G.R. No.

97149 March 31, 1992

FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE REINERIO O. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications; COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD; and
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Chairman of the Administrative Action Board, DOTC, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) and/or its Administrative Action Board (AAB) over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), an agency attached to the said Department.
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr.
1
was first employed by the PPA as arrastre supervisor in 1975. He became Assistant Port Operations Officer
in 1976 and Port Operations Officer in 1977. In February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of the PPA, he was appointed Terminal
Supervisor.
On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 against petitioner Beja and
Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77
on the part of the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the charges. After a preliminary investigation conducted by the
district attorney for Region X, Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 was "considered closed for lack of merit."
On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed as Administrative Case No. 12-01-88, was filed against Beja by the PPA General
Manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and for being notoriously undesirable. The charge consisted of six (6) different specifications of administrative offenses including
fraud against the PPA in the total amount of P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to Sec. 41 of P.D. No.
807.
The case was redocketed as Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA general manager indorsed it to the AAB for
"appropriate action." At the scheduled hearing, Beja asked for continuance on the ground that he needed time to study the charges against
him. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental.
2
Two days later, he filed with the AAB
a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the
certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case.
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case below and proceeded to file before this Court a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 87352 captioned "Fidencio Y. Beja v. Hon.
Reinerio 0. Reyes, etc., et al." In the en banc resolution of March 30, 1989, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
"appropriate action."
3
G.R. No. 87352 was docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 17270.
Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB in Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-049-89. Its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudging the following, namely:
a) That respondents Geronimo Beja, Jr. and Hernando Villaluz are exonerated from the charge against them;
b) That respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from the service;
c) That his leave credits and retirement benefits are declared forfeited;
d) That he be disqualified from re-employment in the government service;
e) That his eligibility is recommended to be cancelled.
Pasig, Metro Manila, February 28, 1989.
On December 10, 1990, after appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals also rendered a decision
4
in CA-G.R. SP No. 17270 dismissing
the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, Beja elevated the case back to this Court through an "appeal by certiorari with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order."
We find the pleadings filed in this case to be sufficient bases for arriving at a decision and hence, the filing of memoranda has been dispensed
with.
In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for having "decided questions of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable decisions" of this Court.
5
Specifically, Beja contends that the Court of Appeals failed to declare that: (a) he was denied due
process; (b) the PPA general manager has no power to issue a preventive suspension order without the necessary approval of the PPA board
of directors; (c) the PPA general manager has no power to refer the administrative case filed against him to the DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC
Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-AAB and DOTC-AAB itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try the administrative case
against him. Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive suspension and the jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB
to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot subject him to a preventive suspension on the following provision of
Sec. 8, Art. V of Presidential Decree No. 857 reorganizing the PPA:
(d) the General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner contends that under this provision, the PPA Board of Directors and not the PPA General Manager is the "proper disciplining
authority.
6

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner erroneously equates "preventive suspension" as a remedial measure with
"suspension" as a penalty for administrative dereliction. The imposition of preventive suspension on a government employee charged with
an administrative offense is subject to the following provision of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No. 807:
Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or
neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his
removal from the service.
Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of
precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the
same is being investigated.
7
Thus, preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as the one
mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No 857. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges against him,
the latter is the penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of the case.
The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a
respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 857
aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of agencies the "jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary actions against officers and employees" in the PPA.
Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted even if the disciplining authority has not finally decided the
administrative case provided the ninety-day period from the effectivity of the preventive suspension has been exhausted. The employee
concerned may then be reinstated. 8 However, the said ninety-day period may be interrupted. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also mandates that
any fault, negligence or petition of a suspended employee may not be considered in the computation of the said period. Thus, when a
suspended employee obtains from a court of justice a restraining order or a preliminary injunction inhibiting proceedings in an
administrative case, the lifespan of such court order should be excluded in the reckoning of the permissible period of the preventive
suspension.
9

With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA
Personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of petitioner.
The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11, 1974. Under that Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing
Board of Directors known as the Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the Council the power "to appoint,
discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the Authority and other personnel."
On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D. No. 857, See. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be
"attached" to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive Order No. 125 dated January 30,
1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications was issued, the PPA retained its "attached" status.
10
Even Executive
Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 classified the PPA as an agency "attached" to the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book IV, Title XV, Chapter 6 of the same Code provides that the agencies attached to the DOTC "shall
continue to operate and function in accordance with the respective charters or laws creating them, except when they conflict with this Code."
Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative relationships mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative supervision. "Attachment" is defined in Sec. 38
thereof as follows:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the Department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation
for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination shall be accomplished by having the department represented in the
governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted
by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of
programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which
shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency;
(b) Matters of day-to-day administration or all those pertaining to internal operations shall he left to the discretion or judgment of the
executive officer of the agency or corporation. In the event that the Secretary and the head of the board or the attached agency or
corporation strongly disagree on the interpretation and application of policies, and the Secretary is unable to resolve the disagreement, he
shall bring the matter to the President for resolution and direction;
(c) Government-owned or controlled corporations attached to a department shall submit to the Secretary concerned their audited financial
statements within sixty (60) days after the close of the fiscal year; and
(d) Pending submission of the required financial statements, the corporation shall continue to operate on the basis of the preceding year's
budget until the financial statements shall have been submitted. Should any government-owned or controlled corporation incur an
operation deficit at the close of its fiscal year, it shall be subject to administrative supervision of the department; and the corporation's
operating and capital budget shall be subject to the department's examination, review, modification and approval. (emphasis supplied.)
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under
departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department
and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the
independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a
Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions
"in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987.
11
Moreover, the Administrative
Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to a
Department.
12

Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free from
Departmental interference and control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which provides:
Sec. 8. Management and Staff. a) The President shall, upon the recommendation of the Board, appoint the General Manager and the
Assistant General Managers.
(b) All other officials and employees of the Authority shall be selected and appointed on the basis of merit and fitness based on a
comprehensive and progressive merit system to be established by the Authority immediately upon its organization and consistent with Civil
Service rules and regulations. The recruitment, transfer, promotion, and dismissal of all personnel of the Authority, including temporary
workers, shall be governed by such merit system.
(c) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, determine the staffing pattern and the number of personnel of the
Authority, define their duties and responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments. For professional and technical positions, the
General Manager shall recommend salaries and emoluments that are comparable to those of similar positions in other government-owned
corporations, the provisions of existing rules and regulations on wage and position classification notwithstanding.
(d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval by the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Manager.
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied.)
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the
power to remove erring employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly grants said
officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense.
During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The
investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807.
13
Only after gathering sufficient facts
may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires the approval of the
PPA Board of Directors.
14

From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of Directors, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the
Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission. The permissive recourse to the
Department Secretary is sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807) under the following provisions:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary
or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a
government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or
group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as
to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. The decisions shall be final in case the
penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory
only after confirmation by the department head.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager
should have first conducted an investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought its approval by the
PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only
then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.
The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes under Office Order No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was designed to act,
decide and recommend to him "all cases of administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the Department."
Composed of a Chairman and two (2) members, the AAB came into being pursuant to Administrative Order No. 25 issued by the President on
May 25, 1987.
15
Its special nature as a quasi-judicial administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not exempt from the observance of
due process in its proceedings.
16
We are not satisfied that it did so in this case the respondents protestation that petitioner waived his right
to be heard notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitioner was precisely questioning the AAB's jurisdiction when it sought judicial
recourse.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to subject
petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and rules that due process has been accorded the petitioner.
The AAB decision in said case is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case in REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall
conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
The preventive suspension of petitioner shall continue unless after a determination of its duration, it is found that he had served the total of
ninety (90) days in which case he shall be reinstated immediately.
SO ORDERED.


















G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS,
BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners, vs. MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO
PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to
resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a
conceded legislative power, that of judicial reorganization,
1
may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the independence of the
judiciary
2
as protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts
shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their
dismissal."
3
For the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit
courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such
Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this
character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition
4

considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners
5

sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of
the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza,
6
it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate
exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the
attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed
on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which
not only petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici curiae,
7
and thereafter submission of the minutes of the
proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive
deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion
and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within
the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera.
8
Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity
of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement."
9
The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and
substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:
10

"Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their
rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials
staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public
interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both
in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their
capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we
act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the American Supreme
Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other
people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is
to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v.
Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been lowered."
11

2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does
manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid
themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization was organized.
12
This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It
clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be
submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire
Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and
all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan."
13
On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It
expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what today is a basic and urgent need,
nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The
felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not
too much to say that the people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in
the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means much more so, the poorest and the humblest can vindicate
their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to all
members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the
Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine
judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of
Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient
administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the
first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16, 1901."
14
I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two
decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for
recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are
asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more
formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative
approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be
both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national progress."
15
After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust
is on development. That has been repeatedly stressed and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it
to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of sustained increases in per capita
income and Gross National Product (GNP).
16
For the New Society, its implication goes further than economic advance, extending to "the
sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social
justice."
17
This process of modernization and change compels the government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The
efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the
social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented."
18
There is likelihood then "that some
measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not
go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders.
Lack of success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies
embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to progress in development."
19
For, as mentioned in such Report,
equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most
determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and
more cases has continued."
20
It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the growth of population, the
increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with
what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became
even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before
enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent."
21
It is
worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough
after four generations.
22
The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of 1901,
23
amended in a significant way,
only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a
Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly,
24
It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to
transact business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time."
25
Two years after the establishment of independence of the Republic of
the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948
26
was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of
Appeals, Courts of First Instance,
27
the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal
Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased.
28
Under a 1978 Presidential
Decree, there would be forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions.
29
Special courts were
likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954,
30
next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955,
31
and then in the
same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955,
32
subsequently followed by the creation of two other such
courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966.
33
In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same
qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance.
34

4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After
setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed
legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain objectives of the
reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which
do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary
leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction
of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than diminish its
jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in
the proposed Bill."
35
In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to
the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there
was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No.
42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report
were not availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some
amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred,
following the public hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of
the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government."
36
Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would,
firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by
the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill,
together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the
exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future."
37
it may be observed that the volume containing
the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took
considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a
background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness.
What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the
Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith
suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr.
38
reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged
by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the
abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold
office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does
not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith."
39
The
above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor,
40
two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having
preceded it.
41
As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition
is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition
becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa
42
cannot be any clearer. This is a quo
warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936,
43
a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth,
amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute,
petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District,
under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the same, with
respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position
This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence
of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the
abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act
No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district
comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or
otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National
Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the
Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The
principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation
of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed;
937)"
44
justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move
deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the
view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application
of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the
unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding
security of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil
purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to
the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative department
and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under
these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater
necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were
approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing for the
vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt
should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power."
45

6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No.
2347
46
on the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007
47
on the reorganization of all branches of the government,
including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by new courts with the same
appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth
Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the
mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or
otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions."
48
The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court,
49

regional trial courts,
50
metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region,
51
and other metropolitan trial courts,
52
municipal trial courts
in cities,
53
as well as in municipalities,
54
and municipal circuit trial courts.
55
There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing
inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to
the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The
choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears mentioning that in
Brillo v. Eage
56
this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda
question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha
quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de
un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 aos de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar
juzgados no constitucionales."
57
Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the
Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de
Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local."
58
The present case is anything
but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the
Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed
legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals
59
gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The
first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance
with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit
Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as
declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall
cease to hold the office."
60
There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by
petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren
form of words. The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that antedated
the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the 1934
Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, subject to the
fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand,
unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social group."
61
The above
excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil.
62
Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once
again the principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63
"obtains not
through express provision but by actual division."
64
The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the
Republic of the Philippines."
65
Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935
Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise."
66
Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks
categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines."
67
As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created
the position of President as the "symbolic head of state."
68
In addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government
exercising the executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet
69
Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the light of
the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor
70
could state: "The adoption of certain aspects
of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character."
71
The retention, however, of the
position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the
Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen
other members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of
government that is now operative.
72
What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is
likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out
national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang
73
it was stressed
that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve
unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the
executive and the legislative branches."
74

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by
incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did
not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts.
75
Moreover, this Court is em
powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal."
76
Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.
77
Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure
to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the
case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only
by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude
any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance
with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the
former is to be preferred.
78
There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to
avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuez v. Sandiganbayan,
79
promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that
other Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for.
The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the
direct fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the
Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself for approval."
80
Nor would such a step be unprecedented.
The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry
out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis."
81
It is true there is no such provision in
this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44.
82
Thus Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality.
83

9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific,
the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As
noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly
distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it
has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of
reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government, the
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where
the one leaves off and the other begins."
84
It is well to recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its
affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of
government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of
Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in
independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution
do not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'"
85
This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need
for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional
structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of
governmental coordination."
86
In the same way that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right,
there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of
power against power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power
to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more
careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the
statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial
Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be
authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597."
87
The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of
non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test
being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta:
88
"To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and
lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard
may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled
out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole."
89
The undeniably strong links that bind
the executive and legislative departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free
Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the
adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar,
Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'"
90
He warned against a "restrictive
approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation."
91
Further on this point from the same opinion" "The spectre of
the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers."
92
Another objection based
on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the
categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the
effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be
issued by the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding section."
93
The first sentence of the next section is even more
categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President."
94
Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.
95
In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of
the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically
abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office."
96
There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically
abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean
record justify their being named anew,
97
in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service.
98
It is equally
reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new
appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve
reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its
implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that
courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that
could be done, "there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
99
Where then is the
unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices
Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other two, members of
the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three
members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not
testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body.
100
Their work was limited, as set forth in the
Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There
could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over interior courts. It has
had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973
Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the
then Senate of the Philippines
101
consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not
inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United
States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and
foremost among them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform."
102
Also: "Thus the Chief Justice
cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at
the state level as well."
103

12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a
government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those
they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office
is a public trust."
104
That is more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does
so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of
tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice
undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their
knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The
independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is
not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care
and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in the national consciousness There is this farther thought to
consider. independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in
Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice,
105
there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those
appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows
them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the
judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in
spite of the power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised to reorganize inferior courts."
106
That is to recall one of
the greatest Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do
what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v.
Mariano,
107
The ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge
their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are
independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government."
108

There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences
to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its
solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of the
appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any
administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the
three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people
as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay
Transportation Company,
109
a decision promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional
rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of
influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act."
110
To that basic postulate underlying our
constitutional system, this Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. 112745 October 16, 1997
AQUILINO T. LARIN, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE COMMITTEE CREATED TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST AQUILINO T.
LARIN, COMPOSED OF FRUMENCIO A. LAGUSTAN, JOSE B. ALEJANDRINO AND JAIME M. MAZA, respondents.
Challenged in this petition is the validity of petitioner's removal from service as Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Incidentally, he questions Memorandum Order No. 164 issued by the Office of the President, which provides for
the creation of "A Committee to Investigate the Administrative Complaint Against Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of
Internal Revenue" as well as the investigation made in pursuance thereto, and Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993 which
found him guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from office.
Likewise, petitioner seeks to assail the legality of Executive Order No. 132, issued by President Ramos on October 26, 1993, which provides
for the "Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue," and of its implementing rules issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, namely: a)
Administrative Order No. 4-93, which provides for the "Organizational Structure and Statement of General Functions of Offices in the
National Office" and b) Administrative Order No. 5-93, which provides for "Redefining the Areas of Jurisdiction and Renumbering of Regional
And District Offices."
The antecedent facts of the instant case as succinctly related by the Solicitor General are as follows:
On September 18, 1992,
1
a decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting herein petitioner Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax
Officer, then Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-accused (except Justino E. Galban, Jr.) of the crimes of
violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 in Criminal Cases Nos. 14208-14209,
entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro T. Pareno, Justino E. Galban, Jr. and Potenciana N. Evangelista,
Accused," the dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is now rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 14208 and 14209 convicting accused Assistant Commissioner for Specific
Tax AQUILINO T. LARIN, Chief of the Alcohol Tax Division TEODORO P. PARENO, and Chief of the Revenue Accounting Division POTENCIANA
M. EVANGELISTA:
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
The fact of petitioner's conviction was reported to the President of the Philippines by the then Acting Finance Secretary Leong through a
memorandum dated June 4, 1993. The memorandum states, inter alia:
This is a report in the case of Assistant Commissioner AQUILINO T. LARIN of the Excise Tax Service, Bureau of Internal Revenue, a
presidential appointee, one of those convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 14208-14209, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Aquilino T. Larin,
et. al." referred to the Department of Finance by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The cases against Pareno and Evangelista are being acted upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as they are non-presidential appointees.
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear from the foregoing that Mr. Larin has been found beyond reasonable doubt to have committed acts constituting grave misconduct.
Under the Civil Service Laws and Rules which require only preponderance of evidence, grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal.
Acting by authority of the President, Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing issued Memorandum Order No. 164 dated
August 25, 1993 which provides for the creation of an Executive Committee to investigate the administrative charge against herein
petitioner Aquilino T. Larin. It states thus:
A Committee is hereby created to investigate the administrative complaint filed against Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of
Internal Revenue, to be composed of:
Atty. Frumencio A. Lagustan Chairman Assistant Executive Secretary for Legislation
Mr. Jose B. Alejandro Member Presidential Assistant
Atty. Jaime M. Maza Member Assistant Commissioner for Inspector Services Bureau of Internal Revenue
The Committee shall have all the powers and prerogatives of (an) investigating committee under the Administrative Code of 1987 including
the power to summon witnesses, administer oath or take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation by subpoena ad testificandum
and subpoena duces tecum.
xxx xxx xxx
The Committee shall convene immediately, conduct the investigation in the most expeditious manner, and terminate the same as soon as
practicable from its first scheduled date of hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the Committee directed the petitioner to respond to the administrative charge leveled against him through a letter dated
September 17, 1993, thus:
Presidential Memorandum Order No. 164 dated August 25, 1993, a xerox copy of which is hereto attached for your ready reference, created
an Investigation Committee to look into the charges against you which are also the subject of the Criminal Cases No. 14208 and 14209
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Aquilino T . Larin, et. al.
The Committee has in its possession a certified true copy of the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in the above-mentioned cases.
Pursuant to Presidential Memorandum Order No. 164, you are hereby directed to file your position paper on the aforementioned charges
within seven (7) days from receipt hereof . . . .
Failure to file the required position paper shall be considered as a waiver on your part to submit such paper or to be heard, in which case,
the Committee shall deem the case submitted on the basis of the documents and records at hand.
In compliance, petitioner submitted a letter dated September 30, 1993 which was addressed to Atty. Frumencio A. Lagustan, the Chairman of
the Investigating Committee. In said latter, he asserts that,
The case being sub-judice, I may not, therefore, comment on the merits of the issues involved for fear of being cited in contempt of Court.
This position paper is thus limited to furnishing the Committee pertinent documents submitted with the Supreme Court and other tribunal
which took cognizance of the case in the past, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing documents readily show that am not administratively liable or criminally culpable of the charges leveled against me, and that
the aforesaid cases are mere persecutions caused to be filed and are being orchestrated by taxpayers who were prejudiced by multi-million
peso assessments I caused to be issued against them in my official capacity as Assistant Commissioner, Excise Tax Office of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.
In the same letter, petitioner claims that the administrative complaint against him is already barred: a) on jurisdictional ground as the Office
of the Ombudsman had already taken cognizance of the case and had caused the filing only of the criminal charges against him, b) by res
judicata, c) by double jeopardy, and d) because to proceed with the case would be redundant, oppressive and a plain persecution against
him.
Meanwhile, the President issued the challenged Executive Order No. 132 dated October 26, 1993 which mandates for the streamlining of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Under said order, some positions and functions are either abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to
other offices, while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax Service, of which petitioner was the Assistant
Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished by said executive order.
The corresponding implementing rules of Executive Order No. 132, namely, Revenue Administrative Orders Nos. 4-93 and 5-93, were
subsequently issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
On October 27, 1993, or one day after the promulgation of Executive Order No. 132, the President appointed the following as BIR Assistant
Commissioners:
1. Bernardo A. Frianeza
2. Dominador L. Galura
3. Jaime D. Gonzales
4. Lilia C. Guillermo
5. Rizalina S. Magalona
6. Victorino C. Mamalateo
7. Jaime M. Maza
8. Antonio N. Pangilinan
9. Melchor S. Ramos
10. Joel L. Tan-Torres
Consequently, the President, in the assailed Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993, found petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement
benefits including disqualification for reappointment in the government service.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition on December 13, 1993 to question basically his alleged unlawful
removal from office.
On April 17, 1996 and while the instant petition is pending, this Court set aside the conviction of petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and
14209.
In his petition, petitioner challenged the authority of the President to dismiss him from office. He argued that in so far as presidential
appointees who are Career Executive Service Officers are concerned, the President exercises only the power of control not the power to
remove. He also averred that the administrative investigation conducted under Memorandum Order No. 164 is void as it violated his right to
due process. According to him, the letter of the Committee dated September 17, 1993 and his position paper dated September 30, 1993 are
not sufficient for purposes of complying with the requirements of due process. He alleged that he was not informed of the administrative
charges leveled against him nor was he given official notice of his dismissal.
Petitioner likewise claimed that he was removed as a result of the reorganization made by the Executive Department in the BIR pursuant to
Executive Order No. 132. Thus, he assailed said Executive Order No. 132 and its implementing rules, namely, Revenue Administrative Orders
4-93 and 5-93 for being ultra vires. He claimed that there is yet no law enacted by Congress which authorizes the reorganization by the
Executive Department of executive agencies, particularly the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He said that the reorganization sought to be
effected by the Executive Department on the basis of E.O. No. 132 is tainted with bad faith in apparent violation of Section 2 of R.A. 6656,
otherwise known as the Act Protecting the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization.
On the other hand. respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the
President. They also contended that E.O. No. 132 and its implementing rules were validly issued pursuant to Sections 48 and 62 of Republic
Act No. 7645. Apart from this, the other legal bases of E.O. No. 132 as stated in its preamble are Section 63 of E.O. No. 127 (Reorganizing the
Ministry of Finance), and Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. In addition, it is clear that
in Section 11 of R.A. No. 6656 future reorganization is expressly contemplated and nothing in said law that prohibits subsequent
reorganization through an executive order. Significantly, respondents clarified that petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of EO 132.
Respondents claimed that he was removed from office because he was found guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative cases filed
against him.
The ultimate issue to be resolved in the instant case falls on the determination of the validity of petitioner's dismissal from office.
Incidentally, in order to resolve this matter, it is imperative that We consider these questions: a) Who has the power to discipline the
petitioner?, b) Were the proceedings taken pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 164 in accord with due process?, c) What is the effect of
petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case to his administrative charge?, d) Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR or to
issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132?, and e) Is the reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted with bad faith?
At the outset, it is worthy to note that the position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career Executive Service.
2
Under the
law,
3
Career Executive Service officers, namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, are all appointed by the President. Concededly, petitioner was appointed as Assistant Commissioner in January,
1987 by then President Aquino. Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a
presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that
the "power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is
ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164, which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner,
was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President. This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no
reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is
characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that
of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987
Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section 36 of P.D. No. 807, as
amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy
security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential
appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is
likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in
accordance with procedural due process.
Was petitioner then removed from office for a legal cause under a valid proceeding?
Although the proceedings taken complied with the requirements of procedural due process, this Court, however, considers that petitioner
was not dismissed for a valid cause.
It should be noted that what precipitated the creation of the investigative committee to look into the administrative charge against petitioner
is his conviction by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209. As admitted by the respondents, the administrative case
against petitioner is based on the Sandiganbayan Decision of September 18, 1992. Thus, in the Administrative Order No. 101 issued by
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Quisumbing which found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct, it clearly states that:
This pertains to the administrative charge against Assistant Commissioner Aquilino T. Larin of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for grave
misconduct by virtue of a Memorandum signed by Acting Secretary Leong of the Department of Finance, on the basis of a decision handed
down by the Hon. Sandiganbayan convicting Larin, et. al. in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209.
4

In a nutshell, the criminal cases against petitioner refer to his alleged violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and
of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 as a consequence of his act of favorably recommending the grant of tax credit to Tanduay Distillery, Inc.. The
pertinent portion of the judgment of the Sandiganbayan reads:
As above pointed out, the accused had conspired in knowingly preparing false memoranda and certification in order to effect a fraud upon
taxes due to the government. By their separate acts which had resulted in an appropriate tax credit of P180,701,682.00 in favor of Tanduay.
The government had been defrauded of a tax revenue for the full amount, if one is to look at the availments or utilization thereof (Exhibits
"AA" to "AA- 31-a"), or for a substantial portion thereof (P73,000,000.00) if we are to rely on the letter of Deputy Commissioner Eufracio D.
Santos (Exhibits "21" for all the accused).
As pointed out above, the confluence of acts and omissions committed by accused Larin, Pareno and Evangelista adequately prove
conspiracy among them for no other purpose than to bring about a tax credit which Tanduay did not deserve. These misrepresentations as
to how much Tanduay had paid in ad valorem taxes obviously constituted a fraud of tax revenue of the government . . . .
5

However, it must be stressed at this juncture that the conviction of petitioner by the Sandiganbayan was set aside by this Court in our
decision promulgated on April 17, 1996 in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and 107119-20. We specifically ruled in no uncertain terms that: a)
petitioner can not be held negligent in relying on the certification of a co-equal unit in the BIR, b) it is not incumbent upon Larin to go beyond
the certification made by the Revenue Accounting Division that Tanduay Distillery, Inc. had paid the ad valorem taxes, c) there is nothing
irregular or anything false in Larin's marginal note on the memorandum addressed to Pareno, the Chief of Alcohol Tax Division who was also
one of the accused, but eventually acquitted, in the said criminal cases, and d) there is no proof of actual agreement between the accused,
including petitioner, to commit the illegal acts charged. We are emphatic in our resolution in said cases that there is nothing "illegal with the
acts committed by the petitioner(s)." We also declare that "there is no showing that petitioner(s) had acted irregularly, or performed acts
outside of his (their) official functions." Significantly, these acts which. We categorically declare to be not unlawful and improper in G.R. Nos.
108037-38 and G.R. Nos. 107119-20 are the very same acts for which petitioner is held to be administratively responsible. Any charge of
malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of the petitioner is clearly belied by our conclusion in said cases. In the light of this decisive
pronouncement, We see no reason for the administrative charge to continue it must, thus, be dismissed.
We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission, the
dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry with it the relief from
administrative liability.
6
However, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well
within the exception. Corollarily, where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action
which was later on set aside by this Court upon a categorical and clear finding that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are
not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action
against him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.
On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner was given every chance to present his side. The rule is well settled
that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
any evidence he may have in support of his defense.
7
The records clearly show that on October 1, 1993 petitioner submitted his letter-
response dated September 30, 1993 to the administrative charge filed against him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted various
documents attached as annexes to his letter, all of which are evidences supporting his defense. Prior to this, he received a letter dated
September 17, 1993 from the Investigation Committee requiring him to explain his side concerning the charge. It can not therefore be
argued that petitioner was denied of due process.
Let us now examine Executive Order No. 132.
As stated earlier, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 132, some of the positions and offices, including the office of Excise Tax Services of
which petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, were abolished or otherwise decentralized. Consequently, the President released the list
of appointed Assistant Commissioners of the BIR. Apparently, petitioner was not included.
We do not agree.
Under its preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down the legal bases of its issuance, namely: a) Section 48 and 62 of R.A. No. 7645, b) Section 63 of E.O.
No. 127, and c) Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices
and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and
which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. . . . Actual scaling down, phasing out or
abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. (emphasis
ours)
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices
or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62, which
provides that:
Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges. Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
organizational unit of charges in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures
and be funded from appropriations by this Act. (emphasis ours)
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational charges including the creation of offices in
the department or agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant consideration. Well settled is the rule that every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality.
8
Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same
is valid and biding for all intents and purposes.
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states:
Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President
in accordance with law. (emphasis ours)
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then which gives him the power to reorganize?
It is Presidential Decree No. 1772
9
which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the
Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked."
10
So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees. Significantly, the Constitution itself
recognizes future reorganizations in the government as what is revealed in Section 16 of Article XVIII, thus:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from service not for cause but as a result of the . . . reorganization following the ratification
of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay . . .
However, We can not consider E.O. No. 127 signed on January 30, 1987 as a legal basis for the reorganization of the BIR. E.O. No. 127 should
be related to the second paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6656.
Section 11 provides inter alia:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies which are authorized by executive orders
promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety days from the approval of this act within which to implement their respective
reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (emphasis ours)
Executive Order No. 127 was part of the 1987 reorganization contemplated under said provision. Obviously, it had become stale by virtue of
the expiration of the ninety day deadline period. It can not thus be used as a proper basis for the reorganization of the BIR. Nevertheless, as
shown earlier, there are other legal bases to sustain the authority of the President to issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132.
While the President's power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however that the reorganization itself is properly made in
accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. Thus, in Dario vs.
Mison, this Court has had the occasion to clarify that:
As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In
that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would
not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab
initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are belied by
the existence of ample funds.
11

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Section 2 of R. A. No. 6656 lists down the circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of
employees as a result of the reorganization, thus:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause
for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to
merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law.
The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of
the reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the
same functions as the original offices;
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
A reading of some of the provisions of the questioned E.O. No. 132 clearly leads us to an inescapable conclusion that there are circumstances
considered as evidences of bad faith in the reorganization of the BIR.
Section 1.1.2 of said executive order provides that:
1.1.2 The Intelligence and Investigation Office and the Inspection Service are abolished. An Intelligence and Investigation Service is hereby
created to absorb the same functions of the abolished office and service. . . . (emphasis ours)
This provision is a clear illustration of the circumstance mentioned in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 6656 that an office is abolished and another
one performing substantially the same function is created.
Another circumstance is the creation of services and divisions in the BIR resulting to a significant increase in the number of positions in the
said bureau as contemplated in paragraph (a) of Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656. Under Section 1.3 of E.O. No. 132, the Information Systems Group
has two newly created Systems Services. Aside from this, six new divisions are also created. Under Section 1.2.1, three more divisions of the
Assessment Service are formed. With these newly created offices, there is no doubt that a significant increase of positions will
correspondingly follow.
Furthermore, it is perceivable that the non-reappointment of the petitioner as Assistant Commissioner violates Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656.
Under said provision, officers holding permanent appointments are given preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved
staffing pattern comparable to their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions to positions next lower in rank. It
is undeniable that petitioner is a career executive officer who is holding a permanent position. Hence, he should have been given preference
for appointment in the position of Assistant Commissioner. As claimed by petitioner, Antonio Pangilinan who was one of those appointed as
Assistant Commissioner, "is an outsider of sorts to the Bureau, not having been an incumbent officer of the Bureau at the time of the
reorganization." We should not lose sight of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656 which explicitly states that no new
employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers shall have been appointed for permanent position.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is hereby reinstated to his position as Assistant Commissioner without
loss of seniority rights and shall be entitled to full backwages from the time of his separation from service until actual reinstatement unless,
in the meanwhile, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years in which case, he shall be deemed to have retired
at such age and entitled thereafter to the corresponding retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.





























































G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993.
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and VIOLETA L.
GARCIA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Raul R. Estrella for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 649; REORGANIZED LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION TO NALTDRA; EXPRESSLY
PROVIDED THE ABOLITION OF EXISTING POSITIONS. Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the now
defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA. The question of whether or not a law abolishes
an office is one of legislative intent about which there can be no controversy whatsoever if there is an explicit declaration in the law itself. A
closer examination of Executive Order No. 649 which authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in express terms, provided for the abolition of
existing positions. Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all
positions in the Land Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a position does
not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom. (Arao vs.
Luspo, 20 SCRA 722 [1967]) After abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from
the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. (De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 [1982])
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION, VALID WHEN PURSUED IN GOOD FAITH; CASE AT BAR. Nothing is better settled in our law than that
the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Two questions therefore
arise: (1) was the abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in good faith? There is no dispute over the authority to
carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution. The
power to reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held in Dario vs. Mison that reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded
as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. This court has pronounced that if the newly created office has substantially new, different
or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even though it
embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different
one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office. Executive Order
No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is
carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar
membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new development of the
times. Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus
clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather,
it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS NO VESTED PROPERTY RIGHT TO BE RE-EMPLOYED IN A REORGANIZED OFFICE; CASE AT BAR. There is no
such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. None of the exceptions to
this rule are obtaining in this case. To reiterate, the position which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was abolished
pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to be re employed in a reorganized
office. Not being a member of the Bar, the minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for permanent appointment as
Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her former position without violating the express mandate of the law.
D E C I S I O N
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether or not membership in the bar, which is the qualification requirement prescribed
for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied
only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and
implementation of the abovesaid Executive Order.
The facts, as succinctly stated in the Resolution ** of the Civil Service Commission, are as follows:
"The records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy
Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to
which position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. She was for two years, more or less,
designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February
9, 1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of
Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of Justice
but her request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion remained unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner
Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending decision, her
temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of
Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving
bribe money". Said Memorandum of Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency
Review Committee which in turn referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
In its Order dated July 6, 1987, the MSPB dropped the appeal of petitioner Garcia on the ground that since the termination of her services
was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment, her separation is in order. Her motion for reconsideration was denied on similar
ground." 1
However, in its Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission directed that private respondent Garcia be restored to her
position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right theory the new requirement of
BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under said Executive Order,
would not apply to her (private respondent Garcia) but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions on or after February 9, 1981, the date
said Executive Order took effect." 3 A fortiori, since private respondent Garcia had been holding the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II
from 1977 to September 1984, she should not be affected by the operation on February 1, 1981 of Executive Order No. 649.
Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the above Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. It contends that
Sections 8 and 10 of Executive Order No. 649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and transferred their functions to the appropriate
new offices created by said Executive Order, which newly created offices required the issuance of new appointments to qualified office
holders. Verily, Executive Order No. 649 applies to private respondent Garcia, and not being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to
her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II.
We find merit in the petition.
Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued
to all employees of the NALTDRA.
The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of legislative intent about which there can be no controversy whatsoever if
there is an explicit declaration in the law itself. 4 A closer examination of Executive Order No. 649 which authorized the reorganization of the
Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), reveals that said law
in express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions, to wit:
Sec. 8. Abolition of Existing Positions in the Land Registration Commission . . .
All structural units in the Land Registration Commission and in the registries of deeds, and all Positions therein shall cease to exist from the
date specified in the implementing order to be issued by the President pursuant to the preceding paragraph. Their pertinent functions,
applicable appropriations, records, equipment and property shall be transferred to the appropriate staff or offices therein created.
(Emphasis Supplied.)
Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land
Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a position does not involve or mean
removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom. 5 After abolition, there is in
law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. 6
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers
from no infirmity. Two questions therefore arise: (1) was the abolition carried out by a legitimate body?; and (2) was it done in good faith?
There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government. Under Section 9,
Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, the applicable law at that time:
Sec. 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this Constitution
vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices upon the appointment and qualifications of their successors.
The power to reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held in Dario vs. Mison 7 that reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been
regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. This court has pronounced 8 that if the newly created office has substantially new,
different or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even
though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or
different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office.
Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. 9 A
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. 10 To this end, the
requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new
development of the times. 11 Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such
qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The additional qualification was not intended to remove
her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
A final word, on the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent Civil Service Commission. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an
estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. 12 None of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case.
To reiterate, the position which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a
valid reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to be re employed in a reorganized office. Not being a member of the Bar, the
minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be
reinstated to her former position without violating the express mandate of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the questioned Resolution of the Civil Service
Commission reinstating private respondent to her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 152845 August 5, 2003
DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY TAGABAN, RICARDO SARANDI, SUSAN IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN DEMDEM, RODOLFO
DAGA, EDGARDO BACLIG, GREGORIO LABAYAN, HILARIO JEREZ, and MARIA CORAZON CUANANG, Petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, represented by ANTONIO DE GUZMAN and PERLITA BAULA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
President Joseph Estrada issued on 30 September 1998 Executive Order No. 29, entitled "Mandating the Streamlining of the National
Tobacco Administration (NTA)," a government agency under the Department of Agriculture. The order was followed by another issuance, on
27 October 1998, by President Estrada of Executive Order No. 36, amending Executive Order No. 29, insofar as the new staffing pattern was
concerned, by increasing from four hundred (400) to not exceeding seven hundred fifty (750) the positions affected thereby. In compliance
therewith, the NTA prepared and adopted a new Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP) which, on 29 October 1998, was
submitted to the Office of the President.
On 11 November 1998, the rank and file employees of NTA Batac, among whom included herein petitioners, filed a letter-appeal with the
Civil Service Commission and sought its assistance in recalling the OSSP. On 04 December 1998, the OSSP was approved by the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) subject to certain revisions. On even date, the NTA created a placement committee to assist the
appointing authority in the selection and placement of permanent personnel in the revised OSSP. The results of the evaluation by the
committee on the individual qualifications of applicants to the positions in the new OSSP were then disseminated and posted at the central
and provincial offices of the NTA.
On 10 June 1996, petitioners, all occupying different positions at the NTA office in Batac, Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of
termination of their employment with the NTA effective thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Finding themselves without any immediate
relief from their dismissal from the service, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte, and prayed -
"1) that a restraining order be immediately issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the notice of termination addressed
individually to the petitioners and/or from committing further acts of dispossession and/or ousting the petitioners from their respective
offices;
"2) that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the respondents, commanding them to maintain the status quo to protect the
rights of the petitioners pending the determination of the validity of the implementation of their dismissal from the service; and
"3) that, after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered declaring the notice of termination of the petitioners illegal and the reorganization
null and void and ordering their reinstatement with backwages, if applicable, commanding the respondents to desist from further
terminating their services, and making the injunction permanent."
1

The RTC, on 09 September 2000, ordered the NTA to appoint petitioners in the new OSSP to positions similar or comparable to their
respective former assignments. A motion for reconsideration filed by the NTA was denied by the trial court in its order of 28 February 2001.
Thereupon, the NTA filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, raising the following issues:
"I. Whether or not respondents submitted evidence as proof that petitioners, individually, were not the best qualified and most deserving
among the incumbent applicant-employees.
"II. Whether or not incumbent permanent employees, including herein petitioners, automatically enjoy a preferential right and the right of
first refusal to appointments/reappointments in the new Organization Structure And Staffing Pattern (OSSP) of respondent NTA.
"III. Whether or not respondent NTA in implementing the mandated reorganization pursuant to E.O. No. 29, as amended by E.O. No. 36,
strictly adhere to the implementing rules on reorganization, particularly RA 6656 and of the Civil Service Commission Rules on
Government Reorganization.
"IV. Whether or not the validity of E.O. Nos. 29 and 36 can be put in issue in the instant case/appeal."
2

On 20 February 2002, the appellate court rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the assailed orders of the trial court.
Petitioners went to this Court to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals, contending that -
"I. The Court of Appeals erred in making a finding that went beyond the issues of the case and which are contrary to those of the trial court
and that it overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion;
"II. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding Executive Order Nos. 29 and 36 of the Office of the President which are mere administrative
issuances which do not have the force and effect of a law to warrant abolition of positions and/or effecting total reorganization;
"III. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners removal from the service is in accordance with law;
"IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent NTA was not guilty of bad faith in the termination of the services of petitioners;
(and)
"V. The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring case law/jurisprudence in the abolition of an office."
3

In its resolution of 10 July 2002, the Court required the NTA to file its comment on the petition. On 18 November 2002, after the NTA had
filed its comment of 23 September 2002, the Court issued its resolution denying the petition for failure of petitioners to sufficiently show any
reversible error on the part of the appellate court in its challenged decision so as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in the Courts resolution of 20 January 2002.
On 21 February 2003, petitioners submitted a "Motion to Admit Petition For En Banc Resolution" of the case allegedly to address a basic
question, i.e., "the legal and constitutional issue on whether the NTA may be reorganized by an executive fiat, not by legislative action."
4
In
their "Petition for an En Banc Resolution" petitioners would have it that -
"1. The Court of Appeals decision upholding the reorganization of the National Tobacco Administration sets a dangerous precedent in that:
"a) A mere Executive Order issued by the Office of the President and procured by a government functionary would have the effect of a
blanket authority to reorganize a bureau, office or agency attached to the various executive departments;
b) The President of the Philippines would have the plenary power to reorganize the entire government Bureaucracy through the issuance of
an Executive Order, an administrative issuance without the benefit of due deliberation, debate and discussion of members of both chambers
of the Congress of the Philippines;
c) The right to security of tenure to a career position created by law or statute would be defeated by the mere adoption of an Organizational
Structure and Staffing Pattern issued pursuant to an Executive Order which is not a law and could thus not abolish an office created by law;
"2. The case law on abolition of an office would be disregarded, ignored and abandoned if the Court of Appeals decision subject matter of this
Petition would remain undisturbed and untouched. In other words, previous doctrines and precedents of this Highest Court would in effect
be reversed and/or modified with the Court of Appeals judgment, should it remain unchallenged.
"3. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 245 dated July 24, 1987 (Annex D, Petition), issued by the Revolutionary government of former
President Corazon Aquino, and the law creating NTA, which provides that the governing body of NTA is the Board of Directors, would be
rendered meaningless, ineffective and a dead letter law because the challenged NTA reorganization which was erroneously upheld by the
Court of Appeals was adopted and implemented by then NTA Administrator Antonio de Guzman without the corresponding authority from
the Board of Directors as mandated therein. In brief, the reorganization is an ultra vires act of the NTA Administrator.
"4. The challenged Executive Order No. 29 issued by former President Joseph Estrada but unsigned by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora would in effect be erroneously upheld and given legal effect as to supersede, amend and/or modify Executive Order No. 245, a law
issued during the Freedom Constitution of President Corazon Aquino. In brief, a mere executive order would amend, supersede and/or
render ineffective a law or statute."
5

In order to allow the parties a full opportunity to ventilate their views on the matter, the Court ultimately resolved to hear the parties in oral
argument. Essentially, the core question raised by them is whether or not the President, through the issuance of an executive order, can
validly carry out the reorganization of the NTA.
Notwithstanding the apparent procedural lapse on the part of petitioner to implead the Office of the President as party respondent pursuant
to Section 7, Rule 3, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
6
this Court resolved to rule on the merits of the petition.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora
7
ruled that the President, based on existing laws, had the authority to carry out a reorganization in any
branch or agency of the executive department. In said case, Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB challenged the issuance, and sought the nullification, of
Executive Order No. 191 (Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau) and Executive Order No. 223 (Supplementary
Executive Order No. 191 on the Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau and for Other Matters) on the ground
that they were issued by the President with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure. The
Court explained:
"The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal
precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by
authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that
brought it into existence.
"The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the Presidents power of
control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures. The case in point is Larin v. Executive Secretary [280 SCRA 713]. In this case, it was argued that there is no law
which empowers the President to reorganize the BIR. In decreeing otherwise, this Court sustained the following legal basis, thus:
"`Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President to issue E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize the BIR.
`We do not agree.
`x x x x x x
`Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
``Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices
and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and
which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or
abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.
`Said provision clearly mentions the acts of `scaling down, phasing out and abolition of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices
or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which
provides that:
``Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures
and be funded from appropriations by this Act.
`The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the
department or agency concerned.
`x x x x x x
`Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states:
``Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President
in accordance with law.
`This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of
these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that `all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letter
of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked. So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.
"Now, let us take a look at the assailed executive order.
"In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745
(FY 1999 General Appropriations Act), a provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645 quoted in Larin, thus:
"`Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or
organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and funded from
appropriations provided by this Act.
"We adhere to the x x x ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the
department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this
law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a
comprehensive review of this respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and
procedures; (b) identify activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out
or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respective
agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization and
operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. The law has spoken clearly.
We are left only with the duty to sustain.
"But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have
to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31,
Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to
the Office of the President. In Canonizado vs. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312], we ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an alteration of
the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The
EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize.
"It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive
department, what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been
regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in `good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence
of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation."
8

The Court of Appeals, in its now assailed decision, has found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the NTA; thus -
"In the case at bar, we find no evidence that the respondents committed bad faith in issuing the notices of non-appointment to the
petitioners.
"Firstly, the number of positions in the new staffing pattern did not increase. Rather, it decreased from 1,125 positions to 750. It is thus
natural that ones position may be lost through the removal or abolition of an office.
"Secondly, the petitioners failed to specifically show which offices were abolished and the new ones that were created performing
substantially the same functions.
"Thirdly, the petitioners likewise failed to prove that less qualified employees were appointed to the positions to which they applied.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Fourthly, the preference stated in Section 4 of R.A. 6656, only means that old employees should be considered first, but it does not
necessarily follow that they should then automatically be appointed. This is because the law does not preclude the infusion of new blood,
younger dynamism, or necessary talents into the government service, provided that the acts of the appointing power are bonafide for the
best interest of the public service and the person chosen has the needed qualifications."
9

These findings of the appellate court are basically factual which this Court must respect and be held bound.
It is important to emphasize that the questioned Executive Orders No. 29 and No. 36 have not abolished the National Tobacco
Administration but merely mandated its reorganization through the streamlining or reduction of its personnel. Article VII, Section
17,
10
of the Constitution, expressly grants the President control of all executive departments, bureaus, agencies and offices which may justify
an executive action to inactivate the functions of a particular office or to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
11

Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 8522 (General Appropriations Act of FY 1998) has decreed that the President may
direct changes in the organization and key positions in any department, bureau or agency pursuant to Article VI, Section 25,
12
of the
Constitution, which grants to the Executive Department the authority to recommend the budget necessary for its operation. Evidently, this
grant of power includes the authority to evaluate each and every government agency, including the determination of the most economical
and efficient staffing pattern, under the Executive Department.
In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo D. Zamora, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, et al.,
13
this Court
has had occasion to also delve on the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31(2) and (3) of Executive
Order No. 292 and the power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. The Court has there observed:
"x x x. Under Section 31(1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31(2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to
reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring
functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa."
The provisions of Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10, of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), above-referred to, reads
thusly:
"SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
"(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
"(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of
the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
"(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other departments and agencies."
The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the
grant to the President of the power to reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section 31(1) of Executive Order No. 292
specifically refers to the Presidents power to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units hereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, while Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive
offices outside the Office of the President Proper allowing the President to transfer any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency and vice-versa.
14

In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general
provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within
the authority of President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that
this Court could only but accept.
15

In passing, relative to petitioners "Motion for an En Banc Resolution of the Case," it may be well to remind counsel, that the Court En Banc is
not an appellate tribunal to which appeals from a Division of the Court may be taken. A Division of the Court is the Supreme Court as fully
and veritably as the Court En Banc itself and a decision of its Division is as authoritative and final as a decision of the Court En Banc.
Referrals of cases from a Division to the Court En Banc do not take place as just a matter of routine but only on such specified grounds as the
Court in its discretion may allow.
16

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course. No costs.
SO ORDERED.