N T E R V l E W

Humberto Maturana
Interviewed by Adam Lucas
E
CONOMISTS, businessmen, and politicians are fond of saying that corn
petition is necessary for economic growth and human well-being.
Using Darwinian evolutionary theory as a justification for this asser-
tion, they claim that humans are ' naturally' competitive. "It' s the law of the
jungle out there", they seem to say, "that's why we need the capitalist compe-
tition of the marketplace. The 'survival of the fittest' is a perfect description
of how the market should operate." But if humans really are biologically com-
petitive, doesn' t that legitimate the exploitation of the'weaker' by the 'stronger',
the ' unfit' by the 'fittest'? Where might moral considerations and ethical re-
sponsibility fit into such a picture? And why is it so seldom that we ever hear
any other case put to us?
Generally speaking, the choice we are given seems rather bleak. Either we
accept the 'scientific' view that humans live in a cruel and indifferent cosmos,
and therefore, that we must ourselves be cruel and indifferent in order to
survive, or else we can retreat to an uncritical religious faith and some form
of creationism. Such a simple view of the meaning and implications of evolu-
tionary theory need not be accepted. The Chiltan neurobiologist, Humberto
Maturana, is one of many scientists who dissent from this narrow orthodoxy.
Maturana shifts the terrain of the debate on human nature and evolution
by proposing that cooperation and love are not simply forms of social behav-
iour, but the biological preconditions for human evolution. According to
Maturana, humans are therefore not just naturally sociable and cooperative,
but naturally loving and compassionate beings. After all, he argues, how could
language and culture have arisen if humans had always lived in competition
and strife, in what Thomas Hobbes called ' a war of all against all', with each
person pursuing his or her own self-interest? Maturana says that if we pause
to reflect on this issue, we find that it is trust, acceptance and the pursuit of
intimacy and a shared existence that provide the basis for social cohesion,
language and culture; not competition, and not self-interest, although there
can be no doubt that these latter characteristics have been instrumental in the
formation of hierarchical, male-dominated societies over the past several thou-
sand years.
Maturana' s radical views on the origins of language, self-consciousness
and culture can be traced back to the beginning of his career in the early
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1960s, when he first began to depart from biological orthodoxy by trying to
conceive of living systems in terms of the processes that constitute them,
rather than in terms of the organism' s relationship to the environment. In
some ways, Maturana' s work can be seen as an elaboration into the biological
and social domains of Ilya Prigogine' s theory of dissipative structures, in the
sense that Maturana shares Prigogine' s concern with the dynamics of evolu-
tion and self-organlsation. Indeed, Maturana' s concept of autopoiesis is often
discussed in connection with Prigogine' s work. At the same time, Maturana
has identified qualitative distinctions between different forms of biological
and social behaviour which Prigogine can only allude to at the physical level.
But while Prigogine places an emphasis on the essential openness of living
systems, because of his focus on thermodynamics and therefore, ma~ter and
energy fiow, Marurana' s focus upon perception and language places an em-
phasis on the essential closure of the nervous system in terms of its dynam-
ics, and how this operational closure constrains the structural changes that
go on within organisms and species over time, including those changes re-
lated to perception and cognition.
Maturana is perhaps best-known for having coined the term autopoiesis,
and for his related theories in developmental biology, which modify some of
classical Darwi ni sm' s basic assumpt i ons about evolutionary change.
Autopoiesis refers to the self-production of living organisms that are struc-
rurally coupled to one another and the medium or environment within which
they live. But the structural, evolutionary changes which they undergo over
time are not actually ' chosen' or 'selected' by their environment, as vulgar
Darwinism would have it. Maturana argues that, on the contrary, any struc-
rural changes that go on within an organism or species cannot be specified by
the environment, because any changes occurring within the organism are
specified by the previous state of that organism, and not by the structure of
the disturbing agent. Maturana calls this the structural determinism of bio-
logical entities. Thus, the envi ronment is merely the source of external
perturbations, and can trigger structural changes in the organism, but it is
misleading and wrong to say that the environment 'chooses' or 'selects' those
changes. It is only the scientific observer, who has some knowledge of the
possible changes that the organism could undergo in different environmen-
tal conditions, who is able to see that only one possibility is actualised.
But this is simply one aspect of Maturana' s fascinating contribution to
modern evolutionary theory. These ideas were first elaborated in Autopoiesis:
The Organisation of the Laving (1973), and subsequently refined in his more
recent book with Francisco Varela, The Tree of Knowledge (1987), and numer-
ous academic papers. Maturana recently retired as a Professor in the Faculty
of Science atthe University of Chil~ in Santiago, having returned to his home-
land in 1980 after seven years in exile. Like many other Chil6an academics
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and intellectuals, Maturana left the country following the overthrow in 1973
of the democratically elected socialist President Salvador Allend~ by the
American-backed fascist General Augusto Pinochet. Nevertheless, Maturana' s
years of exile seem to have contributed to a growing international audience
for his work, in fields as diverse as biology, ecology, psychology, social theory,
philosophy, medicine, education, and the arts.
I first encountered Maturana' s challenging ideas over ten years ago through
numerous references to his work in Erich Jantsch's classic book, The Self-
Organizing Universe (1980). Shortly afterwards, I began reading Maturana' s
own work, and was pleased and surprised at the clarity of his expression and
the refreshing and often philosophical insights which he brought to biology.
When I discovered that Maturana was a regular visitor to Australia, I con-
tacted the Melbourne coordinator of his biannual weekend seminar pro-
gramme and organised to interview Maturana by telephone.The following is
a transcript of that interview.
Co ul d y o u be g i n, Pr o f e s s o r Ma t ur a na , by e x pl a i ni ng t he me a n i n g o f
t he t e r m autopoiesis, a nd t he c o nt e x t wi t hi n whi c h you i ni t i a l l y ap-
pl i e d t he t e r m?
Certainly. The word has two Greek roots: Autos, which means ' self' , and
poien, which means ' to produce' . So it indicates self-production. I thought
that I had coined the term, but it seems Aristotle used this word once or
twice...
Do you k n o w t he n a me o f t he t ext ?
No, I don' t. In fact, I didn' t know that this word had been used before. I
invented it in order to refer to the organisation of living systems; systems that
produce themselves through their own constitution as molecular systems.
Obvi ousl y, autopoiesis i s c l os e l y b o u n d up wi t h t he ge ne r al d y n a m-
i cs o f s e l f - o r g a ni s a t i o n i n t he uni v e r s e . Unl i ke Pr i g o g i ne ' s c o nc e pt
o f di s s i pat i ve s t r uc t ur e s , howe ve r , y o ur own wor k a ppl i e s s pe c i f i -
c al l y t o l i v i ng s y s t e ms wi t h c e l l ul a r s t r uc t ur e s . It s e e ms t o me t hat
wha t i s no v e l a bo ut your i nt e r pr e t a t i o n o f bi o l o g i c a l e v o l ut i o n i s t he
e mp h a s i s y o u pl ac e on t he n e r v o u s s y s t e m, wh i c h you c l a i m ope r -
at es as a c l o s e d s y s t e m i n i t s d y n a mi c s , and t hat i t i s t hi s ope r a-
t i o na l c l o s ur e o f t he n e r v o u s s y s t e m wh i c h s h o u l d be t r e at e d as
f u n d a me n t a l t o our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h o w pe r c e pt i o n a nd c o g ni t i o n
work. But what ' s your e v i d e n c e f or t hi s?
Well, the evidence could be anatomical, for example. If you look at the
nervous system in its make-up, in terms of nerve cells connecting with each
other, you see that it forms a network of elements that are completely inter-
connected with one another. At the same time, it is not something that one
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can show, but something that one has to abstract and conceive from its op-
eration.
You see, in any system with which you interact, you can always consider
the surface of interaction as an opening. But this obscures what is happening
within the system. In the case of the nervous system, I claim that if one looks
at the nervous system as open, in terms of the interactions of the organism
with the medium, then you do not see how the nervous system operates; that
it actually operates as a closed network of changing relations of activity.
For example, if you consider the energetic dimensions involved in seeing:
photo-receptors can respond to a single photon. Now, how does one know
that they can respond to a single photon? Because you can create an experi-
mental situation in which a person claims to be able to see when a single
photon of some sort is fired through their field of vision. But the whole activ-
ity required for seeing, in terms of the experience of seeing, involves the
activity of hundreds of millions of cells. So the energetic activity of the brain
that is required to respond to that single photon is much, much larger than
the energy of that single photon. Secondly, the experience of seeing depends
on the connectivity of the network. So the photon only triggers something
that is realised within the nervous system. Now if one does not recognise this,
one will speak about the photon ' carrying information' . But when you try to
work out just what ' to carry information' means, you discover it means noth-
ing.
On e o f t he e x a mpl e s t hat you of t e n us e t o i l l us t r at e t hi s po i nt r e l at e s
t o whe t he r t he r e i s a di r e c t c o r r e l a t i o n be t we e n t he s p e c t r u m o f
f i ght t hat c o me s t hr o ug h t he e ye , or t he wa v e l e ng t h o f f i ght , a nd t he
c o l o ur t hat ' s ac t ual l y n a me d or pe r c e i v e d. Co ul d y o u br i e f l y e x pl a i n
t he r e s e ar c h t hat you c o nduc t e d i n t hi s area, a nd y o ur r e s e ar c h f i nd-
i ngs ?
Well, the research was precisely in terms of trying to make a correlation
between the spectral composition of the light to which the eye is responding,
and the activity of the ganglial cells in the retina. What you find is that under
many different conditions, which entail many different spectral composi-
tions from the object observed, you get the same activity in the nerve cells.
For example, the perception of the colour green can be triggered by a number
of different light perturbations.
If this is so, and experiment shows that it is, whatever is happening in the
ganglial ceils in the retina is independent of the spectral composition coming
from the object. Therefore, it has to do with something else. And what that
turns out to be relates to the connectivity of the retina, the characteristics of
the cells of the retina, and not with the characteristic of the light to which the
eye is responding.
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H o w t h e n d o e s t h i s a f f e c t o u r t r a d i t i o n a l v i e w s o f p e r c e p t i o n a n d
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ?
Firstly, it shows us t hat t he col our o f t he obj ect s we see is not de t e r mi ne d
by t he f eat ur es of t he l i ght whi ch we r ecei ve f r om t he obj e c t s . Whe n you see
s ome t hi ng, t he act of seei ng is i n fact an act or a pr ocess t hat entails an expe-
r i ence de t e r mi ne d in t he st r uct ur e of t he obser ver . So t he whol e ques t i on of
cogni t i on changes. It cannot be t r i gger ed any mor e as a ma n n e r o f knowi ng
or poi nt i ng o r di st i ngui shi ng or per cei vi ng an i nde pe nde nt reality, but as a
ma n n e r o f oper at i ng in coher ence wi t h t he ci r cumst ances of l i vi ng. The ques-
t i on is t her ef or e of a di f f er ent kind.
W h a t t h e n i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d a n d o u r
p e r c e p t i o n o f i t ?
Th e ext er nal wor l d is an expl anat or y c ons t r uc t f or our exper i ences. I f
you want t o expl ai n how we are able t o di spl ay coher ent behavi our , t hen you
have t o r es or t t o t he st r uct ur al dynami cs of t he or gani sm. You have t o see and
show t hat t he s t r uct ur e of t he or gani s m is a par t i cul ar st r uct ur e t hat arises in
i nt er act i on wi t h a me di um, whi ch you mus t event ual l y des cr i be wi t h r ef er -
ence t o t he or gani sm.
A good anal ogy can be f ound in phar macol ogy. Du r i n g t he pe r i od in
whi ch chemi s t r y was less capabl e of maki ng full descr i pt i ons of di f f er ent
mol ecul es, sci ent i st s who want ed t o speak about t he pr oper t i es of di f f er ent
subst ances us ed what are cal l ed bi o-assays. You i nj ect ed a subst ance i nt o an
ani mal or added i t t o a pl ant , and us ed t he ani mal or pl ant as an i ndi cat or o f
t he pr es ence of t he subst ance. For exampl e, t he changes in t he ovari es of a
f emal e r abbi t i ndi cat e t he pr es ence of a hor mone , oest r ogen. So t hese sub-
st ances wer e des cr i bed in t er ms of t he changes t he or gani s m unde r we nt wi t h
r egar d to t hem. Th e anal ogy is t hat this is how t he out er wor l d is descr i bed,
t hr ough our changes. So we do not see an out s i de wor l d, but rat her, we gen-
erat e an out s i de wor l d t hr ough our changes.
T h i s l a s t p o i n t l e a d s u s o n t o o n e o f y o u r m o r e c o n t r o v e r s i a l c l a i ms ,
w h i c h i n s o m e w a y s c a n b e s e e n a s a r e s p o n s e t o K a n t . Y o u c l a i m
t h a t a s b i o l o g i c a l b e i n g s w i t h a n o p e r a t i o n a l l y c l o s e d n e r v o u s s y s -
t e m , w e h u m a n s c a n ' t m a k e a n y s t a t e m e n t a b o u t a r e a l i t y t h a t e x -
i s t s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f o u r d o i n g o r o u r a c t i o n s . B u t w h a t e x a c t l y d o
y o u m e a n b y t h i s ?
Th e ques t i on o f whet her it is possi bl e to speak about an i nde pe nde nt
real i t y is not new, of course. I n fact, it is ver y old. Ka nt hi ms el f devel oped this
cr i t i ci sm about t he i dea t hat one can' t cl ai m t o speak a bout t he t hi ng-i n-i t sel f,
and yet he r et ai ned t he not i on of t he t hi ng-i n-i t sel f.
No w what I a m sayi ng is, i f we cons i der our bi ol ogy, and t he way t hat we
oper at e as l i vi ng syst ems, one realises t hat , whe n we are act ual l y e xpe r i e nc -
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i ng somet hi ng, we cannot di st i ngui sh per cept i on f r om i l l usi on. When we c om-
mi t a mi st ake, we do not know t hat we are commi t t i ng a mi s t ake. The mi st ake
is acknowl edged as s omet hi ng t hat is i nadequat e onl y after we have done it.
Whi l e we were doi ng it, we di d it as t hough i t were valid.
Th r o u g h t hese refl ect i ons and ar gument s , and by l ooki ng at how we op-
erate, it t ur ns out t hat we can say not hi ng about an i nde pe nde nt reality. We
expl ai n our exper i ence wi t h our experi ence. You see, even sci ence does not
depend on t he supposi t i on t hat we are speaki ng about an i nde pe nde nt real -
ity. The phi l osopher of sci ence, Kar l Popper , hi msel f realises this, but he
conserves t he not i on of an i nde pe nde nt reality as a sort of cont rol l er of t he
validity of what he is saying. Now what I a m sayi ng is t hat even this not i on of
reality as a cont rol l er cannot be sust ai ned, because i t per t ai ns t o our oper a-
t i on as bei ngs t hat can say not hi ng about anyt hi ng i nde pe nde nt f r om our
selves. Now this does n' t creat e a powerful pr obl em, because we have be e n
l i vi ng like this anyway for a l ong, l ong t i me, but it at least opens for us t he
possi bi l i t y of bei ng aware t hat we shall live t he worl d t hat we br i ng fort h.
Th a t t he worl d i n whi ch we live does not de pe nd on s omet hi ng ext er nal t o
us, it depends on us as l i vi ng syst ems doi ng what ever it is we do i n l anguage.
Ka n t was part i cul arl y c onc e r ne d wi t h t hi s pr obl em, j ust as I am. But fi -
nally, he coul d not accept t hat one coul d i ndeed say not hi ng about an i nde-
pe nde nt reality, a nd so he kept t hi s not i on. I t requi res, per haps, a cer t ai n
dar i ng to accept t hat you d o n ' t need this not i on of an i nde pe nde nt reality.
Mo d e r n physi cs, par t i cul ar l y q u a n t u m physi cs, is i n a si t uat i on i n whi ch i t is
be c omi ng appar ent t hat this s uppos ed real i t y is cont i nuous l y changi ng. One
of t he great pr obl ems i n c ont e mpor a r y physi cs is t he rol e of t he observer,
and whet her it is possi bl e to i ncl ude t he obser ver as par t of t he physi cal
syst em, because t he obser ver is not a physi cal bei ng, b u t a bi ol ogi cal bei ng.
So this quest i on has s omehow been pr es ent i n ma n y ways, but as far as I
know, nobody else has be e n wi l l i ng t o t ake t he full st ep of acknowl edgi ng t hat
we can say not hi ng about this so-cal l ed i nde pe nde nt reality. I believe t hat t he
very not i on of an i nde pe nde nt real i t y is meani ngl ess.
Wo ul d i t b e f ai r t o say, t he n, t ha t y o u ar e no t d e n y i n g t ha t t he r e i s a
wo r l d t hat exi s t s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f us? Bu t i s i t s i mp l y a ma t t e r o f
f ac t t ha t t he wa y we ar e s t r u c t u r e d d o e s n ' t e na bl e us t o s pe a k a b o u t
it?
Well, it' s a little bi t mor e t ha n t hat , because t he ver y not i on t hat t here is an
out si de reality bel ongs to our way of bei ng. You may r e me mbe r t hat whe n
physicists ftrst began to di scuss t he possi bi l i t y of t he exi st ence of bl ack hol es,
t hey cl ai med t hat the laws of physi cs e nd wher e t he bl ack hol e begi ns. Wh a t
t hey me a nt by this is t hat a bl ack hol e is a mass of mat t er t hat absor bs ot her
mat t er ; ever yt hi ng goes i nsi de, but not hi ng goes out si de. Th e physi ci st can
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therefore say nothing about what happens inside the black hole. Physics sim-
ply ends there, because it can say nothing about that particular state of af-
fairs. In order to say something about it, you must operate in interactions.
Therefore, anything you could say about it would not apply. So it is a matter
of that kind. Whatever we say about an independent reality does not apply.
We may argue that we need this notion for epistemological reasons, but when-
ever we want to say something about it, it doesn' t apply. So the very notion of
an independent reality is intrinsically misleading, because it leads us to be-
lieve that reality would apply to notions such as ' thingness' . But it doesn' t
apply, because the notion of ' things' applies to what we do.
Yo ur c o m m e n t s r e m i n d m e o f t h e d i f f e r e n t a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t t h e
n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y w h i c h u n d e r l i e d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s . F o r e x a m p l e ,
i n H o p i I n d i a n , a n d s o m e A b o r i g i n a l l a n g u a g e s , t h e r e i s n o n o t i o n
o f s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t . L i k e t h e l a t e p h y s i c i s t D a v i d B o h m ' s c o n c e p t
o f t h e h o l o m o v e m e n t , t h e s e l a n g u a g e s a s s u m e t h a t t h e r e i s a n u n -
b r o k e n u n i t y o f b e i n g w i t h i n w h i c h d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t s e x i s t a s r e l a -
t i v e l y a u t o n o m o u s . H e r e , r e a l i t y i s t h e w h o l e n e s s w i t h i n w h i c h w e
m o v e a n d d r a w a t t e n t i o n t o p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t i e s . I t i s t h e a c t o f b r i n g -
i n g t h o s e q u a l i t i e s i n t o a t t e n t i o n a n d i s o l a t i n g t h e m f r o m t h e w h o l e
t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e w h i c h g i v e s t h e m t h e i r a p p e a r a n c e o f ' t h i n g n e s s ' .
I n y o u r o w n t e r m s , s u c h l a n g u a g e s c o u l d b e s e e n a s r e c u r s i v e l y d r a w-
i n g a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i r o w n c o n s t r u c t i o n . A r e s u c h i s s u e s r e l a t e d t o
w h a t y o u a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t ?
Yes, but at the same time, these languages are still just languages.They are
domains of operation in coordinations of coordinations of behaviour. Enti-
ties do arise in terms of whatever it is we can distinguish; which could be
relations, totalities, differences. But in different cultures, with their different
languages and different manners of living together, the kinds of distinctions
made in each language are also different.
For example, Chinese thinking is very systemic, while European thinking
is very linear. Westerners deal with everything as though it had to do with
linear argumentation. Although I don' t know what is happening now with
this tremendous occidentalisafion of China, I do know that in traditional China,
there was systemic thinking. The whole notion of yin/yang, for example, has
to do with a systemic view, not oppositions in our terms, but systemic
coherences. This entails different manners of living, and yet language still
has to do with coordinations of coordinations of behaviour.
H o w d o e s y o u r o w n t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e d i f f e r f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l v i e ws ?
There are several traditional views on language. Chomsky, for example,
insists on the generative character of grammar, and the distinction between
superficial and deep structures. Essentially, this has to do with the coherences
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of the generation of speech. But Chomsky doesn' t deal with meaning; it is
simply left out. It is another problem. The school of Jacobson does some-
thing different. It is not concerned so much with grammar, but with mean-
ing. Jacobson thinks that every element in language has meaning.
Now, the notion of communication, symbolisation and symbols enters
very much into the usual description of language. What I' m saying is some-
thing different in the sense that I think that any reflection about language has
to go together with the understanding of meaning, and that grammar is sec-
ondary to meaning. Secondly, I am saying that communication and symboli-
sation are secondary to language, and that language consists in an operation
of coordinations of behaviour, and in fact not just in coordinations ofbehav-
lout, but in coordinations of coordinations of behaviour. Therefore, meaning
arises immediately in the process of coordinations of coordinations of be-
haviour which in turn constitute language. Grammar has evolved to deal
with the regularities of those coordinations of behaviour.
So language is primarily related to doing, to behaviour and activity, not
symbols, and not communication, because symbols and communication are
secondary. The primary thing in language, according to what I say, is the
process of coordinations of coordinations of behaviour.
Th e e x a mpl e t hat you s o me t i me s us e t o e x pl a i n y o ur c o nc e pt i o n o f
l a ng ua g e as c o o r di na t i ng c o o r di na t i o ns o f be ha v l o ur r e l at e s t o t he
act o f poi nt i ng. I f s o me o n e po i nt s at s o me t h i n g f or s o me b o d y e l s e ,
t he y c a n pe r c e i ve t hat t he r e i s a r e l a t i o ns hi p be t we e n t he p o i n t i n g
f i nge r and t he obj ect t hat i s be i ng po i nt e d at , whe r e as a dog or a cat
wi l l s i mp l y l ook at t he p o i n t i n g f i nger.
That is basically correct, but it's not exactly that they will perceive that
there is a relation. If I point, I am doing two things. On the one hand, I am
coordinating my relation with the person for whom I am doing the pointing,
and on the other hand, I am coordinating this coordination by orienting the
attention of this person in one direction. So what you have there is a coordi-
nation of a coordination of behaviour.
You would have a better example when you call a taxi.You make a gesture,
and you connect with the taxi driver. What you see is that the person looks at
you, and then you make another gesture, indicating where you would like this
person to stop.With the second gesture, you coordinate your previous coor-
dination. Now the result is a coordination of behaviour which can be com-
mented upon as if it had been an agreement for taking a taxi.
An o t h e r c ont r ove r s i al c l a i m wh i c h y o u ma k e i s t hat l a ng ua g e o r i g i -
na t e d at s o me t i me i n t he v e r y di s t ant pas t . Co ul d y o u e xpl ai n h o w
l o ng ago you t hi nk l a ng ua g e f i rs t ar os e , and why you have c o me t o
t hi s c onc l us i on?
N T E R V I E W
I believe language may have begun as early as three million years ago,
because of the great many changes in the structure of the nervous system, the
face, and the respiratory dynamics. All of these changes are associated with
our being languaging beings that use sound production in language.
Ar e y o u r e f e r r i ng t o phy s i o l o g i c a l c h a n g e s t hat ha v e b e e n f o und i n
t he f os s i l r e c or d o f earl y h o mi n o i d s a nd h o mi n i d s ?
Physiological changes, anatomical changes, and behavioural changes.These
are very great coherent changes, so they are not something that could arise
through a single mutation. It's a whole series of coherent changes that must
have taken place continuously for many generations.
But what ' s t he s our c e f or y o ur c o nc l us i o ns ? Wh a t o t he r r e s e a r c h
has b e e n d o n e i n t hi s area i n or de r f or y o u t o dr aw s uc h c o nc l u-
s i ons ?
My propositions about language have to do with my own more or less
formal research in relation to daily life and what we do with language. Now
with respect to the origins of language, I make this assessment because if you
listen to many of the people who are dealing with this question, they will say
that language began fifty thousand or one hundred thousand or two hundred
thousand years ago; some time much nearer to the present. They are also
thinking in terms of genetic changes. Now the reason why I think differently
is because the characteristics of a species are not primarily determined through
their genetic constitution, but rather by a manner of living that is concerned
with systemic actualisation, in which living system and medium change to-
gether. This requires different dynamics, and this is why I don' t think that
two hundred thousand years is enough.
It's been known for some time now that humans share a fossil ancestor
with the chimpanzees, and that our early hominid ancestors began to evolve
along a different evolutionary path about five to six million years ago. My
own criticism of the genetic basis for language partially relates to the fact that
human beings share more than 99% of their DNA with chimps, and yet our
physiology and behaviour is very different. I believe that the tremendous
expansion of intelligence, apparent throughout human history, is the result
of our hominoid and hominid ancestors being biologically different from the
chimpanzees; the outcome has been an enormous increase in the size of the
human brain.
If you compare the size of the brain of human beings to the size of brains
of chimpanzees for example, the human brain is three times bigger. It's not
only bigger, there are of course many other differences in terms of the con-
nectivity.
] N T E R V I E W
I n t he bo o k you c o - wr o t e wi t h Fr anci sco Varela, The Tree of Kno~ol-
edge ( 1987) , you ar gue t hat , a l t ho ug h c h i mp a n z e e s are ' l anguagl ng'
be i ngs , and c an e ve n be t aught t o us e s i g n l a ng ua g e , as e v i d e n c e d by
t he wor k of R. A. and B. T. Ga r dne r a n d ot he r s , t he y do not l i ve i n
l anguage. Unl i ke any ot her cr eat ur es on ear t h, huma n bei ngs l i ve
wi t hi n t he c o ns t r uc t i o ns e na bl e d b y l anguage or s y mb o l i c c o mmu -
ni c a t i o n. Fu r t h e r mo r e , y o u as s e r t t ha t c h i mp a n z e e s de mo ns t r a t e a
gr e at e r pr o pe ns i t y f or c o mp e t i t i o n a nd s t r uggl e s f or powe r t ha n di d
our h o mi n i d anc e s t or s , wh o l i ve d i n c o o pe r a t i o n, l ove a n d s ha r e d
i nt i ma c y . Yo u al s o c l a i m t hat i f t he y ha d not po s s e s s e d t he s e c ha r a c -
t e r i s t i c s , we wo ul d have r e ma i n e d s i mi a n , l i ke t he c h i mp a n z e e . I n
ot he r wor ds , i t was t he s e c ha r a c t e r i s t i c s t hat al l owe d our homi ni d
a nc e s t o r s t o de ve l op l a ng ua g e a nd e vol ve i n a t ot al l y di f f e r e nt di r e c -
t i o n t o our no w di s t ant c o us i ns .
Because you place love at the centre of human relationships and language,
and claim that humans are biologically loving beings, could you talk about
the role of trust in human relationships generally?
Trust is a fundamental element in social life, but it is love that constitutes
social coexistence, just as it is the emotion that constitutes trust. Love is the
domain of those behaviours through which the Other rises in a legitimate
and allied coexistence with you. This constitutes trust; to trust the Other to
the extent that he or she does not have to justify himself or herself in relation
to you. So trust is secondary to, or goes together with, love.What I claim in
relation to love and language is not that love is central for language, but that
love has been central for the origin of language. Now that we are in language,
we can also use language to hate one another.
But l ove was t he pr e c o ndi t i o n ...
Love was the precondition. It was the condition which allowed humans to
live together in sufficient nearness and recursive intimacy to subsequently
permit the growth, development and conservation of living in coordinations
of coordinations of behaviour.
However, it should be acknowledged that there has been a shift in human
development since Neolithic times. I think that human history is a history of
cooperation, in the sense that it is centred on love. But in the last fifteen
thousand years, cultures have arisen which have emphasised struggle, com-
petition, and relations of domination.
I t ake i t t hat you are her e r ef er r i ng t o t he e me r g e n c e of pat r i ar chy,
and t he work o f s o me a nt hr o po l o g i s t s a nd a r c ha e o l o g i s t s who ar gue
t hat t he earl i es t h u ma n s oc i e t i e s we r e ba s i c a l l y e gal i t ar i an, and t hat
e l e me n t s of t hi s egal i t ar i an ct t l t ure s ur v i v e d i n v a r i o us f o r ms over a
wi de geographi c ar ea unt i l t he l at e Mi ddl e Ages?
Yes. I believe that such ways of life arose from herding practices amongst
pastoral tribes. These tribes, who worked and lived with herd animals, devel-
oped techniques for killing off other animals which preyed on the herds. At
some time in the distant past, these techniques related to the appropriation of
food sources and the development of weapons and killing began to be con-
served as a manner of living. Appropriation in the broader sense of taking
land, animals and people by force soon followed. In this patriarchal manner
of living, procreation and reproduction, rather than a focus on the systemic
coherences of life, became more important.
I believe that if you took at history, you will soon realise several things.
One is that conflicts are never resolved through war. War may change the
domain of the conflict, but conflicts are always resolved through agreement,
through collaboration. Competition has never led to what one would call the
creation of general and basic better conditions for life. It may have led to a
more deep, effective handling of things here and there, and through this per-
haps to things that may sound very novel, but it's always very narrow.
If we look at what happens to us in daily life, first of all, we see that when
people are deprived of love at whatever age, they become ill. Competition
generates all kinds of stressful situations; physiological distortions and things
of this sort. Now if you attend a little to daily life, you will soon realise that
domains of competition reduce intelligence, and they reduce the ability to
see, because they force you to focus in a particular direction, while the reIa-
tional situation of mutual respect and acceptance, that means love, opens this
space of view, expanding intelligence. If you are a teacher and you observe
your students, you will observe that whenever they are accepted, and treated
in a respectful manner, and loved, they become more intelligent.
Do e s wha t y o u ar e s a y i ng ha v e a ny i mp l i c a t i o n s f or e duc at i on?
The main implication for education is a change of emphasis from compe-
tition to collaboration, as a condition which fosters self-respect in young peo-
ple.To collaborate, you have to respect yourself. If you do not respect yourself,
you cannot collaborate, because you feel that you risk your own disappear-
ance in your relations with the Other. So you have to foster self-respect, and
self-acceptance. Through that respect for the Other, acceptance of the Other,
comes the possibility of generating things together in the pleasure and desire
of doing them together.
Now if you compare this with what happens in most schools, where there
is an emphasis on competition, you soon realise that schools should on the
contrary be generating situations in which children can cooperate and grow.
I do not know what it is like in Australia, but in Chil~ there is an expression,
' They are not even there'. As a consequence of this kind of attitude amongst
adults, children become disconnected. They are being brought up in such a
way that they have no connection with the community to which they belong.
N T R V , W
They live a life which is essentially empty. I believe that one has to shift the
orientation of education to creating the conditions of the development in
children of self-respect, rather than fostering the idea of competition. This
would open respect for collaboration, and if there is collaboration, there is
the possibility of doing things together for the well-being of everyone, rather
than simply for oneself or a small group of people with similar interests.
Wha t a bo ut s c i e nc e a nd e t hi c s ?
Well, for ethics I think that this is very important. Unlike Kant, I think that
ethical concern has no rational foundations. Therefore, human rights have
no rational foundations. Human rights are rather an expression of a desire to
live in a certain, particular way. So ethics has to do with love; the concern for
the Other has to do with love.This entails a change in understanding of the
matter of ethics.With science in general, I think that this may lead to a recov-
ery of systemic thinking--which is of course happening already--to a deeper
understanding of systems in general. A more adequate interplay of linear
thinking and systemic thinking allows for a more complete understanding of
ecological and biological phenomena.
I n s o me o f y o ur mo r e r e c e nt wo r k y o u ha v e c l a i me d t hat t he r e i s a
po t e nt i a l l y i nf i ni t e n u mb e r o f f o r ms o f r e a s o n or r at i onal i t y. You
s u p p o r t t hi s c l a i m by p o i n t i n g out , qui t e r i ght l y I t hi nk, t hat a n y
r at i onal s y s t e m i s a l wa y s f o u n d e d o n p r e mi s e s t hat ar e a c c e p t e d
t hr o ug h n o n - r a t i o n a l pr e f e r e nc e s . Al t h o u g h t hi s ma y i ni t i a l l y s e e m
l l ke a v e r y r a di c a l v i e w, a n d c e r t a i nl y o ne t hat wi l l not e n d e a r y o u t o
po s i t i v i s t s a nd r e al i s t s , i t do v e t a i l s wi t h s o me i de a s i n p o s t - s t r u c -
t u r a l i s m, a bo ut t he r e b e i n g ma n y f o r ms o f r e as on, r at he r t h a n a
si ngul ar rat i onal i t y, wh i c h ha s b e e n t he c l as s i c al i de a.
The very many forms of reason have to do with the very many domains in
which we live. So each domain of coherences of life is also a domain of ra-
tionality, in the sense of coherences of the argumentation possible in that
domain. Therefore, whether an individual is in one domain or another is
simply a matter of preference. If one is aware of one's emotions and hence
one's preferences, one can be responsible for the rational arguments that one
develops, which is usually not the case.
You see, one needs to make a distinction between having reasons for do-
ing something, and having motives for doing something. When one asks for
reasons, one asks in terms of rational argumentation to justify something.
When you ask for motives, you ask for the involvement of another person,
and hence the opening of responsibility for his or her participation in doing
something.Thus, the distinction between reasons and motives opens the pos-
sibility of being aware of one's responsibility for what one does. Although
this is not necessarily a new idea, it does make the relationship between rea-
son and ethical responsibility more obvious. And I think this is very impor-
~
for science and ethics, indeed, for social life in general.