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This book began life some fifteen years ago, as the planned third
volume of what I then termed a 'contemporary critique of
historical materialisn1'. That third volume was never written, as
my interests moved away in somewhat different directions. The
present work is based on the ideas I sketched for "'the third
volume, but also draws extensively on concepts I developed in
subsequent published writings.
1 should like to thank those colleagues and friends who have
read and commented on initial drafts of the book, or have
otherwise assisted in its preparation. Thanks, therefore, to Ulrich
Beck, Ann Bone, Montserrat Guibernau, l-lnrkin.
David Held, David Miliband, Veronique Mattier, Debbie Sey-
111our, Avril Syn1onds and Dennis Wrong.
j}JJ&>s.> A. J 1994;;.B?lond q?>tJ. 7f1a- y
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AAdt'c.J.. /?.t,Jc.J,, /lr.,,f:rcl (/.,,.,,e.rP'f::;/Jre4d_, !J./rai.
Introduction
What can it mean to be politica!!y radical today? For the spectre
which disturbed the slumbers of bourgeois Europe, and which
for more than seventy years took on solid flesh, has been returned
to its nether world. The hopes of radicals for a society in which.
as Marx said, human beings could be 'truly fcee' seem to have
turned out to be empty reveries.
The idea of political radicalism has long been bound up
primarily with socialist thought. To be a 'radical' was to have a
certain view of the possibilities inherent in history - radiealism
meant breaking away from the hold of the past. Some radicals
were revolutionaries: according <'J them revolution, and perhaps
only revolution, could produce that sharp separation which they
sought from what went before. Yet the notion of revolution wae
never the defining feature of political radicalism; this feature
consisted in its progre>sivism. History was there to be seized hold
of, to be moulded to human purposes, such that the advantages
which in previous erns seemed given by God, and the prerogative
of the few, could be developed and organized for the benefit of
all.
Radicalism, taking things by the roots, meant not just bringing
about change but controlling such change so as to drive history
onwards. And it is that project which now seems to have lapsed.
How should one react to such a situation? Some say that the
possibilities of radical change have been foreclosed. History, as
it \Vere, bas co1nc to nn end and :.ocia!ism \Vas a bridge too far.
2 Introduction
Yet couldn't it be claimed that, far from the possibilities of change
having been closed off, we are suffering from a surfeit of them?
For surely there comes a point at which endless change is not only
unsettling but positively destructive - and in many areas of social
life, it could be argued, this point has certainly been reached.
Such a train of thought appears io lead well awcy from what
are usually thought of as radical political philosophies, towards,
in fact, co11servatisn1. rfhe 111ain thrust of conservative thought
from the days of Edmund Burke has been a suspicion of radical
change in most or all of its forms. Yet here we !ind something
very surprising, which demands explanation. Conservatism, in
certain of its currently most influential guises in Europe, and to
some extent elsewhere in the world, has come to embrace more
or less exactly what it once set out to repudiate: competitive
capitalism and the processes of dramatic and far-reaching change
that capitalism tends to provoke. Many conservatives are now
active radicals in respect o[ that very pl}enon1enon \vhich pre-
viously they held most dear- tradition. 'Away with the fossils we
have inherited fro111 the past': where is such a scnti111Cnt 111ost
commonly Lo be heard? Not on the left, but on the right.
Conservatisn1 becon1e radical here confronls socialisn1 becon1l'.
conservative. With the fall of the Soviet Unio11, many socialists
have come to concentrate their energies on protecting the \velfare
state in the face of the strains to which it has become subject.
Son1e socialists, it is true, continue to say that authentic socia!isin
has never been tried, arguing that the disappeara11ce of Com111u-
nis1n is a windfall rather than a disaster. Con11nunis111, in this
view, was a form of authoritarian dogmatism, deriving from a
revolution betrayed, while reformist socialism of the sort found
in Western Europe was dragged down by trying to accommodate
to capitalism rather than surpassing it. However, this thesis is
threadbare indeed and socialists have mostly been thrown back
on to the defensive, their position i11 the 'vanguard of history'
reduced to the more modest task of protecting welfare
institutions.
Of course, radicals on the left do have another direction
tO\Vards which to turn their eyes: to the ne\V sociai move1nents,
such as those concerned \Vith ferninisn1, ecology, peace or human
r!ghts. 'universal
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cannot bear the \veight of the
Introduction J
Jeft'_s__hE.!2rical aspirations; perhaps oth:c <ogencies will take
over? For not only do such groups seem 'progressive'. their
chosen mode of polilir3J organization, the social n1ove1nent, is
the sarne as that "vhich \vas supposed to convey the proletariat to
its ulti1nate victory.
But it is plain enough that the n.ew cannot
readily be claimed for socialism. While .the .aspirations_.of some
such movements stand close to socialist ideals. their objectives
are disparate and sometimes actively opposed to one another.
With the possible exception of some sections of
niovement, the ne\v soci2l move1nents are not 'totalizing' in the
way was), promising a -ii"ew-Tstage' of social
development beyond the existing order. Some versions of femin-
ist thought, for example. are as radical as anything that went
under the name of socialism. Yet they don't envisage seizing
control of the future in the way the more ambitious versions of
socialism have done.
The world of the late twentieth century, one must conclude.
has not turned out as the founders of socialism anticipated when
they sought to give direction to h.istory by overcoming trauition
and dogma. They believed, reasor.abiy enough. that the more
we, as collective humanity, get to know about social and material
reality, the more we shall be able to control them in our own
interests. In the case of social life in particular. human beings
can become not just the authors but the masters of their own
destiny.
Events have not borne out these ideas. The world we live in
today is not one subject to tight human mastery - the stuff of the
ambitions of the left and, one could say, the nightmares of the
right. Almost to the contrary, it is one of dislocation and
uncertainty, a 'runaway world'. And. dist,;;t'ingly. what was
supposed to create greater-and greater certainty - the advance of
human knowledge and 'controlled intervention' into societv and
nature - is actually deeply in-Jived with this unpredictability.
Examples abound. Consider, for instance, the debate about
global warming, which concerns the possible effects of human
activities on climatic change. Is globrd warming happening, or is
it not? Probably the majority of scientists agree that it is; but
there are others who question either the very existence of the
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4 Introduction
pheno111enon or the lheory advanced to account for it. If global
wanning is indeed taking place, its consequences are difficult to
assess an<l proble1natic - for it is so1ncthing \vhich bas no real
precedents.
The uncertainties thus created I shall refer to generically as
1nanufactured uncertainty. Life has :.i,\vays been a risky business.
The intrusion of manufactured uncertainty into our lives doesn"t
mean that our on an individual or collective level, is
more risky than it used to be. Rather, the sources, and the scope,
of risk have altered. Manufactured risk is a result of human
intervention into the conditions of social life and into nature.
The uncertainties (an<l opportunities) it creates arc largely 11C\V,
They cannot be dealt with by age-old remedies; but neither do
they respond to the Enlightenment prescription of more know-
ledge, more control. Put more accurately, the sorts of reacttons
thev might evoke today nre often as 1nuch about dan1oge control
and repair as about an endless process of increasing nu1stery.
: The advance of n1anufacturctl uncertainty is the outcornc of
\the long-term. maturation of 1nodern institutions; but it'11as also
as the result of a series of dcvelop111e1lls that have
'transformed society (and nature) over no more than the past four
or five decades. Pinpointing these is essential if we arc to grasp
the altered context of political life. Three sets of developments
are particularly important; they affect especially the industrial-
ized countries, but arc also lo an increasing degree \vorl<l\vi<lc in
their impact.
Giobalization, tradition, uncertainty
First, there is the influence of intensifying glo/Jaliza1ion - a
much bandied about but as yet only poorly understood. Globali-
zation is not only, or even pri1narily, an econon1ic phcnoinenon;
and it should not be equated with the emergence of a 'world
system'. Globalization is really about the transfonpat_ion of sp?ce
and time. I define it as action at distm1ce, an(.! relate >ls mtenstfy-
ing over recent years tOthe c111ergence of 1neans of instantaneous
global con1munication and 1nass transportation.
Globalization does not only concern the creation of large-scale
Introduction 5
systc111s. but also tht: transfornHition of local, and even personal.
contexts of social experience. Our day-to-day activities arc
incrcusingly l" y events happening on the other si<le of
the world. Conversely, local lifestyle irnbits have become globally
consequential. Thus my decision lo buy a certain item of clothing
has irnplications not only for the international division of labour
but for the earth's ecosystems.
Globalization is not a single process but a cornplcx 111ixturc of
processes. \Vhich often act in contradictory \vays. protlucing
conflicts. disjunctures and ne\v fnnns of stratification. 1hus. for
instance. the revival of local nutiogali:ims. and an accentuating of
local identities, are directly bounu up with globalizing
tu \vhich they stand in opposition.
Second. and parriy as a direct result of globalization. \\'C can
speak today of the emergence of a post-traditional social order.
A post-traditional order is not one in which tradition disappears
- far fro111 it. Jt is one in 'Nhich changes its status.
l'raditions have tu e.xpiain the1nselves, to open to
interrogation or discourse. At first sight, such a statetnent 1night
scc1n udd. For haven't 111odcrnity and traditions ahvays been in
collision? Wasn"t overcoming tradition ti': main, impetus of
Enlightenment thought in the first place?
expressed in the expansion of modernity, Enlightenment
thought did destabilize traditions of all sorts. Yet the influence of
tra{.lition rc1nainetl strong: n1orc than this, in earlier phases of
the <levctop111ent of rnodern_ a refocusing of tradition
played a major part in consolidaring the social order. Grand
traditions were invented or reinvented. such as those of nation-
alism or of religion. No less important were reconstrt1cted
traditions of a more down-to-earth kind, to do with, among other
areas of social life, the fn1nily, gender and sexuality. than
being dissolved, these became reformed in such a way as to plant
women ftrn1ly in the reinforce divisions bet\veen the sexes
and stabilize ce ... triin 'normal' canons of sexual behaviour. E\'en
science itself, seemingly so wholly opposed to traditional modes
of thought, became a sort of twdition. Science, that is. became
an 'authority' which could be turned to in a relatively unquestion-
ing way to confront dilemmas or cope with problems. In a
globu!izing. culturally cosmopolitan society. ho\vever, traditions
6 Introduction
are forced into open vie\v: reasons or justiricalions have to be
offered for them.
The rise of fu11d11111c11ralis111 has to be seen against the backdrop
of the en1crgcncc of the post-traUiLional society. The tenn
'fundamentalism' has only come into wide currency quite recently
- as late as 1950 there was no entry "for the word in the Oxford
English Dictionary. ln this case, as elscv.rhere, the appearnnce of
a ne\v concept signals the of ne\v social forces. 'vVhat
is fundan1entalis1n? lt isi so I shall argue, nothing other than
tradition defended in the traditional way - but where that mode
ol defence has become widely called into question. The point
about trnditions is that you do1i"l really have to justify them: they
contain their O\Vll truth, a ritual truth, asserted as correct by the
believer. In a globally cosmopolitan on.ler, however, such a
stance be.conies dangerous, because essentially it is a refusal of
dialogue. Fundamentalism tends lo accentuate the purity of a
given set of doctrines, not only because it .wishes to set them off
from other traditions, but because it is a rejection of a model of
truth linked to the clialogic engagement of ideas in a public space.
It is dangerous because edged with a potential for violence.
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. Fundamentalisms can arise in all domains of social life where
tradition becomes something which has to be decided about
I rather than just taken for granted. There arise not only funda-
mentalisms of religion but of ethnicity, the family and gender,
among other forms.
The lrnnsformation of tradition in the present day is closely
linked to the transformation of nature. Tradition and nature used
to be relatively fixed 'landscapes', as it were, structuring social
activity. The dissolution of tradition (understood in the tra-
ditional way) interlaces with the disappearance of nature, where
'nature' refers to environments and events given independently
of human action. Manufactured uncertainty intrudcc. into all the
arenas of life thus opened up to decision-making.
The third basic change affecting contemporary societies is the
expansion of social reflexivity. In a detraditionalizing society
individuals must become used lo filtering all sorts of information
relevant to their life situations and r<:>utinely act on the basis of
that filtering process. Take the decision to get married. Such a
decision has to be 1nadc in relation to an a\vareness that 111arriage
Introduction 7
has changed in basic \vays over the past fe\V decades. that sexunl
habits and identities have altered too, and that people demand
1nore autono111y in their lives than ever before. Moreover. this is
not just knowledge about an independent social reality; as
applied in action it influences what that reality actually is. The
of social. reflexivity is n major factor introducing--a
Jislocation bct\vccn kno\v\edge and control - a pri1ne source of
n1anufactured uncertainty.
A world of intensified reflexivity is a world of cleier people. l
dont mean by this that people are more intelligent than
used lo be. In a post-traditional order, individuals more or less
have lo engage with tl]e wider world if they are to survive in it.
Information produced by specialists (including scientific know-
ledge) can no longer be wliollx confined to specific groups. but
becomes routinely interpreted and acted on by lay individuals in
the course of thei! everyday actions.
The development of social relle:<ivity is the key influence on a
diversity of changes that otherwise seem to have little in common.
Thus the emergence of 'post-Fordism' in industrial enterprises is
usually analysed in terms of technological change - particularly
the intluence of information technology. But the underlying
reason for the growth of 'flexible production and 'bottom-up
decision-making' is that a universe of high rellexi>ity leads to
greater autonon1y o[ action. \Vhich the enterprise 1T1ust recognize
and dra\v on.
The same applies to bureaucracy and to the sphere of politics.
Bureaucratic authority, as lvlax Webe: 1na<lP used to be a
condition for organizational effectiveness. In a 1nore re!1exivelv
ordered society. opernling in the context of manufactured uncc;-
tainty, this is 110 longer the case. The old bureaucratic systen1s
start to. disappear, the dinosaurs of the post-traditional age. In
the domain of politics, stales can no longer. so readily treat their
citizens as 'subjects'. Demands ior political reconstruction. for
the eliminating of corruption, .as well as widespread disaffection
with orthodox politipl mechanisms. are all in some part
expressions of increa.sed.social reflexivity.
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8 Introduction
Socialism, conservatism and neoliberalism
lt is in tenns of these changes that \VC should look lo explain the
troubles of socialism. In the shape of Soviet Communism (in the
East) and the Keynesian 'welfare compromise' (in the West),
socialism worked tolerably well when most risk was external
(rather than manufactured) and where the level of globalization
and social reflexivity was relatively low. When these circum-
stances no longer apply, socialism either collapses or is turned on
to the defensive - it is certainly not any more in the vanguard of
'history'.
. Socialism was based on what might be called a 'cybernetic
model' of social life, one which strongly rellects the Enlightenment
outlook mentioned at the beginning. According to the cybernetic
model, a system (in the case of socialism, the economy) can best
be organized by being subordinated to a directive intelligence
(the state, understood in one form or another). But while this
set-up might work reasonably effectively for more coherent
systems - in this case a society of low rellexivity, with fairly fixed
lifestyle habits - it doesn't do so for highly complex ones.
Such systems depend on a large amount of low-level input for
their coherence (provided in market situations by a multiplicity
of local pricing, production and consumption deo.:isions). The
hu111an brain probably also works in such a 111anner. It was once
thought that the brain was a cybernetic system, in which the
cortex was responsible for integrating the central nervous system
as a whole. Current theories, however, emphasize much more
the significance o[ low-level inputs in producing effective neural
integration.
The proposition that socialism is moribund is much less contro-
versial now than it was even a few short years ago. More
heterodox, I think, is a second assertion I want to make: that
conservative political thought has become largely dissolved just
at the point at which it has become particularly relevant to our
current condition. How can this be, for hasn't conservatism
triumphed worldwide in the wake of the disintegrating project of
socialism? I-lere, however, we n1ust distinguish CO.QS_e_r.yatism
from the right. 'The right' means many different things--in
'-'' .,;;-,
Introduction 9
differing contexts But one ntnin \Vay in ,,hicil till'
term is used today is to refer to ncolihernlism. wl{ose links with
CtlllSC rva t is111 :l re __tCill1011S:-f.(if ... iT-COi'1Sc rvn t is111 111L'il llS
anything.. it 111eans the - and spccilicallv the
of as _J).[ __ th_e,_.i.,ast .
.. quite elemen ta!) sc nse.
o.n the contrary. sets 111 play ,_ft"1dical
st1111 u la tcd ... i::kcJs. 1-\s noted :
earlier, the __Lui:i.\e\J,,.,ailical. while the left seeks j
- tryingJ_Q __ protect, for exan1ple, \vhat . .ce.111ains I
of the welfare state.
--r1; .. society. the conserving of tradilion cannot
sustain the sense it once had, as the relativelv unreflecti\'e
preservation of the past. For tradition defended in the traditional
way becomes fundan1e!lt[1!i.sm, ioo-dogmatic an outlook on which
to base a conservatism wluch looks to the achievement of social
harmony (or 'one ,nation') as Qn_e _of its main raisons d'etre.
--l"@):Hbernlism,.on the other hand. becomes internallv contra
dietary and thi_s i.s increasingly plain to On the
one hand ncol1b_eral.1s1n.1s hostile.to tradition - and is indeed one
of the 111ain forces_ _ever_Y,vhere. as a
result of the Q!_2Ill_()jI!1. arid an aggressive
on-01.e other, it .depends 11pon the
__1ts Jeg1tunacy and 1fS attacfilnent to conservatis111 -
in the areas of the nation. religion, gender and the fa111ilv. l Iaving
no proper theoretical rationale. its. defence of traditio
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; in these
areas normally takes the form of fundamentalism. The debate
about 'family values' provides a good example.
supposed to reign in the marketplace. and the pur\'iew
of markets becomes greatly extended. The wholesale expansion
of a 1narkct society i is a, pri111e force pron1oting those
very Ji_fc which ncoiiheral-
1sm, weanng its fundamentalist hat, diagnoses and so vigorouslv
opposes. This is an unstable. mix indeed. "
If socialisrn ancd conservatism;_h,UVe disintegrated. and nco-
liberalism is paradoxical. might one turn to liberalism per se
(capitalism plus. liberal. democracy, but shorn of New
fun<lan1e11talisn1s.) ia ,the of Francis Fukuvan;a?
Although I don't deal in the book; 1yiti
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liberal political in
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1 O Introduction
any detail, I don't think so, and for reasons cJocu1ncntcU at
greater length later. An eve.r-'.=!xpan<ling capilulis111 runs up not
only against environmentilC li111its in tcnns of the earth's
resources, but i11., th.c ... sha pc o
manufactured uncertainty; .. 2.<:L!J.0.SllU;.y, based on an elec-\
toral party system, operating at the. level of the nation-state, is \
not well equipped to meet the demands ofn rcllcxivc '1.WSJJL.b!D .. }
f!G'e ral I
den1oc-nrcy"''provides fe\v 1neans of
All this reveals plainly enough--ihe- exha-trstion o[ _received
political ideologies. Should we therefore perhaps accept, as some
of the postmodernists say, that the Enlight_enment hasexhausted
itself and that we have to more or -less take t11e world iis .. it is,
"\v!tf1 all its barbarities and limitations? Surely not. Almost the
last thing we need now is a sort of ne\v 1nedievalisn1, a confession
of impotence in the face of forces larger than ourselves. We live
in a radically da1nagcd