Civil Society Participation in The Decentralisation of Brazil's Water Resources Assessing Participation in Three States

Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 25(3), 2004, 304-321
Copyright 2004 Department of Geography, National University of Singapore and Blackwell Publishers Ltd
INTRODUCTION
Civil society organisations (CSOs)
1
are playing
an increasingly active role in the governance
of South Americas environmental resources.
In particular, environmental non-governmental
organisations (ENGOs) have shaped debates
on issues as diverse as the massive Hidrovia
scheme of the Plata Basin (Hochstetler, 2002),
forest policy in Chile and Venezuela (Silva,
1994; 1997; 1999; Clapp, 1998), and biotech-
nology governance in Brazil (Jepson, 2002).
In the Amazon basin, local ENGOs have formed
alliances with international organisations to
leverage improved policies from national
governments (Hochstetler, 1997; Keck, 1998;
Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Kimerling, 2000;
Rodrigues, 2000), while other NGOs are
involved in daily management of protected
areas or fishing areas (Hall, 1997; McGrath,
2000; Browder, 2002) and developing regional
policies (Nepstad et al., 2002; Fearnside, 2003).
CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN THE
DECENTRALISATION OF BRAZILS WATER RESOURCES:
ASSESSING PARTICIPATION IN THREE STATES
Christian Brannstrom
1
, James Clarke
2
and Mariana Newport
3
1
Department of Geography, Texas A & M University, Texas, USA
2
Amnesty International UK, London, UK
3
Faculdade de Tecnologia e Cincias, Salvador, Brazil
ABSTRACT
Decentralisation, the transfer of powers to a lower level of government, is thought to encourage
more efficient and equitable management of natural resources. Participation of civil society
organisations (CSOs) is considered critical to create positive outcomes of decentralisation. Here
we examine aspects of civil society participation in decentralised management using the case of
Brazils water resources management. Several Brazilian states have enacted reforms mandating
watershed committees in which the participation of civil society is either encouraged or required.
However, actual participation of civil society is not yet well understood. To assess participation,
we collected qualitative data on watershed districts in three Brazilian states (Bahia, Paran and
So Paulo). Our findings reaffirm the importance of the state in establishing a transparent legal
framework to encourage participation and in defining civil society. The ability of civil society
leaders to obtain and deploy local environmental knowledge, which frames environmental issues
in new geographical scales, is useful to achieve the efficiency and efficacy objectives of
decentralisation. However, by upscaling political activities beyond decentralisations new
territories, CSOs could make decentralisation irrelevant to local environmental issues.
Keywords: civil society, water, decentralisation, environmental policy, Brazil
Brannstrom.P7.0.pmd 10/25/2004, 4:44 PM 2
Civil Society and Decentralisation, Brazil 305
Elsewhere in Brazil, ENGOs have played an
influential role in environmental impact
assessment (EIA) (Eve, Arguelles & Fearnside,
2000; Rothman, 2001), reduction of industrial
pollution (Lemos, 1998a; 1998b), and forest
policies (Brannstrom, 2001). In the highland
Andes, indigenous peoples have formed
powerful organisations for agricultural
modernisation, community development and
environmental conservation (Bebbington,
1993; 1996; 1997; Becker, 2003; Perreault, 2003).
Here we analyse the participation of civil
society in decentralisation, an increasingly
popular environmental policy model. Reforms
to Brazils water resources management are well
suited to explore how CSOs have responded
to decentralisation, whether they have
influenced the success of reforms and the
prospects for meaningful participation. Our
analysis begins with a discussion of the
different types of decentralisation, stressing
the preferred democratic decentralisation
and the potential role of CSOs. Then we outline
Brazils decentralisation reforms, setting the
context for sections exploring case studies
from Bahia (Itapicuru valley), Paran (Tibagi
valley) and So Paulo (Sorocaba-Mdio Tiet
valley) (Figure 1). The discussion outlines the
key issues raised: bureaucratic and regulatory
barriers; definitions of civil society; and ENGO
upscaling based on useful environmental
knowledge.
CIVIL SOCIETY IN
DECENTRALISATION
In many developing countries, decentra-
lisation is so far advanced that the issue is no
Figure 1. Study catchments in three states of Brazil: Itapicuru valley in Bahia,
Sorocaba-Tiet valley in So Paulo and Tibagi valley in Paran.
306 Brannstrom, Clarke and Newport
longer of whether local governments will
manage resources better or worse than
national governments or centralised bureau-
cracies rather, the main concerns are what
factors make decentralisation better achieve
its objectives (Larson, 2002:29). Decentra-
lisation has quietly become a fashion of our
time (Manor, 1999:1) because it is seen as a
means to tame corrupt central governments,
tap local knowledge in management decisions,
strengthen democracy and reduce the cost of
government. Supporters of decentralised
governance argue that efficiency and equity
are likely to increase. Lower decision-making
costs, increased accountability and mobilised
local knowledge are thought to result from
decentralisation. Increasing popular partici-
pation is thought to improve the equity of
natural resources management (Manor, 1999;
Ribot, 2002).
Decentralisation creates new management
or governance entities, which we shall refer to
here as decentralised groups. Differences
in the accountability of decentralised groups,
and the powers they wield, distinguish two
general types of decentralisation. Democratic
decentralisation creates groups with effective
powers that are accountable to local popu-
lations. Mechanisms, including (but not limited
to) elections, exist for citizens, CSOs, the media
and the judiciary to hold these groups
accountable. By contrast, upward accoun-
tability of decentralised groups to higher levels
of government characterises administrative
decentralisation, which is sometimes referred
to as deconcentration. Democratic decentra-
lisation is more likely to generate intended
improvements in efficiency and equity
(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2002).
Participation of civil society positively
influences democratic decentralisation
through downward accountability mecha-
nisms (Kaimowitz et al., 1998; Agrawal &
Ribot, 1999; Larson, 2002; Ribot, 2002).
Elections, however, are only one mechanism;
civil society representatives also monitor and
lobby decentralised groups, often by parti-
cipating directly in committees and municipal
councils. Activists also help set agendas and
form alliances with other CSOs, state agencies
and the media.
The territorial basis of civil society networks
is a key to understand more precisely how civil
society encourages downward accountability.
Civil society groups and networks are parti-
cularly effective at obtaining local environ-
mental knowledge and upscaling their political
activities to larger geographical scales. What
is local may become, through collective
action, a municipal, statewide, or na-
tional issue, depending on the most relevant
perceived locus of power and influence. In
upscaling place-specific environmental
concerns, such as pollution, soil erosion and
deforestation, ENGOs may accumulate
valuable local environmental knowledge that
may be shared with other civil society groups.
For example, local ENGOs attending to issues
in relatively small territories may provide
valuable information and access to inter-
national NGOs that may be used to leverage
concessions from governments (Keck &
Sikkink, 1998; Rodrigues, 2000; Hochstetler,
2002). Thus, local environmental concerns
may achieve international or national
relevance by upscaling. But as one analyst
has noted (Keck, 1998), activists may
prematurely internationalise issues before they
are localised among political elites. In the case
of Brazils biotechnology policies, environ-
mental activists and state officials have
downscaled governance from federal to
local and state territories (Jepson, 2002).
Inherent to rescaling is the framing or
interpretation of environmental issues. In the
case of industrial pollution in Cubato, Brazil,
civil society groups expanded the scope of
the pollution control to include human health,
which previously had not been addressed. In
this way, civil society groups increased the
accountability of state and industries to local
populations and forged a temporary alliance
with the state bureaucracy that led to increased
political power and, ultimately, significant
reductions in industrial pollution (Lemos,
1998b:76).
Decentralisations preferred outcomes
depend on downward accountability, which
in turn relies not only on electoral processes,
but also on actions of civil society. Thus, civil
society has a specific potential role in
fomenting downward accountability by
upscaling political activism from local
expertise to new geographical scales
perhaps those imposed geographies, such as
watershed territories, created by decentralised
governance. Through issue framing, local
environmental issues are reinterpreted as
involving people and places more broadly
than a narrow interpretation would suggest.
Rescaling and issue framing potentially hold
state actors to account. To understand the
specific ways in which civil society may
encourage downward accountability, we turn
to a description of three cases. First, however,
an overview of Brazils decentralisation is
necessary to establish proper context.
DECENTRALISING BRAZILS
WATER GOVERNANCE
Decentralisation of Brazils water resources
management has been ongoing for several
years. Federal water law envisioned gover-
nance at three geographical scales. A national
council would oversee a national water agency
and state water councils, while state-level
bureaucracies would supervise catchment-
level committees and agencies (Brazil, 1997).
Watershed committees, the smallest territorial
unit for decision-making, would be created by
state governments and must include
representatives of CSOs. Federal law requires
that committees in watersheds covering more
than one state should include representatives
of civil water resources entities with proven
activity in the watershed, defined as
associations of municipal governments,
associations of water users, technical, research
or teaching institutions and NGOs oriented to
societys diffuse and collective interests
(Brazil, 1997).
2
Several Brazilian states crafted reforms
based on these principles and, importantly, the
idea in federal legislation that water is a public
and finite good with economic value, giving
highest priority to drinking water among
multiple uses (Porto, 1998; Tortajada, 2001).
To implement these ideas, state reforms created
watershed territories in which committees and
agencies received powers of deliberation,
oversight and planning of water investments.
The composition of committees necessarily
required some measure of civil society
participation. However, the key objective of
reforms was the establishment of water tariffs
that would fund investments in new watershed
territories. As of August 2004, only one
watershed district has begun to implement
water tariffs.
Civil society is defined differently in two of
the three states analysed in this research. So
Paulo requires one-third of watershed com-
mittee membership to be comprised of CSOs
based in the watershed, including teaching or
research institutions, associations of water
users, and NGOs specialised in water resources
or socioeconomic issues (Departamento de
guas, 1994). In Paran, committees are com-
prised of representatives from state agencies,
municipalities, water users and civil society
entities with activities related to water
resources (Paran, 2000a). At least 20 per cent
of committee membership must be drawn from
this fourth group, defined to include associa-
tions of municipal governments, associations
of water users, teaching or research insti-
tutions, and NGOs recognised by the states
water council (Paran, 1999; Paran, 2000a).
NGOs must petition the state to be recognised
as legitimate participants in decentralised
water management and must not only present
proof of registration, a current statute,
certification of elected leadership and a
declaration of assets, but also have a record
of activities in the watershed including at least
three years of legal existence and activities,
and at least two years of experience with water
resources issues (Paran, 2000b).
Brazilian states are appropriate scales of
analysis because of their legislative and
administrative responsibilities in environ-
mental governance (Ames & Keck, 1997). Not
surprisingly, states such as Bahia, So Paulo
and Paran pursued somewhat different
versions of decentralisation of water resources
governance. While Bahia opted for a decon-
centration of state offices, in spite of claiming
to pursue decentralisation, Paran empowered
firms and municipalities as water users in
powerful watershed agencies, relegating civil
society participation to less powerful
committees. So Paulo, however, mandated
equal participation of municipalities, civil
society and state agencies in watershed
committees, but delayed the formation of
watershed agencies.
To what extent has civil society participated
in Brazils water management reforms? Using
qualitative data obtained from interviews with
key actors in decentralisation,
3
we evaluate
the participation of civil society in three cases.
Brazils federal system offers significant free-
dom for states to craft subtle differences in
what they mean by participation and how
they will implement participatory policies.
Our research in Bahia, Paran and So Paulo
supports the general idea that civil society may
strongly contribute to improved water
resources governance. In two cases (So Paulo
and Paran), civil society groups promoted
downward accountability using new geogra-
phical scales and issue framing, often leading
to new alliances with state officials.
However, our research also indicates how
state actors actively discourage or limit the
participation of civil society in water resources
decentralisation. In Bahia, high-level bureau-
crats undermined the official discourse of
participation by severely reducing it. In
Paran, a highly restrictive definition of civil
society and participation excluded an
important civil society network from decen-
tralised governance. Decentralisation needs
clear policies that encourage participation of
civil society; however, the ability of civil
society to upscale environmental knowledge
also means that decentralised groups may
become irrelevant to polemic debates on
local water issues.
BAHIA: MARGINALISING CIVIL
SOCIETY
In Bahia, weak civil society combined with a
centralising state has proved an unfortunate
recipe for participatory water management.
Legislation passed in 1995, two years before
the federal government passed water reforms
(Bahia, 1995), created the Superintendncia de
Recursos Hdricos (SRH), a state water agency
responsible for systematising and decentra-
lising water resources management. According
to the legislation, the SRH is responsible for
encouraging the formation of watershed
committees. However, the law made no
reference to the composition of committees
nor necessary legal instruments, without
which watershed committees could not exist
legally (Ogata, 2001:4). Consequently,
principles of participatory management have
been contravened.
Two policies implemented by the SRH
further undermined the efforts to encourage
civil society participation, by in effect
ignoring or altering provisions of federal
legislation regarding the participation of civil
society in river-basin committees. First, Bahias
reforms merely shifted minor responsibilities
from the SRH head office to 13 regional water
districts (regies administrativas de gua)
(SRH, 2001). Although decentralised offices
of the SRH in each district eventually will be
empowered to carry out administrative tasks
currently undertaken by the head office in the
state capital Salvador, they will not be
accountable to local water users because of
the hierarchical structure of the SRH itself and
because of the limited nature of the powers
decentralised.
Second, the SRHs main policy is to identify,
license and charge tariffs to users such as
industries and irrigated agriculture (Bahia,
1997a). For this purpose, the bureaucracy
developed a geographical information system
(GIS) as a management tool for locating water
users and calculating available surface water
for licensing. The SRHs director, who in 2002
argued that low cultural and educational
levels among small-scale water users made
committees impractical, encouraged the
spontaneous formation of water users
associations, for which water-use licenses
were identity cards legitimising their
participation. Thus, the purpose of water users
associations changed from participatory
management to the registration of water users,
as decentralisation in Bahia stressed efficiency
over equity or empowerment.
Unlike the cases of Paran and So Paulo
(see below), significant multilateral funding
influenced the decentralisation of water
governance in Bahia. In 1997, the SRH created
a system for planning, coordinating and
implementing its USD 85-million Projecto de
Gerenciamento de Rescursos Hdricos
(PGRH), supported by a World Bank loan
(Bahia, 1997b). The PGRH had two major
objectives: institutional strengthening for
decentralised and participatory water
management and increasing water supply. The
second was to be achieved by infrastructure
projects, such as the construction and recu-
peration of dams, reservoirs and irrigation
works. Commitments to decentralisation and
participation are the responsibility of a project
management unit, Unidade de Gesto de
Projetos (UGP), with staff recruited and trained
by the World Bank, which works within the
SRH. Superficially, the UGP appears to be
compatible with participatory management of
water resources; however, more serious
commitments to participation and decen-
tralisation are sidelined by the SRH.
The Itapicuru river valley the 36,226 km
2
site of the PGRH pilot project is an illustrative
test case for analysing Bahias decentra-
lisation. Located in Brazils poverty-stricken
drought polygon, the Itapicuru valley is one
of Bahias poorest regions: nearly 60 per cent
of the total population of 287,600 inhabitants
live in rural areas and the incidence of poverty
is almost twice the national average. Three-
quarters of the population earn less then half
the minimum wage and the rate of illiteracy
exceeds 50 per cent (World Bank, 1997:1).
Construction of the Ponto Novo dam and
irrigation system was intended to stabilise local
water supply and increase the productive
capacity of small farmers. Under a model
resettlement programme, farmers could trade
their flooded land for an irrigated five-hectare
plot instead of cash compensation. Organi-
sation of civil society and the involvement of
communities in local water resources manage-
ment were complementary to engineering
projects.
Efforts of the UGP in identifying water users
and civil society leaders while also organising
public meetings and seminars resulted in the
establishment of three types of water users
organisations in the Itapicuru valley. First, four
water users associations (associao de
usurios da gua, or AUAs), founded in the
area near the Ponto Novo reservoir to
undertake local water resources management.
Second, 26 municipal water user commissions
(comit municipal de usurios da gua, or
COMUAs), which create a forum where
representatives from local government, state
agencies, banks, AUAs and members of civil
society, such as the church and rural trade
unions, can discuss water issues and integrate
separate development initiatives. Third, a
basinwide consortium of municipalities, novel
in the region in that a new geographical scale
the Itapicuru catchment rather than estab-
lished municipal borders represents water
users. Apart from representing the interests
of water users and the environment, the
consortium aims to capture funds for small
water management projects and to assist
municipal governments in improving water
resources management. Without proper legal
context for forming committees, UGP staff
viewed the Itapicuru consortium as the
second-best alternative.
However, participatory organisations
created during the past five years in the
Itapicuru valley remain fragile and un-
consolidated. Several factors associated with
poverty have impeded the formation of strong
civil society in general, and water users
organisations in particular. First, successful
participatory initiatives often depend on the
blessings of local political bosses; combined
with a strong clientelist political culture, local
political intransigence has made it difficult for
new participatory organisations to develop.
Second, members of water users associations
often cannot afford the cost of necessary
infrastructure, such as telephone com-
munication and transport, and often have
difficulty paying membership fees. Third, low
education levels can prevent citizens from
sharing their opinions, leading them to
abandon participatory forums such as
association meetings and capacity-building
workshops and seminars. Fourth, meeting
places for participatory forums are often
located at long distances from rural popu-
lations. Finally, negative experiences with
previous government projects in the Itapicuru
catchment encourage the belief that local
opinions have little influence on policies.
These barriers to participatory water
resources governance underscore the
twofold challenge that Bahias water
bureaucracy took on when it selected one of
the states poorest regions to carry out its
pilot project. On the one hand, state
legislation blocks civil society participation
because key legal provisions are absent. On
the other hand, the socioeconomic
characteristics of the catchment slow the
spontaneous organisation of civil society
groups that would be capable of pressuring
the state government for participatory
forums. The state governments lack of
commitment to participatory management has
discouraged the UGP consultants respon-
sible for making water management
participatory as well as water users. Even the
Itapicuru consortium of municipalities is
excluded from a seat on the states water
council, as recent legislation revoked the one
seat allocated to civil society (Bahia, 2002).
Thus, Bahias reforms contradict the spirit of
Brazils national water resources management
system because watershed committees do not
exist. Democratic decentralisation is blocked
on three fronts: the state holds all the power
on the state water council; consortium and
basin committees have no formal means of
influencing water governance; and the state
gives no legal basis for watershed committees
to exist.
Among the several consequences of
Bahias weak efforts to involve civil society
in water governance is the considerable
change made to the Ponto Novo project
resettlement scheme. Between 1998 and 2002,
the total area devoted to large plots increased
from 42 to 72 per cent of the total irrigated
area. The model resettlement project for small
farmers has affected only those who suffered
direct losses due to the flooding of the dam,
rather than the broader rural community of
the Itapicuru valley. With this, Bahia plans to
transform the Ponto Novo region into a centre
of export-oriented (irrigated) agribusiness.
Ponto Novo farmers are encouraged to grow
fruit, emulating the model cases of Juazeiro
and Petrolina (approximately 160 km north of
the Ponto Novo municipality), now major
exporters of irrigated mango and papaya to
Europe and North America.
What are the prospects for the participation
of civil society in Bahias decentralisation?
In January 2003, a new state administration
took office and integrated the environmental
and water agencies under one secretariat. The
environmental agency previously had carried
out a notable horizontal decentralisation
that created numerous conservation areas
(Oliveira, 2002). At present, changes to the
state water council and the formation of
watershed committees are high on the reform
list, as the new administration has replaced
key figures in the water agency and moved
toward closer alignment with federal
provisions. Thus, civil society soon may
have stronger participation in Bahias water
management.
PARAN: CIVIL SOCIETY
NETWORKS SEPARATE FROM
DECENTRALISATION
The decentralisation model in Paran is a
hybrid between the administrative decen-
tralisation (deconcentration) in Bahia and the
mandatory participation of civil society in So
Paulo (see below). Policies adopted in the late
1990s allowed the state to authorise
watershed-scale executive agencies to
implement water tariffs, oversee water invest-
ments and create planning documents (Paran,
1999). Officials in the states water resources
bureaucracy argued that large water users
businesses and municipalities, rather than civil
society representatives should manage
executive agencies in Parans 16 watershed
territories, because fees collected from
industrial water users would support the future
investments. More recently, officials encou-
raged the formation of watershed committees
that favour municipalities and water users but
include representatives from civil society.
Watershed committees are expected to resolve
water conflicts, approve investment plans and
supervise the watershed agency. By late 2002,
Paran had achieved its initial goals for
decentralisation in the Tibagi river valley: two
decentralised groups, an executive agency and
a deliberative committee, had been estab-
lished. However, in 2003, Parans new
Governor dismantled key provisions of the
1999 Water Law and centralised powers in the
states watershed agency. Legislative reforms
will give executive powers in Parans
watershed territories to this agency.
The Tibagi valleys most active CSOs (in
relation to water issues) had formed, not in
support of the states decentralisation policies,
but rather, in opposition to the proposed
construction of a hydroelectric dam in So
Jernimo. The Tibagi case illustrates what
happens when decentralisation favours a
bureaucratic managerial approach to water
resources while marginalising discussion of
polemic water issues. The case also reveals
how geographical characteristics (upscaling
politics and local environmental knowledge)
of civil society networks made decentralisation
irrelevant in the most publicised water issue.
In December 2002, Parans water officials
authorised Consrcio para Proteo Ambiental
do Tibagi (COPATI), a consortium for environ-
mental protection, as the decentralised
executive water agency for the Tibagi valley.
COPATI must develop a watershed planning
document and establish a water tariff scheme
while working closely with the Tibagi
committee. COPATI was created in 1989 as a
consortium of municipalities, initially to carry
out environmental studies of fish populations,
with funding (USD 1 million) from a large local
paper manufacturer. Its success derived from
well publicised initiatives, such as environ-
mental education and regulation, both of which
benefited municipalities that had contributed
financially or logistically.
However, COPATIs support base shifted
during the early 1990s when large water users
(e.g. breweries, coffee roasters and manu-
facturers) replaced municipalities. As COPATI
positioned itself to become Tibagis executive
agency in 2000-01, it was forced to return to
municipalities for political support. The result
is a delicate power balance between the elected
mayors who control COPATIs visible political
front and the industries that dominate financial
support and technical matters, such as
pollution control and even COPATIs legal
counsel. At present, 27 fee-paying firms
(public and private) and 35 municipalities
support COPATI, which was conspicuous by
its absence on the debate over the hydro-
electric project; instead, it has focused on the
concerns of industries as well as its own
internal restructuring to function as the
decentralised water executive.
Shortly before Paran authorised COPATI
as the water executive, the consortium had
worked closely with state officials to organise
the deliberative committee established in June
2002. The watershed committee (required
before authorisation of the water executive) had
40 members selected in caucuses of various
water sectors, including industry, municipalities,
universities and ENGOs. Of the 40 members, 13
were municipalities represented by their mayors
or water-sewage autarchies, and ten repre-
sented state bureaucracies or state-owned firms
for water or electricity supply. The remaining
representatives were from state bureaucracies
and civil society, including public universities.
The majority of leading committee members are
also influential in COPATI.
State officials and private actors, working
in close cooperation with COPATI, expended
much effort to implement decentralisation in
the Tibagi valley. The limitations of their
efforts, however, are patent when considering
the independent network of CSOs opposing a
proposed hydroelectricity complex that would
flood 54 km
2
in the valley, including part of
the five Kaingaing indigenous territories
(Helm, 1999; Tommasino, 2002). The extent of
this network was manifest in August 2001,
when an estimated 25,000 demonstrators
gathered in So Jernimo da Serra to protest
the construction of the hydroelectric plant.
Organised by the Paran section of Comiso
Pastoral da Terra (CPT), a national pastoral
commission that agitates for the reallocation
of land in rural areas, this Romaria da Terra
(March for Land) had included Movimento
dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST),
the national landless workers movement,
Moviemento dos Atingidos por Barragens
(MAB), a national grassroots movement of dam
affected people, and various local-level
religious, environmental and indigenous
groups.
A range of local actors contested the
construction of the So Jernimo plant, uniting
in similar fashion to the anti-dam resistance
networks in southern Brazil during the 1980s
(Navarro, 1994). In 1996, Companhia de
Paranaense de Energia (COPEL), the state-
owned energy enterprise and one of COPATIs
leading supporters, approached academics at
the state university, Universidade Estadual de
Londrina, for the initial investigations into the
potential of the hydroelectric project in So
Jernimo (selected from among more than 12
possible sites). Several academics, especially
members of the biology and anthropology
departments, were opposed to the plans for
various social and environmental reasons and
worked to disseminate what they knew of
COPELs plans for So Jernimo.
Regional meetings and widening opposition
activities were coordinated by the Paran-
based Comisso Regional dos Atingidos por
Barragens do Rio Iguau (CRABI), a regional
commission of dam affected people in the
Igauu river, and the Paran section of CPT,
who also supplied financial resources. These
organisations have supported the activities
of opposition groups within the watershed,
particularly Associao Projeto Educao do
Assalariado Rural Temporrio (APEART), an
autonomous group set up by the CPT that
works with academics among indigenous and
landless peasant communities throughout the
Tibagi. Further support has been forthcoming
from a group of activists in So Jernimo. The
local Catholic priest, who has strong links with
the CPT and MST, facilitated local resistance
by providing facilities and resources while
publicly expressing his moral opposition to
the dam.
In contrast to COPATIs bureaucratic
managerial framing of water issues, actors in
the anti-dam network framed the Tibagis water
issues in highly politicised terms. NGOs
stressed the negative consequences of the
project to undermine positive assessments,
generating state and nationwide support for
the network particularly by focusing on
repercussions for the indigenous Indian
communities in So Jernimo. Flooding caused
by the dam would submerge archaeological
sites, diminish land area, reduce fish stocks
and intensify treatment of drinking water.
Activists also highlighted that the dam would
export electricity, and that in previous
hydroelectric projects, most jobs went to a
large influx of outside construction workers,
with undesirable social outcomes, including
the rise of prostitution. Thus, activists used
their local expertise to frame the So Jernimo
dam in national terms.
Act ors used a vari et y of t act i cs t o
advance their claims with the overall aim of
countering the facts supplied by COPEL
with a different set of educational informa-
tion on the dams ramifications. Local and
regional public meetings were organised
while arguments countering the plans were
disseminated through CSOs. For example,
CRABI held regular meetings to inform
residents of the negative experiences from
the construction of previous hydroelectric
dams in the region. In Londrina, the citys
news media published several articles on the
consequences of the proposed dam, drawing
on social and professional links between
journalists and academics opposed to the
COPELs plans.
Other challenges to the dam relied on close
links to the states public prosecutors office.
Prosecutors used biological data supplied by
academics to challenge the EIA. These
prosecutors were also influenced by the work
of Rede Regional do Advogados Populares
(RENAP), a regional network of peoples
lawyers, closely associated with CPT. Even
before the EIA was presented for public
discussion, the public attorney brought a civil
suit in 2001, alleging that texts written by
biologists working on the EIA were altered
by COPEL. Objections were also raised over
the scientific quality of anthropological and
archaeological analyses relating to indigen-
ous populations in the area. As a result of
the lawsuit, Brazils federal environmental
agency, Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Am-
biente e dos Recursos Naturais (IBAMA),
took over the licensing procedure from
Parans environmental agency and,
eventually, re-evaluated the EIA and the
report. A further development of this
challenge was the creation of SOS Tibagi,
an ENGO formed by students, professors and
workers from the Londrina university who
had campaigned for public hearings for the
proposed dam.
The mobilisation process demanding a
politicised framing of the issue encouraged
antagonism toward decentralisation. Two
public meetings to discuss the EIA provided a
focus for activists to solidify their oppositional
issue framing and consolidate social ties.
Anti-dam activism also fomented a strongly
negative opinion of several state institutions.
The upscaling of activism from local muni-
cipalities to the State Public Attorneys Office
and federal government indicated the lack of
faith in local political channels. Activists
expressed a negative stance towards mayors
and the process of public consultation,
regarding Parans water resources bu-
reaucracy as similar to COPEL and to local
mayors who had prioritised financial interests
above social and environmental impacts.
Avoiding direct interaction and negotiation
with Tibagis decentralised water resources
organisations, such as COPATI, activists
preferred to nationalise a watershed-scale
conflict with a national-level bureaucracy,
such as IBAMA.
The legacy of mistrust in state institutions
was exemplified by activists opinions towards
COPATI and the newly created Tibagi com-
mittee: in July 2002, none of the networks
CSOs belonged to Tibagis river-basin com-
mittee; many representatives were against any
form of participation, citing reasons related to
cooptation and the political intransigence of
state agencies and officials. However, some
activists expressed interest in becoming more
involved in the decision-making process,
providing that it was truly a democratic space.
Antagonism towards the decentralised
governance bodies stemmed from a legacy of
political opposition to state institutions and a
negative view of past experiences with
bureaucratic institutions, both of which were
validated by misgivings over the EIA process
for So Jernimo that was perceived as a mere
ploy to validate the construction of the
hydroelectric plant. Activists felt that the newly
formed Tibagi committee would be used in a
similar way.
The negative view toward Tibagis river-
basin committee was further compounded by
its history of interaction with COPATI, which
was viewed as controlling the committee.
Several ENGOs who previously worked and
cooperated with COPATI had subsequently
lost faith in the consortiums claims to be an
effective and unbiased tool for environmental
improvement. The basis for this mistrust was
in the perceived influence that firms, such as
COPEL, and local mayors the majority of
whom favoured the dam had over COPATI.
Moreover, no civil society representatives
were members of COPATIs executive, and only
ENGOs perceived as ineffectual were invited
to participate in the committee. COPATIs
constituencies did not include people who
would be impacted by the dam; rather, key
supporters included COPEL and pro-dam
municipalities. Thus, COPATIs failure to
develop a coherent position on the hydro-
electric proposal encouraged the formation of
a parallel network to oppose such a polemic
issue.
Decentralised water management insti-
tutions in the Tibagi valley have been
successful in creating a bureaucratic
managerial system, dominated by COPATIs
powerful members that soon must establish a
water-tariff scheme. However, the most
polemic issue as well as the CSOs that have
mobilised public opinion have remained apart
from decentralisation. By excluding this
network, the newly formed Tibagi committee
and agency will lack meaningful civil society
inputs. Parans empowerment of large water
users and municipalities has precluded the
structural means to attract the politicised civil
society network. In addition, COPATI, the
association that preceded decentralisation,
had been incapable of playing host to public
debates on the So Jernimo dam. Although
the efficiency imperative of decentralisation
has been strengthened, the equity imperative
has yet to be addressed.
SO PAULO: MANDATORY
INCLUSION OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Clear rules and practices established in So
Paulo in the early 1990s created a mandatory
role for civil society in decentralised water
management. So Paulo created 22 watershed
territories, with committees, in which
municipalities, state agencies and civil society
participate in equal thirds (Departamento de
guas, 1994). Watershed committees received
non-executive powers that included priori-
tising water investments, developing planning
documents, debating water related issues and
resolving conflicts between water users, and
supervising an eventual water-tariff scheme.
State bureaucracies retained powers to issue
water-use licences and regulate users.
The primary function of each of So Paulos
river-basin committees is to develop a water-
tariff scheme to be implemented by an
executive watershed agency, subordinated to
the committee. Most of the committees have
only begun to establish water agencies and
are still carrying out studies to set water tariffs.
But receipt of water tariffs is still distant and,
until then, committees must rely on meagre
grants from a technocrat-controlled statewide
fund to support projects such as urban runoff
control, environmental education and
research, and planning for sewage treatment
facilities.
In most of committees, civil society repre-
sentatives occupy the vice-presidency and
usually participate in technical sub-
committees. Municipalities usually occupy the
committee presidency, while representatives
of state agencies are executive secretaries. This
division of labour is justified by the argument
that elected mayors successfully use municipal
government to hold meetings and their political
power to encourage other mayors to
participate. Civil society representatives are
an independent check on the actions of
mayors, but tend not to have sufficient
political power to negotiate with mayors as
equals. Environment or water bureaucracies
are well suited to the tasks of managing the
committees daily work while avoiding a
political role. Representatives elected to fulfil
the mandatory one-third civil society
membership are first selected in caucuses of
defined groups, such as trade unions,
industrial associations, universities,
professional organisations and ENGOs.
In the case of the committee established in
1995 for the Sorocaba-Mdio Tiet valley
(12,099 km
2
), civil society representatives have
been influential as officers and leaders of
working groups. ENGO representatives
admitted that decentralisation was imposed by
the state government, but claimed it was well
received and has stimulated public discussion
of environmental issues at the catchment-level
a new geographical scale. A strong network
of ENGOs, an outcome of responses to high
levels of untreated sewage and pollution
introduced in the Tiet river from upstream
So Paulo (the metropolitan region is in a
separate watershed district) (Keck, 2002),
preceded the committee.
Soon after its establishment, the Sorocaba-
Mdio Tiet committee became a focal point
for the watersheds grassroots activists who
previously would have lobbied individual
municipal governments or headquarters of
state agencies. As they engaged in committee-
wide discussions, ENGOs established not just
a network with other civil society groups, but
also strong relations with local state officials
in water resources. Activists identified
technicians open to dialogue with civil society
whom they could rely on for support. These
technicians, in turn, now rely on grassroots
activists as sources of information and checks
on the power of municipalities to set the
priorities of watershed management: civil
society leaders, they say, let us see new
issues; allow us to do our jobs better.
There are several examples illustrating how
participation has resulted in partial achieve-
ment of the efficiency and equity imperatives
of decentralisation. In general terms, civil
society representatives allied with bureaucrats
have used the river basin as a new territory to
raise issues long neglected by municipalities.
First, grassroots activists demanded that the
committee hold public meetings on the adverse
downstream impacts of a controversial
dredging project upstream on the Tiet river,
feared to affect populations as well as
environments. As a result, the committee
issued a statement calling on project managers
to address issues that were eventually
incorporated. Key in this campaign was the
local knowledge on flooding and pollution that
ENGOs brought to the committee.
Second, state technicians, long concerned
about untreated sewage in the basin,
established alliances with grassroots activists
to make sewage treatment the top priority of
the committee. With access to funding for
municipalities to prepare necessary proposals
to build sewage treatment infrastructure, the
committee attracted interest from mayors, who
began to see that treating sewage could attract
political visibility. Of the BRL 2.945 million
(approximately USD 3 million) in grant funding
obtained by the committee from 1997 to 2000,
approximately 40 per cent was directed for the
planning of treatment plants.
Third, grassroots activists and state
technicians allied to prioritise protection of
Sorocaba citys water supply catchment, which
lacked land use controls to limit mining and
urbanisation. Both groups also united to
support research on land use in the threatened
region conducted by prominent university
representatives on the committee. In turn, when
bureaucrats lavished praise on the mayor for
undertaking a significant sewage treatment
project (Sorocabas population is nearly
500,000), civil society leaders, to support the
mayor politically, did not criticise or oppose
the exaggerated claim that the Sorocaba would
be the first depolluted river in South America.
Fourth, bureaucrats on the committee
supported grants to ENGOs for education
projects. These grants comprised about 13 per
cent of the committees funding and
galvanised ENGO support for the committee.
One grant supported a project managed by
SOS Mata Atlntica that lobbies for increased
protection of Brazils Atlantic forest (which
includes the coastal rainforest and drier interior
forests) and has thousands of supporters and
dozens of ongoing projects in several Brazilian
states. The project was initially rejected by
the funds technocratic managers, who argued
that civil society could not receive its grants.
When SOS Mata Atlntica initiated a challenge
that would eventually prove successful, it
formed a statewide network of civil society
groups participating in decentralised water
governance.
Fifth, civil society leaders proved key to
the written report on the initial participatory
diagnosis of water resources in the Sorocaba-
Mdio Tiet valley (CBH-SMT, 1997). So
Paulos reforms required an initial diagnosis
of watershed territories, but gave committees
considerable flexibility. State technicians on
the committee tapped into the civil society
leadership by including more than 80 people
in small thematic working groups collecting
data. The 1997 diagnosis established the
priorities that will guide the committees work
until the more detailed baseline report is
completed. Several actors commented that civil
society was extremely active in producing
the diagnosis and discussing priorities. One
civil society leader noted that each item was
discussed and that, in a show of good faith,
state bureaucracies put competent staff on the
working groups.
Overall, civil society representatives foster
debate on issues that municipalities or state
officials might ignore, thus influencing the
Sorocaba-Mdio Tiet committees agenda.
Less clear, however, is the degree to which
civil society leaders represent the broader
population. Groups on the committee range
from the relatively independent SOS Mata
Atlntica to narrowly focused ENGOs with
only a handful of members and close ties to
municipal governments. In addition, the
legitimacy of the academics on the committee
is based on their representing their
university employer, rather than a broader
public. Significantly, the committee has never
included a group representing shantytown
dwellers or water consumers the actual
drinkers of water in the river basin. Equally
troubling, given the imperative to establish
water tariffs, is the absence of industries on
the committee. So Paulos legislation
prevents individual industry representatives
from sitting on committees; instead, industrial
associations are supposed to represent
industrial sectors. Following this definition of
civil society, the committees leaders have
organised small-scale irrigation farmers
locked in a water conflict with municipal water
suppliers into associations that could
represent their constituents on the
committee. Meanwhile, the powerful industrial
water users in the Sorocaba-Tiet valley remain
aloof, preferring to influence policies by their
own upscaling using their powerful statewide
trade organisation to bypass the committee
and lobby the states political elites directly.
DISCUSSION
Participation of civil society in decentralisation
is essential for meeting objectives of more
efficient and equitable governance of natural
resources. Downward accountability results
not only from electoral processes, but also
from the framing of local water issues by
CSOs at larger geographical scales. The cases
surveyed here indicate how decentralisation
reforms in Brazil have taken very different
approaches to civil society participation,
especially within the legal frameworks
established. Three issues are especially
influential in determining civil society parti-
cipation in decentralised resource governance.
The first issue relates to bureaucratic and
regulatory barriers preventing CSOs from full
participation. The case of Bahia best illustrates
this, as the state failed to issue guidelines that
would give some legal basis to committees.
While bureaucratic inertia resisted the equity
imperative of decentralisation, the state
allowed civil society to mobilise on a limited
basis in the Itapicuru valley. But as water users
associations developed, the state made less
irrigated land available to small-scale farmers,
thus undermining the material basis for
participation. This contrasts strongly with the
case of So Paulo, where reforms established
clear rules that defined which CSOs could
participate in committees that wielded
considerable powers. The state also used the
promise of small project funding to encourage
the participation of ENGOs, which have
implemented various projects in environmental
education. As the water tariff scheme pro-
gresses, however, the ENGOs most active in
the committee will find that they have to justify
the idea of tariffs to those groups that they do
not represent, such as industries and the urban
poor.
Second, the legal definition of civil society
strongly influences subsequent participation
in decentralised groups. Paran has a legal
framework for civil society participation, but it
favours industries and municipalities, the large
water users that will eventually pay water
tariffs. This is compounded by a bias toward
narrowly defined ENGOs, which have to
register with state officials to participate in
committees. Similar to So Paulo, ENGOs in
Paran are but one segment of a broader notion
of civil society, defined to include professional
groups and universities. The overall effect of
this policy in the Tibagi valley has been to
marginalise a vibrant NGO network mobilised
in a highly visible water conflict. So Paulos
definition of civil society is broader than
Parans and one-third of committee seats are
reserved for its representatives. In practice,
the definition of civil society includes
representatives of industrial sectors, profes-
sors representing their universities, farmers
representing their association and activists
representing their ENGOs. The scheme is
useful for attracting ENGOs and academics to
the committee, but is rather less successful in
attracting industrial water users that would pay
future tariffs.
Third, the cases of So Paulo and Paran
reveal the key role of ENGOs in upscaling
useful knowledge resulting from the territorial
basis of grassroots environmental activists.
This environmental knowledge includes
important information for water management,
especially in decentralised governance
regimes. In a clear manifestation of democratic
decentralisation, ENGO representatives in So
Paulo upscaled local issues to the catchment
scale for serious debate, as the new watershed
territories proved inclusive of concerns raised
by civil society representatives. However, the
Tibagi valley anti-dam network upscaled to
state and national levels partly because
watershed governance failed to accommodate
the polemic issues involved.
These cases reveal two problematic aspects
of civil society participation. On the one hand,
the local knowledge of farmers, industrial
firms, academics and ENGO activists are
essential for decentralisation, especially in
encouraging downward accountability. On the
other hand, the upscaling of issues from local
to national levels potentially circumvents
decentralised bodies. Similar to oppositional
groups elsewhere, the Tibagi anti-dam network
used both local and national geographical
scales to articulate their concerns. The local
knowledge of NGOs strengthened arguments
highlighting negative social and environ-
mental impacts, while national upscaling
emphasised negative effects on local indige-
nous populations, biodiversity preservation,
opposition to privatisation and the question-
able need for more hydroelectric plants. The
case indicates that if decentralised groups
cannot take seriously the equity imperative,
then civil society groups will view decentral-
isation as irrelevant to their political strategies.
The challenge of democratic decentralisation
in Brazil and elsewhere is how to incorporate
polemic water related issues into decentralised
groups, while attracting activist networks and
their considerable environmental knowledge.
CONCLUSION
Brazilian states are pursuing different types
of decentralised water management reforms
within a federal mandate for increased
participation of CSOs. Subtle but important
differences between the states of Bahia, Paran
and So Paulo indicate how bureaucratic
barriers, definitions of civil society and uses
of environmental knowledge influence the
nature of civil society participation. These
factors are prominent in determining whether
reforms are characterised as democratic
decentralisation or merely as deconcentration.
Brazils water decentralisation not only
varies between states, it is also a very recent
implementation. Dating to less than a decade
ago, decentralisation is only a few years older
than Brazils post-dictatorship democracy.
Civil society leaders, in addition to the
representatives of industries, municipalities
and state agencies, are constantly testing and
redefining federal and state water reforms. As
these actors participate in decentralisation,
they create new alliances and strategies, which
have territorial expression. Only by studying
specific cases of how CSOs participate in
decentralisation can we begin to draw
conclusions about the merits and drawbacks
of the different paths of reforms.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Research for this paper was supported by the
Watermark Project with funding from the
Hewlett Foundation and MacArthur Founda-
tion. Grants from the Hewlett Foundation and
Central Research Fund (University of London)
to the Institute of Latin American Studies
(London, UK) also supported field research.
We thank the two anonymous SJTG reviewers,
Robert Gwynne, Margaret Keck, Rebecca
Abers, Hugo de Souza Dias, Jussara Lima de
Carvalho, Jos Augusto Leandro, Wendy
Jepson, Lcia Cardoso, Jlia Salomo,
Elizabete Marques, Jelson Oliveira and,
collectively, the staff at the UGP/SRH, the
Ponto Novo municipal government and
Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Paran.
ENDNOTES
1
The term civil society describes both an analy-
tical category and existing social forms (Van Rooy,
1998; Halperin & Laxer, 2003). As a category of
analysis, civil society has two genealogies, one from
Antonio Gramscis writings, stressing resistance to
authoritarian regimes, the other from Enlightenment
thinkers who emphasised collaborative interactions
with the state that strengthen democracy and
citizenship (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Encarnacin,
2002; Lewis, 2002). It is primarily the latter idea
that supports the present funneling of multilateral
development aid to civil society groups as a means
to work around government institutions that are
often corrupt and unresponsive to citizens (Carothers,
1999; Howell & Pearce, 2001; Stiles, 2002:835). As
an existing social form, civil society usually describes
extra-household and non-state social groups
(including but not limited to NGOs) that organise in
collective action and frame issues, and are
sometimes connected in local, regional and inter-
national networks (Keck, 1998; Keck & Sikkik, 1998;
Lemos, 1998a; 1998b; Rodrigues, 2000; Rothman,
2001; Hochstetler, 2002). Although civil society
for some scholars is limited to non-economic
groups, others recognise the active role that NGOs
play in obtaining land resources, education, agricultural
technology and access to markets (Bebbington, 1993;
1996; 1997; Howell & Pearce, 2001:63-87; Per-
reault, 2003).
2
Other entities represented on committees are the
federal, state and municipal governments, and water
users. In general, civil society may participate in
water management as long as it is organised with
respect to a specified (non-state) sector of society,
and in possession of a government-issued identi-
fication number and a statute governing internal
organisation.
3
During April 2001, June-August 2001 and July-
August 2002, we conducted semi-structured interviews
with 60 key actors, including representatives of state
agencies, private firms and NGOs, news media and
universities. More than half of the interviews were
carried out in Bahia, but included interviews of several
individuals who participated in the watershed
development programme. In So Paulo, most
interviews were conducted with civil society
representatives to the Sorocaba-Mdio Tiet comm-
ittee. In Paran, interviews were done with state and
private actors organising the Tibagi committee and
prominent actors in the anti-dam movement. Several
key actors in both So Paulo and Paran were re-
interviewed in 2002.
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Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 25(3), 2004, 304-321

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