[G.R. No. 110427.

February 24, 1997]

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal
guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his
wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
NARVASA, C.J .:
On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen
Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College
of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared
incompetent by judgment
[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
107,
[2]
in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista.
[3]
She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia.
Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and
estate.
Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon
City. On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced
a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to
eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.
[4]
The
complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff,
suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
The amended Complaint
[5]
pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the
absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that
out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children,
grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free;
that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced
age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for
support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian,
Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but
they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully
depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they ** (were)
enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they
** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent
** (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also
alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of
first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had
been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their
faithful service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and
the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by
which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Caiza's
favor,
[6]
the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay
Caiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
But on appeal,
[7]
the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96.
[8]
By judgment rendered on October 21, 1992,
[9]
the
RTC held that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should
be resolved isaccion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation **
demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession
cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court."
Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of
October 21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision
[10]
promulgated on
June 2, 1993, the Appellate Court
[11]
affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It
ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion
publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the
"defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or
occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of
Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of
the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by
the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, **
it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza that
defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and
possession, so much so that Caiza's supervening incompetency can not be
said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the
defendants out."
[12]

Through her guardian, Caiza came to this Court praying for reversal of
the Appellate Court's judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred
in (a) holding that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not
an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a xerox copy of an
alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case."
[13]

In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement,
[14]
the
Estradas insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful
detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had not been
obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as contemplated by
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises
could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never
became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against
them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been
occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen
Caiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the
holographic will of petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate." They
conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal
guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.
Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994,
[15]
and her heirs -- the
aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her
niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for
her.
[16]

Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action
is the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in
dispute; (b) assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as
Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and (c) assuming
an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista may
continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
I
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.
[17]
An inquiry into the averments of the amended
complaint in the Court of origin is thus in order.
[18]

The amended Complaint alleges:
[19]

"6. That the plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a house and
lot at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, which property is now the subject of this
complaint;
** ** **
9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law, were
allowed to live temporarily in the house of plaintiff, Carmen Caiza, for free, out of
her kindness;
10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly notified the defendants,
for them to vacate the said house, but the two (2) letters of demand were ignored and
the defendants refused to vacate the same. **
11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista, made
another demand on the defendants for them to vacate the premises, before Barangay
Captain Angelina A. Diaz of Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, but after two (2)
conferences, the result was negative and no settlement was reached. A photocopy of
the Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990; issued by said Barangay Captain is
attached, marked Annex "D" and made an integral part hereof;
12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30) days to vacate
the house, but they still refused to vacate the premises, and they are up to this time
residing in the said place;
13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent by the plaintiff to the defendants, by
her legal guardian -- Amparo Evangelista;
14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the possession of
the house in question, they are enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent plaintiff, because, while they are saving money by not paying any rent
for the house, the plaintiff is losing much money as her house could not be rented by
others;
15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently, so that
funds could be raised to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical
treatment;
16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61 Scout Tobias,
Quezon City, the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was compelled to go to court
for justice, and she has to spend P10,000.00 as attorney's fees."
Its prayer
[20]
is quoted below:
"WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff, Carmen
Caiza, represented by her legal guardian. Amparo Evangelista, respectfully prays to
this Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons-in-law and other
persons claiming under them, to vacate the house and premises at No. 61 Scout
Tobias, Quezon City, so that its possession can be restored to the plaintiff, Carmen
Caiza: and
2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
3. To pay the costs of the suit."
In essence, the amended complaint states:
1) that the Estradas were occupying Caiza's house by tolerance -- having been
"allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's) kindness;"
2) that Caiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health ** (was) failing
and she ** (needed) funds ** to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and
medical treatment;"
3) that through her general guardian, Caiza requested the Estradas several times,
orally and in writing, to give back possession of the house;
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the house to
Caiza, to her continuing prejudice; and
5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set
out. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that
the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient,
[21]
and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that
the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
[22]

The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the
institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They contend
that since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by
virtue of any contract, express or implied" -- they having been, to repeat,
"allowed to live temporarily ** (therein) for free, out of ** (Caiza's) kindness" -
- in no sense could there be an "expiration or termination of ** (their) right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an
action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they had
"deprived (Caiza) of the possession of ** (her property) by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth."
The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to
occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right
of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary
sense of fairness clearly require that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less
certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning
the house to Caiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court
adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
[23]
The
situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but
who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is
deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the
date of the demand to vacate.
[24]
In other words, one whose stay is merely
tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the
moment he is required to leave.
[25]
Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court
of Appeals,
[26]
where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant
upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill
its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand
and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing possession ** became illegal and the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the ** (plant's owner) was its proper
remedy."
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had
been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the
complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last
demand,
[27]
the reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of
action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in
the premises.
[28]
Now, the complaint filed by Caiza's guardian alleges that the
same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of demand
dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord with law
because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February
27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was actually
filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year from the second (last)
written demand to vacate.
The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express
permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as
was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her
judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so.
Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a will
bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not
give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the
theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership
being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and
until the will is duly probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas
had no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or
sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by
sufferance, that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of
possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as owners
is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property had
allegedly been bequeathed to them -- an event which still has to take place; in
other words; prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by
them would be premature and inefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the
circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e.,
possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the
proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary
action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to
possession de jure.
II
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly
denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it
may be changed or revoked;
[29]
and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit:
"No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.).
[30]
An owner's
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his
tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was
sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she
needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general
guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her
Letters of Guardianship
[31]
dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as
the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN
CAIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said
incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to
perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties **
"
[32]
By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's
person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being,
with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends.
[33]
It
also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control
over, Caiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle
that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her
incompetency.
[34]
That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right
to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it,
[35]
and
bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
[36]

Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely
discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of
the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
"SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of
ward. A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste,
and apply the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the
comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and
if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or
encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such
of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance."
Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the
ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
competence to resolve. "the issue of ownership ** only to determine the issue
of possession."
[37]

III
As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of
this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing
that Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo
Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal
personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian
and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward,
[38]
the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as
niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the
other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by
Resolution of this Court
[39]
of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as
parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
[40]

"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the
deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear
within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of
a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and
the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's
demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her
guardian.
[41]
That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death;
her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal
at bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 -- affirming the Regional Trial Court's
judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari -- is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-860 December 21, 1993
ELPIDIO SY, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE EMELITA HABACON-GARAYBLAS, in her capacity as presiding Judge of Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 7, respondents.
Federico D. Ricafort for petitioner.
Eriberto D. Ignacio for respondent.

QUIASON, J .:
In a sworn complaint dated July 1, 1993, Elpidio Sy charged Judge Emelita Habacon-Garayblas of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila with gross ignorance of the law, partiality and knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment or order, in relation to Civil Case No. 131430-CV, and ejectment case entitled "System
Realty Development Corporation vs. Maria P. Garcia." Complainant is the duly authorized representative of the
System Realty Development Corporation.
On June 16, 1992, respondent rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff in said case (Annex "A") and on
August 20, 1992, she issued a writ of execution (Annex "C"). A Notice to Vacate was served on defendant on
August 21, 1992, giving her three days within which to leave the subject premises (Annex "D").
According to complainant, when Sheriff Samuel Caballes was about to enforce the writ of execution,
respondent whimsically and illegally stopped the implementation thereof by issuing an Order dated August 24,
1992, directing the sheriff "to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Execution issued by the Court
dated August 20, 1992" (Annex "E"). The basis of the order was an unverified Manifestation filed by one Dr.
Peter B. Flores, who claimed to be the occupant of the subject premises (Annex "F").
Complainant alleged that respondent maliciously and unlawfully refused to lift the questioned Order despite
several motions and pleadings to lift the same (Annexes "G", "G-1", "G-2", and "G-3"). Complainant even filed a
petition for mandamus on October 13, 1992, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila to compel
respondent to implement the writ of execution.
In her comment dated August 19, 1992, respondent explained that her actions were justifiably taken to enable
her to judiciously resolve the issues of whether Dr. Flores was claiming rights under the defendant in Civil Case
No. 131430-CV and whether the writ of execution may be enforced against him. Thus, respondent issued an
order dated September 12, 1992, setting the Manifestation for hearing on October 12, 1992 and directing the
sheriff to hold in abeyance the implementation of the writ of execution. On October 13, 1992, the day following
the hearing, complainant filed the petition for mandamus.
Respondent averred that the Regional Trial Court, acting on the petition for mandamus, issued an order
directing her to elevate the records of the case to said court. She also noted that the complainant filed a motion
for withdrawal of the petition for mandamus on July 19, 1993, which motion had not yet been acted upon.
Neither have the records of the case been returned to respondent's sala.
We find respondent's explanation satisfactory.
As admitted by complainant, possession of the subject premises was claimed by Dr. Peter B. Flores, a third
party or stranger to the ejectment case. Thus, respondent's act of suspending the implementation of the writ of
execution was justified under the doctrine laid down in Sta. Ana v. Suga, 54 SCRA 36, 44 [1973]:
There may be cases when the actual possessor may be claimed to be a privy to any of the
parties to the action, or his bona-fide possession may be disputed, or where it is alleged, as in
the instant case, that such possession has been taken in connivance with the defeated litigant
with a view to frustrating the judgment. In any of these events, the proper procedure would be
to order a hearing on the matter of such possession and to deny or accede to the enforcement
of a writ of possession as the finding shall warrant. But in the absence of any such hearing or
any proceeding of similar character, every person in the actual possession of the land has a
right to be respected therein (Art. 446, Civil Code) and his ejectment would constitute
a deprivation of a property right without due process of law (citing2 Moran Rules of Court,
1970 ed., p. 36).
The fact that the manifestation filed by Dr. Flores was unverified does not militate against respondent taking
cognizance thereof. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. The court
may order the correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not
verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order that the end of justice may thereby be served (Villarica v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96085, March 16,
1992, First Division, Minute Resolution).
Complainant also cannot fault respondent for not resolving the several motions to lift the questioned Order
dated August 24, 1992. Respondent could not take action on the motions because complainant filed a petition
formandamus with the Regional Trial Court on October 13, 1992 to compel respondent to lift the questioned
order. As a consequence of said filing the records of the case were taken out in respondent's hands.
Complainant failed to show that respondent acted with bad faith, illegal motive and evident partiality in issuing
the order suspending the implementation of the writ of execution and in not acting on the motions filed by him.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondent is DIRECTED to
take action and resolve WITH DISPATCH the cases subject of this complaint.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118691. July 5, 1996]
ALEJANDRO BAYOG and JORGE PESAYCO, JR., petitioners, vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, and ALBERTO
MAGDATO,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J .:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul
the Order of 18 October 1994
[1]
of the respondent Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique, Branch 23, in Civil Case No.
2708, a petition for relief from judgment.
[2]
The Order set aside the final and
partly executed judgment
[3]
of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique, in an ejectment case, Civil Case
No. 262,
[4]
and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposition.
The antecedent facts are not disputed:
On 16 June 1973, petitioner Alejandro Bayog (hereinafter, BAYOG) and
private respondent Alberto Magdato (hereinafter, MAGDATO) entered into an
Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a lot with an area of 0.8 hectares located
in Centro Pojo, Bugasong, Antique,
[5]
with BAYOG as the LANDOWNER-
LESSOR and MAGDATO as TENANT-LESSEE. The contract commenced
with crop year 1975-1976 and expressly provided that matters not therein
stipulated would be governed by the provisions of R.A. No. 3344, as
amended.
On 19 April 1983, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, pursuant to P.D.
No. 27, R.A. No. 3844, and P.D. No. 1425, issued a Certificate of Agricultural
Leasehold
[6]
to MAGDATO, declaring that the latter had complied with all the
requirements to become the agricultural lessee of the land cultivated by him
and owned by BAYOG located in Centro Pojo, Bugasong, Antique. The
certificate enumerated the following rights of MAGDATO, inter alia:
1. He shall not be ejected, dispossessed, excluded, removed or ousted from his
farmholding by any landowner, agricultural lessor or anybody except when his
disposition has been authorized by the proper court;
2. He shall have the right to peaceful possession, cultivation and enjoyment of his
farmholding;
3. He shall have the right against conversion of the farmholding into . . . any non-
agricultural use or to the production of any other crop by the landowner . . . or
anybody acting for and in his behalf, without prior approval of the proper authorities
and payment of disturbance compensation. . . .
On 3 September 1990, BAYOG, in consideration of P250,000.00,
executed a so-called Deed of Equitable Mortgage, with right of redemption
within five years, in favor of Santiago Pesayco. The document covered four
parcels of unregistered riceland in Bugasong, Antique, with a total area of
30,187 square meters.
[7]

In a letter dated 19 October 1992, BAYOG asked MAGDATO to remove
his (MAGDATO's) house from BAYOG's land. BAYOG explained that the
house was an obstacle to the cultivation of the land by Jorge Pesayco, Jr., the
brother and civil law lessee of Santiago Pesayco.
[8]

As MAGDATO did not comply, BAYOG and Jorge Pesayco, Jr. filed with
the Third MCTC of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique, a complaint,
dated 26 November 1992, for "Ejectment and/or Abatement of Nuisance with
Prayer for Demolition," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 262.
[9]

In its Order of 15 December 1992, the MCTC declared that the case fell
under the Rule on Summary Procedure and directed the issuance of
summons which, together with complaint, was served on MAGDATO on 11
January 1993.
[10]

MAGDATO had then ten days from service of summons (or until 22
January 1993) to file his Answer,
[11]
but he filed it only on 25 January 1993. In
his Answer, MAGDATO admitted BAYOG's ownership of the lot, but asserted
that he was in actual possession thereof as BAYOG's agricultural lessee as
evidenced by the Agricultural Leasehold Contract executed on 17 June
1975. As defenses, MAGDATO alleged that the court had no jurisdiction over
the case, it being an agrarian dispute; and that he had not been able to
cultivate the land because plaintiff Jorge Pesayco, Jr. threatened to shoot
anyone who would work on it.
[12]

On 20 September 1993, the MCTC issued an Order
[13]
holding that since
MAGDATO's Answer was filed outside the reglementary period, it could not
take cognizance thereof without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of
B.P. Blg. 129. It then considered "needless" for the court to resolve all
pleadings subsequently filed, such as the answer; and then claiming authority
under Section 5
[14]
of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MCTC rendered
judgment in favor of plaintiffs BAYOG and Pesayco, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
defendant, as follows:
1. Ejecting defendant from the parcel of land plaintiff Alejandro Bayog described in
paragraph 2 of this complaint and ordering defendant to remove his house
therefrom before judgment becomes final and executory;
2. Ordering the Provincial Sheriff, or his defendant, to demolish and destroy
defendant's house on the above-mentioned land of plaintiff Alejandro Bayog, in case
defendant should fail to remove the same therefrom before judgment against him
becomes final and executory; and
3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the sum of P1,000.00,
Philippine Currency, as and by way of actual litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.
[15]

MAGDATO's counsel, Atty. Marcelo C. Josue, received a copy of the
Order on 11 October 1993.
[16]

On 16 December 1993, the MCTC issued an Order of
Execution
[17]
commanding the Provincial Sheriff or his deputy to eject
MAGDATO, his "attorney-in-fact, agent, or any other person acting on his
behalf" from the parcel of land in question and to "demolish and destroy"
MAGDATO's house standing thereon "should he fail to remove it before the
judgment against him becomes final."
The Sheriff's Return of Service
[18]
dated 26 January 1994 reported that the
order was personally served on MAGDATO on 24 January 1994, and upon
MAGDATO's receipt thereof, "he and any other person acting under his . . .
authority were ejected from the parcel of land . . . and his house was
demolished and destroyed." However, "there was no monetary satisfaction of
the judgment since [MAGDATO] refused to give the amount and he has no
real/personal properties [sic] that can be levied on execution."
On 9 February 1994, MAGDATO filed a petition for relief from judgment
with injunction and prayer to litigate as a pauper with the RTC of San Jose,
Antique, Branch 12 (Civil Case No. 2708). MAGDATO alleged therein that the
late filing of his answer was due to mistake or excusable neglect, for at the
time he received summons, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis
which restricted his mobility and sound judgment. Further, his illiteracy limited
his understanding of the English language, hence, he was unaware of the
"unextendible" 10-day period, and by the time he consulted a lawyer in San
Jose, Antique, said period had already lapsed. In fact, it was only when his
house was demolished in the latter part of January 1994, that he learned of
the judgment rendered against him.
MAGDATO further asserted that he had good, valid, and strong evidence
to counteract BAYOG's claim, and if given a chance to be heard, would prove
that he was a duly instituted tenant of BAYOG, as evidenced by copies of the
Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural
Leasehold. More importantly, this tenancy relationship had never been
terminated for cause. Finally, he contended that as the MCTC judgment had
already been partly executed, he was bereft of other avenues, to protect his
rights. He thus prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent
disturbance of his possession; that he be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis,
as he owned no real property as attested to by a certification from the Office
of the Municipal Assessor;
[19]
and that the MCTC judgment in Civil Case No.
262 be set aside and a new trial ordered.
[20]

On 19 May 1994, BAYOG filed a Motion to Dismiss
[21]
Civil Case No. 2708
on grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC; (b) failure of the
petition to state a cause of action; and (c) prescription and/or laches.
As to the first, BAYOG asserted that a petition for relief from judgment was
a prohibited pleading under Section 19(d) of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Moreover, the petition was not accompanied by the affidavit of
merit required by Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
Anent the second, BAYOG maintained that the petition did not contain a
statement of facts constituting fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. In any event, the cause of action was mooted by the partial
execution of the MCTC judgment, for it was settled that relief from judgment
was not available where the judgment had already been executed, without,
however, prejudice on the part of the aggrieved party to sue to recover the
property.
[22]

Finally, BAYOG contended that Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
required that petitions for relief from judgment be "filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment . . . to be set aside, and not more
than six (6) months after such judgment . . . was entered. . . ." Considering
that MAGDATO learned of the MCTC judgment through his lawyer on 11
October 1993 when the latter received a copy thereof, the 60-day period
expired on 12 December 1993. Since the petition for relief was filed only on 9
February 1994, it was then filed out of time.
On 22 June 1994, MAGDATO filed an Opposition
[23]
to the Motion to
Dismiss, to which BAYOG filed a Reply
[24]
on 7 July 1994.
On 16 September 1994, BAYOG filed another Motion to Dismiss Civil
Case No. 2708 on the ground that the petition for relief from judgment was not
accompanied by a sworn certification against forum-shopping as required by
Administrative Circular No. 9-94 of this Court.
[25]
MAGDATO filed his
Comment
[26]
thereto on 3 October 1994, while BAYOG filed a Reply
[27]
to the
Comment on 10 October 1994.
In its Order
[28]
of 18 October 1994, the RTC denied BAYOG's first and
second motions to dismiss and ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Civil Case No. 262 rendered by Judge Deogracias K.
del Rosario of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Patnongon-Bugasong and
Valderama is set aside and let this case be remanded back to that court for proper
disposal.
The grounds relied upon for the denial were: (1) that the petition for relief
from judgment is not a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure since the latter does not apply to Regional Trial Courts, per the
ruling in Jakihaca vs. Aquino;
[29]
(2) the petition states a cause of action as
MAGDATO, as shown in Annex "B" of the petition, is a tenant farmer who is
entitled to protection against ejectment; (3) the issue of prescription must yield
to the fact that MAGDATO is a tenant farmer, or his ejectment by the MCTC
was a violation of the law; (4) BAYOG and Pesayco did not come to court with
clean hands as they did not reveal the fact that MAGDATO is a holder of a
certificate of agricultural leasehold; (5) the MCTC should not have disregarded
MAGDATO's answer filed therein which showed that the MCTC had no
jurisdiction over the case; and (6) Administrative Circular No. 04-94 took effect
only on 1 April 1994, or before the filing of the petition for relief from judgment,
hence, it could not be given retroactive effect.
BAYOG's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
[30]
was denied on 12
December 1994.
[31]

Hence, BAYOG and Pesayco (hereinafter, Petitioners) filed this petition
for certiorari and ask us to set aside the above order. They reiterate their
arguments regarding the prohibition against petitions for relief from judgment;
maintain that Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is inconsistent with the letter and
spirit of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; allege that since
MAGDATO's Answer in Civil Case No. 262 was filed out of time, it should be
deemed not to have been filed at all, in lightof Lesaca vs. Court of
Appeals;
[32]
assert that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition for relief
from judgment since the decision challenged therein was already final and
executory; and characterize the Order in question as void as it directs the
conduct of a new trial, contrary to Section 19(c) of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
As to the petition for relief from judgment itself, the petitioners assert that it
was fatally defective for it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit; it was
filed out time; its subject matter had become moot and academic; and it is not
the proper remedy pursuant to Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca,
[33]
where
this Court held that the proper remedy was an action to annul the judgment
and enjoin its enforcement, if not yet carried into effect; or an action to recover
the property if the judgment had already been executed and the property of
the aggrieved party disposed of.
We required the respondents to Comment on the petition and issued a
temporary restraining order.
In his Comment, MAGDATO admits that his answer in Civil Case No. 262
was filed out of time; however, he insists that the MCTC should not have
disregarded it as it alleged the existence of a tenancy relationship between
the parties, thereby bringing the case beyond its jurisdiction, and within that of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
As to the affidavit of merit, MAGDATO countered that "the affidavit of merit
may be set forth in the petition itself and need not be in a separate document
(Consul vs. Consul, L-22713, July 26, 1966)," if the "facts constituting
petitioner's substantial cause of action or defense . . . are alleged in the
verified petition for the oath elevated the petition to the same category as a
separate affidavit (Fabar, Inc. vs. Rodelas, L-46394, Oct. 24, 1977)."
In their Reply to the Comment, the petitioners contend that while
MAGDATO used to be a tenant-lessee on another parcel of land of petitioner
BAYOG, this ceased when MAGDATO sold his tenancy rights, without
BAYOG's prior knowledge or consent, to Federico Valdevieso, Sr. under a
Deed of Mortgage of Tenancy Rights dated 31 August 1987. Valdevieso then
tilled the land and delivered to petitioner BAYOG the latter's share of the
harvest, as evidenced by the receipts of 5 December 1987, 10 April 1988, and
15 August 1988.
[34]
Then, in September 1989, Valdevieso, with petitioner
BAYOG's consent, sold his tenancy rights to Jose Bayog, as evidenced by the
3 May 1994 affidavit of Arturo P. Valdevieso, Federico's son.
[35]
The petitioners
then argue, citing Yabut vs. Lillies,
[36]
that the above Deed of Mortgage
"amounted to [MAGDATO's] declaration against his interest and an express
waiver of his tenancy rights" resulting in the extinguishment of the tenant-
lessor relationship between them.
We gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit
their memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
It must be noted that despite the effectivity of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure on 15 November 1991, the MCTC Judge still applied the
previous Rule on Summary Procedure in his 15 December 1992 order. While
it may be true that this did not affect the outcome of the case, judges are
expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and circulars
adopted by this Court which affect the conduct of cases before them.
Moreover, while it may be said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule
on Summary Procedure in Civil Case No. 262 since BAYOG's complaint for
ejectment therein suppressed the fact of an agrarian relationship between him
and MAGDATO, it should not have refrained from taking cognizance of
MAGDATO's Answer. Although filed late, the Answer asserted that the MCTC
had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship
between BAYOG and MAGDATO, which is clearly evidenced by their
Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold
issued in MAGDATO's favor by then President Marcos. While this
assertion, per se, did not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over
the ejectment case,
[37]
nevertheless, in view of MAGDATO's defense, the
MCTC should have heard and received the evidence for the precise purpose
of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case. And
upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should
have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
[38]
Verily, if indeed MAGDATO
were an agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of
jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
[39]

The MCTC should have met and ruled squarely, on the issue of
jurisdiction, instead of simply adopting a strange theory that it could not take
cognizance of the answer belatedly filed without exceeding its jurisdiction
under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Plainly, there is nothing in the said section
which bars the MCTC from taking cognizance of the answer. The Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not provide that
an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from the
records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a
defendant fails to file his answer. It must likewise be pointed out that
MAGDATO's defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even be raised in a
motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under
paragraph (a) of Section 19 thereof, which reads:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or
information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or
failure to comply with the preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of
trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory
order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third Party complaints;
(l) Interventions. (Italics supplied)
Worse, in its Order of 20 September 1993, the MCTC ordered MAGDATO
"to remove his house . . . before judgment becomes final and executory," and
the Provincial Sheriff to demolish and destroy [MAGDATO'S] house on the . . .
land of [BAYOG] in case [MAGDATO] should fail to remove the same . . .
before judgment against him becomes final and executory."
[40]
This was clearly
in violation of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 21 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such orders of "removal" and
"demolition" before the judgment becomes final and executory were obviously
intended to render futile any appeal which MAGDATO could interpose
therefrom pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Compounding this palpably oppressive and capricious Order, the MCTC,
in its Order of Execution
[41]
of 16 December 1993, directed the Provincial
Sheriff "to demolish and destroy defendant's [MAGDATO's] home standing in
the above-described parcel of land in case defendant should fail to remove
the same therefrom before judgment against him becomes final and
executory." And, in strict obedience to this said order, Sheriff IV Amando S.
Lapos, acting for the Ex-OfficioProvincial Sheriff, accompanied by Edgar
Tondares (Sheriff IV), the Barangay Captain of Centro Pojo, members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of Bugasong, Antique, as security escorts,
and BAYOG himself, served on MAGDATO the order of execution on 24
January 1994 and forthwith ejected MAGDATO from the land in question
and demolished and destroyed MAGDATO's house.
[42]

This was a clear abuse of authority or misuse of the strong arm of the
law. No demolition of MAGDATO's house could have been validly effected on
the day of service of the order of execution. MAGDATO should have been
afforded a reasonable period of time to remove his house, and only after he
failed to comply within the given period could a demolition order have been
issued by the court, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
[43]

We now turn to the acts of the RTC.
We disagree with the RTC's holding that a petition for relief from judgment
(Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca
[44]
ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment
[45]
of a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court,
[46]
it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding
petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court,
respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not
by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules
38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable
that no petition for relief from judgment nor a special civil action ofcertiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent
with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this
case, unless some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO, the grave
injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no fault or negligence
on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment
which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception
to the rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the
order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the
RTC correctly held that the circumstances alleged therein and the justification
pleaded worked in favor of MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. 2708 was without merit. And contrary to the petitioners' contention,
the petition for relief from judgment was filed within the period fixed in Section
3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 3. Time for filing of petition contents and verification. A petition for in either
of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside,
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
While the MCTC Order of 20 September 1993 was received by
MAGDATO's lawyer, Atty. Marcelo C. Josue, on 11 October 1993, the latter,
however, did not inform nor notify MAGDATO about it; worse, the said lawyer
took no action whatever after he received a copy of BAYOG's motion for
execution on 22 November 1993. MAGDATO learned of the Order of 20
September 1993 only on 24 January 1994, when he was served with a copy
of the Order of Execution.
[47]
MAGDATO filed the petition for relief from
judgment on 9 February 1994, or FIFTEEN days from the time he learned of
the judgment. BAYOG's insistence then that the period must be reckoned
from Atty. Josue's receipt of the Order on 11 October 1993 deserves scant
consideration. Under what we considered above as the unusual and peculiar
circumstances in this case, we cannot consider as notice to MAGDATO of the
20 September 1993 Order the notice to his lawyer, who to us appears to have
been unconscionably irresponsible. So we did in People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation vs. Tiongco,
[48]
where we declared:
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is
notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt
dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be looked into
and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the court's
desire to make a short cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly,
dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer
to sell one's rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every process of
the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this circumstance, one
should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his
clients.
In any event, the 60-day period in this case can, with equal force and
effect, be reckoned from MAGDATO's receipt of the Order of Execution on 24
January 1994 and the petition may then be treated as a petition for relief from
the said order. Tiongco is likewise authority therefor, to wit:
Moreover, the petition for relief from judgment under consideration, may even be
considered as one for relief from the order of execution, which was filed within the
reglementary period, inasmuch as Section 2 of Rule 38, Revised Rules, does not only
refer to judgments, but also to orders, or any other proceedings.
[49]

Furthermore, as regards the mandatory second period of six months, the
least that can be said is that it had not even begun to run as the records do
not disclose that the Order of 20 September 1993, which is the challenged
"decision," had been entered. On this score, Section 3 of Rule 38 speaks
of entry of the judgment or order, not its rendition nor finality, thus the 6-month
period must be reckoned from the entry. On this matter, Mr. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, in his Remedial Law Compendium,
[50]
states:
The 6-months period is computed from the date of actual entry of the order or
judgment as this is defined in Sec. 2, Rule 36, that is, from the recording of the
judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments and not from the date of the
order of default or the rendition of the judgment or the finality of the judgment. With
respect to the "proceedings" in Courts of First Instance which can be subject of
petitions for relief, supra, the date when the proceedings were taken control
(Dirige vs. Biranya, L-22033, July 30, 1966, reviewing all previous decisions and
expressly repealing all contrary doctrine). Also, in judgments upon compromise,
being immediately executory, prescription runs from the date of its rendition, hence
the 6-months period also runs therefrom (Bodiongan vs. Ceniza, et al., O.G. 8058;
Dirige vs. Biranya, supra).
We likewise agree with the RTC that the absence of an affidavit of merit
was not fatal since the petition itself, which is under oath, recites the
circumstances or facts which constitute the grounds for the petition. Such
being the case, a separate affidavit reiterating the grounds already laid bare in
the petition would be superfluous. Elsewise stated, the absence of the
affidavit is of de minimis importance, as the oath elevates the petition to the
same category as the affidavit.
[51]

In the alternative, the petition for relief from judgment may properly be
considered as MAGDATO's appeal from the order (decision) of the MCTC of
20 September 1993, or an action to annul the said order. It is a settled rule
that a final and executory judgment may be set aside in three ways, viz., (1)
by a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38; (2) when the judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction, by direct action, as certiorari, or by collateral
attack; and (3) when the judgment was obtained by fraud and Rule 38 cannot
be applied, by civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code.
[52]
The fraud
must be extrinsic or collateral. In the instant case, the unconscionable failure
of MAGDATO's lawyer to inform MAGDATO of his receipt of the Order of 20
September 1993 and the motion for execution, and to take the appropriate
action against either or both to protect MAGDATO's rights amounted to
connivance with the prevailing party for MAGDATO's defeat, which constituted
extrinsic fraud.
[53]

The RTC cannot then be faulted for taking cognizance of the
case. However, it acted with rather undue haste when, in its Order of 18
October 1994 denying BAYOG's first and second motions to dismiss, it
forthwith "set aside" the 20 September 1993 Order of the MCTC and
"remanded the case to [the latter] for proper disposal." What it should have
done was simply deny the motions to dismiss, in light of Section 4, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that if a motion to dismiss is denied or if
determination is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period
prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the
denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.
The petitioners do not, however, question the RTC's error on this point. If
we would then annul that portion of the challenged order setting aside the
MCTC's Order of 20 September 1993 as having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion, then the petitioners herein would be allowed to file their Answer
in Civil Case No. 2708. Thereafter, the RTC would hold a pre-trial conference
and trial on the merits. These would merely unduly delay the resolution of an
otherwise uncomplicated issue. Then, if respondent Judge Natino reaches
the same conclusion and renders the same resolution as that of his
challenged Order of 18 October 1994, the case would have to be remanded to
the MCTC for proper "disposal." However, the pleadings filed in this case and
the annexes thereto inexorably firm up the issue of jurisdiction of the MCTC
over the ejectment case. We have for MAGDATO, copies of the Agricultural
Leasehold Contract between him and BAYOG and Certificate of Agricultural
Leasehold issued by then President Marcos; and for BAYOG, the Deed of
Mortgage of Tenancy Rights executed by MAGDATO and his wife in favor of
Federico Valdevieso, the affidavit of Arturo Valdevieso of 3 May 1994 to the
effect that after the execution of the mortgage, his father Federico and the
immediate members of his family possessed its subject property and paid the
rentals to BAYOG, and the so-called receipts issued by the latter for the said
rentals.
In short, there is nothing more the parties can offer on the issue of the
jurisdiction of the MCTC. There is then absolutely no acceptable reason to
await the end of the tedious procedural rituals above indicated since that issue
can now be resolved in view of the foregoing considerations. It serves no
useful purpose to withhold our verdict and remand this case to the MCTC,
only for it to order the dismissal of the ejectment case. The resultant further
delay which may accompany a likely appeal therefrom by BAYOG and
Pesayco must be forestalled to serve the ends of justice.
[54]
Plainly, the greater
interest of justice, especially to MAGDATO, whose rights as an agricultural
leaseholder were trampled upon, demands that we dispose of the issue of the
MCTC's jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
[55]

Accordingly, we adopt that portion of the challenged Order of 18 October
1994 of respondent Judge Natino in Civil Case No. 2708 setting aside the
order (judgment) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993 in Civil Case No. 262,
consider Civil Case No. 2708 closed and terminated, and declare the Third
MCTC of Antique without jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 262.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED
for want of merit. That part of the dispositive portion of the Order of 18
October 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 12, in Civil Case
No. 2708 setting aside the Order of 20 September 1993 of the Third Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique, in Civil Case
No. 262 is AFFIRMED, and the Order of Execution of 16 December 1993 in
Civil Case No. 262 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the said case is
ordered DISMISSED.
Furthermore, Honorable Judge DEOGRACIAS K. DEL ROSARIO of the
Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama,
Antique, and Atty. MARCELO C. JOSUE are directed TO SHOW CAUSE,
within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, why they should
not be disciplinarily dealt with for gross ignorance of law and violation of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished Judge Deogracias K. del Rosario
and Atty. Marcelo C. Josue.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 116695. June 20, 1997]
VICTORIA G. GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA, petitioners, vs. HON.
NORBERTO C. DEVERA, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch XXIV,
RTC, Iloilo City; HON. JOSE R. ASTORGA, Presiding Judge,
Branch I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City; and SUSANA
GUEVARA, represented by her attorney-in-fact, ROSALIE
GUEVARA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
May the Rule on Summary Procedure be interpreted liberally to allow the
admission of an answer filed out of time due to alleged oversight?
This is the main legal question raised in this petition for review assailing
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24,
[1]
which
dismissed a special civil action for certiorari and injunction filed by herein
petitioners. The dispositive portion of the assailed RTC Decision reads:
[2]

WHEREFORE premises considered, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is denied and, with respect to the merits, the instant case is
hereby ordered dismissed.
Double costs against petitioners.
Facts
The factual antecedents of this case as found by the Regional Trial Court
are undisputed and admitted as correct by the parties. A complaint for forcible
entry
[3]
was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara against Patricio
Guevara and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the
Municipal Trial Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Summons was served on
and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an
answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was
abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over
him. On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion
for extension of time to file an answer.
[4]
On September 7, 1993, the MTCC
denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
[5]
On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days
from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion
praying for the admission of their answer,
[6]
which was attached thereto. Two
days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an
amended answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions
and considered the case submitted for resolution.
[7]
On October 27, 1993, the
MTCC also denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[8]
Thereafter, on
November 26, 1993, the MTCC
[9]
issued a decision
[10]
resolving the complaint
for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents.
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City,
[11]
Branch 24,
praying mainly that the MTCC be ordered to admit the amended answer and
to conduct further proceedings in the civil case for forcible entry. As prayed
for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the RTC.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed Decision
[12]
dismissing the
petition. Respondent Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr., ratiocinated:
[13]

Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 provides, among others, as follows:
Sec. 36 - Summary Procedures in Special Cases x x x The Supreme Court shall
adopt special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an
expeditions (sic) and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical
rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits
may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings
shall be non-extendible.
Pursuant to the aforequoted legislative mandate, the Supreme Court promulgated the
Rule on Summary Procedure, the pertinent provisions of which, as related to the
issues raised in this case, are hereunder set forth -
II - Civil Cases
Section 3 - Pleadings
A. (P)leadings allowed - The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaints,
compulsory counter-claims and cross-claims pleaded in the answer, and the answers
thereto
x x x x x
x x x x
Section 5 Answer - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant
shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff x x x
Section 6. Effect of Failure to answer - Should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of
the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: x x x
x x x x x
x x x x
Section 19. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following pleadings, motions, or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
x x x x x
x x x x
The foregoing should underscore quite clearly the reality that the ten-day-period to
file an answer reckoned from the date of the receipt of the summons is mandatory and
no reason of any kind is acceptable to operate as an excuse. The rule is explicit. It is
addressed more, being one of procedure, to counsels than to litigants. Counsels,
therefore cannot assert the validity of their clients cause to evade the mandate of the
law.
Accordingly, the Court cannot fault the respondent judge [referring to Judge Jose R.
Astorga] in acting the way he did in Civil Case No. 130 (93) taking into account the
admitted facts and circumstances.
Hence, this petition directly filed before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioners submit for resolution the following questions of law:
[14]

I. Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period
of pleadings to be applied STRICTLY or LIBERALLY.
II. What is the legal effect of a belated answer under the Rules on
Summary Procedure.
Petitioners argue that the technical rules of procedure must yield to the
higher interest of justice. Petitioners explain that they filed the motion for
extension of time to file an answer, a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, because of oversight. That was why immediately upon
receipt of the denial of that motion, petitioners filed their motion to admit
answer which was later verified and had to be amended. All these (actions)
were done in a period of five (5) days from the lapse of the reglementary
period to file an answer.
[15]
Furthermore, petitioners contend that no prejudice
to private respondent has been claimed or alleged by reason of the delay in
filing an answer.
[16]
Petitioners also argue that their defense in the action for
forcible entry is based on substantial grounds, because they were in prior
physical possession of the premises subject of the action and that their
houses have long been standing on the land in question because the land on
which said houses are standing are (sic) the common properties of the
parties.
Citing Section 2, Rule 1
[17]
of the Rules of Court, petitioners pray that the
provisions in the Rule on Summary Procedure regarding prohibited pleadings
and the period for filing an answer be given liberal interpretation. Petitioners
concede that said provisions appear to be couched in mandatory
language. They contend, however, that other similarly worded provisions in
the Rules of Court have nonetheless been liberally applied by this Court to
promote substantial justice.
[18]

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that the provisions in
question have to be strictly construed in order to avoid delay, considering that
the Rule on Summary Procedure is aimed at inexpensive, expeditious and
summary determination of cases.
[19]
Private respondent adds that the petition
can also be dismissed on the ground of violation of Revised Circular 28-91 on
forum shopping, because three (3) months after the rendition of the assailed
Decision, a petition for quieting of title and partition, and damages, involving
the same parcel of residential land (Cadastral Lot No. 709 x x x ), was
filed xxx docketed as Civil Case No. 21618, by (Petitioner) Victoria Guevara-
Gachon (x x x), Patricio Guevara (father of Petitioner Alex Guevara), Lilia
Guevara-Doreza and Fe Guevara-Burgos against herein private
respondent. Private respondent contends that the subsequent case is the
appropriate forum where ownership of the property in question may be
threshed out.
[20]

As observed at the outset, the issue to be resolved is whether, under the
undisputed facts of this case, the Rule on Summary Procedure may be
liberally construed in order to allow the admission of petitioners answer which
unquestionably was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Preliminary Matter
It bears noting that petitioners filed directly before this Court a petition for
review assailing the RTC Decision. This remedy is allowed under paragraph
2 of Circular 2-90
[21]
which provides:
Section 2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. -- Except in
criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua,
judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
[22]
this being the clear
intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court
shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioners ask the Court to interpret a provision of the Rule on Summary
Procedure. This is a pure question of law that may be properly raised in this
petition for review.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Interpretation of the Period
The pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure are as
follows:
Section 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the
plaintiff x x x
Section 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of
the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: x x x
x x x x x
x x x x
Section 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
x x x x x
x x x x (Underscoring
supplied.)
The word shall ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the
mandatory character of a statute.
[23]
This, however, is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction. The import of the word ultimately depends upon a
consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences
that would follow from construing it one way or the other.
[24]

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.
[25]

The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the
purpose of achieving an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases.
[26]
For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits
altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistent with this
reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial court to render
judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer
within the reglementary period.
Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, mandating the
promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure, authorizes the Court to
stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in cases covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure shall be non-extendible.
[27]

Furthermore, speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of
public policy,
[28]
and this rule should equally apply with full force in forcible entry
cases where the possession of the premises at the start is already illegal.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word shall in the Rule
on Summary Procedure underscores the mandatory character of the
challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a directory application would
subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective
of expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, as
petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory maneuvers -- the very
mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. In this light, petitioners invocation of
the general principle in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.
Other than a plea for the liberal interpretation of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, petitioners do not provide an adequate justification for the
admission of their late answer. Oversight, which they candidly cite as the
reason for their filing a motion for extension of time to file an answer, is not a
justification. Oversight, at best, implies negligence; at worst, ignorance. The
negligence displayed by petitioners is clearly inexcusable; ignorance of so
basic a rule, on the other hand, can never be condoned. In either case, the
directory application of the questioned provision is not warranted.
Petitioners also cite Rosales vs. Court of Appeals
[29]
and Co Keng Kian vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,
[30]
but these cases do not support their position.
In Rosales vs. Court of Appeals,
[31]
this Court applied the Rule on Summary
Procedure liberally when the defendant, instead of filing an answer, filed
within the reglementary period a pleading labeled as a motion to dismiss. In
treating the motion to dismiss as an answer, the Court ruled:
[32]

Parenthetically, petitioner argues in the present petition that, notwithstanding its
being labeled as a motion to dismiss, said pleading should have been considered as his
answer pursuant to the liberal interpretation accorded the rules and inasmuch as the
grounds involved therein also qualify as defenses proper in an answer. In this
instance the Court agrees. Indeed, the rule on summary procedure was conceptualized
to facilitate the immediate resolution of cases such as the present one. Well-settled is
the rule that forcible entry and detainer cases being summary in nature and involving
disturbance of social order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided and
should not be allowed to override substantial justice. With this premise in mind and
having insisted, however erroneously, on its jurisdiction over the case, it certainly
would have been more prudent for the lower court to have treated the motion to
dismiss as the answer of petitioner and examined the case on its merits. As will be
shown shortly, the long drawn out proceedings that took place would have been
avoided.
Furthermore, the said case did not involve the question of extension in the
period for filing pleadings under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
In Co Keng Kian vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
[33]
this Court allowed the
notice to vacate, served upon the tenant, by registered mail instead of
personal service as required by the Rules of Court. We thus ruled:
[34]

At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are summary in nature because they involve a disturbance a social order
which must be abated as promptly as possible without any undue reliance on technical
and procedural rules which only cause delays. In the ultimate analysis, it matters not
how the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as the lessee or his agent has
personally received the written demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his
attorney, a messenger or even a postman. The undisputed facts in the instant case
show that the Manila Times Publishing Company, through its manager, had informed
petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc. was the new owner of the subject building; that on
October 18, 1979, a demand letter was sent to petitioner advising him to leave the
premises but petitioner refused to receive the letter; that a second demand on January
12, 1981 elicited the same reaction; that a final demand dated November 16, 1981 was
sent to petitioner by registered mail which he again refused. And even on the
supposition that there was no personal service as claimed by petitioner, this could only
be due to petitioners blatant attempts at evasion which compelled the new landlord to
resort to registered mail. The Court cannot countenance an unfair situation where the
plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice by the unwarranted delay resulting
from the obstinate refusal of the defendant to acknowledge the existence of a valid
demand.
In both cases, there was substantial compliance with the law, something
that cannot be said of herein petitioners.
Second Issue: Forum-Shopping
Private respondent assails petitioners for engaging in forum-shopping by
pursuing the present ejectment suit, notwithstanding the pendency of an
action for quieting of title involving the same property and parties. We are
unable to find basis for this charge.
For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transactions, essential facts and circumstances; and the actions must raise
identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.
[35]
Suffice it to say that an
action for quieting of title and partition has a different cause of action than that
in an ejectment suit. As private respondent herself contended, ownership of a
certain portion of the property which is determined in a case of partition does
not necessarily mean that the successful litigant has the right to possess the
property adjudged in his favor. In ejectment cases, the only issue for
resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party
litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may
recover such possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true
regardless of the character of a partys possession, provided that he has in his
favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
[36]
It has even been ruled that the institution
of a separate action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the
execution of the summary remedy of ejectment.
[37]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto. Double costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119337 June 17, 1997
BAYVIEW HOTEL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND CLUB FILIPINO, INC. DE CEBU, respondents.

PUNO, J .:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Bayview Hotel, Inc. to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 34800 entitled Bayview Hotel, Inc. v. Hon. Teodoro
Lim andClub Filipino, Inc. de Cebu.
1

The facts are well established. On May 27, 1959, petitioner Bayview Hotel, Inc. entered into a contract of lease
over a parcel of land located in Cebu City with its registered owner, private respondent Club Filipino, Inc. De
Cebu. The lease agreement gave petitioner the right to construct and operate a hotel complex known as the
Magellan International Hotel for a period of thirty (30) years. It also stipulated that ownership of the building and
other permanent improvements on the land built by petitioner will transfer to private respondent upon the
expiration of the lease. Under the agreement, petitioner was given the option to renew the lease for ten (10)
more years, the amount of rent to be computed at five percent (5%) of the approved value of the land and
improvements. Before the expiration of the lease contract on December 31, 1992, petitioner notified private
respondent of its intention to extend the lease contract for a longer period and at a rate of rent different from the
terms as originally agreed upon. There was no meeting of the minds between the parties as private
respondent's Board of Directors insisted on adhering to the provisions of the original lease contract. Private
respondent then sent to petitioner a notice to vacate the premises and to pay accrued rentals. Private
respondent claimed ownership of the building and the improvements pursuant to the provisions of the original
contract.
2

When petitioner failed to vacate the premises, private respondents, on May 18, 1993, filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Cebu a complaint for ejectment and recovery of accrued rentals amounting to P2,850,000.00 as
of April 30, 1993 and P712,500.00 for every month thereafter.
3
Before petitioner could be served with a copy
of the complaint and summons, the building was destroyed by a fire of undetermined origin.
On June 1, 1993, petitioner filed its answer to the complaint for ejectment interposing the following affirmative
defenses:
(a) Summons having been improperly and defectively served, the Honorable Court has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
(b) Plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant.
(c) Plaintiff's claim has been extinguished by the loss of the premises, from which defendant
has been sought to be ejected, in a fire on 21 May, 1993.
(d) The fire has effectively ejected the defendant from the premises rendering the action for
ejectment moot and academic.
(e) Since the defendant has been effectively ejected from the premises by the fire, defendant
cannot be said to have deprived plaintiff of its possession of the same, therefore, the
complaint for ejectment should be dismissed and the case be considered as an ordinary claim
for a sum of money.
(f) Consequently, since the amount being claimed is beyond the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the suit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
(g) Plaintiff's claim for a sum of money has been extinguished by compensation since under
the lease contract with the defendant, plaintiff was bound to pay the latter the value of all its
furnishings and equipment in the leased premises upon the termination of the lease.
Petitioner then moved for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which was denied by the trial judge
on the ground that the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure prohibits the motion. Aggrieved by this Order,
petitioner, on June 24, 1993, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, a petitioner for certiorari with a prayer
for preliminary injunction against private respondent and Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Teodoro
Lim.
4
Allegedly, Judge Lim abused his discretion when he refused to dismiss the complaint for ejectment.
In its answer to the petition forcertiorari, private respondent admitted the destruction of the building but
alleged that petitioner has not completely vacated the premises since its guards continue to remain in the
premises and its cars are still parked thereat. As to the jurisdiction of the court, private respondent argued
that jurisdiction once acquired by the court remains with it until the termination of the case. Private
respondent also sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading under
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. On November 26, 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
granted the petition forcertiorari and ordered the Metropolitan Trial Court to dismiss the ejectment case.
Private respondent appealed to the public respondent Court of Appeals. On February 16, 1995, the appellate
court reversed the decision of the RTC of Cebu. It ruled: (1) that petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Court when it sought affirmative relief from the same court; (2) that despite the burning of the
building, the trial court retained its jurisdiction to try the case for the nature of the action remained to be an
ejectment case; (3) whether petitioner has vacated the premises and transferred its possession to Club Filipino
is a question of fact that should be threshed out in the trial court; and (4) that the petition for certiorari should
not have been given due course by the Regional Trial Court for its filing is proscribed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner where it contends:
5

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DID NOT LOSE ITS JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE BUILDING FROM
WHICH PETITIONER WAS SOUGHT TO BE EJECTED HAD BEEN TOTALLY DESTROYED
BEFORE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
THE PETITIONER'S ANSWER WHICH EMBODIED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IS
TANTAMOUNT TO A MOTION TO DISMISS AND THEREFORE PROSCRIBED BY THE
RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE.
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CANNOT ENTERTAIN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AS IT IS
PROHIBITED UNDER THE REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE.
We reject petitioner's submissions.
Petitioner's contention of lack of jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court is premised on its allegation that the
building it leased from the private respondent was completely burned down before it could be served with
summons in Civil Case No. R-32189. It maintains that it does not have anymore a lessor-lessee relationship
with private respondent citing Articles 1655 of the Civil Code which provides that "if the thing is totally
destroyed by a fortuitous event, the lease is extinguished . . ."
Petitioner has overlooked that the case at bar involves land lease. Private respondent insists that petitioner is
still occupying the subject land although the building on its has been burned down. If the allegation is true, then
the jurisdiction of the MTC cannot be assailed. We have held in Commander Realty Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,
6
that "an unlawful detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the land or
building against or from the landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after the expiration or the
termination of the detainer's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied." We also
ruled in the same case that "the right of a lessee to occupy the land leased as against the demand of the
lessor to regain possession should be decided in a case of Ejectment or Detainer under Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court."
7
To be sure, petitioner makes the contrary claim that private respondent is already in full
and complete possession of the premises. This is, however, a factual question that should be decided by
the Metropolitan Trial Court.
We likewise find no reason to fault respondent court when it rejected petitioner's contention that the
Metropolitan Trial Court should have granted its motion for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses
which raised the issue of jurisdiction. Under the law, parties are not prohibited from filing an answer with
affirmative defenses in cases falling under summary procedure. However, the trial courts are enjoined from
conducting a preliminary hearing on such affirmative defenses to prevent unnecessary delay in disposing the
case
on its merits. Thus, time and again, we have ruled that under summary procedure ". . . adjudication of cases
can be done on the basis of affidavits or other evidence. The proceeding must be as summary as possible in
order not to defeat the need to dispose ejectment cases in as fast a time as possible. The reason is because
cases involving possession of properties usually pose a threat to the peace of society."
8

Finally, we agree with the respondent court that the claim of the petitioner that the petition for certiorari it filed
with the Regional Trial Court is permissible is not in accord with Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure which provides:
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleading and motions. The following pleading, motions, or petitions
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rules.
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding
section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petitioner for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions. (Emphasis supplied.)
The prohibition is plain enough. Its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000]
GLORIA LUCAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE AMELIA A. FABROS, MeTC,
Branch 9, Manila, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
In a verified complaint
[1]
dated May 20, 1997, complainant Gloria Lucas charged
respondent, Judge Amelia A. Fabros of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9,
Manila, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion relative to
Civil Case No. 151248 entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented by Elenita F. Castelo
vs. Gloria Lucas, for Ejectment". Jksm
Complainant, who was the defendant in the aforecited case, alleged that Judge Amelia
A. Fabros issued an Order
[2]
dated February 26, 1997 granting the plaintiffs motion
for reconsideration of the Order
[3]
dated January 13, 1997, which dismissed the case
for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference.
Complainant averred that it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of
Summary Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent
judge, in violation of the rule, granted the motion for reconsideration. She added that,
notwithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court that
the case is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure,
[4]
the judge ordered the
revival of the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause an injury to
complainant.
Further, complainant alleged that the actuations of the respondent is in blatant
disregard of the established rules on procedure, and it is an instance where the
doctrine of IPSA LOQUITOR may once again may be applied by the Court to
discipline judges.
On June 18, 1997, respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative
complaint. In her Comment
[5]
dated September 16, 1997, she admitted that she granted
the motion for reconsideration even if the same is a prohibited motion in an ejectment
case. She explained, however, that it was granted in the interest of justice.
In her Comment, respondent stated:
"The Order subject of this complaint is the Order dated January 13, 1997
dismissing the complaint for ejectment for failure of the plaintiff to
appear for preliminary conference and more importantly her lawyer,
Atty. Jose Suing, who was duly empowered to appear for preliminary
conference by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney. Chief
Immediately upon learning the said order of dismissal and awarding of
attorneys fees, Atty. Suing filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
January 17, 1997 (Annex "A") stating that he failed to appear due to a
sudden excruciating stomach pain. He further stated that his Secretary
called the Court but to no avail until finally the call came through and
she was informed that the case was dismissed. Over the objection of the
defendant that the Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading
which this Presiding Judge is fully aware of under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, the Motion for Reconsideration was nonetheless granted in
the interest of justice. The question is poised. Are the actuations of
judges to be governed strictly by the Rule on Summary Procedure
despite their belief in good faith that in special cases, its observance
would result in a miscarriage of justice? This Presiding Judge does not
think so. Judges are supposed to responsible Public Officials and should
be able to perceive and discern circumstances which might lead to
miscarriage of justice, thus, negating the very purpose and essence of the
Rule on Summary Procedure. The Rule on Summary Procedure is not a
straight jacket and it is believed it was never meant to be that. This is the
reason why we have in the Rules of Court Section 5 (g) of Rule 135
which is one of the inherent powers of the Court, that is, to amend and
control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law
and justice. Ignorance of the law, to the mind of the undersigned, is the
act of a judge in taking legal steps or adopting procedure unknowingly
aware that they are contrary to established Rules which should be known
to the judge. This Presiding Judge in this particular case was fully aware
of the Rule on Summary Procedure. She fully knew that the Motion for
Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading but she still considered it
because to deny it would result in a miscarriage of justice. It was not a
capricious, whimsical and despotic act when viewed in the light of this
circumstance.
With respect to the allegation that the charge of ignorance of the law was
compounded by the failure to issue a writ of execution, it bears stressing
that the Order dated January 13, 1997 never gained finality because the
plaintiff was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration within the
fifteen (15) day period, that is, on January 17, 1997. But even if it is
argued validly that the Motion for Reconsideration being a prohibited
pleading did not interrupt the running of the period of appeal, still the
said Order did not gain finality as far as defendant Gloria Lucas is
concerned because as the record shows, it was she who received the
Order, not her lawyer, Atty. Sulit." Esm
The complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation after the case was docketed
as an administrative matter. On August 25, 1997, OCA in a Memorandum, submitted
the following findings:
"After a careful perusal of the records of the case, we find that
respondent Judge Fabros abused her discretion in granting the Motion
for Reconsideration.
Respondent Judge Fabros maintained that she could not be guilty of
gross ignorance of the law as she knows that a motion for
reconsideration of judgment is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case.
She explained that although there is already a judgment dismissing the
case, she granted the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration in the interest
of justice since the reasons stated in the motion for reconsideration are
meritorious.
Respondent failed to realize that the first duty of the court is to apply the
law and that when the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room
for interpretation. Although her intention was good, this could not free
her from liability.
Respondent should have denied the motion since the plaintiff had other
judicial remedies like appeal."
[6]

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent judge be fined in
the amount of P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion. The Court, however, finds this
recommendation without factual and legal basis.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus,
"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings,
motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this
Rule.
xxx
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for
reopening of trial;
xxx"
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one
rendered on the merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of
the Rules on Summary Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is
that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on
the merits of the case."
[7]
Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due
to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a
judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration
of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the
present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave
abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to
the motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint. Esmsc
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint filed against respondent Judge Amelia A. Fabros
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 105866 July 6, 1993
VICTORIA D. BAYUBAY, represented by her attorney-in-fact, MARIBEL MAMARIL, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Fourth Division and BIG MAK BURGER, INC., respondents.
Rodolfo P. Orticio for petitioner.
Robles, Ricafrente & Aguirre Law Firm for private respondent.

CRUZ, J .:
The proceeding at bar traces its origin to an action for ejectment filed by petitioner Victoria D. Bayubay in the
Municipal Trial Court of Los Baos, Laguna, on April 11, 1990, on the ground of expiration of the contract of
lease.
Private respondent Big Mak Burger argued in its answer that it had the option to renew the term of the lease
contract "under such conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties" and set up the defense of estoppel. It
also alleged a counterclaim for damages and reinbursement of expenses allegedly inccured by it on the leased
promises.
The Municipal Trial Court issued summons with the notification that the case would be heard under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
After three pre-trial meetings and the marking of the exhibits, which included the lease contract and the
exchange of letters between the parties, Judge Romulo G. Carteciano rendered a decision holding that the
contract of lease had expired because no extension had been agreed upon by the parties as required by the
agreement.
1

The private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, on the ground that "the MTC
violated Secs. 6 and 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure by rendering judgment without ordering the parties
to submit their respective position papers and affidavits of their respective witnesses, as a consequence of
which, defendant's right to due process was violated."
2

On December 23, 1991, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the appealed decision in toto.
3
However, it was
reversed by the Court of Appeals, which ordered the remand of the case to the Municipal Trial Court for
further proceedings.
4

The decision of the Court of Appeals is now before us. The petitioner contends that the respondent court erred
in ruling that: (1) the failure of the MTC to give the private respondent the opportunity to submit its position
paper and/or affidavit of witnesses constituted a denial of due process; (2) the questions raised were not only
questions of law because the answer contained a counterclaim for reimbursement of improvements allegedly
made by the lessee on the premises, and damages; and (3) there was still a necessity for the MTC to issue an
order following the close of the pre-trial conference.
In its Comment, the private respondent refutes these contentions and argues that (1) the petition raises
questions of fact as well as law, such as the expenses incurred by the lessor in the improvement of the leased
premises and the damages sustained by it as a result of the filing of the complaint; (2) it was deprived of the
opportunity to submit its position paper and/or affidavits of witnesses and so denied due process; and (3) there
was a need to remand the case to the MTC so that evidence could be presented to prove the factual issues
through position papers and affidavits.
We see nothing wrong with the decision of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the Municipal Trial
Court for further proceedings. The respondent court was merely enforcing the mandatory provisions of the Rule
on Summary Procedure.
The record shows that the Municipal Trial Court failed to take into account the following pertinent provisions of
the Rule:
Sec. 6. Preliminary Conference. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed,
the case shall be calendared for a preliminary conference. Among other matters, should the
parties fail to arrive at an amicable settlement, the court must clarify and define the issues of
the case, which must be clearly and distinctly set forth in the order to be issued immediately
after such preliminary conference, together with the other matters taken up during the same.
Sec. 7. Submission of affidavits. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in
the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of witnesses and other
evidences on the factual issues defined therein, together with a brief statement of their
petitions setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
The above provisions require that immediately after the preliminary conference, the Municipal Trial Court
should issue an order clearly and distinctly setting forth the issues of the case and the other matters taken up
during the preliminary conference.
The order is an important part of the summary procedure because it is its receipt by the parties that begins the
ten-day period to submit the affidavits and other evidence mentioned in Sec. 7.
The minutes of the Municipal Trial Court dated August 22, 1989, contained a notation that the pre-trial had
been "terminated" and that the parties were to submit position papers.
5
However, there was no order to this
effect nor was there an indication of when the position papers were to be submitted for the purpose of
discussing the factual questioning raised.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals
We think that the failure of the MTC to give the petitioner the opportunity to submit its position
paper and/or affidavit of witnesses constituted a denial of due process. True, between August
22, 1989 and December 18, 1989, when the MTC rendered its decision was a period
of more than three months. But under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the ten-day period for
submitting affidavits and position papers did not commence to run, until receipt by a party of
the order of the court embodying the results of the pre-trial conference. Here, as already
stated, the MTC never issued such an order and so the ten day period never started to run.
It is not true, as the MTC said, that the only questions raised were questions of law. The
petitioner's answer contained a counterclaim for reimbursement of improvements allegedly
made by it on the premises, as well as claim for damages for alleged bad faith of private
respondent in bringing the case questions which obviously, required at least the affidavits
of witnesses.
The Court of Appeals did not err therefore in calling for the remand of the case to the Municipal Trial Court.
While the municipal judge may be commended for his zeal in speeding up the resolution of the case, he
nevertheless cannot be sustained for his non-observance of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
We conclude with the following reminder:
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extra-judicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has
been often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will
result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept
is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact the policy of the courts is to give affect to both
kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute
between the parties. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally
guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
only a statute or a rule of court.
6

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

A.M. No. MTJ-93-799 May 18, 1994
RURAL BANK OF MALALAG, INC., complainant,
vs.
JUDGE SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG, respondent.
Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.

QUIASON, J .:
In a letter-complaint dated March 11, 1993, the Rural Bank of Malalag Inc., through its manager, Antonio P.
Dulanas, charged Judge Segundino D. Maniwang of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Malalag-Sulop,
Davao del Sur, with undue delay in the disposition of six collection cases, namely Civil Cases Nos. 226, 227,
228, 229, 230 and 231.
I
Civil Cases Nos. 226, 227 and 228 were filed on September 10, 1991. Complainant alleged that no action was
taken by respondent with respect to these civil actions except for the pre-trial conference on March 12, 1992.
Respondent admitted that he did not take any action on the cases but he claimed that two of the cases were
not triable under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231 were filed on November 15, 1991. The defendants were served with
summons on November 27, 1991; hence, the answers were due on December 12, 1991. As no answers were
filed as of May 6, 1992, complainant filed a motion for the resolution of said cases on May 7, 1992.
On June 2, 1992, the defendants filed a motion to admit their answers. On June 10, 1992, respondent admitted
the answers and denied the motion for resolution on the grounds that the answers raised "factual matters which
need to be clarified in a formal hearing."
On June 26, 1992, complainant filed a second motion for resolution of the cases.
In his Order dated July 10, 1992, respondent denied complainant's motion to declare defendants in default,
stating: (a) that the said motion was a prohibited pleading under Section 15 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure; (b) that he could not just disregard the answers filed by defendants for they raise a meritorious
defense; and (c) that there were factual matters which should be clarified in a formal hearing.
After the preliminary conference on August 20, 1992, respondent issued pre-trial orders stating, in common,
that the following factual issues had yet to be resolved:
1. Whether or not defendants have fully paid their indebtedness to plaintiff.
2. Whether or not defendants signed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Mrs. Dulanas
(complainant's representative) to withdraw all the checks due them as public school teachers
(Rollo, p. 25).
As required by respondent, complainant filed its position paper. The defendants, however, did not file their
position paper.
On September 15, 1992, complainant again filed a motion to resolve the cases, arguing that the defendants
had waived their right to present evidence after having failed to submit their position papers.
In his Order dated October 27, 1992, respondent denied complainant's motion to resolve, stating that there was
a need to conduct a hearing in order to resolve the factual issues. Furthermore, he claimed that the records
pertinent to the said factual issues were in the hands of the officials of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS), necessitating the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He also noted that the hearing
"would also give the defendants the opportunity to establish the merits of their defense and prevent a denial of
substantial justice" (Rollo, pp. 37-38).
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to resolve the civil cases pursuant to Section 6 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure after the defendants therein failed to file their answers to the complaints, and pursuant
to Section 10 thereof, after the defendants failed to submit their position papers. It also alleged that respondent
deviated from the Revised Rule of Summary Procedure by conducting regular trials, under the guise of
"clarificatory hearings."
In his comment, respondent averred that when Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231 were filed on November 15,
1991 in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop, where he was the acting presiding judge, he had other duties as acting
judge of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur and as permanent circuit judge in Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. In May
1991, he was designated to try a case in the MCTC of Bansalan-Magsaysay. He could only conduct the
hearing of cases in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop once a week, giving preference to criminal cases involving
detained prisoners. Thus, not all the cases in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop could be heard and tried by him,
including the civil cases filed by complainant.
Respondent denied the charge of deviation from the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in the handling of
Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231. According to him, his denial of the motions to resolve the cases filed by
complainant was, in fact, consistent with due process in order to give the defendants a chance to establish their
claim of payment. He argued that there would have been a failure of justice if he resolved the cases of
complainant on the basis of the complaints and its evidence alone, in disregard of the meritorious defense in
the answers.
He also denied the charge that he held full-blown trials in contravention of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, asserting that what he conducted were only "clarificatory hearings" for the purpose of allowing the
DECS representatives to bring to court the payrolls of the defendants. The first "clarificatory hearing" was
continued on another date because the payrolls submitted to the court were voluminous and one of the DECS
representative failed to attend the hearing.
II
We find respondent's explanations unsatisfactory.
Respondent's explanation for his inaction in Civil Cases Nos. 226, 227 and 228 was that two of the cases
cannot be tried in accordance with the summary procedure because of the amount involved. He was referring
to Civil Case No. 226, which involved the collection of the amount of P19,890.91 and attorney's fees of
P5,000.00 and Civil Case No. 227, which involved the amount of P19,666.07 and attorney's fees of P5,000.00.
It is true that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not apply where the total amount of the plaintiff's
claim exceeds P10,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs. But if Civil Cases Nos. 226 and 227 cannot be
heard summarily, respondent has not explained why he failed to set these cases for trial in accordance with the
regular procedure. From March 12, 1992, the date of the pre-trial, up to March 22, 1993, the date of the filing of
the administrative complaint, there was no action taken by respondent on these cases. While these cases were
filed on September 10, 1991, respondent set them for pre-trial only on March 13, 1992.
Respondent has not explained either why Civil Case No. 228, which involved only the amount of P7,390.95,
was not heard under the summary procedure.
He has not shown his case load in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop, MCTC of Padada-Kiblawan, and MCTC of Sta.
Cruz, Davao del Sur. However, taking into account his multifarious duties, respondent's culpability is slightly
diminished.
As to Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231, respondent has not explained why after the defendants failed to file
their answer, he did not follow Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides:
Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendants fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion reduce the amount
of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable . . . .
He has not explained the justification for allowing the admission of the answers, which were filed more than five
months after their due date.
He has not explained why he did not decide the cases after the defendants failed to submit the affidavits of
their witnesses on the factual issues defined in the orders, together with their position papers setting forth the
law and the facts relied upon by them.
Section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is very explicit that:
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the
parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues
defined in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts
relied upon by them.
Said Section 9 should be read together with Section 10 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the first
paragraph of which provides:
Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration
of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
While the third paragraph of Section 10 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the court, should it
find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, to issue "an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and
require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of
said order," it has to render judgment "within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits
or the expiration of the period for filing the same."
It is clear from said provisions, that a court cannot resort to "clarificatory procedure," when the parties fail to
submit their affidavits and position paper as required by Section 9 of the Rule. The courts cannot
issue subpoena duces tecum in cases triable summarily merely on the basis of the answers. It is only after
evaluating the affidavits and positions papers submitted by the parties that the court can determine whether he
should resort to the "clarificatory procedure" provided in Section 10 of the Rule. If any of the parties fail to
submit their evidence and position paper within the reglementary period, the court cannot thereby set the
"clarificatory procedure" into motion. Otherwise, a party can derail the proceedings and defeat the purpose of
the summary procedure by not filing the affidavits of his witnesses and his position paper, thus forcing the court
to resort to said procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved the IMPOSE on respondent a FINE of P5,000.00, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
CANIZA V. CA
FACTS: Carmen Caiza was declared an incompetent by RTC of Quezon City because of senile dementia. Her legal
guardian is her niece Amparo Evangelista. Caiza was owner of a house and lot in QC which was being occupied by
the spouses Estrada out of kindness and tolerance. Evangelista, in behalf of Caiza, filed a complaint of unlawful
detainer against the Estradas because despite repeated demands, they refused to vacate said lots. The complaint
alleged that the Estradas are depriving Caiza of needed income since they are occupying the property rent-free.
Estradas said that the lot was already bequeathed to them by virtue of a holographic will made by Caiza before
she was declared an incompetent. MTC ruled in Caizas favor but the RTC reversed saying the action is supposed
to be accion publiciana. CA affirmed the RTC rationating that the Estradas were not occupants by mere tolerance
but they were sort of adopted family as the holographic will, although of no force and effect until probated,
evinces the intent that the Estradas are to remain in possession.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the action of Caiza must be for acion publiciana and not accion
interdictal.

RULING: YES. The SC held that the complaint clearly sets out a case for unlawful detainer and says: It is settled
that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges
that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law. The Estradas defense, relying on the literal interpretation of Sec.1 of Rule 70 is pure
sophistry. "the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to
occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor.
More than once has the SC adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. It is also important
to note that the 1 year period to file the complaint for desahucio is reckoned from the date of last demand to
vacate. The reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on previous demands and
let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a
will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the
premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of
ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly
probated. Also, since there has been a valid substitution of parties after the death of Caiza in this case,
Evangelista, being a legal heir of the original plaintiff, may still continue to prosecute the case against the Estradas.

VICTORIA G. GACHON vs.HON. NORBERTO C. DEVERA, JR.
G.R. No. 116695 June 20, 1997

FACTS: A complaint for forcible entry was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara against Patricio Guevara
and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the MTCC of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and
received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the reglementary period of
10days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him.
On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer.
On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the
Rule on Summary Procedure. On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of the summons,
petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer, which was attached thereto. Two
days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer. On September 23,
1993, the MTCC denied the motions and considered the case submitted for resolution. On October 27, 1993, the
MTCC also denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, on November 26, 1993, the MTCC
issued a decision resolving the complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents. Instead of filing
an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the RTC of Iloilo City praying mainly that
the MTCC be ordered to admit the amended answer and to conduct further proceedings in the civil case for
forcible entry. As prayed for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the RTC. Thereafter, the RTC issued the
assailed Decision dismissing the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Rule on Summary Procedure may be liberally construed.

RULING: No. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly
and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. 25The Rule
on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases." 26 For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the
filing of motions for extension of time. Consistent with this reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial
court to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the
reglementary period. Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, mandating the promulgation of the Rule on
Summary Procedure, authorizes the Court to stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in cases covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure shall be "non-extendible." 27It is clear that the use of the word "shall" in the Rule on
Summary Procedure underscores the mandatory character of the challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a
directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective of
expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put premium on
dilatory maneuvers the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress.

Gloria Lucas v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000

Facts : Complainant Lucas was the defendant in an ejectment case pending before respondent
judge. She alleges that Judge Fabros granted the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration after the case had
been dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference.
She averred that it is elementary, under Section 19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure, that a motion
for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted the motion for
reconsideration. She added that, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in
open court that the case is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the judge ordered the revival
of the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause an injury to complainant. Thus, the instant
complaint, charging respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion

Held: NOT GUILTY. The SC held that respondent judge not guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and grave abuse of discretion.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. This rule, however, applies only where the judgment
sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. Here, the order of dismissal issued by
respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is
obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the
reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c)
of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse
of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for
reconsideration subject of the present