Action & Selfhood

Action and selfhood: a narrative interpretation
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Subscri ber: Uni versi ty of Chi cago; date: 25 Jul y 2014
Print Publication Date: Dec 2012 Subject: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Online Publication Date: Jan
2013
DO: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.013.0014
Action and seIfhood: a narrative interpretation
Lszl Tengelyi
The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology
Edited by Dan Zahavi
Oxford Handbooks Online
Abstract and Keywords
Ths chapter enters nto a debate wth the anaytc theory of acton, especay the verson deveoped by Donad
Davdson, who makes t cear that the upsurge of a desre to perform a specfc acton s a natura event that s
causay responsbe for the acton n queston. The narratve nterpretaton of sefhood was ntated by Hannah
Arendt. Sefhood s certany assured on a passve and affectve pane. Edmund Husser mantans that n the
passve sphere, a sef s consttuted precedng actve refecton. As Pau Rcour ceary determnes, the compcty
wth reaty entas a decentred sef that s strcty opposed to the sef-centred, sef-controed, and sef-assured
ego of modern phosophy. Emmanue Levnas never accepted Wttgensten's constrant on phosophy to reman
sent wth regard to the unsayabe.
Keywords: action, Donald Davidson, desire, narrative interpretation, selfhood, Hannah Arendt, Edmund Husserl, Paul Ricour, modern philosophy,
Emmanuel Levinas
In the orgna Greek, the word drama s marked by a frutfu ambguty: ts tera meanng s acton, but t aso
desgnates a narratve that s staged n a theatre. Ths ambguty s frutfu, because t remnds us of the remarkabe
fact that acton ends tsef to narraton. Indeed, acton s not |ust an event n the word, but t s aso the germ of a
story that can be expressed n a narratve.
In a we-known passage from hs Poetics, Arstote says: oIiv |.| Iq |.| npcm 0o q iqoi
(Arstote 1934: 1450 a 3). Snce no use s made of the dea of iqoi (mtaton) n the foowng consderatons,
for our purposes, we can summarze ths proposton n Engsh as foows: The expresson of acton s a fabe or
even a pot. Arstote especay has n mnd a fabe or a pot that s staged n a theatre. However, n hs eyes, epc
poetry s by no means opposed to drama; rather, n the Poetics he treats these artstc forms as speces of the
same knd: namey, iqyqoIikq noiqoi-that s, narratve poetry. But what, precsey, does Arstote mean here
by a fabe or a pot (0o)? He defnes ths term as a ov0coi or ooIooi I6v npoyImv-that s, as a
combnaton of the ncdents, or of the thngs done n the story (Arstote 1934: 1450 a 3, 1450 a 14 and passim;
see Arstote 1952). The pont of ths defnton s that acton cannot be empotted n a narratve wthout beng
nserted nto a more encompassng whoe, n whch ts consequences unfod and become perceptbe.
In what foows I sha take ths dea as a cue to a partcuar nterpretaton of acton, whch s appropratey
characterzed as narratve, because t ooks at acton n the perspectve of ts empotment n a story to be tod.
From ths pont of vew, acton consdered n ts totaty w prove to be a mxture of actvty and passvty. Indeed,
our actons are not ony that whch we perform but aso that whch happens to us. In other words, at tmes the
narratves n whch our actons fnd ther pace make them ntegbe as events that have happened to us rather
than as ntatves we have taken. Therefore, a combnaton of the ncdents of a story ncudes not ony the
ntatves that are taken ntentonay, but aso the consequences that supervene on these ntatves wthout havng
been, n ther turn, propery ntended or ntended at a. It s a hghy sgnfcant fact that the meanng or sense of an
acton does not reman unaffected by ts unntended consequences, whch therefore cannot be consdered as
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merey externa events, but must rather be acknowedged as subsequenty reveaed shreds of meanng that beong
to the orgna deed. They adhere once and for a to ths deed, modfyng, n hndsght, ts orgna meanng as we
as ts rea sgnfcance. Snce the unntended consequences of an acton wthdraw themseves from the contro of
the agent and happen to hm unexpectedy, the agent goes through them more or ess passvey. Therefore, the
agent reveas hmsef or hersef to be, at the same tme, a patent (n the orgna sense of ths Latn word).
Ths ntertwnement of acton and passon n the combnaton of the thngs done n our fe suggests that we cannot
content ourseves wth the smpe defnton of acton as one event among other events n the word. In ght of ths
fact, then, our frst task w consst n takng a coser ook at and, hopefuy, offerng a convncng crtque of the
knd of arguments adduced n favour of such a smpe defnton. Ths task w requre that we enter nto a debate
wth the anaytc theory of acton, especay the verson deveoped by Donad Davdson (Secton 1). Our second
task, then, w be to compete or correct ths defnton by emphaszng the experence the agent gans of hs or her
acton by undergong ts unntended consequences. Reyng upon Pau Rcour, but aso makng use of some of
Maurce Mereau-Ponty's and Marc Rchr's deas, we sha engage n an nqury that may be propery desgnated as
a phenomenoogy of acton (Secton 2). The unfodng consequences of an acton do not eave the agent's sef
untouched. Our thrd task, therefore, s to propose a narratve understandng of the agent's sef. In order to arrve
at an approprate nterpretaton of ths knd we have to reassess what may be descrbed as the theory of narratve
dentty (Secton 3). It w be easy to show that ths theory s unabe to account for a dmenson of sef-consttuton
that beongs to the passve sphere and s reated to affectvty rather than to sef-refectve awareness (Secton 4).
However, t does not foow from ths crtcsm that the dea of a narratve understandng of sefhood s entrey
pontess. On the contrary, wthn ts proper mts ths dea s qute pertnent and frutfu. However, n ts usua
versons the narratve vew of sefhood provdes a too unfed and monothc representaton of fe-hstory,
dscardng or smoothng down the radca turns that often emerge n persona hstores. Snce, however, t does not
reduce acton to an soated act, but grasps t n ts reaton wth ts-ntended and unntended-consequences, t
deserves to be refned n such a way as to account more adequatey for the unexpected and unforeseeabe
changes n fe-hstory. Such an attempt to refne the narratve understandng of sefhood w be made n the
concudng part of the present paper (Sectons 5 and 6).
1 From action to its agent
Dsregardng the ream of the dvne, one can say that ony human bengs are capabe of performng actons.
Acton s not |ust dfferent from natura events; t s aso dfferent from anma behavour. But what precsey
consttutes ths dfference? A tradtona answer to ths queston dentfes intentionality as the dstnctve feature of
acton.
However, ths answer rases a serous dffcuty. For t s common knowedge that an ntentona acton can be
descrbed n dfferent ways and that t does not reman ntentona n a of the descrptons that appy to t. Sayng
that the future kng Oedpus responds to an offense by kng a haughty stranger at the crossroads certany does
not amount to sayng that the future kng Oedpus commts patrcde, and yet, n Sophoces, the two propostons
descrbe one and the same acton. However, t s ony n the frst descrpton that ths acton can be consdered
ntentona, whereas the second descrpton frames the acton n terms of one of ts unntended consequences.
Thus, the fact that an acton does not reman an ntentona pece of behavour n a of the descrptons that truy
appy to t rues out the cam that ntentona actons consttute a unvocay determned cass of events n the
word.
Ths does not mean, of course, that ntentona actons are not pubc events. The anaytc theory of acton that was
deveoped n the wake of Wttgensten's ater phosophy at the end of the 1950s and n the eary 1960s ceary
demonstrated that the ntentonaty of acton was nseparaby bound up wth some pubcy estabshed crtera.
One of the arguments adduced n support of ths vew was that an agent coud desgnate the ntenton of an acton
as hs or her reason to act. Furthermore, from the fact that the ntator of an ntentona acton necessary tres to
reaze hs or her ntenton, t can be deduced that every ntentona acton s characterzed by a teleological
structure: an acton serves as a means to acheve an am, and the am n queston s none other than the
reazaton of the agent's ntenton. As a consequence of ths approach to ntentonaty, ntentona acton can be
dstngushed from a other events n the word by the fact that, n contrast wth natura processes, as we as wth
anma behavour, t requres a teleological explanation.
1
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In the nta phase of the anaytc theory of acton, teeoogca expanaton was strcty opposed to a causa
expanatons. Phosophers such as A. I. Meden (1961), Stuart Hampshre (1959), and Esabeth Anscombe (1959)
adopted the strategy of dstngushng reasons from causes. They consdered actons and reasons on the one
hand, and events and causes on the other, as pertanng to two dfferent, or even heterogeneous, anguage
games (n the sense gven ths term by the ater Wttgensten). Ths concepton aso gave rse to an mpuse to
revve the Arstotean doctrne of the practca syogsm (Anscombe 1959: 57-74). In ths epoch, then, the attempt
of G. H. von Wrght (1971) to put forward a theory capabe of untng teeoogca expanaton wth causa
expanaton was a notabe excepton. In retrospect, we may fnd the propensty to oppose reasons and causes to
each other n such a strct manner a the more surprsng snce the category of wantng or desre, as Rcour
rghty ponts out, offers tsef as a mxed category, whose apposteness s mssed as soon as, for ogca reasons,
one casts motve on the sde of the reason for actng (Rcour 1990: 83/65).
Indeed, desre consttutes at once a meaning and a force. Consequenty, t beongs |ust as we to the ream of
physca energy that drves acton as t does to the sphere n whch actons are |ustfed by reasons. That s why
desre s never ony a reason to act but aso a motive or even a driving force of acton. Therefore, t s not
surprsng that as eary as the frst haf of the 1960s the strct opposton between reasons and causes-as we as
that between actons and events-was paced n queston.
Donad Davdson frst expressed hs doubts about ths doube opposton n 1963 n hs famous essay, Actons,
Reasons, and Causes. In ths essay he mantans that, as a matter of fact, an ntenton is a reason to act, but a
reason to act s by no means opposed to a cause of acton; rather, the agent's reason to act s the very cause of
his or her action. In order to confrm ths thess, Davdson makes t cear that the upsurge of a desre to perform a
specfc acton-or, more generay, the emergence of an atttude that s favourabe to the performance of ths
acton-s a natura event that s causay responsbe for the acton n queston. Assuredy, ths approach to
reasons and causes nvoves the revson of certan aspects of the modern concept of causaty. Frst of a,
accordng to Davdson, t s a mstake to suppose that a causa expanaton s necessary based on a aw
(Davdson 2001: 17). In reaty there are aso causa expanatons that are reated to snguar events wthout
specfyng any genera aw. Furthermore, he argues that we have to reconsder the wdespread convcton that
observaton and nducton are necessary to estabsh a causa reatonshp (bd.: 18). Davdson re|ects ths beef
and ths aows hm to mantan that we do not need to rey on observaton or nducton to know our own ntentons
(see Anscombe 1959: 13-15), and so, correatvey, the absence of such evdence does not consttute a sgnfcant
obstace to hs thess that an agent's ntenton s the very cause of hs or her acton (Davdson 2001: 18).
These refectons mark the frst step on the road that eads Davdson to the concuson that actons can be defned
smpy as events among other events n the word. Davdson opts for ths road, t s mportant to note, because he
ams to defne acton n a manner that s reevant to ontoogy; that s, he strves for a defnton that carfes
precsey whch enttes must be presupposed f our anguage about actons s to be meanngfu. In ontoogy, as n
severa other areas, Davdson remans a foower of Oune: he commts hmsef to the formua accordng to whch
|t|o be is to be the value of a bound variable (Oune 1994: 15). Ths approach to ontoogy reegates the decson
regardng the exstence of bengs to the ogca semantcs of our ngustc expressons (especay the ngustc
expressons depoyed n our scentfc theores). Thus, Davdson asks whch enttes must be presupposed n order
that our propostons about actons may be true and the nferences we draw from them may be vad. And hs
answer to ths queston s that actons are events among other events n the word. He argues that an nqury nto
ntentona acton compes us to suppement the substance-ontoogy underyng the ogca semantcs of frst-order
predcate ogc. For ndvdua substances as bearers of predcates are not suffcent to account for a of the
partcuartes of the anguage of actons; for ths purpose, t s equay necessary to admt of ndvdua events as
rreducbe enttes. Intentona actons, then, beong to ths category of enttes.
However, the dffcuty encountered above re-emerges here: t s not cear whether ntentona actons consttute a
unvocay determned cass of events n the word, because ntentonaty s dependent on the descrptons that, n
each case, happen to have been chosen for the characterzaton of these actons. And yet Davdson fnds a way
out of ths dffcuty by consderng some mstakes commtted n ntentona actons. To understand precsey what
he means by mstakes here, a gance at a coupe of hs exampes w be suffcent:
1. If a navy offcer wants to scutte the shp Tirpitz wth a torpedo, but, by mstake, he hts the shp 8ismarck,
then he obvousy dd not scutte the 8ismarck on purpose; yet he remans the orgnator of the unntentonay
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performed deed.
2. In hs mother's chamber, Hamet ntentonay ks the man hdng behnd the tapestry; however, he does so
wthout knowng that ths man s Poonus; yet he remans the orgnator of the unntentonay performed deed.
These exampes are desgned to show that the agent s not ony the ntator of hs ntentona actons, but aso
remans the orgnator of ther unntended consequences. Snce these consequences can be used to redescrbe
the orgna acton and to gve t, thereby, an entrey new shape, ths observaton carres wth t a partcuar weght:
t foows from t that the agent remains the originator of his unintentionally performed actions. Consequenty, the
reatonshp between an acton and ts agent can be expressed as foows: the agent is the originator of all actions
that can be ascribed to him under at least one description in which what he does is understood to be
intentional.
The nsght nto ths reatonshp aows us to consder, f not our intentional actons, at east our actons as such as
events among other events n the word. For we have now come to understand that the reatonshp between an
acton and ts agent does not depend on the descrpton that, n each case, happens to have been chosen for ts
characterzaton. It s true that a pece of behavour cannot be regarded as an acton f there s no descrpton
under whch t coud be ascrbed to a human beng as ntentona. But f there s ony a single descrpton under
whch an acton can be ascrbed to a partcuar agent as ntentona, ths acton does not cease to be the acton of
ths agent under other descrptons ether, provded that they rghty appy to t. And ths s the case regardess of
whether, among these descrptons, there are some n whch the acton n queston cannot be understood as
ntentona. Consequenty, f t s true that an event cannot be ascrbed to a partcuar agent as hs or her acton
wthout there beng at east one descrpton n whch ths agent ntentonay gves rse to t, t s no ess true that
once ths condton s fufed, the acton n queston remans the acton of ths agent n all of the descrptons that
rghty appy to t, ncudng those n whch the acton ceases to be ntentona. Therefore, athough we cannot do
so wth ntentona actons as such, we are n a poston to defne the actons |usty ascrbed to a partcuar agent as
a determnate cass of events among other events n the word (Davdson 2001: 46ff).
Ths cam-that actons are |usty ascrbed to ther agents even n descrptons n whch they are not ntentona-s
ess nnocent than t may ntay appear. For t foows from ths fact that the ntator of an ntentona acton s |ust
as we the orgnator of the unntended consequences of ths acton. That s why the reaton between an
ntentona acton and ts unntended consequences must be dstngushed from any reaton between a natura
event and ts causa effects. For, as Davdson hmsef ponts out, each consequence presents us wth a deed; an
agent causes what hs actons cause (bd.: 53). Ths formua ndcates that each new descrpton of an acton s a
re-description of the original action. The causa effects of natura events do not enter nto the meanng or the
sense of the orgna event. The case s dfferent wth the unntended consequences of an acton: they do enter
nto the meanng or the sense of the orgna acton. The erupton of a vocano remans what t s, regardess of the
more or ess devastatng effects brought about by t. Under certan crcumstances, however, an act of revenge
taken aganst a haughty stranger at the crossroads s not |ust an act of retrbuton, but t even takes on the sense
or the meanng of a patricide. The dfference between the two cases ceary shows that we are far from nterpretng
the consequences of actons n the same way as the causa effects of natura events (Davdson 2001: 54ff).
We can perhaps make the sgnfcance of ths observaton even cearer f we aso take nto account the tempora
gap that sometmes separates the unntended consequences of an acton from the orgna acton. Undoubtedy,
even the consequences of an acton that emerge consderaby ater than the orgna acton enter nto the sense or
meanng of ths acton. |ust one exampe: we can say that Fchte founded German deasm by appropratng the
phosophy of Kant n a qute speca way n the frst haf of the 1790s, athough t s ony subsequenty, n a
perspectve opened up by Scheng and Hege, that the noton of German deasm coud be connected wth the
actvty of the eary Fchte. From ths observaton we may draw some consequences that reman aen to the
Davdsonan ontoogy of acton. It s cear that, n a manner qute dstnct from natura events, the sense or meanng
of an acton s far from beng estabshed once and for a; on the contrary, t remans unstabe, unsetted, and
sub|ect to ateraton. The ateraton of meanng we have n mnd has nothng to do wth any progress of knowedge;
t resuts soey from the unfodng of the-often unntended-consequences of the orgna acton. Among these
consequences there are some that ony manfest themseves after a tempora shft of haf a century or even more.
Fchte's act of foundng a current of thought that was to ose ts orgna sgnfcance n the second haf of the
nneteenth century s a fact that may be empoyed n a subsequent redescrpton of an acton performed n the
1790s.
2
3
4
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Faced wth these partcuartes of the events that we ca actons, we may even be tempted to have recourse to the
Kantan expresson that acton does not recognze any tempora dfference (see Kant 1913: 99). However, we
must resst ths temptaton. Even f our refectons ceary show that we cannot content ourseves wth defnng
acton merey as an event among other events n the word, we must not put our confdence nto the specuatve
noton of a noumena freedom that does not recognze any tempora dfference. We must be cautous wth ths
formua, snce we have not yet succeeded n determnng the nature of the reatonshp between an ntentona
acton and ts unntended consequences. Whatever approach we adopt to studyng ths reatonshp, one thng
seems to be cear from the outset: t s not soey from the pont of vew of an externa spectator that the reaton
between an acton and ts unntended consequences s estabshed, because these consequences happen to the
agent. In other words, they are somethng that the agent undergoes. Thus, they beong to the very experience the
agent gans of hs or her own acton. From ths t foows that n acton, consdered n ts totaty or, to put t n
Arstote's terms, as a combnaton of ncdents, that whch s actvey done comes to be ntertwned wth that
whch s passvey undergone. Consequenty, t s ony from the agent's pont of vew that the reaton between the
orgna acton and ts unntended consequences becomes propery perceptbe. For, unke natura causaty, ths
reaton does not smpy connect dfferent events n the word; rather, t nks the entre chan of events wth the
agent as we. That s why the reaton between an orgna acton and ts unntended consequences can be
descrbed as an experienced or, more generay, experiential reaton. It s, ndeed, the experence ganed-or to
be ganed-by the agent of the consequences of hs or her acton that estabshes ths reaton. Consequenty, ths
reaton s not so much observed by a spectator from the outsde, as rather estabshed by the agent from wthn: t
s estabshed by the very fact that the agent relates frst-personay to the consequences of hs or her acton.
As an experenced or experenta reaton the combnaton of ncdents mentoned by Arstote does not beong to
a word of impersonal events-to a word of events as mpersona as natura processes are. Rcour makes ths
pont by camng that the partcuarty of an acton s necessary ost sght of f we rase the questons of what and
why and fa to ask the queston of who (Rcour 1990: 78ff and passim). However, f the reaton between the
orgna acton and ts unntended consequences s understood as an experenced or experenta reaton that
cannot be severed from the perspectve of the agent, the queston of who re-emerges n a ts sgnfcance. Ths
queston requres, n partcuar, an nvestgaton nto the selfhood of the agent. One cannot avod askng hmsef or
hersef whether or not one remans oneself, f one s confronted wth the unntended consequences of one's own
actons. As Rcour ceary sees, ths new queston urges us to pass on from the anaytc theory of acton to a
phenomenoogca hermeneutcs of actng human beng (Rcour: 352), as we as to a hermeneutc
phenomenoogy of the sef (bd.: 106ff and 135ff).
Moreover, we mght add that we sha aso need a phenomenoogca approach n order to shed ght on the
meanng or sense of an acton, whch s characterzed by a partcuar dynamsm, snce, as we have seen, t s
never setted once and for a but remans constanty n formaton. If we take serousy the task of decdng, to put t
n Davdson's terms, what makes a bt of bography an acton (Davdson 2001: 44), we sha have to pass over
from a Davdsonan ontoogy of mpersona events to a phenomenoogy of experence n the fe-word. Here we
may take nspraton from the phenomenoogy of spontaneous sense-formation that has been eaborated by
Maurce Mereau-Ponty and especay by Marc Rchr. Ony such a phenomenoogy s capabe of determnng n
what sense a combnaton of ncdents consttutes an experenced or experenta reaton.
2 From the experience of action to the story to be told about it
What s t, then, that makes a bt of bography an acton? Our consderatons ed us, frst, to answer ths queston
by pontng out the ntentonaty of acton. Later, focusng on the reaton between an acton and ts agent, we came
to modfy our frst answer. We have made cear that acton s not |ust an ntentona pece of human behavour but
s rather a bt of my bography that I ascrbe to mysef when I consder mysef as the ntator of the acton. From ths
perspectve, acton as a whoe s seen as a mxture of actvty and passvty, and t turns out to be a combnaton
of ncdents rather than a snge act. Ths observaton now eads us to a thrd answer to Davdson's queston: what
makes a bt of bography an acton s nothng ese than the pattern of plot t suggests. Accordngy, we may say
that a bit of biography is an action if-and only if-it contains in itself the germ of a story to be told about an
initiative taken by the agent, as well as about the consequences-and especially the unintended consequences
-of this initiative.
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That acton gves rse to a story to be recounted, that t s, moreover, n search of a narratve, whch aone can
make t ntegbe, s a fact that has been ncessanty rehearsed snce Hannah Arendt frst ponted t out n The
Human Condition. Yet, t s sedom added that t s the agent's experence of hs or her acton that suppes the
mssng nk n the connecton between actng and recountng (see Tengey 2004: chapter 1, secton II. 3:
Experence, acton, and narraton). Grasped ony n a single descrpton, acton s certany designated, but t s
not yet narrated. It s not camed here that acton as a pece of ntentona behavour cannot be understood wthout
a story tod about t. Every correct descrpton of an acton s based on an understandng of t as a pece of
ntentona behavour. Here however, an hostc vew of acton s adopted, accordng to whch a snge descrpton
never exhausts the content of a deed. The pot of a story to be tod about an acton resuts necessary from a
connecton between two or more dfferent descrptons of t. What s propery camed here s that t s precsey the
artcuated reaton between the dfferent descrptons of one and the same acton that provdes ths acton wth a
specfcay narratve ntegbty. That s why t w be usefu to examne the dfferent knds of ths reaton.
We sha begn wth a ook at the connecton between dfferent descrptons of one and the same acton that s
reated to practices. A professon, a game, a scence, or an art s |ust as we a practce as gardenng n one's own
estate or gosspng among neghbours. Practces are habts or customs that are often ted to certan nsttutons
wthout concdng wth them. As Aasdar MacIntyre says: Chess, physcs, and medcne are practces, whereas
chess cubs, aboratores, unverstes, and hosptas are nsttutons (MacIntyre 1985: 194). It can easy be seen
that a practce aways connects some dfferent descrptons of one and the same acton or actvty. For nstance, a
professor of phosophy () presents a unversty ecture on the rse of Greek metaphyscs, () he sets forth hs
vews on the reatonshp between Pato and Arstote, () he gves a course on the hstory of phosophy, (v) he
prepares hs students for an examnaton, and (v) he nssts on the standards of hs professon. It s the very |ob of
a professor of phosophy that connects these dfferent descrptons of one and the same actvty. The reaton
between the fve descrptons s, of course, not of a ogca or anaytca character; t s, on the contrary, ceary of
an emprca or synthetc nature. However, t s hardy dependent on the w of the agent; rather, t s gven wth the
very |ob of beng a phosophy professor, as t s understood n our days at amost a unverstes n the word. Yet
the actvty n queston s ntentona n a of the fve dfferent descrptons. It s obvousy the nterna coherence of
a practce that assures the ntentonaty of acton n a of these descrptons. One coud say that a practce aways
rests on a systematc and, to some extent, mpersona artcuaton of certan ntentons to act.
The actons performed n the framework of dfferent practces are, of course, not mpossbe to narrate, but they
sedom deserve the attenton of a story-teer. For, at east n prncpe, the transparent structure of a practce that
hods together the dfferent descrptons of one and the same acton does not often gve rse to any surprses.
However, the second knd of connecton between dfferent descrptons of one and the same acton, whch we sha
consder n the next few paragraphs, s a rch source of stores to be narrated. The connecton I have n mnd here
s the reaton between an acton and ts unntended consequences.
Hege was not the frst to see that an acton may have mpcatons whch transcend the ntenton and
conscousness of the agent and that the act often reacts upon the ndvdua who performed t, moreover, t
recos upon hm and destroys hm (Hege 1994: 89; 1975c: 75). It s as eary as Greek tragedy that these
observatons had been expressed for the frst tme. If we reca how, n the lliad, Aches wrath eads, utmatey, to
the death of hs frend Patrocus, we come to see that, precsey n ths respect, epc s not essentay dfferent from
tragedy. Arstote, who, n the Poetics, has not ony drama but aso epc n mnd, cons the very terms that are
approprate to express the tragc dmenson of acton hnted at by Hege n the passage |ust quoted. I mean the
terms ncpinIcio (reversa or turn) and voyv6pioi (recognton, experence). In the Poetics, dfferent knds of
recognton are enumerated; there are some among them that go wthout a turn or reversa. But Arstote nssts that
the most sgnfcant knd of recognton s necessary ted up wth a turn or reversa, as t s exempfed by
Sophoces drama, Oedipus Rex. Snce every acton s apt to generate some unntended consequences and to
gve rse, thereby, to a sudden turn n the course of events, every acton carres wth t at east the possbty of an
unforeseeabe reversa, whch happens unexpectedy to the agent. Consequenty, the noton of ncpinIcio, as we
as that of voyv6pioi, s pertnent to every acton, even f, n many cases, nothng but a tendency corresponds to
these notons. Of course, t woud be snster to set every acton n a tragc ght. But ths does not ater the fact that
every agent takes at east the risk of experencng some unforeseeabe and unexpected turns that resut from hs
or her acton. Therefore, t s by no means a mere accdent that the orgna meanng of the Greek word drama s
not restrcted to narratves staged n the theatre, but t s reated to acton as we.
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Undoubtedy, the network of practces, wth whch our fe-word s permeated, protects us aganst the radca turns
that our actons are apt to take. Practces nsert actons nto the frameworks of certan forms of actvty that have
been eaborated by and permeated wth ong-ved tradtons. That s why they are abe to keep these forms of
actvty at a dstance from the unpredctabe paths that consttute persona hstores.
It s cear from the outset, however, that ths process of depersonazaton s necessary bound to come to an end.
For even when he or she s entanged n a network of dfferent practces, an agent necessary remans the
orgnator of hs or her actons. And ths fact connects the dfferent actons n hs or her fe, even f they do not
beong to one and the same practce. Such transversa reatons preserve the traces of an experiential way
through the fe-word, whch s characterstc of persona hstory. Such an experenta way can, however, never be
entrey mmune to the unntended consequences of actons. That s why acton, as we may put t by convertng the
Davdsonan phrase, remains always a bit of biography.
The reatonshp between acton and bography, fe-hstory, or persona hstory has been expored by what we may
desgnate as the theory of narratve dentty. In order to deveop a narratve vew of the agent's sef, t s
necessary to examne ths theory.
3 Life-history and selfhood: the theory of narrative identity
The narratve nterpretaton of sefhood was ntated by Hannah Arendt. In The Human Condition she argues that n
speech and acton, peope manfest who they are. She adds that actons, embedded as they are n the
nterreatons of human affars, gve rse to hstores that shed more ght on the sef of the agent than the ntentons
he or she tres to reaze.
Another thnker puttng forward an eary verson of the narratve nterpretaton of sef-dentty s Whem Schapp.
Schapp, a former pup of Edmund Husser's, rees upon the experences he ganed as a professona attorney. An
attorney usuay encounters a cuprt through an ndctment, whch necessary takes the shape of stores. Schapp
generazes ths experence by camng that hstory represents the person: Die Ceschichte steht fr den Mann
(Schapp 1976: 103). Accordng to hm, a person s entanged-verstrickt-n hstores. Schapp adds that these
hstores can never be competey tod, because every hstory that s expressy narrated ponts back to a
Vorgeschichte, a pre-hstory, that remans n the background. Narratves expressy tod about one's fe are, so to
speak, ony contnuatons of the hstores onesef s nvoved n and s defned by.
In the 1980s these ntatves were pcked up and eaborated by such exceent thnkers as Aasdar MacIntyre, Pau
Rcour, Davd Carr, Chares Tayor, and others. MacIntyre refers many to Hannah Arendt, drawng, to some
extent, aso upon the terary crtc Barbara Hardy (Hardy 1968: 5-14; see Hardy 1975, especay Chapter 2);
Rcour, on the contrary, knows Whem Schapp as we. To some extent, Davd Carr and Chares Tayor rey on
both MacIntyre and Rcour.
The theory of narratve dentty put forward by these authors s based on the thess that sefhood, whch s to be
dstngushed from the substanta dentty-or the sefsameness-of the thngs n the word, can be equated wth the
story of one's fe. As Rcour puts t: We consder fe to be dentca wth the story or the stores we te about t.
In opposton to a phosophy of fe, the theory of narratve dentty characterzes fe, nstead of usng the anguage
of urge and drve, n terms of a recountabe-and party aways aready recounted-hstory.
A probematc aspect of the narratve approach to persona dentty may be seen n the danger of reducng fe and
sefhood to fctona constructons. Teng stores on one's own fe can easy be nterpreted as an attempt to
construct a meanngfu fe-hstory and, so to speak, to invent an approprate sefhood. Even Rcour seems to gve
support to such an nterpretaton of hs poston by sayng that a fe-hstory s an unstabe mxture of fabuaton
and vey experence (Rcour 1990: 191).
Yet t s cear that such a constructvst nterpretaton of the theory of narratve dentty s, utmatey, nothng but a
msnterpretaton. Rcour eaves no doubt about the proper meanng of hs theory. He says: Our fe . appears to
us as the fed of a constructve actvty, borrowed from narratve understandng, but he mmedatey adds that, by
ths narratve understandng, we attempt to discover and not smpy mpose from outsde the narratve dentty
whch consttutes us (Rcour 1991: 32). However, the dea of a discovery of our narratve dentty by teng
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stores about our ves ceary mpes that our sefhood s somehow gven before t comes to be specfed and
determned by narratves. Otherwse, t coud not be discovered but ony invented or constructed. However, t s by
no means cear how a narrative vew of the sef coud account for the consttuton of a pre- narratve sef-dentty.
There s no exaggeraton n sayng that ths s a fundamenta dffcuty wth whch the proponents of the theory of
narratve dentty fnd themseves confronted.
The attempt to surmount ths fundamenta dffcuty gves rse to heterogeneous currents that dvde the adherents
of the theory of narratve dentty nto dfferent camps.
MacIntyre s commtted to the assumpton that fe s an enacted narrative. He says: What I have caed a hstory
|of a fe| s an enacted dramatc narratve n whch the characters are aso the authors (see MacIntyre 1985: 215;
see 211ff). MacIntyre opposes ths thess to Hayden Whte and Lous O. Mnk, who emphaszed the dstance
between narratve and reaty. It s Mnk who formuated the famous thess: 5tories are not lived but told.
MacIntyre's repy to Mnk runs as foows: 5tories are lived before they are told.
Rcour, on the contrary, re|ects the dea of an enacted narratve and envsages an appcaton of narratve to fe
(Rcour 1990: 191). By appcaton he means a redescription of fe by narratves, and even ts refiguration by
narratve structures. Here, however, the queston arses of how, n such and such an epsode of fe, a story can be
anchored and how t can fnd, n such and such an epsode of fe, structures to whch t appes. Rcour repes to
ths queston by assertng that acton-and even fe as a whoe-s somethng ke a vrtua story, a story n ts
begnnngs or n ts germ, an nchoate story, whch s, so to speak, n search of a narratve (Rcour 1983: 114).
The dea of a hermeneutca crce makes t possbe for hm to brdge the gap between vrtua or nchoate stores
and terary narratves. However, t remans uncear how vrtua or nchoate stores are consttuted n acton and n
fe, and, as Rcour aso admts, even n the unconscous, as t s studed by psychoanayss.
Ths faure motvates Carr to defne the reatonshp between fe and narratve yet n another way. He takes
Husser's return to the fe-word as a mode of hs approach. He dstngushes between stores tod n the fe-word
and narratves eaborated n terature, tryng to show that, n the fe-word, the sef-consttuton of the ndvdua, as
we as that of human communtes, rests aready on recounted stores before an appcaton of terary narratves to
fe takes pace. However, ths approach resuts n a concepton that remnds us of MacIntyre's enacted narratves.
Indeed, Carr envsages a mode of exstence that s aready narratve, and he determnes the beng of man and of
human communtes as a narratve exstence or as a recounted beng.
Tayor empoys the theory of narratve dentty many to eucdate the structure of mora argumentaton. He shows
that a mora argument can ony be convncng f t ndcates a possbe transton from one poston to another,
addng that n ths fed no transton can be consdered as possbe that cannot be ved through, or, n terms
borrowed from Ernst Tugendhat, that does not take an experenta way (Erfahrungsweg) (see Tugendhat 1979:
275). That s why, accordng to Tayor, ths type of argument has ts source n narrated fe-hstores (Tayor 1989:
72). Athough ths theory of mora argumentaton s ceary commtted to a narratve vew of the sef, t does not
make t necessary to decde how precsey a narratve s reated to fe and reaty.
In the past two decades, severa studes were dedcated to the narratve approach to persona dentty (these
studes ncude Bruner 1990; Kerby 1991; Schechtman 1996; Schechtman 2011; Kraus 1996; Thom 1998;
Tengey 1998; 2004; Eakn 1999; Ochs and Capps 2001). They contrbuted to carfy the strength and the
weaknesses of ths approach. Aso, some goba crtcsms were formuated (Battner 2000: 187-201; Strawson
2004: 428-542, reprnted n Strawson 2005: 63-86; Strawson 2007: 85-115; Strawson 2009; Strawson 2011: 253-
78. and dscussed (Battersby 2006: 27-44; Schechtman 2007: 155-78; Rmer (2011: 235-58)). As a resut of such
debates, the mts of a narratve nterpretaton of sefhood have now become more ceary vsbe than n earer
tmes.
From a phenomenoogca pont of vew, such mts have been ponted out especay by Dan Zahav (Zahav 2007:
179-201; Zahav 2011: 316-35). He rghty puts the accent on the basc phenomenoogca nsght, accordng to
whch there s no sef wthout a pre-refectve sef-ntmacy and a conscousy experenced "mneness" (Zahav
2007; 186). It s cear that ths pre-refectve experence of the sef necessary precedes story-teng. Therefore,
narratves cannot be taken to consttute t.
It may be added that n the prmtve sense of the word, sefhood s certany assured on a passve and affectve
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pane.
4 Pre-narrative self-constitution in the passive sphere
That sefhood s reated to passvty and affectvty s an observaton that has payed a centra roe n the
phenomenoogca tradton from Edmund Husser to Mche Henry and Emmanue Levnas. However, t orgnay
goes back to Davd Hume, who nssted that we must dstngush betwxt persona dentty, as t regards our thought
or magnaton, and as t regards our passons or the concern we take n ourseves (Hume 1969: 301). Whereas he
re|ects the dea of persona dentty n the frst sense, he endorses t n the second. The mportance of ths
dstncton conssts n showng, for the frst tme, that sefhood does not resut from an act of refecton on onesef; t
rather rests on the bass of an affectvty that s orgnay entrey passve.
Husser pcks up Hume's nsght wthout, however, adoptng Hume's sceptca atttude towards refectve sef-
awareness. On the one hand he takes t for granted that passvty s the very bass of a actve accompshments of
the ego, whe he emphaszes that passve processes end themseves to be contnued by actve accompshments
on the other.
Ths twofod or doube-sded reatonshp between passvty and actvty s typca of Husser's anayss of sef-
consttuton. Athough Hume's descrpton of the sef as a bunde of perceptons pays a fundamenta roe n
Husser's Logical lnvestigations, t woud be abandoned as eary as the ldeas pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. Husser came to understand that Hume was commtted to a
reductive nterpretaton of the sef. Indeed, Hume consdered one's dea of one's own sef as usory, and
attempted to fnd out what ay behind ths uson-that s, what was, properly speaking or in reality, nvoved n
one's dea of one's own sef. Husser, opposng and extendng Hume's poston, tres to eucdate and to artcuate
the actual meaning of one's tak of one's sef, wthout reducng ths meanng to anythng that s not intended n t.
Ths ant-reductonst atttude of the phenomenoogca approach to the sef expans why, n hs return to passvty,
Husser never negects one's actve refecton upon onesef. In the Analyses on Passive 5ynthesis we are tod: A
sef. can be gven. ony n ts reaton wth the actve ego, t can ony be "present" for ths ego as somethng that
s at ts dsposa, as somethng that remans aways redentfabe. And that we speak of a consttuted sef aready n
the passve sphere s ony because the condtons for a free dsposabty are aready pre-deneated n ths sphere
(Husser 1966: 203). By condtons for a free dsposabty of the sef for the actve ego, Husser presumaby
means the recollections that pay, not ony accordng to |ohn Locke but aso accordng to hmsef, a pre-emnent
roe n the consttuton of the sef. However, nsofar as they are awakened by actua perceptons or by accdenta
remnscences, recoectons st beong to the passve sphere, even f, once emerged, they are at the dsposa of
the ego, whch then s abe to submt them to an actve eaboraton.
Yet the dea of a passve sef-consttuton serves as a necessary correctve of a conceptons of the sef that are
based soey on the assumpton of a refectve sef-awareness. Ths dea makes t cear what we mean when we say
that n an actve search for the sef, ths sef s not invented, but t s, n the fu sense of the word, discovered.
What s dscovered s a passvey consttuted sef. In ths context t s mportant to know that not ony Sartre but
aready Husser spoke of a transcendence of the sef. In the Analyses on Passive 5ynthesis he says: It s n the
mmanence of the prmorda present that experences of recoecton emerge, but what they make once agan
present (vergegenwrtigen), namey the past, s transcendent wth respect to actua experence and to everythng
that beong to what s consttuted as present (Husser 1966: 204). Husser has, above a, the transcendence of
one's own past n mnd, and ths not ony nsofar as ths past conssts of a certan amount of ob|ectve facts, but
aso nsofar as ths past was experenced and ved through conscousy. (That s why, n the German orgna, the
transcendence of one's own 8ewusstseinsvergangenheit s mentoned). Everythng one thought, fet, and dd,
everythng one experenced and ved through, has become rrevocabe. That s why one's owns conscous past
consttutes a ream of rea beng that remans constanty dentca wth tsef (Husser 1966: 207). Husser
descrbes ths ream as a persstent and remanng n-tsef (Ansich) (bd.), as an n-tsef of the stream of
conscousness (bd.: 208). What happened cannot be transmuted nto what dd not happen. Therefore, the sef
can never eave ts own conscous past entrey behnd tsef. From ths t foows that . the sef s transcendent n
an orgna and good sense . (bd.: 204).
Ths transcendence of the sef mposes a restrctve condton on the consttuton of the sef by narraton. A
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narratve cannot adequatey express a fe-hstory f t does not account for the facts preserved n one's own
memory. In opposton to fantasy, recoecton supposes the exstence of ts ob|ect; t s, consequenty, a postona
act, and as such t necessary remans n touch wth reaty. There s no conscous past-and therefore no fe-
hstory-wthout ths adherence to reaty. However, the reatonshp wth reaty that s characterstc of recoecton
s by no means consttuted by story-teng; on the contrary, t precedes narraton. In other words, the adherence to
reaty that marks the re-memoraton of one's own conscous past s consttuted n the passve sphere. Of course,
Husser ceary sees that, sometmes, recoecton makes mstakes, and thereby gves rse to erroneous vews of
the past. But accordng to hm, the mstakes of memory arse ether from the fact that a recoecton comes to be
covered up by another one, or from the fact that two recoectons merge and fuse. Both processes presuppose,
however, some recoectons that have ther truth content. Recoecton s certany not nfabe, but even n ts
errors t remans n touch wth reaty. Husser expresses ths nsght by appyng a prncpe of Herbartan
provenance to memory. He says: So much uson, so much beng-whch s ony covered up and fasfed
thereby (Husser 1987: 105; 1999: 103). From ths the foowng concuson s drawn, mtng the vadty of the
theores of narratve dentty outned above: teng stores on one's own fe can ony contrbute to the consttuton
of one's own sef, f t preserves the adherence of recoecton to reaty.
Thus, Husser mantans that n the passve sphere a sef s consttuted precedng actve refecton. Accordng to
hm, t s ths passvey consttuted sef that manfests tsef n the nterna, pre-refectve conscousness that
accompanes ntentona acts wthout beng tsef a separate act. Lke Brentano, who assumes that such an nterna
conscousness necessary takes the shape of a feeng (Brentano 1973: vo. 1, 203-18), Husser descrbes the
nterna and pre-refectve conscousness of tme as a sensaton that s generay mxed up wth feengs. In the
Analyses on Passive 5ynthesis we are expressy tod that feengs are orgnay unted to data of sense (Husser
1966: 150, nes 31-2). Ths remark makes t evdent that Husser nks passvty n the sef-manfestaton of the sef
wth affectvty. In the phenomenoogca tradton ths ne of thought has been deveoped further by thnkers such
as Mche Henry and Emmanue Levnas (see Tengey 2009a: 401-14).
However, even f refectve sef-awareness s preceded and founded by a sef-consttuton n the passve sphere,
the theory of narratve dentty may be rght n mantanng that, n the fu sense of the word, sefhood can hardy be
gven wthout beng refected upon. The consttuton of sefhood s certany a mut-ayered process. The strength
of the narratve approach to sef-dentty conssts precsey n showng how the ayer of refectve sef-awareness s
artcuated by the stores about one's fe.
Yet the exstng versons of ths approach seem to me to favour a too unfed and too homogeneous type of
persona hstory, dsregardng the wdespread experence that unexpected and unforeseeabe turns may emerge
n fe. That s why some proponents of the theory of narratve dentty are so ndugent wth the tendency of
bographca narratves to foster a more or ess arbtrary seecton between the dfferent shreds of meanng that
penetrate actons, as far as they are experenced by ther agents. In what foows I w try to refne the narratve
vew of sefhood n order to account for the possbty of radca turns n fe-hstory. Frst of a I sha dedcate
mysef to the queston of how the freedom of acton s to be revsed n ght of the observaton that we are ony co-
orgnators of the unntended consequences of our deeds. Secondy, pckng up a term used by Rcour, I sha
characterze the agent's sef as a decentred sef.
5 Freedom as a partial causality of action
There s an dea ted up wth the narratve nterpretaton of persona dentty that deserves speca attenton: the
dea of accountability. As MacIntyre rghty says, we desgnate by the term acton an event for whch we can be
held to account (MacIntyre 1985: 209). To account for one's acton s, n the frst pace, to gve an account of one's
reasons for actng. But the most exact and most convncng enumeraton of these reasons can utmatey turn out
to be nsuffcent, because the agent may be requred to account aso for the unntended consequences of hs or
her acton. It s on ths pont that the agent fnds hmsef or hersef constraned to have recourse to the narratve
ntegbty of the combnaton of the ncdents of hs or her acton.
From these consderatons we can draw out an mportant consequence concernng the reaton between actng and
recountng: the reason why actons are narrated n stores s a doube one-namey that, on the one hand, actons
have a tendency to wthdraw themseves from the contro of the agent by generatng unntended and
Page 11 of 17
unforeseeabe consequences, and that on the other hand they reman nevertheess mputabe to the agent. Ths
atter fact-that the agent s supposed to be abe to account for hs or her acton wthout, however, beng n a
poston to contro the unntended consequences of ths acton-may be descrbed as the fundamental dilemma of
the freedom of action. The stores tod about actons are nurtured by ths demma. They end t a certan fertty or
frutfuness, wthout, however, beng abe to resove t. Reyng upon Rcour, we may evoke here a re-description
or even a re-figuration of actons by narratves.
But how can we conceve of the freedom of acton f we consder t from a narratve pont of vew? I sha take two
steps to answer ths queston. The frst step eads us to a rather specuatve concepton that we stumbe upon n
Scheng's Philosophy of Art. In ths work, Greek tragedy s characterzed by an equbrum between freedom and
necessty (Scheng 1860: 699). In order to ustrate ths concepton, Scheng refers to Sophoces drama Oedipus
Rex. He says that Oedpus was affcted by the greatest possbe msfortune, whch conssts n becomng guty by
fataty, wthout any rea faut (bd.: 695). Yet he adds that Oedpus was ready to assume vountary the
punshment even for ths fata gut (bd.: 697) n order to manfest, at the very moment of osng hs freedom,
precsey ths freedom (bd.) and to re-estabsh, n ths way, the dsturbed equbrum between freedom and
necessty or fataty. From the pont of vew of hstorca research, ths nterpretaton of Oedpus tragedy cannot be
desgnated as satsfyng, snce t attrbutes to Sophoces, anachronstcay, an dea of freedom that must have
been unknown to hm. However, consdered from a phosophca pont of vew t represents a serous attempt to
resove the fundamenta demma of the freedom of acton. Scheng's man dea s that freedom recuperates the
unntended consequences of ts actons from necessty (or fate) by assumng the responsbty for them. But t s
not dffcut to recognze the specuatve character of ths dea. Scheng hmsef descrbes the fact that Oedpus
becomes guty by fataty, wthout any rea faut purey and smpy as a msfortune, thereby wthdrawng t from
the ream of freedom. He even desgnates t n contradctory terms by evokng the noton of an nevtabe crme
(unvermeidliches Verbrechen) (Scheng 1860: 697). It s ony n the modaty of as f that the agent can account
for such a crme. Lteray, the dea of an equbrum between freedom and necessty or fataty does not seem to
appy to a freedom of acton that can be attrbuted to a fnte beng.
That s why t s necessary to take another step towards a possbe resouton of the fundamenta demma of the
freedom of acton. We may foow Rcour, who rees here upon Arstote (Rcour 1990: 115ff). In the Nicomachaen
Ethics, Arstote anayses a partcuar consequence of acton that s reated to the formaton of character (ci) n
the agent. The formaton of character s a consequence of acton that s, to some extent, wthdrawn from the
agent's contro: as we are tod n the Nicomachaen Ethics, though we contro the begnnng of our states of
character the gradua progress s not obvous (Arstote 1959: III 8, 1114 b 32-1115 a 1; see aso Arstote 1925).
Yet Arstote adds we are ourseves somehow co-orgnators |ouvoiIioi| of our character. Takng nspraton from
these thoughts and transferrng them from the states of character to actons, we may say that we are ntators or
orgnators of our ntentona actons, but, as far as ther unntended consequences are concerned, we have to
content ourseves wth beng ther co-originators. Snce every acton can gve rse to some unntended
consequences, t foows from ths that we can attrbute to ourseves ony a partial causality of our actons (Rcour
1990: 115). Accordng to Arstote, nothng more than such a parta causaty s requred for the mputabty of
acton. Ths causaty obges us, ndeed, to gve an account of our actons and to assume responsbty for them,
snce t foows from t that we contro at east ther begnnngs; t s n our power. to act n ths way or not n ths
way (Arstote 1959: III 5, 1115 a 2-3). Yet the very dea of a parta causaty ndcates that another knd of
causaty s aso nvoved n our actons, and that ths atter causaty s, to a arge extent, beyond our contro. That
s why actng mpes that we become the accomplices of a reality that ultimately cannot be fully mastered.
The reason why the noton of a noumena freedom, n the Kantan sense of the word, has to be re|ected s precsey
ts nabty to account for ths compcty wth reaty. The narratve vew of acton makes vsbe a sef who s not
|ust a bearer of free ntatves and who therefore cannot be consdered as sef-centred. As Rcour ceary sees,
the compcty wth reaty entas a decentred sef (Rcour 1990: 357), whch s strcty opposed to the sef-
centred, sef-controed, and sef-assured ego of modern phosophy.
6 The decentred self of the agent
By presentng the combnaton of the ncdents n the thngs done, narratves present our actons n ther
ntertwnement wth the causa mechansms of the word. At the same tme, they decde the queston of who
11
Page 12 of 17
(Rcour 1990: 76) by representng the agent not ony as the orgnator of certan ntatves, but aso as the
decentred co-orgnator of the unntended consequences that supervene on these ntatves. These can be
consdered the most mportant contrbutons, yeded by a narratve nterpretaton of acton, to the characterzaton
of the freedom of acton and of the sefhood of the agent.
At frst gance, the narratve vew of the agent's sef seems to share a basc convcton wth Hege: one's actions
show who one is. However, the same convcton s nterpreted dfferenty n the two cases. Hege says n hs
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 5ciences (140): As a man s outwardy, that s to say n hs actons (not of
course n hs merey body outwardness), so s he nwardy: and f hs vrtue, moraty, etc. are ony nwardy hs-
that s f they exst ony n hs ntentons and sentments, and hs outward acts are not dentca wth them-the one
haf s as hoow and empty as the other (Hege 1975a: 139; 1975b: 197). Ths proposton does not |ust sette a
fact, but aunches an attack; ts poemca thrust s drected aganst Kant's and Fchte's ethcs. It s n the heat of ths
poemc that Hege adopts the vew that the nterorty of a human beng fnds a compete expresson n the
exterorty of hs or her deeds. The narratve nterpretaton of the agent's sef s by no means constraned to share
ths-presumaby exaggerated-opnon. For t takes for granted that acton s characterzed by an nterna
dfference between an ntended deed and ts unntended consequences. However, ths dfference entas a
correspondng spt between the nterorty and the exterorty of the sef. That s why a decentred sef reveas tsef
to be marked by an nterna confct or dscord. The spt between nterorty and exterorty s an nexhaustbe
source of dscontent, because the sef cannot act wthout havng recourse to the causa mechansms of the word
whch, however, n ther turn are aways prone to con|ure up some unntended consequences of the ntended
actons.
However, the decentred sef exhbts not ony a spt between nterorty and exterorty, but shows aso a rft
between ts beng-for-tsef and ts beng-for-others. Ths topc was deat wth extensvey by |ean-Pau Sartre.
However, n 8eing and Nothingness Sartre reed on a rather confct-aden mode of ob|ectfcaton and refcaton
of one's conscousness by the Other's. The unversa vadty of ths mode was rghty paced nto queston by
Maurce Mereau-Ponty. Let us remnd ourseves of a not ony acute but aso hghy pertnent remark of Mereau-
Ponty's n hs crtcsm of Sartre's concepton of the Other: For the other to be truy the other, t does not suffce
and t s not necessary that he be a scourge (Mereau-Ponty 1964: 114/82). Therefore, a narratve nterpretaton of
the sef has the task of eucdatng the dfference between the sef's beng-for-tsef and ts beng-for others wthout
reyng on Sartre's controversa mode of ob|ectfcaton and refcaton. It s, however, not dffcut to show that
nobody can te the story of hs or her fe wthout takng nto account some stores tod by others. One comes, n a
sense, too ate to te the frst stores of one's own fe; for exampe, t s others who te how one came to fe and
ved through one's own eary chdhood. Ths stuaton does not necessary ead to any confct between one's
beng-for-onesef and one's beng-for-others. But f such a confct s by no means nevtabe, t s nowhere
excuded ether. Snce one's own fe-hstory s nextrcaby ntertwned wth the fe-hstores of others, one never
acqures an uncontroversa and prveged access to one's own fe-hstory. In many cases the same epsodes of
fe are dfferenty tod by dfferent narrators. Ths dvergence arses n most cases from the fact that these epsodes
are not ony dfferenty tod and thus nterpreted by dfferent narrators, but that they are dfferenty ved through
and experenced by them. Ths s, however, precsey the reason why the crack between the sef's beng-for-tsef
and ts beng-for-others s, n a certan sense, rremedabe.
Perhaps even a thrd type of breach can be dscovered n the nner structure of a decentred sef as we. I mean
the ne of break between what is and what is not recountabe. It s not wthout reason that Levnas comes to
speak of what cannot be narrated (linnarrable) (see Levnas 1990: 258/166). He has the encounter wth the
Other n vew, from whch a task arses for the l. Levnas descrbes ths encounter as a drama that will always
already have taken place, whenever the l w respond to an appea or cam of the Other. The future perfect tense
used n ths proposton refers to an mmemora past that, n ts Levnasan dachrony, wthdraws tsef from
retenton and recoecton, as we as from narraton. By the anayss of dachrony, Levnas makes cear how the
atttude of actng s separated from the atttude of story-teng. Narraton necessary presupposes a dramatc
dmenson of acton, n whch the agent fnds hmsef or hersef confronted wth a task whose orgn remans for hm
or her a mystery. Story-teng s by nature reated to such a dramatc dmenson n fe wthout, however, beng abe
to consttute t. What n ths dmenson happens can be narrated; but t cannot be narrated how ths dmenson tsef
s consttuted. Therefore, a ne of break between what can and what cannot be narrated beongs necessary to
every fe-hstory.
Page 13 of 17
If, however, there s necessary an area n the sef whch cannot be narrated, can then a narratve provde access
to the sef at a? Is t not, |ust as necessary, doomed to faure? In the concudng part of my refectons, I want to
face ths ob|ecton. It seems to me that ths doubt about the vabty of a narratve approach to the sef can be
emnated: I am convnced that narratves are abe to provde access even to a decentred sef. For narraton s not
ony capabe of teng what s recountabe; t s |ust as we capabe of ndcatng what s not teray recountabe.
Lterature seems to have precsey the task of teng what can be tod n order to make perceptbe, or even
papabe, what cannot be tod. In ths respect t s a fact of fundamenta sgnfcance that Levnas never accepted
Wttgensten's constrant on phosophy to reman sent wth regard to the unsayabe. Therefore, by hs remark on
what cannot be narrated, Levnas coud not have meant that a whoe dmenson of the sef, beng unsayabe,
shoud be abandoned to sence. For, contrary to Wttgensten, he nssted that the task of phosophy conssted
precsey n an ndscreton wth regard to the unsayabe (Levnas 1990: 19/7). Coud we not say, n the sprt of
ths quotaton, that at east one way towards what cannot be narrated eads precsey through the narraton of what
can be narrated?
BibIiography
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---(2009a), Sefhood, passvty, and affectvty n Henry and Levnas, lnternational journal of Philosophical
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---(2009b), Une nterprtaton narratve de acton, n P. Kerszberg, A. Mazz, and A. Schne (eds.), Louvre
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Notes:
(1) The mpossbty of consderng ntentona actons as a unvocay determned cass of events n the word s
reated to the intensionality of the ngustc expressons we use to attrbute to somebody an ntenton to act; see
Page 16 of 17
Davdson 2001: 46. It s the expresson semantc opacty, or ntentonaty (wth a t) whch s to be found n the
passage, but ntentonaty s used here n a semantca sense, n whch t can be repaced by the more
approprate term ntensonaty (wth an s).
(2) As Davdson puts t, a man s the agent of an act f what he does can be descrbed under an aspect that makes
t ntentona; see Davdson 2001: 46.
(3) Here we shoud be mndfu of the dfference between an expresson that we use to describe an acton and the
expresson that we empoy to ascribe ths acton to a partcuar agent. It s ony n certan descrptons that an
acton s ntentona; however, regardess of the way n whch t s descrbed, the acton s ascrbed once and for a
to ts agent. It foows from ths that even f the criterion of acton s ntensona n the semantca sense of the word,
the expresson wth whch we ascrbe an acton to ts agent s purey extensona; see Davdson 2001: 46ff. Once
more, Davdson uses the word ntentona (wth a t), but he adds that here ths term s taken n the semantca
sense of the word. In ths sense, aso the perhaps more approprate term ntensona (wth an s) coud have
been used.
(4) What Davdson descrbes here s, n the anaytc theory of acton, often desgnated, wth a term coned by |oe
Fenberg, as an accordion effect; see Fenberg 1965: 146: Ths we-known feature of our anguage, whereby a
man's acton can be descrbed as narrowy or broady as we pease, I propose to ca the "accordon effect",
because an act, ke the fodng musca nstrument, can be squeezed down to a mnmum or ese stretched out. He
turned the key, he opened the door, he started Smth, he ked Smth-a of these are thngs we mght say that
|ones dd wth one dentca set of body movements.
(5) Rcour 1988: 300: Nous gaons a ve hstore ou aux hstores que nous racontons son propos.
(6) The emphass s mne.
(7) See, on the geness of the theory of narratve dentty, Carr 1986: 7-17, 65-72.
(8) Carr 1991: 210: . est possbe de concevor a consttuton de so comme une narraton de so. On Carr's
reatonshp wth Rcour, see Carr 1991: 212-14.
(9) Carr 1991: 206: exstence narratve; 212: exstence raconte; 214: un mode dexstence qu est d|
narratf.
(10) Used n ts phenomenoogca sense, ths expresson refers to what transcends sub|ectvty (and, of course,
not to what transcends the word of experence).
(11) Ibd.: 1114 b 23; W. D. Ross transates ths passage, ess teray, as we are ourseves somehow party
responsbe for our states of character.
(12) An earer German verson of some parts of the present text can be found n my paper Narratves
Handungsverstndns (Tengey 2007; French verson: 2009b).
LszI TengeIyi
Lszl Tengelyi is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the nstitute of Phenomenology at the University of Wuppertal, Germany.
From 2003 to 2005 he was the President of the German Society of Phenomenology. Besides four books in Hungarian, he has
published The Wild Region in Life-History (2004; German original, 1998), L'exprience retrouve (2006), Erfahrung und Ausdruck
(2007), and, with Hans-Dieter Gondek, Neue Phnomenologie in Frankreich (2011).
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