You are on page 1of 11

Family Resemblances in digital activism: close

cousins or false brothers?

Vivien Garca & Carlo Milani
21th of November, 2013
1 Does the Internet have what it takes to be political? Some
1.1 Close cousins or false brothers
Web 2.0 is generally described by its unity and coherence. e IPP (International Pirate Par-
ties), Anonymous, WikiLeaks, people digitising the social movements (the Occupy-like ones
in particular), slacktivists, and Liquid feedback or more generally e-Democracy enthusiasts
give the impression that they have something in common. Most journalistic and scientic lit-
erature on the subject that endorses this assertion explains it by analogy. So usually, the unity
in question is not presented in processes such as deduction (starting from a particular or more
general statements to reach a logical conclusion) or simple induction (starting with particular
instances and moving on to broader generalisations, even statistical ones). It is maintained
with what psychology and rhetoric describe as a cognitive process of transferring information
froma particular source (the analogue) to another particular target. Analogy is, as such, a kind
of inference from a particular to another particular. If an appearance of unity is produced, it
does not depend on a common feature or a common origin.
However, it is sometimes stated that the central value of these movements is freedom or
that they share the same enemies (the established and traditional institutions for example).
But this is not always true: in some cases, transparency is more important than freedom (Han
2012), and social networks can be used for institutional politics purpose (M5S for example).
Delving deeper into the subject, it becomes dicult to articulate a global discourse on such
dierent realities. ey dont necessarily agree on the possible relationships between freedom
and progress, equality or individuality. Of course there are some connections between them,
but they arent characterised by one essential common feature. ey simply present a series
of overlapping similarities; they only have, employing Wigensteins vocabulary, a family
resemblance. is idea means that each feature is not necessarily shared by each member of
the family. Wigenstein gives the example of games. ings and activities that we refer
to as games can be very wide-ranging: card games, board games, ball games, games like
ring-a-ring-a-roses. ere is not a clear-cut boundary, there arises certain ambiguities if this
indeniteness can be separated from the main point. As Wigenstein puts it similarities crop
up and disappear (Wigenstein 2009, 66, p. 36e).
We could easily paraphrase Wigenstein, and change the words numbers and games
(his examples) with digital social movement.
I can give the concept of number rigid boundaries in this way, that is, use the word
number for a rigidly bounded concept; but I can also use it so that the extension
of the concept is not closed by a boundary. And this is how we do use the word
game. For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game,
and what no longer does? Can you say where the boundaries are? No. You can
draw some, for there arent any drawn yet. (But this never bothered you before
when you used the word game). (Wigenstein 2009, 68, p. 37e)
1.2 What kind of politics. Politics and Ideologies
Obviously, most of the web 2.0 actors use political words, and generally the same words (free-
dom, transparency). But these are equivocal, especially in politics. ey can infer dierent
meanings depending on their contexts and situations. If we want to understand in what way
web 2.0 is political, we must go beyond the words and look into the concepts. Following
Michael Freeden, we can mantain that words are the outward forms of concepts. But concepts
can constitute theories, and theory is to concepts what language is to words: an organizer, a
regulator, a set of rules and uniformities, a grammar, a system (Freeden 1996, p. 48). e var-
ious components of web 2.0 can, in this sense, reveal features related to dierent ideologies.
e laer term needs to be explained. Its various meanings, particularly during the last
century, made it really ambivalent. Our purpose here, following again Freeden, is not to
consider ideologies as static belief systems, as arbitrary, or simply stipulative models that
thinkers, as separated from actors, invite us to adopt. On the contrary, they are understood
as constructs reecting social and historical usages, which can change and evolve over time.
Furthermore, they not only emanate from the context but also seek to interpret and shape it.
is is not to imply that politics means pure relativism. It is also clear that the established cul-
tural, historical, and social contexts, for example in which a word emerges impose on most
of its users common, or overlapping, elds which they cannot easily shrug o (ibid., p. 52).
But ideologies distinguish the one from the other because they are characterised by a mor-
phology that displays core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts (ibid., p. 78). Freeden gives the
example of the liberalisms and argues that liberty is situated within their core, that human
rights, democracy, and equality are adjacent to liberty, and that nationalism is to be found on
their periphery (ibid., p. 78).
As ideologies are not xed, the concepts they implicate, can be relocated. Some change
in a context (such as the emergence of a new technical object, or an unpredictable event for
example) can lead to new priorities that the old meaning of a concept could not face up to.
e will to eliminate the possible questioning (inter- or intra- ideological) of a conceptual def-
inition can drive a partial redenition or bring about a focus on an adjacent concept within
the ideological morphology. In the long run, it might have some transformational impact on
the core itself. e existing morphology may, conversely, be reinforced. Freeden calls this op-
eration decontestation. But one might ask how we can determine which ideologies belong
to which ideological grouping. Freedens answer uses the same tool we have previously em-
ployed : Wigensteins family resemblance. To him, ideological morphology is neither xed
nor permanent apart from the decontesting nature of the core-adjacency-periphery nexus it-
self. Within those connes, internal formations are malleable relationships among political
2 / 11
ideas that reect changing cultural and historical conceptions. ese laer factors rejig the ba-
sic morphology of ideologies to create dierent ideological families, so that within each family
the structural element can only be held together through devices such as the Wigensteinian
family resemblance. Nevertheless, the existence of historically long-term families of ideo-
logical interpretation suggests that meaning is not as contingent as some post-structuralists
would have it. [. . .] Political ideas can exist in broad paerns that may be shared, or at least
overlap. When those paerns, which dene each specic ideological family, change, they may
do so almost imperceptibly. (Freeden 1996, p. 95)
1.3 Social, tenical and politics. e legacy of ANT
Today, we would like to present an ideology spread by one important component of web 2.0,
especially when talking about politics. But Freedens approach only focuses on political con-
cepts and how they construct ideologies. Our object, however, is not only constituted by dis-
courses. It depends rst on arrangements of technical objects and actors using these objects
in particular ways. is could be a diculty when considering that there is an unbridgeable
chasm between tools and ideas, between theory and action. We dont. For us, science, tech-
nology, and societies are co-produced in a process of the reciprocal tuning of machines, social
relations, actors, facts and theories. On this point, we agree with the Actor-Network theory.
Born from Latour and Callons sociology of science, it was rst based on the analysis of sci-
entic controversies. e most famous one is probably the Latours study of omas Hobbes
and Robert Boyle controversy.
But furthermore, the Actor-Network theory tends to interpret technological innovation as
constructed, negotiated and, at the same time, depending on the identity of the actors, their
needs, their interests and their strategies. As Callon puts it is is not to say that everything
is constantly negotiated, but to recognise that nothing can be ruled out of the negotiations and
that there is no self-evident criterion (of truth or eectiveness). Necessities are built, strength-
ened and guaranteed (more or less) by power relations (Callon 2006). Technical objects are
stakeholders in the formation of heterogeneous networks that combine actants of all types and
sizes, human or not. is approach rejects simple technological determinism, which reads
into technological artefacts just as part of a technological structure, or pure social construc-
1. e second one has elaborated technical equipment which was supposed to be able to produce vacuum.
Hobbes addresses him with two critics. First, he contests that the machine could really create vacuum. He
then criticises the experimental program, inspired by Francis Bacon which aempts to produce facts rather than
looking for the causes, developed by Boyd. More fundamentally, the controversy engages the relation between
science, technical objects and politics. Boyle shows the air-pump to the king who is compelled to acknowledge
the facts. His machine creates a vacuum quite independently of his will (yet the political theory of Hobbes stated
that the will of the sovereign has to be absolute). ere are, then, incontrovertible facts, scientic artefacts out-
side the power of the monarch. At rst, we can think that Hobbes had developed a language for speaking about
power (which armed that society is constructed, or immanent), while Boyle had developed a language to de-
scribe nature (which armed that nature is non-constructed, or transcendent). But for Latour, we might read
this debate not as opposing two position but revealing one invention : a division between political and scien-
tic discourse. e representation of non-humans belongs to science, but science is not allowed to appeal to
politics; the representation of citizens belongs to politics, but politics is not allowed to have any relation to the
non-humans produced and mobilised by science and technology (Latour 1993, p. 28). is situation implicates
operations of translation : the political spokespersons come to represent the quarrelsome and calculating mul-
titude of citizens; the scientic spokespersons come to represent the mute and material multitude of objects. e
former translate their principals, who cannot all speak at once; the laer translate their constituents, who are
mute from birth (ibid., p. 29).
3 / 11
tivism, which denies the objects of its own consistency and only grants the status of actant to
So the point, from our point of view, is not to show for example that web 2.0 is a signicant
progress for politics or another instrument designed for people enslavement, but to determine
on which conditions and with which mechanisms a new technology can lead to a partial rear-
rangement of social and political relations, in order to determine what kinds of relationships
and politics are at stake. As Madeleine Akrich puts it, to complete this program, we have to
constantly navigate from technical to social and, as we should perhaps say, to be more pre-
cise, from the inside of the technical object to the outside: because what exactly interests us is
how the conguration of the technical object in itself constrains the relationships between the
actants amongst themselves and between the actants and the object and, conversely, how the
nature of these actants and links between them may (re-)form the object and its uses (Akrich
2 From cypherpunks to WikiLeaks and beyond
We will now trace an interesting genealogy, leading from the cypherpunk movement to Wik-
iLeaks. In this endeavour, we only use archives, to employ a foucaldian terminology (Foucault
1969), provided by documents widely published on the Web. We dont have any insider in-
formation, leak or whistle-blown secret. We just use a vast amount of data and act as human
lters to reconstruct a reliable account in reasonably good time.
2.1 Cryptography enthusiasm
Our story starts with the cryptography enthusiasts movement called cypherpunk. Lets quote
Wikipedia In late 1992, Eric Hughes, Timothy C. May and John Gilmore founded a small
group that met monthly at Gilmores company Cygnus Solutions in the San Francisco Bay
Area, and was humorously termed cypherpunks by Jude Milhon at one of the rst meetings
- derived from cipher and cyberpunk. In November 2006, the word was added to the Oxford
English Dictionary. e mailing list was started in 1992, and by 1994 had 700 subscribers
(Wikipedia 2013). Julian Assange was one of the subscribers, and active members. A web page
hosted by a Berkeley University server claimed to be the original cypherpunks homepage
but it is not available at present. WebArchive goes back only until 9 January 1997: a further
investigation is necessary, but nothing really relevant appears to exists before 1988-1992. We
have to point out that the web came into existence in 1991 but began to spread only in 1993.
Present Cypherpunk homepage is no longer hosted by Berkley, but in Tonga (the WHOIS
is extremely scarce of information: Tonic whoisd V1.1 - cypherpunks -
Chronologically, the rst important text for the cypherpunk movement is e Crypto Anar-
chist Manifesto (1988-1992) by Timothy C. May, a.k.a. Tim May (507 words, 3300 signs). From
the title it seems political : it refers to anarchy, even if it doesnt explain what kind of anarchy
it is about. It starts with a friendly nudge at Marx and Engels Communist Manifesto : A
specter is haunting the modern world, the specter of crypto anarchy (May 1988), even if it
4 / 11
contains a reference to the liberal notion of liquid market. Despite these elements, most of
the text has a technical purpose. It considers that privacy is an asset of primary importance
in computer technology and states that cryptography is a means to reach it. Its keywords are:
anonymous, reputation, secret, trust, regulation. It also holds a strong thesis on the impact of
technology on societies revealed in the following sentence : Just as the technology of print-
ing altered and reduced the power of medieval guilds and the social power structure, so too
will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the nature of corporations and of government
interference in economic transaction (May 1988). Technical artefacts change the world, so
creating such objects is acting on the world and transforming it.
From the standpoint of the history of technology, at the time of the Crypto Anarchist Man-
ifesto, the main encryption tool are conventional cryptosystems, such as the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) which uses a single key for both encryption and decryption or the asymmet-
rical RSA. e rst one was designed in the early 1970s at IBM. But its further development
was suspected to be inuenced by the National Security Agency. e algorithm had probably
been covertly weakened by the agency so that they could easily read encrypted messages. e
RSA system Hat was created at MIT. When the Manifesto was wrien, it was still quite safe
(even if in 1985 the Hstads aack has been discovered) but heavy.
A new tool called PGP was to appear in 1991. Interestingly, its manual seems to fully con-
verge with the preoccupations of e Crypto Anarchist Manifesto. Combining Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA) public key cryptosystem with the speed of fast conventional cryptographic
algorithms it is presented as RSA public key cryptography for the masses (Zimmermann
1990). More amazingly, for a manual, its takes a clear political tone and criticises established
institution in defence of privacy : e principle job of the US Governments National Security
Agency (NSA) is to gather intelligence, principally by covertly tapping into peoples private
communications. [. . .] ey have amassed considerable skill and resources for cracking codes.
When people cant get good cryptography to protect themselves, it makes NSAs job much
easier. [. . .] NSA has been pushing anew encryption algorithm that they designed, and they
wont tell anybody how it works because thats classied. ey want others to trust it and use
it. But any cryptographer can tell you that a well-designed encryption algorithmdoes not have
to be classied to remain secure. Only the keys should need protection. How does anyone else
really know if NSAs classied algorithm is secure? Its not that hard for NSA to design an en-
cryption algorithm that only they can crack, if no one else can review the algorithm. Are they
deliberately selling snake oil? (ibid.). Zimmermann was a long-time anti-nuclear activist. He
designed PGP so that similarly inclined people might securely use Bulletin Board Systems and
securely store messages and les. No license was required for the non-commercial use of the
soware and the complete source code was included with all copies.
2.2 What kind of anary?
Two texts characterise the continuation of the cypherpunk Odyssey and help us to understand
its progressive denition.
e rst one is A Cypherpunks Manifesto (1993) by Eric Hugues. e maer is basically the
same as in the two documents previously cited. But some elements have changed. Paradox-
ically, the title appears to be more technical but the text is more political. e rst sentence
4. Computer technology is on the verge of providing the ability for individuals and groups to communicate
and interact with each other in a totally anonymous manner (May 1988)
5 / 11
mixes a clear liberal orientation with a worldview (Weltanschauung) based on technological
preoccupations : Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic age. Privacy is
now primarily justied in defence of free transaction, and the idea of electronic money is men-
tioned. e text creates a technico-political identity: the cypherpunk one, which is expressed
using the we pronoun. It denes an activist methodology: Cypherpunks write code. We
know that someone has to write soware to defend privacy, and since we cant get privacy
unless we all do, were going to write it. We publish our code so that our fellow Cypherpunks
may practice and play with it. Our code is free for all to use, worldwide. We dont much care
if you dont approve of the soware we write. We know that soware cant be destroyed and
that a widely dispersed system cant be shut down (Hughes 1993).
e second determining text is e Cyphernomicon: Cypherpunks FAQ and More (Version
0.666, 1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May more than 161.000 words, i.e. more than
1 million signs). e title is explained by May in the release note: I have retitled it e
Cyphernomicon, a whimsical reference to the mythical Necronomicon (May 1994a). e
laer is a ctional grimoire appearing in the stories by horror writer H. P. Lovecra and his
followers. It was rst mentioned in Lovecras 1924 short story e Hound. Longer than the
other cypherpunk texts e Cyphernomicon develops, on the whole, the same ideas. We note
that an entire chapter is dedicated to PGP. Spreading the soware and cryptography in general
(by education, diskees containing essays and programs, p sites and raves, conventions and
gatherings) is an important part of the cypherpunk project. Its interest relies on a clear polit-
ical positioning : libertarian, and more precisely anarcho-capitalist. Liberals are described as
possible allies and an eort is made to convinced them.
How can non libertarians (liberals, for example) be convinced of the need for
strong crypto?
For liberals, I would examine some pet cause and examine the consequences
of that cause becoming illegal. For instance, if your friends are pro choice,
you might ask them what they would do if the right to lifers outlawed abortion.
Would they think it was wrong for a rape victim to get an abortion just because
it was illegal? How would they feel about an abortion underground railroad
organized via a network of stations coordinated via the Internet using illegal
encryption? Or would they trust Clipper in such a situation? As a consequence,
the Cypherpunk movement seems to oer a space for a certain political plurality
and dierent tendencies (compared with rooms) limited by an economically and
politically liberal frame (compared with the house). May also writes with irony
Were also a more radical group in nearly every way, with various avors of polit-
ical extremism strongly represented. Mostly anarcho-capitalists and strong liber-
tarians, and many no compromises privacy advocates. (As usual, my apologies
to any Maoists or the like who dont feel comfortable being lumped in with the
libertarians.if youre out there, youre not speaking up.) In any case, the house
of Cypherpunks has many rooms. (May 1994b)
So, how is crypto anarchy anarchist? Analysing the two Manifestos and the Cyphernomi-
cons statement, we can argue that they are, globally, right-wing supporters of markets liberty
6 / 11
more than supporters of peoples freedom. Both May and Hugues have widely displayed their
blind faith in what is nowadays called the frictionless market. eirs critiques of political
institutions, and principally the states one , consider them as limiting individual liberties.
ey advocate the elimination of that kind of structure in favour of individual sovereignty in
a free market. In this context, the emphasis on cryptography is now easily understandable
as it seems to be the technical object that guarantees separated spheres of individual freedom
and secures direct transactions (particularly economical transactions) out of the control of the
state, establishing, thus, legally or not, a real economic laissez-faire. Politics, in the tradi-
tional sense of the term, disappears in favour of voluntary and contractual relations among
individuals based on a free market economy.
Remember! We are in 1988-1992, more than 20 years before of the Wikileaks and DataGate
2.3 Wikileaks and beyond
A very brief summary of the Wikileaks aair will be given here (for further analysis, see
Brevini, Hintz, and McCurdy 2013 and Ippolita 2012, and above all the insighful Lovink and
Riemens 2013). WikiLeaks was founded in 2006 as a website publishing condential and/or
secret leaks. It rst used the same interface as Wikipedia (up to 2010) and was presented as
a place where anyone can anonymously deliver dangerous documents to publicly release
them aer they are screened and selected by the Wikileaks organisation. Initially, it was not
really safe and not even really anonymous to blurt something out to Wikileaks. e organ-
isation set up later a relatively safer system. Wikileaks made the international headlines on
the arrival, in 2007, of its self-proclaimed editor in chief Julian Assange. Assange is an Aus-
tralian high-level skilled hacker, born in 1971. He was under investigation and convicted in
1992 for federal crimes in Australia by the AFP (Australian Federal Police), and received, in
1996, a good behaviour bond and a ne. His history has been narrated by Suelee Dreyfus in
her book Underground: Tales of Hacking, Madness and Obsession on the Electronic Frontier (Drey-
fus and Assange 2012). e hacker Mendax, a major character of the story, is Assange. e
Australian hacker displayed original contributions to various projects of code, the most im-
portant being probably the deniable encryption system Rubberhose, code-name Marutukku,
1997-2000. Assanges gure occupied the front pages of newspapers around the world for
months, before and aer the cable-gate in November 2010, when Wikileaks diused cables of
secret diplomatic documents (not classied as top secret), mainly concerning the misdeeds of
the U.S. government. Accused of a double rape in Sweden and to avoid extradition, Assange
has taken refuge at the Embassy of Ecuador in London, where he lives since mid June 2012
with the status of political refugee.
e Wikileaks aair is not concluded at all. Because this is a Show, taking place in com-
pliance with the requirements identied by Guy Debord over forty years ago, plot twists are
always possible. However, the lack of critical analysis and of non-trivial stances, beyond the
5. In a short essay called Brief Explanation of Anarcho Capitalism, Bell explains: e free market is ecient
and just. Bell has been convicted and jailed for 11 months (1999-2000) on felony charges of harassment and
using false Social Security numbers. Rearrested for harassment and stalking of federal agents, he was charged
with intimidation and stalking and was convicted and again imprisoned, this time for a decade-long sentence.
He was released in December 2009, only to be rearrested in July 2010 for violating his parole conditions. Bells
parole violation hearing resulted in another sentence, and Bell was released in 2012.
6. see and
7 / 11
I like it / I do not like style is blindingly obvious. Most of le-wing political forces, espe-
cially in Europe, tend to see Assange and Wikileaks in general as a champion of the oppressed
facing, without fear, the corrupted governments. e underlying logic is that the foe of my
foe is my friend. Patriotic and conservative politicians, generally consider that the Wikileaks
project endangers international diplomacy, and puts at risk the lives of soldiers of the forces
of good engaged in peace operations and in the war on terror against the forces of evil,
discrediting the institutions of established power. Analysing the reactions in public opinion
concerning the revelations of Wikileaks displays mixed mechanisms of identication and re-
jection and interpretative controversies about actions mediated by technical object and that
have political consequences. But the ideological point of view of the actors seems clearer. In
an interview realised on November 2011 for Forbes Magazine, Julian Assange, opposing the
Federal USA government anathema, declared that Wikileaks revelations serve to improve the
markets information, because a perfect market requires perfect information and frictionless
information ows.
On dierent occasions Assange has widely claimed and asserted his cypherpunk member-
ship. But Wikileaks drives cypherpunks statements to a next stage. ese have promoted an
activism based on the spreading of cryptography, in order to realise the necessary conditions
for what they theoretically consider as real free transactions. Wikileaks doesnt just support
anonymous and encrypted exchanges between individuals, it paradoxically reveals (princi-
pally from anonymous individual denunciations) governmental and institutional secrets, the
secrets of those who are considered to avoid free exchanges. But Wikileaks libertarian poli-
tics and the cypherpunk project contain a more problematic paradox. On the one hand, they
encourage the proliferation of safe, anonymous and direct interaction between individuals,
shrugging o the mediation of political institutions. On the other hand, they consider tech-
nological objects (and especially computer related ones) as means to transform the world and
they perfectly know that who control these artefacts detains a gigantic power. e mediation
of the old political institutions is replaced by the mediation of technology.
Julian Assanges co-authored (with the digital activists Jacob Appelbaum, Andy Mller-
Maguhn, and Jrmie Zimmermann) latest book titled Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of
the Internet doesnt ignore this point. Its introduction is subtitled A Call to Cryptographic
Arm. And who are the recipients of this call? Who are the political subjects of cypher-
punk politics? Not at all ordinary people, but a truelite. Smart rats in Assanges words:
an extremely conning, homogenised, postmodern transnational totalitarian structure with
incredible complexity, absurdities and debasements, and within that incredible complexity a
space where only the smart rats can go. [. . .] All communications will be surveyed, perma-
nently recorded, permanently tracked, each individual in all their interactions permanently
identied as that individual to this new Establishment, from birth to death. [. . .] So I think
the only people who will be able to keep the freedom that we had, say, twenty years ago
because the surveillance state has already eliminated quite a lot of that, we just dont realize
it yet are those who are highly educated in the internals of this system. So it will only be a
high-tech rebel elite that is free, these clever rats running around the opera house (Assange
et al. 2012).
One of the most important controversies of the current internet-related political questions
is here. e smart rats has absolutely nothing in common with the oppressed crowds or
masses to whom it is addressed, a message in the socialist tradition, nor, we argue, with the
masses gathering and revolting in a variety of popular movements as diverse as OWS (we are
8 / 11
the 99%), Indignados, M5S, and so on. On the contrary, it is an elitist mark of what the liberal
hacker Jaron Lanier has called Nerd Supremacy (Lanier 2010) It seems quite essential and
urgent to address in detail how truelite nerd supremacists are tinkering with the hacker ethics
to mould present day movements. Do nowadays political movements share with cyperpunks
a similar vision of politics? Are hackers a major threat, concealing under the veil of real-time
participation, of erce opposition to secrets through hierarchical, hard-encrypted organi-
sations, a technocratic aitude far from the claimed leaderless? Could the tools designed for
a cypherpunk purpose be subverted? Some scholars begin to investigate, and for some of
them hackers ethic sounds still very promising (Coleman 2012). We see, for our part, a re-
lation between the gure of the hacker as a knight in shining armor and the priest-founder
of a new kind of religion. At the boom, hackers Gnosis has always joked with the re of
mysticism and trance (see Davis 2004). e knight in shining armour could be seen also as a
scapegoat in the Datagate era: Brenda Manning and Edward Snowden, together with Assange,
are maybe its rst incarnations. Mark Anspach has explicitly applied Ren Girards theory of
scapegoat to Assange in Julian Assanges Double Trouble, analysing the relationship of love-
identication and hate-rivalry between himand Daniel Domscheit-Berg, a german technology
activist and a former Wikileaks spokesperson. eir vicissitude clearly shows reversals and
transformations of trust into suspicion and of secrecy into transparency, and vice versa (see
Anspach 2013). Not surprisingly, this article has been published on, a brand of
the Peter iel Foundation, the cuing edge of the most radical anarcho-capitalist galaxy. A
galaxy rapidly expanding (Ippolita 2013).
9 / 11
Akrich, Madeleine (2006). La description des objets techniques. In: Sociologie de la traduc-
tion. Ed. by Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon, and Bruno Latour. Paris: Presses des Mines,
pp. 159178. : (visited on 08/31/2013).
Anspach, Mark. Julian Assanges Double Trouble. :
theory/mark-anspach/julian-assanges-double-trouble.html (visited on 10/28/2013).
Assange, Julian et al. (2012). Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet. OR Books,
Brevini, Benedea, Arne Hintz, and Patrick McCurdy, eds. (2013). Beyond WikiLeaks: Implica-
tions for the Future of Communications, Journalismand Society. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Callon, Michel (2006). Pour une sociologie des controverses technologiques. In: Sociologie de
la traduction. Ed. by Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon, and Bruno Latour. Paris: Presses des
Mines, pp. 135157. : (visited on
Coleman, Gabriella E. (2012). Coding Freedom: e Ethics and Aesthetics of Hacking. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Davis, Erik (2004). Techgnosis: Myth, Magic and Mysticism in the Age of Information. London:
Serpents Tail.
Dreyfus, Suelee and Julian Assange (2012). Underground: Tales of Hacking, Madness and Ob-
session on the Electronic Frontier. Edinburgh: Canongate Books.
Foucault, Michel (1969). Larchologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard.
Freeden, Michael (1996). Ideologies and Political eory: A Conceptual Approach. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Han, Byung-Chul (2012). Transparenzgesellscha. Berlin: Mahes & Seitz Verlag.
Hughes, Eric (1993). A Cypherpunks Manifesto. :
manifesto.html (visited on 10/28/2013).
Ippolita (2012). Nellacquario di Facebook. La resistibile ascesa dellanarco-capitalismo. Milano:
(2013). e Dark Side of Google. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures.
Lanier, Jaron (2010). e Hazards of Nerd Supremacy: e Case of WikiLeaks. In: e At-
lantic. :
nerd-supremacy-the-case-of-wikileaks/68217/ (visited on 10/28/2013).
Latour, Bruno (1993). We Have Never Been Modern. Trans. by Catherine Porter. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Lovink, Geert and Patrice Riemens (2013). Twelve esis on Wikileaks. In: Beyond WikiLeaks:
Implications for the Future of Communications, Journalism and Society. Ed. by Benedea
Brevini, Arne Hintz, and Patrick McCurdy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
May, Timothy C. (1988). e Crypto Anarchist Manifesto. : http : / / www . activism . net /
cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html (visited on 10/28/2013).
(1994a). Release Notes for Cyphernomicon. : http : / / groups . csail . mit . edu / mac /
classes/6.805/articles/crypto/cypherpunks/cyphernomicon/Release- Notes (visited
on 10/28/2013).
(1994b). e Cyphernomicon: Cypherpunks FAQ and More. :
faq/cyphernomicron/cyphernomicon.html (visited on 10/28/2013).
Wikipedia. Cypherpunk. : (visited on 10/28/2013).
10 / 11
Wigenstein, Ludwig (2009). Philosophical Investigations. Trans. by Gertrude Elizabeth Mar-
garet Anscombe, Peter Michael Stephan Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley &
Zimmermann, Philip (1990). Prey Good Privacy, RSA Public Key Cryptography for the Masses:
PGP Users Guide. : http : / / openpgp . vie - privee . org / manupgp1 . htm (visited on
11 / 11