Uson v.

Del Rosario
92:530| Andres

FACTS:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land in Pangasinan,
filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four illegit children. Maria Uson was the lawful wife of
Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no
other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his
common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession
and enjoyment. Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her husband, executed a
public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of which Uson was
given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her
husband upon his death. CFI found for Uson. Defendants appealed.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of her husband.
2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife have successional rights.

HELD:
1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five
parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a
common-law wife with whom she had four illegitimate children with the deceased. It likewise appears that
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed
from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art 777 NCC).As this Court aptly said,
"The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor
had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death". From that moment, therefore, the
rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon
his death in the deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.

2. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence, since the right of
ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late
husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952, 90PHIL757
90 PHIL 757

FACTS: Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum of P4,039. Failing
to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded to file a claim in the intestate
proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the deceased. The estate has not yet been properly
probated.

ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's deceased parent?

HELD: No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held that the
creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by
inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate have been paid and when the net assets that
are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can
inherit. It was therein also held that a person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to
intervene either in the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. The
foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not a creditor of the
deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir,
before the net assets of the intestate estate have been determined.

LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938
66 PHIL 547

FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana
Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her as compulsory heir
which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he left some personal
and real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his compulsory
heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum
payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of
Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the defendants represents that of the
successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's estate?

HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are not
subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any property.
While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or
mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not
make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be
seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is
received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their
predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco,
are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom they did not inherit anything.


PAULMITAN V. CA- Co-ownership of
Property

When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other co-owners, only
his pro indiviso share on the property is transferred to the buyer.

FACTS:
The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by Agatona Paulmitan.
She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. Pascuals (7) children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino,
Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-
law are petitioners.

Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to himself Lot 757
claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a
TCT was issued in his name. He executed a deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his
daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes, the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the
Provincial Govt of Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was able to redeem the property.
Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against petitioners
to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners defense was that the action has already
prescribed for it was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana
has acquired exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said
property.

The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With respect to Lot 1091,
the court decided in favor of respondents. They are entitled to of Lot 1091, pro indiviso.
The redemption did not in anyway prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be
partitioned and the petitioners were ordered to pay the respondents their share of the fruits
and the respondents to pay their share in the redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the
decision thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pascuals children and Donato and Juliana were co-owners of their
mothers lot
(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the property

HELD:
(1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that
Where there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition,
owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Since
Pascual and Donato were still alive when she died, they are co-owners of the estate. When
Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the property.

When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same thus he can
only sell his undivided portion of the property. Art. 493 states that each co-owner shall have
the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer (Juliana) a co-
owner.

(2) NO: When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The right of
repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in
Art. 1612. But she may compel them to reimburse her for half of the repurchase price for a
co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the
preservation of the thing and to taxes.
tob e c o m e o p e r a t i v e a t o r a f t e r d e a t h . T h o m a s H a n l e y h a v i n g d i e d o n M
a y 2 7 , 1 9 2 2 , t h e inheritance tax accrued as of the date.2.
Based of the value of the estate at the time of the testators death
- If death is the generatingsource from which the power of the estate to impose inheri tance
taxes takes i ts bei ng and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of
the estate to tax vestsi nstantl y, the tax shoul d be measured by the val ue of the estate as it
stood at the time of thedecedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any
subsequent increaseor decrease in value.A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the
predecessor's death, notwithstandingthe postponement of the actual possession or enj oyment
of the estate by the benefici ar y, andt he t ax meas ur ed by t he v al ue of t he
pr oper t y t r ansmi t t ed at t hat t i me r egar dl es s of i t s appreciation or depreciation


CASTAEDA v. ALEMANY
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426

FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon the ground that although the
attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed the will in the presence of three witnesses who also
each signed in each presence, the will was not actually written by the testator.

ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself?

HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator
sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express
direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore,
that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.

Miciano vs Brimo
TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed
Micianos participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of
Joseph Brimos estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made
and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island, this
condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those
contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his
testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in
such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.