SUMMARY

On July 26 1956, the Egyptian President, Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser, announced the
Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal and its operating Suez Canal Company in
retaliation to the reneging of an agreement by the American and British Governments to
finance the construction of the Aswan Dam (on Nile River). As the canal represented a
major source of supply of oil for Britain and France, the potential loss of these supplies
represented an economic threat that they couldnt ignore.
Furthermore, France believed that Nasser was supporting rebels in the French colony of
Algeria.
After this, a conference (16-23 Aug.) is held in London in an attempt to find a diplomatic
solution and adopts 18 proposals which included an offer to Nasser (as Egyptian
representation) on the Suez Canal Company board and share its profits, which he later
rejected.
Afterwards another conference is held in London to discuss American proposals for a Suez
Canal Users Association to ensure continued int. use of the Canal, which was vetoed by the
USSR in Security Council.
Britain and France hold secret discussions over a military operation to recover use of the
Canal. This results in the formation of a plan by which Israel would invade Egypt and thus
allow British and French forces to seize the Canal as an act of intervention between warring
nations.
In the early 1950s, Egypt had violated the terms of the Egyptian-Isaeli armistice agreement
and blocked Israeli ships from passing through the Suez Canal, a major international
waterway. It also began to block traffic through the Straits of Tiran, a narrow passage of
water linking the Israeli port of Eilat to the Red Sea. This action effectively cut off the port
of Eilat -- Israel's sole outlet to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
In spite of the Security Council passing a resolution (SC Reso. 95) which called for Egypt to
remove the barricade, Egypt did not heed to the order and continued to block Israeli ships,
thus instigating the conflict further.
This was another reason for the hostility of the Israelis towards the Egyptian govt. and why
they became part of the plan by Britain and France. They wanted free navigation through
international waters (NOTE- Israel was already hostile towards Egypt due to multiple
conflicts and thus actually needed little provocation to strike at the enemy)
So, according to the plan, the Israelis (with help from France and Britain) attacked the Sinai
Desert on October 29
th
and thus began the war. On the 30
th
of October, France and Britain
also addressed a joint ultimatum to Egypt and Israel calling on both sides to cease fire and
withdraw 10 miles on each side of the canal (this was part of the plan). They also requested
Egypt to allow Anglo-French forces to be stationed temporarily on the Canal at Port Said,
Ismailia and Suez for the purpose of separating the belligerents and ensuring the safety of
shipping. Israel agreed on condition that Egypt also agrees; but Egypt refused.
So on Oct. 31
st
France and the United Kingdom launched an air attack against targets in
Egypt, which was followed shortly by a landing of their troops near Port Said at the northern
end of the Canal.
The Security Council held meetings on 30
th
October at the request of US and submitted draft
for ceasefire and retreat of the Israeli troops behind the armistice lines, which was vetoed
by the UK and France. A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was also
rejected.
The matter was then transferred to the General Assembly, in accordance with the
procedure provided by Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950.
In the early hours of the next day, the General Assembly adopted, on the proposal of the
United States, resolution 997 (ES-I), calling for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of
all forces behind the armistice lines and the reopening of the Canal. The Secretary-General
was requested to observe and report promptly on compliance to the Security Council and to
the General Assembly, for such further action as those bodies might deem appropriate in
accordance with the United Nations Charter.
Mr Pearson (Canada) had had extensive discussions with the Secretary-General and he felt
that it might be necessary to establish some sort of United Nations police force to help
resolve the crisis. Mr Pearson submitte0d to the General Assembly, when it reconvened the
next morning, a draft resolution on the establishment of an emergency international United
Nations force.
The Canadian proposal was adopted by the General Assembly and became resolution 998
(ES-I) of 4 November 1956, by which the Assembly requested, as a matter of priority, the
Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with
the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force
to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the
aforementioned resolution 997 (ES-I).
At the same meeting, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 999 (ES-I), by which it
reaffirmed resolution 997 (ES-I) and authorized the Secretary-General immediately to
arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the ceasefire and the halting
of the movement of military forces and arms into the area.
On the same day, the Secretary-General submitted his first report on the plan for an
emergency international United Nations Force, in which he recommended certain
preliminary steps, including the immediate setting up of a United Nations Command.