PEOPLE V. NARANJA, G.R.

NO L-13288 (1960)

FACTS: Accused Naranja was charged and convicted of murder of Mamerto Signey. Accused
appealed on the ground that the crime has not been established, particularly because there is
no evidence:
a. As to the kind of instrument/weapon used to kill the deceased
b. As to the position of the assailant when he allegedly killed the deceased
c. As to possession of the instrument used to kill the deceased
d. As to the victims cause of death.
According to the accused, the testimony of Maria Diaz, wife the deceased, is weak,
uncorroborated, self-serving, unnatural and not direct
1. According to Diaz, on the day her husband was killed, the accused approached her and
asked Diaz to leave her husband for the accused, who had illicit relations with Diaz. As
Diaz refused, the accused told her that he intends to kill Signey.
2. Thereafter, Diaz found the accused at their house and the latter told her that he killed
Signey and left his body at the creek near their house
3. Diaz, then, informed her mother about the occurrence and asked her neighbors to help
her bring Signeys body to the house

ISSUE: WON Diazs testimony is admissible

HELD: Yes. Diaz testimony is not self-serving because she had not gained any beneficial
interest and instead stands to lose by admitting to having illicit relations with the accused.

Moreover, her confession is strong evidence falling under the Res Gestae rule as provided in
Sec 33, Rule 123.(now Rule 130, Sec 42).

In his Comments on the Rules of Court, Justice Moran explains the Res Gestae rule:

There are other declarations which are admitted as original evidence, being distinguished from
hearsay by their connection with the principal fact under investigation. The affairs of men consist
of a complication of circumstances so intimately interwoven as to be hardly separable from each
other. These surrounding circumstances, constituting parts of Res Gestae, may always be
shown to the jury along with the principal fact and their admissibility is determined by the judged
according to the degree of their relation to that fact, and in the exercise of his sound discretion:
it being extremely difficult, if not impossible to bring this class of cases within the limits of a more
particular description.

CAB: Diazs testimony made reference to what the accused intended to do with the deceased;
and this implementation of his evil design is borne out by the actual and physical facts of the
case. The testimony of Balderas to the effect that, when Diaz came to his house for help, she
told him her husband was dead and could be found at a certain place, amply proves the fact of
the crime as confessed by the accused. That and the presence of a bluish black spot at the
name of the deceased and the opinion of the Dr. Valera that a blow delivered right on the
medulla oblongata could have caused instantaneous death, confirm the admission of the
accused to Diaz.





PEOPLE V. PROVO, 37 SCRA 19 (1971)

FACTS: Accused Pan Provo and Leonardo David were acquitted of the crime of murder of
Matignas Serrano. The co-accused Jose Mesina was found guilty of the crime.
1. Accused Mesina impugned the admissibility of Exhibits C and E, the extrajudicial
confessions of Leonardo David and Emilio Provo, respectively. Mesina contended that
the same were admissible as evidence only as to the confessors and not as to him
2. Exhibit C is an affidavit executed by Leonardo and sworn before the Justice of Peace of
Angeles, stating that on the day of the victims death, Leonardo joined his brother
Pedring and Mesina in going to Pisok. As Matignas refused to allow them pass through,
Pedring snatched Matignas carbine while their other companions dragged Matignas.
Pedring then hit the victims head with the butt of the carbine which caused Matignas to
fall unconscious
3. Exhibit E, on the other hand, is the transcript of testimony given by Emilio Provo before
the fiscal who conduct the preliminary investigation. Provo narrated that Mesina
snatched the carbine from Matignas and thereafter their companions dragged Matignas
down the hill and hacked him several times
4. Emilio subsequently recanted his testimony before lower court and alleged that he gave
said testimony upon instructions of Angel Manipon, who had assured him that he would,
thereafter, be free

ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confessions of Provo and David bind Mesina

HELD: Yes. Although extrajudicial confessions are generally admissible only against those who
made the same, this rule is subject to an exception. As pointed out in People v. Condemena:

Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, which are identical with
each other in their essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on record,
are admissible, as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated to show the
probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime.

CAB: Exhibits C and E were made without collusion and independently of each otherfor the
purpose of establishing the guilt of Federico (Pedring) David and Pan Provo, and that they
corroborate one another and the testimony of other witnesses with respect to the fact that
Matignas was dragged from his post by Mesina and his companions for not allowing them to
steal the electric cables from Clark Air Base. Hence, said exhibits were properly admitted as
circumstantial evidence tending to show the probability of the participation of Mesina in the
commission of the said offense.













PEOPE V. TIOZON, 198 SCRA 368 (1991)

FACTS: Tiozon was charged and convicted for the murder of Leonardo Bolima
1. On the evening of February 24, 1989, while the victim and his husband were sleeping
inside their house, the accused who appeared to be drunk, went to the victims house
2. Tiozon showed Bolima a gun and the latter even toyed with it. Later, the two went
outside. Thereafter, Bolimas wife heard two successive gunshots
3. Five minutes later, she heard the accused knocking at their door and saying that he
accidentally shot Bolima.
4. The wife testified on the declaration that the accused made shortly after Bolima was
shot.
5. The trial court convicted Tiozon; the court considered the testimony of Bolimas wife to
be part of Res Gestae

ISSUE: WON the declaration in this case is part of Res Gestae

HELD: No. That the trial court considered the statement by the accused to the victims wife as
part of Res Gestae is a misapplication of the said rule.

The general rule on testimonial evidence is that a witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of or his own knowledge, i.e. those which are derived from own perceptions.
Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to what he heard other persons say about the facts in
dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are, however, exceptions to
this rule. One of them is statements as part of the Res Gestae under Sec 36, Rule 130 ROC.
The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact hearsay but it is to be admitted in
evidence. Under Sec 36, statements may be deemed as part of Res Gestae if they are
made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof. Statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and giving it a legal significance
may also be received as part of the Res Gestae.

CAB: The wifes testimony is not hearsay. She testified on what the accused told her, not what
any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The statement of the accused was an
oral confession, not part of Res Gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which he
did in this case.

















PEOPLE V. MAPAN LE, G.R. NO 188976 (2010)

FACTS: Mapan Le and Del Castillo were charged and convicted for violation of Sec 5 in relation
to Sec 26 of Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002 (illegal possession and sale of prohibited
drugs)
1. In 2004, the Pasig City Police received information from a confidential informant (CI) that
Mapan Le and Del Castillo were selling shabu in Pasig.
2. As such, PO2 Castillo organized a buy-bust operation and designated PO2 Noble as
poseur-buyer. They then went to the place of Mapan Le where the CI introduced Noble
as a regular shabu buyer
3. After inquiring on the price of the drug, Noble handed Mapan Le P200 marked money.
Mapan Le then instructed Castillo to give Noble a plastic sachet which upon inspection
contained shabu.
4. On appeal, the accused-appellants questioned the non-presentation of the marked
money used in the buy-bust operations.
5. The OSG argued that the non-presentation of the marked money does not create a
hiatus in the evidence of the prosecution as the sale of the shabu was adequately
proven and the shabu itself was presented before the court. Moreover, the accused-
appellants did not object to the presentation of the photocopies of the marked money
during trial

ISSUE: WON the presentation of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation is
necessary to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: No. Accused-appellants argument on the failure to present the marked money in court is
not only without merit but baseless. The P200 marked money was presented as evidence as the
buy-bust money used and marked as Exhibits E and F. Moreover, the presentation of buy-
bust money is not required by law or jurisprudence. Its non-presentation is not fatal to
the case for the prosecution. The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not
indispensable but merely corroborative in nature.




















PEOPLE V. PENASO, 326 SCRA 311 (2000)

FACTS: In April 1990, private complainant Lacar, a minor, filed a complaint for multiple rape
against Gonzalo Penaso.
1. Private complainant alleged that Penaso with the use of force and superior strength,
raped Lacar and threatened to kill her if she reported the matter to her parents
2. Subsequently, the private complainant gave birth to a baby boy
3. The trial court convicted Penaso of rape. Penaso then filed an appeal.
4. Penaso alleged that he did not get Lacar pregnant. He cited the testimony of defense
witness Libres, a classmate of Lacar, to the effect that the complainant admitted to him
that Penaso did not cause her pregnancy. According to Libres, complainant identified
one Willy Guitano or a certain man from Sagumay as the possible father of her child.
Penaso also accused the private complainants stepfather as a possible culprit
5. Penaso challenged the allegations of Lacar and asked for a DNA test or blood test

ISSUE: WON DNA test is necessary evidence to prove rape

HELD: No. The SC held in one case: the issue of DNA tests as a more accurate and
authoritative means of identification than eye-witness identification need not be
belabored. The accused were all properly and duly identified by the prosecutions
principal witness. DNA testing proposed by petitioners to have an objective and scientific basis
of identification of semen samples to compare with those taken from the vagina of the victim are
thus unnecessary or are forgotten evidence to late to consider on appeal

Regarding Penasos allegation that he did not get Lacar pregnant, this attempt to impugn the
victims moral character is self-serving and not supported by the evidence. Moreover, the
question of who sire the victims child has no bearing here for in rape cases, the identity of the
father of the victims child is not an issue since pregnancy is not an element of the crime of rape.























BORJE V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 125 SCRA 736 (1983)

FACTS: Borje was accused of the crime of falsification of public document. Complainant
Ducusin alleged that Borje, as the Provincial Plant Officer of the Bureau of Plant Industry in La
Union, took advantage of his position in falsifying the Timebook and Payroll of his office for the
periods January to March 1977, Daily Time Record of Ducusin by causing it to appear that
Ducusin participated in the same and affixed his signatures thereon when in fact he did not sign
the documents, in order to receive P225 which was supposed to have been received by
Ducusin
1. To prove that Borje committed the crime, the prosecution presented the following
documents as evidence: (a) Exhibit A, Timebook and Payroll of accused-appellants
office for the period January to March 1977; (b) Exhibit D, Daily Time Record for the
same period of Rodrigo Ducusin; and (c) Exhibit C, certification that Ducusin was
detailed to the program
2. Ducusin testified that he was no longer connected with the Program during the period of
January to March 1977 because his assignment had been terminated. When asked for
evidence to prove that he was terminated, Ducusin only referred to a verbal order
3. On appeal, Borje argued that proof beyond reasonable doubt was not established since:
a. The originals of the alleged falsified documents were not presented in court and
hence, the corpus delicti was not established as held in US v. Gregorio
b. There is no iota of evidence that the petitioner falsified the complainants
signature on the alleged falsified documents
4. Reacting to the defenses contention, the Sandiganbayan held that the accuseds
reliance in the case of US v. Gregorio is misplaced since the issue in the instant case is
not one of alteration or superimposition of signature or word or figure. Sandiganbayan
also questioned the relevancy of the decision in US v. Gregorio since there are modern
copying devices virtually eliminate the possibility of error in reproduction of the original

ISSUES:
1. WON Ducusins testimony with regard to his non-participation in the program is
admissible
2. WON the presentation of Xerox copies of the falsified documents is enough to prove the
crime of falsification of public documents

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No. The alleged verbal order is doubtful for under normal and usual official
procedure, a written special order is issued by a government office is cancelled, amended or
modified only by another written special order, not only for the purpose of record on file but also
to prevent conflict and confusion in government operations. Under the Best Evidence Rule, the
supposed verbal order cannot prevail over the Special Order no 172 which lists Ducusin in the
payroll for the Program.

SECOND ISSUE: No. In US v. Gregorio, the SC held that: In a criminal case for the
falsification of document, it is indispensable that the judges and the courts have before
them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited or falsified, in order
that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced at the trial, whether or not the
crime of falsification was actually committed; in the absence of the original document, it
is improper to conclude, with only a copy of the said original in view, that there has been
a falsification of a document which was neither found nor exhibited, because in such a
case, even the existence of such original document may be doubted.

The Sandiganbayan is incorrect to dismiss the ruling in the Gregorio case. Firstly, the Gregorio
ruling makes no distinction for the doctrine itself applies in criminal proceedings for the
falsification of a document, whether simulated, counterfeited or falsified. Secondly, the Gregorio
doctrine is still tenable notwithstanding the modern copying devices for a falsified document,
passed off as an original can also be duplicated by Xeroxing and thereafter, certified as true
copy of the original. And thirdly, considering that in the case at bar, the Xeroxing was done or
caused to be done by complainant Ducusin after taking out the original documents without
official authority and permission of the Disbursing Officer and Cashier, and thereafter the
originals were lost, misplaced and are now missing, the failure to present to originals is
suspicious for complainant had ulterior and ill motives in accusing Borje.









































SARMING V. DY, 383 SCRA 131 (2002)

FACTS: Petitioners are the successorsin-interest of the original defendant Silveria Flores while
respondents Dy are the successors-in-interest of the original plaintiff Alejandra Delfino.
1. Plaintiffs alleged that the they are the heirs of Valentina Flores who owned the subject
property. After the death of Valentina, her 3 children (Jose Venancio and Silveria) tooko
possession of the lot with each occupying 1/3 portion. Upon their death, the
grandchildren took possession of their respective shares
2. Subsequently, the grandchildren of Jose entered into a contract of sale with Delfino for
the share of the lot in question
3. Before preparing the Deed of Sale, Delfinos lawyer asked for the title of the land to be
sold. Silveria in turn delivered the OCT (OCT 4918-A) covering Lot 5734 and not the
correct title covering Lot 4163, which was the subject of the sale. At the time, the parties
knew the location of Lot 4163 but not the OCT number corresponding to said lot
4. Believing that OCT delivered was correct, the parties executed a deed of sale over the
parcel of land. As a result, the OCT 4918-A was cancelled and a new TCT was issued
5. Thereafter, Delfino discovered that what was designated in the deed was the wrong lot.
She then asked Silveria to turn over the correct OCT covering the land she purchased
for the reformation of the deed of sale. Despite, demands however, Silveria failed to do
the same.

ISSUE: WON reformation of the subject deed is proper by reason of mistake in designating the
correct lot number

HELD: Yes. Reformation is a remedy in equity by means of which a written instrument is made
or construed so as to express or conform to the real intention of the parties.

An action for reformation of instrument under Art 1359 may prosper only upon the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) there must have been a meeting of the minds
of the parties to the contract; (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the
parties; and (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is
due to mistake, fraud and inequitable conduct or accident.

CAB: All of these requisites are present. There was a meeting of minds between the parties to
the contract but the deed did not express the true intention of the parties due to mistake int eh
designation of the lot subject of the deed. There is no dispute as to the intention of the parties to
sell the land to Delfino but there was a mistake as to the designation of the lot intended to be
sold as stated in the Settlement of Estate and Sale.

NOTE: An action for reformation is an exception to the Parol Evidence Rule.











PEOPLE V. CRISOSTOMO, 160 SCRA 47 (1998)

FACTS: While Crisostomo was passing near the house of Geronimo, he met the latter and
invited him for a drink. Geronimo declined the offer. Suddenly, Crisostomo rushed towards
Geronimo who was standing near a store facing the street with his back towards Crisostomo
and shot him.
1. The trial court charged and convicted Crisostomo of murder,
2. On appeal, Crisostomo contends that the trial court erred in finding that there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt that he killed Geronimo since there was no evidence
presented as to the cause of death i.e., no autopsy was performed on the victims body.
3. In particular, Crisostomo avers that the death certificate of the victim is admissible only
to establish the fact of death not the cause of death of the victim.
4. Moreover, the testimony of Dr. Santos who examined the body of the victim but did not
perform an autopsy shows that he did not qualify as an expert witness

ISSUE: WON death certificate of the victim establishes the cause of death

HELD: Yes. The death certificate and the notes issued by Dr. Santos after his external
examination of the body of the victim establish of death of the deceased contrary to the
contention of Crisostomo. In this junction such death certificate and notes issued by
municipal health officer (Dr. Santos) in the regular performance of his duty are prima
facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim.

Moreover, the said death certificate is not only confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Santos and by
2 eyewitnesses who were friends of both the victim and the appellant, stated that they saw the
appellant rush at the victim and suddenly shoot him; that the victim fell down after he was hit;
and that they brought him to the hospital but the doctor pronounced him dead on arrival.