I.

Introduction
In his book, The Antichrist, Nietzsche sets out to denounce and illegitimize not only Christianity
itself as a belief and a practice, but also the ethical-moral value system hich modern estern
civilization has inherited from it. This book can be considered a further development of some of
his ideas concerning Christianity that can be found in !eyond "ood and #vil and in The
"enealogy of $orals, particularly the idea that the present morality is an inversion of true, noble
morality. An understanding of the main ideas in the latter orks are therefore %uite helpful in
understanding and fully appreciating the ideas set forth in The Antichrist. &ne of the most
important of these ideas is that Christianity has made people nihilistic and eak by regarding
pity and related sentiments as the highest virtues. 'ere, (ust as in the "enealogy, Nietzsche
traces the origin of these values to the ancient )es ho lived under *oman occupation, but
here he puts them in terms of a reversal of their conception of "od. 'e argues that the )eish
"od as once one hich embodied the noble virtues of a proud, poerful people, but hen
they became sub(ugated by the *omans, their "od began to embody the +virtues+ ,more like
sentiments- of an oppressed, resentful people, until it became something entirely alien to hat it
formerly had been.
II. .ity
Nietzsche begins by criticizing Christianity for denouncing and regarding as evil those basic
instincts of human beings hich are life-preserving and strength-promoting. In their place,
Christianity maintains and advocates values hich Nietzsche sees as life-negating or nihilistic,
of hich the most important is pity.
In /ection 0, Nietzsche rites1
Christianity is called the religion of pity. .ity stands opposed to the tonic emotions hich
heighten our vitality1 it has a depressing effect. 2e are deprived of strength hen e feel pity.
That loss of strength hich suffering as such inflicts on life is still further increased and
multiplied by pity. .ity makes suffering contagious.3
.ity, according to Nietzsche, is nothing less than the multiplication of suffering, in that it allos
us to suffer along ith those for hom e feel pity. It depresses us, sapping us of our strength
and ill to poer. It is interesting to note that the "erman ord for pity itself, $itleid, literally
means +suffering ith+ ,leid 4 pain, suffering 5 mit 4 ith-. /o to feel pity for someone is to
simply suffer along ith them, as Nietzsche sees it. It also promotes the preservation of those
ho nature has selected for destruction, or in other ords, those ho Nietzsche calls +failures.+
This preservation of failures, he argues, makes the overall picture of life look decadent, in that it
becomes filled ith eak and retrograde individuals. .ity, then, has a tofold effect for
Nietzsche, since it both multiplies suffering and also leads to the preservation of those ho
ould cause us this suffering as the ob(ects of our pity. 6ltimately, pity is nihilism put into
practice, according to Nietzsche, since it makes life simply seem more miserable and decadent
and therefore more orthy of negation itself. Nietzsche does not really develop this conception
of pity any farther. As it stands, it seems to be rather problematic. 7oes his conception of pity
mean to include compassion and sympathy as ell8 Can these ords be used
interchangeably8 The "erman ord for compassion is $itleid as ell, so it is possible that
Nietzsche is using them interchangeably. The "erman ord for sympathy, hoever, is $itgef9hl,
hich means +feeling ith.+ .erhaps Nietzsche is confusing pity ith compassion and
sympathy. .ity ould seem to have a more negative connotation, in that it is a suffering-ith that
does not achieve anything: a aste of emotional energy toard those ho are beyond help, in
other ords. /ympathy and compassion, as I understand the terms, seem to lean more toard
having an understanding ,a +feeling-ith+- of hat someone is suffering through and also being
in a position to help that person. I take Nietzsche to be using ,maybe misusing- these terms
interchangeably, hoever, since he uses the ord sympathy ,$itgef9hl- in other orks in very
similar conte;ts.
<*I#7*IC' NI#T=/C'# - !I&"*A.'>
<riedrich Nietzsche ,3?@@A3BCC-
Nietzsche as born in *Dcken, the .russian province of /a;ony, on &ctober 3Eth, 3?@@. 'is
father died hen Nietzsche as five years old, hence, his childhood as spent ith his mother,
sister and to maiden aunts. At fourteen the young Nietzsche as aarded a scholarship to
enter the preparatory school, /chulpforta, ith the intent of training for the clergy. 'e e;celled in
religious studies, "erman literature, and classical studies. 'e also began to suffer from migraine
headaches, an ailment that ould trouble him for most of his adult life. 'e graduated in 3?F@,
and continued studies in theology and classical philology and the 6niversity of !onn. 'oever,
he soon gave up theology and transferred to Geipzig, here he as introduced to the orks of
Hant, the composer *ichard 2agner and /chopenhauer and his recent te;t, The 2orld as 2ill
and Idea.
Although Nietzsche served in the army in 3?F? his appointment as cut short by illness.
'oever, he as thought to be a brilliant student, and rather than return to the army, the
6niversity of !asel called him to the chair of classical philology at the age of I@, even though
arrangements to aard him a doctorate had to be made shortly thereafter. Then during the
<ranco-.russian ar, he served as a medical orderly for a brief period, returning this time to
!asel in ill-health, and though he managed to teach there from 3?FB-0B, he as again forced by
his health to retire.
It as in !asel that Nietzsche became a close friend of *ichard 2agner, the second part of The
!irth of Tragedy is devoted to 2agnerJs music. 2ith the publication of The !irth of Tragedy out
of the /pirit of $usic in 3?0I Nietzsche returned to !asel to lecture. 6pon NietzscheJs rise to
celebrity, he sought to bring his friend along, and together, they managed to convince the
government to fund the construction of the !ayreuth theatre, built to feature 2agnerJs ork. The
theatre as completed in 3?0F, and 2agnerJs self-proclaimed masterpiece, The *ing of the
Nibelung, as performed for the #mperor. $uch to his despair, Nietzsche found that he hated
the ork, and began to %uestion not only 2agnerJs ork, but .russian culture in general. 'is
friendship ith 2agner ended in 3?0?, at the time Nietzsche discovered the <rench
#nlightenment. Tensions beteen the to rose as 2agner disapproved of the <rench and
Nietzsche refused the cult of 2agnerian ideals in !ayreuth, particularly the anti-/emitism it
propagated.
Nietzsche encountered more adversities in his life, the re(ection of Gou Andreas-/alomK to his
proposal of marriage, along ith his ongoing resistance to .russian citizenship ,hich he had
given up in 3?FB-, provoked a ithdraal of Nietzsche. 'e remained stateless for the rest of his
life, preferring the life of a tourist-scholar and spending his time riting in boarding houses -the
summers in /itzerland and the inters in Italy. 7uring this time he published nine books,
beteen 3?0I and 3???, hile preparing four others for publication.
In his first published book, 7ie "eburt der TragDdie aus dem "eist der $usik ,The !irth of
Tragedy-, he diagnosed that human beings are sub(ect to 7ionysian instincts L unconscious
desires, impulses, or overhelmingly self-destructive tendencies. Nietzsche pointed out that the
"reeks had opposed Apollonian principles of sobriety and rationale to such destructive drives.
These became to ma(or principles in his future ork, the 7ionysian and Apollonian, one of
chaos, dream and into;ication, the other one of order and the lending of form. These Nietzsche
associated ith an aesthetic disposition in hich life be vieed as a ork of art. 'e
demonstrated that the "reeks had theorized the relation of the to principles in hich art is a
illed illusion and is composed of both form-giving and into;ication, and thus, art offers one a
vantage point of life. Therefore, life itself becomes recognizable as unknoable in terms of an
ultimate truth, as proposed by an idealist metaphysics.
Also /prach =arathustra ,Thus /poke =arathustra- as formally published first in three parts in
3??M-3??@ and 3?BI. Central in his thinking is the notion of the ill to poer, the eternal return
and radical nihilism, hich together negotiate pain, suffering and contradiction as e;pressions of
e;istence and its actual tensions instead of ob(ectionable phenomena. Nietzche opposed ideas
of the progress of the human species as theorized by 7arin, preferring instead the idea of an
eternal recurrence ith an accompanying positive poer of heroic suffering. The ideal of JmanJ
for Nietzche is to be overcome along ith all idealism, as such concepts bear no
correspondence to reality. =arathustra is the figure of the JhigherJ man, and his thought is poetic.
This superman re(ects faith and morality upon the assumption that either +"od is dead,+ or that
his role in human development ended shortly after Creation. Nietzche believed that an ideal
society should form its on morality outside of religious morality, suggesting even that the use
of )udeo-Christian morality as often the cause of the avoidance of decisive actions or the
acceptance of our fundamental e;istence in the material orld. The failure to live, take risks and
decisive actions is a failure to realize actual human potential L for nothing e;ists beyond life.
'is most influential ork, The 2ill to .oer, published posthumously in 3BC3, as based on a
series of notes in his (ournals and contains his strongest oppositions to idealism. This anti-
idealist stance not only had an influence on thinkers such as !ataille, but continued to shape the
thought of e;istentialists, post-modernists and post-structuralists ell into the ICth century. The
ork is a continuation of key principles of Thus /poke =arathustra, The ill to poer is
foundational to his anti-idealist stance: it is an affirmation of life, a vision of the orld itself as a
ill to poer. The implications are profound L all simplistic oppositions beteen sub(ect and
ob(ect, beteen ill and apathy, being and nothingness are divisions ithin the orld as ill to
poer itself. There is nothing else besides, and identity itself is to be constructed in the plurality
of forces for hich there is no unity of reality behind appearance. <olloing HantJs thought on
the necessary affirmation of values, Nietzsche sa the revaluation of values as the e%uivalent of
making values ithin the play of forces of the ill to poer.
Near the end of his life, NietzscheJs productivity ended in )anuary 3??B, hen he suffered a
mental breakdon upon seeing a coachman cruelly hipping his horse -this drama had him
sobbing ith his arms around the beastJs neck. 'e as housed in an asylum at first, then
placed in the care of his family. 7uring his illness he as mostly pleasant, engaging in
conversation hen he as more lucid. 'oever, his health deteriorated, and in the final decade
of his life he as generally dysfunctional, dying in 3BCC in 2eimar. 'is sister #lisabeth secured
the rights to his literary orks as yet unpublished, and edited them for publication, although
sometimes in rather dis(ointed form. To further complicate manners, #lisabeth as married to a
prominent member of the "erman anti-/emite movement, hich Nietzsche loathed: the
supposed nature of his influence of Nazism served to make the interpretation of his te;ts
difficult. 'e re(ected biological racism and "erman nationalism, riting +every great crime
against culture for the last four hundred years lies on their conscience.+ 'is ideas ere first
championed by the 7anish critic, "eorg !randes, ho lectured on Nietzsche in Copenhagen in
3???. NietzscheJs ork has influenced among others Thomas $ann, 'erman 'esse, AndrK
$alrau;, AndrK "ide, Albert Camus, *ainer $aria *ilke, /tefan "eorge, /igmund <reud, and
)ean .aul /artre.
Influence in modern society
As more and more of the political regimes erected under the banner of $ar;ism repudiate
$ar;Js ideas, it becomes ever clearer that much of hat makes the modern orld modern also
makes it Nietzschean.
NietzscheJs glorification of poer and his contention that +there are altogether no moral facts+
are grim signatures of the age. /o, too, is his enthusiasm for violence, cruelty and the irrational.
This is not to say that Nietzsche, 3?@@-3BCC, ould approve of the societies that his ideas have
shaped so profoundly. &n the contrary, he ould regard both the proliferation of democracy and
the triumph of mass media and popular culture ith a distaste bordering on horror.
'e ould abominate the idespread attack on rank, hierarchy, and social distinction: the
political emancipation of omen in particular he ould re(ect as ,to %uote from his book +The
"enealogy of $orals+- +one of the orst developments of the general uglification of #urope.+
#ven the casual atheism, relativism, and hedonism of our time -- even, that is, behavior and
attitudes that might seem ,in NietzscheJs arresting phrase- +beyond good and evil+ -- ould earn
his contempt precisely for being adopted casually.
It as a first principle ith this enemy of first principles to make nothing easy for himself -- or for
us.
2ith his famous announcement +"od is dead,+ Nietzsche foresa the rise of anomie, the
spreading sense of angst and meaninglessness, hat the Czech novelist $ilan Hundera called
+the unbearable lightness of being.+ All this Nietzsche diagnosed under the heading of nihilism.
&ne of NietzscheJs greatest fears as creeping mediocrity. If the +bermensch+ represented his
ideal -- the ideal of a being strong enough to create his on values, strong enough to live
ithout the consolation of traditional morality -- the opposite of the bermensch as the timid
creature Nietzsche called +the last man.+
+2hat is love8 2hat is creation8 2hat is longing8 2hat is a star8+ thus asks the last man, and
he blinks.
+2e have invented happiness,+ say the last men, and they blink. They have left the regions
here it as hard to live, for one needs armth. &ne still loves oneJs neighbor and rubs against
him, for one needs armth.
&ne still orks, for ork is a form of entertainment. !ut one is careful lest the entertainment
become too harroing.
No shepherd and one herdN #verybody ants the same, everybody is the same1 hoever feels
different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.
The last man, Nietzsche predicted, ould be one response to nihilism. !ut the full implications
of the death of "od had yet to unfold. +The event itself is far too great, too distant, too remote
from the multitudeJs capacity for comprehension even for the tidings of it to be thought of having
arrived as yet.+
And hen they did arrive, hat certainties ould not suddenly become dispensableN -- +for
e;ample, the hole of our #uropean morality.+
To say that Nietzsche elcomed this development ould be only half true. 'e thought that it
meant liberation, yes1 ith the death of "od, Nietzsche believed that man ould be free to
create values that accord more generously ith human nature than do inherited religious
values.
!ut Nietzsche also kne that the loss of religious faith also threatened man ith a terrifying
rootlessness. 2hat happens hen +the highest values devalue themselves+8 2ho or hat ill
take the place of "od8 2hat prodigies ill fill the vacuum left by a faltering morality8 2hat
unfathomed comforts ill man devise for himself in the absence of faith8
To a large e;tent, NietzscheJs philosophy is an attempt to live ith these %uestions1 to probe the
loss, the temptations, the opportunities that they imply.
Nietzsche also seemed to believe that he had fashioned a novel response to nihilism. It is not
alays clear, hoever, that his ansers are usefully distinguishable from the problems that they
are meant to address.
Nietzsche liked to think of himself as +untimely.+ 'e believed that his solitary anderings and
meditations had brought him insights far too advanced and devastating for most of his
contemporaries.
And indeed, some of NietzscheJs ritings on truth, language, and morality seem e;traordinarily
prescient -- or at least e;traordinarily contemporary.
!ut Nietzsche as also very much a product of his time -- strikingly +timely+ as ell as untimely.
'is apotheosis of art, his +immoralism,+ his celebration of instinct at the e;pense of reason, his
attack on the middle-class, religion, etc.1 all this as part of the heady intellectual atmosphere of
the fin de sicle, in #ngland and America as ell as in <rance and "ermany.
#ven as Nietzsche as suggesting that +to tell the truth is to lie according to a fi;ed convention,+
so, for e;ample, &scar 2ilde as bemoaning the +decay of lying+ and arning readers not to be
led astray +into the paths of virtue.+
It is orth remembering, hoever, that attacks on virtue are most attractive hen virtue remains
ell established, (ust as the homage to poer, violence, cruelty, and the like seems amusingly
bracing only so long as one doesnJt suffer from them oneself.
In 3??0, such glorification of violence and +the voluptuousness of victory and cruelty+ may have
been merely pi%uant: by the 3BMCs, hen the Nazis appropriated NietzscheJs rhetoric as a
garland for their murderous deeds, it had become impossible to vie such passages neutrally.
It is one of the curious features of NietzscheJs mature thought that he ished to %uestion the
value of truth hile upholding honesty as his one remaining virtue.
Traditionally, the moral virtues have been all of a piece. <or e;ample, A%uinas observes that
+nearly all are agreed in saying+ that the moral virtues are interconnected, that +discernment
belongs to prudence, rectitude to (ustice,+ and so on.
It is orth asking hether honesty, sundered from the family of virtues, remains a virtue --
hether, in the end, it even remains honest. 6ntempered by other virtues, honesty functions not
so much to reveal truth as to e;pose it. Is that honest8
Nietzsche clung to honesty after abandoning the other virtues because it alloed him to fashion
the most ruthless instrument of interrogation imaginable.
7ifficulty, not truth, became his criterion of value.
Nietzsche never tired of pointing out that the demands of traditional morality fly in the face of
life. &ne might say, >es, and that is precisely hy morality is so valuable1 it acknoledges that
manJs allegiance is not only to life but also to hat ennobles life -- that, indeed, life itself is not
the highest court of appeals.
!ut for Nietzsche the measure of nobility is the uninhibited pulse of life1 hence his penchant for
biological and physiological metaphors, his invocation of +ascending+ and +descending+ forms of
art and life. 'e defines the good as that hich enhances the feeling of life. If +to see others
suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more,+ then violence and cruelty may have to
be granted the patent of morality and enlisted in the aestheteJs palette of diversions.
In more or less concentrated form, NietzscheJs ideal is also modernityJs ideal. It is an ideal that
subordinates morality to poer in order to transform life into an aesthetic spectacle. It promises
freedom and e;altation. !ut as the "erman poet Novalis pointed out some years before
Nietzsche, such an ideal is really the ultimate attainment of the barbarian.