Republic vs Lapina

Facts:
On June 17, 1978 spouses Mario Lapina and Flor De Vega bought a parcel of lot situated in San Pablo City with
lot nos. 347 and 348 with a total area of 91.77 square meters, from Cristeta Dazo Belen who inherited the lot
from his father, who has been in possession of the lot since 1937 which was corroborated by the sister of
Cristeta. On February 5, 1987 the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two parcels of land
before the RTC of San Pablo City. However they were no longer Filipino citizen at the time of the application for
registration of the said parcels of lot. Even with the opposition by the Republic, the court a quo decided to
approve the application for registration to the parcel of lot designated as lot 347 and 348. Not satisfied with the
decision of the lower court the Republic appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirms the
resolution of the lower court. Hence the Republic filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court to nullify
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not, the vendee or applicant considering that he is a foreign national can apply for the registration of
title over a parcel of lot.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that, it matters not whether vendee or applicant has been in possession of the subject
property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been
complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession .In the case at bar it
must be noticed that the predecessor-in-interest has been in possession of the land since 1937, the public land
act requires that the applicant must prove: (a)the land is alienable public land (b) his possession, in the concept
above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribe in the public land act. Which was
complied with as presented in the evidence, which includes a certification from the Bureau of land with al etter
from the Bureau of Forest Development, proving that the land in question is alienable public land, and an
affidavit from the vendor Cristeta Dazo and her sister, proving that she inherited it from their father. Since the
adoption of the 1987 constitution up to the present no other law has been passed by the legislature on the
subject matter at bar, it remains to be B.P. 185, which grants to natural born Filipino citizen who has lost his
citizenship to own a land. Wherefore the petition has been dismissed by the Supreme Court and the decision of
the Court of Appeals has been affirmed by the court.

Ting Ho Jr. vs Teng Gui
Facts:
Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against
their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The controversy revolves around a parcel of land,
and the improvements which should form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting
Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners alleged that their
father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his death an estate.
According to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in
the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who,
being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in thePhilippines; and that
upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same for his own
exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void
Ruling:
No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided that if the price is
simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donatin, or some
other act or contract. The sale in this case, was however valid because the sale was in fact a
donation. The law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of the sale. But since
the finding was based on a mere assumption, the price has not been proven to be a simulation.

Muller vs Muller
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned
by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in
1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he
sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo
property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438
5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila. Due to incompatibilities and respondents
alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On
September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which
terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and
respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by
gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it
was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent
cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article
XII of the Constitution. Thus
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title
by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real
property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute
community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real
property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the
petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house
and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. "The law
will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary
partition by the parties of the said real property.
ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of
the Antipolo property?
NO. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, Helmuts disqualification
from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Where the purchase is made in violation of an
existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favour of the
party who is guilty of the fraud. Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition.

Cheesman vs IAC
CHEESMAN V IAC 193 SCRA 93G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991
FACTS: This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas
Cheesman) to annul
for lack of consent on his part the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot
and building to Estelita Padilla
December 4, 1970 Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married but have been
separated since February 15, 1981
June 4, 1974 a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was executed by Armando
Altares, convey
ing a parcel of land in favor of Criselda Cheesman, married to Thomas Cheesman. Thomas,
although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax
declarations for the said property were issued in the name of Criselda Cheesman alone and she
assumed exclusive management and administration of the property
July 1, 1981 Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without knowledge and consent of
Thomas
July 31, 1981 Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the
transaction hadbeen executed without his knowledge and consent. Criselda filed an answer
alleging that the property sold was paraphernal, having purchased the property from her own
money; that Thomas, an American was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership
in the land and; that Estelita was a buyer in good faith
During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property took
place during the existence of their marriage as it was acquired on June 4, 1974
June 24, 1982 RTC declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab initio and ordered the
delivery of the property to Thomas as administrator of the conjugal property
Thomas appealed to IAC where he assailed the granting of Estelitas petition for relief and
resolution of matters not subject of said petition; in declaring valid the sale to Estelita without
his knowledge and consent. On January 7, 1986, IAC affirmed summary judgment decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can dispose of the property in question; Whether or not
Cheesman, being an American citizen, can question the sale HELD: Section 14, Art. XIV of
1973 Constitution provides
that: save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.
Thus,assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his
wife, he acquired no right whatsoever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, he was knowingly violating the Constitution.
As such, the sale to him was null and void. At any rate, Cheesman had and has NO CAPACITY
TOQUESTION THE SUBSEQUENTSALE OF THE SAME PROPERTY BY HIS WIFE ON
THETHEORY THAT IN SO DOING HEIS MERELY EXERCISING THE PREROGATIVE OF
AHUSBAND IN RESPECT OFCONJUGAL PROPERTY. To sustain such a theory would permit
indirect controversion of the Constitutional prohibition.
If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not in
substantialinterest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer
or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. Even if the
wife did use conjugal funds to make the acquisition, his recovering and holding the property
cannot be warranted as it is against the constitution. Consequently, Estelita is a purchaser in
good faith since she knew that Thomas cannot intervene in the sale or disposition of the said
property. DECISION: The Court AFFIRMED the appealed decision.

De Castro vs Tan
Review on certiorari of the order of the former Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissing
petitioner's action for annulment of contract with damages. In 1938, petitioner Filomena
Gerona de Castro sold a1,258 sq. m. residential lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan Tai, a Chinese.
In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving herein respondents his widow, To O. Hiap, and children
Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng Bio, Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing. Before the
death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one of his sons, Joaquin, became a naturalized
Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's death, or on November 18, 1962,his heirs executed an extra-
judicial settlement of estate with sale, whereby the disputed lot in its entirety was allotted to
Joaquin. On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of Tan Tai for
annulment of the sale for alleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land
to aliens.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs are not allowed to inherit the land owned by Tan Tai because the
sale of the land to him violated the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.
HELD: Except for respondent Tan Teng Bio who filed an answer to the complaint, respondents
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of (a) lack of cause of action, the plaintiff being
in
pari delicto with the vendee, and the land being already owned by a Philippine citizen; (b)
laches; and (c) acquisitive prescription. The court a quo dismissed the complaint, sustaining
the first two grounds invoked by the movants. Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the
petitioner cannot have the sale annulled and recover the lot she herself has sold. While the
vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property, of
respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who is constitutionally qualified to
own land. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino.
It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Laches also militates against petitioner's cause.
She sold the disputed lot in 1938. She instituted the action to annul the sale only on July 15,
1968. What the Court said in the cited
Sarsosa case applies with equal force to the petitioner.... it is likewise inescapable that
petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction
of inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated
property. Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property. The
appealed order is affirmed.