Review: When Muslims and Modernity Meet

Author(s): Asef Bayat

Source: Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 6 (Nov., 2007), pp. 507-511
Published by: American Sociological Association
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A SYMPOSIUM ON "POLITICAL ISLAM"
When Muslims and Modernity Meet
ASEF BAYAT
ISIM/Leiden University
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the
U.S., a series of events ranging from the
Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004, the
murder of Dutch filmmaker van Gogh in No
vember 2004, followed by the London blasts
of July 7, 2005, riots in the French banlieues
in November 2005, and then the cartoon cri
sis in Denmark have caused a profound anx
iety about the "Islamic threat" to security and
the cultural well-being of Europe. The native
majority seems to view the Muslim minority
as a danger to the indigenous demography
(currently estimated at 11-12 million or 3% of
the continent) and cultural landscape of the
continent in a remarkably similar fashion that
Muslim elites in the Middle East perceive rur
al migrants as distorting the cultural integrity
and modern make-up of their cities. So, the
growth of mosques, Islamic schools, head
scarves, the traditional clothes, and facial hair
have been turned into an anomaly in the Eu
ropean urban setting, in the same manner
that the spread of squatter settlements, street
vendors, traditional religiosity-allegedly re
sulting from poverty, anomie, and extrem
ism-are seen as "ruralizing" the Middle East
ern modern urbanity, turning such metropo
lises as Cairo or Istanbul into "cities of peas
ants" (Bayat, 2007). Underlying this appre
hension in both Europe and the Middle East
is the prevailing belief that the "traditional
culture" collides with rational behavior and
organized modern life. Just as the urban elite
in the Muslim Middle East (politicians and
planners, for instance) fear the distorting
"peasant culture," the European majority
dread "Islamic traditions," which they fear are
undermining liberal democracy, individual
freedom, and rational ways of life. Indeed,
the predominance of what Mahmood Mam
dani (2004) calls "cultural talk" in Europe has
virtually Islamized ethnic designations and
urban problematiques. Thus, Turkish, North
African, or South Asian minorities are invari
ably labeled as "Muslims," and "immigration
problems" as "Islamic." What are the under
When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims
in Europe and in the United States, by
Jocelyne Cesari. New York, NY:
Palgrave, 2006. 280pp. $24.95 paper. ISBN:
1403971463.
The Islamic Challenge: Politics and
Religion in Western Europe, by Jytte
Klausen. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2005. 264pp. $34.95
cloth. ISBN: 0199289921.
Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and
Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse,
by Mansoor Moaddel. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2005. 424pp.
$24.00 paper. ISBN: 0226533336.
lying issues in this tension? Do the sources of
conflict lie in the clash between Islamic tra
dition-al values and the modern fabric of Eu
ropean life? The three books under consider
ation, despite their different depths and per
spectives, offer useful historical entry and so
ciological backdrop to grapple with these
questions.
To begin with, as both Jocelyn Cesari and
Jytte Klausen demonstrate, the Muslim mi
nority in Europe and the U.S. represent a het
erogeneous entity differentiated by ethnicity,
class, educational background, and religious
inclinations. In addition, both authors attest
to the fact that the conflict of "tradition and
modernity" bears little purchase in explaining
the roots of the current clash between the
Muslim minority and the native majority in
the West today. But, as to the underlying log
ic behind the conflict, the studies do not of
fer fresh insights. The studies are preoccu
pied primarily with individuals (immigrants)
and organizations, rather than with historical
context within which the Muslim minority's
relationships with the host society are sys
tematically examined. I propose that the key
507 Contemporary Sociology 36, 6
508 Symposium
issue lies in the European projection of a
modernity, Europeanness, the costs of which
many Muslim migrants cannot afford, even
though they wish they were able to. The fact
is that groups in general, whether Muslim or
non-Muslim, possess differential capacities
(or capitals) to cope with the exigencies of
modernity. While segments of the European
Muslims have indeed succeeded in this path,
others are in the throes of a protracted strug
gle.
On the whole, three groups within the
Muslim minority can be currently identified.
First are the "secular Muslims," those who
seem to be fully "integrated" as they try to
reach out to the "majority" culture, economy,
and social interaction, even though they are
frustrated by the fact that many natives do
refuse to recognize them as "Europeans." In
France, 87% of Muslims surveyed said they
believed Islam was compatible with the
French Republic. The elite segment of this
Muslim group, or what Klausen calls "Euro
pean Muslim leaders," is the subject of
Klausen's Islamic Challenge. Despite its quite
narrow focus, Klausen's study sheds a posi
tive light on the social make-up and the
worldviews of these Muslims who represent
some 2,000-3,000 influential individuals ac
tive in politics, media, business, religious,
and civil society organizations. Klausen sug
gests that European Muslims, represented by
these leaders, constitute a new interest
group, which will affect the European politi
cal systems as a result of their participation in
the political process. These Muslims embrace
liberal democracy, resent the extremism of
fundamentalist Sheikhs and radicals, respect
human rights as a God-given gift that cannot
be taken away, and wish to build a "Euro
pean Islam" through the reinterpretation of
religious texts. Possessing the necessary re
sources-higher education, respectable jobs,
information and relevant knowledge-the
group is enabled to handle and live a Euro
pean life. They enjoy and take advantage of
what modernity offers-including liberal
democracy-and know how to maneuver
within it.
The second strain within the Muslim mi
nority consists of young extremist groups,
linked to transnational networks, who make
up only a very small portion (Dutch police,
for instance, say there are some 150 such
persons in the Netherlands). But these radi
cals, who get much of the media attention,
are hardly "traditional" in the sense of being
fed the norms and values of their parents'
home culture. They are largely second-gen
eration ethnic or non-white Europeans or
converts, who rarely speak native languages,
nor have much knowledge about "tradition
al" Islam, but are influenced by what Olivier
Roy describes as a "de-cultured" Islam. In
other words, it is neither the "traditional cul
ture" nor the "culture of Islam" (whatever
that is), but primarily the "deculturation" of
religion-the construction of a "pure," ab
stract, and "fundamentalist Islam" devoid of
human cultural experience and influence
that inform these young Muslims. Suspended
from their own ethnic values and dejected by
the host culture which views them in suspi
cion and derision, they look desperately for
an outlet to forge identities. Detached from
the governing values of ancestry, yet en
gulfed by the multiplicity of lifestyles, and
overwhelmed by the flow of transnational in
formation, the truth of which they can sel
dom ascertain, these youngsters tend to re
sort to an imagined "authentic" reference-a
trans-local, global, and abstract Islam
stripped of cultural influences, one that can
be exploited for arbitrary use/abuse.
And then there is a significant but little
known third group of Muslims to which nei
ther Cesari nor Klausen pay serious attention.
It includes the first generation immigrants
who try to speak the European languages,
strive to hold regular jobs, and wish to live a
normal life, but are oriented to practicing
many aspects of their home culture-food,
fashion, rituals, or private religious practices.
Most of them strive to survive and to live
with dignity, invest in their children to get by
in the societal settings they often find too
complex to operate. So they are inclined to
restore and revert to their immediate circles,
the language and religious groups, informal
economic networks, and communities of
friends and status groups built in the neigh
borhoods or prayer halls. In sum, they feel at
home on the margin of the mainstream.
As such, this feeling at home on the mar
gin is hardly a thing of Islam, nor a sign of
resentment against modernity, or a primor
dial desire for "tradition." Rather, it represents
a familiar theme in the classical Chicago
School of urban sociology-a typical coping
strategy that lower-class immigrants often
Contemporary Sociology 36, 6
Symposium 509
pursue when they encounter complex for
eign life-worlds. It reflects the paradoxical re
ality of peripheral communalism that enables
the members to get around the costs, to en
dure, and to negotiate with the mainstream in
an attempt to be part of it. Because to im
merse fully in the mainstream requires cer
tain material, cultural, and informational ca
pabilities that most plebian migrants, Muslim
or non-Muslim, do not possess, which com
pel them to seek alternative venues. Thus,
being part of an organized economy de
mands regular payment of various dues and
taxes; if you cannot afford them, then you go
informal. If a migrant cannot afford to pay for
the cost of fixing his bathroom through regu
lar companies, then he will look for, or gen
erate, a network of friends, relatives, and lo
cals to mobilize support. If he cannot afford
to shop in the mainstream modern super
markets, or to borrow money from regular
banks (because he does not have the credit
and credentials), then he resorts to ethnic
street bazaars to get his affordable supplies,
and to informal credit associations to secure
loans. When he lacks the necessary informa
tion and skill to function within the modern
bureaucratic organizations-which do not
understand flexibility, negotiation, and inter
personal relations-he relies on the locals
with whom he establishes flexible transac
tions based upon mutual trust and reciproci
ty. If people cannot function within a culture
that is perceived to be inhospitable, too for
mal and strict, then they are likely to get in
volved in the ones that they fit.
An unintended consequence of these eco
nomic and cultural processes is the likely re
vitalization of "negative integration," in paral
lel and peripheral communities, where ethnic
networks or religious rituals are revived to
serve as structures of support and survival. It
is no surprise that "ghettoization" is especial
ly more pronounced among lower-class
British Muslims where unemployment re
mains three times higher than that among
other ethno-religious groups (Cesari, p. 23).
This process of "feeling at home on the mar
gin" represents a way to cope with the im
peratives of modernity embodied in the bu
reaucratic arrangement, the discipline of
time, space, fixed and formal contract, and
the like. Unless host societies are prepared to
maximize these people's capabilities and
minimize their costs of integration, such mi
grants are compelled to seek refuge in their
informal marginal existence. This process is
by no means specific to Muslim migrants'
lives in Europe. It is a widespread global
phenomenon. Rural migrants in
Cairo,
Tehran, Istanbul, or Casablanca undergo
more or less similar experiences as many res
idents with Turkish or Moroccan origin in
Germany or in the Netherlands.
However,
anti-Muslim rhetoric of the mainstream polit
ical and intellectual circles, not to mention
the ultra-nationalist parties (National Front in
France, Geert Wilders's party in
Holland,
Germany's neo-Fascists, Danish People's Par
ty, and the American evangelical preachers),
further push such Muslim minorities to seek
sanctuary in themselves. Otherwise, they
yearn for a modern life of relief and recogni
tion, but strive to manage and minimize its
detriments.
Muslims' varied encounters with the forces
of modernity in the Islamic heartland are not
terribly different from those residing current
ly in the West. Like their counterparts in
Western Europe, the Muslim population in
the Middle East is also divided into segments
with different religious intensity (secular lib
eral, moderate Muslims, fundamentalists, and
violent trends) and differential experiences of
encounters with modernity. Mansoor Moad
del's ambitious book, Islamic Modernism,
Nationalism, and Fundamentalism, shows
with impressive detail and clarity how the
Middle East has been home to many overar
ching secular and religious ideologies, in
cluding Islamic modernism (wanting to rec
oncile Islam with modernity), liberal nation
alism, and lately the exclusivist "fundamen
talist" Islam. Rather than being rooted in
some traditional psyche or cultural make-up
of Muslims, "fundamentalism" is an
historical,
indeed, a modern movement. It is, according
to Moaddel, an exclusivist religious reaction
to monolithic secular states (Moaddel dis
agrees with those who view this movement
as a reaction to "foreign domination"). Where
a pluralistic intellectual market prevailed, in
clusive ideologies such as liberalism and Is
lamic modernism flourished. Whether or not
one agrees with the term "fundamentalism" (I
prefer to use the term Islamism), it still re
quires further clarification. In my understand
ing, "Islamism" developed as the language of
self-assertion to mobilize those (largely mid
dle-class high achievers) who felt marginal
Contemporary Sociology 36, 6
510 Symposium
ized by the dominant economic, political, or
cultural processes in their societies, those for
whom the perceived failure of both capitalist
modernity and socialist utopia made the lan
guage of morality (religion) a substitute for
politics. In a sense, it was the Muslim middle
class way of saying "no" to those who they
considered their excluders-their national
elites, secular governments, and these gov
ernments' Western allies. Hence, they re
buffed "Western cultural domination," its po
litical rationale, moral sensibilities, and nor
mative symbols, even though in practice they
shared many of those traits, as in their neck
ties, food, education, and technologies (Bay
at 2007).
Even though Moaddel's argument may not
hold for the growth of "fundamentalist" ide
ologies in the current pluralist settings such
as Europe or in Turkey, he neglects the ele
ment of new awareness and rhetoric about
the real or imagined "global domination" that
has come about due to the educational
growth and global information flows. Never
theless, his emphasis on indigenous and
modern sources of "fundamentalist" Islam is
crucial. Yet the book concentrates primarily
on the intellectual elites, the producers of
ideas-a theme that holds its own important
merit, but offers little on the worldviews of
ordinary people, on how these grand dis
courses are perceived and negotiated at the
base. Indeed, Moaddel's preoccupation with
episode-or bounded temporal constellation
of major events-to explain ideology forma
tion would leave little ground to examine
how ideas are constructed among social
groups. In other words, in his scheme, ide
ologies are the products of particular
times/episodes, rather than of particular so
cial groups. I would not dispute that attribut
ing fixed ideas to particular social classes as
a means to pursue their "objective" interests
is a misguided approach. Yet, I would not
write off altogether the role of "interests" in
forming ideas. But I take a different under
standing of "interests." Perceived in Isaac Bal
bus's sense as having a "stake in" or "being
affected by" (Balbus, 1973: 279), "interests" in
my understanding includes both material and
non-material (like respect, honor, or moral
certitude) elements, and refers to those that
are articulated by the agents themselves
rather than fixated as "objective" by outside
observers. Perceived as such, "interests" in
the end play a central part in determining
why certain individuals or groups uphold
certain ideas or patterns of behavior at cer
tain times. This is crucial because it can help
us understand why differential Muslim mi
norities with different positions and capaci
ties espouse different relationships with mod
ern life, with some of the mainstream im
mersed easily in its rationale while others
have to negotiate and navigate their way
through diverse venues to minimize their
costs.
Why is it that despite the complex dy
namics and struggles of Muslim communities
to live a life similar to most inhabitants in Eu
rope, opinion makers in the continent con
tinue to project the interaction in terms of
cultural clash for which "Islamic traditional
ism" is supposedly responsible? Historically,
European elites seemed to express reluctance
to host immigrant communities in their
homeland. Instead, they welcomed "guest
workers"-from ex-colonies or nations such
as Turkey and those of North Africa and
South Asia-who were expected to return
home after performing their functions as fac
tory or construction workers. Once European
elites realized that Muslim immigrants were
here to stay, anxiety arose; it reached a crisis
point when that anxiety in recent years
turned into fear-fear of terrorism, of in
creasing Muslim immigration, of "eroding lib
eral democracy," and the loss of "European
character," even though in reality violent
groups remain extremely small and many or
dinary Muslims embrace liberal democracy. It
appears then that the "multiculturalism" that
countries like the Netherlands were practic
ing in 1960s and 1970s has been rather disin
genuous since it was designed not to equip
the "guest-workers" with the necessary ca
pacity and skills to live a life of fellow Euro
peans, but to enable them to return to their
home countries.
So while the relentless process of global
ization has turned Europe into a multi-ethnic
continent, the mainstream Europeans have
yet to acknowledge and come to terms with
this historic shift. In reality, a multi-ethnic Eu
rope means also a multi-religious citizenry; it
means recognizing the reality of mosques,
minarets, headscarves, even
burqas
in the
public squares along with churches, temples,
and the like. But the assimilationist senti
ments fail to acknowledge that co-existence
Contemporary Sociology 36, 6
Symposium 511
and integration imply a two-way process of
give and take. Klausen is right when she
charges the European nativists with wanting
the Muslim minority to change (and when
they do, Muslims do not get recognition), but
refusing to change themselves. Instead, they
lump the Muslim minority together under the
broad cultural religious category (as Mus
lims), with little attention to differences and
conflicts within the category, and without re
gard to their desires, dilemmas, and struggles
to cohabit in peace. Thus, the association of
Al-Qaeda violence with Islam, and the latter
with scenes of veiled women walking in the
streets of Amsterdam or Berlin, instanta
neously conjure up the image of Muslims and
Islam as Europe's cultural "Other." And this is
happening at a time when Europeans seem
to aspire to revive their troubled national
identities in the aftermath of European inte
gration and an accelerated globalization.
Once again, Islam-or rather contradistinction
with Islam, the idea that "we are different"
has come to play that crucial role in forging
such an identity. This is not new. The early
modern Europe also built its identity partly in
relation to Islam and the Ottoman Empire.
However, then, Europe suffered from an "in
feriority complex"-with the Christians anxi
ety over Islamic wealth and might (Vitkus,
1999), whereas today it boasts on a superior
ity fixation (as in the Dutch politician, Geert
Wilders). In both times, anxiety seems to
guide Europe's relations with Islam.
References
Balbus, Isaac. 1973. "The Concept of Interest in
Pluralist and Marxist Analysis," in The Politics
and Society Reader, edited by I. Katznelson, G.
Adams, P. Brenner, and A. Wolfe. New York:
David McKay Co.
Bayat, Asef. 2007. Making Islam Democratic: So
cial Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn. Pa
lo Alto: Stanford University Press.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 2004. Good Muslim, Bad
Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots
of Terror. New York: Pantheon.
Viktus, Daniel. 1999. "Early Modern Orientalism:
Representation of Islam in 16th and 17th Cen
tury Europe," in Western Views of Islam in Me
dieval and Early Modern Europe, edited by D.
Blanks and M. Frassetto. New York: St. Martin's
Press.
Are Muslims Really That Special?
HALDUN GULiALP
Yyldyz Technical University, Istanbul
hgulalp@superonUine.com
In an interview with the Washington Post,
only weeks before the invasion of Iraq, I de
clared that "September 11 came as the turn
ing point that sealed the end" of Islamism.
Perhaps because of my undergraduate edu
cation in economics, I was used to making
ceteris paribus assumptions, but failed to
mention it in the interview. My intention was
to join the chorus of opposition that was al
ready growing against the war by indicating
that it was unnecessary and unjustified. One
could say that my prediction about the end of
Islamism failed, but I believe that the situa
tion is more complex than that. In fact, there
seem to be at least two lessons in it for soci
ologists: one heartening, and the other dis
heartening.
The first is that predictions do not always
hold in sociology, because our ideas direct
our behavior. This may be found heartening
because it is about the power of our theories:
theorists may make a difference. The second,
When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims
in Europe and in the United States, by
Jocelyne Cesari. New York, NY: Palgrave,
2006. 280pp. $24.95 paper. ISBN:
1403971463.
The Islamic Challenge: Politics and
Religion in Western Europe, by
Jytte
Klausen. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2005. 264pp. $34.95 cloth.
ISBN: 0199289921.
Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and
Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse,
by Mansoor Moaddel. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2005. 424pp.
$24.00 paper. ISBN: 0226533336.
however, is that our ideas may be wrong and
may therefore mislead us. One might add
that the more subtle and sophisticated our
Contemporary Sociology 36, 6