CRiminal Case Doctrines

San Beda College of Law
2004 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
CRIMINAL LAW
SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES
BOOK ONE
FELONIES
MOTIVE
Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively
identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established. In People vs. Galano,
we ruled that in the crime of murder, motive is not an element of the offense, it becomes material
only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the
accused had committed it. (PEOPLE vs. DELOS SANTOS, GR No. 135919, May 9, 2003)
STAGES OF COMMISSION
FRUSTRATED
The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide,
said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Here, the intent to kill is at once
evident from the weapon used by petitioner, in this case, a gunIf the victim's wound would
normally cause death, then the last act necessary to produce homicide has been performed and
death would have resulted were it not for the timely medical attention given to the victim. Thus,
the CA did not err in ruling that petitioner should be held liable for frustrated homicide. (ADAME
vs. CA and PEOPLE, GR No. 139830, November 21, 2002)
ATTEMPTED
The victim was hit in the left buttock which was not per se a mortal wound. Clearly, where the
wound inflicted on the victim is not as severe as to cause her death, the offender not having
performed all the acts of execution that would have brought it about, the crime is perpetrated only
in its attempted stage. (PEOPLE vs. TADEO, GR No. 127660 & 144011-12, September 17, 2002)
CONSPIRACY
This Court had consistently ruled that conspiracy may be inferred when by their acts, two or more
persons proceed towards the accomplishment of the same felonious objective, with each doing
his act, so that their acts though seemingly independent were in fact connected, showing a
closeness of former association and concurrence of sentiment. To hold one as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy it must be shown that he performed an overt act in pursuance of or
furtherance of the conspiracy, although the acts performed might have been distinct and separate.
This overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it
may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the
commission of the crime, or by exerting a moral ascendance over the other co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. Once conspiracy is established, all the
conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of their degree of participation, for in the
contemplation of the law, the act of one becomes the act of all. It matters not who among the
accused inflicted the fatal blow to the victim. (PEOPLE vs. ABUT, et al., GR No. 137601, April 24,
2003)
The synchronized acts of the three appellants indubitably point to the conclusion that they are
moved by a common design, which is to kill the victims. Even the location of the wounds inflicted
on the victims, all on the heads, necks and shoulders are mute but strong physical evidence of
1
2004 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Katrina Nina Odi (Over-all Chairperson), Bruce Rivera (Over-all Vice Chair), Janice Tejano (VC-Acads), Maricel Abarentos (VCSecretariat), Rhea Gregorio (VC-Finance), Kristine Joy Diaz (VC-EDP), Dorothy Gayon (VC-Logistics).
Antonio Eduardo Nachura, Jr. (Political Law), Ferdinand Sabillo (Labor Law), Melissa Kwong (Civil Law), Christiane Alonzo (Taxation
Law), Jennifer Tiu (Criminal Law), Juan Emmanuel Reyes (Commercial Law),
Charo Rejuso (Remedial Law), Sharon Pagaling (Legal Ethics)

CRIMINAL LAW
their deliberate and concerted efforts to kill the victims, as in fact, they did. (PEOPLE vs.
MELENDRES, GR No. 134940, April 30, 2003)
Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the
conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by
which an illegal objective is to be carried out. (PEOPLE vs. MUSA, JR., et. al., GR No. 137042, June
17, 2003)
Conspiracy was correctly appreciated by the trial court because the individual acts of the accused
when taken together as a whole showed that they acted in concert and cooperated to achieve the
same unlawful objective We have repeatedly held that in cases of multiple rape, each of the
defendants is responsible not only for the rape committed by him but also for those committed by
the others. (PEOPLE vs. PLURAD, et. al., GR Nos. 138361-63, December 3, 2002)
There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders,
and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the
scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it.
One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his coconspirators. (PEOPLE vs. AGUILOS, et. al., GR No. 121828, June 27, 2003)
The presence of conspiracy could be revealed by the acts done before, during and after the
commission of the crime that made evident a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. The several acts of appellants during and after the shooting rampage disclosed a
unison of objectives. Not one tried to stop the other in the perpetration of the crime. All were
clearly in it together, performing specific acts with such closeness and coordination as would
unmistakably show a common scheme. (PEOPLE vs. RECEPCION, et. al., GR No. 141943-45,
November 13, 2002)
Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without the cooperation and the
agreement to cooperate is not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were
present and agreed to cooperate with the main perpetrators of the crime, their mere presence
does not make them parties to it, absent any active participation in the furtherance of the common
design or purpose. (PEOPLE vs. MANDAO, et. al., GR No. 135048, December 3, 2002)
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
SELF-DEFENSE
The presence of many wounds on the victim negates self-defense; it in fact indicates a determined
effort to kill him. Even assuming for the sake of argument that it was the deceased who initiated
the attack and the accused merely defended himself, clearly there was no need for him to stab the
victim several times if the purpose was simply to disable the victim or make him desist from his
unlawful assault.
One thing more is the matter of flight. Appellant admitted that, immediately after the
incident, he fled from the crime scene. Flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong indication of guilt,
although the opposite does not necessarily imply innocence either. Appellant's alleged fear of
retaliation from the victim's relatives was a figment of his imagination. He failed to report the
incident immediately to the barangay chairman and police authorities, negating his claim of selfdefense. (PEOPLE vs. DELIMA, et. al., GR No. 138692, June 16, 2003)
Self-defense, like alibi is a defense easy to concoct. It is axiomatic that once an accused had
admitted that he inflicted fatal injuries on the deceased, it is incumbent upon him, in order to
avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence. The question of whether the accused-appellant acted in self-defense is
essentially a question of fact. In self-defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element.
(ARCONA vs. CA and PEOPLE, GR No. 134784, December 9, 2002)
2
CHAIRPERSON:
CRIMINAL LAW COMMITTEE:

EDP: Sorhaya Dilabakun SUBJECT HEADS: Albert Rodriguez, Mygee Nieves, Braniel
Jennifer Tiu EDP: Meanne Cruz
Monzon, Jean Kuda DIGEST POOL: Bethany Conde, Jhera May Tupas, Noeli Francisco, Christopher Godinez, Juanito Lim, Jr.,
Naiz Hassiman, Julie Malicdem, Pamela Pulmano, Au Viray, Bubbles Jamir, Jay Miranda, Rina Garcia, Tin Constantino,
John Lemuel Gatdula, Paul John Galang, Cathy Danao, Eis Menguito, Jeffrey Alarilla, Bon Vincent Agustin,
Avigail Panganiban, Romuald Padilla, Jaepee Victa, Pandoy Fernando, Christian Cabrera, Katrina Odi

CRIMINAL LAW
Three requisites must concur for a plea of self-defense to prosper: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. (URETA, et. al., vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 135308, August
15, 2002; PEOPLE vs. ATADERO, et. al., GR No. 135239-40, August 12, 2002))
There is unlawful aggression when the peril to ones life, limb or right is either actual or imminent.
There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. It is a statutory and doctrinal
requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to prosper, the presence of
unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, unless the victim commits an unlawful aggression against the person defending
himself. (PEOPLE vs. ANSOWAS, GR No. 140647, December 18, 2002)
It is axiomatic that the mere thrusting of one's hand into his pocket as if for the purpose of
drawing a weapon is not unlawful aggression. Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the
firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude that one's life was in imminent danger.
Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to be attacked,
is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or
by some external acts showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression.
(PEOPLE vs. RUBISO, GR No. 128871, March 18, 2003)
Certain badges of guilt that renders accused-appellant's claim of self-defense improbable and
unworthy of belief: first The number of wounds, by itself, negates self-defense and
demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim second a plea of selfdefense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is extremely doubtful by itself and third,
accused-appellant failed to inform the police that he acted in self-defense In a number of cases,
this Court ruled that failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim and to surrender the knife used in stabbing him militates against the claim of self-defense.
(PEOPLE vs. ALCODIA, GR No. 134121, March 6, 2003)
Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes
voluntariness, induced only by necessity. Indeed, if there is truth to either of his claim, his natural
course of action was to assist the victim, or at the very least, report the incident to the authorities.
Certainly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense or the exempting circumstance of accident
cannot be appreciated considering accused-appellant's flight from the crime scene and his failure
to inform the authorities of the incident. Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife to the
authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead, indicates his culpability of the
crime charged. (PEOPLE vs. ABRAZALDO, GR No. 124392, February 7, 2003)
When the unlawful aggression which had begun no longer exists, the one purportedly making the
defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and
not self-defense is committed. (PEOPLE vs. DELADA, GR No. 137406, March 26, 2003)
DEFENSE OF RELATIVES
The essential elements of the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives are the following: (a)
unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and,
(c) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no
part therein.
In the case at bar, petitioner utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof of the existence of a
positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the [deceased]. With the exception of his
self-serving allegations, there is nothing on record that would justify his killing the [deceased].
(BALUNUECO vs. CA, GR No. 126968, April 9, 2003)
In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses testified that after the fight between [the victim] and
[appellants relative], [the victim] immediately ran away. The unlawful aggression ceased from that
moment. Therefore, accused-appellant's use of force was completely unjustified as there was no
more hostility to be repelled. (PEOPLE vs. MENDEZ, et. al., GR No. 131815, August 14, 2002)
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CRIMINAL LAW
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
INSANITY
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane
as to be incapable of entertaining criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and acting
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. (PEOPLE vs. ANTONIO, GR No. 144266, November 27, 2002)
COMPULSION OF AN IRRESISTIBLE FORCE (DURESS)

For duress to exempt accused-appellant of the crimes charged, "the fear must be well-founded,
and immediate and actual danger of death or great bodily harm must be present and the
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accuse to escape or
interpose self-defense in equal combat." Accused-appellant is burdened to prove by clear and
convincing evidence his defense of duress. He should not be shielded from prosecution for crime
by merely setting up a fear from, or because of, a threat of a third person." As Lord Dennan
declared in Reg. Vs. Tyler, "No man from fear of circumstances to himself has the right to make
himself a party to committing mischief on mankind." (PEOPLE vs. BALDOGO, GR Nos. 128106-07,
January 24, 2003)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE
From the details of the incident, it could not be said that there was no provocation nor unlawful
aggression on the part of the petitioner, despite his assertion to the contrary. In the absence of
any evidence showing that the victim was solely the aggressor, the law will consider the
aggression as reciprocal between the two combatants. Self-defense will not lie where the
aggression is reciprocal. (VALLEJO vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 136363, September 17, 2002)
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
Under any of these two circumstances, it is easy to see how appellant acted with obfuscation
because of jealousy upon discovering his legitimate wife in the company of another man and the
brazen admission by this man that he loved his wife. The situation was aggravated by the fact that
[his wife] brought their child along to her trysting place with [her paramour]. Extreme emotional
pain could result from such a situation and produce such passion and anguish in the mind of a
betrayed husband as to deprive him of self-control.
[However], treachery cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation. The reason for this is
that in passion, the offender loses his control while in treachery the means employed are
consciously adopted. One who loses reason and self-control cannot deliberately employ a
particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime.
Similarly, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot co-exist with the
circumstance of passion and obfuscation. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of
the criminal act must be preceded by calm thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a composed judgment. Verily, a
finding that there was a preconceived plan to kill would negate passion and obfuscation.
(PEOPLE vs. PANSENSOY, GR No. 140634, September 12, 2002; PEOPLE vs. EMPERADOR, GR No.
132669, September 25, 2002))
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
In order that this circumstance may be appreciated, these elements must be established: (1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an
agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. It is sufficient that the
surrender be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to
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CHAIRPERSON:


CRIMINAL LAW
surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the
authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and
capturing him. We find that accused-appellants surrender to [the Brgy. Captain] right after the
incident satisfies the foregoing elements. (PEOPLE vs. VILLEGAS, GR No. 138782, September 27,
2002)
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of the
appellant. First, he had not been actually arrested at the time he surrendered; second, he
surrendered to a person in authority; and third, his surrender was voluntary. Although he did not
surrender to the policemen on the same night that the incident occurred, he did surrender himself
to the barangay captain early the next day. Besides, when the policemen came that night, they
were not looking for a specific person but were merely inquiring about the incident that happened
in front of the house of appellant. (PEOPLE vs. CABICAL, GR No. 148519, May 29, 2003)
There is no dispute that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the governor a person in authority,
then to the police, before he was arrested. In People v. Antonio, the accused's surrender to the
mayor was considered as a mitigating circumstance. In the same way, appellant's voluntary
surrender to the governor should be considered in his favor. It is immaterial that appellant did not
immediately surrender to the authorities, but did so only after the lapse of two days. In People v.
Bautista, the voluntary surrender of the accused to a police authority four (4) days after the
commission of the crime was considered attenuating. Finally, even if not raised on appeal, since
an appeal opens the whole case for review, we could take into account this mitigating
circumstance favorable to appellant. (PEOPLE vs. ANNIBONG, GR No. 139879, May 8, 2003)
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to
report the shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility to the killing. Thus,
he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. (LADIANA vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 144293,
December 4, 2002)
In the case at bar, petitioner surrendered to the authorities in order to disclaim responsibility for
the killing of the victim. This hardly shows any repentance or acknowledgment of the crime on the
part of the petitioner. Moreover, at the time petitioner surrendered, there was already a pending
warrant of arrest against him. His arrest by that time was imminent. Hence, he should not be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. (LUCES vs. PEOPLE, GR No.
149492, January 20, 2003)
ANALOGOUS CIRCUMSTANCE
The injury sustained by accused-appellant after he was allegedly struck by a stool on the head
will not entitle him to a mitigating circumstance. The alleged injury hardly qualifies as mitigating
circumstance analogous to illness or defect that would diminish the exercise of will power.
(PEOPLE vs. ANTONIO, GR No. 144933, July 3, 2002)
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
NIGHTTIME
For nocturnity to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the commission of
the crime and that it was purposely sought for by the offender. By and itself, nighttime is not an
aggravating circumstance. In the instant case, no sufficient evidence was offered to prove that
accused-appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness to accomplish his criminal design. In
fact, [the witness] testified that there was a fluorescent lamp sufficiently illuminating the scene of
the crime. (PEOPLE vs. ABRAZALDO, GR No. 124392, February 7, 2003)
5

CRIMINAL LAW
BY A BAND
Robbery is deemed to have been committed by a band when more than 3 armed malefactors took
part in the commission thereof. While it can be conceded that [two of the appellants] were indeed
armed with an ice pick and a gun, the records, however, are bereft of proof that the two
unidentified muggers were also armed. (PEOPLE vs. VINALON, et. al., GR No. 135542, July 18,
2002)
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
In the case at bar, evident premeditation was shown by the testimonies of [the witnesses] where
they narrated how several men, including herein accused, planned on several occasions the
ambush-slay of [the deceased]. The group met several times to plan the killing of [the deceased],
which plan they held on to and finally executed on April 2, 1993. (PEOPLE vs. PERALTA, GR No.
133267, August 8, 2002)
To establish evident premeditation, it must be shown that there was a period sufficient to afford
full opportunity for meditation and reflection, a time adequate to allow the conscience to
overcome the resolution of the will, as well as outward acts showing the intent to kill. It must
appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution
but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent
attempt [A]ccused-appellants had sufficient time to reflect upon the consequences of their act
but they persisted in their determination to commit the crime. (PEOPLE vs. SILVA, et. al., GR No.
140871, August 8, 2002)
The records show that the prosecution did not adduce any evidence to prove [the] elements [of
evident premeditation]. What was established was that the victim and his in-laws were just
passing by at the place where the accused-appellant's group was drinking. They had a chance
encounter. There is no evidence adduced on when and how the accused-appellant had planned
the killing of the victim. Nor is there proof offered to show how much time had elapsed before the
plan was executed. Absent all these, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated against the
accused-appellant. (PEOPLE vs. ANTIPOLO, et. al., GR No. 141135, July 4, 2002)
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Evident premeditation must be based on external facts
which are evident, not merely suspected, which indicate deliberate planning. There must be direct
evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected
upon his decision to kill the victim. Criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts
evidencing a determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the
offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident
premeditation." (PEOPLE vs. ABADIES, GR No. 135975, August 14, 2002)
Evident premeditation requires proof of (1) the time when the offender has appeared determined
to commit the crime; (2) the act evidently indicating that the offender has clung to his
determination; (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the
execution thereof during which the offender could have reflected upon the consequences of his
act. These circumstances are manifested by the planning and preparation undertaken by the
offender prior to the commission of the crime. In the instant case, instead of ensuring impunity,
appellant and his companion executed the crime in broad daylight and in the presence of persons
who could easily identify them. These facts do not bear the earmarks of a carefully planned
murder. (PEOPLE vs. ERNOSA, GR No. 137273, September 17, 2002)
The existence of conspiracy notwithstanding, evident premeditation cannot be presumed. Only
where conspiracy is directly established, as opposed to its being merely implied, can this
aggravating circumstance itself be possibly assumed to be attendant. (PEOPLE vs. SAPIGAO, et.
al., GR No. 144975, June 18, 2003)
CHAIRPERSON:


CRIMINAL LAW
Previous altercations are insufficient to prove evident premeditation. On record, there is no
showing that the appellant meditated and reflected on his intention between the plan to kill was
conceived and the time the crime was actually perpetrated. (PEOPLE vs. GO and JARLOS, GR No.
140897, February 19, 2003)
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

The disparity in age between the assailant and the victim, aged 29 and 69, respectively, indicates
physical superiority on appellant's part over the deceased. It did not matter that appellant was
"dark" with a "slim body build" or "medyo mataba." What mattered was that the malefactor was
male and armed with a lethal weapon that he used to slay the victim. Thus, abuse of superior
strength was present in the commission of the crime. (PEOPLE vs. BARCELON, JR., GR No.
144308, September 24, 2002)
Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength. It is necessary to show that the aggressors cooperated in such a
way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength. There must be proof of the relative
physical strength of the aggressors and the assaulted party or proof that the accused
simultaneously assaulted the deceased. The circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered whenever there is
a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of by
him in the commission of the crime. (PEOPLE vs. ALIBEN, et. al., GR No. 140404, February 27, 2003)
It appears that the deceased was armed with a gun and was able to fire at his attackers. However,
it is apparent that he failed to save his life despite being armed. Evidently, it was the superiority in
number enjoyed by the appellants which allowed them to overpower the victim. (PEOPLE vs.
GOMEZ, et. al., GR No. 128378, April 30, 2003)
Abuse of superior strength likewise qualify the crime to murder since it was clearly shown that
there was deliberate intent to take advantage of it. They stabbed the victim even as he stumbled
and fell to the ground. Accused-appellant and his companions took advantage of their numerical
superiority with their knives and their bolos in killing the victim. (PEOPLE vs. SANTIAGO, et. al.,
GR No. 1334475, February 27, 2003)
There are no fixed and invariable rules regarding abuse of superior strength or employing means
to weaken the defense of the victim. Superiority does not always means numerical superiority.
Abuse of superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-a-vis the victim.
There is abuse of superior strength even if there is only one malefactor and one victim. Abuse of
superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense, although
not annulling it. The aggressor must have taken advantage of his natural strength to insure the
commission of the crime. (PEOPLE vs. LORETO, GR No. 137411-13, February 28, 2003)
An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes abuse of superiority which his sex and weapon used in the act afforded him and from
which the woman was unable to defend herself. (PEOPLE vs. RIVERA, GR No. 125895, July 4, 2002)
To appreciate abuse of superior strength, there must be deliberate intent on the part of the
malefactors to take advantage of their greater number. They must have notoriously selected and
made use of superior strength in the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior
strength is to use excessive force that is out of proportion to the means for self-defense available
to the person attacked; thus the prosecution must clearly show the offenders deliberate intent to
do so. There was no clear indication in this case that the accused-appellant and his companions
purposely used their joint efforts to consummate the crime. Consequently, the crime committed
by accused-appellant was only homicide. (PEOPLE vs. LOBRIGAS, et. al., GR No. 147649,
December 17, 2002)
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CRIMINAL LAW
Settled is the rule that such circumstance (abuse of superior strength) is present whenever there
is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor. Under the facts, no one actually saw
how the killing was perpetrated. No evidence, whether direct or circumstantial was presented to
establish that there had been inequality of strength between the appellant and the victim, or that
the former had purposely or consciously taken advantage of superior strength in committing the
crime. (PEOPLE vs. CASITAS, JR., GR No. 137404, February 14, 2003)
TREACHERY
It is clear that treachery qualified the killing of the deceased to murder as the appellants
deliberately restrained the victim so as to enable one of them to successfully deliver the stab
blows without giving the latter a chance to defend himself or to retaliate. (PEOPLE vs. ASTUDILLO,
et. al., GR No. 141518, April 29, 2003)
The prosecution proved that [the victim] was unarmed and hogtied during the time he was
repeatedly stabbed by the appellant. In that situation, the victim was utterly defenseless and
cannot in any manner render any form of resistance to prevent or parry the fatal blow of the
accused-appellant. (PEOPLE vs. ASALDO, GR No. 139790, July 4, 2002)
[T]he attack on the victim, though frontal was sudden and unexpected giving him no opportunity
to defend himself. As testified by the witness, accused-appellants attack came as a surprise
because he suddenly rushed inside the restaurant and stabbed the victim on the chest, affording
no chance for said victim to retaliate or to defend himself. (PEOPLE vs. BARTOLO, et. al., GR No.
140639, September 27, 2002)
The prosecution has shown that there was that swift and unexpected attack of an unarmed victim,
which is the essence of treachery. The victim was defenseless and unarmed as he was then
promenading with his pregnant girlfriend, clueless of the danger that lies ahead. Thus the twin
requirements for the existence of treachery under Art. 14 (16) of the Revised Penal Code 39 had
been adequately proven: (1) the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted. (PEOPLE vs. CABRERA, JR., GR No. 138266, April 30, 2003)
To constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Here, the evidence shows that
the victim was shot suddenly. He was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack, as he was
eating his supper at the time of the incident. (PEOPLE vs. LLANDA, GR No. 133386, November 27,
2002)
Once abuse of superior strength is absorbed in alevosia, only the latter circumstance will be
appreciated. Once abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, it cannot even be treated
as a generic aggravating circumstance. (PEOPLE vs. DELMO, et. al., GR No. 130078-82, October 4,
2002)
Well-settled is the rule that the killing by adults of minor children aged up to thirteen years old is
treacherous because they could not be expected to put up a defense even if the method of attack
is not shown. (PEOPLE vs. CALOZA, JR., GR No. 138404, January 28, 2003)
There may still be treachery even if before the assault, the assailant and the victim had an
altercation and a fisticuffs where, after the lapse of some time from the said altercation, the
assailant attacked the unsuspecting victim without affording him of any real chance to defend
himself. (PEOPLE vs. MONTEMAYOR, GR No. 125305, June 18, 2003)
Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his
person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate. (PEOPLE vs. NASAYAO, JR., GR No. 141237, September 17, 2002)
CHAIRPERSON:


CRIMINAL LAW
Treachery cannot be appreciated absent any particulars as to the manner by which the
aggression was commenced or how the act that resulted in the death of the victim unfolded. It is
not sufficient that the means employed by the malefactor brought the desired result. The
prosecution must prove that the appellant deliberately and consciously adopted such means,
method or manner of attack as would deprive the victim of an opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation. One cannot substitute mere suppositions for a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence.
Since the prosecution witness failed to see how the attack had been initiated on the victim, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be applied. (PEOPLE vs. MATORE, GR No. 131874,
August 22, 2002)
While it may be admitted that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself because he was driving the tricycle, there was no proof that accused-appellant
consciously or purposely adopted the mode of attack employed by him. Indeed, accusedappellant's attack was sudden; however, mere suddenness of the attack is not enough to
constitute treachery. It must be shown that the means of attack was consciously adopted and the
accused reflected on the means and made some preparation to kill the victim. On the other hand,
there is enough evidence to show that the shooting of the victim was made on the spur of the
moment brought about by a stinging provocation from the victim. We have ruled that provocation
of the accused by the victim negates the presence of treachery even if the attack may have been
sudden and unexpected. When the assault upon the victim is preceded by a heated argument,
treachery cannot be appreciated. (PEOPLE vs. JAVIER, GR No. 142996, July 11, 2002)
There is no treachery where the attack is neither sudden nor preconceived and deliberately
adopted but just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the offender. To establish
treachery, the evidence must show that the offender made some preparation to kill the victim in
such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or difficult for the
person attacked to defend himself. The mode of attack must be planned by the offender and must
not spring from the unexpected turn of events. There is no treachery when the killing results from
a verbal altercation between the victim and the assailant such that the victim was forewarned of
the impending danger. (PEOPLE vs. ILO, GR No. 140731, November 21, 2002)
Repeatedly upheld has been the rule that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed
at the spur of the moment, or those that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not
attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the accused deliberately to employ a treacherous
mode of attack. (PEOPLE vs. CARATAO, GR No. 126281, June 10, 2003)
In the case at bar, while the attack on [the deceased] was concededly swift, it was not, however,
entirely unexpected. [The deceased] had reasonably surmised or anticipated an attack from
[accused-appellant] when he saw the latter draw a gun and point it at [the deceaseds
companions]. This could be easily inferred from his behavior. He quickly sensed the forthcoming
trouble. Thus alerted, he immediately retreated to, or climbed, the third floor where unfortunately,
he was pursued and killed by [accused-appellant]. This forewarning negates the presence of
treachery. (PEOPLE vs. WAD-AS, GR No. 146103, November 21, 2002)
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no change to resist
or escapeThat [the victim] was able to elude the first and the second shots and was able to
scamper for safety as he headed towards the nearby store of Manlangit negates the notion that he
was caught unaware and totally defenseless. (PEOPLE vs. NARRA, GR No. 128225, June 17, 2003)
In order to appreciate treachery as a modifying circumstance in a continuous aggression, it must
be shown to have been present at the inception of the attack. The fact that the fatal wounds were
found at the back of the deceased does not, by itself, compel a finding of treachery. It is not
enough that the means employed by the malefactor gave the victim no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate as when the attack came from behind. To sustain a finding of treachery, an
equally important requirement is that the means, method or form of attack must be shown to have
been deliberately adopted by the appellant. (PEOPLE vs. MANALAD, GR No. 128593, August 14,
2002)
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CRIMINAL LAW
For treachery to be considered, not only must the victim be without means of defending herself
but also the means, method or form employed by the assailant must have been consciously
adopted. The interval of time between the act of loosening his belt, betting the knife, chasing the
victim and eventually stabbing her sufficiently shows that the use of the knife was not
consciously thought of, but rather it came together with appellants outburst, arising from the
heated altercation he had with the victim. (PEOPLE vs. INGGO, GR No. 140872, June 23, 2003)
[T]reachery cannot be appreciated in this case where appellant could have stabbed the victim by
way of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the will even though the
victim was stabbed from behind. Moreover, the victim was already aware of appellant's hostile
attitude towards him even before the attack, hence, he was already forewarned of impending
danger to his life. The rule that a sudden attack by the assailant constitutes treachery, whether
frontally or from behind, does not apply where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately
adopted but was first triggered evidently by a sudden anger of the accused. (PEOPLE vs.
CABACAN, GR No. 130965, August 22, 2002)
USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE

The evidence shows that [the accused] deliberately used his truck in pursuing [the victim]. Upon
catching up with him, [the accused] hit him with the truck, as a result of which [the victim] died
instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by [the accused] to perpetrate the
killing of [the deceased]. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another
"by means of a motor vehicle" is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the
killing to murder. (PEOPLE vs. MALLARI, GR No. 145993, June 17, 2003)
CRUELTY
Paragraph 21, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is cruelty in the
commission of a felony when the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission. There is no cruelty when
the other wrong is done after the victim is already dead. The test in appreciating cruelty as an
aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the
wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the
victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. (PEOPLE vs. SIBONGA, et. al.,
June 16, 2003)
The trial court held that the crime was committed with deliberate cruelty "considering that the
victim suffered twenty-one hack and stab-wounds, contusions and abrasions on the different
parts of his body." The number of wounds is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an
aggravating circumstance. The mere fact that wounds in excess of what is necessary to cause
death were inflicted upon the body of the victim does not necessarily imply that such wounds
were inflicted with cruelty. It is necessary to show that the accused intentionally and deliberately
increased the victim's suffering. (PEOPLE vs. SOLAMILLO, et. al., GR No. 123161, June 18, 2003)
ACCOMPLICES
It is significant to note that the plan to kill the [victims] could have been accomplished even
without accused-appellant's participation. It should be noted further that he was unarmed that
night. The prosecution evidence has certainly not established that accused-appellant was part of
the conspiracy to kill the victims. The lack of such complete evidence of conspiracy impels this
Court to impute to him a milder form of responsibility, i.e., guilt of a mere accomplice. (PEOPLE
vs. TAMAYO, et. al., GR No. 138608, September 24, 2002)
PENALTIES
EFFECT OF PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY
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CRIMINAL LAW
Since the affidavit of desistance was given after the filing of the complaint, such has no effect as
to doubt guilt of the accused-appellant. The reason for this rule is that the true aggrieved party
here is the People of the Philippines, whose sense of morality, decency and justice has been
outraged. The complaint required in Article 344 of the RPC is only a condition precedent to the
exercise of proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties in the name of the
People of the Philippines. (PEOPLE vs. DELA CERNA, GR No. 136899-904, October 9, 2002)
DURATION AND EFFECT OF PENALTIES

The Revised Penal Code does not prescribe the penalty of "life imprisonment" for any of the
felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not
by the Code but by the special law. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least (30)
years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory
penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as "life imprisonment"
which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not
appear to have any definite extent or duration. (PEOPLE vs. MEDINA, SR., GR No. 127756-58, June
18, 2003)
COMPLEX CRIMES (ART. 48)

Estafa through falsification of a commercial document
While there is no direct proof that petitioner and her co-conspirators were the authors of the
falsification, since petitioner was the possessor and utterer of the dollar checks and benefited
from the proceeds of the cashier's checks which were exchanged therefor, the inevitable
conclusion is that she falsified them. It is an established rule that when it is proved that a person
has in his possession a falsified document and he makes use of the same, the presumption or
inference is justified that such person is the forger. (SERRANO vs. CA, GR No. 123896, June 25,
2003)
The acts attributed to petitioner cannot constitute a complex crime. The alleged actions showing
her falsification of a public and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa.
Neither were the two crimes the result of a single act. Settled is the rule that when a complex
crime is charged and the evidence fails to establish one of the component offenses, the defendant
can be convicted of the others, so long as they are proved. (MONTEVERDE vs. People, GR No.
139610, August 12, 2002)
INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES (ART. 63)

Although aggravating circumstances, consisting of the use of a weapon (screwdriver) and of a
motor vehicle (trisikad), were proven, the trial court correctly disregarded them because Art. 63 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the penalty imposed is a single
indivisible penalty, that penalty shall be applied regardless of the presence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. Moreover, these aggravating
circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty, although they were proven, because
they were not alleged in the information. By virtue of its amendment effective December 1, 2000,
Rule 110, 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure now provide that aggravating as
well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information, otherwise they cannot be
considered against the accused even if they were proven during the trial. (PEOPLE vs. DUROHOM,
GR No. 146276, November 21, 2002)
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, when the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Penal Code
provides that where the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties and
there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
lesser penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant
11

CRIMINAL LAW
should be reclusion perpetua since there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances.
(PEOPLE vs. YONTO, GR No. 148917-18, November 21, 2002)
Although the qualifying circumstances of use of deadly weapon is not specifically alleged in the
Information insofar as the commission of the crime of Rape is concerned, the qualifying
circumstance that more than two (2) persons raped [the victim] is alleged in the Information and
proven. The presence of only one qualifying circumstance is sufficient for the crime to fall under
R.A. 7659 which provides that the imposable penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Considering that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling attends the commission of the
complex crime of Robbery with Rape, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death.
(PEOPLE vs. ORANZA, GR No. 127748, July 25, 2002)
Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Death may be imposed only if there are
aggravating circumstances present in the commission of the crime. If there is none, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. This is pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the present case, we can no longer consider treachery as an aggravating circumstance
again, this time for the purpose of imposing the death penalty, because it was already used to
qualify the killing to murder. (PEOPLE vs. CARITATIVO, GR Nos. 145452-53, June 10, 2003)
PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY (ART. 68)

A perusal of the Certificate of Live Birth reveals that appellant was born on May 7, 1979,
confirming his claim that he was only seventeen (17) years old at the time the crime was
committed on October 7, 1996. Thus, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under
paragraph 2, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated in favor of appellant and
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law should be imposed on him. (PEOPLE vs.
ALVERO, GR No. 132364, September 27, 2002)
It was error on the part of the trial court to mete the death penalty even while Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659 prescribes that penalty when by reason, or on the occasion, of the rape the
crime of homicide is committedThe first part of [Art. 47] is consistent with Article 68 of the same
Code which treats minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance and reduces the imposable
penalty by one degree if the accused is over fifteen (15) and under eighteen (18) years of age, and
by two degrees, if under fifteen (15) but over nine (9) years of age, and the accused acted with
discernment. [The accused] was only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the commission of the
crime as so evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth. Thus, pursuant to the provisions of Article
47, as amended, and consonantly with Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty that can
only be imposed on appellant for the crime of rape with homicide is reclusion perpetua. (PEOPLE
vs. MANGUERA, GR No. 139906, March 5, 2003)
CIVIL LIABILITY (ART. 100)

Obviously, it was the clear intent of the law to decriminalize or do away with the crime of
squatting. Hence, there being no criminal liability, there is likewise no civil liability because the
latter is rooted in the former. Where an act or omission is not a crime, no person can be held liable
for such act or omission. There being no delict, logically, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question. (TUATES vs. BERSAMIN, GR No. 138962, October 4, 2002)
BOOK TWO
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
FALSIFICATION
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CRIMINAL LAW
[T]he elements of falsification are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a document statements in
a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the perversion of truth
in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. The rule is
that "there can be no conviction for falsification of a public document if the acts of the accused
are consistent with good faith . . . " Thus, the maxim, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent.
(RELUCIO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, GR No. 147182, November 21, 2002)
A sales invoice is a public and/or a commercial document within the meaning of "falsification" as
defined under the Revised Penal Code. A private document acquires the character of a public
document when it becomes part of an official record and is certified by a public officer duly
authorized by law. Thus, although it was a private document at the time of its falsification, it is
regarded as falsification of public or official document. (MONTEVERDE vs. PEOPLE, GR No.
139610, August 12, 2002)
PERJURY
At the time he filed his petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier,
all the elements of the crime were already present then. He knew all along that he willfully stated
material falsities in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without even stating
any reason therefor. But such withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for naturalization. It did
not extinguish his culpability for perjury he already committed. Indeed, the fact of withdrawal
alone cannot bar the State from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of
the Philippine naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as well. And the petition for
naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as evidence of his unlawful act. (CHOA
vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 142011, March 14, 2003)
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

KNOWINGLY RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT
[B]efore one can be held liable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019, the person subject of the complaint must be shown to have committed the act in bad
faith. It was held in Guerrero vs. Villamor, that a judge will be held liable for rendering an unjust
judgment where he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. In Ingco vs.
Sandiganbayan, it was clearly indicated, as one of the elements of the offense under Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019, that the public officer complained of should have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence [U]nder Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code, the offender must be a judge. (BAN HUA FLORES vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, GR No.
136769, September 17, 2002)
MALVERSATION
An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one
who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. To be
liable for malversation, an accountable officer need not be a bonded official. The name or relative
importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor. What is decisive is the nature
of the duties that he performs and that as part of, and by reason of said duties, he receives public
money or property which he is bound to account. In the case at bar, the delivery to petitioner of
the firearms belonging to the Government, by reason of his office as Station Commander of
Calinog, Iloilo, PC-INP, necessarily entailed the obligation on his part to safely keep the firearms,
use them for the purposes for which they were entrusted to him, and to return them to the proper
authority at the termination of his tenure as commander, or on demand by the owner, the duty to
account for said firearms. (QUION vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 136462, September 19, 2002)
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CRIMINAL LAW
Art. 217 of the RPC provides a prima facie presumption of malversation whenever a public officer
fails to account any public fund or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officerThe prima facie presumption arises only if there is no issue as to the
accuracy, correctness and regularity of the audit findings In this case, the shortage of funds
which was attributed to petitioner was not indubitably established considering that the audit
conducted was incomplete, irregular and inaccurate and did not follow standard auditing
procedures by excluding from the examination the other accountable officers in the office and
failing to open the other safe used in the office. Hence, the presumption under Art. 217 of the RPC,
which was made the basis of petitioners conviction by the Sandiganbayan, is not applicable.
(QUERIJERO vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 153483, February 14, 2003)
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

PARRICIDE
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased
would be the marriage certificate. (PEOPLE vs. DALAG, GR No. 129895, April 30, 2003)
DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

To satisfy this burden (Death under exceptional circumstances), appellant must prove that he
actually surprised his wife and [her paramour] in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man
during or immediately thereafter. However, all that appellant established was [the victims]
promiscuity, which was inconsequential to the killing. (PEOPLE vs. PUEDAN, GR No. 139576,
September 2, 2002)
MURDER
It has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even
for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds
the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto,
but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious
illegal detention. What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in
the information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged
with that of murder or kidnapping. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In
kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. (PEOPLE vs. DELIM, et. al.,
GR No. 142773, January 28, 2003)
While the information did not allege [the] qualifying circumstance in the exact words of the law,
outraging the dead and scoffing at the victim's corpse are nevertheless deducible
from the recital in the information. The sequence of events as "attack, assault,
club, beheaded and cut the penis of the [victim]" alleged in the information points
to the outrage committed on the dead. This circumstance qualified the killing to
murder. (PEOPLE vs. GUERRERO, SR., et al., GR No. 134759, September 19, 2002)
DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY

The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of individuals, one of whom was
sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular victim.
It is not, as the defense suggests, a "tumultuous affray" within the meaning of Art. 251 of The
Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free-for-all, where several persons not comprising definite
or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the
death or injury of one or some of them. (PEOPLE vs. UNLAGADA, GR No. 141080, September 17,
2002)
DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS
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CRIMINAL LAW
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the
crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of
this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that
the offender has no intention to kill that person. Though the information charged the petitioner
with murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is
necessarily included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person. (DADO vs. PEOPLE, GR NO.
131421, November 18, 2002)
RAPE
In rape committed by force or intimidation, it is imperative that the prosecution should establish
that voluntariness on the part of the offended party was absolutely lacking. In the present case,
complainant's conduct before, during, and after the alleged rape, as gleaned from her testimony,
tells a different story. It is noteworthy that before the incident, complainant freely and voluntarily
went with appellant to several places before they ultimately ended up in a motel. (PEOPLE vs.
GAVINA, GR No. 143237, October 28, 2002)
The test is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim
that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out.
Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to the sexual
assault. It is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death or sustained physical
injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if the intercourse takes place against her will or if
she yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so. (PEOPLE vs.
LAYOSO, GR Nos. 141773-76, January 22, 2003; PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ, GR Nos. 147656, May 9,
2003))
The lack of tenacity by a rape victim in resisting sexual aggression does not necessarily mean
consent or voluntary submission to the criminal act. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires such
kind of obstinacy on the part of the victim to establish rape, particularly if the defiance becomes
futile or would pose undue risk to herself or her family. (PEOPLE vs. BACUS, GR No. 140216,
November 18, 2002)
It is well-settled that penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ
into the labia of the pudendum constitutes carnal knowledge. "Carnal knowledge," unlike its
ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. (PEOPLE vs. MICLAT, JR., GR No. 137024, August 7,
2002)
The important consideration in rape is not the presence of semen or spermatozoa, but the
penetration of the male penis into the female genitalia. A medical examination is merely
corroborative in character and is not an essential element of rape. (PEOPLE vs. FUNESTO, GR No.
143432, April 9, 2003)
For the imposition of the death penalty, the information must allege the qualifying circumstances
of relationship between the accused and the victim, and the victim's minority. In the present case,
the victim's minority was not alleged in the information. (PEOPLE vs. ROMERO, GR No. 137037-38,
August 5, 2002)
The law does not distinguish between full blood and half blood relatives. The law does not in fact
speak of full blood and half blood relatives but "of relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree. (PEOPLE vs. SAJOLGA, GR No. 146684, August 21, 2002)
Where an accusation of rape is made and it is found that the person supposed to have been raped
is suffering either from gonorrhea or syphilis, not only should there be a thorough investigation
as to the stage which this infection has reached, so as to possibly ascertain whether the time of
infection coincides with the time when the rape is supposed to have been committed, but the
accused should also be examined carefully for any evidence of either gonorrhea or syphilis.
(PEOPLE vs. BALLESTEROL, GR No. 145503, August 20, 2002)
15

CRIMINAL LAW
[T]he three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the appellant was
obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. There is no indication in the recordsfrom which
it can be inferred that the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual
assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was
committed. (PEOPLE vs. AARON, GR No. 136300-02, September 24, 2002)
[I]t would appear from the records that the main objective of the accused when the victim was
taken to [an unoccupied house] was to rape her. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed in the
crime of rape. (PEOPLE vs. LINING, et. al., GR No. 138401, July 11, 2002)
In rape, the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will, or without
her consent. Additionally, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code includes a victim who is suffering
from some form of mental abnormality or deficiency, including feeble-mindedness and
retardation, in the term "deprived of reason" such that the victim is deemed incapable of
consenting intelligently to coitus. Settled is the rule that sexual intercourse with a mentally
deficient woman constitutes rape. (PEOPLE vs. CANAVERAL, GR No. 133790, August 1, 2002)
Carnal knowledge with a woman who is asleep constitutes rape. (PEOPLE vs. DE LA CRUZ, GR No.
136158, August 6, 2002)
Under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the only elements of statutory rape are:
(1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is under twelve
(12) years of age. Mere sexual congress with a woman of such tender age consummates the crime
of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. In this kind of rape, the law
presumes the child-victim to be lacking in discernment which would enable her to give intelligent
consent to the sexual act. Consequently, the application of force and intimidation or deprivation of
reason of said victim is irrelevant in a prosecution for this kind of offense. (PEOPLE vs. LOPEZ,
GR No. 138648, October 3, 2002)
To constitute sexual congress with a girl of minor age into a crime of incestuous rape, it is
sufficient that the accused exercised a pervasive influence and control over the victim. (PEOPLE
vs. METIN, GR No. 140781, May 8, 2003)
If the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and the offender is a parent, the
penalty for the crime shall be death. (PEOPLE vs. GONDAWAY, GR Nos. 144344-68, July 23, 2002)
Rape with the use of a deadly weapon prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
(PEOPLE vs. PADAO, GR No. 140734-35, September 11, 2002)
Where an accused is definitely and squarely charged with rape, he cannot be convicted of
qualified seduction. The charge of rape does not include qualified seduction. (PEOPLE vs.
PATOSA, GR No. 137759, September 3, 2002)
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
In kidnapping or serious illegal detention for ransom, the purpose of extorting ransom is a
qualifying circumstance which must be alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution
as the crime itself by words and overt acts of the accused before, during and after the kidnapping
and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary
for the crime to be committed. Although kidnapping for a certain purpose is a qualifying
circumstance, the law does not require that the purpose be accomplished. Ransom employed in
the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense: a sum of money or other thing of value, price,
or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment
that releases from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue
to the kidnapper or a third person as a condition for the release of the victim.
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CRIMINAL LAW
While the epigraph or title of Article 268 mentions only slight illegal detention, kidnapping
committed in connection with the lower offense of slight illegal detention is also covered by the
article. The crime of slight illegal detention is consummated upon the occurrence of all the
elements thereof. "A day," in the last paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, should
be understood as twenty-four hours, to be counted from the deprivation of the liberty of the victim
until the cessation thereof.
Although the appellant and his co-conspirators kidnapped [the two victims] on the same
occasion and from the same situs, the appellant is guilty of two separate crimes: kidnapping
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code. The appellant and his co-conspirators were animated by two sets of separate
criminal intents and criminal resolutions in kidnapping and illegally detaining the two victims.
(PEOPLE vs, PAGALASAN, GR No. 131926 & 138991, June 18, 2003)
The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with
proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the same. It is thus essential
that the following be established by the prosecution: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four
circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be present. But if the kidnapping was done for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary.
For the crime (kidnapping for ransom) to be committed, at least one overt act of
demanding ransom must be made. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom
because what the law requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom.
(PEOPLE vs. SILONGAN, et. al., GR No. 137182, April 24, 2003)
Even if the purpose alleged by the defense be accepted that is, to compel the alleged payment
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 1084 effective June 15, 1954,
the offense is still kidnapping for ransom. 'Ransom' under American rulings, as used in statutes
making kidnapping with intent to hold for ransom a capital offense, has been held to mean in its
ordinary sense as `money, price, or, consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. Since the accused in this case
demanded and received money as a requisite for releasing a person from captivity, whatever other
motive may have impelled them to do so, the money is still ransom under the law. (PEOPLE vs.
CASTRO, et. al., GR No. 132726, July 23, 2002]
The penalty prescribed by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of RA
7659, where the purpose of the kidnapping and serious illegal detention is to extort ransom from
the victim, or any other person, is death. (PEOPLE vs. SANTOS, GR No. 125353, December 17,
2002)
KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR

Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code has two
essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and
(2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is
actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the
custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. The word deliberate as
used in Article 270 must imply something more than mere negligence it must be premeditated,
headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. (PEOPLE vs. PASTRANA, GR
No. 143644, August 14, 2002)
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF PERSONS
Robbery with homicide
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Robo con homicidio is an indivisible offense, a special complex crime. It carries a severe penalty
because the law sees in this crime that men place lucre above the value of human life, thus
justifying the imposition of a harsher penalty than that for simple robbery or homicide. A
conviction for robbery with homicide requires the prosecution to firmly establish the following
elements: (a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons; (b) the
property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking was done with animo lucrandi; and, (d) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide was committed. (PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ,
et. al., GR No. 148730, June 26, 2003)
The consistent doctrinal rule is that whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence
of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be
held guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if some of
them did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it appears that those who did not do so
endeavored to prevent the homicide. (PEOPLE vs. GUIMBA, GR No. 139472, November 27, 2002)
The near-fatal shooting of [one of the victims] took place on the occasion of the robbery. The
injuries she suffered could be merged in the composite crime of robbery with homicide, and for
purposes of reckoning the appropriate penalty, could be characterized as an aggravating
circumstance to emphasize that the crime resulted not only in one victim killed but also in lifethreatening injuries on another victim. (PEOPLE vs. TUPPAL, GR Nos. 137982-85, January 13, 2003)
[T]reachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime
is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a
qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision dated
September 11, 1878, the word "homicide" is used in its broadest and most generic sense.
Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime
specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with
homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of
robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery
with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against
persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery
is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. (PEOPLE vs. ESCOTE, et al., GR No. 140756,
April 4, 2003)
A conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose
and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The animo
lucrandi must proceed the killing. If the original design does not comprehend robbery, but robbery
follows the homicide either as an afterthought or merely as an incident of the homicide, then the
malefactor is guilty of two separate crimes, that of homicide or murder and robbery, and not of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, a single and indivisible offense. It is the intent of
the actor to rob which supplies the connection between the homicide and the robbery necessary
to constitute the complex crime of robbery with homicide. However, the law does not require that
the sole motive of the malefactor is robbery and commits homicide by reason or on the occasion
thereof
A conviction for robbery with homicide is proper even if the homicide is committed before,
during or after the commission of the robbery. The homicide may be committed by the actor at the
spur of the moment or by mere accident. Even if two or more persons are killed and a woman is
raped and physical injuries are inflicted on another, on the occasion or by reason of robbery, there
is only one special complex crime of robbery with homicide. What is primordial is the result
obtained without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, cause, modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime.
Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim of the robbery is different from the
victim of homicide, as long as the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery. It is not even necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very person the malefactor
intended to rob. For the conviction of the special complex crime, the robbery itself must be
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proved as conclusively as any other element of the crime. (PEOPLE vs. DANIELA, et al., GR No.
139230)
Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt
acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the
robbery is circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the furtive
taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different
intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful
taking.
Art. 293 of the RPC employs the phrase belonging to another and this has been
interpreted to merely require that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual
possession of the property by the person dispossessed thereof suffices. In fact it has been held
that robbery may be committed against a bailee or a person who himself has stolen it. So long as
there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latters will through violence
or intimidation, with animo de lucro, robbery is the offense imputable to the offender. If the victim
is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the offense is converted into the composite
crime of robbery with homicide. (PEOPLE vs. REYES, GR No. 135682, March 26, 2003)
In this case, aside from the fact that no inventory was conducted after the incident, as is usually
done in robbery cases, the prosecution did not convincingly establish the corpus delicti of the
crime of robbery. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its
primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. As applied to a
particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. In
this case, the element of taking as well as the existence of the money alleged to have been lost
and stolen by appellant was not adequately established. (PEOPLE vs. OBEDO, GR No. 123054,
June 10, 2003)
Robbery with rape
As conspiracy was proven and rape was committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of the
robbery, all the conspirators-participants are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape.
(PEOPLE vs. BALACANAO, et al., GR No. 118133, February 28, 2003)
For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was
committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This special
complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the
original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to
another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. In this type
of felony, the intent to gain precedes the intent to have illegal carnal intercourse with another,
since robbery with rape is basically a crime against property. And if the original design was to
commit rape but the accused, after committing rape, also committed robbery because the
opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses.
(PEOPLE vs. TAMAYO, GR No. 137586, July 30, 2002)
SWINDLING (ESTAFA)
The fact that petitioners are the President and Secretary of the [corporation defrauded] does not
mean that they could not be held liable for Estafa with Abuse of Confidence, if they did in fact
misappropriate the corporate fund for personal use. The crime of Estafa is committed when a
person shall defraud another by means mentioned in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. This
is true whether or not such person is an officer of the corporation defrauded. (LEE vs. PEOPLE,
GR No. 137914, December 4, 2002)
Estafa is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name; or by falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business; by
imaginary transactions or similar forms of deceit executed prior to or simultaneous with the fraud.
Moreover, these false pretenses should have been the very reason that motivated complainants to
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deliver property or pay money to the perpetrators of the fraud. (PEOPLE vs. LAPIS, GR No. 14573435, October 15, 2002)
It is well settled that a person, for the same acts, may be charged and convicted separately of the
crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. Illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of
the accused is necessary for conviction. In other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code
may also be convicted of offenses punishable by other laws for the same acts. (PEOPLE vs.
BALLESTEROS, GR No. 116905-908, August 6, 2002)
[E]ven a temporary disturbance of property rights constitutes misappropriation. The words
"convert" and "misappropriate" as used in Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it
to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To "misappropriate" a thing of value for one's
own use includes, not only conversion to one's personal advantage but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. Thus, when petitioner caused the remittance of
the amount withdrawn to another account, such act constituted conversion or misappropriation or
unauthorized disposition of the property, contrary to the purpose for which the property was
devoted.
As held in the case of First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co, in estafa, the person
prejudiced or the immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods
misappropriated. Thus, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "any person who shall
defraud another by any means mentioned [in Article 315]" may be held liable for estafa. The use
by the law of the word "another" instead of the word "owner" means that as an element of the
offense, loss should have fallen upon someone other than the perpetrator of the crime. (SALAZAR
vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 149472, October 15, 2002)
Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation, for it is a public offense
which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on its own motion even though
complete reparation has been made of the damage suffered by the offended party. (PEOPLE vs.
BULI-E, GR No. 123146, June 17, 2003)
To constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be
the efficient cause of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with
the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party
because of the issuance of a check whether postdated or not. That is, the latter would not have
parted with his money or other property were it not for the issuance of the check.
BP 22 cannot be deemed necessarily included in the crime of estafa under RPC, Article
315, 2 (d). The offense of fraud defined under the Revised Penal Code is malum in se, whereas BP
22, also known as Bouncing Checks Law, is a special law which punishes the issuance of
bouncing checks, a malum prohibitum. Fraud or estafa under the Revised Penal Code is a distinct
offense from the violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. They are different offenses, having
different elements. (PEOPLE vs. CUYUGAN, GR No. 146641-43, November 18, 2002)
The offense requires that the dishonored check must have been postdated or issued at the time
the obligation was contracted. In other words, the date the obligation was entered into, being the
first element, is a material ingredient of the offense. Hence, not only must said date be specifically
and particularly alleged in the information, it must be proved as alleged. (PEOPLE vs. DINGLASAN,
GR No. 133645, September 17, 2002)
The essence of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and "misappropriated"
connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it
to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes
not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right.
In the case at bar, it was established that the inability of petitioner as agent to comply with
her duty to return either the pieces of jewelry or the proceeds of its sale to her [principal] was due,
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in turn, to the failure of [petitioners sub-agent] to abide by her agreement with petitionerIn other
words, the pieces of jewelry were given by petitioner to [her sub-agent] to achieve the very same
end for which they were delivered to her in the first place. Consequently, there is no conversion
since the pieces of jewelry were not devoted to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.
(SERONA, vs. CA and PEOPLE, GR No. 130423, November 18, 2002)
OTHER FORMS OF SWINDLING

The gravamen of the crime is the disposition of legally encumbered real property by the offender
under the express representation that there is no encumbrance thereon. Hence, for one to be
criminally liable for estafa under the law, the accused must make an express representation in the
deed of conveyance that the property sold or disposed of is free from any encumbrance. The
prosecution is burdened to allege in the information and prove the confluence of the following
essential elements of the crime for the accused to be criminally liable for estafa under Art 316,
paragraph 2 of the RPC: (1) that the thing disposed of be real property; (2) that the offender knew
that the real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that
there must be express representation by the offender that the real property is free from
encumbrance; and (4) that the ect of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of
another. (NAYA vs. SPS. ABING and PEOPLE, GR No. 146770, February 27, 2003)
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
Under the present law on rape, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353 (or the "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which took effect on October 22, 1997), and interpreted
in People v. Soriano, insertion of one's finger into the genital of another constitutes "rape through
sexual assault." This law, however, finds no application in the case at bar, considering that the
governing law at the time of the commission of the crime on August 19, 1997 was Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, where insertion of one's finger into the
genitals of another does not amount to rape. (PEOPLE vs. BON, GR No. 149199, January 28, 2003)
[A]cts of lasciviousness is considered an offense included or subsumed in the rape charge. The
elements of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness; (2) the act is done under any of the following circumstances (a) when force or
intimidation is used, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age, or (3) when the offended
party is another person of either sex. (PEOPLE vs. CARALIPIO, GR No. 137766-67, November 27,
2002)
In People vs. Tiburcio Balbar, we held that what constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be
determined from the circumstances of each case. The presence or absence of the lewd designs is
inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. (PEOPLE
vs. VICTOR, GR No. 127904, December 5, 2002)
PROSECUTION OF THE CRIMES OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION,

ABDUCTION, AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS (ART. 344)
A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes against chastity out of
consideration for the offended woman and her family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser policy
to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated
controversies in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the family.
We agree with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of Court can file a complaint for
rape independently of her parents, [the victim], then 20 years of age who was found to have the
mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her
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complaint can be rightfully considered filed by a minor. (PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ, GR No. 135022,
July 11, 2002)
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CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
LIBEL
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite
derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is
injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.
Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Declarations made about a large class of
people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent
circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of
such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech
and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights. (MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., et al.
vs. ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., et al., G.R. No. 135306, January 28,
2003.)
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
IMPRUDENCE AND NEGLIGENCE
Qualifying circumstance of failure to lend help to the injured party
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods which has a
range of from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. However, if the
offender fails to lend on the spot such help as may be in his hands to give to the injured parties,
the penalty for the crime is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods which has a range
of six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. In this case, petitioner failed to render help to the
victim. Petitioner simply abandoned the victim at the situs criminis and left posthaste.
(TAPDASAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 141344, November 21, 2002)
The assistance required by Article 365 Revised Penal Code, is one which "may be in the hands of
the offender to give." The type and degree of assistance that the offender, at the time and place of
the incident, is capable of giving should be taken into consideration. Under the circumstances of
this case, petitioner is not a hit-and-run driver. He exerted efforts to see to it that the victim had
been attended to. There were several people assisting the victim, including his co-employees
working for the bus company. The injured party was carried from the terminal, to a vehicle, then to
the hospital. Before petitioner was given clearance by the dispatcher to leave, an hour later, he
was assured that the victim was brought already to the hospital. Petitioner had a bus full of
passengers requiring also his attention. He could only do so much, so that the burden of helping
the injured party was shared by the bus company personnel and other good Samaritans. (ABUEVA
vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 134387, September 27, 2002)
SPECIAL LAWS
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (RA 3019)
For a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment to prosper, it must be shown that the
judgment was unjust, and not that the judge merely committed an error of judgment or took the
unpopular side of a controversial point of law. He must have known that his judgment was indeed
unjust. The failure of a judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence
presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable. (SACMAR vs. REYES-CARPIO,
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1766, March 28, 2003)
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ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972 (RA 6539)
[A]ccused-appellants were charged separately with the crimes of carnapping and murder. We
cannot convict them of the crime of qualified carnapping, which consists of the two crimes
alleged in the two separate information, without impairing their constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. (PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ, et. al., GR Nos.
141162-63, July 11, 2002)
The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it
is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner
thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual
possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there is
apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's will through violence or
intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is imputable
to the offender. (PEOPLE vs. GARCIA, GR No. 138470, April 1, 2003)
Section 2 of R.A. 6536 as amended, defines the crime of carnapping as the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It becomes qualified when in the
course of the commission or on occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped. When the carnapping is qualified, the penalty imposable is
reclusion perpetua to death.
The killing or rape merely qualifies the crime of carnapping and no distinction should be
made between homicide and murder. (PEOPLE vs. LOBITANIA, GR No. 142380, September 5, 2002)
More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is one penalized under RA 6538 or The AntiCarnapping Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under The Revised Penal Code. Unless
otherwise specified, if the special penal law imposes such penalty, it is error to designate it with
terms provided for in The Revised Penal Code since those terms apply only to the penalties
imposed by the Penal Code, and not to the penalty in special penal laws. This is because
generally, special laws provide their own specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which
penalties are not taken from nor refer to those in The Revised Penal Code. (MERCADO vs.
PEOPLE, GR No. 149375, November 26, 2002)
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972

[T]he Dangerous Drugs Law punishes the mere act of possessing prohibited drugs. Present in
the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug, (2) such possession is
not authorized by law, and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.
(PEOPLE vs. SY, GR No. 147348, September 24, 2002)
Jurisprudence clearly sets the essential elements to be established in the prosecution of illegal
sale of shabu as follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is
the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt
by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. (PEOPLE
vs. RAZUL, et al., GR No. 146470, November 22, 2002)
In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody
inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement,
wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute
him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause.
(PEOPLE vs. VALENCIA, GR No. 143032, October 14, 2002)
In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution
shows that the accused knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that animus
possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession or control of such article. Animus
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possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence
that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did not
intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of
animus possidendi. (CUPCUPIN vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 132389, November 19, 2002)
The entrapment operation paved the way for the valid warrantless arrest of appellant.
Consequently, any search resulting from said lawful warrantless arrest was also valid because the
accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the person to be arrested (appellant)
committed a crime in the presence of the arresting officers or the poseur-buyer. (PEOPLE vs. DE
LEON, GR Nos. 132484-85, November 15, 2002)
In People vs. Del Rosario, the Court made the following observations: "The usual procedure in a
buy-bust operation is for the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment he
hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is the very reason why such a police
operation is called a 'buy-bust' operation. The police poseur-buyer 'buys' dangerous drugs from
the pusher and 'busts' (arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over the drug to the police
officer." (PEOPLE vs. LIM, et al., GR No. 141699, August 7, 2002)
[T]he prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense, an essential requirement in drug-related cases. In People v. Mapa,
the appellant was acquitted after the prosecution failed to clarify whether the specimen submitted
to the NBI for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly taken from him. In People v.
Dismuke, we ruled that the failure to prove that the specimen of marijuana examined by the
forensic chemist was that seized from the appellant was fatal to the prosecution's case. (PEOPLE
vs. PEDRONAN, GR No. 148668, June 17, 2003)
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS

In cases involving illegal possession of firearm, the requisite elements are: a) the existence of the
subject firearm b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have
the corresponding license or permit to possess. The latter is a negative fact that constitutes an
essential ingredient of the offense, and it is the duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but
also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. (BOTONA vs. CA and PEOPLE, GR No. 120650, February
21, 2003)
In the case at bar, the special aggravating circumstance of "use of unlicensed firearm" was not
alleged in the informations. The two (2) informations at bar, for murder and frustrated murder,
merely alleged that the appellant used a "long firearm." They did not allege that the firearm used
was unlicensed. The failure of the prosecution to allege in the Information the aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in committing the crime of murder prevents us from
imposing the death penalty on the appellant even if the same was proved at the trial. The appellant
should, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. (PEOPLE vs. DAN AVE, GR Nos.
137274-75, October 18, 2002)
[I]f an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any other crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. (PEOPLE vs. HAMTON, et al., GR Nos. 134823-25)
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (BP 22)

The elements of the violation of B.P. 22 are: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to
apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. (GARCIA vs. CA and PEOPLE, GR No. 138197,
November 27, 2002)
25

CRIMINAL LAW
This Court, in Lozano vs. Martinez, was explicit in ruling that the language of B.P. Blg. 22 is broad
enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in
payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something
of value.
For liability to attach under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough that the prosecution establishes
that checks were issued and that the same were subsequently dishonored. The prosecution must
also prove that the issuer, at the time of the check's issuance, had knowledge that he did not have
enough funds or credit in the bank of payment thereof upon its presentment. Since the second
element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a
prima facie presumption of such knowledge only after it is proved that the issuer had received a
notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of
the check or to make arrangement for its payment. (YU OH vs. CA and PEOPLE, GR No. 125297,
June 6, 2003)
We have held that a check issued as evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for
payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check. Such check falls within the ambit of B.P. 22
because what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum. (SAN PEDRO vs. PEOPLE and CA, GR No. 133297, August
15, 2002)
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment
of an obligation, which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor
to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order. (RECUERDO vs. PEOPLE and CA, GR No. 133036,
January 22, 2003)
Since the petitioner admitted that he issued the two postdated checks worth P75,000 each, the
fact that the checks were presented beyond the 90-day period provided in Sec. 2 of BP 22 is of no
moment since this is not an element of the offense but merely a condition for the prima facie
presumption of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation and, as such, it should be
either prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money
or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check, or the person to whom
the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property had there been no
check issued to him. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for
the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property, and not in payment of a pre-existing
obligation. (NAGRAMPA vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 146211, August 6, 2002)
26
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San Beda College of Law

2004 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

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