. Petitioner claims that heads of offices have to
rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and that there should be grounds other than the
mere signature appearing on a questioned document to sustain a conspiracy charge.
Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioners motion to set aside his
arraignment. Respondent court argues that petitioners motion for reconsideration, filed on 26
January 2006 and pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his arraignment, violated Section 7,
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended. Respondent court
maintains that the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against
petitioner was the final decision of the Ombudsman.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No.
15, Series of 2001,
22
sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a
finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule
II of the Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration.
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution
shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office
of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with
corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the
corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the
resolution subject of the motion.(Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the
filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which
in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information.
An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for
the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The accused
is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.
23

Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493,
24
otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the
court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the
information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge is
pending, whichever is later, thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and
Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of
the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court
in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493, provides:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment
shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493 mean the
same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, which is when the accused appears before the court.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension
shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office.
25

Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of
arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded
with petitioners arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution, petitioners motion
for reconsideration filed on 26 January 2006 was already his second motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. The Ombudsman, in its 19 December
2005 memorandum, has already denied petitioners first motion for reconsideration,
26
impugning for
the first time the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. Under Section 7, Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion
for reconsideration questioning yet again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will
be no end to litigation.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioners defenses are evidentiary in nature and are best
threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits. Petitioners claim that the Ombudsman made
conflicting conclusions on the existence of probable cause against him is baseless. The
memorandum of the OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of the cases against petitioner, has
been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following:
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside and
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal be DENIED;
27
(Emphasis supplied)
As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause
against petitioner prevails. This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause.
28
The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory
prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal complaints.
29
As this Court succinctly
stated in Alba v. Hon. Nitorreda:
30

Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by the Ombudsman
of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond
the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or
dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the
Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the
integrity of the public service.
31

In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman,
32
the Court explained the rationale behind this policy, thus:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions
of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
33

Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is
the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case.
34
1avvphi 1
In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioners motion to set aside
his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion when power is exercised in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and
gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
35

Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it. The Sandiganbayan is empowered to
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings
and speedy termination of the case.
36
There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on its
part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch.
We remind respondent to abide by this Courts ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
37
where we
stated that the mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by
itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the Sandiganbayan.
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides:
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which the petition [for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also
grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights
of the parties pending such proceedings.The petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45, which denied petitioners motion to set aside
his arraignment. This Decision is immediately executory.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.





















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151800 November 5, 2009
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, represented by HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA, represented by PACITA V. PASCUAL, EMILIANO
EUSEBIO, JR., and CARLOS RUSTIA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that
the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 27, 2001, and the CA Resolution
2
dated
December 11, 2001, be reversed and set aside.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On November 17, 1996, respondents filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint for
Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e)
3
of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) against Zenaida H. Palacio and
spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang. Respondents alleged therein that Palacio, then officer-in-
charge of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Office in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija,
designated Celerina Darang, Senior Agrarian Reform Program Technologist stationed at Sto.
Tomas, San Jose City, to investigate the claims of respondents against the formers husband
Edilberto Darang; that Celerina Darang accepted such designation, conducted an investigation and
rendered a report favorable to her husband, Edilberto Darang; that Celerina Darang supported such
report with public documents which she falsified; and that Palacios then issued a recommendation,
based on Celerina Darangs report, to award the landholding in dispute to Edilberto Darang.
4

Acting on respondents complaint against the aforementioned DAR officers and Edilberto Darang,
petitioner issued a Resolution
5
dated June 9, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the charge against
respondents for falsification of public documents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
It is further recommended that the charge against respondents for Violation of Section 3, par. (e) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, be provisionally dismissed. This is, however, without prejudice to its re-
opening should the outcome of DARAB Case No. 0040 pending before the DAR Adjudication Board,
Diliman, Quezon City, so warrant.
SO RESOLVED.
6

Respondents filed several motions seeking reconsideration of the above Resolution, all of which
were denied.
Herein respondents then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court, but per
Resolution dated July 14, 1999, the petition was referred to the CA. On February 27, 2001, the CA
promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which is reproduced hereunder:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari, in regard to the public respondents
Resolution dated June 09, 1998 and Orders dated August 06 and 26, 1998 in OMB-196-2268, is
hereby DENIED as to the dismissal of the complaint against private respondents for falsification of
public documents, but GRANTED as to the provisional dismissal of the complaint for violation of
Section 3, Par. (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended, which is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, and consequently, the appropriate criminal
charges under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act are hereby ordered filed against the
individual respondents.
SO ORDERED.
7

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied in its Resolution dated
December 11, 2001.
Hence, this petition, where it is alleged that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF PROBABLE
CAUSE BY THE OMBUDSMAN IN CRIMINAL CASE OMB-1-96-2268.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE OMBUDSMANS
PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF OMB-1-96-2268 WAS INFIRM, AS THE SAID COURT CANNOT
COMPEL THE OMBUDSMAN TO USURP THE PREROGATIVES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
DARAB.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE IN OMB-1-96-2268 AS SUCH AUTHORITY IS GIVEN EXCLUSIVELY TO THE
OMBUDSMAN.
8

The petition deserves ample consideration.
The crux of the matter is whether the CA has jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases. This issue has been directly addressed in Kuizon v. Desierto
9
and
reiterated in the more recent Golangco v. Fung,
10
wherein the Court declared, thus:
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.
In Kuizon v. Desierto, this Court clarified:
The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when we
declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said
provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in
an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a
criminal action.
x x x It is settled that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter is
void. Since the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in
criminal cases, its ruling on the same is void.
11

The question that arises next is what remedy should an aggrieved party avail of to assail the
Ombudsmans finding of the existence or lack of probable cause in criminal cases or non-
administrative cases. In Estrada v. Desierto,
12
the Court emphasized that parties seeking to question
the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, may
file an original action for certiorari with this Court, not with the CA, when it is believed that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondents originally filed a petition for certiorari before this Court but the same was referred to the
CA. It, thus, behooves this Court to now look into whether the Ombudsman indeed acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the charge of Falsification of Public Documents and provisionally
dismissing the charge of Violation of Section 3, par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against
Zenaida H. Palacio and spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang.
A close examination of the records will reveal that the Ombudsman acted properly in dismissing the
charge for falsification of public documents because herein respondents utterly failed to identify the
supposedly falsified documents and submit certified true copies thereof. In fact, respondents
admitted in their petition for certiorari, originally filed with this Court but referred to the CA, that they
had not yet submitted documents in support of the charge for falsification of documents as they
intended to present the same in a formal preliminary investigation, which they expected to be
conducted by the Ombudsman.
13
However, it has long been acknowledged that in administrative
proceedings, even those before the Ombudsman, a formal hearing is not required and cases may be
submitted for resolution based only on affidavits, supporting documents and pleadings. Such
procedure has been held to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of procedural due
process as all that is needed is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
14
In this case, records show that respondents
had been afforded such opportunities.
As to the provisional dismissal of the charge for Violation of Section 3 par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, the Court likewise finds no reason to overturn the ruling of the Ombudsman. The
hornbook doctrine emphasized in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto
15
must
be borne in mind, to wit:
x x x the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in
its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise,
innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman
will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts
will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors
each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
16

Nevertheless, the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not
absolute. However, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused
in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsmans findings by this Court.
17

In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,
18
the Court defined "grave abuse of discretion" as follows:
x x x grave abuse of discretion is such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a
manner not at all in contemplation of law."
Here, the Ombudsman based its provisional dismissal on the ground that the case between the
same parties before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), DARAB Case No. 0040, had not yet
reached finality, as there was a pending Motion for Relief from Judgment that was yet to be
resolved. The Ombudsman reasoned out that since what Section 3, par. (e), R.A. No. 3019
penalized was the giving of unwarranted advantage or preference to a private party, it was only
prudent to await the final resolution in DARAB Case No. 0040, which would show if the favorable
recommendation given by Celerina Darang benefiting her husband Edilberto was, indeed,
unjustified, unwarranted or unfounded.
The Ombudsmans reasoning was not unfounded. Note that the elements of the offense in Section
3(e) are: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
(2) that said public officers have committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official
duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they have caused undue injury to a party,
whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury was caused by giving an
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such party; and (5) that the public officers have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
19
From the
foregoing, it can be seen that the complainants must show that the benefits, advantage or
preference given to a party is unwarranted. Since the main issue in DARAB Case No. 0040 is
whether the disputed parcel of land should be awarded to Edilberto Darang, then it is true that a final
resolution of the aforementioned DARAB case would establish whether the benefit or advantage
given to him was indeed unwarranted.1avvphi1
Verily, the action of the Ombudsman in provisionally dismissing the complaint for violation of Section
3(e), without prejudice to its re-opening upon final resolution of DARAB Case No. 0040, is not
whimsical or arbitrary. Such action finds support in the Courts rulings that a trial court, or in this case
a quasi-judicial tribunal, has the inherent power to control the disposition of cases by holding in
abeyance the proceedings before it in the exercise of its sound discretion to await the outcome of
another case pending in another court or body, especially where the parties and the issues are the
same. This is to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments,
confusion between litigants and courts, and ensuring economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action (in this case, the criminal
complaint for violation of Section 3(e) before the Ombudsman) cannot be properly determined until
the questions raised in the first action (DARAB Case No. 0040) are settled, the second action should
be stayed.
20

The reason behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may also be applied here by analogy. The
objective of said doctrine is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising
its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency, which has special knowledge, experience and
tools to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, has determined some question or a
particular aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
21
This is not to say that
the Ombudsman cannot acquire jurisdiction or take cognizance of a criminal complaint until after the
administrative agency has decided on a particular issue that is also involved in the complaint before
it. Rather, using the same reasoning behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it is only prudent and
practical for the Ombudsman to refrain from proceeding with the criminal action until after the
DARAB, which is the administrative agency with special knowledge and experience over agrarian
matters, has arrived at a final resolution on the issue of whether Edilberto Darang is indeed entitled
under the law to be awarded the land in dispute. This would establish whether the benefits or
advantages given to him by the public officials charged under the complaint, are truly unwarranted.
Thus, aside from the fact that the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases, it was also incorrect to hold that the Ombudsman acted with grave
abuse of discretion. The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the assailed Resolution of the
Ombudsman.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 27, 2001, reversing the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, dated June 9,
1998, and its Resolution dated December 11, 2001, are declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.













Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of
the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an
employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted
therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it
investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned,
denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO
MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG
MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.
1

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it,
respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National
Police.
2

By Memorandum
3
dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human
Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa
as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of " reports that there were
accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President
and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for
a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive"
nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her
residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security
of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged
threats to her security in this wise:
x x x x
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged
accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious.
But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears
that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just
mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management
apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a
"sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its
expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for
managements initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the management
supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a
punitive one.
4
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending
resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition
5
for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed
as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.
By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure
and refusalto provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO
purportedly receivedconcerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to
privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the
issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report
purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the
nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information;
and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order
6
of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified
written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondents application
for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter
alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
7

By Decision
8
of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing
respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should
extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like
respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her
with information or data on the reported threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data
9
contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot
restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2)
the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data.
10
1avvphi1
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute,
petitioners argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is
essentially questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer"
11
and the terms and
conditions of her employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the
Memorandum transferring respondents place of work which is purely a management prerogative,
and that OCA-Circular No. 79-2003
12
expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in
labor-related cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the
writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or
home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in
possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of
information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
13

Castillo v. Cruz
14
underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario
15
that the writs of
amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when
the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
16
Employment
constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.
17
It is
evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern
respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law
with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on
the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-
quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they
existed at all."
18
And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real
intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the
issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan
RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No.
213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.










Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI
WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI,
WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY
GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH VDA DE
FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND
REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO
CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
(AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR
ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE
MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS
SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J .:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of
the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street,
Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. 1
The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was not unlike the
feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a
locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright (although
the last part is not included in the modern refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of
gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter
them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the situation
aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a
number of casualties.
2

The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were
arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The
military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and
several rounds of ammunition found in the premises.
3

On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the
articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to
challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against
self-incrimination.
4

The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the return of the articles alleged
to have been illegally seized, referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial court,
Zamboanga City.
5
After receiving the testimonial and documentary evidence of the parties, he
submitted the report and recommendations on which this opinion is based.
6

The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken
without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said report and in
fact admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance.
7

Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the incident in
question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify their act
on the ground that they were acting under superior orders.
8
There was also the suggestion that the
measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by
the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco.
9

Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact that the
petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-
cuts the respondents took. As eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte
Milligan: 10
The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not
excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions
committed therein against the petitioners.
It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the arbitrary treatment they
received to take them into custody; but that is a criminal argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious
flaw lies in the conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of
unsubstantiated reports that they were stockpiling weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At
the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even
been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as
summarily pronounced by the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not have
been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the
guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it does simply
signify is that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to
protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled
to due process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people
who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made their illegal raid, they
certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is truly regrettable for it was incumbent on them,
especially during those tense and tindery times, to encourage rather than undermine respect for the
law, which it was their duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over
the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the respondents
simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was
probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without
a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They
knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making
the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they
could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all
the menace of a military invasion.
Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless
considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement
authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on
the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as
a fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN civil courts
then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged into the beleaguered
premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's
house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is
protected from official intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all free regimes, that a man's
house is his castle.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may enter. But the King of
England may not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement. 13
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime
about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no
allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the
Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. 14
If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the
firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the
proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. 15 As Judge
Learned Hand observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. 16 Pending determination of
the legality of such articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate
disposition as the corresponding courts may decide. 17
The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners deserves
slight comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As
Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."
The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded operations should remain in the
past, banished with the secret marshals and their covert license to kill without trial. We must be done
with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those who are supposed to uphold the law must
not be the first to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his concurring opinion
in Lacanilao v. De Leon, 19 "It is time that the martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be
discarded and that there be a return to the force and rule of law."
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and democratic, where every individual is
entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid sentinel
for all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared
ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the
petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the
outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.








Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 171163 July 4, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
MELITON JALBUENA y TADIOSA, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Accused-appellant Meliton Jalbuena y Tadiosa was charged with rape of a daughter, a minor,
1
in an
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-601 before the Lucena City Regional Trial Court,
which reads:
x x x x
That on or about the month of August 1996, at Barangay Ilayang Nangka, in the Municipality of
Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Philippines[,] and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and
there[,] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], his own daughter, a
minor, 11 years of age,
2
against her will.
3

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is culled:
In the morning of August 19, 1996, while her mother BBB was out of the house, her father-accused-
appellant approached AAA while she was in bed, pulled down her underwear, placed himself on top
of her, and inserted his penis in her vagina. She was warned not to report the incident to anyone;
otherwise, something bad would occur to her.
4

The incident was repeated on two other occasions, the last of which was in the morning and
witnessed by her uncle CCC while accused-appellant was on top of her.
CCC reported what he saw to AAAs grandfather who merely advised her to avoid her father, to an
aunt, as well as to her mother BBB who refused to believe it.
5

AAA later mustered enough courage to narrate her ordeals to two classmates who reported them to
their teacher, who in turn reported and brought her to the school principal.
6

On September 12, 1996, Dr. Marilyn Salumbides examined AAA and reduced her findings to writing
as follows:
P.P.E.: Normal Looking External Genitalia
Internal Exam admits tip of finger with difficulty
Hymen intact
Vaginal Smear taken for Spermatozoa NONE SEEN
x x x x
7
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, accused-appellants indictment.
Accused-appellant denied the accusation and gave his side of the case as follows:
He could not have raped AAA as his job as a canvasser of plastic wares required him to be out of
the house most of the time, except on Saturdays, albeit he would return home in the afternoon or
evening.
8

Appellants wife BBB corroborated his claim.
Branch 58 of the RTC of Lucena City, however, found the testimony of AAA "clear, consistent, direct
and without any hesitation when confronted by the presence of her own abuser."
9
It discredited
appellants defense of alibi, there being no proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
place, date and time of the commission of the offense.
The trial court thus disposed in its Judgment of September 11, 2003:
10

WHEREFORE, accused MELITON JALBUENA y TADIOSA of Bgy. Ilayang Nangka, Tayabas,
Quezon, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape, defined and
punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659; and in the
absence of any mitigating circumstance and with the special aggravating circumstances of minority
and relationship alleged and duly proven by the prosecution, Meliton Jalbuena y Tadiosa is hereby
sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH.
Further, accused is hereby ordered to pay to the offended party, [AAA] the amounts of P75,000.00,
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00, as moral damages, and P25,000.00, as exemplary damages.
The Jail Warden, Quezon Provincial Jail, Lucena City, is hereby ordered to immediately deliver the
person of Meliton Jalbuena y Tadiosa to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, and to remain
thereat until the penalty imposed upon him may be served.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to forward the entire records of this case to the
Supreme Court, Manila, for automatic review of the case pursuant to the provision of Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
11
(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
This case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review in view of the death penalty imposed.
Per People v. Mateo,
12
however, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals by Resolution
of July 26, 2005.
13

The appellate court, finding that the testimony of AAA is credible and free from material
inconsistencies and contradictions, affirmed the Judgment of the trial court by Decision of November
18, 2005,
14
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment dated September 11, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 58 in Criminal Case No. 96-601 finding MELITON
JALBUENA y TADIOSA guilty of Statutory Rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty
of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED.
In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, 2004, amending Section
13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, let the entire records of this case be
elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
15
(Emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present review of the case.
By Resolution of February 21, 2006, this Court required the parties to submit Supplemental Briefs
within 30 days from notice if they so desire.
16
Both parties filed their respective Manifestations that
they are no longer filing any Supplemental Briefs.
17

In his Brief filed before the appellate court, accused-appellant faulted the trial court (1) for convicting
him despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and (2) in not
considering the information insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for failure to state the
precise date of the commission of the rape.
18

The second assigned error shall, for obvious reasons, first be resolved.
Appellant questions as fatally defective the information for failure to allege the date and time of the
commission of the offense charged, thus violating his constitutionally protected right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and depriving him of the opportunity to
prepare for his defense.
Prior to its substantial incorporation in the Revised Rules of Court in 2000, Section 11, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court, reads:
Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when the time is a material
ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to
the actual date at which offense was committed as the information or complaint will
permit.
19
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In rape, the gravamen of the offense, being the carnal knowledge of a woman, the date is not an
essential element, hence, the specification of the exact date or time of its commission is not
important.
20

In statutory rape, like in this case, what matters most is that the information alleges that the victim is
a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her.
21

If accused-appellant found the information defective as it bears only the month and year of the
incident complained of, he should have filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars, as provided for under
Rule 116,
22
before he entered a plea. His failure to do so amounted to a waiver of the defect or detail
desired in the information.
23

Indeed, in the case at bar, the criminal complaint states that the rape was committed "on or about
the month of August 1996." Such an allegation in the criminal complaint as to the time of the offense
was committed is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Besides, if the appellant was of the belief that the criminal complaint
was defective, he should have filed a motion for a bill of particulars with the trial court before his
arraignment. The appellant failed to do so. It was only when the case was brought to this Court on
automatic review that he raised the question of the supposed insufficiency of the criminal complaint,
which is now too late by any reckoning.
24

At all events, accused-appellant participated in the trial and never objected to the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution that the rape was committed "on or about the month of August 1996."
Appellant likewise never objected to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to prove that
the offenses were committed "on or about sometime (sic) 1987, prior and subsequent thereto." He
cannot now pretend that he was unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the allegation
in the Information as to when the crimes were committed, as it was shown to the contrary that he
participated in the trial and was even able to give an alibi in his defense.
25
(Italics in the original)
On the merits, accused-appellant assails the credibility of AAAs testimony that she was raped three
times, in light of the finding of Dr. Salumbides that her hymen was intact.
And accused-appellant questions the prosecutions failure to present as witness AAAs uncle CCC
who allegedly saw him on top of AAA, which failure amounts to, so he claims, willful suppression of
evidence.
In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single most important issue.
26
If the
testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted solely on that
basis.
27
Significantly, the trial court, passing on AAAs credibility, noted:
The credibility of the testimony of the offended party is put to a stringent test in order that it could be
said as credible to sustain a conviction. The Court finds [AAAs] testimony to have passed said test.
Her testimony given in open court is clear, consistent, direct and without any hesitation when
confronted by the presence of her own abuser.
It is noted that [AAA] had to tell her story several times to her two classmates, to the teacher, the
principal, the police, the doctor, the Municipal Trial Court Judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation, to the prosecutor, to the social worker and to this Court, in the presence of the public
and her father. Her testimony is one and the same her father sexually abused her not once, but
thrice, and that every time she was subjected to this maltreatment, her mother was out of their
home, her father would pull down her panty, laid on top of her, placed his sexual organ into her own
private part and made push and pull, or rubbing motions (binubundol-bundol o ikinikiskis). Worse,
she was always warned not to tell anyone about the incidents or her father would kill
her.
28
(Underscoring supplied)
Apropos is this Courts taking stock of the fact that when one accuses a close relative of having
raped her, as in this case where AAA accused her very own father,
29
her testimony is entitled to
greater weight.
x x x [A] daughter would not accuse her own father of a serious offense like rape, had she really not
been aggrieved. Her testimony against him is entitled to greater weight, since reverence and respect
for elders is too deeply ingrained in Filipino children and is even recognized by law. x x x That she
would accuse her own father of this heinous crime had she not been aggrieved would be
absurd.
30
(Underscoring supplied)
Accused-appellants claim that AAA charged him with rape because he would scold her very often
does not impress. People v. Bidoc instructs:
x x x In previous cases, this Court held that parental punishment or disciplinary chastisement is not
enough for a daughter in a Filipino family to falsely accuse her father of rape. She would not subject
herself to an examination of her private parts, undergo the trauma and humiliation of public trial, and
embarrass herself with the need to narrate in detail how she was raped if she was not in fact
raped. It takes depravity for a young girl to concoct a tale of defloration, which would put her own
father on death row, drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame, and make them
the object of gossip among their classmates and friends.
31
(Underscoring supplied)
That AAAs hymen remained intact despite the claim of three occasions of rape is not impossible
and does not negate a finding that they were committed.
32
A torn or broken hymen is not an essential
element of rape, not even when the victim is an innocent child.
33
Dr. Salumbides, on cross-
examination, testified that there are several classes of hymen; some are elastic and flexible that
even in cases of several deliveries, the hymen remains intact.
34

As to the failure of the prosecution to present AAAs uncle CCC and to proffer a plausible
explanation therefor, a prosecutor has the discretion, the prerogative to determine the witnesses he
is going to present.
35

In any event, the records show that on the request of the prosecution,
36
several subpoenas
37
for, as
well as bench warrants
38
against, CCC were issued. CCC, however, had ceased to reside in
Barangay Ilayang Nangka and his whereabouts could not be ascertained. The trial court in fact even
reprimanded on one occasion SPO2 Edilberto Conjares, the subpoena/warrant officer of the
Philippine National Police in Tayabas, Quezon, for failure to serve the subpoena.
39

On accused-appellants alibi, the rule is settled that for it to prosper, it must be established with clear
and convincing evidence not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but
also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.
40
This, accused-appellant failed to do. As reflected above, he admitted that after work,
he goes home in the afternoon or early evening.
41

The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and established. Hence, the
death penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals is proper. In view,
however, of the subsequent enactment on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act No. 9346, "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," accused-appellant must be sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
42

A word on the award of moral damages. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the amount
of P50,000 which was awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, is increased
to P75,000.
43

WHEREFORE, the assailed November 18, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01496 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that in lieu of death penalty, accused-
appellant, Meliton Jalbuena y Tadiosa, is
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, and the award of P50,000 for
moral damages, is increased to P75,000.
SO ORDERED.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 166061 July 6, 2007
ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22001 dated 12 November 2004, affirming the Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 138, Makati City, in Criminal Case No. 96-1498, that found Andy Quelnan y
Quino
3
(petitioner) guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The accusatory portion of the Information against petitioner reads:
That on or about the 27th day of August, [sic] 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
27.7458 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated drug.
Contrary to law.
4

During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
Witnesses
5
for the prosecution testified as to the following set of facts:
On 27 August 1996, a team from the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), composed of Chief Inspector Carlos Acosta,
SPO4 Isagani Ilas, SPO2 Manubay, SPO2 Sanggalang, SPO2 Teodoro Sinag, SPO2 Mario Magno,
SPO2 de Leon, SPO2 Cecil Fajardo, SPO3 Marcelo Alcancia, SPO3 Dennis Zarcal, and PO1 Eraldo
Lectura,
6
was formed to implement a search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila on 26 August
1996.
7

At around 3:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the Cityland Condominium in South Superhighway,
Makati. Upon arrival, they went directly to the Security Office of said building to seek assistance in
serving the warrant. Security Officer Celedonio Punsaran (Punsaran) accompanied the group and
they proceeded to Unit 615.
At their knocking, a male person naked from the waist up opened the door.
8
He was later identified
as petitioner. SPO2 Sinag presented the search warrant to petitioner.
9
Upon entry, the police
operatives searched the unit, which was composed of a small room with a plywood divider
separating the sala from the bedroom.
10
In the presence of petitioner and Punsaran, the group
started searching the place and eventually found on top of the bedroom table three (3) pieces of
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances later confirmed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forensic chemist as shabu, plastic tubings, weighing scales, an
improvised burner, and empty transparent plastic sachets.
11
Thereafter, the group prepared a receipt
of the properties seized and an Affidavit of Orderly Search allegedly signed by petitioner in their
presence and that of Punsaran.
12

Meanwhile, the group also went to Unit 418 of the same building to serve the warrant and search the
place. The police operatives did not find any occupant in the room.
Petitioner was then brought to the PARAC office for investigation. The pieces of evidence gathered
by the police operatives were brought to the NBI for examination. That same day, NBI Forensic
Chemist Loreto F. Bravo issued a certification stating that upon examination, the specimen
submitted yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
13
The following day, the Arrest
Report and Joint Affidavit of Apprehension were executed by the police operatives leading to the
arrest and charging of petitioner for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425.
In his defense, petitioner testified that he is a resident of 150 Legaspi Tower 300, 2600 Roxas
Boulevard, Manila.
14
He also happens to be the registered owner of Unit 615 of Cityland
Condominium in Makati City, which he leased to Sung Kok Lee (Lee) beginning May 1996.
15
On 27
August 1996, at around 3:00 p.m., petitioner went to Unit 615 to collect payment of rental from Lee.
Upon knocking at the door, petitioner was greeted by the maid. The maid told him to wait for Lee
inside the room while she went out to buy some refreshments. After a while, petitioner heard
somebody
knocking at the door and he opened it. He saw around 15 to 20 armed men who suddenly barged
into the room. The officer in charge asked for a certain Bernard Kim and petitioner introduced
himself as the owner of the condominium unit. The police operatives then proceeded to search the
house for the next half hour while petitioner was waiting in the sala. Petitioner was also forced to
sign some documents at gunpoint. Petitioner was then handcuffed and brought to the PARAC office.
Two days later, he was brought to the Makati Prosecutors Office for inquest and a case was
subsequently filed against him.
16

In behalf of petitioner, Luis Alvarez, the administrator of Cityland Condominium, testified that Lee
was the actual occupant of Unit 615 at the time petitioner was arrested.
17
Celso Fiesta, petitioners
driver, also stated in court that petitioner resides at Legaspi Tower. On 27 August 1996, he dropped
petitioner off at Cityland Condominium between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. Two and a half hours later, he
went back to pick him up. As he was about to park the car, somebody poked a gun at him and
introduced himself as PARAC. Fiesta was ordered to get out of the car and the PARAC team
searched the vehicle. They found a gun and brought Fiesta to the DILG. He was released the
following day.
18

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum.
19
In convicting petitioner, the trial
court relied heavily on the clear, straightforward, and candid testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses:
They were all present when the search warrant was implemented at Unit 615 Cityland
Condominium. No infirmity or flaw affecting their credibility exists. Further, the Court considered that
they are public officers and there was no showing that they were motivated by ill-will testimonies or
bad faith to falsely testify against the accused. There was no evidence of intent to harass the
accused. The presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions can be fairly applied.
20

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling, modifying however the penalty to be
imposed on petitioner in that he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor
as minimum to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional as maximum.
21

Petitioner now seeks the reversal of said judgment. His conviction or acquittal rests on the validity of
the warrantless arrest. The prosecution proffers that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of the subject shabu justifying his warrantless arrest. Another crucial issue arises, that of
the validity of the enforcement of the search warrant as basis for the presence of the police
operatives in the Cityland Condominium unit. Therefore, these matters may be summarized into two
issues for our resolution: whether the search warrant was properly enforced and whether petitioner
was validly arrested without warrant.
The issue as to whether the search warrant was validly implemented necessitates a review of the
tenor of the search warrant, vis--vis the conduct of the police operatives enforcing such warrant.
Search Warrant No. 96-585 reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff
- versus -
BERNARD LIM
22

Room 615 Cityland Condominium
South Superhighway, Makati City
Respondent.
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 96-585
FOR: VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425
(Dangerous Drug Act 1972)
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned under examining under oath PNP SPO4 ISAGANI
J. ILAS and his witness, that there are [sic] reasonable ground to believe that VIOLATION OF R.A.
[No.] 6425 has been committed or is about to be committed and there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that still undetermined Quantity of Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)
has [sic] in his possession and control.
You are commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of the premises
abovementioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the abovementioned
MET[H]AMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) subject of the offense and bring to this Court
said drugs and persons to be dealt with as the law may direct. You are further directed to submit
return within ten (10) days from today.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF THIS COURT, this 26[th] day of August 1996 in Manila,
Philippines.
HON. WILLIAM M. BAYHON
Executive Judge, RTC
Branch XXIII, Manila
NOTE: This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue.
23

Petitioner assails the improper enforcement of the search warrant in that despite the knowledge that
petitioner was not the subject of such warrant, the police operatives proceeded anyway with the
search and his resulting arrest. According to him, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that where
a search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises and not of a person, the
omission of the name of the owner or occupant of such property in the warrant does not invalidate
the same. Petitioner contends that this doctrine applies only if the search warrant does not indicate
with all certainty the owner or occupant of the premises sought to be searched; on the contrary, the
subject search warrant indicated with absolute clarity that the person subject thereof is Kim.
This argument is misplaced. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides for the requisites for the issuance of search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
Nowhere in said rule or any other provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is it required
that the search warrant must name the person who occupies the described premises. In Uy v.
Bureau of Internal Revenue,
24
the Court has definitively ruled that where the search warrant is issued
for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure
to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not
invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is
incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the
premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the
search as to the place to be searched.
A cursory reading of the search warrant reveals that the police officers were ordered to make an
immediate search of the premises mentioned and to seize and take possession of shabu.
Furthermore, they were directed to bring "persons to be dealt with as the law may direct." While
petitioner may not be the person subject of the search, the fact that he was caught in flagrante
delicto necessitated his valid warrantless arrest. Therefore, the fact that petitioners name was not
indicated in the search warrant is immaterial.
Turning to the second issue, petitioner insists that his apprehension cannot be considered in
flagrante delicto because he was not in possession of the forbidden drug.
In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said
drug is a regulated drug.
25

More importantly, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess the drug.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the
accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The fact of possession may be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion, as well as the character of the
drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drug in the place where
he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact that
the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or
within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
26

For the trial court, the fact of possession was clearly and convincingly established by the
prosecution, to wit:
Prosecution has presented in Court the three (3) plastic sachet[s] containing 27.7458 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as well as all paraphernalia seized from the accused consisting of
an improvised burner, two (2) pieces of weighing scale, plastic tubing, aluminum foil, empty
transparent plastic sachets, Icom radio, Calculator, Cellular phone, disposable lighters, and two (2)
pieces [of] blank cartridge. SPO4 Ilas and SPO2 Sinag clearly testified that they were found on top
of a table in a room of [sic] Unit 615 in the afternoon of August 27, 1996 at a time when only the
accused was inside the premises. Thus, the fact of possession was clearly and convincingly
established.
27

The Court of Appeals pointed out that possession necessary for conviction of the offense of
possession of controlled substances may be actual or constructive:
Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on his person but in the bedroom of the
subject premises, appellant is deemed in possession thereof since he was the only person in said
premises. Moreover, at the time of entry of the searching team in the subject premises, appellant
was half-naked from the waist up which, as the trial court correctly concluded, only "indicates
extreme familiarity and gives the impression of he being at home" in the premises, of which he was
the registered owner.
28

Petitioner counters that he was in all his right to be in the leased premises because he had to collect
the rentals due him from his tenant. He further argues that the shabu was allegedly found on top of
the table inside the bedroom and not within the immediate location where he was positioned. When
he was found half-naked by police operatives in another persons house, petitioner defends his act
by invoking his "long bond of friendship" with Lee which made the former treat Lees home like his
own.
29

In support of the appellate courts ruling, the Solicitor General maintained that petitioner was in
constructive possession of the subject shabu by citing several circumstances showing petitioners
control and dominion over the same. First, the shabu was found on top of a table in Unit 615 of
Cityland Condominium when and where only petitioner was present inside the premises. Second,
petitioner introduced himself as the owner of the condominium. Third, petitioner admitted that he was
at the subject premises allegedly to collect rentals from the lessee. Fourth, petitioner was found
naked from the waist up by the police operatives upon entering Unit 615. The Solicitor General
stresses that petitioners actuation of being naked from the waist up while opening the door to greet
visitors is natural only to someone who owns the premises.
30
Fifth, Unit 615 is a studio unit with a
divider and a sala. There was no room with a door to be closed and locked which can prevent
petitioner from having free access to the shabu found on the table.
This Court is convinced that petitioners control and dominion over the shabu found on top of the
table were sufficiently established by his questionable presence in Unit 615. Petitioners explanation
that he went to Lees unit to collect rentals and was left by the maid to fend for himself while the
latter went out to buy refreshments is highly suspicious. The maid never came back. The maids
testimony would have corroborated that of petitioners.
Despite the presentation of the testimonies of Cityland Condominium Administrator Luis Alvarez and
other witnesses tending to prove that petitioner is the owner and lessor of Unit 615 and his actual
place of residence is in Legaspi Tower, such pieces of evidence do not necessarily prove that
petitioner did not have access and control over the subject premises. In fact, petitioners overt act of
getting half-naked while opening the door establishes intimate familiarity with and over his
surroundings. Petitioner seeks to justify such act by invoking his "long bond of friendship" with Lee.
This was, however, belied by the testimony of the building administrator which showed that Lee was
a mere walk-in applicant and he began renting Unit 615 only on 1 May 1996, barely three (3) months
before petitioner was apprehended.
31

Petitioner, in fact, affirmed this fact in his earlier testimony that he allowed Lee, whom he barely
knew, to occupy the unit with only one month rental deposit:
Q: Is it your practice to go personally to that unit to receive the rental?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Thats your practice?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How much is the lease price?
A: P6,500.00.
Q: Payable monthly?
A: At the second week of the month.
Q: For what month was that rental where [sic] you were suppose to collect?
A: June and July[,] your Honor.
Q: Is it not a practice[,] Mr. Witness[,] that now lessee should pay the deposit and a few
months in advance?
A: Yes, but he promise he does not have any money and to produce later on.[sic]
Q: Which rental he is going to pay?
A: The deposit and the monthly rental.
Q: What you are saying [sic] when he entered the premises of this property he does not paid
[sic] anything?
A: He just paid for the month of May.
Q: What you are saying you entered into a lease contract with a person you do not know
during the said month, that he entered the unit he was not able to pay you even the deposit
[sic]?
A: He paid me just one month.
Q: And you agreed?
A: Yes, sir. [H]e promised to pay later on.
32

Equally doubtful is the existence of the lease contract allegedly executed between petitioner and Lee
which purportedly validates the presence of the former in Unit 615, which was to collect rentals from
the latter. As the Solicitor General correctly observed, the lease agreement is undated and
unnotarized.
33
During cross-examination, the building administrator who presented a copy of the
lease agreement could not even remember when the contract was executed.
34
Petitioner also
testified that the rentals are payable at the second week of each month.
35
His statement is
inconsistent with his avowed effort to collect payment in the last week of the month, particularly on
27 August 1996.
We further find the Solicitor Generals conclusion that petitioner was privy to the existence of the
shabu on top of the table credible because the unit was a small room with a piece of plywood
dividing the sala and the bedroom. With petitioner seemingly comfortable in moving about the unit,
the shabu and other paraphernalia could not have escaped his vision.
Even more telling are the testimonies of the police operatives who conducted the search and
subsequent arrest of petitioner. Inspector Acosta testified that his team conducted a search on Unit
615 and found petitioner inside the room alone and that the search resulted in the discovery of the
shabu, to wit:
Q: In connection with your duties then as the member of the PARAC[,] do you recall if there
was any occasion if you meet a certain person whose name [was] Andy Quelman?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: During what occasion did you meet this person?
A: During [sic] when we conducted the search of the Cityland Condominium[,] South
Superhighway[,] Makati City.
Q: If this person Andy Quelman is present in this Courtroom[,] can you point him out in the
Court?
COURT:
Will you step down on the witness stand and tap on his shoulder?
A: Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Make of record that the witness stepped down on the witness stand and tapped the shoulder
of a person seated on the gallery who when asked of his name answered his name as Andy
Quelman.
Q: You said that you conducted a search, when was this?
A: August 27, 1996.
Q: What time?
A: 3:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Q: Where did you conduct the search?
A: At room 615 Cityland Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,] Makati City.
x x x x
Q: By what authority did you conduct your search at room or [U]nit 615 Cityland
Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,] Makati City.
A: We are armed with [a] search warrant.
Q: Issued by whom?
A: The RTC Judge Hon. Bayhon, City of Manila.
x x x x
Q: So upon arriving at the 6th floor what did you do, or what did you do?
A: We knocked at the door of [R]oom 615.
Q: And what happened next?
A: Somebody opened the door.
Q: And after the door was opened[,] what did you and your team do next?
A: We presented our search warrant.
Q: To whom?
COURT:
Would you know who open[ed] the door?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR GARVIDA:
Q: Who?
A: Andy Quelman.
PROSECUTOR GARVIDA:
Q: Can you describe[,] Mr. Witness[,] the appearance of Mr. Andy Quelman when he opened
the door?
A: He is half[-]naked wearing pants.
Q: What about the upper body?
A: Naked.
Q: Upon presenting the search warrant[,] what did you do next?
A: We proceeded to the room to conduct the search.
x x x x
Q: You said you proceeded to conduct the search. [W]hat was Mr. Quelman doing while you
are conducting the search?
A: He was sitting at the table inside the room.
x x x x
Q: Now can you describe to this Court how you conducted the search[,] Mr. Witness?
A: First we proceeded to his room and I saw Mr. Quelman sitting at his table. Later on we
found at his table all the paraphernalia.
Q: Can you enumerate to this Court what[,] if any[,] did you find [sic] during the search?
A: We found 3 transparent plastic containing white crystalline substance.
Q: Where did you find [sic]?
A: Atop the table.
x x x x
Q: What did you do with Mr. Quelman after you found these items which you [have] just
enumerated?
A: We bring [sic] Andy Quelman to our office.
36

The foregoing testimony was substantially corroborated by SPO4 Isagani Ilas and SPO1 Teodoro
Sinag who were both part of the arresting team. These witnesses positively identified petitioner as
the occupant of Unit 615 at the time the search was conducted and that he was caught in flagrante
delicto when the shabu was found in his constructive possession.
The trial court placed great weight on the testimonies of these police officers and accorded them the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions.
37
The prosecution of drug cases
largely depends on the credibility of the police officers. The factual findings of the trial court
especially those which revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected when
no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of the facts or no speculative, arbitrary, and
unsupported conclusions can be gleaned from such findings. The evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment, demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination.
38
In this case, the RTC was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner has not
convinced this Court of the existence of any of the recognized exceptions
39
to the conclusiveness of
the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
In sum, petitioners unlawful possession, as exhibited by his control and dominion over the shabu
found on top of the table, was duly established by the following evidence: his presence in Unit 615 at
the time of his arrest;
40
his representation to the police that he was the owner of the unit;
41
his half-
naked state when he opened the door, strongly implying that he had stayed in the house longer than
he claimed to be; and finally, the fact that the shabu was found on top of a table beside the bed
which appears to be within sight of petitioner as there was a mere divider between the sala and
bedroom.
42
1avvphil
Having caught petitioner in flagrante delicto, the police operatives are obligated to apprehend him
even without a warrant of arrest.
We shall now determine the imposable penalty. Both the lower courts erred as to the respective
penalties they imposed. Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, provides that if the
quantity of the regulated drug involved, in this case, shabu, is less than 200 grams, the penalty to be
imposed shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Since petitioner was charged
with the possession of 27.7458 grams of shabu, the imposable penalty is prision
correccional.
43
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium
period as minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Court of Appeals Decision in CA-
G.R. CR No. 22001 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO
is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Four (4) Months and
One (1) Day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to Three (3) Years of prision
correccional in its medium period as maximum.
SO ORDERED.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners,
vs.
NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSN., I XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
REYES, R.T., J .:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the
following premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and
embodied in our Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private
and Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is
the only solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules
the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO."
1

It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan,
Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the
petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land
titles, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth
these so-called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the
"squatting syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the
Government must be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political
protges. If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System
of land registration in this Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein
Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these
unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation in the
issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the Private
Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this Honorable Supreme Court, are
likewise being made to believe that said titles in the possession of the Private
Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.
2

what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos.
177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration
for the second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such
therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in
any way be treated as such motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the
possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this
Honorable Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038.
Inherent in the powers of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse
and set aside, even its own previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced
by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this
petition for the Writ of Amparo.
3

We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case
was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not
included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the
remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have
any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty
and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged in the
petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed
out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a
clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if
on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge
shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of
court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the
justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any
officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not
be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued
and the petition will be dismissed outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the
protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and
security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of
this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not
covered by the writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.