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ROMANO, Gerlianne Joy S.

Law 2B


HIZON vs HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GR 119619 December 13, 1996

FACTS:
The crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by First
Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by Richard Hizon, a domestic
corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, being then the owner,
crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson and with the use of said fishing
boat, the accused conspired to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or
gathered fish or fishery aquatic products in the coastal waters of Puerto Princess
City, Palawan, with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium
cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes which were illegally
caught thru the use of obnoxious/poisonous substance (sodium cyanide) on the
30th day of September 1992, at Brgy. San Rafael, Puerto Princesa City.
It was later found out that one of the 4 sample fishes gathered by the
authorities as a specimen gave positive results to sodium cyanide. Prior to such
apprehension, about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force BantayDagat reported to
the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by
"muroami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa.
The Lower Court and the Court of Appeals ruled against the accused based
on the evidence presented by the prosecution.

ISSUE:
Whether the positive results to the test for the presence of sodium cyanide
is admissible and sufficient for the petitioners conviction, despite the fact that it
was seized without a warrant.
Whether the statutory presumption of guilt under Sec. 33 of P.D. 704 will
prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.

RULING:
The Supreme Court hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B
Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish
and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the
trial court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and hence,
waived their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said
search and seizure. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing
vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered
by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine
Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery
laws.
Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and
38 of P.D. 704. The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a
presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence is not constitutionally
impermissible. It makes the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances,
explosives, or devices for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of
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obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or electricity in any fishing boat
or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the
fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The
ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman
were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the
discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the
fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the
fact proved.
The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish
samples and this omission raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the
cage was caught with the use of sodium cyanide. The only basis for the charge of
fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the
four fish specimens. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding
does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or
even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
Moreover, the muroami would require around 200 fishermen, while the officers
only caught 28.
Therefore, petitioners are acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the
use of poisonous substances defined under Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the
Fisheries Decree of 1975.


HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
GR 68166 February 12, 1997

FACTS:
On October 3, 1946, SinforosoPascual filed an application for foreshore
lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an
area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on
January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond
application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of
foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was
denied, eventually however the grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land is
an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on
Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. SinforosoPascual claimed the
accretion as the riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating
that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the
subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it
belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore land and
therefore part of public domain. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pascual for
ejectment against Navarro and also denied his land registration request. Pascuals
heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by the IAC. The Apellate court granted
petition for registration! The reason? The accretion was caused by the two rivers,
not manila bay. Hence it wasnt foreshore land. Aggrieved, the Director of Forestry
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moved for. The Apellate court denied all motions of the Director and the
Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the
principle of accretion.
RULING:
The petitioners claim is misplaced. The disputed land is an accretion not on
a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay
which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side The disputed
property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the
sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain, the herein
disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation
belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of
being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization
granted in due form by a competent authority."Only the executive and possibly the
legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that
the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of
public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast
guard services. Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or
legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as
owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

PEOPLE vs VERGARA
GR 110286 April 2, 1997

FACTS:
In the morning of 04 July 1992, a team composed of deputized Fish Warden
and President of the Leyte Fish Warden Association Jesus P. Bindoy, Police
Officers Casimiro Villas and Diosdado Moron of the Palo PNP Station, Leyte, Fish
Wardens Mario Castillote and EstanislaoCabreros and Fish Examiner Nestor Aldas
of the Department of Agriculture were on board, "Bantay-Dagat," a pumpboat, on
"preventive patrol" along the municipal waters fronting barangays Baras and
Candahug of Palo, Leyte, when they chanced upon a blue-colored fishing boat at a
distance of approximately 200 meters away. The boat, 30 feet long, had on board
appellant RenerioVergara and his three co-accused BernardoCuesta, Pedro Dagao
and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr., and was on parallel course toward the general direction of
Samar. Momentarily, the team saw appellant throw into the sea a bottle known in
the locality as "badil" containing ammonium nitrate and having a blasting cap on
top which, when ignited and thrown into the water, could explode. The explosion
would indiscriminately kill schools and various species of fish within a certain
radius. Approximately three seconds after appellant had thrown the "badil" into the
sea, the explosion occurred. Vergara and Cuesta dove into the sea with their gear
while Dagao and Cuesta, Jr., stayed on board to tend to the air hose for the divers.
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SPO2 Casimiro Villas boarded the fishing boat while Fish Warden Jesus
Bindoy held on to one end of the boat Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying
a fishnet or "sibot" filled with about a kilo of "bolinao" fish scooped from under
the water. Having been caught red-handed, the four accused were apprehended
and taken by the patrol team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later to the
police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its paraphernalia, as well as the
two fishnets of "bolinao," were impounded. The accused, however, refused to sign
and acknowledge the corresponding receipts therefor.
The trial court rendered judgment convicting Vergara.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision was biased.
RULING:
The Court is convinced that the trial court has acted correctly in finding
accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged.
Sections 33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058, read:
"Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for
illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It
shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught,
taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use
of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as
defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided,
That mere possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal
fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided:Provided,
That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the Director and subject to such
safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for research, educational or
scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance
or electricity to catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in specified
area: Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in
fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery practices without causing
deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided,
finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or
other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the
Secretary.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS
GR 110120 March 16, 1994

FACTS:
This is a petition made by Laguna Lake Development Authority to declare
anexclusive power on the regulation of issuing a fish open permits over the
businessmen engage in the Laguna de bay. The power to issue a permit was then
transferred to the office of the mayor on the different municipalities of Laguna thus
making the Laguna debay crowded and unhealthy for living of natural resources
and danger to the livelihood among the folks of Laguna
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ISSUE:
Whether the Local Government Code Code of 1991 repealed the Charter of
Laguna Lake Developmental Authority (RA NO. 4850) in the issuance of fish pen
permits and other related activity involving Laguna de Bay.

RULING:
No, the court holds that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not
necessarily repeal the laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and
granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
TheLocal Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which
categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded
that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendments. It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the
Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory
construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot
be construed to have repealed a special law.

CHAVEZ vs NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
GR 164527 August 15, 2007

FACTS:
President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161, approving
and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated
Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey
Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, is being made residence of many
Filipinos living in a subhuman state. As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared
feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA
6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the
importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter,
Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP. Under the JVA, the
project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a
low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully
finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land
at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on
Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components. To summarize,
the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves
clearing, leveling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units
for the current residents on the cleared and leveled site. Phase II involves the
construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at
the dumpsite. Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations
done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the
design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the
project. Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made
the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey
Mountain necessary. The project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by
President Estrada in MO No. 33. NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of
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Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent
agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures
and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no
declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use.
Whether or not the establishment of an incinerator is illegal.
RULING:
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be
no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to
be disposed to qualified beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have already
been necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.
Based on the issues raised in this petition, we find that the March 19, 1993 JVA
between NHA and RBI and the SMDRP embodied in the JVA, the subsequent
amendments to the JVA and all other agreements signed and executed in relation to
it, including, but not limited to, the September 26, 1994 Smokey Mountain Asset
Pool Agreement and the agreement on Phase I of the Project as well as all other
transactions which emanated from the Project, have been shown to be valid, legal,
and constitutional. Phase II has been struck down by the Clean Air Act.
The Act (PD 8749) made the establishment of an incinerator illegal and
effectively barred the implementation of the planned incinerator project under
Phase II. Thus, the off-site disposal of the garbage at the Smokey Mountain
became necessary.

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE vs JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL
CORPORATION
GR 163663 June 30, 2006

FACTS:
President Fidel Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum Order no. 202
creating an Executive Committee (EC) to oversee and develop waste-to-energy
projects for the waste disposal sites in Rizal and Carmona under the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Respondent Jancom International Development
Projects Pty. Limited of Australia was one of the bidders for the Rizal Site which
subsequently entered into a partnership with its co-respondent Asea Brown
Boveriunder the firm name Jancom Environmental Corporation (JANCOM).
Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered
the closure of the San Mateo landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a
Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefore
the passage of Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999,
the non-availability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees.
JANCOM filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of MMDA calling for the bids
for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste
management as illegal, unconstitutional and void, and to enjoin them from
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implementing the Resolution and making another award. The trial court ruled in
favor of JANCOM which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court declared the contract valid and perfected, albeit ineffective and
unimplementable pending the approval by the President.
JANCOM and MMDA later entered into negotiations to modify certain
provisions of the contract which were embodied in a draft Amended Agreement
which bore no signature of the parties. JANCOM then filed before the Pasig City
RTC an Omnibus Motion for a writ of execution which upon its issuance, was
challenged by GMMSWMC and MMDA. The Court of Appeals however affirmed
the RTC Order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contract is ineffective and unimplementable until and
unless it is approved by the President.

HELD:
The petition is granted. The only question before the Court is whether or not
there is a valid and perfected contract between the parties. As to necessity,
expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are outside the realm of judicial
adjudication. These considerations are primarily and exclusively a matter for the
President to decide. While the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a
matter of grave public concern, it can only declare that the contract in question is a
valid and perfected one between the parties, but the same is still ineffective or
unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President, the contract itself
providing that such approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity.
In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect ordered the
enforcement of the contract despite this Courts unequivocal pronouncement that
albeit valid and perfected, the contract shall become effective only upon approval
by the President.

HENARES vsLTFRB
GR 158290 October 23, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents LTFRB and DOTC to require PUVs to use compressed natural gas
(CNG) as alternative fuel. The petitioners alleged that the particulate matters (PM) have
caused detrimental effects on health, productivity and the overall quality of life. This PM
constitutes complex mixture of dust, dirt, smoke and liquid droplets composed of harmful
elements which are emitted into the air from engine combustions. Studies from the Philippine
Environment Monitor in 2002 shows that over 2,000 die prematurely, 9,000 people suffer from
chronic bronchitis and 51 million cases of respiratory symptoms in Metro Manila alone. The
petitioners proposed the use of CNG to counter the effects. CNG is known to be the cleanest
fossil fuel and 90 percent less CO emissions and cuts hydrocarbon emission by half. The
petitioners assert their right to clean air as stipulated in Sec. 4 of R. A. 8749 known
asPhilippine Clean Air Act of 1999 and Sec. 16 Article II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
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The Solicitor General, in his comments for LTFRB and DOTC, said that nothing in the
Philippine Clean Air Act prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by motor vehicle owners, and
more sadly, the said act does not include CNG as an alternative fuel. Further, the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is the agency tasked to set the emission
standards for fuel use and tasked to develop an action plan.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their
petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG
as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the
ruling in the case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LTFRB can be compelled to require PUVs to use CNG
through a writ of mandamus.

RULING:
No. Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air
Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are
general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel,
particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program
on the use of CNG by public vehicles.
There is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to
order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Further, mandamus will not generally
lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason
that neither is inferior to the other.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to
a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and" inter-generational justice" in Oposa, where we upheld the right
of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of there in forests, so do we
recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to clean
air.
The present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as
these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to
drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit
in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an
indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of
mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles.


SALALIMA vs EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION
GR 146360 May 20, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioners husband JuanchoSaldima was employed for twenty nine years as
a route helper and salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca Cola Bottlers
Philippines Inc. during the annual company medical examination, Juancho was
diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis. Later found him to have cancer of the
lungs and died after few months. After he died, a claim for compensation benefits
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under P.D. 626 as amended was filed by his surviving wife, Azucena, petitioner
herein, with the SSS. The claim was denied on the ground that cancer of the lungs
had no causal relationship with Juanchos job as a route salesman. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied. The ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS.
The ECC argued that lung cancer is not an occupational disease nor is the
risk of contracting lung cancer increased by Juanchos working conditions. Claim
for compensation benefits under P.D. 626 as amended was filed by his surviving
wife, Azucena, petitioner herein, with the Social Security System (SSS). SSS
recommended the denial of petitioners claim on the ground that Adenocarcinoma
of the Lungs (Cancer of the Lungs) had no causal relationship with Juanchos job
as a route salesman. In its Decision dated October 7, 1999, the ECC relied upon the
Quality Assurance Medical Report prepared by Dr. Ma. Victoria M. Abesamis for
the SSS stating that Juanchos exposure to smog and dust is not associated with the
development of lung cancer Azucena, the wife of Juancho is now claiming for the
benefits of her husband from the company and the SSS.
RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed and this petition was therefore filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners death was directly connected with his line of
work.

RULING:
Yes. SC answered in the affirmative. Because the facts of the case showed
that the cause of Juanchos death was his mere work and that his medical history
states that his stay at Coca cola is a contributory to his sickness. SSS was ordered
to pay the claimant and the RTCs and CAs decisions were reversed and set aside.
The combination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound in his work environment
verily contributed to the worsening of his already weak respiratory system. His
continuous exposure to these factors may have led to the development of his cancer
of the lungs. Medical books list the etiology of lung cancers as follows: cigarette
smoking, occupational exposure, air pollution, and other factors such as preexisting
lung damage and genetic influences.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS HON ATIENZA
GR 156052 March 7, 2007

FACTS:
The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. The said ordinance, in
essence, reclassified portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining
areas from industrial to commercial areas [reservoir of oils of big oil companies are
located in this area this is called as the Pandacan terminals] and owners or
operators of industries and other businesses, of the Pandacan terminals are given a
period of 6 months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to
cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are disallowed.
Subsequent to the approval of the ordinance, on June 26, 2002, the City of
Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a memorandum of
understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that:scaling down of
Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Under the MOU,
the oil companies agreed to scale down the oils reservoir and agreed that the joint
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operations of the oil companies in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the
common and integrated areas or facilities. The said MOU was adopted by a
resolution of the SanggunianPanglunsod of Manila.
Petitioners filed a mandamus compelling respondent in his capacity as
Mayor of Manila to enforce the said ordinance and order the immediate removal of
the terminals of the oil companies. Atienza contended that Ordinance 8027 was
superseded by the MOU, hence he cannot enforce it.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And
Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and the
resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

RULING:
The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City
Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.
On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of
understanding were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which
ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and
effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent
from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027.

MMDA vs CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY

FACTS:
Judgment is rendered ordering the petitioners agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB
level to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation. In accordance with said decision, the petitioners were issued a writ of
continuing mandamus and tasked to submit periodic progressive reports on the
activities they undertake until the fulfillment of the said judgment. In their
individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of
petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of writ of continuing mandamus an
encroachment over the powers and function of the executive branch.

RULING:
No. It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to
fully implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
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Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Sections 7 and 8,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:Sec. 7. Judgment.If
warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus
requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully
satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the
wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to
submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment, and
the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government
agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments
or observations on the execution of the judgment.