HOW THE DAY UNFOLDS 100 YEARS AGO

Saturday, August 1, 1914

As dawn broke on Saturday August 1 1914, two critical demands made by Germany were
awaiting answers. At 7pm the night before, Germany had requested that France state
whether it would remain neutral in a Russian-German war. A reply was demanded within 18
hours by 1pm on Saturday. And at midnight, Germany had given Russia an ultimatum to
demobilise within 12 hours.
9am: In Paris, J oseph J offre, commander-in-chief of the
army, urged the French cabinet led by Ren Viviani
(pictured right) to announce general mobilisation. France
had a plan for deployment Plan XVII in the event of
war with Germany; it was designed for swift action before
Germany could mobilise its reserves. Now J offre feared the
French were losing valuable time every 24-hour delay, he
thought, meant a potential 20km loss of French territory if
Germany attacked.
10am In Berlin, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the
German chancellor, chaired a Bundesrat (federal council)
meeting whose approval was needed for mobilisation or a
declaration of war.He had worked hard to maintain peace,
he told the leaders of the German states But we cannot
bear Russias provocation, if we do not want to abdicate as
a Great Power in Europe.
11am Two hours before Germanys deadline to France expired, Baron von Schoen, the
Kaisers ambassador in Paris, presented himself to Viviani to receive Frances reply. He was
told that France would act in accordance with her interests. Shortly afterwards, the Russian
ambassador, Alexander Izvolsky, arrived with news of Germanys ultimatum to Russia. He
was desperate to know from Viviani and President Poincar what Frances intentions were.
How well do you know the history of the First World War?
He feared that the French parliament would not ratify the military alliance with Russia, the
terms of which said that France would respond if Germany attacked Russia. When Viviani
returned to the cabinet, the order was given to Adolphe Messimy, the war minister, to
mobilise, though he was told to hold on to the document until 3.30pm.
Meanwhile in London, it was the start of a Bank Holiday weekend, and the prime minister,
for one, regretted that the crisis kept him in London and away from Venetia Stanley, the 26-
year-old friend with whom he appeared besotted:
I can honestly say I have never had a more bitter disappointment.
Herbert Asquith, letter to Venetia Stanley
The Cabinet was to meet at 11am. Beforehand, Sir Edward
Grey, the British foreign secretary, telephoned Prince
Lichnowsky, the German ambassador (pictured right).
Grey asked him whether Germany could give an assurance
that France would not be attacked if it remained neutral in
a war between Germany and Russia. Lichnowsky
understood him to be offering both British neutrality and a
guarantee of French neutrality.
11.15am (London time) Lichnowsky sent a telegram to
Berlin with what he took to be the offer from Grey and
which he believed Grey was taking to Cabinet. The
message was not received until shortly after 5pm.
12 noon The German ultimatum to Russia expired without
reply.
1pm Asquiths Cabinet had been in no mood for war, but
three days before had ordered preliminary mobilisation of
the Royal Navy. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, now argued for full
mobilisation. J ohn Morley, president of the Board of Trade, and J ohn Simon, Attorney
General, led those opposed, saying Britain should not go to war at all.
Herbert Samuel, President of the Local Government Board, emphasised that their decision
depended on whether Germany violated Belgian independence or attacked the northern coast
of France. During the meeting, Churchill passed notes to Lloyd George, Chancellor of the
Exchequer, attempting to win him round.
I hold that in all the circumstances if we allowed
Belgian neutrality to be trampled down by Germany
without exerting ourselves to aid France we should be in a
very melancholy position both in regard to our interests
and our honour.
Winston Churchill, letter to Lord Robert Cecil,
Unionist MP
1.30pm The Cabinet meeting ended and Grey went to meet
Paul Cambon, the French ambassador, who had been
waiting anxiously at the Foreign Office. Grey could give
him no assurances: France must take her own decision at
this moment, without reckoning on an assistance we are
not now in a position to give. Cambon left the meeting
shaking and told Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Under-
Secretary at the FO: Ils vont nous lcher they are going
to desert us.
3.30pm Grey met Lichnowsky, the German ambassador,
who now found the Foreign Secretary simply offering the
suggestion that if there was war between Germany and
Russia, then Germany and France might agree to stand mobilised but not attack each other.
There was no guarantee of neutrality on offer after all. Grey told him that it would be very
difficult to restrain English feeling on any violation of Belgian neutrality by either France or
Germany.
4pm In France, the order for mobilisation was issued, though President Poincar said it was a
precaution and that a peaceful outcome might still be attainable. Posters appeared on the
streets of Paris: MOBILISATION GENERALE. LE PREMIER J OUR DE LA
MOBILISATION EST LE DIMANCHE 2 AOUT.

A notice posted in France on August 1, 1914, stating that general mobilisation would begin the next day

In Germany, food was being hoarded and savings were withdrawn from the banks. In London
the bank rate had doubled overnight and people were queueing at the Bank of England to
exchange paper notes for gold.
5pm Germany having had no satisfactory response from Russia, the Kaiser signed the decree
of general mobilisation. Speaking to an excited crowd from the balcony of his Berlin palace,
he said: In the battle now lying ahead of us, I see no more parties in my Volk. Among us
there are only Germans.

The German mobilisation order, signed by the Kaiser

5.25pm Grey telegrammed Sir Francis Bertie, British
ambassador in Paris, with his suggestion that France and
Germany might mobilise but act no further. Baffled, Bertie
pointed out that Frances agreement with the Tsar was
unlikely to imply inaction if Germany attacked Russia.
Am I to enquire precisely what are the obligations of the
French under [the] Franco-Russian alliance? he asked
sarcastically.
5.30pm The telegram sent by Lichnowsky in London at
11.15am arrived in Berlin, shortly after mobilisation had
been declared, containing what Lichnowsky thought was
an offer of British neutrality. A mildly farcical scene
ensued, as Bethmann, the chancellor, and Gottlieb von
J agow, Foreign Minister, rushed to the palace with it.
General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff,
was recalled as the Kaiser digested the British offer. To
Moltkes despair, the Kaiser announced: Now we can go
to war against Russia only. We simply march the whole of
our army to the East! Since 1905, under the Schlieffen
Plan, Germanys war planning had involved attacking
France first. Moltke was distressed at the prospect of this
being undone and his mobilisation schedule being
wrecked. Once settled it cannot be altered, he told the
Kaiser.
For Germany, mobilisation was not a diplomatic tool, it was war itself.
Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace
One army corps alone out of the total of 40 in the German forces required 170
railway cars for officers, 965 for infantry, 2,960 for cavalry, 1,915 for artillery and supply
wagons, 6,010 in all, grouped in 140 trains and an equal number again for their supplies.
From the moment the order was given, everything was to move at fixed times according to a
schedule precise down to the number of train axles that would pass over a given bridge
within a given time.
Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August
7pm The German 16th Division was due to move into Luxembourg as part of Moltkes plan
he knew that Luxembourgs railways were essential for the route through Belgium to
France. Bethmann insisted the invasion could not go ahead
while the British offer was pending. But the order did not
arrive and an infantry company of the 69th Regiment led
by a Lt Feldmann made the first frontier crossing of the
war and captured the railway station at Ulflingen.
Meanwhile, in St Petersburg, the German ambassador,
Count Friedrich Pourtals, a cousin of Bethmann Hollweg,
had handed Germanys declaration of war to Sergei
Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister. Pourtals had been
informing Berlin during late J uly that Russia was bluffing;
now he was in tears, and the two men embraced.
7.30pm Paul Eyschen, Prime Minister of Luxembourg,
telegraphed London, Paris and Brussels informing them of
the incursion, and protested to Berlin.
8pm A further telegram from Lichnowsky in London
arrived in Berlin; this explained that Grey had summoned
him to their 3.30pm meeting. Meanwhile, the Kaiser had
sent a telegram directly to his cousin George V accepting
what he believed was the British offer guaranteeing French
neutrality. Mobilisation could not be reversed, he said, but
If France offers me neutrality, which must be guaranteed
by the British fleet and army, I shall of course refrain from
attacking France and employ my troops elsewhere.
Lichnowsky was authorised to promise that Germany
would not cross the French frontier before 7pm on Monday
August 3, while discussions went on with Britain.
9pm Grey was summoned to Buckingham Palace to draft
the Kings reply clearing up the misunderstanding that
had come out of his conversation with Lichnowsky that afternoon.
Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early tomorrow to ascertain
whether there is a misunderstanding on his part.
George Vs telegram to the Kaiser
10.30pm Crowds were pouring on to the streets of St Petersburg. In Paris, the area around the
Gare de lEst was filling with reservists responding to the mobilisation order. In Berlin, the
Kaiser still hoping for peace with Britain sent a message to his cousin Tsar Nicholas. He
said mobilisation had proceeded because Russia had not responded to Germanys request and
that Russian troops should not be allowed to cross the frontier.
11pm George Vs telegram arrived in Berlin. The Kaiser
showed the reply to Moltke, with the words: Now you can
do what you want.
In Britain, it was the first day of a bank holiday weekend
but holidaymakers were no longer thinking about foreign
resorts; the urgent need now was to get home, as the crisis
grew. The next morning's Daily Telegraph reported the
arrival of the late boat train from Ostend: passengers were
telling tales of 'panic' abroad and of their relief at returning
to the 'dear old country'.
Join us again tomorrow, August 2, the day when
Germany issued its ultimatum to Belgium