Balochistan Af Pak S Forgotton Frontier

Balochistan: AF-PAKs Forgotten Frontier P a g e | 1
BALOCHISTAN:
AF-PAKS FORGOTTEN FRONTIER
Rabeah Sabri
Policy Options for Rebuilding Afghanistan
May 4, 200
Professor Rani Mullen
1 | P a g e
ABSTRACT:
!alochistan"s strategic i#portance to the $nited States" ob%ecti&es in Afghanistan and to
stability in the region is #ultiple'fold( it shares a long, porous border )ith Afghanistan that is
facilitating instability and &iolence in southeast Afghanistan* the +aliban ha&e a safe ha&en for
operation in the northern region of !alochistan, and are )idely considered to be based in ,uetta,
!alochistan"s capital* the Afghanistan'!alochistan border has long ser&ed as the principal s#uggling
route for opiu# fro# Afghanistan to the -est* !alochistan ser&es as an abundant recruiting ground
for the +aliban* and finally, !alochistan houses a highly'traffic.ed supply route fro# /arachi to
Afghanistan that is used by $0S0 and 1SA2 forces and other co##ercial actors0 Separate but lin.ed to
the $0S0"s strategic interest in the region are the decades'old ethnic !aloch grie&ances )ith the
Pa.istani central go&ern#ent that are no) threatening the stability of the Pa.istani go&ern#ent0
1t is !alochistan"s centrality in these t)o broad challenges 3 the strength of the +aliban4al'
,aeda and the unaddressed grie&ances of the !aloch separatists, and the potential of the t)o groups
#erging their ob%ecti&es 3 that necessitates a co#prehensi&e strategy on the part of the $nited States,
Pa.istan, and Afghanistan to reduce the threats e#anating fro# the region0 -hile $0S0 and Pa.istani
policies to)ards the northern A2'PA/ border in the 5-2P and 2A+A ha&e been clear in their
ob%ecti&es, !alochistan policy see#s to ha&e been, at best, .ept under the radar, and at )orst, under'
for#ulated and not prioriti6ed as highly as it ought to be0
+he paper outlines the relationship bet)een !aloch nationalis# and the central Pa.istani
go&ern#ent0 2or the past fi&e years, so#e !aloch insurgents ha&e been fighting for econo#ic and
political rights, )hile others ha&e been pushing for and independent !alochistan0 Mean)hile, the
+aliban ha&e been e&ol&ing in dyna#ic )ays and ta.ing ad&antage of their safe ha&en in ,uetta to
e7pand their sphere of influence throughout Pa.istan and Afghanistan0 +he t)o insurgencies in
!alochistan are destabili6ing Pa.istan and the region as a )hole* )hile they re#ain distinct, they
#ay o&er ti#e find it strategically beneficial to cooperate in their acti&ities, greatly e#boldening
the#0
+he paper ends )ith reco##endations for the $nited States and Pa.istan for for#ulating an
appropriate policy approach to)ards !alochistan in the conte7t of the A2'PA/ strategy0 +he $nited
States and its A2'PA/ partners #ust )or. to 8uell the +aliban insurgency, disrupt its net)or.s for
recruit#ent, and address the !aloch nationalist grie&ances through granting political and econo#ic
autono#y0 1n the absence of a co#prehensi&e plan, !alochistan could be co#e the lost frontier0
9 | P a g e
INTRODUCTION
+he -hite :ouse"s ne) Afghanistan'Pa.istan ;A2'PA/< strategy focuses on eli#inating al'
,aeda as a threat to security and disrupting the +aliban insurgency0 +he ne) strategy lin.s stability
in Pa.istan to success in Afghanistan0 +his paper argues that $S strategy and policy to)ards
Afghanistan'Pa.istan #ust include a )ise policy to)ards !alochistan
1
, and in particular to)ards the
northern, Pashtun'do#inated area of the pro&ince, .no)n as the =Pashtun >orridor0?
!alochistan"s strategic i#portance to the $nited States" ob%ecti&es in Afghanistan and to
stability in the region in general is #ultiple'fold0 2irst, !alochistan shares a @00'#ile border )ith
Afghanistan0 +he large, porous, poorly #onitored border is facilitating the instability and &iolence
ta.ing place in southeast Afghanistan, in pro&inces such as /andahar and :el#and, the sites of the
greatest challenges to the Afghan national go&ern#ent"s stability and reach0 +he +aliban ha&e a safe
ha&en for operation in the northern region of !alochistan, and are )idely considered to be based in
,uetta, !alochistan"s capital0 2urther, the Afghanistan'!alochistan border has long ser&ed as the
principal s#uggling route for opiu# fro# Afghanistan to the -est0 +oday, the opiu# trade is
funding +aliban acti&ity on both sides of the border0 1n addition, the lac. of econo#ic de&elop#ent
and opportunity in !alochistan has pro&ided the +aliban an abundant recruiting ground a#ong adults
and children* the +aliban pay local residents high salaries or strong'ar# the# to %oin their ran.s and
ha&e )ide'scale recruit#ent process in place for children0 2inally, !alochistan is ho#e to a highly'
traffic.ed supply route fro# /arachi to Afghanistan that is used by $0S0 and 1SA2 forces and other
co##ercial actors0 1ts presence in the turbulent pro&ince offers a nu#ber of challenges and
opportunities for all regional interests0
1
=!alochistan? and =!aluchistan? are t)o co##on spellings for the pro&ince0 +his paper uses the for#er spelling,
but so#e 8uotations and #aps use the latter0 =!alochi? is used as the singular noun, =!aloch? is used as the plural
noun ;rather than =!alochis?< and ad%ecti&e0
4 | P a g e
Balochistan: AF-PAKs Forgotten Frontier P a g e | A
!alochistan is not only &ital to $S, Pa.istani, and Afghan interests because of its pro7i#ity
to and role in perpetuating the conflict in Afghanistan0 !alochistan is also ho#e to a nu#ber of
unsettled conflicts that today #anifest the#sel&es in the for# of an insurgency and sporadic &iolence
that threatens to challenge the already )ea.ened central go&ern#ent0 1t is !alochistan"s centrality in
these t)o broad challenges 3 the strength of the +aliban4al',aeda and the unaddressed grie&ances of
the !aloch separatists 3 that is the basis upon )hich the $nited States, Pa.istan, and Afghanistan
should enact a co#prehensi&e strategy )ithin the sche#e of the current A2'PA/ strategy to reduce
the threats e#anating fro# the region0 +he causes of the !aloch nationalist separatists and the
+aliban at present re#ain distinct0 !ut, as )ill be de#onstrated belo), the dyna#ic nature of the
+aliban and the gro)ing unrest a#ong the !aloch nationalists could be a for#ula for a %oining of the
t)o groups" in their ob%ecti&es0 +a.en separately, each group threatens to destabili6e Pa.istan, and
ulti#ately derail international a#bitions for a stable Afghanistan0 A coalition of the +aliban and
!aloch nationalists 3 though not i##inent gi&en their ideological, geographical, and ethnic di&ides 3
could be a for#ula for &ast destabili6ation Pa.istani go&ern#ent and could bring progress in
Afghanistan and in the region as a )hole to a standstill0
+his paper see.s to pro&ide conte7t for the current threats bre)ing in Afghanistan0 1t does so
by fra#ing the i#portance of !alochistan &is'B'&is the ne) A2'PA/ strategy by offering an outline
of the !aloch separatists, past and present, and an analysis of the +aliban"s e&ol&ing acti&ities in the
border regions of Pa.istan0 +he paper ends )ith reco##endations for the $nited States and Pa.istan
for for#ulating an appropriate policy approach to)ards !alochistan in the conte7t of the A2'PA/
strategy0
A | P a g e
Balochistan: AF-PAKs Forgotten Frontier P a g e | @
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BALOCHISTAN
Pashtun Corridor and Quetta
!alochistan is a .ey area fro# )hich the +aliban plan operations in areas of Afghanistan
e7periencing the hea&iest +aliban insurgency acti&ity, such as /andahar and :el#and0
2
$nli.e the
#a%ority of !alochistan, )hich is ethnically !aloch, the north)est tip of the pro&ince has a large
nu#ber of Pashtuns0 +his area, )hich is a natural ethnic e7tension of the 2ederally Ad#inistered
+ribal Areas )hich it borders to the north, has been ter#ed the =Pashtun >orridor? because it holds
one of the #ain border crossing bet)een Afghanistan and Pa.istan, and offers fluid passage for
tra&el for Pashtun tribes#en on both sides of the border0
9
+he capital of !alochistan, ,uetta, is a city
populated by both !aloch and Pashtuns, and lies in the south of the Pashtun corridor0
2
=Poppies a +arget in 2ight Against +aliban0? New York Times0 April 2, 200C0
Dhttp(44)))0nyti#es0co#4200404424)orld4asia42afghan0ht#lEs8FtalibanG20afghanistan
G20HstFcseHscpF2Hpage)antedFall ;accessed May 4, 200<I
9
=Pa.istan( +rouble Along another $S'5A+O Supply Jine0? T!ATF"!0 Kanuary 1A, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0stratfor0co#4analysis4200011ALpa.istanLtroubleLalongLanotherLuLsLnatoLsupplyLroute ;accessed
May 4, 200orridor is highlighted in yello), )hile the Pashtun regions
of the A2'PA/ border are #ar.ed by )hite stripes0 +he Pahstun >orridor is the northern region of
!alochistan, south of South -a6iristan in the 2A+A regions0 +he i#portance of the Pashtun
>orridor to $0S0 interests in the region is #ultiple'fold0 Most &itally, it is )here the Afghan +aliban"s
leadership is based and is the location fro# )hich the +aliban are leading the insurgency in
/andahar, :el#and, and the southeast #ore broadly0 +he strength of the +aliban insurgency is
greatest in this region0 Mullah O#ar, the leader of the Afghan +aliban is )idely belie&ed to be based
in ,uetta, at the southern end of the Pashtun >orridor0
4
+he $0S0 has targeted Mullah O#ar since
2001 as the grantor of refuge to al',aeda and for inciting, leading, and planning the +aliban
insurgency in Afghanistan0
u##l$ !oute: %ighwa$ &rom Karachi to Kandahar
+he $nited States and international forces in Afghanistan depend on t)o o&erland supply
routes through Pa.istan for #ost of their supply transportation0 +he #ost highly traffic.ed route runs
fro# /arachi in the south of Pa.istan through the pro&inces of Sindh and Pun%ab through the
tu#ultuous /hyber Pass in the 2ederally Ad#inistered +ribal Areas ;2A+A<0 +he second of the
$0S0'1SA2"s #ain land routes into Afghanistan starts in /arachi and runs through !alochistan,
passing through to Afghanistan at the >ha#an border crossing0
A
Appro7i#ately one 8uarter of $0S0'
1SA2 supplies run through this route0 Most of the route is free fro# potential disruption, and the
supply route as a )hole has not been the target of as #any attac.s as the #ain supply route that runs
4
=Afghanistan, Pa.istan( +he !attlespace of the !order0? T!ATF"!0 October 14, 200C0
Dhttp(44)))0stratfor0co#4analysis4200C1014LafghanistanLpa.istanLbattlespaceLborder ;accessed May 4, 200<I and
=$S la)#a.ers e7press doubts on Pa. )illingness to fight terror0? 'NA (ndia0 March 11, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0dnaindia0co#4report0aspEne)sidF129C14@ ;accessed May 4, 200<I
A
=Pa.istan( +rouble Along Another $S'5A+O Supply Jine? 100
M | P a g e
Balochistan: AF-PAKs Forgotten Frontier P a g e | C
along :igh)ay 5'A through /hyber Pass in the 2A+A0
@
+he #ap belo) sho)s the t)o supply
routes running fro# /arachi to Afghanistan0
+he supply route through !alochistan, :igh)ay 5'A, is &ulnerable to disruption by !aloch
insurgency attac.s in eastern !alochistan and to +aliban attac.s in the )est near the border and on
the Afghan side of the border in /andahar and the surrounding areas0
"#ium
+he production and trade of opiu# ser&es as the +aliban"s lifeline for funding its insurgency0
So#e esti#ates place annual funding fro# opiu# at N900 #illion0
M
+he opiu# is centered in
@
1bid 20
M
=Poppies a +arget in 2ight Against +aliban0?
C | P a g e
Balochistan: AF-PAKs Forgotten Frontier P a g e |
Afghanistan"s southern pro&inces of :el#and, /andahar, and Oabul* their pro7i#ity to !alochistan
#a.es the >ha#an pass and :igh)ay 5'A the #ost efficient )ay of transporting the narcotics out of
the country0
C
Afghanistan no) supplies 0G of the )orld"s opiu#0
1t ser&es as the source of inco#e

for the #a%ority of Afghan far#ers, and #a.es up an esti#ated @0G of Afghanistan"s PQP0
10
As opiu# re&enues ha&e increased o&er the past se&eral years, the +aliban are able to offer
lucrati&e salaries for local residents on either side of the A2'PA/ border to run the business0 +he
illegal production of opiu# in Afghanistan is confounding the ability of the Afghan 5ational
Po&ern#ent to enforce eradication efforts0 +he federally run Anti 5arcotics 2orce !alochistan has
had #ild successes in stopping the opiu# s#uggling, but on the )hole is not e8uipped to #anage the
&olu#e being s#uggled through the >ha#an border crossing and across its supply routes0
11,12
HISTORY OF THE BALOCHISTAN CONFLICT
C
1bid0
1bid0
10
1bid0
11
=:uge 8uantity of opiu# sei6ed in Pishin district0? 'awn)com0 April 29, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0da)n0co#4)ps4)c#4connect4da)n'content'library4da)n4ne)s4pa.istan4balochistan4huge'8uantity'of'
opiu#'sei6ed'in'pishin'district''s6h ;accessed May 4, 200<I
12
See also( Ah#ed Rashid0 =Pa.istan ris.s ne) battlefront0? BBC News0 Kanuary 1M, 200A0 Dhttp(44ne)s0bbc0co0u.424
hi4southLasia441C21A10st# ;accessed May 4, 200<I
| P a g e
!alochistan is the largest and #ost sparsely populated pro&ince of Pa.istan, containing 49G
of the country"s land #ass but, )ith an esti#ated population of ten #illion, is ho#e to only fi&e
percent of the population0
19
Much of the country lies on a thousand #eter high plateau, surrounded
by t)o #ountain ranges0 +he region is bordered by the Pun%ab and Sindh pro&inces in the east0
!ordering Afghanistan to the east and 1ran to the north, the !aloch )ithin the borders of Pa.istan
ha&e fello) tribes#en in sparsely populated regions of southern Afghanistan and northern 1ran0
-ithin Pa.istan, t)o'thirds of the population of !alochistan is ethnically !aloch, )ith a si6eable
Pashtun population in the north0 +he #ap belo) sho)s a general ethnic brea.do)n by geography
bet)een the Pashtun and !aloch tribes in !alochistan(
19
!ur.i %istorical 'ictionar$ o& Pakistan 90
10 | P a g e
Since Pa.istan"s founding si7 decades ago, political tensions bet)een regional political actors
in !alochistan and the central go&ern#ent ha&e led to &iolent turbulence0 !alochistan has
e7perienced ar#ed conflict in 14C, 1AC, 1M9, and today, in the for# of ethnic4nationalist
insurgencies0 !alochistan )as anne7ed by Pa.istan in March 14C0 At the end of !ritish rule, as the
creation of Pa.istan beca#e a #ore clear reality, the !aloch tribes pursued their o)n nationalistic
interests0 Aspirations for an independent !alochistan that )ould span fro# )estern Pa.istan to
northeast 1ran and southern Afghanistan )ere crushed by the Pa.istan Ar#y during each insurgency0
+he first insurgency, spar.ed by the /han of /halat 3 a tribal leader )ho sought to defend against
the !aloch tribes being absorbed into a centrali6ed go&ern#ent, transfor#ed the !aloch fro# a group
of independent tribes into a nationalist separatist #o&e#ent0 +he trau#a of three insurgencies being
crushed bet)een 14C and 1M9 ha&e left scars that defined the !aloch nationalist psyche and ha&e
infor#ed the latest stretch of separatist acti&is#0
14

!alochistan"s present'day geography )as defined in 1M00 !efore then, !alochistan )as a
group of princely states ruled by nawa*s and sardars that =ulti#ately succu#bed to blandish#ents,
bribes, or threats? and acceded to %oin the ne) state of Pa.istan0
1A
$nder President Oulfi8ar Ali
!hutto, the central go&ern#ent )or.ed )ith the !aloch sardars, or tribal leaders, to car&e out rights
to pro&incial autono#y under the 1M9 constitution, including pro&isions for creating a !aloch
pro&incial go&ern#ent0
1@
Qespite the concession, !hutto preferred .eeping a tight reign on pro&incial
control by ha&ing his o)n party, the Pa.istan People"s Party ;PPP<, go&ern in !alochistan0 Soon after
the constitution )as appro&ed, the t)o #ain political parties )ith ethnic roots in !alochistan 3 the
5ational A)a#i Party ;largely Pashtun< and the Ka#iat'ul'$la#a'i'1sla# ;K$1< 3 ca#e to control
&arious #inistries in the ne) !aloch pro&inicial go&ern#ent0 1t is i#portant to note that the 5ational
14
-ea&er 9'A0
1A
1bid 40
1@
Blood @00
11 | P a g e
A)a#i Party, a nationalist secular party had for#ed a coalition )ith the K$1, an 1sla#ist party0
$nder#ining the constitution he had %ust had appro&ed, !hutto dissol&ed the #inistries run by the
!aloch parties0 +he granting and then rescinding of pro&incial autono#y )as the final stra) in
coalescing the !aloch grie&ances )ith the central go&ern#ent0
A four'year long insurgency ensued that )ould last until a #ilitary coup by Oia ul':a8
replaced the !hutto go&ern#ent0
1M
+he separatist insurgency in !alochistan of 1M9'1MM )as a
bloody conflict0 >o#ing on the heels of Rast Pa.istan"s ;later !angladesh"s< secession fro#
Pa.istan, no action on the part of the central go&ern#ent could be seen as an o&erreaction to #aintain
Pa.istan"s territorial integrity0 1t is esti#ated that @,000 !aloch and 9,900 Pa.istani soldiers died in
the conflict0
1C
Most of the fi&e #illion Afghan refugees that fled to Pa.istan during the So&iet occupation of
Afghanistan settled in ca#ps in !alochistan and the 5-2P ;5orth)est 2rontier Pro&ince<0
1
+he
)a&e of refugees strained relations bet)een the generally har#onious !aloch and Pashtuns in
!alochistan( #illions of refugees fleeing the &iolence in Afghanistan flooded across the border in the
1C0s, )hich strained the econo#y and shifted the pro&ince"s ethnic de#ography0
20
Jater, these
relations )ould be strained further by the fa&oritis# that the central go&ern#ent displayed to the
+aliban and the K$1 in !alochistan to the detri#ent of !aloch nationalist interests0
21

1M
!ur.i 40
1C
-ea&er A0
1
On the Afghan side of the border, in the early 1M0s, )hen President Moha##ed Qaoud /han ca#e to po)er
through the start of the So&iet occupation of Afghanistan, so#e !aloch tribes allied )ith the So&iets both for
ideological and strategic reasons0 !alochis on both sides of the Afghnistan'Pa.istan border established alliances
)ith the co##unist'led Afghan go&ern#ent0 Qaoud"s co##unist bent led hi# to crac.do)n on the nascent 1sla#ic
#o&e#ents, led by a di&erse group of Pashtuns and +a%i.s0 Pa.istan"s fear that a co##unist Afghanistan )ould
e#bolden the !aloch and Pashtun Mar7ist separatists in the )estern Pa.istani pro&ince of !alochistan )as
confir#ed )hen Qaoud began supporting Mar7ist !aloch and Pashtun groups in eastern Afghanistan0 As a result,
Pa.istan began training the 1sla#ic opposition #o&e#ents, led by the Pashtun Pulbuddin :e.#etyar and the +a%i.s
Ah#ed Shah Massoud and !urhanuddin Rabbani0 +hese Pa.istani'trained 1sla#ist #o&e#ents )ould soon beco#e
the Mu%ahideen insurgency, the #ain opponents to the So&iet $nion in Afghanistan0 1ronically, these groups )ould
later beco#e the Pa.istan'trained +aliban"s #ain co#petitors for po)er in Afghanistan after the )ithdra)al of the
So&iet $nion0
20
Rashid 'escent (nto Chaos 2C90
21
1bid 2C40
12 | P a g e
+housands of madrassas )ere setup to house and educate the refugees and the rural poor for
the t)o pro&inces0 2unding for these madrassas ca#e fro# the central go&ern#ent and fro# a
steady )a&e of funding fro# Saudi Arabia0 +he nu#ber of madrassas increased fro# appro7i#ately
00 in 1M1 to 99,000 in 1CC0
22
+he K$1, )hich, prior to 1M0, had been an apolitical religious and
educational #o&e#ent, setup #any of these schools in !alochistan and the 5-2P0 1deologically, the
schools )ere influenced by t)o #ain strains of thought0 2irst )as a for# of Qeobandi 1sla# that )as
influenced hea&ily by Pashtunwali, or the Pashtun tribal code of honor0
29
Second )as the puritan
theology of -ahhabis#, )hich Saudi funding of madrassas helped to propagate0 !oth ideologies
ha&e a long history and presence in !alochistan and the tribal areas, but #ost rele&ant to this
discussion is that the madrassas that )ere setup to house the #illions of refugees )ere the early
training grounds for a generation of e7tre#ists0 +he madrassa culture continues today and is one of
the +aliban"s #ost fertile recruit#ent centers0
22
Rashid Tali*an C0
29
1bid CC0
19 | P a g e
BALOCHISTAN TODAY
+oday in !alochistan, the #issions of the K$1'supported +aliban and the secular !aloch
nationalists are separate, but their alliance as recently as the 1M0s should be a )arning for the
conse8uences of the t)o groups" #erging their causes0 +he #ain point of contention bet)een the
!aloch nationalists and the Pashtun #ilitias has been Pa.istani central go&ern#ent support for the
latter at the cost of the for#ers" interests0 +he relationship bet)een the +aliban and the go&ern#ent is
no) shifting to)ards one of en#ity, as )ill be discussed later, and thus the #ain obstruction to
har#ony and perhaps cooperation bet)een the t)o causes is fast beco#ing obsolete0
Baloch Nationalist +rie,ances
+he #ain grie&ances of the nationalists are( 1< R7ploitation ;or e&en e7propriation< of
natural resources0 R7ploitation of gas resources has been a #a%or grie&ance of the !aloch for
decades* despite their efforts to sta.e a rightful clai# in the natural gas #ar.et, they ha&e been
continually bloc.ed by the central go&ern#ent0
24
1n 200A, for e7a#ple, state'o)ned co#panies earn
N104 billion in gas re&enue for the central go&ern#ent fro# the Sui gas fields, of )hich the pro&ince
earned only N11@ #illion in re&enues0
2A
2< Marginali6ation fro# de&elop#ent efforts0 Que to its
geographical location in >entral Asia and along the coast of the Arabian Sea, !alochistan is a natural
transit hub for energy resources and trade0 Siolent tensions ha&e risen o&er the construction of a port
at P)adar, on the Arabian coast0 +he tas. of building the port )hich lin.s >hina, South Asia,
>entral Asia, and the Arabian Pulf through !alochistan, )as gi&en al#ost e7clusi&ely to Sindhis,
Pun%abis, and the >hinese0 9< Jac. of autono#y in security, political, and econo#ic affairs0 1n the
tradition that began )ith Oulfi8ar Ali !hutto, successi&e central go&ern#ents ha&e pushed for their
24
Prare A0
2A
Rashid 'escent (nto Chaos 2C90
14 | P a g e
Balochistan: AF-PAKs Forgotten Frontier P a g e | 1A
o)n parties to ad#inister !alochistan"s pro&incial go&ern#ent rather than the nationalist parties0
President Musharraf"s trac. record )as particularly re&iled by the !aloch( he )as belie&ed to ha&e
rigged pro&incial and parlia#entary elections in !alochistan in fa&or for the K$1'2, )hich had the
secondary conse8uence of souring relations bet)een the 1sla#ists and the nationalists0
2@
Pa.istan has
ta.en a =di&ide and con8uer? approach to dis#antling the nationalist challenge to 1sla#abad
ste##ing fro# the political arena0 1ntelligence and security agencies ha&e gained a reputation for
assassinating nationalist political leaders, and then pressuring the re#aining leadership of the
political parties, and ulti#ately succeed in fracturing the#0
2M
April 200 )itnessed a dar. chapter that co#pounded the grie&ances of the !aloch
nationalists( three top !aloch leaders )ere #urdered0 -hile the culprits and #oti&es behind the
#urders re#ain unclear, !aloch nationalists suspected the Pa.istani go&ern#ent )as behind the
.illings0
2C
+he #ysterious #urders of the !aloch leaders fit )ell into the pattern of Pa.istani hea&y'
handedness in the region0 1ts solution to !aloch unrest has in&ol&ed political assassinations and
su##ary indefinite detention of thousands of political acti&ists0
2

'e,elo#ment- Natural !esources- . /conom$
!alochistan is a resource'rich pro&ince0 1t has large natural gas, coal, copper and uraniu#
reser&es and untapped oil resources0 5early M0G of Pa.istan"s natural gas reser&es 3 an esti#ated 1
trillion of the country"s total 2C trillion cubic feet ;tcf< 3 are located in !alochistan and 4AG of gas
production ta.es place in the pro&ince0
90
5atural gas accounts for appro7i#ately A0G of Pa.istan"s
2@
1bid 2C40
2M
=Pa.istan( +he 2orgotten >onflict in !alochistan0? 0#date Brie&ing: Asia Brie&ing No) 12) Brussels: 1nternational
>risis Proup, October 22, 200M, 110
2C
=2urore in !alochistan o&er .illing of nationalist leaders0? 'awn)com0 April 10, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0da)n0co#4)ps4)c#4connect4da)n'content'library4da)n4ne)s4pa.istan4balochistan4one'police#an'
.illed'as'riots'brea.'out'in'balochistan'ha ;accessed May 4, 200<0I
2
=Pa.istan( +he 2orgotten >onflict in !alochistan? 100
90
=!aloch 5ationalis# and the Peopolitics of Rnergy Resources0? @'M0
1A | P a g e
Balochistan: AF-PAKs Forgotten Frontier P a g e | 1@
total energy consu#ption* thus, Pa.istan is hea&ily reliant on !alochistan for its natural gas
reser&es0
91
1n addition to natural gas, coal and copper are other #ain resources of the region0
As of 200C, the Pa.istani go&ern#ent )as recei&ing 900 billion rupees ;Rs< in re&enue
annually !alochistan"s natural gas #ar.et0
92
Mean)hile, the total operating budget of the !aloch
pro&incial go&ern#ent is Rs M1 billion )ith Rs 1A billion allocated to de&elop#ent0
99
+his is a s#all
a#ount considering the resource'richness of the region and the need for de&elop#ent there0 +he lac.
of re&enue returns to the pro&ince has conse8uently resulted in a lac. of de&elop#ent in the pro&ince0
One of the #ain co#plicating factors to allo)ing greater econo#ic autono#y is the issue of
ta7ation* #ore autono#y ulti#ately #eans less ta7 re&enue going to the central go&ern#ent0
94
1n
addition, the central go&ern#ent of Pa.istan is gi&ing little attention to de&elop#ent in !alochistan
)hile also not gi&ing the pro&incial go&ern#ent !alochistan the freedo# to pursue de&elop#ent
opportunities0 1n fact, despite its potential )ealth, !alochistan has consistently ran.ed lo)est in
de&elop indicators co#paring Pa.istan"s four pro&inces0
9A
+his is particularly alar#ing gi&en the
abys#al state of education and social ser&ices in the 5orth'-est 2rontier Pro&ince0 An esti#ated
4AG of the !aloch population li&es beneath the po&erty line0
9@
Jiteracy, for e7a#ple, in 1C )as
esti#ated to be 24G0
Another e7planation for the central go&ern#ent"s lac. of attention to de&elop#ent in
!alochistan is the pro&ince"s sparse population0 !ecause only fi&e percent of the population of
Pa.istan resides in !alochistan, the go&ern#ent has little #oti&ation to allocate large a#ounts of
resources to the region0 Qe&elop#ent is a proble# across Pa.istan, )ith the e7ception of )ealthy
91
=Rs M101 billion !alochistan budget is un&eiled0? Associated Press o& Pakistan) Kune 21, 200C0
;http(44)))0app0co#0p.4enL4inde70phpEoptionFco#LcontentHtas.F&ie)HidF42A@AH1te#idF124 Daccess May 4,
200enter for Strategic and 1nternational Studies0 Kanuary 24, 200C0
99
1bid0
94
Selig :arrison =Pa.istan"s !aluch 1nsurgency0? 3e 4onde 'i#lomati5ue0 October 200@0
9A
Prare 90
9@
Rashid 'escent into Chaos 2C90
1@ | P a g e
Balochistan: AF-PAKs Forgotten Frontier P a g e | 1M
ha#lets scattered throughout the #a%or urban areas of the country0 Jac. of de&elop#ent in
!alochistan, then, can be seen in the sa#e light as the dearth of de&elop#ent efforts on the part of the
central go&ern#ent across the country0 -hereas #any international organi6ations and 5POs
ad#inister aid for de&elop#ent in Sindh and !alochistan, co#parati&ely little international or pri&ate
do#estic aid has gone to !alochistan0 +he e7ception to this trend has been scattered pro%ects funded
by the -orld !an. and the Aga /han Qe&elop#ent 5et)or.0
9M
Perhaps the #ost defining aspect of Pa.istan"s policy in !alochistan is its relationship )ith
1ndia and its desire for strategic depth in the region &ia !alochistan0
9C
A preoccupation )ith the
intentions of 1ndia, its neighbor )ith )ho# it has established an uneasy peace, has shaped Pa.istan"s
strategy to)ards !alochistan into a regional ga#e of po)er plays i#ple#ented through hea&y'
handed policies0 +he debate o&er 1ndia"s sub&ersi&e role in supporting ;or instigating< the !aloch
insurgencies of past and present is an ongoing one, though popular senti#ent appears to &ie) 1ndia
as a #ere bogey#an in !aloch affairs0
9

+he Oardari go&ern#ent has #ade o&ertures to the !aloch people0 Recently, he de#anded
that a parlia#entary co##ittee be for#ed to address their grie&ances and offered a large aid pac.age
for de&elop#ent pro%ects0
40
1t is unclear )hether this action is part of a strategic shift by the central
go&ern#ent to 8uell the unrest through non'#ilitary #eans or if it is an isolated act of lip ser&ice0 1t
re#ains to be seen )hether this co##ittee )ill be for#ed and if its )or. )ill bring concrete steps
to)ard reconciliation to fruition0
9M
See( =Pa.istan( -orld !an. Supports Rducation Sector in !alochistan Pro&ince )ith $SN22 Million0?
-orld!an.0org0 Kune 22, 200@0 Dhttp(44go0)orldban.0org4RAAJ0109$0 ;accessed May 4, 200<I
9C
Rashid, -ea&er, and Kones discuss this as the basis for their analyses of the Pa.istan central go&ern#ent"s
relationship )ith !alochistan0
9
=$nderstanding !alochistan0? 'awn)com0 April 29, 2000 Dhttp(44)))0da)n0co#4)ps4)c#4connect4da)n'
content'library4da)n4ne)s4pa.istan4balochistan4$nderstanding'!alochistan''8s ;accessed May 4, 200<I
40
=Oardari &o)s to pacify disgruntled !aloch0? 'ail$ Times Pakistan0 March 2M, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0dailyti#es0co#0p.4default0aspEpageF200T09T2MTstoryL2M'9'200Lpg1L1 ;accessed May 4, 200<I
1M | P a g e
Balochistan: AF-PAKs Forgotten Frontier P a g e | 1C
The Current (nsurgenc$
Many !aloch leaders see. full independence fro# Pa.istan, )hile the Pashtuns, Sindhis, and
other ethnic #inorities see. an end to the econo#ic discri#ination0
41
+he current insurgency that
began in 2009 is being led by the !alochistan Jiberation Ar#y ;!JA<, a unified front of disciplined
fighters and can be )ell understood in the conte7t of these grie&ances0 One analysis su##ari6es the
strengthening insurgency(
=!y targeting the !aloch leadership, #arginalising secular nationalist parties,
sidelining the pro&incial legislature, forging ahead )ith contentious de&elop#ent
plans and using #ilitary force to subdue dissent, the go&ern#ent has sho)n a
disregard for the political process that is no) )idely #irrored in !alochistan0 Many
young !aloch ha&e lost faith in politics and pic.ed up the gun0?
42
+he abo&e 8uote hints at a di&ide that has for#ed in recent years in the !aloch nationalist"s strategy0
Partly as a conse8uence of repressi&e and brutal tactics on the part of the central go&ern#ent, #any
!aloch, particularly youth, see #ilitantis#, rather than the political process, as the legiti#ate #eans
of pursuing their aspirations0 Mean)hile, older sardars prefer to pursue their agendas through
political and diplo#atic #eans0
49
+his generational di&ide is dangerous because it lea&es &iolence as
the preferred modus o#erandi of the ne7t generation of e#bittered nationalists0
1n 2009 and 2004, the !JA #ade a series of attac.s on pro&incial infrastructure, targeting
#ilitary and econo#ic sites, such as #ilitary outposts and gas pipelines0
44
+he cli#a7 of !JA
&iolence ca#e in May 2004 )hen the group #urdered three >hinese engineers )or.ing on the
P)ardar port0
4A
2ighting continued o&er the #onths as the !JA attac.ed con&oys, rail)ay trac.s,
pipelines, and electricity pylons0 After the !JA atte#pted to assassinate President Musharraf, the
41
1bid 100
42
1bid 120
49
1bid 120
44
Rashid 'escent (nto Chaos 2CA0
4A
1bid 2C40
1C | P a g e
ar#y launched a #ilitary ca#paign that included )idespread airstri.es and large'scale deploy#ent
that began in Qece#ber 200A, .illing hundreds and lea&ing tens of thousands internally displaced0
+he abo&e analysis is not predicated on the assu#ption that e&ery ele#ent of the !aloch insurgency
is a response to a legiti#ate grie&ance, or that #ilitary inter&ention )as inappropriate0 :o)e&er, it is
clear that Pa.istan policy has greatly e7acerbated the situation in !alochistan, particularly based on
the perception that the actions )ere iron'fisted0
UUUUU
+he abo&e sections ha&e pro&ided a conte7t for understanding !alochistan"s strategic
i#portance and the roots and history of nationalist unrest in the region0 5e7t, the paper turns to a
discussion of the +aliban that see.s to outline precisely the nature of the #ilitant organi6ation, its
e&ol&ing tactics, and the )ay in )hich the )estern and northern regions of !alochistan are .ey to the
+aliban"s e7panding sphere of influence0
UUUUU
THE TALIBAN TODAY
Tali*an tructure Toda$
A broad )ay of characteri6ing the +aliban today is that they are a net)or. of #ostly Pashtun
#ilitias that &ary in their #oti&es, targets, and grie&ances0 So#e are focused on regaining po)er in
Afghanistan* others are focused on gaining influence or at least destabili6ing Pa.istan through
fighting the Pa.istani #ilitary or conducing terrorist acti&ities0 +he identities of each group of
+aliban are fluid, but se&eral distincti&e characteristics help in clarifying the other)ise nebulous
natures of the groups0 +he $nited States" understanding of the factions, organi6ation, and leadership
of the &arious +aliban groups operating in the A2'PA/ border regions is li#ited0 +his is partly
1 | P a g e
because the +aliban are a dyna#ic group )hose tactics and ob%ecti&es are e&ol&ing fre8uently and
rapidly0 +he +aliban are )idely .no)n to #aintain ties )ith Pa.istan"s 1nter'Ser&ices 1ntelligence,
or 1S1, )hich presents a great challenge to the $nited States in coordinating intelligence )ith
Pa.istan0
4@
"rgani6ational tructure
+his structure, created through consultation )ith Pa.istan Ar#y sources for a recent article in
4ilitar$ !e,iew in Kune 200C is useful in pro&iding a picture of )hat the +aliban organi6ational
structure #ay loo. li.e0
4M
+he structural layout of the +aliban organi6ation can be understood as a
net)or. of franchises fitting for an insurgency group of tribal origins(
=A s#all #ilitant group begins calling itself =the local +aliban0? 1t gains so#e for#
of recognition fro# the central +aliban hierarchy in return for its support and
4@
2or e7a#ple, see( =Afghan Stri.es by +aliban Pet Pa.istan :elp, $0S0 Aides Say0? New York Times) March 2A,
2000 Dhttp(44)))0nyti#es0co#420040942@4)orld4asia42@tribal0ht#l ;accessed May 4, 200<I
4M
=+aliban( An Organi6ational Analysis0? 4ilitar$ !e,iew0 May4Kune 200C0 @40
20 | P a g e
cooperation0 +he ne) cell supports +aliban grand strategy, but retains local freedo#
of action0 +he #odus operandi preser&es tribal loyalties and territorial boundaries0?
4C
+o the e7tent that this organi6ational layout )as accurate last year, the +aliban has no doubt e&ol&ed
significantly e&en o&er the past year0
Mullah O#ar re#ains the leader of the +aliban, but there is a )ide debate in the intelligence
and #ilitary co##unities about the e7tent of his role0 Many analysts belie&e that his is si#ply a
titular role, )hile others argue that he is an acti&e planner and strategist of +aliban acti&ity0 +he
)idely held belief that he li&es and operates )ith relati&e freedo# in the ,uetta +aliban Shura #ight
be e&idence that he is indeed acti&e in day'to'day and strategic affairs0 1n March 200, the 5e) Vor.
+i#es lea.ed a story fro# the Pentagon stating that it intended to e7tend its Predator drone attac.s to
!alochistan0 Pi&en that the drone attac.s to date in Pa.istan ha&e targeted Afghan +aliban figures,
the lea.ed story indicates that the $nited States #ay also belie&e that Mullah O#ar and4or other
upper echelon Afghan +aliban figures are operating fro# !alochistan0 So#e e7perts ha&e noted
Mullah O#ar"s presence in ,uetta since 2002, though it is not clear )hy the intelligence and defense
co##unities in the $0S0 #ight be ta.ing that clai# #ore seriously no)0
4,A0
+he structure also highlights the independence )ith )hich the +ehree.'e +aliban Pa.istan
;++P<, or the =+aliban Mo&e#ent of Pa.istan? functions0 1t is not necessarily lin.ed )ith any of the
Afghan +aliban"s speciali6ed resources, though it is li.ely that the ++P and Afghan +aliban do share
intelligence and coordinate logistics0 -hat is #issing fro# this layout is the liaison'style relationship
that the +aliban, and particularly the ++P, is no) forging )ith other rebel and separatist groups
operating in Pa.istan0
4C
1bid, @A0
4
=Mullah O#ar >alls for a +aliban Surge? New York Times ;+he Jede !log<0 March @, 2000
Dhttp(44thelede0blogs0nyti#es0co#420040940@4#ullah'o#ar'tries'to'rein'in'pa.istans'taliban4E
scpF4Hs8FbaluchistanHstFcse ;accessed May 4, 200<I
A0
Rashid Ah#ed treats Mullah O#ar"s presence in ,uetta since 2002 as a co##on fact0
21 | P a g e
1n March 200, there )as so#e indication that the ++P and Afghan +aliban )ere pursuing
closer relations in preparation for the planned increases in international troops in Afghanistan0
A1
According to a New York Times article, se&eral #e#bers of the +aliban ha&e reported that Mullah
O#ar has tried to persuade ++P leaders to scale do)n their acti&ities in Pa.istan and %oin forces )ith
the Afghan +aliban to plan for the prospect of an A#erican buildup of troops0
A2
+his report offers a
nu#ber of insights0 2irst, gi&en the recent spate of Pa.istani +aliban acti&ity and the ++P"s efforts to
e7pand control beyond the tribal areas, it appears that the ++P has not been con&inced to scale do)n
its acti&ities in Pa.istan0 Secondly, )hile +aliban acti&ity #ay be increasing in Pa.istan, there #ay
also be increasing cooperation bet)een the ++P and the Afghan +aliban0 +hird, if Mullah O#ar did
indeed send e#issaries to con&ince ++P leaders to shift their attention, then this )ould indicate that
Mullah O#ar #ay be #ore of a titular leader rather than a central strategic co##ander of +aliban
aciti&ity0
Supple#enting the acti&ities and ai#s of the &arious +aliban groups are other ar#ed groups0
Proups such as Jash.ar'e'+aiba ;)idely belie&ed to ha&e e7ecuted the 5o&e#ber 200C Mu#bai
attac.s< and Kaish'e'Moha##ed are no#inally #oti&ated by the goal of liberating /ash#ir0
:o)e&er, these #ilitias in tande# to the ++P use the tactic of destabili6ing 1sla#abad to pursue their
goals0
A&ghan Tali*an
+he Afghan +aliban are those )ho ruled Afghanistan fro# 14'2001, and then retreated to
the #ountainous border regions after the $0S0 in&asion of Afghanistan in 20010 Ah#ed Rashid
describes the +aliban as arri&ing in dro&es by the thousands and being ushered into !alochistan by
A1
= Pa.istan and Afghan +aliban >lose Ran.s0? New York Times) March 2@, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0nyti#es0co#420040942M4)orld4asia42Mtaliban0ht#lEscpF4Hs8FtalibanG20afghanistanG20HstFcse
;accessed May 4, 200<I
A2
1bid0
22 | P a g e
Pa.istani officials0
A9
+he Afghan +aliban re'gathered in the border regions, and no) run the
insurgency in southeast Afghanistan fro# either side of the !alochistan'southern Afghanistan border
and recruit fro# the local populations0 Many of the older +aliban )ere refugees in Pa.istan during
the So&iet occupation of Afghanistan and returned to Afghanistan after the defeat of the So&iets and
helped the Pahstuns do#inate and )rest control of #uch of the country in the 10s0 +heir #ain
target today is fighting Afghan and 1SA2 forces0
+he Afghan +aliban are not necessarily citi6ens or residents of Afghanistan0 +hey are distinct
fro# the Pa.istani +aliban ;++P< only in their ob%ecti&es( the Afghan +aliban are focused on
e7panding control in Afghanistan and fighting the $0S0 and 1SA2 #ilitary presence there0 +he ++P
are focused broadly on retaliating against $0S0 presence in the region by targeting Pa.istani do#estic
targets and on e7panding their sphere of influence in Pa.istan0
+he Afghan +aliban ser&e both as a net)or. of insurgent groups &ying for control of territory
and also as ad#inistrators of go&ernance0 +he Afghan +aliban"s role in go&ernance and
i#ple#enting la) is e7panding0 :o)e&er, thorough infor#ation is #ore )idely a&ailable on the
=hot'button? #atters relating to +aliban go&ernance, such as i#ple#entations of =%ustice? that shoc.
the sensibilities0
A4

Qay'by'day, the Afghan +aliban are e7panding their control o&er #ore &illages and lands in
Afghanistan, defeating the efforts of the international forces and nascent Afghan 5ational Ar#y,
Afghan 5ational Police to bring stability and central go&ern#ent control to #uch of the country0
+he Afghan central go&ern#ent faces nu#erous debilitating obstacles in co#peting for go&ernance
rights )ith the +aliban0 1t is underta.ing se&eral gargantuan tas.s )hile si#ultaneously fighting an
insurgency0 As Sali 5asr has obser&ed, =Vou ha&e a )ea. state, and trying to create reconstruction,
A9
Rashid 'escent (nto Chaos 2420
A4
See =+aliban 2ill 5A+O"s !ig Paps in Afghan South0? New York Times) Kanuary 22, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0nyti#es0co#42004014224)orld4asia422taliban0ht#l ;accessed May 4, 200<I
29 | P a g e
run a go&ern#ent, run a state, and #anage a )ar in a territory that really doesn"t ha&e the
rudi#entary ad#inistrati&e, bureaucratic, econo#ic infrastructures institutions0?
AA

Pakistani Tali*an
+he Pa.istani +aliban, also .no)n as the ++P ;+ehree.'e'+aliban Pa.istan<, are those )ho
target Pa.istani security forces and other Pa.istani targets )ith the ob%ecti&e of fighting $0S0
presence in the region0 +heir focus is on o&erthro)ing or at least destabili6ing the Pa.istani state by
)resting control of #ore territory and encroaching closer to)ards the cities0 Most recently, in April
200, the Pa.istani #edia confir#ed that the ++P had ta.en control of !uner, a district si7ty #iles
fro# the Pa.istani capital of 1sla#abad0
A@
1n cooperation )ith other sy#pathetic #ilitant groups, they
are conducting terrorist attac.s in #a%or cities the#sel&es0 +he attac.s ha&e beco#e bolder( for
e7a#ple, in April 200, they attac.ed a police acade#y in Jahore, .illing ele&en0 Jahore is the heart
of the Pun%ab pro&ince, and had not pre&iously e7perienced +aliban terroris#0 !eyond the
disconcerting security i#plications of targeting Pun%ab, the recent attac.s touch on the long'standing
ethnic tensions bet)een the Pashtuns and the Pun%abis0 +he attac.s are also beco#ing bigger( the
Septe#ber 200C bo#bing of the Marriott that .illed A9 in 1sla#abad re8uired the use of #ore
po)erful and sophisticated e7plosi&es than had pre&iously been seen0
AM

!aitullah Mehsud, a Pashtun fro# a pro#inent clan, created the ++P by for#ing an alliance
)ith 40 other +aliban leaders and their #ilitias0 1t is a federation centered in South -a6iristan, the
tribal agency in 2A+A that borders !alochistan, but is operating in the entire border region0 +he ++P
AA
1nter&ie) )ith Sali 5asr in =+he -ar !riefing Roo#0? Frontline ;Qocu#entary<0 October 2C, 200C0
A@
=!uner 2alls 1nto the :ands of S)at +aliban0? 'awn0 April 22, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0da)n0co#4)ps4)c#4connect4da)n'content'library4da)n4ne)s4pa.istan4n)fp4buner'falls'to's)at'
talibanWbi ;accessed April 22, 200<I
AM
=Al ,aeda Suspected of Pa.istan"s Marriott !o#bing0? !euters0 Septe#ber 21, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0reuters0co#4article4top5e)s4id$SJ/1C9@1200C021Efeed+ypeFRSSHfeed5a#eFtop5e)s ;accessed
April 22, 200<I
24 | P a g e
has clai#ed responsibility for do6ens of suicide attac.s and bo#bings since its founding in
Qece#ber 200M0 Most pro#inently, !aitullah Mehsud clai#ed responsibility for the assassination of
!ena6ir !hutto, the popular Pa.istani presidential candidate and for#er pri#e #inister0
AC

Much of the ++P"s grie&ances ha&e to do )ith the percei&ed illegiti#acy of the Pa.istani
state and #ilitary, particularly )ith respect to its alliance )ith the $nited States0 1n their rhetoric, the
++P cites their #ain #oti&ation as retaliation for A#erican and Pa.istani attac.s4#ilitary
inter&ention in their pre&iously autono#ous regions0 :a.i#ullah Mehsud, the ne) Qeputy leader of
the ++P, and a cousin of !aitullah, e7plained that A#erican attac.s are increasing the +aliban"s
resol&e to fight( =1f A#erica continues bo#bing and #artyrs people, then )e ha&e to attac.0 1f the
Pa.istani leaders and ar#y #aintain their stance, then )e )ill try to ta.e control of Pesha)ar and
other cities0?
A
Another ++P co##ander has stated, =-e ne&er used to fight against Pa.istan because
)e thought they )ere an ar#y of Musli#s0 !ut )hen they started bo#bing us, )e had to )age %ihad
against the#0?
@0

Balochistan
As recently as April 200, e&idence e#erged of the creation of the +ehree.'e'+aliban
!alochistan, or the ++!0 A #an identifying hi#self as =Rngineer Asad? and clai#ing to be the
++!"s spo.es#an infor#ed Pa.istan #edia outlets &ia telephone of the group"s creation and
alliance0 According to the Pa.istani ne)spaper, 'ail$ News, =:e said the struggle of the ++! )as
against non'Musli#s and -estern forces that had attac.ed and occupied 1sla#ic countries0 :e said
the ++! )as opposed to fighting the Pa.istani security forces and la)'enforce#ent agencies and
turning Pa.istan into a battlefield0 1nstead, he said, the ++! )as co##itted to fighting the ene#ies
AC
>itation no longer accessible0 Dhttp(44)))0nation0co#0p.4daily4dec'200M41A4inde7100phpI
A
=+he -ar !riefing Roo#0?
@0
1bid0
2A | P a g e
of 1sla#0?
@1
1t re#ains to be seen )hether the ++! )ill e#erge as a threat to $0S0 and regional
interests, and )hether the ++! )ill lin. up )ith the ++P in coordinating their acti&ities0
wat
S)at )as once a tran8uil &acation spot, often called the =S)eden of the Rast0? Qespite efforts
by the +aliban to create ne) ha&ens for the#sel&es in S)at, for years, the Pashtuns of S)at re%ected
the spread of the +aliban0 Qeeply religious, they stood against the 1sla#ic la) that the +aliban sought
to i#pose, insisting that their co##it#ent to 1sla#ic la) did not allo) supporting &iolence0 +he
++P, undeterred, built a #assi&e #adrassa on the outs.irts of S)at"s capital0 Ma)lana 2a6lallah, the
head of K$1'2, the #ost popular branch of the K$1, began preaching &ia radio in fa&or of the +aliban0
+he anti'+aliban Pashtun leaders persisted in their opposition to a +aliban ta.eo&er0 +o rid
the S)at Salley of these strong leaders, the +aliban i#ple#ented a techni8ue pre&iously unobser&ed
by analysts( recogni6ing that these tribal leaders )ere also the &alley"s lando)ners, the +aliban
organi6ed the leaders" landless tenants into ar#ed gangs to strong'ar# their landlords" out of S)at0
@2
+he +aliban e7ploited econo#ic grie&ances bet)een lando)ner and tenant, and appropriated the
cause of the lo)er class to their o)n0 +he tactic )as successful, and S)at"s largest lando)ners )ere
force to flee0
+his co#bination of techni8ues allo)ed the +aliban to begin occupying S)at in the fall of
200M0 +hey began to easily defeat the Pa.istani 2rontier >orps0 +he #a%ority of the population of
S)at re#ained against the +aliban ta.eo&er, and sought the pro&incial and central go&ern#ent"s aid0
1n Qece#ber 200M, President Musharraf sent t)enty thousand ar#y troops into S)at 3 far too late
according to #ost analysts0 +he ar#y too. bac. the #ain parts of S)at, but did not capture any
@1
=And 5o) +here"s the +ehree.'e'+aliban !alochistan? The News (nternational) March 4, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0thene)s0co#0p.4dailyLdetail0aspEidF1@A4A ;accessed May 4, 200lass Rifts0? New York Times0 April 1@, 2000 Dhttp(44)))0nyti#es0co#420040441M4)orld4asia4
1Mpstan0ht#l ;accessed April 22, 200<I
2@ | P a g e
leadership* fighting continued0 Musharraf later tried to 8uell the +aliban and Ma)lana 2a6lur
Reh#an through a deal )hich cul#inated in the 2ebruary 200 i#ple#entation of haria0 +he
+aliban )ould be allo)ed to i#ple#ent their &ersion of 1sla#ic la), )hich )ould be officially
recogni6ed by the federal go&ern#ent, and in e7change, the +aliban )ould lay do)n their ar#s and
not e7pand beyond S)at0 1n practice this has not happened( recently, +aliban fro# S)at ha&e ta.e
control of the district of !uner, located bet)een the S)at &alley and 1sla#abad, )hich has spar.ed a
large'scale #ilitary operation0
@9
Allo)ing the +aliban and 1sla#ists to run S)at on their o)n syste# of la) )as a blo) to the
credibility and perception of strength of the Pa.istani go&ern#ent0 +he S)at deal represents a #a%or
&ictory for the +aliban, as S)at lies outside the tribal areas, the +aliban"s traditional base of
operation0 +his indicates that the +aliban"s sphere of influence is spreading beyond the tribal areas0
+he Pa.istani go&ern#ent suffered a #a%or defeat in ter#s of its legiti#acy and control of the
country0
+he central go&ern#ent"s concession to the K$1'2 to i#ple#ent their &ersion of haria in
S)at calls for a co#parison to be dra)n )ith the central go&ern#ent"s lac. of acco##odation for
pro&incial autono#y in !alochistan0 +hat the central go&ern#ent )ould allo) for a parallel syste#
of %ustice is a clear abrogation of the )rite of state0 Allo)ing for this le&el of autono#y in S)at )hile
not acceding de#ands for greater control of econo#ic resources or political affairs in !alochistan
can ser&e only to further frustrate and inspire !aloch nationalists0 +o so#e, the concession also
signals the long'standing suspicion of close ties bet)een the +aliban and the central go&ern#ent0 1t
#ay also ha&e sent the #essage to !aloch #ilitias that once enough ha&oc is created, the go&ern#ent
@9
=Pa. forces .ill @0 +aliban in !uner0? Press Trust o& (ndia0 May 1, 2000 Dhttp(44)))0ptine)s0co#4ptiTptisite0nsf4
042!>10220RQA@122A@A2AMAA004!CQCAEOpenQocu#ent ;accessed May 4, 200orridor, the e&ent )as an e#boldening one0
!elationshi# with al-Qaeda
Al',aeda can loosely be understood as Arabs and other non'Afghan and non'Pa.istani
#ilitants )ho are planning attac.s against the $nited States ho#eland and interests abroad0 1n the
5orth -est 2rontier Pro&ince, 2ederally Ad#inistered +ribal Areas, and !alochistan, al',aeda can
be understood as the foreign, non'tribal people that li&e and operate under the custodianship of the
nati&e populations0 Osa#a bin Jaden and Ay#an al'Oa)ahiri are considered the ostensible leaders
of al',aeda0 +he distinction bet)een al',aeda and the +aliban has beco#e blurred as the +aliban
continue to di&ersify their ob%ecti&es across the region0 +he relationship bet)een al',aeda and the
+aliban spans bac. to the 1C0s0 2oreign fighters fro# across the Arab )orld and Rastern Rurope
trained for the Afghan %ihad in Pa.istan and fought in Afghanistan0 Many foreign fighters in
Afghanistan integrated the#sel&es to so#e degree into the tribal structure through inter'#arriage0
+here is no consensus on the closeness of bin Jaden"s relationship to Mullah O#ar0 1n 1@,
after bo)ing to pressure fro# the $nited States, bin Jaden )as e7pelled fro# Sudan0
@4
After
choosing Afghanistan as his ne7t ho#e, he depended on non'+aliban Pashtun leaders in Kalalabad,
rather than the +aliban0 +his indicates that although he had ties )ith the +aliban leadership going
bac. to the So&iet %ihad days, at the ti#e of his arri&al in Kalalabad in 1@, he had not yet built
strong relations )ith the#0
@A
One analyst argues that )hile they #ay ha&e .no)n each other, there is
@4
Osa#a bin Jaden had spent #uch ti#e in Afghanistan0 After ha&ing setup his o)n %ihad training ca#ps in
Pa.istan and ha&ing fought in the Afghan %ihad, bin Jaden returned to Afghanistan se&eral ti#es0 After !in Jaden
)as e7iled fro# Saudi Arabia )ith the beginning of the first Pulf -ar in 10, the Sudanese leader, :asan al'
+urabi, in&ited bin Jaden to ta.e up residence in /hartou#0 !in Jaden organi6ed al',aeda acti&ities )ithout the aid
of the +aliban during the years he )as in /hartou#0
@A
Ste&en >oll0 +host 7ars0 5e) Vor.( Penguin !oo.s, 2004, 9290
2C | P a g e
little e&idence that they ha&e re#ained in touch since the )ar in Afghanistan began in 20010
@@
Others
argue that the t)o are closely tied, and cite possible inter'#arriages and other social connections
bet)een the t)o leaders" fa#ilies0 According to one for#er Qepart#ent of State official, there is
gro)ing consensus in the intelligence co##unity that bin Jaden is residing in >htiral, a &alley in the
northern tip 5-2P, far a)ay fro# his protector'host, Mullah O#ar0
@M
Quring the late 10s, the $nited States did negotiate )ith the +aliban to deny bin Jaden
sanctuary in Afghanistan0 -hile the >linton ad#inistration )anted to disrupt bin Jaden"s net)or.s
of funding and pre&ent hi# fro# planning further attac.s, it lac.ed the %ustifications under
international la) to charge bin Jaden )ithin the $nited States for any cri#e0
@C
+he $nited States
le&eled sanctions against the +aliban regi#e* the sanctions had little effect, and )ere li.ely
counterproducti&e in that, )ith its assets fro6en and tra&el restricted, the +aliban leadership )as
forced to rely on bin Jaden #ore0
@,M0

+here are indications that al',aeda and the +aliban are )or.ing together to so#e e7tent in
the northern border regions of 2A+A and 5-2P0 1t is clear that al',aeda and the +aliban ha&e a
sy#biotic relationship, )herein al',aeda has benefited fro# the +aliban"s sanctuaries in Afghanistan
and Pa.istan and the +aliban ha&e benefited fro# al',aeda"s fighters and funding fro# pri&ate
sources in the Pulf0 Pi&en that the +aliban are no) ta.ing on a greater degree of acti&ity and ha&e
secured their o)n funding sources through the opiu# trade, it is unclear )hether the +aliban )ill
@@
1nter&ie), /a#ran !o.hari, Strategic 2orecasting, April 9, 2000
@M
1nter&ie) )ith for#er Qepart#ent of State official, April 22, 2000
@C
1bid0
@
Jecture by Mar&in -einbau#0 Kohns :op.ins $ni&ersity SA1S0 Kanuary 2, 2000
M0
So#e e&idence suggests that the +aliban did offer to e7tradite bin Jaden to Pa.istan in 2001 and )hen Pa.istan
re%ected, to ha&e hi# tried in an international Sharia tribunal0 +his further indicates that the +aliban )ere )illing to
negotiate al',aeda"s future, and thus, the relationship bet)een the t)o groups )as second to the +aliban"s self'
interest0 Mar&in -einbau# argues that it )as the 1S1 that reassured the +aliban against its fears of a $0S0 in&asion(
the $0S0 )ould not ai# for regi#e change in Afghanistan, but )ould rather li#it its ob%ecti&es to routing out al'
,aeda0 So#e argue that Mullah O#ar did not concede to the $nited States because he belie&ed that in the )orst
case scenario, the A#ericans )ould =)in,? forcing the +aliban to retreat te#porarily until the occupying po)ers
left0
2 | P a g e
continue to benefit fro# their alliance )ith al',aeda beyond ha&ing the al',aeda =brand na#e? to
associate )ith their acti&ities0 $0S0 intelligence analysts ha&e stated that, as of August 200C, al',aeda
and the +aliban run at least 1AM training ca#ps in the 2A+A and 5-2P0 As recently as April 200, a
$0S0 drone attac. in the Ora.6ai agency in the southern 2A+A targeted an alleged al',aeda'+aliban
#eeting, )herein four Arabs ;suspected #e#bers of al',aeda< and an esti#ated 20 suspected
+aliban )ere .illed, indicating continued cooperation bet)een the groups and presence of foreign
fighters in the tribal regions0
M1

The '$namic Tali*an
+he +aliban are sei6ing e&ery opportunity to e7pand their sphere of influence in the
Afghanistan'Pa.istan region0 +heir ha&ens in !alochistan and particularly in ,uetta are facilitating
this0 As they e7pand, their organi6ation, tactics, and alliances e&ol&e0 !elo) is an outline of so#e
changes that are facilitating the +aliban"s sphere of influence and areas of control0
2ocus on Pa.istan
+he +aliban"s reorientation to)ards destabili6ing Pa.istan represents the group"s largest
strategic shift since 20010 :a&ing al)ays had a co6y relationship )ith the Pa.istani #ilitary and
intelligence ser&ices, this shift has been a surprise and has certainly caught the Pa.istani go&ern#ent
utterly unprepared0 2ocusing on Pa.istan is a strategic #o&e for a nu#ber of reasons0 2irst, Pa.istan
re#ains a so&ereign nation )ithout the presence of foreign interference on the scale that Afghanistan
is e7periencing0 +he +aliban are dealing )ith the Pa.istanis alone )ith co#parati&ely #inor
inter&entions fro# the $nited States in the for# of un#anned aerial &ehicle ;$AS< attac.s0 2urther,
M1
=+aliban >o##ander :a.i#ullah Mehsud Rscapes Air Stri.e0? (ndia T8 News0 April 21, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0indiat&ne)s0co#4election04ne)sdetails0phpEidF910HpgFinde7 ;accessed May 4, 200<I
90 | P a g e
gi&en the franchise'li.e nature of the +aliban, hea&y acti&ity in Pa.istan does not detract fro# its
acti&ities in Afghanistan0
So#e esti#ated characteri6er the ++P threat to Pa.istan as dire0 1n March 200, a top ad&iser
to >R5+>OM, Qa&id /ilcullen )arned of a collapse of the Pa.istani state )ithin si7 #onths based
on the follo)ing realities( =Pa.istan has 1M9 #illion people, 100 nuclear )eapons, an ar#y bigger
than the $S Ar#y, and al',aeda head8uarters sitting right there in the t)o'thirds of the country that
the go&ern#ent doesn"t control0?
M2
:e also pointed to the 1nter'Ser&ices 1ntelligence"s ;1S1"s<
continued ties )ith the +aliban0 Success for the +aliban in Afghanistan has been achie&ed already in
the sense that they ha&e successfully begun to destabili6e the country0 +he collapse or near'collapse
of the Pa.istani state and the potential for a partial +aliban ta.eo&er )ould be an e&en greater &ictory
for the +aliban0
!randing
Supple#enting the acti&ities and ai#s of the &arious +aliban groups are other ar#ed groups0
Militant groups such as Jash.ar'e'+aiba ;)idely belie&ed to ha&e e7ecuted the 5o&e#ber 200C
Mu#bai attac.s< and Kaish'e'Moha##ed are no#inally #oti&ated by the goal of liberating /ash#ir,
but benefit fro# the +aliban"s use of the tactic of destabili6ing the outs.irts of #a%or urban centers
such as 1sla#abad and Jahore to pursue their goals0 +he +aliban"s cooperation )ith such nationalist4
separatist groups see#s to be .ey to their dyna#ics of e7pansion0 Allying )ith #ilitant groups that
target the Pa.istani state allo)s the +aliban great access into the depths of urban Pa.istan0
+he e7tent to )hich these groups collaborate in staging attac.s is unclear0 1t is difficult to
.no) )hich groups ha&e actually been behind each terrorist attac.0 2or e7a#ple, Abdullah Mehsud,
the ++P deputy co##ander, clai#ed responsibility for the Marriott bo#bing in 1sla#abdad in
M2
=Pa.istan >ould >ollapse in Si7 Months0? The News (nternational) March 24, 2000 Dhttp(44)))0thene)s0co#0p.4
topLstoryLdetail0aspE1dF2110 ;accessed April 22, 200<I
91 | P a g e
Septe#ber 200C0 Si#ilarly, !aitullah Mehsud clai#ed responsibility for the Jahore police acade#y
attac. of April 2000 +he +aliban"s role #ay ha&e been li#ited in these attac.s* )hat is clear is that
the +aliban benefit fro# tagging their na#e on terrorist acti&ities for )hich they are not e7clusi&ely
responsible0 +he result is an increase in the po)er of the +aliban in the public"s perception, )hich is
a significant achie&e#ent in the psychological battlefield0
+he +aliban"s apparent alliance )ith /ash#iri nationalist groups #ight be a fore)arning of a
potential future alliance )ith !aloch nationalist groups0
5e) Proups Qeeper 1nside Pa.istan
$0S0 predator'drone attac.s in the 2A+A ha&e successfully forced the +aliban to flee and
see. refuge deeper inside the settled areas of Pa.istan0
M9
+he ,uetta shura, or the +aliban"s council in
,uetta, ha&e operated )ith i#punity there, though recent discussion in the #ilitary co##unity in
light of the ne) A2'PA/ strategy ha&e identified ,uetta as potential ne7t target for predator'drone
attac.s0
M4

+he +aliban are also e7panding further to)ards the urban centers of Pa.istan as a #eans of
e7panding their influence0 +he ne)ness of this approach lies in geography( for the first ti#e, the
+aliban cells are popping up outside of the tribal areas0 +he creation of the +ehree.'e +aliban
!alochistan ;++!< in March 200 is an e7a#ple of this0
R7ploiting Social Prie&ances
+he +aliban .eep their finger on the pulse of the #ost &ulnerable portions of the tribal
populations0 +hey are able to channel their recruit#ent and PR efforts through appropriating social
M9
Ka#es +raub0 =>an Pa.istan be Po&ernedE? New York Times 4aga6ine) March 91, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0nyti#es0co#420040440A4#aga6ine40A6ardari't0ht#lELrF1HscpF9Hs8FbaluchistanHstFcse ;accessed
May 4, 200<I* Also =Al',aida, +aliban are not in !alochistan( Pa.0? /9#ress(ndia)com0 March 1, 2000
Dhttp(44)))0e7pressindia0co#4latest'ne)s4Al,aida'+aliban'are'not'in'!alochistan'Pa.449@A@24 ;accessed May 4,
200<I
M4
=$SX plans to broaden air stri.es in Pa. #eets roadbloc.0? (BN 3i,e0 March 20, 2000 Dhttp(44ibnli&e0in0co#4ne)s4
us'plans'to'broaden'air'stri.es'in'pa.'#eets'roadbloc.4CC1CM'20ht#l ;accessed May 4, 200apitali6e on anger of $0S0 drone attac.s and &iolations
of Pa.istani so&ereignty0 2< R7ploit class di&isions and econo#ic issues0 +he ta.eo&er of S)at is a
po)erful e7a#ple of identifying a )ronged population ;peasants<, tying the +aliban"s cause to the
cause of the )ronged, and gaining recruits, sy#pathy, and influence0 R&idence that the +aliban are
no) recruiting in the slu#s of /arachi offers a gli#pse into the po)er of this tactic0 +he counter'
current to this tactic is that large portions of the Pashtun population are &ehe#ently anti'+aliban for
&arious reasons* these =irreconcilables? are lu#ped into the sa#e category as the Pa.istani
go&ern#ent 3 betrayers 3 and are dealt )ith by force0
MA
+his is particularly rele&ant )ithin the conte7t of !alochistan, )herein grie&ances against the
central go&ern#ent abound0
Recruiting >hildren
+he +aliban ha&e been recruiting children through Qeobandi #adrassas since their
earliest days0
M@
+he inno&ation they are no) displaying is in the spread of recruit#ent practices in
urban #adrassas a#ong non'Pashtuns as )ell as Pashtuns0 Voung boys fro#, so#eti#es fro#
#iddle class bac.grounds, are being persuaded to %oin the ran.s of the +aliban to fight off the
A#erican ku&&ar or infidels0 Most recruit#ent, ho)e&er, re#ains )ithin the lo)est socio'econo#ic
rungs, )hich poses a particular challenge to !alochistan, )hose i#po&erished Pashtun and !aloch
youth ha&e beco#e the #ost &ulnerable for +aliban conscription0
MM
UUUUU
MA
=-ar !riefing Roo#0?
M@
2or lengthy discussion of past +aliban recruit#ent practices, see( Ah#ed Rashid0 Tali*an0 5e) :a&en( Vale
$ni&ersity Press, 20000 See also( =On the %ob )ith a +aliban Recruiter0? Asia Times) 5o&e#ber 2@, 20090
Dhttp(44)))0ati#es0co#4ati#es4SouthLAsia4R/2@Qf090ht#l ;accessed May 4, 200houdhury0 =>hildren of the +aliban0? Frontline ;Qocu#entary<, 200C0
99 | P a g e
+he abo&e discussion has sought to delineate the nature of the +aliban and its connection )ith
!alochistan* the pre&ious analysis discussed !aloch nationalist separatis# and the econo#ic and
political tensions bet)een !alochistan and the central Pa.istani go&ern#ent0 1n the conte7t of !aloch
pro&incial grie&ances and the +aliban"s operations in !alochistan, the paper )ill ne7t discuss policy
options in the conte7t of the still'de&eloping A2'PA/ strategy0
UUUUU
94 | P a g e
POLICY OPTIONS
The New trateg$
President Oba#a has #ade it clear that the $0S0"s &ictory in Afghanistan is tied to defeating
al',aeda0 +he =-hite Paper of the 1nteragency Policy ProupXs Report on $0S0 Policy to)ard
Afghanistan and Pa.istan? released on March 2M, 200 states, =the core goal of the $0S0 #ust be to
disrupt, dis#antle, and defeat al ,aeda and its safe ha&ens in Pa.istan, and to pre&ent their return to
Pa.istan or Afghanistan0?
MC,M
+his paper has focused #ore on the +aliban and less on al',aeda
because there is sufficient e&idence de#onstrating that the +aliban pose a &ital challenge to the
interests of the $nited States, Pa.istan, and Afghanistan, beyond si#ply harboring al',aeda0 Al'
,aeda continues to pose the uni8ue challenge of targeting the ho#eland of the $nited States and its
allies* nonetheless, the $nited States has lin.ed its strategic interests to the stability of the Afghan
and Pa.istani states and thus, #anaging the +aliban threat ought to be a top priority in itself0
$0S0 and Pa.istani policy to)ards !alochistan to date has been inade8uate0 +he Pa.istanis, as
discussed abo&e, ha&e ignored the region, allo)ing hostilities to boil o&er into a ne) insurgency0 +he
$0S0 has also largely ignored the region in its official policy until &ery recently, despite clear
e&idence that the +aliban has been operating freely fro# ,uetta since at least 200@, and by so#e
analyses, since 20020
C0

+o this point, the $nited States has focused its counter'insurgency efforts on the 5-2P and
2A+A regions, but not the Pashtun corridor0 +he Pashtun >orridor is contiguous )ith the 2A+A, and
gi&en the tentati&e nature of borders in Pa.istan, it )ould see# reasonable to si#ply e7tend the
MC
=-hite Paper of the 1nteragency Policy Proup"s Report on $0S0 Policy +o)ards Afghanistan and Pa.istan0? +he
-hite :ouse0 March 2M, 2000 Dhttp(44)))0)hitehouse0go&4assets4docu#ents4Afghanistan'
Pa.istanL-hiteLPaper0pdf ;accessed May 4, 200<I
M
+he -hite Paper does ac.no)ledge that +aliban acti&ity has pro&ided al',aeda the safe ha&ens fro# )hich to
operate, though it does not state the defeat of the +aliban as a goal0 +his is a departure fro# the pre&ious
ad#inistrations stated goals, )hich rhetorically pitted the +aliban ideology against the goal of establish a central
Afghan de#ocracy0
C0
=!aluchistan feeds +alibanXs gro)ing po)er0? an Francisco Chronicle0 May 91, 200@0
Dhttp(44)))0sfgate0co#4cgi'bin4article0cgiEfileF4c4a4200@40A4914M5P+1K4$J110Q+J ;accessed May 4, 200<I
9A | P a g e
efforts south)ard0 +here are se&eral e7planations 3 both political and strategic 3 that this has not
been the case0 +he political %ustification is that the $nited States" presence and acti&ities )ithin
Pa.istani territory has poisoned Pa.istani public opinion to e&en higher le&els of anti'A#ericanis#0
Pi&en the history of tension and neglect bet)een the Pa.istani go&ern#ent and !alochistan, the
Pashtun >orridor has re#ained off li#its in negotiations o&er the geography )ithin )hich the $nited
States can ta.e action )ithin Pa.istan"s borders0
+he strategic reasoning is that the $nited States is focusing on defeating the threat of al'
,aeda rather than defeating or dis#antling al',aeda0 +he Oba#a ad#inistration has co##unicated
this distinction 8uite clearly0 -ithin the #ilitary and diplo#atic co##unities, there is a perception of
an =al',aeda'+aliban di&ide0? 1ndeed, special en&oy Richard :olbroo.e, Secretary of State :illary
>linton, and President Oba#a ha&e sought to #a.e the distinction bet)een al',aeda and the
+aliban, i#plying that they are distinct geographically0 Al',aeda is based in the north in the 5-2P
and 2A+A regions )hereas the +aliban strongholds are in the southern border regions spanning
!alochistan0 +his is supported sy#bolically by the gro)ing consensus that Osa#a bin Jaden is
based in the northern regions of the 5-2P )hile Mullah O#ar is based se&eral hundred .ilo#eters
south in ,uetta0
+he $nited States faces a third obstacle in e7panding its reach into !alochistan( Pa.istan"s
a#bi&alence to)ards Afghan +aliban0 +here is strong e&idence suggesting that the 1S1 #ay still be
aiding the Afghan +aliban0 2urther, as one analyst has argued, Pa.istan doesn"t see the +aliban as a
global threat( =Pa.istan has traditionally resisted going after the Afghan +aliban, arguing that they
are pri#arily interested in regaining po)er in Afghanistan and do not present a global threat in the
9@ | P a g e
sa#e )ay as al',aeda doesYAccording to this argu#ent, if the +aliban could be persuaded to se&er
ties )ith al',aeda, they could be included in any e&entual political settle#ent in Afghanistan0?
C1
+he attitudes of the $nited States and Pa.istan to)ards the Pa.istan'based Afghan +aliban
represent a dangerous o&ersi#plification0 +o the e7tent that the $nited States" #ission in
Afghanistan is to defeat the insurgencies that are pre&enting stabili6ation in the country, such a false
dichoto#y denies that the +aliban, beyond pro&iding safe ha&ens for al',aeda, ha&e s8uads of
insurgents in their ran.s )rea.ing ha&oc in the southeastern regions of Afghanistan0 !ecause
establishing stability in Afghanistan is the #ain priority of the $nited States, it should engage the
+aliban regardless of their longitude on the A2'PA/ border0
Two Current Policies
Abandon th !"dato"-d"on ta#t$#% "&!#t &o'"$(nt)
According to infor#ation lea.ed to the 5e) Vor. +i#es in March 200, Pen0 Petraeus and
Jt0 Pen0 Jute both support e7panding reco##ended e7panding the >1A"s use of #issile stri.es &ia
un#anned aerial &ehicles ;$ASs< into !alochistan because the stri.es in the tribal regions north of
!alochistan ha&e forced +aliban leadership to flee south)ard, thus #a.ing the# easier targets0 On
the one hand, the predator'drone tactic see#s to be )or.ing( once targeted by drones, +aliban
#e#bers are fleeing their ha&ens in the northern border regions and #o&ing east)ard to the outs.irts
of 1sla#abad and south)ard into !alochistan0 Once forced into areas o&er )hich the #ilitary has
better control, the Pa.istan Ar#y can #o&e in and defeat the #ilitants in #ore co#fortable ground0 1t
is not clear that this is part of a $0S0'Pa.istan #ilitary strategy, but it #ay be an effecti&e tactic in
eli#inating #ilitants0 :o)e&er, the drone attac.s ha&e been utterly despised by the Pa.istani people
C1
Myra MacQonald0 =Pa.istan( 5o) or 5e&erE? !euters Blogs0 March 2, 2000 Dhttp(44blogs0reuters0co#4pa.istan4
2004094294tal.ing'to'the'taliban'and'the'last'#an'standing4 ;accessed May 4, 200<I
9M | P a g e
on the basis of ci&ilian deaths and &iolation of so&ereignty0
C2
+he $nited States #ust re'e&aluate the
costs and benefits of the predator'drone tactic and create an alternati&e approach that ulti#ately
brings #ore benefit than har# on in the long'run0
Qrone attac.s in !alochistan )ill li.ely inspire #ore #ilitant acti&ity in the cities0 !aitullah
Mehsud announced that the attac. on the Jahore police acade#y in early April 200 )as done in
retaliation for the deaths caused by an earlier drone attac.0 Missile stri.es )ill push #ilitants deeper
into the urban areas of Pa.istan, )hich )ould ha&e a further destabili6ing effect0 Moreo&er, they #ay
disrupt the &ital de&elop#ent )or. that needs to ta.e place in the pro&ince0 2inally, #issile stri.es in
the Pashtun >orridor #ay endanger the :igh)ay 5'A supply route0
C9

Cont$n* t"*&t-b*$+d$n( bt,n th U-S-& and Pa.$&tan& /$+$ta") and $nt++$(n#
Qisrupting the +aliban net)or. in !alochistan, and indeed the entire effort to defeat al',aeda
and the +aliban insurgency in Afghanistan, re8uires a re&olutionary change in the relationship
bet)een the $nited States" #ilitary and intelligence outlets and its Pa.istani counterparts0 +his
process is under )ay to a large e7tent, and #ust continue0 +he funda#ental challenge that the
#ilitaries of the $nited States and Pa.istan face is to i#ple#ent effecti&e #ethods of #anaging the
insurgency )hile building and #aintaining the legiti#acy of their actions in the eyes of the local and
national populations0
Polic$ !ecommendations
2ar fro# a co#prehensi&e policy prescription, this section offers policy reco##endations
that are not currently being i#ple#ented0 1t identifies three ob%ecti&es to pursue in !alochistan that
synthesi6e the priorities of the A2'PA/ strategy )ith the analysis offered in this paper0
C2
Kuan >ole0 =$rdu Rditorials >onde#n $S Predator Stri.es on Pa.istan0? (n&ormed Comment ;blog<0 March 2C,
2000 Dhttp(44)))0%uancole0co#42004094urdu'editorials'conde#n'us'predator0ht#l ;accessed May 4, 200<I
C9
=Pa.istan( +rouble Along another $S'5A+O Supply Jine0?
9C | P a g e
Ob0#t$' 1: D$&"*!t th Ta+$ban In&*"(n#)( +he #ost urgent priority as it relates to security in
Afghanistan is to disrupt the +aliban"s attac.s into southern Afghanistan0 Pa.istan, Afghanistan, and
the $nited States should pursue its counter'insurgency strategy in !alochistan, and also consider the
follo)ing policy supple#ents0
Po+$#) 12 Pa.istan should transfer security responsibilities to the local population in !alochistan0
Parallel to its efforts in Afghanistan to strengthen la) enforce#ent institutions, the $nited States
should train the residents of !alochistan to guard their borders and )eed out +aliban ele#ents0 +he
!aloch people ha&e been de#anding the right to autono#y o&er their security and la) enforce#ent,
and, once trained, )ill ha&en an innate ad&antage in securing their o)n territory0 !aloch ci&ilians of
all ethnicities should #anage their land to the e7tent that a counter'insurgency can be #anaged by
la) enforce#ent0
!aloch citi6ens should also be charged )ith securing the supply route fro# /arachi to
>ha#an and )or. in counter'narcotics0 Offering funds co#petiti&e )ith the +aliban"s hiring rates
#ay help dri&e a )edge bet)een the +aliban and their #id'le&el recruit#ent pool0
Ob0#t$' 3: P"'nt R#"*$t/nt o4 Ch$+d"n( Rstablishing long'ter# security in Afghanistan and
Pa.istan )ill re8uire a generations'long co##it#ent fro# all in&ol&ed parties0 +he +aliban ha&e
been preparing for this by recruiting hea&ily a#ong children as young as fi&e years old and fro# a
lo)er and #iddle classes0
C4
Pa.istan #ust recogni6e that it is in a in a long'ter# battle for hearts and
#inds, and that the neglect that has been paid to creating a functioning educational syste# and
econo#ic opportunities has )rought the present crisis reflected in the success of +aliban recruit#ent0
Recruit#ent )ill not be significantly disrupted until a &iable alternati&e to the educational syste# and
career options are created0
C4
Obaid'>houdhury =>hildren of the +aliban0?
9 | P a g e
Po+$#) 32 >reate an educational syste# in !alochistan to render the madrassas syste# obsolete0
+here is no )ay around creating an education syste# that endo)s pri#ary and secondary school
children )ith tools they need to be contributing #e#bers to society0 -hile the $nited States can play
a #a%or role in o&erseeing this pro%ect, particularly in the li.ely e&ent that the Rnhanced Partnership
)ith Pa.istan Act of 200 )ill pass, regional players such as +ur.ey, )hich has deep e7perience in
progressi&e religious education in tribal regions, #ay be best suited for the tas.0
Ob0#t$' 5: Rstablish stability through autono#y in !alochistan0 As has been described pre&iously,
for decades, the central go&ern#ent of Pa.istan has ser&ed in%ustices upon the !aloch people0
Pa.istan"s priorities lie in #anaging the threat of e7tre#is# fro# )ithin its borders and in
Afghanistan0 +he +aliban and its allied #ilitias in Pa.istan ha&e destabili6ed the country and threaten
the state"s collapse if they adopt the cause of the !aloch insurgency0 2or the sa.e of its o)n sur&i&al,
the Oardari ad#inistration should co##it to establishing stability in !alochistan through allo)ing
the pro&ince its constitutionally guaranteed autono#y0
Po+$#) 5a2 >reate the institutions necessary for !aloch econo#ic autono#y0 !alochistan is in the
#idst of #a%or econo#ic transfor#ations due to its strategic location and natural resources0 +he
!aloch people are ill'e8uipped to participate in the burgeoning econo#y and ha&e been denied the
resources to beco#e co#petiti&e players in it0 >reating technical training and other opportunities to
prepare the !aloch people to co#pete and inno&ate in their econo#y )ill contribute to econo#ic
gro)th, lo)ering une#ploy#ent, and ha&e other positi&e econo#ic and social conse8uences0 O&er
ti#e, econo#ic de&elop#ent in !alochistan )ill offer opportunities for residents to counter the
econo#ic incenti&es that the +aliban pro&ide0
Po+$#) 5b2 Restore the de#ocratic syste# by returning integrity to pro&incial go&ernance and
politics( 2or decades, Pa.istan has interfered in the pro&incial political syste# and in its elections to
40 | P a g e
fa&or its o)n interests0 +his has led to propping up the K$1 and other pro'+aliban ele#ents in the
region to establish strategic depth in Afghanistan0 +his policy bac.fired )hen the +aliban turned
against the Pa.istani go&ern#ent0 Restoring free and fair elections and allo)ing the !aloch
nationalists to co#pete )ill ha&e #ultiple benefits, including the restoration of %ustice, the prospects
for si##ering the insurgency as the =older generation"s? approach of politics and diplo#acy is gi&en
an opportunity to flourish0
41 | P a g e
CONCLUSION
!alochistan sits at the ne7us of se&eral dangerous realities in a strategically critical region0 A
strengthened +aliban acts )ith relati&e i#punity in the )est of the pro&ince0 A belligerent nationalist
#o&e#ent see.ing autono#y is in the east of the pro&ince0 Pi&en the changing dyna#ics in the
region, greater destabili6ation of the Pa.istan and Afghanistan are plausible in the near future0
:o)e&er, the geopolitical and econo#ic strengths of !alochistan also present opportunities for
Pa.istan, the $nited States, and Afghanistan to i#pro&e their strategic standings in the region and
shape a #ore positi&e future for the pro&ince, for each country, and for the region as a )hole0 -ise
policies that see. to disrupt the +aliban"s e7pansi&e pro%ects, build the institutions that the !aloch
need, and grant the people their long'o&erdue rights can ha&e an effect and can &ery li.ely re&erse
course in the region0 A better for#ulated policy could release the lynchpin on !alochistan"s troubles
and pa&e the )ay to a #ore stable Afghanistan and Pa.istan0
42 | P a g e
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49 | P a g e
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4@ | P a g e

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