Shri Suresh Kumar S/O vs Union Of India Through on 4 March, 2011

order dated 27.1.2003. Therefore, the instant Original Applicant is not maintainable
in view of principle of estoppel. Hence the instant Original Application is liable to be
dismissed. On merit also the applicant did not secure marks over and above the last
candidate. The father of the applicant died in the year 1997 and his claim was
rejected in the year 1999. In view of the settled law compassionate appointment
cannot be given after long period. In the instant case, more than 8 years has lapsed.
The other object being to enable the family to get over the financial crises which it
faces at the time of death of the sole bread earner the compassionate appointment
cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crises is
over. And if the family of the deceased employee tide over the sudden financial crises
by passage of time then they are not entitled to have the employment under the
Compassionate Scheme as it is not a mode of appointment. The very object of the
appointment of dependent of the deceased employees who dies-in-harness is to
relieve unexpected immediate hardship and distress caused to the family by sudden
from the judgements passed by the Honble Supreme Court in cases Umesh Kumar
Nagpal versus State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138, their Lordships of the Supreme
Court held as under:- The whole object of grant of compassionate employment is,
thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crises. The object is not to give
member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is
further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such
source of livelihood. The Government or public authority concerned has to examine
the financial condition of the family of the deceased and it is only if it is satisfied that
but for the provisions of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis
that job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. xx xx xx
The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at
the time of death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be
claimed and offeredwhatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.
In case Jagdish
appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It
must be provided for in the rules. The criteria laid down therefore, viz., that the
death of the sole bread earner of the family, must be established. It is meant to
provide for a minimum relief. When such contentions are raised, the constitutional
philosophy of equality behind making such a scheme be taken into consideration.
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India mandate that all eligible candidates
should be considered for appointment in the posts which have fallen vacant.
Appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependant of a deceased
employee is an exception to the said rule. It is a concession, not a right."
As has been held by Honble the Supreme Court in the cases of National Hydro
Electric Power Corpn. Vs. Nanak Chand, (2004) 12 SCC 487 and Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd. (supra) and. Such an appointment cannot be secured as a matter of
right as it is an exception to Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.
The similar view has been taken in the case of State of J & K and others Vs.
Sajad Ahmed




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Ramchandra Murarilal Bhattad & ... vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 5 December, 2006
which is invited for projects and schemes framed by it.
D. In exercise of the powers under Article 226 it could not act as an Appellate
Authority to review of supervise the functions of authorities like the Mumbai
Metropolitan Region Development Authority.
E. Considering the material on record it cannot be held that the Authority acted
unreasonably unfairly or in an unjust manner.
F. The Authority consisting of people possessing expertise and skill in the field its
decision to develop the property as a C&EC by itself cannot be faulted with.
G. It is not a case where Article 14 can be said to have been infringed.
H. It cannot be said the facts which are pleaded are not based on evidence or
materials which are not annexed to the counter affidavit.
I. Reasons in such matters can be gathered from files/records maintained by the
authorities.
A review petition filed thereagainst was dismissed. Appellants filed the special leave
petition on 29.10.2004 against the order dated 20.1.2004 as also against the order
dated 11.10.2004 dismissing the review petition.
In its counter affidavit filed before this Court the Authority, inter alia, disclosed that
the rate of premium
this appeal would contend that
i) the purported major shift in the policy by the Authority was impermissible in law;
ii) rejection of the bid offered by the Authority was wholly illegal as the Executive
Committee alone was the sole judge in relation thereto;
iii) in accepting the bid of Reliance Industries Ltd., the offer of the appellants that
they would pay @2=% per year from the annual turnover from the 21st year had not
been considered;
iv) in rejecting the tender of the appellant, the Executive Committee/Mumbai
Metropolitan Region Development Authority was required to assign sufficient and
valid reason; and the same having not been done, the order impugned in the writ
petition was vitiated in law.
Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Reliance
Industries Ltd., on the other hand, would submit that
i) the Executive Committee could not have taken a decision in regard to the change of
policy;
ii) when the second tender was floated, Appellant did not take part therein;
iii) procedural lapses, if any, cannot be a ground for judicial review.
Contentions of Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the Authority were
i) judicial
determines to dispose of land by making offers to the Government, Local Authority
or Public Sector Undertaking, the offers shall be made by the Metropolitan
Commissioner in such form as he may decide, incorporating the terms and
conditions of offers determined by the Authority which shall include the condition
that the offer shall remain open and valid for acceptance for a period of 30 days and
shall lapse if it remains unaccepted by the expiry of this period; provided that it
shall be lawful for the Metropolitan Commissioner to renew any lapsed offer on an
additional condition that the Government, Local Authority or Public Sector
Undertaking, as the case may be, shall pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum
over the premium specified in the lapsed offer with effect from the date on which
the lapsed offer was made; provided further that nothing contained herein shall
authorize the Metropolitan Commissioner to renew any lapsed offer after three
months of its lapse."
Regulation 9 provides for the mode and manner of payment of premium.
Sub-Regulation (ii) of Regulation 9 reads as under : "9(ii) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the foregoing Clause to contrary, if there shall a scheme
thereof read as under :
"7.24 The turnover of the Bidding Company or the combined turnover of the
Financially Significant Members of the Bidding Consortium from the directly related
field of activities shall not be less than Rs.500 million.
7.25 Format for Cover I compliance to minimum eligibility criteria
Bidders are required to organize "Cover I Companies with Minimum Eligibility
Criteria" according to the following checklist :
Cover 1
Compliance to Minimum Eligibility
Criteria
Section 1
.
Section 2
a)
b)
c) Letters of Acceptance, as per the
format specified in Exhibit 4, from each of the Consortium Members in case of a
Bidding Consortium.
Section 3
a) ..
b) Letters of Commitment as per the
format specified in Exhibit 3, from each of the entities which are Financially
Significant Consortium Member, the
strengths of which is to be considered for the purpose of evaluation.
Clause 7.26 reads as under :
"7.26 MMRDA on demand will return unopened Financial Bids and Technical Bids
(Covers 2 and 3) of the Bidders who do not comply with the minimum eligibility
criteria."
Step 2 (Cover 2) provides for financial bid. Clause 7.30 provides for methodology for
evaluation of bids.
Clause 7.30 deals with the manner in which
Kuppu Damayanthi vs C. Rama Rao on 27 September, 1967
only where the Court is satisfied that there has been no unnecessary or improper
delay that relief under Section 24 could be granted but not otherwise. After remand
the learned District Judge holding that there was no unnecessary or improper delay
in instituting the proceeding, once more granted the declaration prayed for . The wife
has now appealed against the decree of the learned District Judge.
2. The Marriage, as we said, was solemnised on 24-2-1953 and the petition for a
declaration that the marriage was null and void was filed on 12-6-1960. The
explanation offered by the respondent for this long delay, which has been accepted
by the learned District Judge is that almost from the date of marriage, he or those
interested in him were trying to secure a divorce peacefully and that he was
compelled to file the petition under Section 24 only after those efforts proved
fruitless. But, in our opinion, this is no explanation at all. On the contrary, it implies
a recognition by the parties of the existence and validity of the marriage which is not
valid. We cannot help that the failure of a spouse to induce the other spouse
case Denning. L. J. after observing that the petitioner 'cannot play fast and lose with
marriage in that way' extracted the following passage from Boulting v. Boulting,
(1863) 164 ER 1302:
"The Petitioner must feel and suffer under the wrong of which complaint is made,
and the Court must be satisfied that the remedy is sought as a genuine relief from the
pressure of that grievance. Such is the beaten track of the decisions. It is impossible
to tread too faithfully in footsteps so wisely placed.
3. In the present case the grievance of the respondent, in truth, is not that the
marriage is invalid, but that it is unhappy, the remedy which he wanted all these
years was a dissolution of the marriage and not a declaration that it was null and
void. Having failed in his attempts to induce the respondent to agree to a divorce he
is now seeking to get rid of an unhappy marriage though for seven years he was
content to recognise it as a valid marriage. We consider that it would be unfair and
inequitable to the wife and the children of the marriage to permit him to do so after
a lapse
Johnson v. Johnson, 1901 P. 193 Wilkins v. Reynolds, 1 PD 405 1955-2 All ER 110 etc.
The law as stated in Section 17 of the Special Marriage Act is not different.
8. The learned Counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon the case of Dunis v.
Donovan, (1830) 162 ER 1165 where Dr. Lushington observed:
'It is true that a very considerable time has elapsed between the period of which this
marriage was contracted, and the institution of the present suit but suits of a similar
description have been brought after the lapse of at least as long a period. In
Johnston and Johnston, upwards of twenty years had intervened between the
solemnization of the marriage and the commencement of proceedings, Considering
therefore, that the Court has to pronounce only a declaratory sentence, and to
determine whether the law has made this marriage null and void, I think the lapse of
timeoffers no bar to the inquiry."
That was a case where the marriage was solemnized under an Act known by the
name of Lord Hardwick's Act which expressly declared all marriages of minors
without the consent of guardians absolute nullities
Dr. Prem Lata vs Gnct Of Delhi And Ors on 3 May, 2011
18th March, 2010 by the Food Supplies and Consumer
Affairs Department of Government of NCT of Delhi. Seventy Two (72)
applications including that of the petitioner were received. In accordance
with Section 10(1A) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Consumer Act)
a Selection Committee was constituted. The Selection Committee made its
recommendation for filling up the vacancies in the Office of five District
Fora in Delhi by preparing a panel, valid for one year. The said
recommendation also provided:
"In case the candidates selected fail to join within 45 days of offer of appointment,
the appointment will lapse and the second or third person as the case may be in
preference will beoffered the appointment.
During the course of interview on our query the candidates already serving had
candidly expressed before us that in case they are selected
and offered appointment, they will join immediately."

2. The name of the petitioner did not figure in the name of the five (5)
selected candidates in the said recommendation. However the name of the
petitioner was mentioned as the "second person" in the event of Mr. M.C.
W.P.(C) 178/2011 Page 2 of 32 Mehra whose name
petitioner claims that the panel was subsequently revised and
inspite of the petitioner, being a candidate in waiting in the event of
Mr. M.C. Mehra not joining, the name of the petitioner was placed at serial
no.6 i.e. entitled to join in the event of any of the first five selected
candidates not joining within 45 days of offer of appointment.

4. It is further the case of the petitioner that the respondents no.4, 5 & 6
whose name appeared at number 1, 2 & 5 respectively of the selected
candidates, did not join within 45 days of offer of appointment to them and
thus as per the recommendation aforesaid of the Selection Committee, the
offer to them of appointment, automatically lapsed and the petitioner being
the next person on the panel became entitled to appointment. Upon the
representation of the petitioner seeking such appointment meeting with no
success, this writ petition was filed seeking quashing of the extension if any
granted to the respondents no. 4 to 6 to join and mandamus declaring
appointment of the respondents no. 4 to 6 to the said post as illegal and void
W.P.(C) 178/2011 Page
relax the period
of 45 days laid down in the recommendation of the Selection Committee, it
W.P.(C) 178/2011 Page 16 of 32 is apposite to refer to another question put during
the course of hearing to
the Ld. Amicus Curiae. The Consumer Act does not provide for preparation
of a panel of candidates or for the selected candidate being required to join
within 45 days of offer of appointment and the appointment automatically
lapsing upon not so joining and the candidate in waiting becoming the
"selected candidate". No rules also in this regard were cited. It was as such
enquired as to what was the power of the Selection Committee to, besides
naming the selected candidates, provide a period of 45 days for joining or
for automatic lapsing of appointment or to prepare a panel of others in
waiting.

18. No answer was forthcoming from Mr. Saini. He rather suggested that
it was for the Government to explain. He also contended that the appointing
authority being the Lt. Governor having accepted the said recommendation
of the Selection Committee, the said question did not arise. I may however
notice that the advertisement inviting applications did provide that
route their
applications through proper channel. At this stage, I may also notice that
though it is the case of the petitioner that pursuant to the initial
recommendation, a consolidated panel in which she was placed at serial no.6
was prepared but the record and/or the office notings do not support such
case. The record and the office notings contain only the one
recommendation of the Selection Committee and in which the petitioner had
W.P.(C) 178/2011 Page 19 of 32 a right of appointment only in the event of Shri M.C.
Mehra not joining
within 45 days. It is not the case of the petitioner that Shri M.C. Mehra did
not join within 45 days; Shri M.C. Mehra is not even impleaded as a party to
this petition. Rather the record shows that Mr. M.C. Mehra joined within 45
days. Thus as per the recommendation on record, the petitioner had no right
of appointment upon delay by the respondents no.4 to 6 in joining.

22. The record shows that offer of appointment was made to the
respondents no.4 to 6 vide letters dated 13 th October, 2010. The said