FRIAS VS ATTY.

BAUTISTA- LOZADA
A.C. No. 6656 May 4, 2006
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada seeks reconsideration of
the Courts resolution finding her guilty of violating Rules !."# and $."% of
the Code of &rofessional Responsi'ility and of (ilfully diso'eying a final and
e)ecutory decision of the Court of Appeals and suspending her from the
practice of la( for t(o years.
Respondent contends that* pursuant to Rule +,,, of the Rules of &rocedure of
the Commission on Bar -iscipline of the ,ntegrated Bar of the &hilippines* the
complaint against her (as already 'arred 'y prescription. .he also asserts
that her -ecem'er /* 00" loan agreement (ith complainant complied (ith
Rule $."% 'ecause the interest of complainant (as fully protected.
ISSUE: 1hether or not a complaint for dis'arment is su'2ect to prescription.
1hether or not Rule +,,,* .ection of the Rules of &rocedure of the CB--,B&
is valid.
COMMENT: 3hese issues concern legal ethics 'ecause the rule on
prescription (ill someho( pre2udice the aggrieved parties 'ecause of the
misconducts done 'y a la(yer or a 2udge. Although* it may seem unfair for
the la(yers* yet* they have to face the conse4uences of their actions.
La(yers kne( from the start that they are duty 'ound to o'ey the la(s of
the land* o'serve candor (ith respect to their dealings and 'e of good moral
standing. 3o allo( prescription to set in for dis'arment cases* the la(s* (ith
regards to the conduct and discipline of 2udges* (ould 'e su'2ect to a'use
and (orst* it (ould lead to its mockery. &ractice of la( is a privilege and such
privilege entails great responsi'ility.
HELD: 56
As early as 0$/* (e have held that the defense of prescription does not lie
in administrative proceedings against la(yers.

And in the 7""% case of Heck

v. Santos* (e declared that an administrative complaint against a mem'er of
the 'ar does not prescri'e. ,f the rule (ere other(ise* mem'ers of the 'ar
(ould 'e em'oldened to disregard the very oath they took as la(yers*
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant (ould
immediately come for(ard* they stand a chance of 'eing completely
e)onerated from (hatever administrative lia'ility they ought to ans(er for
,t is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of la( as
(ell as the administration of 2ustice. No matter how much time has elapsed
from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot
escape the disciplining arm of the Court. 3his categorical pronouncement is
aimed at unscrupulous mem'ers of the 'ench and 'ar* to deter them from
committing acts (hich violate the Code of &rofessional Responsi'ility* the
Code of 8udicial Conduct* or the La(yers 6ath. 3hus* even the lapse of
considera'le time from the commission of the offending act to the institution
of the administrative complaint (ill not erase the administrative culpa'ility of
a la(yer
SECOND ISSUE: 56.
Rule +,,,* .ection of the Rules of &rocedure of the CB--,B& (hich provides
for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against
la(yers runs afoul of the settled ruling of this Court. ,t should therefore 'e
struck do(n as void and of no legal effect for 'eing ultra vires.
REALA VS SANDIANBAYAN
.R. No. !0"!!# S$%&$'($) 20, !**6
FACTS: A complaint (as filed 'efore the .andigan'ayan 'y the Repu'lic of
the &hilippines* through the &C99 against :duardo ;. Co2uangco* 8r.* as one
of the principal defendants* for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten (ealth*
(hich includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in &C99 Case 5o.
## regarding Coco Levy <unds.
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners 3eodoro
Regala* :dgardo 8. Angara* Avelino +. Cruz* 8ose C. Concepcion* Rogelio A.
+inluan* +ictor &. Lazatin* :duardo =. :scueta and &ara2a 9. >ayudini* and
herein private respondent Raul .. Roco* (ho all (ere then partners of the
ACCRA La( <irm.
&C99 filed a 3hird Amended Complaint (hich e)cluded private respondent
Raul .. Roco from the complaint in &C99 Case 5o. ## as party-defendant.

3he e)clusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant (as 'ased on
his undertaking that he (ill reveal the identity of the principal?s for (hich he
acted as nominee?stockholder in the companies involved in &C99 Case 5o.
##.
&etitioners ACCRA la(yers su'se4uently filed their @C6;;:53 A5-?6R
6&&6.,3,65@ (ith Counter-;otion that respondent &C99 similarly grant the
same treatment to them Ae)clusion as parties-defendantsB as accorded
private respondent Roco.

>o(ever* respondent &C99 set the follo(ing
conditions precedent for the e)clusion of petitioners* namely: AaB the
disclosure of the identity of its clientsC A'B su'mission of documents
su'stantiating the la(yer-client relationshipC and AcB the su'mission of the
deeds of assignments petitioners e)ecuted in favor of its client covering their
respective shareholdings. .andigan'ayan promulgated the Resolution* herein
4uestioned* denying the e)clusion of petitioners in &C99 Case 5o. ##* for
their refusal to comply (ith the conditions re4uired 'y respondent &C99.
>ence* this petition.
ISSUE: 1hether or not &C99 can compel petitioners to reveal their clients
name
COMMENT: 3his is an ethical issue for la(yers 'ecause it affects the
attorney- client relationship. As a rule* la(yers should disclose the identity of
his client. 3his is also in consonance of the other partys right to kno( the
opposing party. >o(ever* pro'lem arises if such disclosure (ould lead to the
implication of the said client. ,f that is the case* the la(yer should not 'e
'ound to disclose the name of his client especially if the said disclosure is
related to the very activity in (hich the client sought the la(yers advice.
.uch information is covered 'y the attorney- client privilege communication
(hich should 'e respected 'y the courts. >o(ever* such privilege (ould not
apply if said communication is in pursuant for a perpetuation of a crime.
HELD: 56
As a matter of pu'lic policy* a clientDs identity should not 'e shrouded in
mystery. =nder this premise* the general rule in our 2urisdiction as (ell as in
the =nited .tates is that a la(yer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of this client.
<irst* the court has a right to kno( that the client (hose privileged
information is sought to 'e protected is flesh and 'lood. .econd* the privilege
'egins to e)ist only after the attorney-client relationship has 'een
esta'lished. 3he attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a
client. 3hird* the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the
relationship. <inally* due process considerations re4uire that the opposing
party should* as a general rule* kno( his adversary. @A party suing or sued is
entitled to kno( (ho his opponent is.@ >e cannot 'e o'liged to grope in the
dark against unkno(n forces.
5ot(ithstanding these considerations* the general rule is ho(ever 4ualified
'y some important e)ceptions.
B Client identity is privileged (here a strong pro'a'ility e)ists that revealing
the clientDs name (ould implicate that client in the very activity for (hich he
sought the la(yerDs advice.
7B 1here disclosure (ould open the client to civil lia'ilityC his identity is
privileged.
#B 1here the governmentDs la(yers have no case against an attorneyDs client
unless* 'y revealing the clientDs name* the said name (ould furnish the only
link that (ould form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual
of a crime* the clientDs name is privileged.
.ummarizing these e)ceptions* information relating to the identity of a client
may fall (ithin the am'it of the privilege (hen the clientDs name itself has an
independent significance* such that disclosure (ould then reveal client
confidences.
3he circumstances involving the engagement of la(yers in the case at 'ench*
therefore* clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least t(o
e)ceptions to the general rule. <irst* disclosure of the alleged clientDs name
(ould lead to esta'lish said clientDs connection (ith the very fact in issue of
the case* (hich is privileged information* 'ecause the privilege* as stated
earlier* protects the su'2ect matter or the su'stance A(ithout (hich there
(ould 'e not attorney-client relationshipB.
3he link 'et(een the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal
service sought (as duly esta'lishes in the case at 'ar* 'y no less than the
&C99 itself. 3he key lies in the three specific conditions laid do(n 'y the
&C99 (hich constitutes petitionersD ticket to non-prosecution should they
accede thereto:AaB the disclosure of the identity of its clientsC A'B su'mission
of documents su'stantiating the la(yer-client relationshipC and AcB the
su'mission of the deeds of assignment petitioners e)ecuted in favor of their
clients covering their respective shareholdings.
<rom these conditions* particularly the third* (e can readily deduce that the
clients indeed consulted the petitioners* in their capacity as la(yers*
regarding the financial and corporate structure* frame(ork and set-up of the
corporations in 4uestion. ,n turn* petitioners gave their professional advice in
the form of* among others* the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering
their clientDs shareholdings. 3he preparation of the aforestated documents
(as part and parcel of petitionersD legal service to their clients. ;ore
important* it constituted an integral part of their duties as la(yers.
&etitioners* therefore* have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients
(ould implicate them in the very activity for (hich legal advice had 'een
sought* i.e.* the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten (ealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
<urthermore* under the third main e)ception* revelation of the clientDs name
(ould o'viously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to 'uild its
case* (here none other(ise e)ists. ,t is the link* in the (ords of Baird* @that
(ould inevita'ly form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the AclientB
of a . . . crime.@
4+
1e have no choice 'ut to uphold petitionersD right not to reveal the identity
of their clients under pain of the 'reach of fiduciary duty o(ing to their
clients* 'ecause the facts of the instant case clearly fall (ithin recognized
e)ceptions to the rule that the clientDs name is not privileged information.
ISSUE: 1hether or not the condition re4uired 'y the respondent &C99 of
the petitioners for their e)clusion as parties-defendants in &C99 Case 5o. ##
violates the la(yer-client confidentiality privilege.
HELD: E:.
1e find that the condition precedent re4uired 'y the respondent &C99 of the
petitioners for their e)clusion as parties-defendants in &C99 Case 5o. ##
violates the la(yer-client confidentiality privilege. 3he condition also
constitutes a transgression 'y respondents .andigan'ayan and &C99 of the
e4ual protection clause of the Constitution. ,t is grossly unfair to e)empt one
similarly situated litigant from prosecution (ithout allo(ing the same
e)emption to the others. ;oreover* the &C99s demand not only touches
upon the 4uestion of the identity of their clients 'ut also on documents
related to the suspected transactions* not only in violation of the attorney-
client privilege 'ut also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
1hichever (ay one looks at it* this is a fishing e)pedition* a free ride at the
e)pense of such rights.
COMMENT: 3he conditions violate the la(yer- client confidentiality privilege
'ecause the conditions refer to the very activity (hich the clients sought the
advice of the petitioner la(yers. 3he la( treats (ith respect the rule on
attorney- client privilege communication. 3he client should not 'e put into
dou't as to (hether or not he (ill tell the la(yer the truth or the facts or
(hether he should trust the la(yer. Attorney- client relationship is 'ased on
trust. 3hus* the communications 'y the client to the la(yer should not 'e
disclosed unless it violates the la(.
NORTH,ESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., a-. BEN A. NICOLAS /0. A&&y.
MACARIO D. AR1UILLO
A.C. No. 66#2. A2320& 2, 2005
FACTS: &etitioners filed a letter-complaint against respondent (here'y the
latter (as charged (ith deceit* malpractice* gross misconduct and?or
violation of his oath as attorney 'y representing conflicting interests. ,n its
complaint* petitioners accuse respondent of engaging in conflicting interest in
a case 'efore the 5LRC* Regional Ar'itration Branch 5o. * .an <ernando* La
=nion.
,t appears that respondent appeared and acted as counsels for 'oth
complainants Aeight out of the eighteen complainants thereinB and
respondent Aone out of the ten respondents thereinB. ,n a consolidation of
5LRC Cases respondent appeared as counsel for complainants. ,n the very
same consolidated case* respondent (as also the counsel of one of the
respondents therein* 8ose 9. Castro. Complainants* as their evidence*
su'mitted the Motion to Dismiss filed 'y 8ose 9. Castro* represented 'y his
counsel* herein respondent filed 'efore the 5LRC. .i)teen days later*
respondent filed a Complainants Consolidated !osition !aper, this time
representing some of the complainants in the very same consolidated case.@
ISSUE: 1hether or not respondent is guilty for representing conflicting
interest.
COMMENT: 3he issue concerns legal ethics 'ecause it touches upon the rule
on conflicting interest (ith respect to the dealings of a la(yer or a 2udge. 3he
rule against conflicting interest provides that a la(yer shall not represent
clients that are of conflicting interest or entertain a case (hich pre2udice the
interest of his client. 3he essence of this rule is for the la(yer to o'serve
loyalty to his client since attorney- client relationship is 'ased on trust. 3hus*
(hatever information disclosed 'y the client or any circumstances related to
the client* should not 'e used 'y the la(yer to the pre2udice of him. ,f the
la(yer is allo(ed to represent conflicting interest* it (ill 'reak the trust
reposed upon 'y the client to the la(yer. <urthermore* a la(yer cannot serve
t(o clients at the same time. 6ne person (ill really 'e pre2udiced and this is
not in line (ith the rules on legal ethics.
HELD: E:.
3he Code of &rofessional Responsi'ility re4uires la(yers to o'serve candor*
fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions (ith their
clients.
/
Corollary to this duty* la(yers shall not represent conflicting
interests* e)cept (ith all the concerned clients (ritten consent* given after a
full disclosure of the facts.
,n the present case* Atty. ;acario -. Ar4uillo* as counsel for Respondent 8ose
C. Castro in the consolidated 5LRC Cases* filed a ;otion to -ismiss those
cases. .hortly thereafter* a position paper (as filed 'y Atty. Ar4uillo as
counsel for several complainants in the said cases. All the cases in the
second set (ere included in the first one* for (hich he had filed the su'2ect
;otion to -ismiss. <urthermore* in his position paper for the complainants*
Atty. Ar4uillo even protected his other client* Respondent 8ose C. Castro.
<urthermore* as counsel for complainants* respondent had the duty to
oppose the Motion to Dismiss filed 'y 8ose 9. Castro. But under the
circumstance* it (ould 'e impossi'le since respondent is also the counsel of
8ose 9. Castro. And it appears that it (as respondent (ho prepared
the Motion to Dismiss, (hich he should 'e opposing as counsel of 8ose 9.
Castro* Respondent had &4$ .2&y &o %)o/$ &4$ Co'%5a6-& 7)o-3. But
Respondent cannot do this 'ecause he is the counsel for the
complainants. Here lies the inconsistency. The inconsistency o8
6-&$)$0&0 60 /$)y 95$a).
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. ,t is a horn'ook doctrine
grounded on pu'lic policy that a la(yers representation of 'oth sides of an
issue is highly improper. 3he proscription applies (hen the conflicting
interests arise (ith respect to the same general matter* ho(ever slight such
conflict may 'e. ,t applies even (hen the attorney acts from honest
intentions or in good faith.
S:OUSES SADI; VS <UDE ABDALLAH CASAR
.R. No. MT<-*5-!05# <a-2a)y 2, !**+
FACTS: Lekiya &aito filed an application for life insurance (ith the 9repalife.
3he application (as approved and &olicy 5o. "!"#"## (as issued in her
name Linang ;inalang and ;akadaya .adik (ere named as 'eneficiaries. 6n
6cto'er 7* 0F!* Lekiya &aito died in &agaya(an* 3ampara* Lanao del .ur.
3he 'eneficiaries sought for and o'tained the assistance of respondent* (ho
(as then a trial attorney of the Bureau of <orest -evelopment* Cota'ato City*
to claim the insurance 'enefits. Respondent* as counsel of the 'eneficiaries*
filed a complaint for specific performance against 9repalife and (as a'le
o'tain a favoura'le 2udgment yet their prayer as to dou'le indemnity (as
denied. At this time* respondent (as already the presiding 8udge of the !th
;unicipal Circuit 3rial Court of Golam'ugan-;aigo.
Respondent still continued to represent for the plaintiffs and appealed the
case until it reached the .upreme Court. 9repalife filed a manifestation
declaring its (illingness to pay the 2udgment a(ard and depositing RCBC
check 5o. $7F#/ amounting to &#"*"""."". Respondent collected the check
and thereafter cashed it. >o(ever* respondent did not deliver the money to
the plaintiffs. .u'se4uently* complainants filed their administrative complaint
against respondent.
,n his defense* respondent alleged that he has the right to retain the amount
pursuant to .ection #/* Rule #F. <urthermore* he contended that he
accepted the case long 'efore he 'ecame a 2udge and that complainant*
;akadaya .adik is not the real ;akadaya .adik* and 'eing an impostor she
is not entitled to the money.
ISSUE: 1hether or not respondent 2udge is guilty of misconduct and
misappropriation.
HELD: E:.
COMMENT: 3his is an ethical issue for la(yers of 2udges 'ecause it is
concerned (ith the conduct of a la(yer or 2udge that he is 'ound to o'serve.
A la(yer or a 2udge is 'ound to o'serve several rules on conduct and
professional responsi'ility. 3his is in line (ith the principle that practice of
la( is not a right* it is a privilege. 6nly those (ho possess the necessary
4ualifications and conduct are called to practice la(. Being a la(yer or a
2udge entails great po(er and status in the society* and such also re4uires
great responsi'ility that the la(yer must o'serve and comply (ith. 3hus if a
la(yer or 2udge has failed to comply (ith those responsi'ilities provided 'y
la(* he should suffer the conse4uences of his actions.
R:.&65-:53 +,6LA3:- R=L: !."/ 6< 3>: C6-: 6< 8=-,C,AL C65-=C3
Rule !."/ of the Code of 8udicial Conduct provides that @A 2udge shall not
engage in the private practice of la(.
,n the case at 'ar* there is no dispute that (hen respondent agreed to file
the complaint in 'ehalf of ;akadaya .adik and Linang ;inalang* he (as not
yet a mem'er of the 2udiciary. >e (as a trial attorney of the Bureau of <orest
-evelopment. >e continued to represent the plaintiffs in Civil Case 5o. 7/%/
(hen he 2oined the Citizens Legal Assistance 6ffice in a private capacity.
<urthermore* even after he 'ecame a municipal 2udge* he continued to act as
counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case 5o. 7/%/ on appeal to the Court of
Appeals and the .upreme Court. >e actively handled the case on appeal.
>e had no authority to practice la( (hile in government service. ,n
continuing to handle the case of herein complainants against 9repalife after
he 2oined the government and (ithout first securing proper authority is no
less constitutive of a'use of authority.
R:.&65-:53 ,. 9=,L3E 6< ;,.A&&R6&R,A3,65
RespondentDs act of collecting the 2udgment a(ard of &#"*"""."" from the
Clerk of Court of R3C* Cota'ato City and his refusal to turn over the amount
to his client* complainant ;akadaya .adik and her sister* is an act of
misappropriation amounting to gross misconduct and?or dishonesty. >is
defense that he has the right to retain the entire &#"*"""."" as attorneyDs
lien in unaccepta'le. <or he has no right to retain the 2udgment a(ard
allegedly to secure payment of litigation e)penses and attorneyDs fees.
Respondent failed to sho( 'y clear and convincing evidence that he did
indeed spent more than &#"*"""."" to prosecute the insurance claim. >is
various claims of e)penses for travels to ;anila* to find (itnesses and to look
for his clients are all designed to inflate his demand for reim'ursement and
2ustify his (ithholding of the 2udgment a(ard from his clients.
5onetheless* it appears that his reliance on .ection #/* Rule #F of the Rules
of Court is nothing more than an afterthought. ,f indeed* he (as claiming
attorneyDs lien pursuant to said section* then he should have kno(n that to
'e entitled thereto he must comply (ith certain pre-conditions. 1ith respect
to 2udgments for payment of money* a la(yer shall have a lien thereto @from
and after the time (hen he shall have caused a statement of his claim of
such lien to 'e entered upon the records of the court rendering such
2udgment . . . and shall have caused (ritten notice thereof to 'e delivered to
his client and the adverse party.@ <rom 8uly* 00# (hen he learned of the
dismissal of 9repalifeDs petition 'y the .upreme Court until no(* he did not
file the necessary pleadings to enforce his alleged lien. ,t surfaces only (hen
the administrative case (as filed.
R:.&65-:53 +,6LA3:- 3>: LA1E:R. 6A3>
>e like(ise violated the AttorneyDs 6ath in agreeing to file Civil Case 5o.
7/%/ for the purpose of claiming the insurance proceeds from 9repalife
despite his having 'een informed that the insurance policy of Lekiya &aito
(as fraudulently applied for. Agreeing to handle the claim said to have arisen
from a fraudulent act against the insurer certainly speaks of a moral fla( in
his character.
,ndeed* to 'e effective in his role* a 2udge must 'e a man of e)ceptional
integrity and honesty. 3he special urgency for re4uiring these 4ualities in a
2udge is not hard to understand for the 2udge acts directly upon the property*
li'erty* even life* of his countrymen. >ence* 'eing in a position of such grave
responsi'ility in the administration of 2ustice* a 2udge must conduct himself in
a manner 'efitting the dignity of such e)alted office. Respondent 2udge*
ho(ever* not only failed in this respect 'ut proved himself repeatedly
un(orthy of his post.
HORNILLA VS ATTY RICAFORT
A.C. No. 5"04 <25y !, 200#
FACTS: Benedicto >ornilla and <ederico -. Ricafort filed an administrative
complaint (ith the ,B& Commission on Bar -iscipline* against respondent
Atty. :rnesto .. .alunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of
interest.
Complainants* (ho are mem'ers of the &&.3A* filed an intra-corporate case
against its mem'ers of the Board of -irectors 'efore the .ecurities and
:)change Commission* and a complaint 'efore the 6ffice of the 6m'udsman*
for unla(ful spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the &&.3A.
Respondent represented the &&.3A Board mem'ers in the said cases.
Complainants contend that respondent (as guilty of conflict of interest
'ecause he (as engaged 'y the &&.3A* of (hich complainants (ere
mem'ers* and (as 'eing paid out of its corporate funds (here complainants
have contri'uted. -espite 'eing told 'y &&.3A mem'ers of the said conflict
of interest* respondent refused to (ithdra( his appearance in the said cases.
;oreover* complainants aver that respondent violated Rule !."$ of the Code
of &rofessional Responsi'ility (hen he appeared at the meeting of the &&.3A
Board and assured its mem'ers that he (ill (in the &&.3A cases.
Respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the
&&.3A Board ;em'ers for and in 'ehalf of the A..A La( and Associates. >e
denied that he ensured the victory of the &&.3A Board >e merely assured the
Board that the truth (ill come out and that the case 'efore the 6m'udsman
(ill 'e dismissed for lack of 2urisdiction* considering that respondents therein
are not pu'lic officials* 'ut private employees.
ISSUE: 1hether or not respondent is representing conflicting interest.
COMMENT: 3his is an ethical issue for la(yer or 2udges 'ecause it deals (ith
the rule that la(yer should not represent conflicting interest. 3o allo( this* it
(ould pre2udice the other party* (ho 'y dealing (ith the la(yer has reposed
trust to the latter of his case. ,n the present case* Atty Ricafort has
represented the mem'ers of &&.3A (ho filed a case against the corporation.
3o represent the corporation* to (hich his clients* mem'ers of &&.3A filed a
case* (ould definitely give rise to conflicting interest. Although* the la( does
not prohi'it ho( many clients the la(yer can entertain* 'ut still the la(yer
should 'e vigilant in determining (hether or not there e)ists conflict of
interest. 6ther(ise
HELD: E:.
,n cases of derivative suits* the prevailing rule is that a situation (herein a
la(yer represents 'oth the corporation and its assailed directors unavoida'ly
gives rise to a conflict of interest. 3he interest of the corporate client is
paramount and should not 'e influenced 'y any interest of the individual
corporate officials.
%
3he rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon
us. After due deli'eration on the (isdom of this doctrine* (e are sufficiently
convinced that a la(yer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot
represent mem'ers of the same corporations 'oard of directors in a
derivative suit 'rought against them. 3o do so (ould 'e tantamount to
representing conflicting interests* (hich is prohi'ited 'y the Code of
&rofessional Responsi'ility.
,n the case at 'ar* the records sho( that .:C Case 5o. "!-0/-!$!/* entitled
@&hilippine &u'lic .chool 3eachers Assn.* ,nc.* et al. v. 007-00! Board of
-irectors of the &hilippine &u'lic .chool 3eachers Assn. A&&.3AB* et al.*@ (as
filed 'y the &&.3A against its o(n Board of -irectors. Respondent admits
that the A..A La( <irm* of (hich he is the ;anaging &artner* (as the
retained counsel of &&.3A. Eet* he appeared as counsel of record for the
respondent Board of -irectors in the said case. Clearly* respondent (as guilty
of conflict of interest (hen he represented the parties against (hom his
other client* the &&.3A* filed suit.
,n 6;B Case 5o. "-0/-"$0!* he filed a ;anifestation of :)treme =rgency
(herein he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients* the
individual Board ;em'ers. By filing the said pleading* he necessarily entered
his appearance therein. Again* this constituted conflict of interests*
considering that the complaint in the 6m'udsman* al'eit in the name of the
individual mem'ers of the &&.3A* (as 'rought in 'ehalf of and to protect the
interest of the corporation.
<OSEFINA M. ANI=ON vs. ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, <R.
A.C. No. 50*" A%)65 !!, 20!2
FACTS: 8osefina ;. AniHon previously engaged the legal services of Atty.
.a'itsana in the preparation and e)ecution in her favor of a -eed of .ale
over a parcel of land o(ned 'y her late common-la( hus'and* Brigido
Cane2a* 8r. Atty. .a'itsana allegedly violated her confidence (hen he
su'se4uently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the -eed of
.ale in 'ehalf of Ienaida L. CaHete* the legal (ife of Brigido Cane2a* 8r. 3he
complainant accused Atty. .a'itsana of using the confidential information he
o'tained from her in filing the civil case.
Atty. .a'itsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation
and e)ecution of the -eed of .ale yet denied having received any confidential
information.
ISSUE: (hether Atty. .a'itsana is guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests.
COMMENT: 3his is an ethical issue for la(yers and 2udges 'ecause they are
'ound to strictly o'serve the rule on conflicting interests. An attorney- client
relationship is 'ased from trust and confidence. 3hus* any information
e)changed 'y the la(yer and the client should 'e kept confidential.
<urthermore* a la(yer should not represent conflicting interests. Any
information o'tained from the client should not 'e used to advance the
interest of the other party. ,n the present case* it is evident that respondent
is representing conflict of interest. -espite the clash 'et(een the t(o parties*
still respondent proceeded to represent Ienaida.
HELD: E:.
3he relationship 'et(een a la(yer and his?her client should ideally 'e im'ued
(ith the highest level of trust and confidence. 3his is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients
most confidential information to his?her la(yer for an unhampered e)change
of information 'et(een them. &art of the la(yers duty in this regard is to
avoid representing conflicting interests* a matter covered 'y Rule !."#
(hich states that JA la(yer shall not represent conflicting interests e)cept 'y
(ritten consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.K
6n the 'asis of the attendant facts of the case* (e find su'stantial evidence
to support Atty. .a'itsanas violation of the a'ove rule* as esta'lished 'y the
follo(ing circumstances on record:
6ne* his legal services (ere initially engaged 'y the complainant to
protect her interest over a certain property. 3he records sho( that
upon the legal advice of Atty. .a'itsana* the -eed of .ale over the
property (as prepared and e)ecuted in the complainants favor.
3(o* Atty. .a'itsana met (ith Ienaida CaHete to discuss the latters
legal interest over the property su'2ect of the -eed of .ale. At that
point* Atty. .a'itsana already had kno(ledge that Ienaida CaHetes
interest clashed (ith the complainants interests.
3hree* despite the kno(ledge of the clashing interests 'et(een his t(o
clients* Atty. .a'itsana accepted the engagement from Ienaida
CaHete.
<our* Atty. .a'itsanas actual kno(ledge of the conflicting interests
'et(een his t(o clients (as demonstrated 'y his o(n actions: first* he
filed a case against the complainant in 'ehalf of Ienaida CaHeteC
second* he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the caseC
and third* the case he filed (as for the annulment of the -eed of .ale
that he had previously prepared and e)ecuted for the complainant.
By his acts* not only did Atty. .a'itsana agree to represent one client against
another client in the same actionC he also accepted a ne( engagement that
entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a
property in (hich his legal services had 'een previously retained.
<urthermore* (e find no reason to apply the e)ception due to Atty.
.a'itsanas failure to comply (ith the re4uirements set forth under the rule.
Atty. .a'itsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and
to Ienaida CaHete 'efore he accepted the ne( engagement (ith Ienaida
CaHete. 3he records like(ise sho( that although Atty. .a'itsana (rote a
letter to the complainant informing her of Ienaida CaHetes adverse claim to
the property covered 'y the -eed of .ale and* urging her to settle the
adverse claimC Atty. .a'itsana ho(ever did not disclose to the complainant
that he (as also 'eing engaged as counsel 'y Ienaida CaHete. ;oreover* the
records sho( that Atty. .a'itsana failed to o'tain the (ritten consent of his
t(o clients* as re4uired 'y Rule !."#* Canon ! of the Code of &rofessional
Responsi'ility.
FERDINAND A. SAMSON vs. ATTY. EDARDO O. ERA,
A.C. No. 6664 <25y !6, 20!#
FACTS: <erdinand A. .amson has 'rought this complaint for dis'arment
charging respondent Atty. :dgardo 6. :ra (ith violation of his trust and
confidence of a client 'y representing the interest of :milia C. .ison* his
present client* in a manner that 'latantly conflicted (ith his interest.
.amson engaged Atty. :ra to represent and assist him and his relatives in
the criminal prosecution of .ison and her group. &ursuant to the
engagement* Atty. :ra prepared the demand letter. .u'se4uently* a
complaint-affidavit (as filed charging .ison and the other corporate officials
of ,C. Corporation (ith several counts of estafa. .ison and the others (ere
then formally charged (ith the said crime.
Atty. :ra called a meeting (ith .amson and his relatives to discuss the
possi'ility of an amica'le settlement (ith .ison and her cohorts. &etitioners
acceded and e)ecuted the affidavit of desistance he prepared* and in turn
they received a deed of assignment covering a land e)ecuted 'y .ison in
'ehalf of ,C. Corporation. <inally* the deed
.amson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. :ra that they 'e given
instead a deed of a'solute sale to ena'le them to li4uidate the property
among themselves. Atty. :ra gave them five copies of the deed of a'solute
sale yet and emphasized that his professional responsi'ility to(ards them
has already ceased. >o(ever* petitioner* upon verification of the title to the
Register of -eeds* learned that they could not li4uidate the property 'ecause
it (as no longer registered under the name of ,C. Corporation 'ut (as
already under the name of Bank 1ise ,nc. Later* petitioners discovered that
Atty. :ra had already 'een entering his appearance as the counsel for .ison
in her other criminal cases in the other 'ranches of the R3C in Luezon City
involving the same pyramiding scam that she and her ,C. Corporation had
perpetrated.
ISSUE: 1hether not respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests.
COMMENT: 3his issue concerns legal ethics 'ecause it deals (ith the
conduct that a la(yer is 'ound to o'serve (ith respect to his clients. ,t is
mandated 'y the la( that a la(yer shall not represent conflicting interest.
3his is in line (ith the principle that a la(yer must o'serve loyalty (ith his
clients. 3his rule still applies even though the relationship of the la(yer and
the client has already severed. ,t is not an e)cuse for the la(yer not to
respect the rule despite termination of the relationship. ,n the present case*
Attorney :ra is still 'ound to o'serve the rule on conflicting interest despite
the termination of the relationship. 3his is also aimed for the protection of
the client (ho reposed trust and confidence to the la(yer during the
su'sistence of the la(yer- client relationship.
HELD: E:.
Rule !."#* Canon ! of the Code of &rofessional Responsi'ility provides
that: @A la(yer shall not represent conflicting interests e)cept 'y (ritten
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.@ Atty. :ra
thus o(ed to .amson and his group entire devotion to their genuine interest*
and (arm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. >e (as
e)pected to e)ert his 'est efforts and a'ility to preserve the clients cause*
for the un(avering loyalty displayed to his clients like(ise served the ends of
2ustice.
3he rule prohi'iting conflict of interest (as fashioned to prevent situations
(herein a la(yer (ould 'e representing a client (hose interest is directly
adverse to any of his present or former clients. ,n the same (ay* a la(yer
may only 'e allo(ed to represent a client involving the same or a
su'stantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client
only if the former client consents to it after consultation. 3he rule is grounded
in the fiduciary o'ligation of loyalty. 3hroughout the course of a la(yer-client
relationship* the la(yer learns all the facts connected (ith the clientDs case*
including the (eak and strong points of the case. Gno(ledge and information
gathered in the course of the relationship must 'e treated as sacred and
guarded (ith care. ,t 'ehoves la(yers not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence* 'ut also to avoid the appearance of treachery and dou'le-
dealing* for only then can litigants 'e encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their la(yers* (hich is paramount in the administration of 2ustice. 3he nature
of that relationship is* therefore* one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree.
Contrary to Atty. :ras ill-conceived attempt to e)plain his disloyalty to
.amson and his group* the termination of the attorney-client relationship
does not 2ustify a la(yer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
(ith that of the former client. 3he spirit 'ehind this rule is that the clients
confidence once given should not 'e stripped 'y the mere e)piration of the
professional employment. :ven after the severance of the relation* a la(yer
should not do anything that (ill in2uriously affect his former client in any
matter in (hich the la(yer previously represented the client. 5or should the
la(yer disclose or use any of the clients confidences ac4uired in the previous
relation. ,n this regard* Canon / of the Code of &rofessional Responsi'ility
e)pressly declares that: @A la(yer o(es fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall 'e mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.@
,n the a'sence of the e)press consent from .amson and his group after full
disclosure to them of the conflict of interest* therefore* the most ethical thing
for Atty. :ra to have done (as either to outrightly decline representing and
entering his appearance as counsel for .ison* or to advice .ison to engage
another la(yer for herself. =nfortunately* he did neither* and should no(
suffer the proper sanction.
ENEROSA BUTED a-. BENITO BOLISAY vs. ATTY. HAROLD M.
HERNANDO
A.C. No. !#5* O9&o($) !+, !**!
FACTS:,n an action for partition instituted 'y 9enerosa as compulsory heir
of the deceased 3eofilo Buted* respondent (as counsel for Luciana A'adilla
and a certain Angela Buted. Respondent ultimately succeeded in defending
Luciana A'adillaDs claim of e)clusive o(nership over the lot. 1hen Luciana
died* respondent (ithdre( his appearance from that partition case.
,t appears that Luciana A'adilla sold the lot to Benito Bolisay and a ne(
3ransfer Certificate of 3itle over the lot (as issued in the name of
complainant spouses. ;ean(hile* the .pouses .y filed an action for specific
performance against Benito Bolisay. 3he latter retained the services of
respondent Atty. >ernando ho(ever claims that he rendered his services to
Benito Bolisay free of charge.
:ventually* the .yDs (ere ordered to vacate the house su'2ect of the lease.
6n 7# <e'ruary 0/%* respondent >ernando* (ithout the consent of the heirs
of Luciana A'adilla and complainant spouses* filed a petition on 'ehalf of the
heirs of Carlos* -ionisia and <rancisco all surnamed A'adilla* seeking the
cancellation of the title of complainant spouses over the lot.
At the hearing* respondent >ernando testified that if the petition for
cancellation of 3C3 (as granted* Lot 0%#0-B (ould no longer 'e o(ned 'y
complainant spouses 'ut (ould 'e o(ned in common 'y all the heirs of
Luciana A'adilla.
Complainant spouses*manifested their disapproval thereof in a letter dated
#" 8uly 0/%. Respondent ho(ever* pursued the case until it (as eventually
dismissed 'y the trial court on 7 .eptem'er 0/% on the ground of
prescription.
ISSUE: 1hether or not respondent >ernando had a conflict of interests
under the circumstances descri'ed a'ove.
COMMENT: 3his issue concerns legal ethics 'ecause it tackles a'out the rule
on conflicting of interest. ,t is a rule of la( that a la(yer should not represent
conflicting interest. 3his rule applies not(ithstanding (hether or not
confidential information (as disclosed 'y the la(yer to the other party. 3he
fact that the parties in (hich the la(yer is representing are in conflict then
the rule applies. ,n instant case* it is evident that respondent is representing
conflicting interest. 3he parties interest are adverse thus to represent one
(ould pre2udice the other.
HELD: E:.
3hough as regards the first and second cases handled 'y respondent* no
conflict of interest e)isted* the same cannot 'e said (ith respect to the
action for specific performance and the cadastral proceeding. By respondentDs
o(n admission* he defended the right of o(nership over Lot 0%#0-B of
complainant Benito Bolisay in the action for specific performance. >e assailed
this same right of o(nership (hen he su'se4uently filed a petition for
cancellation of complainantsD 3ransfer Certificate of 3itle over that same lot.
Respondent >ernando (as in a conflict of interest situation.
,t is clear from the a'ove-4uoted portion of the Canons of &rofessional :thics
that in cases (here a conflict of interests may e)ist* full disclosure of the
facts and e)press consent of all the parties concerned are necessary. 3he
present Code of &rofessional Responsi'ility is stricter on this matter
considering that consent of the parties is no( re4uired to 'e in (ritten form.
,n the case at 'ar* such consent (as (anting.
Respondent persistently argues that contrary to the claims of complainant
spouses* he had never seen nor taken hold of the 3ransfer Certificate of 3itle
covering Lot 5o. 0%#0-B nor o'tained any confidential information in
handling the action for specific performance. 3he contention of respondent
is* in effect* that 'ecause complainant has not clearly sho(n that respondent
had o'tained any confidential information from Benito Bolisay (hile
representing the latter in the action for specific performance* respondent
cannot 'e penalized for representing conflicting interests. 3hat is not the rule
in this 2urisdiction. 3he rule here is* rather* that the mere fact that
respondent had acted as counsel for Benito Bolisay in the action for specific
performance should have precluded respondent from acting or appearing as
counsel for the other side in the su'se4uent petition for cancellation of the
3ransfer Certificate of 3itle of the spouses 9enerosa and Benito Bolisay. 3here
is no necessity for proving the actual transmission of confidential information
to an attorney in the course of his employment 'y his first client in order that
he may 'e precluded from accepting employment 'y the second or
su'se4uent client (here there are conflicting interests 'et(een the first and
the su'se4uent clients.
MA. LUISA HAD<ULA vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA
A.C. No. 6+!! <25y #, 200+
FACTS: Complainant and respondent 'oth (orked at the Bureau of <ire
&rotection AB<&B (hereat respondent (as the Chief Legal 6fficer (hile she
(as the Chief 5urse of the ;edical* -ental and 5ursing .ervices. ,n 00F*
complainant approached respondent for some legal advice. ,n course their
conversation* she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a
marriage contract* a 'irth certificate and a 'aptismal certificate* only to 'e
informed later that respondent (ould refer the matter to a la(yer friend.
>o(ever* their friendship turned soured after >ad2ula filed criminal and
disciplinary actions against respondent* (hen the latter* then a mem'er of
the B<& promotion 'oard* demanded a cellular phone in e)change for the
complainantDs promotion.
,n return* respondent filed a counter complaint (ith the 6m'udsman
charging >ad2ula (ith violation of .ection #AaB of Repu'lic Act 5o.
#"0* falsification of pu'lic documents and immorality* the last t(o charges
'eing 'ased on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And
also on the 'asis of the same disclosures* complainant further stated* a
disciplinary case (as also instituted against her 'efore the &rofessional
Regulation Commission.
ISSUE: 1hether or not a la(yer- client relationship e)isted 'et(een >ad2ula
and Atty. ;adianda.
COMMENT: 3his is an ethical issue for la(yers or 2udges 'ecause it deals
(ith the conduct that the la(yer or 2udge should o'serve in his dealings (ith
his client. A la(yer- client relationship e)ists the moment that the client asks
for a legal advice or assistance (ith respect (ith his affairs or trou'les of any
kind. ,t is not essential that a contract 'e e)ecuted or that there is already
payment for the legal services rendered for the relationship to e)ist. 3he fact
that the client approached the la(yer and asks the latter of his legal opinion
a'out a certain matter* the la(yer- client relationship is deemed to e)ist.
<urthermore* (hatever information divulged 'y the client to the la(yer
should 'e kept confidential. 3his is in line (ith the standard that la(yer-
client relationship is 'ased on trust and confidence. ,n the present case* the
moment complainant approached respondent for some legal advice* la(yer-
client relationship already deemed to e)ist. 3hus* any information told 'y the
complainant to respondent should 'e kept confidential and should not 'e
used to the pre2udice of the former.
HELD: E:.
3he moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek
legal advice* a verita'le la(yer-client relationship evolved 'et(een the t(o.
.uch relationship imposes upon the la(yer certain restrictions circumscri'ed
'y the ethics of the profession. Among the 'urdens of the relationship is that
(hich en2oins the la(yer* respondent in this instance* to keep inviolate
confidential information ac4uired or revealed during legal consultations.
3he fact that one is* at the end of the day* not inclined to handle the clientDs
case is hardly of conse4uence. 6f little moment* too* is the fact that no
formal professional engagement follo(s the consultation.
As (e said in"urbe v. Magulta* -
A la(yer-client relationship (as esta'lished from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formerDs
'usiness. 3o constitute professional employment* it is not essential that the
client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. ,t is
not necessary that any retainer 'e paid* promised* or chargedC neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not after(ard handle the case for
(hich his service had 'een sought. ,f a person* in respect to 'usiness affairs
or trou'les of any kind* consults a la(yer (ith a vie( to o'taining
professional advice or assistance* and the attorney voluntarily permits or
ac4uiesces (ith the consultation* then the professional employments is
esta'lished. Like(ise* a la(yer-client relationship e)ists not(ithstanding the
close personal relationship 'et(een the la(yer and the complainant or the
non-payment of the formerDs fees.
Respondent indeed 'reached his duty of preserving the confidence of a client.
As found 'y the ,B& ,nvestigating Commissioner* the documents sho(n and
the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the
legal consultation in 4uestion* (ere used as 'ases in the criminal and
administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.
3he purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from
possi'le 'reach of confidence as a result of a consultation (ith a la(yer.
ROSA F. MERCADO vs. ATTY. <ULITO D. VITRIOLO
A.C. No. 5!0" May 26, 2005
FACTS: Rosa <. ;ercado filed the instant administrative complaint against
Atty. 8ulito -. +itriolo* seeking his dis'arment from the practice of la(. 3he
complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for
falsification of pu'lic document against her* a former client* 'ased on
confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
,t appears that* in 000* respondent filed a criminal action against
complainant for violation of Articles / and /7 Afalsification of pu'lic
documentB of the Revised &enal Code. Respondent alleged that complainant
made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children* Angelica
and Gatelyn Anne. ;ore specifically* complainant allegedly indicated in said
Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain <erdinand
<ernandez* and that their marriage (as solemnized on April * 0/0* (hen
in truth* she is legally married to Ru'en 9. ;ercado and their marriage took
place on April * 0/F.
Complainant ;ercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of
pu'lic document disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the
civil case for annulment* and then handled 'y respondent +itriolo as her
counsel. 3his prompted complainant ;ercado to 'ring this action against
respondent. .he claims that* in filing the criminal case for falsification*
respondent is guilty of 'reaching their privileged and confidential la(yer-
client relationship* and should 'e dis'arred.
ISSUE: 1hether or not the respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication 'et(een attorney-client (hen he filed the criminal case for
falsification
COMMENT: 3his issue concerns legal ethics 'ecause it deals (ith the
responsi'ilities (hich the la(yer ought to o'serve as mandated 'y the la(.
3he rule on privileged communication 'et(een the attorney and the client
provides that any information o'tained 'y the la(yer in the course of the
attorney- client relationship should 'e kept confidential 'y the la(yer. .uch
privilege still e)tends despite the termination of the relationship. 3his is
aimed for the protection of the client. >o(ever* in order for one to invoke
such privilege* one must specify the facts in relation to the alleged violation
of the rule. ;ere allegation (ould not suffice. ,t must 'e su'stantiated 'y the
complainant. <urthermore* the rule on privilege communication (ould also
not apply if such information is aimed for a perpetuation of a crime.
HELD: 56.
-ean 1igmore cites the factors essential to esta'lish the e)istence of the
privilege* vi#: AB 1here legal advice of any kind is sought A7B from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such* A#B the communications
relating to that purpose* A%B made in confidence A!B 'y the client* A$B are at
his instance permanently protected A/B from disclosure 'y himself or 'y the
legal advisor* AFB e)cept the protection 'e (aived.
77
,n fine* the factors are as follo(s:
AB 3here e)ists an attorney-client relationship* or a prospective attorney-
client relationship* and it is 'y reason of this relationship that the client made
the communication.
A7B 3he client made the communication in confidence.
A#B 3he legal advice must 'e sought from the attorney in his professional
capacity.
Applying all these rules to the case at 'ar* (e hold that the evidence on
record fails to su'stantiate complainantDs allegations. 1e note that
complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence
disclosed 'y respondent. All her claims (ere couched in general terms and
lacked specificity. .he contends that respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication (hen he instituted a criminal action against her for
falsification of pu'lic documents 'ecause the criminal complaint disclosed
facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled 'y respondent.
.he did not* ho(ever* spell out these facts (hich (ill determine the merit of
her complaint. 3he Court cannot 'e involved in a guessing game as to the
e)istence of facts (hich the complainant must prove.
,ndeed* complainant failed to attend the hearings at the ,B&. 1ithout any
testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information
allegedly divulged 'y respondent (ithout her consent* it is difficult* if not
impossi'le to determine if there (as any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. .uch confidential information is a crucial link in esta'lishing
a 'reach of the rule on privileged communication 'et(een attorney and
client. ,t is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.
#/
3he
'urden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party
asserting the privilege.
UY CHICO vs. THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET AL
.R. No. L-*2#! <a-2a)y 6, !*!5
FACTS> 3he plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of t(o insurance policies
upon a stock of dry goods destroyed 'y fire. .ometime 'efore the date of the
fire* the plaintiff purchased his 'rotherDs interest in the 'usiness and
continued to carry on the 'usiness under the fatherDs name. At the time of
the fire @=y Layco@ (as heavily inde'ted and su'se4uent thereto the
creditors of the estate of the plaintiffDs father. -uring the course of these
proceedings* the plaintiffDs attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to
the administrator of the estate* (ho compromised (ith the insurance
company for one-half their face value* or &$*""". 3his money (as paid into
court and is no( 'eing held 'y the sheriff. 3he plaintiff no( 'rings this
action* maintaining that the policies and goods insured 'elonged to him and
not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not 'ound 'y
the compromise effected 'y the administrator of his fatherDs estate.
3he defendant insurance company sought to sho( that the plaintiff had
agreed to compromise settlement of the policies and for that purpose
introduced evidence sho(ing that the plaintiffDs attorney had surrendered the
policies to the administrator (ith the understanding that such a compromise
(as to 'e effected. 3he attorney (as then called for that purpose (hich
plaintiff did not o'2ect. >o(ever* counsel of plaintiff su'se4uently (ithdre(
the (aiver previously given 'y the plaintiff and o'2ected to the testimony of
the attorney on the ground that it (as privileged.
ISSUE: 1hether or not the testimony of plaintiffs former counsel (as
privileged.
COMMENT: 3his is an ethical issue for la(yers or 2udges 'ecause it deals
(ith the rule on privileged communication (hich the la(yer or 2udge is
strictly 'ound to o'serve. As a rule* any information disclosed 'y the client to
the la(yer should 'e kept confidential. >o(ever* the rule on privilege
communication does not apply (hen the information (as given 'y the client
to the la(yer and such information is intended to 'e communicated to third
persons as instructed 'y the client. <urthermore* the rule also does not apply
(hen the client already allo(ed such information to 'e disclosed* (hich is
already tantamount to (aiver on his part.
HELD: 56
6ur practice Act provides: @A la(yer must strictly maintain inviolate the
confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. >e shall not 'e permitted in
any court* (ithout the consent of his client* given in open court* to testify to
any facts imparted to him 'y his client in professional consultation* or for the
purpose of o'taining advice upon legal matters.@
,t (ill 'e noted that the evidence in 4uestion concerned the dealings of the
plaintiffDs attorney (ith a third person. 6f the very essence of the veil of
secrecy (hich surrounds communications made 'et(een attorney and client*
is that such communications are not intended for the information of third
persons or to 'e acted upon 'y them* put of the purpose of advising the
client as to his rights. ,t is evident that a communication made 'y a client to
his attorney for the e)press purpose of its 'eing communicated to a third
person is essentially inconsistent (ith the confidential relation. 1hen the
attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions 'e delivering the
communication to the third person for (hom it (as intended and the latter
acts upon it* it cannot* 'y any reasoning (hatever* 'e classified in a legal
sense as a privileged communication 'et(een the attorney and his client. ,t
is plain that such a communication* after reaching the party for (hom it (as
intended at least* is a communication 'et(een the client and a third person*
and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.
3he testimony (as to the effect that (hen the attorney delivered the policies
to the administrator* he understood that there (as a compromise to 'e
effected* and that (hen he informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the
policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no o'2ection (hatever. 3he
evidence is sufficient to sho( that the plaintiff ac4uiesced in the compromise
settlement of the policies. >aving agreed to the compromise* he cannot no(
disavo( it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face value.
,ILLIAM ON ENATO vs. ATTY. ESSE? L. SILA:AN:UNO,
A.C. No. 40+" <25y !4, 200#
FACTS: 1illiam 6ng 9enato filed a complaint for dis'arment against
respondent Atty. :sse) L. .ilapan alleging that in 8uly 007 respondent
'orro(ed &7""*""" from complainant. Respondent issued a postdated check
in favour of complainant and like(ise mortgage his house and lot in Luezon
City. 1ith the 'orro(ed money* respondent purchased a ne( car. >o(ever*
the document of sale of the car (as issued in complainantDs name and
financed through City 3rust Company.
.u'se4uently* respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the
financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant encashed
respondentDs postdated check 'ut it (as dishonored as respondentDs account
therein (as already closed. 3hus* complainant filed a criminal case against
respondent for violation B& Blg. 77 and a civil case for 2udicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage.
>o(ever* in the foreclosure case* respondent averred that complainant is a
'usinessman (ho is engaged in the real estate 'usiness* trading and 'uy and
sell of deficiency ta)ed imported cars* shark loans and other shady deals and
has many cases pending in court. >e further contended that complainant
even (anted respondent to offer 'ri'e money to the mem'ers of the revie(
committee of the -epartment of 8ustice or to the prosecutors.
ISSUE: 1hether respondent committed a 'reach of trust and confidence 'y
imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainantDs alleged
intention to 'ri'e government officials in connection (ith a pending case.
COMMENT: 3his is an ethical issue for la(yers 'ecause it deals (ith the
conduct that the la(yer ought to o'serve in his dealings (ith his client and
his duty to uphold the truth and the la(. As a rule* a la(yer is 'ound to keep
any information disclosed 'y the client to the former 'y virtue of the
attorney- client relationship. >o(ever* conflict arises (hen such information
is aimed for the perpetuation of a crime. ,n such cases* the rule on privilege
communication does not apply. ,t is the duty of the la(yer to help the client
and uphold his interest. But if such is contrary to la(* the la(yer is not 'ound
to pursue the clients interest. 3he la(yer still has the duty to uphold the la(.
HELD: E:..
Canon / of the Code of &rofessional Responsi'ility provides that a la(yer
o(es fidelity to the cause of his client and shall 'e mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him. 3he long-esta'lished rule is that an attorney is
not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional
character 'y a client* unless the latter consents. 3his o'ligation to preserve
the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their
relationship. ,t even survives the death of the client.
>o(ever* the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or
information is limited only to communications (hich are legitimately and
properly (ithin the scope of a la(ful employment of a la(yer. ,t does not
e)tend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.
,f the unla(ful purpose is avo(ed* as in this case* the complainantDs alleged
intention to 'ri'e government officials in relation to his case* the
communication is not covered 'y the privilege as the client does not consult
the la(yer professionally. ,t is not (ithin the profession of a la(yer to advise
a client as to ho( he may commit a crime as a la(yer is not a gun for hire.
3hus* the attorney-client privilege does not attach* there 'eing no
professional employment in the strict sense.
Be that as it may* respondentDs e)planation that it (as necessary for him to
make the disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy us. 3he disclosures (ere
not indispensa'le to protect his rights as they (ere not pertinent to the
foreclosure case. ,t (as improper for the respondent to use it against the
complainant in the foreclosure case as it (as not the su'2ect matter of
litigation therein and respondentDs professional competence and legal advice
(ere not 'eing attacked in said case. A la(yer must conduct himself*
especially in his dealings (ith his clients* (ith integrity in a manner that is
'eyond reproach. >is relationship (ith his clients should 'e characterized 'y
the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
RAMON SAURA, <R. vs. ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH ADE::A
ADM. CASE No. 442* F$()2a)y !+, 2000
FACTS> 3(o A7B petitions* one 'y Ramon .aura* 8r. and the other 'y >elen ..
Baldoria and Raymundo E. .aura* (ere filed 'efore this Court charging Atty.
Lalaine Lili'eth Agdeppa for violation of her la(yerDs oath and disregard of
.ections !* 77* 7!* 70* # and #7 of the Canons of &rofessional :thics.

Respondent handled the settlement of the property of Ramon .aura.
>o(ever* the negotiations for the settlement dragged on for three years.
&etitioners then learned that the administrators of the property of the late
Ramon .aura* (ith the assistance of respondent* (ho in fact notarized the
-eed of .ale* sold the property to .andal(ood Real :state and -evelopment
Corporation (ithout the kno(ledge and participation of petitioners.
&etitioners allege that despite repeated demands* respondent have refused to
disclose the amount of the sale. 3he petitioners have thus 'een constrained
to institute criminal and civil actions.
-uring the scheduled hearing of the case* respondent did not appear despite
receipt of the copy of the petition. 3o date* no response has 'een forth
coming from Atty. Agdeppa.
ISSUE: 1hether or not the re4uest for the information a'out the sale of the
property and account for the proceeds violates the attorney- client privilege.
COMMENT: 3his is an ethical issue 'ecause it affects the relation of the
la(yer to the client (ith respect to the rule on privilege communication.
=nder the rule on privilege communication* a la(yer is 'ound to keep
information ac4uired 'y the la(yer from the client 'y virtue of the attorney -
client relationship. 3his is in line (ith the principle that the attorney- client
relationship is 'ased on trust and confidence. 3hus* the la(yer is 'ound to
o'serve loyalty to his client. 3his rule is intended for the protection of the
client. >o(ever* the rule does not apply (hen the information disclosed is not
related to the la(yers employment and is intended to 'e disclosed to other
persons.
HELD: 56.
3he re4uest for the information regarding the sale of the property and to
account for the proceeds is not a violation of the attorney-client privilege.
Rule #"* .ection 7% A'B of the Rules of Court provides:
.ec. 7%. Dis$ualification b% reason of privileged communication. M 3he
follo(ing persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the follo(ing cases:
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
A'B An attorney cannot* (ithout the consent of his client* 'e e)amined
as to any communication made 'y the client to him* or his advice
given thereon in the course of* or (ith a vie( to* professional
employment* nor can an attorneyDs secretary* stenographer* or clerk 'e
e)amined* (ithout the consent of the client and his employer*
concerning any fact the kno(ledge of (hich has 'een ac4uired in such
capacity.
3he information re4uested 'y petitioners is not privileged. 3he petitioners are
only asking for the disclosure of the amount of the sale or account for the
proceeds. &etitioners certainly have the right to ask for such information
since they o(n the property as co-heirs of the late Ramon :. .aura and as
co-administrators of the property. >ence* respondent cannot refuse to
divulge such information to them and hide 'ehind the cloak of the attorney-
client relationship.
LORITO V. MATURAN vs. ATTY. CONRADO S. ONZALES
A.C. No. 25*+ Ma)94 !2, !**"
FACTS: A complaint for dis'arment (as filed 'y 9lorito +. ;aturan against
his counsel* Atty. Conrado .. 9onzales* charging him (ith immoral* unethical*
and anomalous acts.
.pouses Cas4ue2o instituted 9lorito +. ;aturan* as their attorney-in-fact*
through a .pecial &o(er of Attorney A.&AB authorizing ;aturan to file
e2ectment cases against the s4uatters and criminal cases for violation of &-
//7. &etitioner engaged the services of respondent in e2ecting several
s4uatters occupying the lot. Respondent 9onzales filed Civil Case 5o. /F#-
for <orci'le :ntry and -amages against several individuals in (hich a
2udgment (as rendered in favour of petitioner.
;ean(hile* Antonio Cas4ue2o had* ho(ever* filed a case for reconvenyance of
property and declaration of nullity against Celestino Eokingco docketed as
Civil Case 5o. 7"$/. ,n the interim* the parties to Civil Case 5o. 7"$/
entered into a compromise agreement* (hich (as 2udicially approved in a
2udgment dated ;arch 7F* 0F#.
1hile the motion for issuance of a (rit of e)ecution (as pending* and
(ithout (ithdra(ing as counsel for petitioner* respondent filed* on 'ehalf of
Celestino Eokingco* et al.* Civil Case 5o. 7/%$* an action to annul the
2udgment rendered in Civil Case 5o. 7"$/. Respondent* again on 'ehalf of
Celestino Eokingco* et al.* also filed .pecial Civil Case 5o. $ for in2unction
(ith a prayer for preliminary in2unction* (ith damages* against petitioner.
ISSUE: 1hether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests.
COMMENT: 3his issue concerns legal ethics 'ecause it deals (ith the rule on
conflicting interests. 3he la( provides that a la(yer should not 'e allo(ed to
represent conflicting interests. Aside of the effect that it (ill pre2udice the
parties* the la(yer is 'ound to o'serve this rule 'ecause a la(yer o(es
loyalty to his client* (ho has reposed some trust and confidence to the
la(yer. ,n the instant case* it is clear that there e)ist conflicting interest
'et(een the t(o parties (hich respondent represents. <urthermore* in
representing Eokingco* respondent has 'reached the trust and confidence
reposed 'y petitioner to him. Respondent is 'ound to uphold the interest of
petitioner. Eet* he cannot do the same 'ecause he is also representing the
other party.
HELD: E:..
3his Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding
respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests. ,t is improper for a
la(yer to appear as counsel for one party against the adverse party (ho is
his client in a related suit* as a la(yer is prohi'ited from representing
conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. >e may not* (ithout
'eing guilty of professional misconduct* act as counsel for a person (hose
interest conflicts (ith that of his present or former client.
!
3hat the
representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and (ith honest
intention on the part of the la(yer does not make the prohi'ition inoperative.
3he reason for the prohi'ition is found in the relation of attorney and client*
(hich is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A la(yer 'ecomes
familiar (ith all the facts connected (ith his clientDs case. >e learns from his
client the (eak points of the action as (ell as the strong ones. .uch
kno(ledge must 'e considered sacred and guarded (ith care. 5o opportunity
must 'e given him to take advantage of the clientDs secrets. A la(yer must
have the fullest confidence of his client. <or if the confidence is a'used* the
profession (ill suffer 'y the loss thereof.

3his Court finds respondentDs actuations violative of Canon $ of the Canons of
&rofessional :thics (hich provide in part:
,t is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests* e)cept 'y
e)press consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. 1ithin the meaning of this canon* a la(yer represents conflicting
interests (hen* in 'ehalf of one client* it is his duty to contend for that
(hich duty to another client re4uires him to oppose.
;oreover* respondentDs 2ustification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance
of the fiduciary o'ligations (hich a la(yer o(es to his client. A la(yer-client
relationship is not terminated 'y the filing of a motion for a (rit of e)ecution.
>is acceptance of a case implies that he (ill prosecute the case to its
conclusion. >e may not 'e permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to
the pre2udice of his client.
:EO:LE OF THE :HILI::INES vs. SANDIANBAYAN
.R. No0. !!54#*-4! <25y !6, !**+
FACTS: .everal cases for per2ury and graft charges (ere filed against
respondent &aredes. ,n all these cases* respondent .ansaet served as
counsel for &aredes. 3he cases filed (ere dismissed either on the ground of
prescription or dou'le 2eopardy. .u'se4uently* 3eofilo 9elacio* a ta)payer
(ho had initiated the per2ury and graft charges against respondent &aredes*
sent a letter to the 6m'udsman seeking the investigation of the three
respondents herein for falsification of pu'lic documents. >e claimed that
respondent >onrada* in conspiracy (ith his herein co-respondents* simulated
and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to 'e a notice of
arraignment* dated 8uly * 0F!* and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during the arraignment of &aredes on the per2ury
charge. 3hese falsified documents (ere anne)ed to respondent &aredesD
motion for reconsideration of the 3anod'ayan resolution for the filing of a
graft charge against him* in order to support his contention that the same
(ould constitute dou'le 2eopardy.
9elacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment (as
ever received 'y the 6ffice of the &rovincial <iscal of Agusan del .ur in
connection (ith that per2ury caseC and a certification of &residing 8udge
Ciriaco AriHo that said per2ury case in his court did not reach the arraignment
stage since action thereon (as suspended pending the revie( of the case 'y
the -epartment of 8ustice.
>o(ever* .ansaet su'se4uently discarded and repudiated the su'missions he
had made in his counter-affidavit. .ansaet revealed that &aredes contrived to
have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground
of dou'le 2eopardy 'y making it appear that the per2ury case had 'een
dismissed 'y the trial court after he had 'een arraigned therein.
A motion (as filed 'y the &eople for the discharge of .ansaet as a state
(itness. >o(ever* the same (as denied 'y the .andigan'ayan on the ground
that it is covered 'y the attorney- client privilege.
ISSUE: (hether or not the pro2ected testimony of respondent .ansaet* as
proposed state (itness* is 'arred 'y the attorney-client privilege
COMMENT: 3his is an ethical issue for la(yers or 2udges 'ecause it deals
(ith the situation on (hether or not a la(yer can divulge the information
communicated 'y the client to the la(yer. As a rule* a la(yer should keep the
information disclosed 'y client confidential. >o(ever* this rule is not
a'solute. 1hen such information (as given to the la(yer for the
perpetuation of a crime* the rule on confidential information does not apply.
3he rule only applies to those information the client divulged to the la(yer 'y
virtue of the past crime committed 'y the former 'y (hich the client sought
the advice of the la(yer. 3he instant case falls to the e)ception on the rule on
privilege communication. 3he information given to respondent (as made at
the time (hen &aredes and >onorada (as
HELD: 56
3he attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases* as the facts thereof
and actuations of 'oth respondents therein constitute an e)ception to the
rule. <or a clearer understanding of that evidential rule* (e (ill first s(eep
aside some distracting mental co'(e's in these cases.
,t is postulated that despite such complicity of .ansaet at the instance of
&aredes in the criminal act for (hich the latter stands charged* a distinction
must 'e made 'et(een confidential communications relating to past crimes
already committed* and future crimes intended to 'e committed* 'y the
client. Corollarily* it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included (ithin the confidences (hich his attorney is
'ound to respect. Respondent court appears* ho(ever* to 'elieve that in the
instant case it is dealing (ith a past crime* and that respondent .ansaet is
set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents &aredes and >onrada
that have already 'een committed and consummated.
3he Court repro'ates the last assumption (hich is fla(ed 'y a some(hat
inaccurate 'asis. ,t is true that b% now* insofar as the falsifications to 'e
testified to in respondent court are concerned* those crimes (ere necessarily
committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege*
ho(ever* the period to 'e considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made b% the client to the attorne% in relation to either a
crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be
committed in the future. ,n other (ords* if the client seeks his la(yerDs
advice (ith respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed* he
is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal (hich the attorney-client
privilege declares cannot 'e 'roken 'y the attorney (ithout the clientDs
consent. 3he same privileged confidentiality* ho(ever* does not attach (ith
regard to a crime (hich a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future
and for purposes of (hich he seeks the la(yerDs advice.
.tatements and communications regarding the commission of a
crime alread% committed* made 'y a party (ho committed it* to an attorney*
consulted as such* are privileged communications. Contrarily* the un'roken
stream of 2udicial dicta is to the effect that communications 'et(een attorney
and client having to do (ith the clientDscontemplated criminal acts, or in aid
or furtherance thereof, are not covered b% the cloak of privileges ordinarily
e)isting in reference to communications 'et(een attorney and client.
A:mphases supplied.B
,n the present cases* the testimony sought to 'e elicited from .ansate as
state (itness are the communications made to him 'y physical acts and?or
accompanying (ords of &arades at the time he and >onrada* either (ith the
active or passive participation of .ansaet* (ere a'out to falsify* or in the
process of falsifying* the documents (hich (ere later filed in the 3anod'ayan
'y .ansaet and culminated in the criminal charges no( pending in
respondent .andigan'ayan. Clearly* therefore* the confidential
communications thus made 'y &aredes to .ansaet (ere for purposes of and
in reference to the crime of falsification (hich had not %et been committed in
the past 'y &aredes 'ut (hich he* in confederacy (ith his present co-
respondents* later committed. >aving 'een made for purposes of
a future offense* those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-
client privilege.
<urthermore* .ansaet (as himself a conspirator in the commission of that
crime of falsification (hich he* &aredes and >onrada concocted and foisted
upon the authorities. ,t is (ell settled that in order that a communication
'et(een a la(yer and his client may 'e privileged* it must 'e for a la(ful
purpose or in furtherance of a la(ful end. 3he e)istence of an unla(ful
purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. ,n fact* it has also 'een
pointed out to the Court that the @prosecution of the honora'le relation of
attorney and client (ill not 'e permitted under the guise of privilege* and
every communication made to an attorney 'y a client for a criminal purpose
is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy (hich is not only la(ful to divulge*
'ut (hich the attorney under certain circumstances may 'e 'ound to disclose
at once in the interest of 2ustice.@
,t is evident* therefore* that it (as error for respondent .andigan'ayan to
insist that such unla(ful communications intended for an illegal purpose
contrived 'y conspirators are nonetheless covered 'y the so-called mantle of
privilege. 3o prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a
crime (hich (as later committed pursuant to a conspiracy* 'ecause of the
o'2ection thereto of his conspiring client* (ould 'e one of the (orst
travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the no'le profession of la(.