G.R. No.

152318 April 16,2009DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FRTECHNISCHE

ZUSAMMENARBEIT,ET. AL. vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.

FACTS: The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
the Philippines ratified an Agreement called Social Health InsuranceNetworking
and Empowerment (SHINE which was designed to "enable Philippine families
especially poor onesto maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable
quality." Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to
work for SHINE. Nicolay, a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project
Manager. Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and private respondents
in matters such as proposed salary adjustments, and the course Nicolay was taking
in the implementation of SHINE different from her predecessors. The dispute
culminated in a signed by the private respondents, addressed to Nicolay, and copies
furnished officials of the DOH, Philheath, and the director of the Manila office of
GTZ. The letter raised several issues which private respondents claim had been
brought up several times in the past, but have not been given appropriate response.
In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter, all similarly
worded except for their respective addressees. She informed private respondents
that they could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of
these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately. Under the foregoing
premises and circumstances, it is now imperative that I am to accept your
resignation, which I expect to receive as soon as possible. Negotiations ensued
between private respondents and Nicolay, but for naught. Each of the private
respondents received a letter from Nicolay, informing them of the pre-termination of
their contracts of employment on the grounds of "serious and gross insubordination,
among others, resulting to loss of confidence and trust."
HELD: NO. This self-description of GTZ in its own official website gives further cause
for pause in adopting petitioners argument that GTZ is entitled to immunity from
suit because it is "an implementing agency." The above-quoted statement does not
dispute the characterization of GTZ as an "implementing agency of the Federal
Republic of Germany," yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under
private law, it has a legal personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of
Germany. The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been
unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally
enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany

G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO IIFACTS:

Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station.
Petitioner Moreau was thecommanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private
respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence inthe Philippines.

Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants
in the special servicesdepartment of the NAVSTA.On October 3, 1975, the private
respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanentfull-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings
to the rules and regulations of the U.S.Department of Defense. The hearing officer
recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.However, in a
letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's
report. The lettercontained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate
most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi andWyers have proven,
according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;"
and c) "eventhough the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with
anyone, (they) placed the records in public placeswhere others not involved in the
case could hear."Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner
Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnelexplaining the change of the private
respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages
allegingthat the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of
the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary
rights.However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by
them in the discharge of their official dutiesand that, consequently, the court had no
jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the
motionwas denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any
evidence that their acts were official in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?
RULING:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA,
undoubtedly had supervision over itspersonnel, including the private respondents.
Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued asofficers
of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that
government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and
not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.It is stressed at the
outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his
personal capacitywill not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of
public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of stateimmunity. By the same token,
the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from
suability andliability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without

or in excess of his authority. These well-settledprinciples are applicable not only to

the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains
tothe government of a foreign state, as in the present case.Assuming that the trial
can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, suchaward will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal
capacities but by the United States government astheir principal. This will require
that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment,
viz,
theappropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus
making the action a suit against thatgovernment without its consent.
Myla Ruth N. Sara

The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no
legalright against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In
the case of foreign states, the rule isderived from the principle of the sovereign
equality of states which wisely admonishes that
par in parem non habet imperium
and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
17
Our adherence to this precept isformally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our
Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that thePhilippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. WHEREFORE, thepetition is GRANTED.

U.P. vs DIZON
Facts:
On August 30, 1990, the UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into
a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders for the
construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and
Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baos
(UPLB).
In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three
progress billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two
of the billings. The third billing was not paid due to its disallowance by the

Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to
pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders to sue the UP and its co-respondent
officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various damages. After trial, on
November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs.
Following the RTCs denial of its motion for reconsideration on May 7, 2002, the UP
filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. Stern Builders opposed the notice of appeal
on the ground of its filing being belated, and moved for the execution of the
decision. The UP countered that the notice of appeal was filed within the
reglementary period because the UPs Office of Legal Affairs (OLS) in Diliman,
Quezon City received the order of denial only on May 31, 2002. On September 26,
2002, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of
time and granted the private respondents motion for execution.
The RTC issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002, and the sheriff of the RTC
served the writ of execution and notice of demand upon the UP, through its counsel,
on October 9, 2002. The UP filed an urgent motion to reconsider the order dated
September 26, 2002, to quash the writ of execution dated October 4, 2002, and to
restrain the proceedings. However, the RTC denied the urgent motion on April 1,
2003.
On June 24, 2003, the UP assailed the denial of due course to its appeal through a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 24, 2004, the CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that the UPs notice of appeal had
been filed late. The UP sought a reconsideration, but the CA denied the UPs motion
for reconsideration on April 19, 2004. On May 11, 2004, the UP appealed to the
Court by petition for review on certiorari. On June 23, 2004, the Court denied the
petition for review. The UP moved for the reconsideration of the denial of its petition
for review on August 29, 2004, but the Court denied the motion on October 6, 2004.
The denial became final and executory on November 12, 2004.
Issue:
Whether or not the fresh period rule announced in Neypes v. CA can be given
retroactive application?
Held:
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco
of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not
the counsel of record of the UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client
that the service should be made.
That counsel was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City, which was served with the denial
only on May 31, 2002. As such, the running of the remaining period of six days

resumed only on June 1, 2002, rendering the filing of the UPs notice of appeal on
June 3, 2002 timely and well within the remaining days of the UPs period to appeal.
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and
effective, such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would
end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the
RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed
too late on June 3, 2002.
In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC
applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted
the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon
notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and
the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the freshperiod rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its
ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution," is impervious to any serious challenge. This
is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
xxx
We have further said that a procedural rule that is amended for the benefit of
litigants in furtherance of the administration of justice shall be retroactively applied
to likewise favor actions then pending, as equity delights in equality.
xxx
It is cogent to add in this regard that to deny the benefit of the fresh-period rule to
the UP would amount to injustice and absurdity injustice, because the judgment in
question was issued on November 28, 2001 as compared to the judgment in Neypes
that was rendered in 1998; absurdity, because parties receiving notices of judgment
and final orders issued in the year 1998 would enjoy the benefit of the fresh-period
rule but the later rulings of the lower courts like that herein would not.

Republic vs. Sandoval (Consti1)

(Two petitions consolidated.)
En Banc

Campos, Jr., March 19, 1993

Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of Authority
Facts:
The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre (background:
Wiki), together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted the petition, seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and
Aug 8, 1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." which
dismissed the case against the Republic of the Philippines
May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in their
personal and official capacity, holding them liable, if at all, would not result in
financial responsibility of the government
Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration
In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what
they called "genuine agrarian reform"
The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their
problems and demands such as:
giving lands for free to farmers
zero retention of lands by landlords
stop amortizations of land payments
Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on
January 15, 1987
On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez
Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention
of then President Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meeting
Tension mounted the next day

The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and
prevented the employees from going inside their offices
On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo,
Tadeo's group decided to march to Malacanang to air their demands
On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and
Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML)
Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily
infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection was impending
Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola
The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm
From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place;
"pandemonium broke loose"
After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo)
39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the
group of marchers
Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor
physical injuries
The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident on
February 27, 1987 as follows
The march did not have any permit
The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by law
The security men assigned to protect the government units were in civilian attire
(prohibited by law)
There was unnecessary firing by the police and military
The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law
It is not clear who started the firing
The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the
crowd; the water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because:
there was no order to use them
they were incorrectly prepositioned

they were out of range of the marchers

The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified,
uniformed individuals shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of
the marchers
The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the
Western Police District (WPD) and Integrated National Police (INP) who were armed
be prosecuted for violation of par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended
It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the rally
without permit and for inciting sedition
Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers for their
failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal
operations in Mendiola:
Gen. Ramon E. Montao
Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim
Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres
Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz
Col. Cezar Nazareno
Maj. Filemon Gasmin
Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded victims
to be compensated by the government
It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages
from the government
No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims
On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the Republic
of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the
Mendiola incident
Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be
sued without its consent
Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit
Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no such waiver

Motion for Reconsideration was also denied

Issues:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not this
is a suit against the State with its consent)
Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the
government to indemnify the heirs and victims, and by public addresses made by
President Aquino, the State has consented to be sued
Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State
Holding:
No.
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
No.
Ratio:
Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its consent
The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that liability
automatically attaches to the State
The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve only as
cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State immediately
President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are not
tantamount to a waiver by the State
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:
When the Republic is sued by name;
When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that
the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government
Although the military officers and personnel were discharging their official functions
during the incident, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded
their authority
There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms.

Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but they fired at the
crowd instead
No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, RTC of Manila,
Branch 9, Caylao et.alG. R. No. 84607, March 19, 2003
FACTS:
The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in the
Constitution underArticle XVI, Section 3. It is provided that the State may not be
sued without its consent. Some instances whena suit against the State is proper are:
(1) When the Republic is sued by name; (2) When the suit is against
anunincorporated government agency; (3) When the suit is, on its face, against a
government officer but thecase is such that ultimate liablity will belong not to the
officer but to the government.With respect to the incident that happened in
Mendiola on January 22, 1987 that befell twelverallyists, the the case filed against
the military officers was dismissed by the lower court. The defendantswere held
liable but it would not result in financial responsibility to the government. The
petitioner (CaylaoGroup) filed a suit against the State that for them the State has
waived its immunity when the MendiolaCommission recommended the government
to indemnify the victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts andutterances of
President Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is indicative of State's waiver of
immunityand therefore, the government should also be liable and should be
compensated by the government . Thecase has been dismissed that State has not
waived its immunity. On the other hand, the Military Officer filed apetition for
certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and therefore should
the State be liablefor the incident?
HELD:
No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding the
indemnification of theheirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident does not
in any way mean liability authomaticallyattaches to the State. The purpose of which
is to investigate of the disorders that took place and therecommendation it makes
cannot in any way bind the State. The acts and utterances of President Aquino
doesnot mean admission of the State of its liability. Moreover, the case does not
qualify as suit against the State.While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the
ultimate liability does not pertain to the government.The military officials are held
liable for the damages for their official functions ceased the moment they

haveexceeded to their authority. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would
be peaceful and orderly andshould guarantee the safety of the people. The court
has made it quite clear that even a high position in thegovernment does not confer
a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The court rules that there isno
reversible error and no grave abuse of dicretion commited by the respondent Judge
in issuing thequestioned orders.

G.R. No. L-11154 March 21,1916E. MERRITT vs.GOVERNMENT OF THE

PHILIPPINEISLANDS
FACTS:
Counsel for the plaintiff insists that thetrial court erred (1) "in limiting the
generaldamages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000,instead of P25,000 as
claimed in thecomplaint," and (2) "in limiting the time whenplaintiff was entirely
disabled to two monthsand twenty-one days and fixing the damageaccordingly in
the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in hiscomplaint."The
Attorney-General on behalf of thedefendant urges that the trial court erred: (a)in
finding that the collision between theplaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of
theGeneral Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged
agent oremployee of the Government; (b) in holdingthat the Government of the
Philippine Islandsis liable for the damages sustained by theplaintiff as a result of the
collision, even if it betrue that the collision was due to thenegligence of the
chauffeur; and (c) inrendering judgment against the defendant forthe sum of
P14,741.Consequently, the Government issuedan act allowing the plaintiff to
commence alawsuit against it.ISSUE:
1)
WON the Government conceded itsliability to the plaintiff by allowing alawsuit to
commence against it.2)WON the chauffeur is a governmentemployee or
agent.HELD:1)NO.By consenting to be sued a state simplywaives its immunity from
suit. It does notthereby concede its liability to plaintiff, orcreate any cause of action
in his favor, orextend its liability to any cause not previouslyrecognized. It merely
gives a remedy toenforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction
of the court, subject to itsright to interpose any lawful defense.2)NO.We will now
examine the substantive lawtouching the defendant's liability for thenegligent acts
of its officers, agents, andemployees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of theCivil Code
reads:
The state is liable in thissense when it acts through a special agent, but not when
the damage should have beencaused by the official to whom properly it pertained
to do the act performed, in whichcase the provisions of the preceding articleshall be
applicable

. The responsibility of thestate is limited to that which it contractsthrough a special

agent, duly empowered bya
definite order or commission to performsome act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim
.The chauffeur of the ambulance of theGeneral Hospital was not such an agent

G.R. No. L-5156 March 11, 1954CARMEN FESTEJO

vs.
ISAIAS FERNANDO,FACTS:
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority
obtained first from the Court of FirstInstance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a
right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of theplaintiff, and against her
express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land
andcaused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels
of land on to the damage andprejudice of the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not this is a suit against the state?
RULING:
No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff's
land defendant committed actsoutside the scope of his authority. When he went
outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's landand damaged it or
destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly
departedfrom the duties imposed on him by law.Ordinarily the officer or employee
committing the tort is personally liable therefore, and may be sued as any
othercitizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his
tortuous act.It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasijudicial, ministerial, or otherwise who actsoutside the scope of his jurisdiction and
without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable topersonal
liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot
shelter himself by theplea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his
office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his actsthen are wholly without
authority.ART. 32. Any public officer or emplyee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall beliable to the latter
for damages:(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;

Separate Opinions CONCEPCION,

J.
,
dissenting: To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion
than that appellee Isaias Fernando is a party inthis case, not in his personal
capacity, but as an officer of the Government. According to said pleading the
defendant is"Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works." Moreover, in
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged:4. That the defendant
as Director of the Bureau of Public Works
, is in charge of irrigation projects and systems,and the official responsible for the
construction of irrigation system in the Philippines;We take judicial notice of the fact
that the irrigation projects and system reffered to in the complaint of which
thedefendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is "in charge" and
for which he is "responsible" as Director of the Bureau of Public Works are
established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution,
must be
Myla Ruth N. Sara

appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have
beenundertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a
property of the Government.

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972VICTORIA AMIGABLE,

plaintiff-appellant,vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Pub. Highways and REP. OF THE PHIL,
defendants-appellees. This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
FACTS:
Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale,the government used a portion of said lot for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.On March 27, 1958 Amigable's
counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of theportion of
her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to

the AuditorGeneral, who disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus, Amigable filed
in the court
a quo
a complaint,against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca
(Commissioner of Public Highways) for therecovery of ownership and possession of
her lot. The defendants denied the plaintiffs allegations stating: (1) that the action
was premature, the claim nothaving been filed first with the Office of the Auditor
General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery hadalready prescribed; (3) that
the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral
damages,attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since the Government had not
given its consent to be sued; and(4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu
that appropriated and used the area involved in theconstruction of Mango Avenue,
plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.On July 29, 1959, the court
rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause
of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that
the government cannot besued without its consent; that it had neither original nor
appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff'sclaim for compensatory damages,
being a money claim against the government; and that it had longprescribed, nor
did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its
consent tobe sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
ISSUE
: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government
RULING:
Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back
of her certificate of titleand that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of
any portion of her lot to the government, theappellant remains the owner of the
whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recoverpossession of
the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by
the government is neither convenientnor feasible at this time because it is now and
has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is forthe government to
make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine thedue compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
thereof at the time of the taking.

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal
interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that
payment is made by the government.

In addition, thegovernment should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which
should be fixed by the trial court after
MYLA RUTH N. SARA

hearing. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and thecase
remanded to the court
a quo
for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to whichthe
appellant is entitled as above indicated

US v. Ruiz (Consti1)

US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and
ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV,
Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in
Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon
damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids
and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the US.

In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the
company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat
landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway,
William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the
U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform
the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer
possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering
into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint
and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of
America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any
other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included
an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company
opposed the motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice
to reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental
functions to be able to invoke state immunity

Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent
judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private
respondent.

Ratio:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence
of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving.
And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract
by a State but the legal nature of the act
US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
Facts:
The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in
the military bases agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it
won in the bidding conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base
that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific
preformance was filed by him against the US.
Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
Held:
The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary
consequence of the principle of indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer,
the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and
because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish
them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and
proprietory acts. the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign

and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial
activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a
function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated
to commercial or business purposes

Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of
the City of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd.,
Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, respondents.

November 28, 1973

Fernando, J:

Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino
Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final and
executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was
issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of
garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the
same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of
military and civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.

Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held:
No
Ratio:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from
suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-30671November 28, 1973
Facts:
On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor
of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and InternationalConstruction
Corporation and against petitioner confirming the arbitration award in theamount of
P1,712,396.40. The award is for the satisfaction of a judgment against thePhlippine
Government.On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an
Order declaring the decision final and executory. Villasor directed the Sheriffs of
RizalProvince, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute said decision. The Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks, specially on
PhilippineVeterans Bank and PNB.The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
on deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military
and civilian personneland for maintenance and operations of the AFP.Petitioner, on
certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent JudgeVillasor for acting
in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of
jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the propertiesof
the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.
Issue:

Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?

Held:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of
theConstitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristicconcept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune
from suitunless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formalconception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can beno legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends.The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both
dictated by logicand sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot
be the object of agarnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted andthe state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the
State gives its consent tobe sued by private parties either by general or special law,
it may limit claimants actiononly up to the completion of proceedings anterior to
the stage of execution and that thepower of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since the government fundsand properties may not be seized under writs
of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by
the corresponding appropriation as required by law. Thefunctions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzedor disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,
asappropriated by law