ABS-CBN Broadcasting Group vs COMELEC

Facts: The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule

65 of the Rules of Court assailing COMELEC Res. No. 98-
1419 which resolved to approve the issuance of restraining
order to stop the petitioner or any groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting exit survey. The electoral
body believed that the exit survey might conflict with the
official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count
of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It
also had not authorized or deputized petitioner to undertake the
exit survey.
The petitioner filed for a temporary restraining order which
was granted by the court on May 9, 1998.
Solicitor General contends that the petition is already moot and
academic because the May 11, 1998 elections has already been
held and done with and there is no longer any actual
controversy. SG further contends that the Petition should be
dismissed for petitioners failure to exhaust available remedies
before issuing forum, especially the filling of a motion for
reconsideration.
The Court believed that the issue is not totally moot because
of the basic feature of our democratic government which is the
periodic elections where exit polling is said to be tied with it.
The Court ruled that the procedural requirement may be
glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice when the need
for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate
and speedy remedy available. The Court based its judgment on
the span of time the instant petition was filed by the respondent
and the time when the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof.
Under the circumstances, the court believed that there was
hardly enough opportunity to move for reconsideration and to
obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998
elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the
Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. And
the court also resolved to settle the issue because the
fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being
invoked.
Argument of the Petitioner:
The petitioner argues that holding of exit polls and
the nationwide reporting of their results are valid
exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the
press.
That the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion
and grossly violated the petitioners constitutional
right.
Argument of the Respondent:
It insists that the issuance was "pursuant to its
constitutional and statutory powers to promote a
clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998
elections" and "to protect, preserve and maintain the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."
That "exit surveys indirectly violate the
constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of
the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the
contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution; and relevant
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.
That the exit poll has a clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of the
electoral process
Issue: Whether or not the respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it

approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the
petitioner or any other group, its agents or representatives from
conducting exit polls during the May 11, 1998 elections.
Ruling:
Validity of Conducting Exit Polls: No law prohibits the holding
and the reporting of exit polls.
Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the Press:
Freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our
democratic government. Our Constitution clearly mandates that
no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of
the press. Limitation: a limitation on the freedom of expression
may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character
that the state has a right to prevent.
Even though the governments purpose is legitimate and
substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly
conceal fundamental liberties, when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.
Secrecy of the Ballots
The Court noted that the COMELEC has the duty to secure the
secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the
integrity of the electoral process. However, in order to justify a
restriction of the people's freedoms of speech and of the press,
the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far
outweigh them. The Court contends that the contention of
public respondent that exit polls indirectly violated the sanctity
of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. The reason behind
the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through
voter identification. What is forbidden is the association of
voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring
that the votes have been casted in accordance with the
instruction of a third party.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually
exposed. Moreover, the revelation of whom an elector has
voted for is not compulsory, but VOLUNTARY.
On the contention of the COMELEC that exit poll has a clear
and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of
the electoral process, the court ruled that such arguments are
purely speculative and clearly untenable. Because: 1) the
participants are selected at random; 2) the survey result is not
meant to replace or be at par with the official COMELEC
count. It is merely an opinion. 3) credibility and integrity of the
elections are not at stake here. The holding and the reporting of
the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the
elections, since the exit poll is only part of the election.
The Court argues that the COMELEC has other valid and
reasonable ways and means to avoid or minimize disorder and
confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.

The petition is granted and the temporary restraining order
issued by the court is made permanent.
Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the COMELEC is nullified
and set aside.



Bayan vs Zamora
Petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Facts:
Philippines and USA forged Military Bases Agreement on 14
March 1947 which formalized the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by the United States military personnel. On
30 August 1951, both countries entered into Mutual Defense
Treaty to further strengthen their defense and security
relationship. The parties agreed to respond to any external
armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and
aircraft.
On 16 September 1991, Philippine Senate rejected the
proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Security which would have extended the presence of US
military bases in the Philippines.
On 18 July 1997, US panel met with the Philippine panel to
exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of
the US and PH in the Asia-pacific region. The Visiting Forces
Agreement was among the things discussed. On 10 February
1998, Pres. Ramos approved VFA; and on 5 October 1998,
Pres. Estrada, through respondent Sec. of Foreign Affairs,
ratified the VFA which was officially transmitted to the Senate
of the Philippines on 6 October 1998 for concurrence pursuant
to Sec. 21, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
On 27 May 1999, the Senates Committee on Foreign Relations
submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending
the concurrence of Senate to the VFA and the creation of
Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its
implementation. This was approved by the Senate on 27 May
1999, by a 2/3 vote of its members. Senate Res. No. 443 was
re-numbered to Senate Res. No. 18.
The VFA consists of a Preamble and 9 Articles which provides
for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and
conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense
personnel may be present in the Philippines.
Petitioners- as legislators, non-governmental organizations,
citizen and taxpayers- assail the constitutionality of the VFA
and impute the respondents with grave abuse of discretion
in ratifying the agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to
question the constitutionality of the VFA
Whether or not VFA is governed by the provisions
of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the petitioners have no legal standing to
question the constitutionality of VFA on the ground that they
failed to substantiate that they have sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA. This was
counter-argued by the petitioners which they contend that the
validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental
importance which justifies their standing.
The Court ruled that the petitioners failed to show, to the
satisfaction of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in
danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the

enforcement of the VFA. Consequently, as taxpayers, they
have not established that the VFA involves the exercise of
Congress of taxing and spending powers, for a taxpayers suit
refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves
the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
Which provision of the constitution applies with regards to
the exercise by senate of its constitutional power to concur
with the VFA?
The petitioners argue that Sec. 25, Art. 18 is applicable
considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of
foreign military troops in the Philippines. Sec 25, Art 18
provides:
"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress
so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."
The respondents argue that Sec. 21, Art. 7 should apply as the
VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which
involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel
engaged in joint military exercises. Sec.21, Art. 7 provides:
"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate."

The Court further examined the provisions:
Sec. 25, Art. 18 is a special provision that applies to treatise
which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in the Philippines. The provision requires that
"foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in
the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress,
and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Concurrence of Senate is only one of the requisites.
Sec. 21, Art. 7 deals with treatise or international agreements in
general, in which case, the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the
Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty,
or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the
Philippines. All treaties or international agreements entered
into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage,
or particular designation or appellation, requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
Both provisions include the fundamental law that the
concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the
strict constitutional requirements
Lex specialis derogate generali- special provision or law
prevails over general one
In both provision, concurrence of senate is present, therefore, it
is not an issue. On the provision in Art 18, requiring
ratification by the majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum is deemed necessary since the Congress has not
required it.


Grave abuse of discretion of power of the respondents
The Court ruled that the president acted within the confines and
limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution in
ratifying the VFA and submitting it to the Senate for
Concurrence. No abuse of discretion may be imputed to the
Pres. in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring it to the
Senate. The Pres. merely performed a constitutional task and
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of
his office.
The President merely performed a constitutional task and
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the function of
his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate
for concurrence under the provisions of Section 21 of Article
VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution,
still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be
adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some
patent, gross, and capricious manner.

The instant petitions are dismissed.






In re: Saturnino V. Bermudez
Facts:
The petitioner in his petition quotes Sec. 5 (1) of Art. 18 of the
proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides:
The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
Under the proposed Constitution, it is also provided that the
first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May 1992.
Petitioner claimed that the said provision is not clear as to
whom it refers. He asked the Court to declare and answer the
question as to who, among the present incumbent Pres. Aquino
and Vice-Pres. Laurel, and the elected Pres. Marcos and Vice-
Pres. Tolentino being referred to under the said provision.
Issue: Whether or not the petition is ambiguous.
Ruling:
The petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for lack
for cause of action. This Court assumes no jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief.
The Court also finds that the petition would amount to a suit
against the incumbent President and it is useless for the
incumbent President of the Philippines are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure.

The petition states no cause of action for the petitioners
allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of Sec. 5, Art. 18 is
manifestly gratuitous (without cause), it being a matter of
public record and common public knowledge that the
Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President and Vice-President to no other persons, and provides
for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for
purposes of synchronization of elections.
The Court further contends that the petitioners have no
personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action.
The legitimacy of Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter for it belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge.
The petition is dismissed.

Lozano vs Nograles
Facts:
Petitioners hoped for the nullification of House Resolution No.
1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the members of
Congress to convene for the purpose of considering proposal to
amend or revise the Constitution, upon a 3/4 vote of all
members of Congress. The petition seeks to trigger a
justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive
interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article 17, which
provides for the procedure for amending or revising the
Constitution.
The duty of the judiciary is to say what the law is. The
determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of
government is the exclusive province of the judiciary. This
Courts power to review is limited to actual cases and
controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal
claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of arguments by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. The case-or-
controversy requirement bans this court from deciding
abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions.
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the
requisite of ripeness.
Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of
ripeness:
1) The fitness of the issues for judicial decision
2) The hardship to the parties entailed by withholding
court consideration.
In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally
treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners case has met the
requirements for a judicial review.
Ruling:
The fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial
review is grossly lacking. 1) The petitioners have not
sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
complained of. 2) House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved
that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time
for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. No convention has yet transpired, no rules of

procedure have yet been adopted, and no proposal has yet been
made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of
discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109
involves a typical example of an uncertain contingent future
event that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all.
There is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight
since the proposed amendments is still unacted. Only after
it has made concrete what it intends to submit for
ratification may the appropriate case be instituted.
Locus standi or standing to sue:
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he
can demonstrate that 1) he has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; 3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the
remedy of sought.
The petitioners have not shown the elemental injury that would
grant them with the standing to sue. They failed to show that
they have sustained or will sustain direct injury in the
promulgation of the act. Moreover, the claim of the petitioners
that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and
concerned citizens do not grant them with locus standi. It is
because a taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation.
The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet
unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi
under the transcendental importance doctrine.
The petitions are dismissed.

Salonga vs Cruz Pano
The Petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to
life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging
that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the
filling of an information for subversion against him.
Facts:
There were series of bombing occurred in Metro Manila in the
months of August, September and October of 1980.
On 6 September 1980, Victor Burns Lovely, Jr. almost killed
himself and injured his younger brother as a result of the
explosion of a small bomb inside his room at YMCA building
in Manila.
At the Presidents anniversary television radio press conference
held on 20 September 1980, the younger brother of Lovely was
interviewed and stated that his brother has a connection with
the petitioner as he had driven Lovely to the petitioners house
twice on the month of August. Because of his statement, the
petitioner has been linked to the various bombings in Metro
Manila.
The explosion of a small bomb minutes after the President had
finished delivering speech before the International Conference
of the American Society of Travel agents at the Philippine
International Convention Center held on 19 October 1980
triggered the issuance of Arrest, Search, and Seizure Orders
(ASSOs) against persons who were apparently implicated by
Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila.
On 21 October 1980, the petitioner was arrested at the Manila
Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and

chronic ailment of bronchial asthma. The arresting officer
showed the ASSO form which however did not specify the
charge or charges against the petitioner.
The petitioner was transferred against his objections on 2
November 1980 from his hospital arrest to an isolation room
without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why he
was detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by
any military or civil authority.
On 27 November 1980, the petitioner was released from
military custody for humanitarian reasons and placed under
house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Salonga still without the
benefit of any investigation or charges.
On 24 February 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a
complaint accusing the petitioner of having violated RA No.
1700, as amended by PD 885 and BP 31 in relation to Art 142
of the Revised Penal Code.
On 6 March 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the
country to attend a series of church conferences and undergo
comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach,
liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to
save his right eye. The petitioner is totally deaf in the right ear
and partially deaf in the left ear.
On 15 October 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss the charges against the petitioner for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. It was
denied by the respondent judge on 2 December 1981 and
issued on 4 January 1982 a resolution ordering the filling of
information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act
against 40 people including the petitioner.
Actual Case
The resolution of the respondent judge dated 2 December 1981
and 4 January 1982 are the subject on the petition at bar. The
petitioner contended that no prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution to justify the filing of
information against him. He states that to sanction his further
prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be
to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Ruling:
The Court finds that the evidence offered by the prosecution is
insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the
petitioner. The Court contends that even if the evidence were
unexplained or uncontradicted they wont sufficiently
overcome the presumption of innocence and warrant his
conviction. This is because, as the records reveal in finding a
case against the petitioner, respondent judge only relied on the
testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely.
Testimonies that are based on affidavits of other persons and
purely hearsay can hardly qualify as a prima facie evidence of
subversion.
"Prima facie evidence" denotes evidence if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it
supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the
presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.
The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly
linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts of violence or
terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any
overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of
subversive organization for 2 reasons: 1) Because his house
was used as a contactpoint; and 2) Because he mentioned

some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most
likely should reforms be instated by President Marcos
immediately.
The Court ruled that the contact point theory is too weak as a
basis to conclude that petitioner Salonga was a leader or
mastermind of the bombing incidents. Moreover, the Court
believed that the testimony of Lovely is full of inconsistencies.
Salonga and Atty. Tanada could not have whispered to one
another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. It is also
impossible for Lovely to meet Salonga at a Manglapus party in
D.C. in 1977 because Salonga left for US only on November
1978. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the presence of
Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Dazas birthday
party in Los Angeles where Salonga was a guest is not proof of
conspiracy.
The Court ruled that the alleged opinion of the petitioner
contended by respondent judge is nothing but a legitimate
exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man
deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam
memo meretur.
The Court firmly stated that the prosecution has failed to
produce sufficient evidence that would establish any link
between petitioner and any subversive organization. The
prosecution fails to establish a prima facie case against the
petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to
overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any
subversive organization.
The petition is dismissed for having become moot and
academic as the prosecution have taken initiative of dropping
the charges against the petitioner.
Tanada vs Cuenco
Petitioners pray that the respondents be issued writ of
preliminary injunction, restraining them from continuing to
usurp, intrude and/or hold or exercise the said public offices
respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.
Facts:
On 22 February 1956, Senate is in session for the nomination
of senators for Senate Electoral Tribunal which will be
composed of 3 majority senators (party having the largest
number of votes in the Senate), 3 minority senators (party
having the second largest number of votes), and 3 justices to be
designated by the Chief Justice.
Petitioner Tanada refused to elect 2 senators to fill in for the
remaining 2 minority senators positions in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal as he is the only one coming from the
minority group.
During the nomination, respondents Sen. Cuenco and Delgado
were appointed by the Senate to fill in the vacant position of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Tanada is the lone member of the Citizens Party (minority
group). Senate consists of 23 senators who belong to the
Nacionalista Party.
Petitioners alleged that the Committee on Rules for the Senate,
in nominating Sen. Cuenco and Delgado as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal had acted absolutely without power
or color of authority which is a violation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of
the Constitution, which reads:

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior
Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
On the other hand, respondents argue that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the case since it poses a political question.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue is a political question.
Whether or not the election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal valid and lawful.
Ruling:
I.
Though the legislative power is vested exclusively in the
Congress of the Philippines, this does not detract from the
power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. Judicial power includes the authority to inquire into
the legality of statutes enacted by the Congress, and approved
by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of
an act of one of said Houses may not be determined in the
proper actions.
The Court states that the contention of the respondents that the
case is of political question is not true. The Court ruled that the
case at bar is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed
with full discretionary authority in the choice of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal.
Political question refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government."
Because of the above-mentioned points, the Court believed that
they not only have jurisdiction, but also the duty, to consider
and determine the principal issue raised by the parties.
II.
The purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its
composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties
and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling
power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance
of power.- Senator Sabido
The most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal
representation of said parties and the resulting equilibrium to
be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as
members of said Tribunals.
The Court contends that the framers intended to prevent the
majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals and it is
founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and
minority parties, with the Justices of the Supreme Court. The
provision for the selection of members of the Electoral
Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. The

Court resolved that the compliance with said procedure is
mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and
void.
The spirit of the law prevails over its letter.
The Court holds that:
Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been
nominated by the political parties specified in the
Constitution.
That the party having the largest number of votes in the
Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members
thereof to said Electoral Tribunal
That the party having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate
the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in
the Electoral Tribunal
That neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them,
may be nominated by a person or party other than the
one having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate or its representative therein
That the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no
standing to validly make such nomination and that the
nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by
Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents
by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and
void ab initio.
The j Sen Cuenco and Delgado have not been duly elected as
Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and they are not
entitled to act as such and they are enjoined from exercising the
powers and duties of Members of the said Electoral Tribunal.
The petition with regards to respondents Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is
dismissed for the reason that, though they were recommended
by Sen Cuenco and Delgado, they were appointed by the
Chairman.