Equality as the Virtue of Sovereigns: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin

Samuel Scheffler
Philosophy & Public Affairs, Volume 31, Number 2, Spring 2003, pp.
199-206 (Article)
Published by Princeton University
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SAMUEL SCHEFFLER Equality as the Virtue
of Sovereigns: A Reply
to Ronald Dworkin
In Equality, Luck, and Hierarchy, Ronald Dworkin raises a number
of objections to my article What is Egalitarianism?
1
In this reply, I will
respond briey to his main objections.
I. IS DWORKIN A LUCK EGALITARIAN?
My article was not a review of Sovereign Virtue nor was it primarily a
critique of Dworkins theory. The articles primary topic was the position
that Anderson has labeled luck egalitarianism. I said at the outset of
the article that there are many different versions of luck egalitarianism,
but that they share a common core idea. The core idea is that inequal-
ities deriving from peoples voluntary choices are acceptable, whereas
inequalities deriving from unchosen features of peoples circumstances
are unjust. Parts of my discussion were devoted to identifying what
I take to be some general difculties with this core idea, when it is taken
at face value. In his reply, Dworkin responds to a number of these
generic criticisms as if they had been aimed specically at him, but I am
well aware that his theory departs from the generic luck-egalitarian posi-
tion in certain respects. Indeed, I emphasized that the reason I was de-
voting special attention to his theory was precisely because of the ways
in which it departs from the generic luck-egalitarian position, and thus
avoids some of the difculties of that position.
2003 by Princeton University Press. Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, no. 2
1. Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Luck and Hierarchy, Philosophy & Public Affairs 31
(2003): 19098 (referred to hereafter as ELH, with page references given parenthetically in
the text). My article, What is Egalitarianism?, appeared in Philosophy & Public Affairs 31
(2003): 539. This article will be referred to hereafter as WE, with page references again
given parenthetically in the text. I will also give parenthetical page references to Dworkins
book Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), which I will re-
fer to as SV.
In his article, however, Dworkin says not only that his view differs
from the generic luck-egalitarian position in various respects, but also
that he does not accept the core idea and is not a luck egalitarian at all.
This seems to me misleading. It is true that, through its reliance on de-
vices like hypothetical insurance schemes, Dworkins fully developed
theory ends up qualifying the core idea in important ways. Nevertheless,
Sovereign Virtue characterizes the general aims of that theory in terms
that are quite similar to the ones I used in describing the core idea.
Dworkin writes, for example, that his theory aims to make peoples im-
personal resources sensitive to their choices but insensitive to their cir-
cumstances (SV, p. 323), and he then reiterates that the general goal of
equality of resources is that distribution should be sensitive to choice
but not to circumstance (SV, p. 334). In a typical passage, he elaborates
on these ideas as follows: In principle . . . individuals should be relieved
of consequential responsibility for those unfortunate features of their
situation that are brute bad luck, but not from those that should be seen
as owing from their own choices. If someone has been born blind or
without talents others have, that is his bad luck, and, so far as this can be
managed, a just society would compensate him for that bad luck. But if
he has fewer resources than other people now because he spent more on
luxuries earlier, or because he chose not to work, or to work at less re-
munerative jobs than others chose, then his situation is the result of
choice not luck, and he is not entitled to any compensation (SV, p. 287).
These formulations are hardly so remote from the core idea that it is a
mistake to count Dworkin as a luck egalitarian at all. It is more accurate
to say that his developed theory represents an interpretation or a rene-
ment of the core idea itself.
II. CHOICE AND CIRCUMSTANCE
Anyone who says that distribution should be sensitive to choice but not
to circumstance (SV, p. 334) must provide some explanation of what, for
distributive purposes, is to count as choice and what is to count as cir-
cumstance. Dworkin has characterized the distinction between choice
and circumstance in different ways over the years. Indeed, as I noted in
my article (WE, p. 19 n. 35), he has not always used those precise terms to
characterize the relevant distinction. Nevertheless, he says in Sovereign
Virtue that the distinction between choices and circumstances tracks
200 Philosophy &Public Affairs
ordinary peoples ethical experience (SV, pp. 28990). In my article, I
tried to explain what he might mean by this, and how the ethical inter-
pretation of the distinction might appear to avoid some of the difcul-
ties faced by other interpretations. Dworkin now says that my characteri-
zation of the ethical interpretation was based on a few independent
remarks (ELH, p. 193) he made that were not intended to elucidate the
choice-circumstance distinction. Since space does not permit a detailed
analysis of the relevant passages from Sovereign Virtue, sufce it to say in
response that, contrary to what Dworkin now suggests, his comment in
the book (SV, p. 322) about the way in which character traits affect ones
pursuit of ones ambitions was not presented as a self-standing observa-
tion about the relation between character and ambition. It was instead
presentedimplicitly but unmistakablyas an explanation of why, in
his taxonomy of the various factors affecting individuals fates, traits of
characterlike ambitions but unlike talentsare discussed under the
heading of choice rather than under the heading of circumstance.
This taxonomy as a whole provides a general account of the choice/
circumstance distinction (SV, pp. 32223) and, as far as I can see, Dworkin
has said nothing that undermines my interpretation of that account.
Nor am I persuaded by his response to my criticism of the account so
interpreted. My point was that, if any personal feature with which one
identies and which inuences choice is to be classied under the head-
ing of (noncompensable) choice rather than (compensable) circum-
stance, then, contrary to Dworkins stated position, talents and even
handicaps will often need to be so classied. The reason why Dworkins
discussion of parameters is relevant here is because it appears to as-
sert, in effect, that we must all identify with some of our unchosen cir-
cumstances (SV, pp. 26063). However, insofar as the circumstances
with which we identify include (choice-affecting) personal talents or
handicaps, the account in question would imply that these features
should in fact be classied under the heading of choice rather than cir-
cumstance.
In his article, Dworkin offers a different account of the distinction be-
tween choices and circumstances. What he says is that the pertinent
question is not whether people have chosen to have some property, but
whether having that property makes them unable to choose among
combinations of occupation and income that people without it are free
to choose among (ELH, p. 192). So, for example, someone without
201 Equality as the Virtue of Sovereigns
much marketable talent is unable to choose many occupations that
are open to others (ELH, p. 193), but someone with expensive ambitions
is nevertheless free to choose other, less expensive pursuits.
Dworkin is certainly right about these two examples, but do they gen-
eralize to an account of the distinction between choices and circum-
stances that serves his purposes? The general claim would have to be
that any property of a person is to be counted among that persons cir-
cumstances if, in virtue of possessing the property, the person is unable
to choose among combinations of occupation and income that are open
to people without the property. By this criterion, however, traits of char-
acter will often qualify as being among a persons circumstances. People
are often denied combinations of occupation and income because
they lack suitable traits of character. A candidate for a deanship or a cor-
porate vice presidency may be passed over because she does not have
good judgment. A military ofcer may be denied a promotion because
he is lacking in personal courage. People may be denied jobs because
they are seen as decient in wisdom or empathy or tenacity. Yet Dworkin
believes that traits of character, unless they are pathological, do not nor-
mally count as being among a persons circumstances. Thus, his stated
criterion gives what is, by his own lights, the wrong result here. More-
over, people may be denied combinations of occupation and income
not only because of their character traits but also because of their ambi-
tions. Candidates for jobs or for university admission are often asked to
describe their goals and ambitions, and they are often rejected because
their (genuine and deeply held) goals and ambitions are judged to be
unsuitable. By the stated criterion, then, these goals and ambitions
would have to be classied as being among the unsuccessful candidates
circumstances.
It is important to be clear about what this shows. It does not show that
Dworkin is mistaken in holding that people should not be compensated
for expensive tastes. What it does show is that his stated criterion for
distinguishing (compensable) circumstances from (noncompensable)
choices would draw that distinction in a manner that is incompatible
with Dworkins independent judgments about which personal proper-
ties entitle one to compensation and which do not. The stated criterion
would classify many nonpathological character traits and ambitions as
personal circumstances, and this is inconsistent with Dworkins posi-
tion. Thus, the stated criterion does not provide a general account of the
202 Philosophy &Public Affairs
distinction between choices and circumstances that is adequate for his
purposes.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC EQUALITY
Dworkin interprets me as thinking that the dimensions of equality are
somehow competitive (ELH, p. 195), and that economic equality should
be subordinated to social and political equality. He counters that no di-
mension of equality is more fundamental than the others, and he insists
on the continuing importance of economic equality, as opposed to a
more minimal commitment to meeting peoples basic needs. But I nei-
ther argued that economic equality was unimportant nor advocated its
subordination to other dimensions of equality. Nor did I assertin-
deed, I explicitly denied (WE, p. 23)that meeting basic needs is
enough. What I did claim was that most luck-egalitarian writers do not
offer compelling arguments for economic equality. Instead they simply
assume a shared commitment to the idea of distributive equality and
ask how that idea is to be best understood. Precisely because I do regard
economic equality as important, I argued that it needs to be shown to
have roots in a more general conception of equality as a moral value or
normative ideal. Or, to put it another way, economic equality is impor-
tant, in my view, precisely because and to the extent that it does have
such roots. Moreover, I said that Dworkin is exceptional among luck-
egalitarian writers because he does seek to anchor his egalitarian distrib-
utive principles in a more general ideal of equality. My disagreement
with him was not about the relative importance of the different dimen-
sions of equality, but rather about the nature of the general ideal under-
lying all those dimensions.
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONCEPTION AND HIERARCHY
Dworkin does not challenge my interpretation of him as seeking to an-
chor his egalitarian distributive principles in a more general ideal of
equality, but he does object to my suggestion that different forms of
egalitarianism begin from different questions. Sovereign Virtue, he
says, proceeds not . . . by selecting one political value as fundamental
so that others are subordinatenot by designating a particular value as
the one with which one beginsbut through an interpretive method
203 Equality as the Virtue of Sovereigns
that emphasizes interrelations and interdependencies among all the
political values (ELH, pp. 19697). Yet in Sovereign Virtue itself, Dworkin
writes: I have been studying the idea of equality beginning in a prin-
ciplethe abstract egalitarian principlethat states the idea in its
most abstract form. This principle stipulates that government must act
to make the lives of citizens better, and must act with equal concern for
the life of each member. We reach a useful, practical theory about what
equality requires by constructing and testing concrete interpretations
conceptionsof that principle, to decide which conception is, all things
considered, the best (SV, p. 184). This passage conrms that, notwith-
standing his emphasis on the interdependencies among the various
dimensions of equality, Dworkin also posits a more general ideal of
equality underlying the accounts he offers of those various dimensions.
The ideal in question, from which his inquiry indeed begins, is the
ideal of equal concern, as expressed in the abstract egalitarian prin-
ciple. He begins from the abstract egalitarian principle because,
though equality admits of different conceptions, these different con-
ceptions are competing interpretations of that principle (SV, p. 128).
Accordingly, he asserts, all of our arguments about political justice must
be capable of being understood as arguments about what equal concern
really means or comes to (SV, p. 131). And since the abstract egalitarian
principle species how governments in particular should act, equal con-
cern is the special and indispensable virtue of sovereigns (SV, p. 6).
Unlike Dworkin, I do not think that the most basic or abstract idea of
equality is the principle that a government should treat its citizens with
equal concern. Nor do I think that all conceptions of equality are simply
competing interpretations of that principle. In contrast to Dworkins
form of egalitarianism, many egalitarians believe that equality, at its
most basic or abstract level, is not the special virtue of sovereigns but
rather a normative ideal of human relations. On this view, the most basic
question requiring interpretation is not the question of what it is for a
government to treat people with equal concern, but rather the question
of what it is for people to relate to one another as equals. The special
case of this question that is of particular interest to political philosophy
is the question of what a society of equals is like and, in particular, what
sort of social, political, and economic institutions are appropriate to
such a society. Dworkin says in his response that he meant to be ad-
dressing these questions. However, the question to which his book is ex-
204 Philosophy &Public Affairs
plicitly devoted is the question of how the government must act if it is to
treat its citizens with equal concern. It is because Dworkin identies this
as the fundamental issue that an egalitarian theory must address that I
describe him as having an administrative conception of equality.
It is true that Dworkin sometimes alternates between saying that the
requirement of equal concern applies to governments and saying that it
applies to the political community. At one point he says that a com-
munity collectively must treat its members individually with equal con-
cern (SV, pp. 20910). So perhaps when he says that equal concern is the
special virtue of sovereigns, he is best understood as meaning that it is
the special virtue of political communities, acting through their govern-
ments. However, I do not believe that the basic idea of equality is the
principle that a political community should treat its members with
equal concern. For one thing, equality is a more general ideal that also
applies to groups other than political communities. More importantly
for our purposes, the ideal of equality applies to the relations among
group members and not merely to the treatment of individuals by the
group as a whole. A group may have policies that treat all of its members
with equal concern, yet the relations among group members may con-
tinue to be structured by mutually recognized differences of rank or sta-
tus. Thus, it makes a difference whether one conceives of equality as the
special virtue that governs the treatment of citizens by the sovereign
however the sovereign is understoodor whether one thinks of it in-
stead as a normative ideal of human relations.
One symptom of the difference, I argued in my article, is that
Dworkins ideal of equal concern, as applied to questions of economic
equality, is not by itself incompatible with social hierarchy, nor does the
ideal support the equal distribution of power.
2
Dworkin accuses me of
using deconstructive . . . critical maneuvers (ELH, p. 195) when I say
that his testator example illustrates the rst of these points. But my only
critical maneuver was to assume that an example used by an author to
illustrate his theory may reasonably be taken to illustrate his theory.
Dworkin makes the same assumption when he says that the hypothetical
205 Equality as the Virtue of Sovereigns
2. In his reply, Dworkin construes the point about power as applying only to the distri-
bution of inuence, and he responds that inuence is just a technical term for him
(ELH, p. 196). But, as I noted in my article, what he says in Sovereign Virtue is that impact
and inuence are the two modes of power (p. 199), and that his theory allows a limited
place for equality of impact but none for equality of inuence (p. 200).
auction is a better illustration of his theory than the testator example.
3
In
any case, the observation that his theory of distributive equality is not
incompatible with social hierarchy is one that Dworkin himself makes;
that was the point of his comment that the theory does not by itself rule
out benevolent tyranny (SV, p. 187). The lesson to be drawn from this is
obviously not that Dworkin favors social hierarchy. That is not what he
meant to convey when he made the benevolent tyranny comment nor
what I meant to convey when I cited it. Nor was my point that Dworkin
is insensitive to all of the noneconomic dimensions of equality. The
point was rather that treating equal concern as the starting point for
ones theory has consequences for the theory as a whole, and that the
idea of equal concern cannot plausibly account for, or do justice to, all of
the various dimensions of equality about which egalitariansincluding
Dworkincare.
206 Philosophy &Public Affairs
3. I anticipated that response, and replied to it, in n. 72 of my article.