Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN.
EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J .:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional
grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine
National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like
robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal
directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols
for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of
National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(the "AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In
compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police
Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction
02/2000
1
(the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility
patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
2
Task
Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of
Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000,
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.
3
In the
Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace
and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime
prevention program including increased police patrols.
4
The President
further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis,
augmentation from the AFP is necessary.
5
Invoking his powers as
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist
the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
6
Finally,
the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved.
7

The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility
patrols as follows:
x x x
2. PURPOSE:
The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and
the Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro
Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to
national security.
3. SITUATION:
Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary
criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active and
former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower
prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to handle.
The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of
police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes
specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.
4. MISSION:
The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint
NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila streets crime-free, through
a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile
crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose
members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active
or former PNP/Military personnel.
5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:
a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO
[National Capital Regional Police Office] and the Philippine Marines to
curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of
the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security,
although the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still
rests upon the AFP.
b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all
forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by organized crime syndicates
operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police
to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and
holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the
role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is
to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to
the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint
NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are
responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality.
c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional
Task Force "TULUNGAN" shall be organized to provide the mechanism,
structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating,
monitoring and assessing the security situation.
xxx.
8

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle,
North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall,
Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic
Airport.
9

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed
the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of
the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS
WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF
SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID
DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF
THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION
BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT
(LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI,
SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO
RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS
OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE
ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE
POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.
10

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with
the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP
questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a
Resolution,
11
dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General to file
his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General
submitted his Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of
the President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that
petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the
Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political
question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which
feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier,
does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner
has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination
of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review;
and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in
joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the
requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the
President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
12

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this
case.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.
13
The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in
issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
14
The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."
15

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of
law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it
with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-
stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in
the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law
profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and
cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be
noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the
petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file
the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary
included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming
that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not
shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the
questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP
purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the
operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its
members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated
by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the
supposed "militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten
Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in
the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it
is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a
direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does
not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the
Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has
absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future.
The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has
sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.
16
In not
a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of
a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people.
17
Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure.
18
In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover,
because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence
occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao
insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost
certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore,
behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue
now, rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the
Marines.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual
determination of the President of the necessity of calling the armed forces,
particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard,
the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What
the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under
the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that
would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force.
It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant
the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court "review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment."
19

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining
to the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny
since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues
which are beyond the review powers of this Court.
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of
presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But, while
this Court gives considerable weight to the parties formulation of the
issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach
that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the
parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the
power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power
involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and
promotion of the general welfare.
20
For one, the realities on the ground do
not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or
anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the
citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of
the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers
as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power
of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished
by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration
of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presidents exercising
as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusor declaring martial
law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
xxx
21

Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the
Presidents power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will
reach a similar result.
We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is
not susceptible to review by the judiciary because it involves a political
question, and thus, not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter
which is appropriate for court review.
22
It pertains to issues which are
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over
actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe
for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are
"political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act
or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a
function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere
with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a
clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Taada v. Cuenco
23
puts it, political questions refer "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government."
Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as
matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to
the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the
classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,
24
"[p]rominent on
the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question."
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing
that "(T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
25
Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the
Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is
justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its
wisdom.
26
Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court.
27
When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the official whose action is being questioned.
28

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
29
Under this
definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no
power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it
may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in
grave abuse of discretion.
30
A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for
the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable
controversy.
31

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the
framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot
be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent
upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as
there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification
for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support
the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call
was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on
civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty
of "purposeful hesitation"
32
before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is
to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on
the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law.
x x x
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis
for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further
reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:
x x x
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following
such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested
or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall
be released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation
or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters,
it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.
33
That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says,
i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in
the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a
graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can
call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless
violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We
are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to
concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser
power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is
my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.
x x x
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger,
the matter can be handled by the first sentence: "The President may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.
MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is
imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First Sentence: "The
President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion." So we feel that that is sufficient for handling
imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or
suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the
Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the
idea?
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature
nor is it subject to judicial review.
34

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned
powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and
broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered
as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial
law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic
civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise
of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to
impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual
invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions
are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The
only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may
call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and
wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two
other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the
President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of
calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is
a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the
courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to
judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might
also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information
might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is
a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting
technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified
as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of
the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to
prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if
it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we
consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem
could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the
necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny
could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly
straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it
is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to
call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the
petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely
abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded
respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for
calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted
that, "[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and
carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila..."
35
We do not doubt the
veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the
light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent
bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public
utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment
described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the
President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law
enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy
clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify
the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the
Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is "militarized" in violation of
Section 3, Article II
36
of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach
of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is
evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the
metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the
real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is
the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility
patrols.
37
Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the
soldiers on police patrol procedures.
38
It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines.
39
It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers.
40
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly
argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover,
the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious
incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
41

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of
Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement,
has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited
provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is
lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief
actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise
any authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character
of the PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more
than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be
no "insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a
violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in
various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience
reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in
the implementation and execution of certain traditionally "civil" functions. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious
activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities
that bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of
cooperation, are:
1. Elections;
42

2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;
43

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;
44

4. Amateur sports promotion and development;
45

5. Development of the culture and the arts;
46

6. Conservation of natural resources;
47

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;
48

8. Enforcement of customs laws;
49

9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;
50

10. Conduct of licensure examinations;
51

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school
students;
52

12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;
53

13. Sanitary inspections;
54

14. Conduct of census work;
55

15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;
56

16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;
57

17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.
58

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge
of Congress and, yet, never before questioned.
59
What we have here is
mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian
authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility
towards the use of military force for domestic purposes has persisted,
60
and
whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power
to call, the use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is
allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present
deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act
61
of
the US, the use of the military in civilian law enforcement is generally
prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act
states:
1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or
the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
62

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the
use of military personnel, the US courts
63
apply the following standards, to
wit:
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement
officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that the military personnel
subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory
64
George Washington Law Review,
pp. 404-433 (1986), which discusses the four divergent standards for
assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law
enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale
Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature, either presently or
prospectively?
x x x
When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it
to mean that military involvement, even when not expressly authorized by
the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act
unless it actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of
those claiming relief.1wphi 1 A mere threat of some future injury would be
insufficient. (emphasis supplied)
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present
case to determine whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian
law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court
agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:
3. The designation of tasks in Annex A
65
does not constitute the exercise of
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do
not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,
66
8(k)
67
and
9(a)
68
of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit
or condemn. In No. 9(d)
69
of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to
the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers
apply no coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as
shown in No. 8(c)
70
of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in
character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory,
proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of
Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military power for
civilian law enforcement.
71

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed
forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in
peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded.
The power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed
forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the
deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law,
exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this
Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the factual
basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January,
2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights
have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was
precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people
that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will
be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the
streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in
their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August
15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military
and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review
of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers
of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided
for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent
to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power
to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared
to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain
basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed
forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the
Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none
of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be
no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the
PNP.