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Complaint for Damages
McNICHOLAS & McNICHOLAS, LLP
Matthew S. McNicholas, State Bar No. 190249
Alyssa Kim Schabloski, State Bar No. 258876
10866 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1400
Los Angeles, California 90024
Tel.: (310) 474-1582
Fax: (310) 475-7871

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
STEVEN RUIZ


SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES



STEVEN RUIZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a government
entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive.

Defendants.
CASE NO.:


COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

1. RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF
LABOR CODE 1102.5

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMES NOW Plaintiff STEVEN RUIZ, and hereby demands a trial by jury, and based on
information and belief complains of Defendants CITY OF LOS ANGELES (COLA or
Defendant), and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, and each of them, as follows:
THE PARTIES
1. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff STEVEN RUIZ (Ruiz or Plaintiff) was a
sworn California police officer employed by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD or
Department), and was a competent adult.
2. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that, at all times relevant
hereto, COLA was a public entity violating laws within the State of California in the County of Los
Angeles. At all times pertinent hereto, COLA owned, controlled, and operated the law enforcement
agency known as the LAPD.

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Complaint for Damages
3. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Defendants DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, and each of them, at all times relevant hereto, were public, business, and/or
other entities whose form is unknown committing torts in and/or engaged in purposeful economic
activity within the County of Los Angeles, State of California.
4. The true names and capacities of Defendants DOES 1 through 100, and each of
them, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, are unknown to Plaintiff at this time,
therefore Plaintiff sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will file DOE
amendments, and/or ask leave of court to amend this complaint to assert the true names and
capacities of these Defendants when they have been ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes,
and upon such information and belief alleges, that each Defendant herein designated as a DOE was
and is in some manner, negligently, wrongfully, or otherwise, responsible and liable to Plaintiff for
the injuries and damages hereinafter alleged, and that Plaintiff's damages as herein alleged were
proximately caused by their conduct.
5. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at all times material
herein the Defendants, and each of them, were the agents, servants, or employees, or ostensible
agents, servants, and employees of each other Defendant, and as such, were acting within the
course and scope of said agency and employment or ostensible agency and employment, except on
those occasions when Defendants were acting as principals, in which case, said Defendants; and
each of them, were negligent in the selection, hiring, and use of the other Defendants.
6. At all times mentioned herein, each of the Defendants was the co-tortfeasor of each
of the other Defendants in doing the things hereinafter alleged.
7. Plaintiff is further informed and believes that at all times relevant hereto,
Defendants, and each of them, acted in concert and in furtherance of the interests of each other
Defendant. The conduct of each Defendant combined and cooperated with the conduct of each of
the remaining Defendants so as to cause the herein described incidents and the resulting injuries
and damages to Plaintiff.

//

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Complaint for Damages
VENUE AND JURISDICTION
8. At all relevant times hereto, Plaintiff was residing in the County of Los Angeles,
State of California.
9. At all relevant times hereto, Defendants, and each of them, were residents of the
County of Los Angeles, State of California.
10. The wrongful conduct alleged against Defendants, and each of them, occurred in the
County of Los Angeles, State of California. At all relevant times hereto, the conduct at issue was
part of a continuous and ongoing pattern of behavior.
11. This Court is the proper court because the wrongful acts that are the subject of this
action occurred here, at least one Defendant now resides in its jurisdictional area, and injury to
person or damage to personal property occurred in its jurisdictional area.
12. Plaintiff has complied with and/or exhausted any applicable claims statutes and/or
administrative and/or internal remedies and/or grievance procedures, and/or is excused from
complying therewith. Plaintiff has complied with the claim presentation requirement of California
Government Code 945.4 and 912.4. Plaintiff filed a government claim with the City of Los
Angeles and the LAPD on or about March 17, 2014. On or about April 7, 2014, Plaintiff received a
letter dated April 4, 2014 from the City of Los Angeles rejecting his government claim.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
13. At all relevant times herein, Plaintiff was a sworn police officer for the Los Angeles
Police Department. Plaintiff was qualified for the position he held by reason of his education and
training. Plaintiff joined the LAPD in 1987. Plaintiff promoted through the ranks over his career,
ultimately promoting to Captain III of Rampart Division on or about February 8, 2009.
14. As part of his duties as a captain in the LAPD, Plaintiff sat on various Board of
Rights (Board) proceedings. The Board of Rights is an administrative tribunal that determines
whether there is a preponderance of the evidence to substantiate the charge(s) assigned as cause for
the order of relief from duty, suspension or demotion; in essence, whether the officer is guilty or
not guilty of the charges against him/her. This proceeding arises pursuant to due process of law,

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Complaint for Damages
which all sworn peace officers are afforded when an officers property interest in his/her job may
be affected.
15. Los Angeles City Charter section 1070 governs the suspension, demotion, and
removal of sworn LAPD officers and states, in pertinent part: The rights of a member, except the
Chief of Police and any other member in a position exempt from civil service, to hold his or her
office or position and to receive compensation attached to the office or position is hereby declared
to be a substantial property right of which the holder shall not be deprived arbitrarily or summarily,
nor other than as provided in this section. No member shall be suspended, demoted in rank,
suspended and demoted in rank, removed, or otherwise separated from the service of the
department (other than by resignation), except for good and sufficient cause shown upon a finding
of guilty of the specific charge or charges assigned as cause or causes after a full, fair, and
impartial hearing before a Board of Rights, except as provided in subsections (b) and (i).
According to the LAPD Board of Rights Manual, 12th edition (October 2005), The procedure
outlined in the Charter section is designed as a safeguard for police officers against political
interference and pressure, personal prejudice, intimidation, and false accusation.
16. The Board members are comprised of two sworn members of the LAPD, typically
captains and above, and one civilian. The most senior of the two sworn members serves as
Chairperson of the Board. All sworn officers of the ranks of Captain and above are considered
qualified to be a Board member. However, certain positions are exempt from participating as
Board members, including: the Chief of Police; any Assistant Chief; the Commanding Officer,
Internal Affairs Group; and captains assigned within Internal Affairs Group, among others.
17. In or around October 2011, Plaintiff sat as the chairperson on certain officers Board
of Rights. At the culmination of this Board, Plaintiff did not recommend termination; rather,
Plaintiff recommended a lesser penalty. As a result, the employees at issue were not terminated.
18. In or around November 2011, less than a month later, Plaintiff was summoned to an
in-person meeting with Assistant Chief Earl Paysinger to discuss Plaintiffs determination that the
officers at the Board should not have been terminated. Plaintiff was advised that both Assistant
Chief Paysinger and Chief of Police Charlie Beck were disappointed in the decision not to

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Complaint for Damages
terminate, and that Plaintiff knows the Chief expects officers to be terminated when ordered to a
Board for termination. Plaintiff was then advised that he would be receiving training by Deputy
Chief Mark Perez, the then-Commanding Officer of Internal Affairs Group, on handling Boards.
19. In or around December 2011, the officers that Plaintiff recommended should not be
fired were transferred to Plaintiffs division at Rampart. They have done very well since that time.
20. In or around January 2012, Plaintiff attended a LEADS training session, which is
held for command staff, those at or above the rank of Captain. During his opening remarks, Chief
Beck stated his expectation that Captains sitting on Boards were to terminate employees that he
(the Chief) ordered to a Board for termination, or such captains would have to answer to him.
21. About three days after the LEADS meeting, Plaintiff received his in-person
training concerning Boards and how they should be handled from Deputy Chief Mark Perez.
22. In or around February 2012, Plaintiff was ordered to a follow-up meeting with
Assistant Chief Paysinger to discuss the training Plaintiff received and what he learned from it.
23. In or around May 2013, Plaintiff was served with his annual performance evaluation
(see Exhibit 1 to the Complaint). In the evaluation, the only item in the needs improvement
section concerned Plaintiffs decisions in Boards of Rights. To wit: Plaintiff had never been
disciplined about his decisions before, despite sitting on many Boards. However, in those other
circumstances, Plaintiff decided to impose the most serious penalty at issue. Yet after those Boards,
Plaintiff never received counseling, or training, nor writings that he needs improvement
concerning Boards of Rights.
24. On or about May 30, 2013, Plaintiff was stopped and cited for driving under the
influence (DUI) while off-duty. On or about June 5, 2013, Plaintiff received a written notice of
downgrade from Captain III to Captain I. The demotion was contrary to the Departments policy
and procedure for handling officers cited for DUIs while off-duty, which was to resolve the issue
through the Departments Settlement Unit, put the affected officer in treatment if necessary, and
implement a Conditional Official Reprimand (COR). The policy was not simply to demote the
officer. However, the LAPD did not send Plaintiff to the Settlement Unit and rejected his request
to participate in the Settlement Unit process. The Department also did not implement a COR

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Complaint for Damages
Plaintiff was simply demoted. In fact, the Department failed to even interview Plaintiff on the
internal complaint generated from the DUI incident, violating the policies and procedures when an
officer is an accused in a complaint, or 1.28. When the LAPD fails and refuses to interview the
accused officer, the message is clear: the officer has done something the Department does not like
and he/she is to be dealt with. Nonetheless, Plaintiff accepted the decision and moved on without
objection. Plaintiff accepted responsibility for his actions.
25. However, the Department was not done. On or about October 27, 2013, Plaintiff
was further demoted from Captain to Lieutenant. Assistant Chief Paysinger served Plaintiff with
the demotionthe same person who is exempt from serving on Boards and counseled Plaintiff
that when the Chief orders an officer to a Board for termination, the officer is to be fired. Again,
Plaintiff was never interviewed on the internal complaint that ostensibly led to the second
demotion. Plaintiff tried to oppose the further demotion, but the ultimate decision was with Chief
Beckthe same person who stood up and told all his command staff, When I order someone to a
Board, I expect them to be fired. Plaintiff remains a Lieutenant to date.
26. In stark contrast to how Plaintiff was treated following his DUI, Captain III Edward
Prokop of Newton Division allegedly received preferential treatment from Chief Beck following
Captain III Prokops DUI. On information and belief: Captain III Prokop was pulled over for a
DUI in Riverside earlier this year. Captain III Prokop was taken to a station in Riverside, and
released to Deputy Chief Jose Perez, Jr. Notably, the Riverside Chief of Police is Chief Sergio
Diaz, who spent thirty-three years in the LAPD. Internal Affairs Group, headed by Deputy Chief
Mark Perez (who trained Plaintiff), allegedly conducted an investigation. Captain III Prokop
remains the Area Commanding Officer of Newton, despite recent allegations of the captains
alleged involvement in the theft of funds under color of authority from a charitable organization for
children, the Police Activities League, at one point associated with Newton Division.
27. The following acts were retaliatory: forcing Plaintiff to undergo mandatory
training to threaten, intimidate and harass him; the unwarranted negative performance
evaluation; not interviewing Plaintiff on the internal complaint against him in violation of
Department policy and Plaintiffs due process rights; not allowing Plaintiff to participate in the

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Complaint for Damages
DUI program according to Department policy; demoting Plaintiff from Captain III to Captain I;
and again demoting Plaintiff from Captain I to Lieutenant.
28. The Department retaliated against Plaintiff because he refused to violate the rights
of the accused officers at the Board over which he presided. The whole reason there is a Board of
Rights for officers before they are terminated is because such is required by due process of law
pursuant to the United States and California Constitutions, and state law. Each sworn police officer
has a constitutionally protected property interest in his/her job, which cannot be taken away
without due process of law. That due process takes the form of an ostensibly fair and impartial
Board of Rights at the LAPD. Per the Board of Rights Manual,
It shall be the purpose of the hearing to ascertain the truth. The
members of the Board shall protect the rights of the complainant,
accused, or witnesses . . . . [] The keynote of the Board of Rights
hearings is administrative justice. It shall be the duty of the
members of the Board to vigorously pursue the true facts of the
matter being heard and to return a finding and penalty commensurate
with the evidence developed and presented. This is the avowed
obligation of the Board to the Department and the public.
Department members are afforded the protection of being able to
properly perform their sworn duties without fear of reprisal . . . .
29. When Plaintiff provided that fair and impartial Board and did not accede to Chiefs
desired termination, Chief Beck and the LAPD were unhappy because they wanted termination
regardless of the merits of the case before the Board. In other words, as Chief Beck himself stated,
Beck expects all officers who are ordered to a Board pending termination to in fact be terminated.
Acting in conformity with Chief Becks statement is a violation of constitutional due process and
other state laws, and therefore a blatant violation of law. Plaintiff refused to violate certain officers
rights and was retaliated against for it.

//

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Complaint for Damages
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
BY PLAINTIFF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE SECTION 1102.5
30. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation
contained in paragraphs 1-29 of this complaint as though fully set forth herein again.
31. At all times herein mentioned, California Labor Code section 1102.5 was in full
force and effect and was binding on the Defendants, and each of them.
32. Defendants, and each of them, made, adopted, and/or enforced rules, regulations,
and/or policies designed to prevent employees from disclosing information to a government or law
enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee, or to another employee who has
authority to investigate, discovery, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or from providing
information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or
inquiry, which Plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe disclosed violations of state or federal
statutes, or state or federal rules and regulations, as identified herein.
33. Defendants, and each of them, retaliated against Plaintiff for disclosing information
to, or because Defendants, and each of them, believes Plaintiff disclosed or may disclose
information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over Plaintiff
or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discovery, or correct the violation or
noncompliance, or for providing information to or testifying before, any public body conducting an
investigation, hearing, or inquiry, and/or for refusing to engage in illegal activity at, the Los
Angeles Police Department, which the Plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe disclosed
violations of state or federal statutes, or violations or noncompliance with state or federal rules or
regulations, as identified herein.
34. As a result, Plaintiff was subject to adverse employment actions including but not
limited to: forcing Plaintiff to undergo mandatory training to threaten, intimidate and harass him,
the unwarranted negative performance evaluation, not interviewing Plaintiff on the internal
complaint against him in violation of Department policy and Plaintiffs due process rights, not
being allowed to participate in the DUI program according to Department policy, demoting

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Complaint for Damages
Plaintiff from Captain III to Captain I; and demoting Plaintiff from Captain 1 to Lieutenant, being
ostracized, damage to his reputation, and various other acts intended to retaliate against him.
35. A motivating factor for the Defendants to engage in the foregoing adverse
employment actions against Plaintiff was to retaliate for the Plaintiff's refusal to engage in illegal
activity and/or his engaging in the protected activities of disclosing information to the City of Los
Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department, which the Plaintiff had reasonable cause to
believe disclosed violations of state or federal statutes, or violations or noncompliance with state or
federal rules or regulations, as identified herein.
36. Defendants, and each of them, allowed, permitted, condoned, ratified, and/or
enabled the retaliation and/or other wrongful conduct as described herein.
37. As a legal result of the above-described conduct of Defendants, and each of them,
Plaintiff has sustained and will continue to sustain physical, mental, and emotional injuries, pain,
distress, suffering, anguish, fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shame, mortification, injured
feelings, mental suffering, shock, humiliation, and indignity, as well as other unpleasant physical,
mental, and emotional reactions, damages to good name, reputation, standing in the community,
and other non-economic damages.
38. As a further legal result of the above-described conduct of Defendants, and each of
them, Plaintiff was required, and/or in the future may be required, to engage the services of health
care providers, and incurred expenses for medicines, health care appliances, modalities, and/or
other related expenses in a sum to be ascertained according to proof.
39. As a further legal result of the above-described conduct of Defendants, and each of
them, Plaintiff was and/or will be hindered, prevented, and/or precluded from performing Plaintiff's
usual activities, namely the position of a Captain III employed by the Los Angeles Police
Department, causing the Plaintiff to sustain damages for loss of income, wages, earnings, and
earning capacity, and other economic damages, in an amount to be ascertained according to proof.
Plaintiff claims such amount as damages together with prejudgment interest pursuant to California
Civil Code section 3287 and/or any other provision of law providing for prejudgment interest.

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Complaint for Damages
40. As a further legal result of the above-described conduct of Defendants, and each of
them, Plaintiff suffered incidental, consequential, and/or special damages, in an amount according
to proof.
41. As a further legal result of the above-described conduct of Defendants, and each of
them, Plaintiff has and will continue to incur attorneys fees and costs in an amount according to
proof.
42. Finally, as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid unlawful acts of
Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff suffered stress-related health consequences. Plaintiff claims
general damages for such health problems in an amount to be proven at time of trial.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, on all
Causes of Action for:
1. Physical, mental, and emotional injuries, pain, distress, suffering, anguish, fright,
nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shame, mortification, injured feelings, shock, humiliation and
indignity, as well as other unpleasant physical, mental, and emotional reactions, damages to
reputation, and other non-economic damages, in a sum to be ascertained according to proof;
2. Health care, services, supplies, medicines, health care appliances, modalities, and
other related expenses in a sum to be ascertained according to proof;
3. Loss of wages, income, earnings, earning capacity, support, domestic services,
benefits, and other economic damages in a sum to be ascertained according to proof;
4. Other actual, consequential, and/or incidental damages in a sum to be ascertained
according to proof;
5. Attorney fees and costs of suit pursuant to statute;
6. Costs of suit herein incurred;
7. Pre-judgment interest; and

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Complaint for Damages
8. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: August 7, 2014 McNICHOLAS & McNICHOLAS, LLP



By:
Matthew S. McNicholas
Alyssa Kim Schabloski
Attorneys for Plaintiff
STEVEN RUIZ





DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiff hereby demands trial of all causes by jury.

Dated: August 7, 2014 McNICHOLAS & McNICHOLAS, LLP



By:
Matthew S. McNicholas
Alyssa Kim Schabloski
Attorneys for Plaintiff
STEVEN RUIZ