2.

Husband designated as sole heir with obligation to

deliver
properties to certain persons referred to as
beneficiaries.
Facts: In her will, T(conception de mapa hidrosollo),
testatrix,
designated her husband, H(Ludovico Hidrosollo),
as universal and sole heir with the obligation to
deliver the
properties in question to certain persons who were
referred
to as beneficiaries. The word trust does not
appear in the
will.
Issue: Did T effectively create a trust in favor of the
parties
over the properties adverted to in the will?
Held: Yes. The designations, coupled with the other
provisions
for co-ownership and joint administration of the
properties
and other conditions imposed by T, clearly
demonstrated
the intent of T that the legal title to the properties
should vest in
H and the beneficial or equitable interest thereto
should repose
in said persons. (Vda. de Mapa vs. Court of Appeals,
154 SCRA 294
[1987].)

Vendee a retro, though the title to the property was
still in his
name, recognized the right to repurchase of vendor a
retro by allowing
the latter to exercise acts of ownership over the
property.
Facts: The trial court declared in a decision that
S(Geronimo) had the
right to redeem four (4) lots with a house of strong
materials,
and ordered B(defendants) to make the resale of the
property in favor of S.
After the decision had become final and executory, B
suggested
that the tenants of the house pay his rentals to S
instead of to
him. Not only this but when the tenants left the
house, S took
possession of, and exercised acts of, ownership over
the house
and B all along showed conformity thereto.
Issue: Upon the facts, is there an express trust?
Art. 1444
633
Held: Yes. The acts of B should be construed as a
recognition
of the fact that the property, though still in his name,
is to be
held in trust for S, to be conveyed to the latter upon
payment of
the repurchase price. Such trust is an express one, not
subject to
prescription. (Geronimo and Isidro vs. Nava and
Aquino, 105 Phil.
145 [1959].)



















140. Sinaon vs. Sorogon, 136 SCRA 407 (1985)
Aquino,
J
Facts
1.Canuta Soblingo on of the 5 children of
Domingo Soblingo (thealleged owner of the lot
in litigation when it was not yet registered)
2. 4 March 1916
Judge Carlos Imperial adjudicated to CanutaSoblingo
Lot No 4781 of the Sta Barbara, Iloilo cadastre with
an areaof 5.5 hectares. OCT No 6178-A was issued in
1917 to Canuta
3.1923- Canuta sold the lot to spouses Patricio
Sinaon and
JuliaSualibio (granddaughter of Canuta)a.

Canutas were registered owners for more than
40years andhad possession of the lot during that
period
4.1968 Sorongon (et al) amended their complaint
filed in 1964 that Canuta and the Sinaons were TRUSTEES
of the lot in litigation. Assuch the heirs of Domingo s
four heirs are entitled to 4/5 share.
5.Trial Court sustained the Trustee theory of Sorongon,
andordered the Sinaons to convey 4/5 of Lot No 4781
to Sorongon et al.Issue
:
WON Canuta and the Sinaons were mere trustees via
an implied or expresstrust of the lot in litigation?

Held/Ratio:
No.1.

Sinaons were registered owners for more than 40
years had becomeindefeasible and possession could
not be disturbed. Any pretensionas to the existence of
an implied trust should not be
countenanced.Sorongon used unreliable oral evidence
to prove the trust to whichThe Court said that title
and possession cannot be defeated by oralevidence
that can be easily fabricated and contradicted.2.

The Court said that there was no express trust
because Express trusts concerning real property
cannot be proven by parol evidence(Art 1443, Civil
Code). Citing Suarez vs Tirambulo where it was
heldthat An implied trust cannot be established
contrary to the recitalsof a Torrens Title, upon vague
and inconclusive proof. No3.

The supposed trust in this case is a constructive trust
arising by operation of law. (Art 1465, Civil Code). It
is not a trust in the technical sense.Note:
Even assuming that there was an implied trust,
prescription would have worked in favor of the
Sinaons. In Gerona vs de Guzman, the Court said that
an action for reconveyance of realty, based upon
aconstructive or implied trust resulting from fraud,
may be barred byprescription. The prescriptive period
is reckoned from the issuance of thetitle which
operates as a constructive notice .

When failure to pay share of one of co-
owners as promised by
new co-owner (buyer from a co-owner)
will constitute an act of
repudiation.
Facts: A, etc. and B are the co-owners
of a fishpond which
they inherited from their parents.
Without the knowledge of
A, etc., B sold his undivided share to C
in a private contract
of sale. A, etc. brought action to recover
their shares against C
who relied on the defense of
prescription in resisting the action,
alleging adverse possession. C argues
that he has not been
giving A, etc. their share of the fi sh
harvested and by such act,
he has shown repudiation of the trust
which may have been
created.
It appears, however, that C had
promised one of the heirs
(A, etc.) to pay him for his share in the fi
shpond. No date has
been fi xed for the fulfi llment of the
promise. C has not paid as
promised.
Issue: Does the failure of C to pay
constitute a repudiation
of the trust?
Held: No. (1) No unequivocal act of
refusal to make payment.
The promise made by C interrupted his
possession as a source
of prescriptive rights. It manifested his
continuing recognition
of the right of A, etc. as long as the
promise was not expressly
withdrawn. To constitute the failure to
pay as promised as an
act of repudiation of the trust, or as a
manifestation of adverse
possession, there should be an
unequivocal act of refusal to
make payment, or a definite reneging
from the promise. This
can happen only if a date has been fixed
for the fulfillment of
the promise, but the period had lapsed
without the promise
having been redeemed.
(2) New co-owners possession not
completely adverse or open.
Furthermore, it appearing that the tax
declaration to the
property remained in the parents of A,
etc., Cs possession was
not completely adverse or open, nor
was it truly in the concept
Art. 1447
655
of an owner, which are indispensable
elements for prescription
to become legally effective as a means
of acquiring real property.
Finally, when one harvests from a
fishpond of which is only a
part-owner, it must be assumed that his
harvest is only to the
extent he is rightfully entitled to, until the
contrary is positively
shown. (Sunga vs. De Guzman, 90
SCRA 618 [1979].)