A Short Guide To Writing A Philosophy Paper

A Short Guide to Writing
a Philosophy Paper

Andrew Roche

2010 Andrew Roche
All rights reserved.

Note to the reader:

This guide is available to all for free at http://www.andrewfrancisroche.com/writing_guide.
I hope that you find it useful.

Contained herein are sample essays in philosophy. I wrote them for this guide (although
they do not necessarily reflect my views). They are intended for students who are new to
philosophyto help them see that philosophical writing is not some mysterious form of
prose.

I realize that there is a risk that a small number of desperate students may be tempted to
plagiarize these example papers. If you happen to be one of them, please resist the
temptation. Setting to one side that plagiarism is wrong, it also often ends badly for the
person plagiarizing. Bear in mind how easy it would be for your instructor to find these
essays through a web search.

Contents

1. Preliminaries
1.1. Whom is This Guide For?
1.2. Writing and Preparing to Write
1.3. Aims (Defending a Thesis)
1.4. Citation Practices

2. The Content of Your Paper
2.1. The Introduction
2.2. The Body
2.3. The Conclusion

3. Examples
3.1. The First Assignment
3.2. A Paper that Needs Work
3.3. The Same Paper, Improved
3.4. The Second Assignment
3.7. Checklist of Some Key Points

4. Final Remarks
4.1. Other Resources
4.2. Acknowledgments

1
1
1
2

3
4
5

6
6
13
23
23
30
39

40
40

1
1. Preliminaries


First and foremost, this guide is for my own students: to give them a sense for what I expect
from their papers. The sort of paper that I have in mind is a position paper that is 2-15 pages
long. This guide says nothing about how to write, say, a dialogue; and it is not intended to help
students write very short pieces (e.g., prcis of assigned reading), whose conventions are less de-
manding.

Although this guide is meant for my students, I am not that idiosyncratic. Much of the advice
that follows will apply to papers assigned by other philosophy instructors (although you should
always ask your professor what his/her expectations are). How far it will apply beyond philoso-
phy courses, I will not speculate.

1.2. Writing and Preparing to Write

One size probably does not fit all when it comes to the process of producing a paper. Early in
your undergraduate career you should try to find the process that works best for you.

Here is some advice that I have found useful:

Write multiple drafts.
In between drafts, reread the material on which you are writing (you will find that things
jump out at you that you previously missed).
Start your paper early, and take a vacation from it after one of your first drafts. It helps to
approach your work with a fresh pair of eyes.

1.3. Aims (Defending a Thesis)

Typically, your task in a philosophy paper is to defend a position or claim. This means that you
need a thesis. Every word of your paper should help you defend this thesis. When you edit your
paper, you should cut everything that fails to do so.

Your thesis should be a good thesis. Here are some bad thesis statements, and some explanations
of why they are bad:

I wi l l compar e and
cont r ast act - and
r ul e- ut i l i t ar i ani sm.
This is not the point of a paper (unless the professor explic-
itly asks only for comparison and contrast). Of course, you
may well need to articulate the differences between two
views. But that is as a means to defending a position; it
should not be an end in itself.

I wi l l expl or e t he
consequences of ac-
cept i ng a t heor y of
def i ni t e descr i p-
t i ons.
Again, your task is to defend a positionnot to go explor-
ing. It is true that you will read philosophers who will
claim that their aim is to investigate or probe some-
thing or other. But this is rarely the main task of a piece of
philosophical prose.
2

I wi l l show t hat
Spi noza s ar gument
t hat God i s t he onl y
subst ance i s not
cl ear and t hus cannot
be accept ed as i t
st ands.
It is OK to argue that another argument goes wrong
especially if the task that your professor has set for you is
to evaluate the argument. But a thesis like this is unac-
ceptable. When a students main criticism is that an argu-
ment is not clear, he/she is adopting the pose of an in-
structor who is commenting on a pupils work. This is not
your role. Your role is the more substantial and more ex-
citing role of scholar engaging in debate. If you think that
an argument is not clear, then you ought to consider what
the author most plausibly had in mind and evaluate that ar-
gument. Sometimes students offer a thesis like this because
it does not require them to have a substantive opinion about
the argument under consideration. But this is clearly no
justification. Get opinionated. That is part of your task in
writing a paper.

I wi l l ar gue t hat
Si nger i s cor r ect
t hat eat i ng ani mal s
i s i mper mi ssi bl e.

I wi l l ar gue t hat
peopl e shoul d t ypi c-
al l y t el l t he t r ut h.

This thesis is actually not so bad as far it goesprovided
that the author says more. The trouble is that for a lot of
students, a thesis like this represents the following game
plan: recite another authors argument and then claim, I
agree! This is no contribution to the discussion. Consider
instead, for example, defending Singers argument from a
criticism or providing better support for a claim that Singer
takes for granted.

Does such a claim really require defense? The unconten-
tious does not require your support.

I wi l l r ebut al l ma-
j or obj ect i ons t o a
l i ber t ar i an account
of f r eedom.

While you do not want to dedicate a paper to defending
what is obvious, you also do not want to bite off more than
you can chew.

A thesis should be reasonably ambitious, clear, and interesting. Beyond that, there really are no
fixed rules about what makes for a good thesis. It depends on the subject, and your professor is
one of the best persons to help you gauge whether your proposed thesis is worth defending.


Professors typically do not care what citation style you use: MLA, APA, Chicago, etc. are each
fine. It does matter, however, that your style be consistent and that your professor is able to
track down your sources.

I usually do not demand that students produce bibliographies or works-cited pages. Yet I cer-
tainly do expect that through your references I can easily locate the passages to which you
appeal. If you refer to work not on the course syllabus, make sure that you provide a complete
bibliographic reference, either in a bibliography or in footnotes/endnotes.
3
Do not quote a lot of text: you are authoring, not co-authoring, your paper. Yet you should
make abundantly clear wherei.e., on what pagesan author says what you claim she
says, especially if it is a point of importance to your paper. This rule applies both to quoting and
paraphrasing an author. If you are not sure whether some point needs a page reference, err on
the side of referencing too much.

2. The Content of Your Paper


Your introduction may be the most important part of your paper. First, it sets the tone. A good
introduction gives your reader reason to think that good thoughts will follow. A bad introduction
gives your reader reason to be skeptical that you have anything worthwhile to say. In papers, as
in life, you want to make a good first impression.

Second, and more importantly, the introduction provides the reader a sense of what is to come.
In literary works, unexpected twists and turns can be exciting. Such devices just dont work in
philosophical prose. Moreover, your goal in a philosophy paper is not to entertain but to con-
vince. To accomplish this goal, make it as easy as possible for your reader to follow along. If
she knows what is coming, she will be in a better position to appreciate the force of your case.

Your introduction should first give the reader a basic sense of the issue in which you are interest-
ed. It must contain a thesis statement (see 1.3), and more often than not it is helpful to articu-
late, in broad outline, how you will support it. In longer papers authors divide their work into
sections, and in their introductions they may write something like the following:

I n sect i on 1, I ar gue t hat . I n sect i on 2, I consi der and r ebut
t he obj ect i on t hat . Fi nal l y, i n sect i on 3, I show why t he al -
t er nat i ve t hat i s i n no bet t er posi t i on t o expl ai n .

Shorter papers may not have numbered sections, but the basic idea is the same.

Do not begin your paper with platitudes (e.g., the problem of identity over time is a very diffi-
cult philosophical problem) or clichs (e.g., since the dawn of time, philosophers have wrest-
led with the age-old question of how we know that there is an external world). Additionally,
your reader does not need to know the biographical details (e.g., date of birth) of the authors with
whom you are engaging. The inclusion of such material will give your reader the impression
that you are only trying to use up space. J ust get down to business (see the introductions to the
essays in 3.3 and 3.6; compare them to those in 3.2 and 3.5, respectively).
1

1
I once offered this advice to students during a period when we were reading J ohn Stuart Mills Utilitarianism. Af-
ter that class, one student noted to me that in the opening paragraph to that work, Mill writes:
From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, con-
cerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought, has occu-
2.2. The Body
4
2.2. The Body

Some general tips:
Do not assume that your professor is your audience. Rather, assume that your audience is a
fellow philosopher who is not as familiar with the material about which you are writing as
you. So: you can take for granted that your audience knows what a valid argument is. But
you should not assume that your audience understands the details of the subject of your paper,
including the jargon, who thinks what, etc.

Remember also that you do have an audience. Do not assume that your reader can divine the
finer points of what is running through your head if you fail to express those points clearly on
paper. Studentsas well as professional philosophersoften assume that what is obvious to
them will be obvious to everyone else. Not so. Assume that you are working a tough crowd.

Feel free to write in the first-person. But remember that you are trying to defend a position;
you are not writing a journal entry. So avoid writing such things as: When I read this pas-
sage, it made me feel that de Beauvoir was confused to hold. But then I considered that ,
and I became convinced that de Beauvoir was right.

Avoid jargon. Where you must use it, explain it. Use examples if possible.

Avoid attempts at wit, sarcasm, literary flourish, etc. These typically fall flat. Write simply
and in plain English.

If you disagree with someone, be charitable. Put the best face possible on his/her position.
Then explain why it is wrong.

You may very well be asked to consider someones argument. If so, make sure that you pre-
sent that argumentat least a basic outline of it. Consider also putting that argument into
numbered steps (this is where studying a little logic can prove useful). For instance, you
might be asked to evaluate an argument against the death penalty. Perhaps that argument
looks like the following when put into numbered steps (the horizontal line symbolizes a
therefore or a consequently):

( 1) Deat h r ow i nmat es ar e per sons.
( 2) I t i s never per mi ssi bl e t o ki l l a per son.
( 3) I t i s never per mi ssi bl e t o ki l l a deat h r ow i nmat e.

You are now in a position to examine this argument fruitfully. If you disagree with the argu-
ment, this might be because you believe that it is invalid: i.e., that its conclusion does not fol-
low from the premises (this argument, by the way, is valid, at least assuming that the mean-
ings of the words remain the same throughout). Or perhaps you think that the argument is

pied the most gifted intellects and divided them into sects and schools carrying on a vigorous warfare against
one another (2
nd
ed., Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001; p. 1; my emphasis on the first five words).
Fair enough. But there are a number of things that one might say in response to this sort of observation. I will rest
content borrowing a point from Jim Pryor (see 4.1): we often read philosophers in spite of, not because of, the way
that they write.
2.3. The Conclusion
5
valid but that one or more of its premises is false. Or perhaps you think that this argument is
indeed sound and you want to defend, say, (2) from some criticism. Or perhaps you think that
the argument is bad as it stands but could be made to work with slightly amended premises.

The point is: it is a lot easier to write about this argument when you can simply refer to (1),
(2), or (3) in your prose. It is much easier for those reading your paper, too.

Avoid writing a book report. Students frequently make summaries of the texts the biggest
parts of their papers. Of course, it is important to make your reader familiar with what is at
stake. But that should be set-up for your own contribution.

Your contribution will be the defense of some thesis. I have already covered the importance
of having a thesis. But the defense is also very important. Adopting a position is not enough.
What reasons support your position? Note also that it wont do to say such things as p is true
because it is more logical or I believe that p because I find it more agreeable. These are
not serious reasons. Why is p more logical? Why is p more agreeable?

If you do not have the option to select your own paper topic, make sure that you address the
question or prompt that your instructor assigns, not something merely similar. For instance, if
you are asked to consider As argument against stem cell research, you should do just that. It
is not responsive to the prompt to ignore As argument and produce your own argument in
support of or against stem cell research, regardless of how compelling your case is.

2.3. The Conclusion

Dont feel compelled to write a conclusion, especially if the paper is relatively short (in longer
papers there may be more pressure to include one). Sometimes (i) conclusions are summaries;
sometimes, (ii) they serve to indicate the relevance of the ideas presented in the paper for other
fields; sometimes (iii) authors use conclusions to draw a moral that they did not draw earlier in
the paper. But (i) summaries are unnecessary in short papers; (ii) you (as an undergraduate) are
at this point unlikely to be in a position to explain how your claims are relevant in other areas in
philosophy; and (iii) you (as an undergraduate) are at this point unlikely to be in a position to
draw any additional moral that was not already a feature of your main argument.

6
3. Examples


Wr i t e a 3- 5 page paper answer i ng t he f ol l owi ng quest i on:

Mar y Anne War r en s paper , On t he Mor al and Legal St at us of Abor -
t i on, cont ai ns cr i t i ci smof J udi t h Thomson s def ense of abor t i on.
I s War r en s cr i t i ci smj ust ?


What follows is a paper that needs a fair amount of work. The topic should be accessible to stu-
dents at any level. Its length is equivalent to about 3.5 pages of proper-sized font, although given
the font and margins that I am using, it appears somewhat longer than that.

I have lettered some of the comments below. This is because I refer to them in comments in
3.3. In that section, the same paper has been substantially improved.

J ane Doe
Phi l osophy 101
Febr uar y 14, 2007

A Def ense of Thomson on Abor t i on
The i ssue of a woman s r i ght t o do wi t h her body
what she want s vs. t he pot ent i al r i ght s of a f et us not
t o be ki l l ed i s a per enni al pr obl emi n pol i t i cs and i n
mor al i t y. J udi t h Thomson pr oduces a power f ul def ense
of abor t i on i n her paper , I n Def ense of Abor t i on.
But Mar y Anne War r en came back at Thomson wi t h equal l y
power f ul obj ect i ons i n her t r act , On t he Mor al and
Legal St at us of Abor t i on. I n t hi s paper I pr esent my
vi ews on t hi s debat e.
This intro-
ductory
sentence is
just a
platitude.
Dont start
your paper
this way.
A Defense
of Abor-
tion!

essay or article or paper
This is not
a thesis
statement.
Jane
should
state more
specific-
ally what
she will
accom-
plish.
1

7
Thomson s ar gument get s goi ng by consi der i ng what
she t hi nks i s t he best ar gument agai nst abor t i on out
t her e. I t st ar t s wi t h t he cont r over si al pr emi se t hat
a f et us has t he r i ght t o l i f e, somet hi ng t hat Thomson
i s pr epar ed t o t ake f or gr ant ed. The ar gument next
says t hat i f a f et us has a r i ght t o l i f e, t hen t hat i s
mor e i mpor t ant t han a woman s r i ght t o do what she
want s wi t h her own body. Then t he ar gument cl ai ms
t hat a f et us s r i ght t o l i f e i s mor e i mpor t ant t han a
woman s r i ght t o do what she want s wi t h her own body.
But t hen i n t hat case, an abor t i on i s wr ong.
Thomson ar gues t hat t he second poi nt i s wr ong. She
does t hi s by usi ng her exampl e of a vi ol i ni st . But
now l et me ask you t o i magi ne t hi s. You wake up i n
t he mor ni ng and f i nd your sel f back t o back i n bed wi t h
an unconsci ous vi ol i ni st . A f amous unconsci ous
vi ol i ni st . He has been f ound t o have a f at al ki dney
ai l ment , and t he Soci et y of Musi c Lover s has canvassed
al l t he avai l abl e medi cal r ecor ds and f ound t hat you
al one have t he r i ght bl ood t ype t o hel p. They have
t her ef or e ki dnapped you, and l ast ni ght t he
vi ol i ni st s ci r cul at or y syst emwas pl ugged i nt o your s,
so t hat your ki dneys can be used t o ext r act poi sons
f r om hi s bl ood as wel l as your own. The di r ect or of
t he hospi t al now t el l s you, Look, we r e sor r y t he
(A) Here
Jane is
presenting
an argu-
ment and
then refer-
ring to
one of its
premises.
It is a lit-
tle diffi-
cult to fol-
low the
argument
thus pre-
sentedit
is espec-
ially dif-
ficult to
discern
what the
second
point is.
This is a
good ex-
ample of
why it can
be helpful
to present
argu-
ments in
numbered
steps.
(B) First,
this is
much,
much too
much
quotation.

Second, if
and when
you quote
a lot of
text, use
block
quotation.
2

8
Soci et y of Musi c Lover s di d t hi s t o you- - we woul d
never have per mi t t ed i t i f we had known. But st i l l ,
t hey di d i t , and t he vi ol i ni st now i s pl ugged i nt o
you. To unpl ug you woul d be t o ki l l hi m. But never
mi nd, i t s onl y f or ni ne mont hs. By t hen he wi l l have
r ecover ed f r om hi s ai l ment , and can saf el y be
unpl ugged f r om you. I s i t mor al l y i ncumbent on you
t o accede t o t hi s si t uat i on? ( 49) Thomson t hi nks
t hat i t woul d be out r ageous t o suggest t hat i t i s.
But t hen, by anal ogy, i t woul d be out r ageous f or
someone t o suggest t he pr oposal t hat a woman has t o
st ay connect ed t o a f et us once she vi si t s t he doct or
or t akes a pr egnancy t est and f i nds out t hat she i s
pr egnant .
War r en s mai n obj ect i on t o Thomson i s t hat her
anal ogy i sn t f ai r because t he per son i n t he vi ol i ni st
case di dn t do anyt hi ng t hat woul d l ead t o bei ng
at t ached t o t he vi ol i ni st , wher eas t ypi cal l y pr egnancy
i s t he r esul t of consensual sex ( 49- 50) . But Thomson
ant i ci pat es t hi s r esponse. I f t he r oom i s st uf f y,
and I t her ef or e open a wi ndow t o ai r i t , and a bur gl ar
cl i mbs i n, i t woul d be absur d t o say, Ah, now he can
st ay, she s gi ven hi ma r i ght t o t he use of her house-
- f or she i s par t i al l y r esponsi bl e f or hi s pr esence
t her e, havi ng vol unt ar i l y done what enabl ed hi mt o get
Ambigu-
ous. Most
pregnan-
cies result
from con-
sensual
sex or con-
sensual
sex typic-
ally re-
sults in
pregnan-
cy?
(C) Lots of
quotation.
Again.

It is im-
portant to
under-
stand why
this is
bad.

It is not
difficult to
quote rel-
evant pas-
The refer-
ence must
be more
specific
than this.
Whose
paper is
Jane quot-
ing?

to suggest that a woman must stay connected to a fetus once she discovers that she is pregnant.
did nothing
3
9
i n, i n f ul l knowl edge t hat t her e ar e such t hi ngs as
bur gl ar s, and t hat bur gl ar s bur gl e ( 58- 9) . Thomson
uses a mor e f ar - f et ched, yet even mor e apt , exampl e i n
t he f ol l owi ng: suppose i t wer e l i ke t hi s: peopl e-
seeds dr i f t about i n t he ai r l i ke pol l en, and i f you
open your wi ndows, one may dr i f t i n and t ake r oot i n
your car pet s or uphol st er y. You don t want chi l dr en,
so you f i x up your wi ndows wi t h f i ne mesh scr eens, t he
ver y best you can buy. As can happen, however , and on
ver y, ver y r ar e occasi ons does happen, one of t he
scr eens i s def ect i ve; and a seed dr i f t s i n and t akes
r oot . Does t he per son- pl ant who now devel ops have a
r i ght t o t he use of your house? ( 59) . Sur el y not ,
t hi nks Thomson. Thomson s poi nt i n al l of t hi s i s
t hat j ust because you di d somet hi ng t hat l eads t o
someone usi ng you r e st uf f , t hat doesn t mean you have
t o l et t hem.
But t hi s l eads t o a second obj ect i on l evel ed by
War r en, al t hough she does not pr esent i t as an
obj ect i on t o Thompson exact l y. Thompson sees t he
bur gl ar and t he vi ol i ni st as vi ol at i ng someone s
pr oper t y r i ght s. She sees an unwant ed f et us as
ut i l i zi ng t he woman s pr oper t y, her body. Thomson
t hi nks t hat you ar e not obl i ged t o t ol er at e t hi s sor t
of t hi ng and ar e per mi t t ed t o end t he vi ol at i on. Thi s
(D) Yet
more
quotation!

grammar!
It is good
that Jane
articu-
lates, in
her own
words, the
moral
that
Thomson
is trying
to draw.
(E) The
point that
Jane is
trying to
make is
that this is
an object-
tion that
Warren
makes
generally
about
many de-
fenses of
abortion
without
making it
specifical-
ly of
Thomson.
Jane
could be
clearer
about this.
sages, es-
pecially if
the prof-
esssor went
over them
in class.
Quoting a
lot of text
does not
demon-
strate
compre-
hension of
the mater-
ial. But
demon-
strating
that you
under-
stand the
material
is one of
the things
that you
are trying
to accom-
plish in
your pap-
er!
4

10
i s wher e War r en di sagr ees: I t i s equal l y uncl ear
t hat I have any mor al r i ght t o expel an i nnocent
per son f r ommy pr oper t y when I know t hat doi ng so wi l l
r esul t i n hi s deat h. Fur t her mor e, i t i s pr obabl y
i nappr opr i at e t o descr i be a woman s body as her
pr oper t y, si nce i t seems nat ur al t o hol d t hat a per son
i s somet hi ng di st i nct f r om her pr oper t y, but not f r om
her body. Even t hose who woul d obj ect t o t he
i dent i f i cat i on of a per son wi t h hi s body, or wi t h t he
conj unct i on of hi s body and hi s mi nd, must admi t t hat
i t woul d be ver y odd t o descr i be, say, br eaki ng a l eg,
as damagi ng one s pr oper t y, and much mor e appr opr i at e
t o descr i be i t as i nj ur i ng oneself. Thus i t i s
pr obabl y a mi st ake t o ar gue t hat t he r i ght t o obt ai n
an abor t i on i s i n any way der i ved f r om t he r i ght t o
own and r egul at e pr oper t y ( 44) .
I t hi nk t hat Thomson does descr i be someone s body
as t hat per son s pr oper t y and uses t hi s expl anat i on t o
el abor at e on her ar gument . I al so t hi nk t hat War r en
i s cor r ect t hat t hi s pr i nci pl e i s wr ong and t hat
Thomson i s wr ong t o appeal t o i t . But I bel i eve t hat
i n f act t he pr i nci pl e i s not essent i al t o Thomson s
case. Al l she needs i s t he t heor y t hat one i s
ent i t l ed t o l eave a si t uat i on i n whi ch t hey have been
made t o ser ve somebody el se wi t hout per mi ssi on. Thi s
In its
original
context,
Warrens
use of
equally
is perfectly
appro-
priate. In
this quot-
ation, out
of context,
it reads
funny.
Since it
does not
affect the
authors
inten-
tions,
Jane
could
have used
an ellipsis
here.

Another
very, very
long
quotation.
Where?
How so?
grammar!
There is a
para-
graph
break here
that Jane
is not rep-
resenting,
and it
would be
better if
she did.
The break
would be
easy to
represent
if Jane
used block
quotation.
5
Be sparing
in explic-
itly telling
your read-
er that
you be-
lieve
some-
thing. If
you state
some-
thing, it
typically
goes with-
out saying
that you
believe it.

11
expl ai ns why one can di sconnect hi msel f f r om t he
vi ol i ni st . The per son has been t ur ned i nt o a di al ysi s
machi ne of t he vi ol i ni st wi t hout per mi ssi on. Why a
woman can di sconnect her sel f f r om her f et us i s al so
expl ai ned by t hi s. She has been t ur ned i nt o an
i ncubat or f or t he f et us wi t hout anyone aski ng her
per mi ssi on.
Ther e ar e l ot s of cases i n whi ch peopl e i n some
sense ser ve ot her peopl e. But I bel i eve t hat i n t hese
cases, when t he peopl e do not have t he mor al r i ght t o
end t hei r ser vi ce, t he peopl e have consent ed t o t hat
ar r angement . For i nst ance, i f I ent er a cont r act wi t h
you t o f i x your house, I am agr eei ng t o pr ovi de you a
ser vi ce. But i f you pay me up f r ont , and I bl ow t he
money on a t r i p t o Vegas wher e I spend i t on gambl i ng
and dr i nki ng and t hen deci de I don t want t o f i x your
house and can t r et ur n t he money, i t i sn t accept abl e
f or me t o no l onger f i x your house, t o no l onger
per f or m t hi s ser vi ce f or you. Thi s i s because I
cont r act ed t o pr ovi de i t .
I n concl usi on, Thomson s def ense of abor t i on shoul d
be t aken ser i ousl y. War r en pr ovi des t wo obj ect i ons t o
Thomson s ar gument . The f i r st over l ooks Thomson s
i nsi ght f ul exampl e of peopl e- seeds. The second
obj ect i on i s appr opr i at e but can be accommodat ed. I n
A couple
of observa-
tions.

(F) First,
it is only
in the pre-
vious par-
agraph
that Jane
goes be-
yond sim-
ply re-
counting
the work
of Thom-
son and
Warren.
There is
not much
origin-
ality in
this essay.

(G) Se-
cond,
Jane does
offer an
interest-
ing pro-
posal on
Thomsons
behalf.
But she is
doing lit-
tle to de-
fend it,
and coun-
terexam-
ples to her
principle
suggest
them-
selves. For
example,
it would
seem that
children
have obli-
gations to
do chores
even if
they never
consented
to provide
such ser-
vices to
their par-
ents. It
would be
good if
Jane
could an-
ticipate
and ad-
dress wor-
ries like
this.

A sum-
mary of
such a
short pap-
er does
not con-
tribute
much.
Jane
should cut
itor re-
write it
signifi-
cantly.
It also explains why a woman may disconnect herself from her fetus.
others
Long sen-
tence.
And some
of this
detail
seems
super-
fluous.
6

12
t hi s way, I have def ended Thomson s def ense of
abor t i on.

Bi bl i ogr aphy

Thomson, J udi t h J ar vi s. A Def ense of Abor t i on.
Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, No 1 ( 1971) : 47- 66.

War r en, Mar y Anne. On t he Mor al and Legal St at us of
Abor t i on. The Monist 57, No. 1 ( J an. 1973) : 43- 61.
7
13

The following is a thoroughly updated and improved version of the paper from 3.2. But before
turning to that, I want to say a few words about the previous draft.

For all of the problems with that paper, Jane kept her eye on the ball throughout. She was asked
to write a paper analyzing Warrens criticism of Thomson. She wrote a paper about that. Jane
kept her focus on whether Warren found compelling flaws in Thomsons defense of abortion.

I stress this because a common mistake in undergraduate papers, especially when it comes to top-
ics about which students are antecedently opinionated, is to address related but different issues
than those assigned. For instance, in answer to the prompt from 3.1, students will often enough
write an essay on why abortion is wrong or about why abortion must be kept legal. Such papers
obviously do not assess the merits of Warrens claims and are, besides, much too ambitious for a
3-5 page paper. Professors typically assign the questions they do in part because those questions
are manageable in the space students have to work with.

The following paper is somewhat longer than the original, but still within the five-page limit
when normal-sized font and margins are used.

Jane Doe
Philosophy 101
February 14, 2007

A Defense of Thomson on Abortion
In On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,
Mary Anne Warren contests Judith Thomsons defense of
abortion. Warren faults the analogy that Thomson uses
to motivate her argument. Additionally, she
criticizes the belief, which seems also to be
Thomsons, that we should regard our bodies as our
property. In what follows, I show that Warren misses
Thomsons anticipation of the first objection, which
Thomson adequately rebuts. I then argue that while
1
14
Warren is right to criticize the view that ones body
is ones property, we can abandon this component of
Thomsons case without abandoning her fundamentally
sound defense of abortion.
In her paper, A Defense of Abortion, Thomson
defends abortion against the following line of
argument (see Thomson, 48):
(1) A fetus has a right to life.
(2) If a fetus has a right to life, then its
right to life outweighs a womans right to do
with her own body what she wants.
(3) A fetuss right to life outweighs a womans
right to do with her own body what she wants.
[from (1) & (2)]
(4) If a fetuss right to life outweighs a
womans right to do with her own body what
she wants, then aborting a fetus is
impermissible.
(5) Aborting a fetus is impermissible. [from (3)
& (4)]

This argument is valid. So if (5) is false, one of
the premises must be, too. Many abortion rights
advocates dispute (1). But what is novel in Thomsons
defense is her willingness to grant it for the sake of
argument. Instead, she contests (2). Even supposing
that a fetus has a right to life, it does not follow
that its right to life supersedes a womans right to
determine what happens to her own body.
Thomson argues by analogy (Thomson, 48-9). Suppose
that you are kidnapped and drugged and wake up to
discover that your circulatory system has been plugged
An appro-
priately
detailed
and to-
the-point
introduc-
tion.
Some bas-
ic logic: if
an argu-
ment is
valid, its
conclu-
sion fol-
lows from
its prem-
ises. But
that
leaves
open that
some or
all of its
premises
are false.
If any of
its prem-
ises is
false, one
hasnt
been pro-
vided
sound
support for
the con-
clusion. A
sound ar-
gument is
a valid
argument
whose pre-
mises are
all true.

Jane is
here ad-
mitting
that this
argument
is valid.
Thomson,
however,
thinks
that it is
not sound.
Cf. (A).
2
15
into that of a very ill violinist. Being connected to
your kidneys is the only thing keeping the violinist
alive: no one elses kidneys will suffice. But
sharing your kidneys for nine months will cure the
violinist of his sickness, at which time he can be
disconnected from you. Thomson asks whether you have
the right to disconnect yourself. She thinks that it
is obvious that you do. The violinist, of course, has
as much of a right to life as anyone. But that right
does not outweigh your right to do with your body what
you want. This case, Thomson thinks, is relevantly
similar to a case of a woman who is pregnant and would
prefer not to be. So the example seems to show that
(2) is false.
Warrens main objection is that Thomsons example
is not truly analogous to most situations in which a
woman finds herself pregnant (Warren, 49-50). You
find yourself connected to the violinist through no
fault of your own and without your consent. This is
at best analogous to cases of rape. And in fact many
people otherwise opposed to abortion think that
abortions of pregnancies that result from rape are
permissible.
Cf. (B). By
para-
phrasing
Thomsons
argument,
Jane dem-
onstrates
her un-
derstand-
ing of the
material
and
makes
more effic-
ient use of
the space
with
which she
has to
work.
3
16
But Warren fails to see that Thomson anticipates
this response (Thomson, 58-9). Consider the following
colorful scenario:
[S]uppose it were like this: people-seeds drift
about in the air like pollen, and if you open
your windows, one may drift in and take root in
your carpets or upholstery. You dont want
children, so you fix up your windows with fine
mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can
happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions
does happen, one of the screens is defective; and
a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the
person-plant who now develops have a right to the
use of your house? (Thomson, 59)

Thomson thinks not. Her moral is this: simply doing
something that enables someone else to use your
property does not give that person a right to use your
property. So, too: a womans having consensual sex,
even if she knows that pregnancy could result, does
not give the resulting fetus a right to her body.
But Warren issues a more troublesome objection
(which she does not direct explicitly at Thomson).
Thomson seems to regard the person-seed and the
violinist in the above examples as violating someones
property rights.
2
She appears to think likewise of a
fetus: it is violating a womans property rights.
The property in question is the womans body. But it

2
Asdfasdf
Asdf
Asdf

Cf. (C)
and (D).
Note the
editing
that took
place here.
Jane is
presenting
Thomsons
case just
as well as
before, but
she is giv-
ing herself
more
space to
develop
her own
ideas (cf.
(F)).

Cf. (E).
Perhaps
one op-
posed to
Thomsons
moral
could
question
whether
the new
analogy is
fair. Is
consen-
sual sex-
ual inter-
course
merely an
event that
can lead
to the fet-
uss occu-
pation of
the wo-
mans
womb? Is
it some-
thing
more than
that,
something
morally
relevant?
1
See also Thomson, 53: [W]hat we have to keep in mind is
that the mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants
in a small house which has, by an unfortunate mistake, been
rented to both: the mother owns the house.
1
4
17
is awkward to think of ones body as ones property
(Warren, 44). Our bodies are much more intimately
connected to us than that. For instance, when one
breaks ones leg, one is not injuring ones property;
one has injured oneself (Warren, 44).
But this is only part of Warrens complaint.
Thomsons defense above turns on the following
principle:
(P) One has the right to remove another from her
property if that other is there without
permission.

Accordingly, you have the right to remove the
violinist from your circulatory system, since he is
there without permission; likewise, a woman has the
right to remove a fetus from her body. But, says
Warren, (P) is at best contentious. It is unclear
that I have any moral right to expel an innocent
person from my property when I know that doing so will
result in his death (Warren, 44). For instance--and
this is my own example--it is dubious that if a
homeless family, without permission, takes up
residence in a shack at the far corner of my land in
the dead of winter that it is permissible for me to
remove them if this would certainly lead to their
deaths.
5
18
I think that Thomson implicitly appeals to (P) and
that Warren is correct that (P) is probably false. On
the other hand, (P) is not essential to explain the
permissibility of your disconnecting yourself from the
violinist. And it is not essential to explain the
permissibility of a woman having an abortion, either.
To explain why these are permissible, one can avail
oneself instead of the following intuitive principle:
(P) One has the right to extricate oneself from
a situation in which one is serving another
without ones consent.

(P) explains why you may disconnect yourself from the
violinist, and it explains why a woman may disconnect
herself from her fetus. You have been turned into the
violinists dialysis machine without your consent; a
pregnant woman has been turned into the fetuss
incubator without her consent.
So (P) is intuitive. But does it, unlike (P),
withstand scrutiny?
Children may seem to be a counterexample. For
instance, it does not seem right that a child has no
obligation to perform chores around the house just
because he has not consented to such service.
But all this shows is that children are special
cases. Most people will grant that. I suggest that
(P) applies only to persons fit to offer consent, in
Cf. (G).
Here and
in what
follows
Jane is
making
her own
contri-
bution to
the de-
bate.
6
19
the sense that they can enter into binding moral
contracts. Presumably that covers you; it plausibly
covers nearly any woman old enough to be pregnant.
Military conscription may also seem like a
counterexample to (P). For many think that in a
draft one has an obligation to serve ones country
even if one never consented to do so.
But this is far from a clear-cut counterexample.
It may often be true that one incurs a legal
obligation, under a draft, to serve in the military of
ones country. But the plausibility of this position
should not affect how we feel about whether one also
incurs a moral obligation to serve. It is in fact not
obvious that one does. But even if one does, that
obligation seems contingent on ones continuing to be
a citizen of that country. So conscription is not a
situation in which one would lose the moral right to
extricate oneself from service to another party. One
retains that right--it is just that the extrication
involves not only leaving the military but also ones
country.
A final and more difficult case for (P) is this.
Suppose that Xander contracts to provide a service for
Avery. As it happens, however, and without Xanders
knowledge, Avery is Baileys agent, and so by dint of
7
20
serving Avery, Xander also serves Bailey. Since
Xander dislikes Bailey, when he later learns of the
relationship, he wishes to annul the arrangement,
because: Xander never consented to provide services
to Bailey. Yet it does not seem to follow
automatically that Xander is entitled to end his
service, as (P) suggests.
3

I do not think this example is ultimately a
problem. The following principle seems very
plausible:
(*) If one consents to provide services to A,
then one also consents to provide services
to whomever one should foresee A might be
providing services.

Thus, if Avery and Bailey conspired to dupe Xander,
(P) poses no problem: Xander does have the right
(all other things being equal) to extricate himself
from his service, since he could not reasonably have
foreseen the possibility that service to Avery was
also service to Bailey. On the other hand, if it is
well-known that Avery is Baileys agent, then it is
reasonable to expect someone in Xanders situation to
anticipate that to provide services to Avery might
also be to provide services to Bailey. In this case,
by (*), if Xander consents to serve Avery, he also

3
I owe this example to John Doe (no relation).
2
I owe this example to John Doe (no relation).
2
8
21
consents, in effect, to serve Bailey. It is plausible
in this case that Xander is obligated to complete his
service, and (P) does not suggest otherwise.
Granted, (*) is not very illuminating, since it is
up for grabs what reasonable foresight consists in.
But there is no reason to think that this will be a
principled source of disagreement between Thomson and
her opponents.
Thus (P) seems to be a robust principle, one which
is perfectly suitable for Thomsons purposes. Yet it
may seem to jeopardize Thomsons response to Warrens
first objection, according to which Thomsons
violinist example is not relevantly analogous to most
cases of unwanted pregnancy. Thomsons response
presupposed that ones body is like ones home--i.e.,
ones property. But Thomson could easily reconsider
what is relevant in her example:
[S]uppose it were like this: people-seeds drift
about in the air like pollen, and if you open
your windows, one may drift in and take root in
your carpets or upholstery. You dont want
children, so you fix up your windows with fine
mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can
happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions
does happen, one of the screens is defective; and
a seed drifts in and takes root. Did opening
your windows constitute consent to serve as the
person-plants long-term host?

A negative answer to this question is no less
plausible than to the original.
It is worth
asking
what
other
cases
might be
problem-
atic for
Janes
principle
(P ).
9
22
Bibliography

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. A Defense of Abortion.
Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, No 1 (1971): 47-66.

Warren, Mary Anne. On the Moral and Legal Status of
Abortion. The Monist 57, No. 1 (Jan. 1973): 43-61.

10
3.4. The Second Asssignment
23
3.4. The Second Assignment

Wr i t e a 3- 5 page paper answer i ng t he f ol l owi ng quest i on:

I n t he Meditations, Descar t es ar gues t hat God i s not a decei ver ,
despi t e t hat God al l ows us t o er r . I s hi s ar gument pl ausi bl e? I f
so, def end i t . I f not , expl ai n why not .


The following examples follow the same format as in 3.2-3.3. The topic is slightly more
specialized, although many philosophy students have at least some exposure to Descartes
Meditations (which is one reason that I selected this topic). The length of this paper is equivalent
to nearly four pages of proper-sized font.

J ane Doe
Phi l osophy 102
Oct ober 15, 2008

Descar t e s At t empt t o Absol ve God
Phi l osopher s consi der some of t he most chal l engi ng
quest i ons known t o t he human speci es. Aski ng t hese
quest i ons of t en l eads t o f ur t her quest i ons, whi ch can
be f r ust r at i ng. St i l l , phi l osopher s hope t o answer
t hem. One of t hose quest i ons i s why God al l ows us t o
er r si nce he coul d have made us not er r . I t s l i ke
t he pr obl em of evi l : i f God i s omni pot ent ,
omni sci ent , per f ect , and good, t hen why does God al l ow
evi l ? I t hi nk t hat Descar t e s expl anat i on of why God
al l ows us t o make mi st akes i s r i di cul ous, and I wi l l
ar gue t hi s, al t hough one mi ght di sagr ee.
Of course
one might
disagree.
This
doesnt
need
saying.
Avoid
openings
like this.
These
claims are
empty fil-
ler. Just
explain to
your read-
er what is
at issue.

Substan-
tive ques-
tion: what
does Gods
omnisci-
ence and
perfection
have to do
with the
problem of
evil?

Also: how
is the
problem of
evil like
the prob-
lem that
Jane is
consider-
ing?

and of how God is not a deceiver? tone
1
24
I n t he Medi t at i ons, Descar t es i s wor r i ed t hat he
i s bei ng decei ved by an evi l demon. But he concl udes
t hat he necessar i l y knows t hat he exi st s whenever t he
t hought occur s t o hi m. Fr omt hi s he ar gues t hat he i s
a t hi nki ng t hi ng and t hat he knows t he nat ur e of t he
mi nd bet t er t han he knows t he nat ur e of body and t hat
God exi st s.
But God, Descar t es hol ds, i s not a decei ver .
And si nce God does not wi sh t o decei ve me, he
sur el y di d not gi ve me t he ki nd of f acul t y whi ch
woul d ever enabl e me t o go wr ong whi l e usi ng i t
cor r ect l y.
Ther e woul d be no f ur t her doubt on t hi s i ssue
wer e i t not t hat what I have j ust sai d appear s t o
i mpl y t hat I am i ncapabl e of ever goi ng wr ong.
For i f ever yt hi ng t hat i s i n me comes f r om God,
and he di d not endow me wi t h a f acul t y f or maki ng
mi st akes, i t appear s t hat I can never go wr ong.
( Medi t at i ons)

Si nce we of t en do go wr ong, t hi s i s a pr obl em f or
Descar t es phi l osophy.
Descar t es r esponds t o t hi s chal l enge by sayi ng a
number of t hi ngs. Fi r st , he cl ai ms t hat what appear s
t o be an i mper f ect i on i n me mi ght not r eal l y be an
i mper f ect i on, si nce eval uat i ng whet her somet hi ng i s
mor e or l ess per f ect i s somet hi ng t hat must be done
whi l e consi der i ng t he uni ver se as a whol e, and
somet hi ng t hat seems l i ke an i mper f ect i on t o us mi ght
act ual l y make t he uni ver se mor e per f ect .
Here Jane
is sum-
marizing
Medita-
tions I-
III. But
this sum-
mary does
not help
Jane ad-
vance her
argument.
She should
cut these
passages.
Use italics
or under-
lining for
longer
works like
the Medit-
ations. Use
quotation
marks for
articles.

Too much
quotation.

When
quoting in
block
form,
dont use
quotation
marks.

Provide a
page re-
ference!

Overly
long
sentence.

Provide a
page ref-
erence!
(A) Here
Jane pro-
vides her
reader
some
guidance
about
what is to
come (as-
suming
that Jane
covers
these
things).
The troub-
le is that
this mark-
er is
vague: all
we know is
that a
number
of points
are com-
ing. Some
more de-
tail would
be wel-
come.
i.e., my mistakes?
Avoid the
expression
from
this.
Students
sometimes
use it be-
cause they
think it
gives the
impres-
sion that
they have
explained
some-
thing. But
what ex-
actly is
this?
And how
does what
follows fol-
low from
it?

2
25
But how i s t hi s r el evant ? At i ssue i s whet her God
i s a decei ver . Descar t es i s sayi ng t hat God may have
a good r eason f or al l owi ng us t o er r , but t hat doesn t
negat e t he poi nt t hat God i s decei vi ng us. And
Descar t es hol ds t hat God doesn t do t hat .
Descar t es mai n case i nvol ves car ef ul l y f or mul at i ng
how he under st ands t he case agai nst God. He
st i pul at es t hat i f God can f ai r l y be cal l ed a
decei ver , t hen God must have gi ven us ei t her a f aul t y
i nt el l ect or a f aul t y wi l l . Si nce God has done
nei t her , God i s not gui l t y of t he char ge of decept i on.
The vi ew t hat our i nt el l ect s ar e l i mi t ed i s
acknowl edged by Descar t es. Never t hel ess, he i nsi st s
t hat whi l e t hey f i ni t e, t hi s i s not a desi gn f l aw.
Now al l t hat t he i nt el l ect does i s t o enabl e me t o
per cei ve t he i deas whi ch ar e subj ect s f or possi bl e
j udgement s; and when r egar ded st r i ct l y i n t hi s l i ght ,
i t t ur ns out t o cont ai n no er r or i n t he pr oper sense
of t hat t er m ( Medi t at i ons, 39) . What seems l i ke
Descar t es vi ew i s t hat t he i nt el l ect i s j ust our
abi l i t y t o entertain var i ous t hought s. One doesn t
er r when t hey ar e si mpl y ent er t ai ni ng some gi ven
t hought . So t her e i s not hi ng br oken i n our i nt el l ect ,
despi t e t he f act t hat t her e ar e many t hi ngs I have no
Main case
for what?
Say!

This is a
reason-
able point.
On the
other
hand, its
worth ask-
ing whe-
ther Des-
cartes has
other rea-
sons for
question-
ing whe-
ther we
finite
creatures
are in a
position to
assess how
perfect
something
is.

Addition-
ally, Jane
might
consider
cutting
these last
two para-
graphs
entirely
from her
paper, es-
pecially if
she is
short on
space. Re-
member:
if you dis-
agree with
an au-
thor, put
his work
in the best
light pos-
sible.
Since Jane
thinks
that
Descartes
real case
is distinct
from the
above, the
foregoing
criticism
is, strictly-
speaking,
otiose.

Jane
might
have an-
ticipated
hereeven
quite
briefly
how she
will res-
pond to
Descartes
argument.
For in-
stance: is
Descartes
presump-
tion that
God is on-
ly a de-
ceiver if
one of
these fac-
ulties is
faulty
false?
Does Des-
cartes fail
to justify
his con-
tention
that these
faculties
are in
good
order?

(B) Why
these fac-
ulties?
Descartes acknowledges that our intellects are limited.
Descartes seems to think.
One does not err simply by entertaining a thought.
grammar!
are
3
26
i deas of , whi ch i s why Descar t es t hi nks t he i nt el l ect
i s f i ni t e.
By cont r ast , Descar t es t hi nks t hat our wi l l s ar e
pr act i cal l y di vi ne:
I cannot compl ai n t hat t he wi l l or f r eedom of
choi ce whi ch I r ecei ved f r om God i s not
suf f i ci ent l y ext ensi ve or per f ect , si nce I know
by exper i ence t hat i t i s not r est r i ct ed i n any
way. I ndeed, I t hi nk i t i s ver y not ewor t hy t hat
t her e i s not hi ng el se i n me t hat i s so per f ect
and so gr eat t hat t he possi bi l i t y of a f ur t her
i ncr ease i n i t s per f ect i on or gr eat ness i s beyond
my under st andi ng ( Medi t at i ons, 39) .

The wi l l , f or Descar t es, i s t he abi l i t y t o do or not
do somet hi ng- - t o af f i r m or deny, t o pur sue or avoi d.
And he hol ds t hat whi l e our wi l l s ar e not accompani ed
by t he knowl edge and power t hat God possesses, t hey
ar e st i l l per f ect i n t hemsel ves. So our wi l l s by
t hemsel ves cannot be t he sour ce of our er r or s, ei t her .
Thi s makes i t seem as t hough we cannot er r , whi ch
i s obvi ousl y f al se. Descar t es hol ds t hat t he sour ce
of my mi st akes
must be si mpl y t hi s: t he scope of t he wi l l i s
wi der t han t hat of t he i nt el l ect ; but i nst ead of
r est r i ct i ng i t wi t hi n t he same l i mi t s, I ext end
i t s use t o mat t er s whi ch I do not under st and.
Si nce t he wi l l i s i ndi f f er ent i n such cases, i t
easi l y t ur ns asi de f r om what i s t r ue and good,
and t hi s i s t he sour ce of my er r or and si n
( Medi t at i ons, 40- 1) .

I n ot her wor ds, nei t her of t he mi nd s f acul t i es i s
f l awed. Rat her , my use of them i s t he sour ce of my
(C) Jane
is taking
this from
Descartes
Medita-
tions at
AT 7:57 (p.
40),
slightly
amend-
ing the
text.
There is
nothing
wrong
with quot-
ing this
passage.
But Jane
gives no
indica-
tion that
she is get-
ting these
words
from Des-
cartes,
and that
is unac-
ceptable
scholarly
practice.

Do not
misquote
an au-
thor! It is
which,
not
that.
4
27
mi st akes, speci f i cal l y when I af f i r m or deny t hought s
( an act of wi l l ) t hat I do not suf f i ci ent l y
under st and. But t hen t he f al t f or my er r or s l i es
squar el y wi t h me, not wi t h God. He i s not decei vi ng
me; r at her , I ammi susi ng f acul t i es t hat he gave me.
But Descar t e s ar gument i s absur d. Fi r st ,
Descar t es di st i ngui shes me f r ommy i nt el l ect and wi l l .
I have no obj ect i ons t o t hi s, but Descar t es does not
consi der t hat I am cr eat ed by God j ust as much as my
i nt el l ect and wi l l ar e. Per haps my i nt el l ect and wi l l
t hemsel ves cont ai n no f l aws, but t hen sur el y I do.
Si nce God made me and si nce he made me pr one t o er r or ,
God i s, st r i ct l y, a decei ver .
One mi ght r espond t hat whi l e God made me able t o
er r , he di d not force me t o er r , and t hat her e l i es an
i mpor t ant di st i nct i on. God i s not a decei ver si mpl y
because he per mi t t ed me t o go wr ong. I ndeed,
Descar t es ar gues t hat I was gi ven by God t he t ool s t o
avoi d maki ng mi st akes. I f we wonder why God di d not
si mpl y make i t i mpossi bl e f or me t o er r , one possi bl e
expl anat i on i s one t hat Gar y Hat f i el d of f er s: t hat
our bei ng f r ee r equi r es our bei ng abl e t o make
mi st akes, and t hat bei ng f r ee i s a gr eat good, one
t hat i s wor t h our er r i ng f r omt i me t o t i me ( Hat f i el d) .
Provide a
page
reference!
(D) What
tools?
Jane
should not
presuppose
that her
audience
is already
familiar
with this
material.

Here Jane
is doing
something
import-
antly
right:
Shes
thinking
against
herself,
anticipat-
ing object-
tions.
God gave me
5
This seems
like an
apt
distinc-
tion to
consider.
28
I t hought t hat t hi s was a good r esponse unt i l I
t hought of t he f ol l owi ng exampl e. I magi ne t hat an
el ement ar y school t eacher i s pr epar i ng her st udent s
f or a st andar di zed exam. The t eacher deci des t o
wi t hhol d cer t ai n l essons f r om her st udent s. She
doesn t gi ve t hem any f al se i nf or mat i on, but she does
f ai l t o t each t hemt hi ngs t hat she coul d easi l y t each.
I s she decei vi ng her st udent s?
She i s: or i f she i sn t t echni cal l y decei vi ng
t hem, si nce she i sn t l yi ng t o t hem, she i s doi ng
somet hi ng j ust as bad. But t he t eacher i s i n t he same
si t uat i on as God i s r egar di ng us. He coul d easi l y
have made us so t hat we di d not er r . He di dn t . So
God i s a decei ver , or somet hi ng j ust as bad. Or maybe
God i sn t doi ng somet hi ng t hat awf ul , maybe he had hi s
r easons, even ver y good r easons. But t hat doesn t
mean he i sn t decei vi ng us. He s j ust decei vi ng wi t h
ver y good r eason f or doi ng so.
Ther e i s anot her pr obl em wi t h appeal i ng t o f r eedom
i n or der t o expl ai n why God al l ows us t o er r , namel y,
t hat i t assumes t hat we can be f r ee i n t he f i r st
pl ace. But our f acul t i es ar e made by God, and we
f i r st ent er t he wor l d wi t h nat ur es pr oduced by God.
These, al ong wi t h t he envi r onment we f i nd our sel ves
i n, det er mi ne ever yt hi ng t hat we go on t o do, whi ch
Avoid
autobio-
graphy.
(E) Subs-
tantive
point:
Descartes
would
pretty
clearly
deny that
Janes an-
alogy is
apt. It
would be
good if
Jane
would
consider
what Des-
cartes
would say
in res-
ponse to
her anal-
ogy.

run-on
God creates our faculties
(F) Jane
has a rea-
sonable
worry
here. But
she may or
may not
appreciate
that her
presump-
tionthat
if our na-
tures are
not of our
own crea-
tion, what
actions
result
from them
6
29
means t hat ever yt hi ng t hat we do i s det er mi ned by
f act or s out si de of our cont r ol f r om t he get - go. I t
doesn t even make sense t o say t hat we ar e f r ee on
Descar t e s met aphysi cal pi ct ur e, so Descar t es can t
appeal t o our bei ng f r ee t o hel p expl ai n how God i sn t
decei vi ng us.
I n concl usi on, Descar t es f aces t he di f f i cul t y of
expl ai ni ng how God i s not a decei ver despi t e t he f act
t hat we er r . I have pr esent ed Descar t es case, but i t
i s i nsuf f i ci ent .

Bi bl i ogr aphy
Descar t es, Ren. Meditations on First Philosophy,
with Selections from the Objections and Replies.
Tr ans. J ohn Cot t i ngham. Cambr i dge: Cambr i dge
Uni ver si t y Pr ess, 1986.

Hat f i el d, Gar y. Descartes and the Medi t at i ons. New
Yor k: Rout l edge, 2003.

This con-
clusion
limps.
Better to
cut it en-
tirely.
are not of
our own
free will
is enorm-
ously con-
troversial.
In the fin-
al draft of
Janes
paper (see
3.6), this
objection
has evol-
ved into a
different
one, one
which pre-
sumes less.
7
30

The following is an updated and improved version of the paper from 3.5. You will notice that
J ane has completely rewritten and restructured it. Do not be afraid of doing this. Rewriting a
paper typically requires rethinking how one packaged it to begin with. It is very often a good
idea to start again with a blank sheet, culling ideas from the earlier draft only when necessary.
You may find that you change your mind significantly from draft to draft.

J ane Doe
Phi l osophy 102
Oct ober 15, 2008

Descar t es At t empt t o Absol ve God
Descar t es hol ds a t r adi t i onal concept i on of God
accor di ng t o whi ch God i s per f ect . Yet Descar t es
accept s t he obvi ous f act t hat we er r . Thi s l eaves hi m
wi t h a pr obl em si mi l ar t o t he so- cal l ed pr obl em of
evi l . The pr obl em of evi l i s a pr obl em f or t he
t r adi t i onal monot hei st , who seems commi t t ed t o t he
f ol l owi ng t hr ee t heses:
( 1 ) God i s omni benevol ent .
( 2 ) God i s omni pot ent .
( 3 ) Evi l exi st s.
The di f f i cul t y i s t hat ( 1 ) - ( 3 ) appear t o f or m an
i nconsi st ent t r i ad: i f God i s bot h al l - good and al l -
power f ul , t hen he has bot h t he wi l l and t he power t o
el i mi nat e evi l . I t seems t o f ol l ow t hat evi l does not
exi st . Yet i t does. Descar t es pr obl em i s sl i ght l y
si mpl er . He r ecogni zes t hat t he f ol l owi ng t wo t heses
appear i ncompat i bl e:
1
A much
better in-
troduc-
tion. Note,
however,
that while
Janes
compari-
son to the
problem of
evil is
helpful
especially
to those
familiar
31
( 1) God i s per f ect .
( 2) Per sons er r .
They appear i ncompat i bl e f or t he f ol l owi ng r eason.
Decept i on i s a mar k of weakness, whi ch i s an
i mper f ect i on ( AT 7: 52, 53) .
1
And God seems decept i ve
i f he has cr eat ed us i n a way t hat makes us pr one t o
er r . So i t appear s t hat ei t her ( 1) or ( 2) must gi ve
way.
I n Par t I V of t he Meditations, Descar t es expl ai ns
how he t hi nks t hat ( 1) and ( 2) ar e compat i bl e. I n
t hi s paper , I pr esent Descar t es case. I t hen ar gue
agai nst i t . Assumi ng t hat God exi st s, he does decei ve
us by al l owi ng us t o er r , what ever hi s r easons f or
doi ng so.
I n t he backgr ound of Medi t at i on I V ar e t wo pi ct ur es
of God s r el at i onshi p t o us. I n one- - and t hi s i s t he
pi ct ur e t hat gi ves r i se t o t he pr obl em- - God has
desi gned us badl y. But God i s no bumbl i ng engi neer ;
he knows what he i s doi ng. I t t hus seems t hat God
knowi ngl y cr eat ed us so t hat our er r i ng was
i nevi t abl e. Thi s const r ual of our r el at i onshi p t o
God, Descar t es seems t o t hi nk, does make God a
decei ver . Or , t o put t he poi nt as Descar t es does:
x
with that
problem
Jane
could
probably
cut it if
she were
pressed for
space.

In profes-
sional
publica-
tions,
scholars
try to use
the most
standard-
ized pag-
ination
possible in
their ref-
erences.
The
Adam/
Tannery
pagina-
tion is
found in
the mar-
gins of
many edi-
tions of
Descartes
works, in-
cluding
the trans-
lation
that Jane
has used.
In a long-
er paper,
Jane
might
examine
the conse-
quences of
this con-
clusion.
For in-
stance:
would
Jane
conclude
that God
does not
exist, since
it is im-
possible
for God to
be a de-
ceiver?
Would
Jane
argue in-
stead that
in fact de-
ception
need not
be an im-
perfec-
tion?
1
I n t hi s paper , I r ef er t o Descar t es Meditations by way of
t he Adam/ Tanner y ( AT) pagi nat i on.
2
32
si nce i t i s absur d t hat God woul d decei ve us ( AT
7: 62) , t he equal l y absur d concl usi on t hat I can never
go wr ong appear s t o f ol l ow ( AT 7: 54) .
Ther e i s anot her pi ct ur e, and Descar t es pr ef er s i t .
I n i t , God has cr eat ed us wi t h no desi gn f l aws.
Rat her , er r or ar i ses when we mi suse t he f acul t i es t hat
God has gi ven us. That i s not God s f aul t . God i s
l i ke t he t eacher who has gi ven us al l t he necessar y
t ool s t o ace an exam, i f onl y we use t hem car ef ul l y.
I t i s not t he t eacher s f aul t i f we sl ack of f , and i t
woul d be unj ust t o suggest t hat t he t eacher has
decei ved us when we do. Li kewi se, per sons ar e i n f act
somet i mes r ash i n t hei r j udgment s, and t hi s i s why ( 2)
we er r . But t hi s har dl y cont r adi ct s t he cl ai m t hat
( 1) God i s per f ect .
I f we ar e t o accept t he l at t er pi ct ur e, t hen i t i s
cr uci al t o expl ai n how our mi st akes do not i ndi cat e a
f l awed desi gn; and t o under st and Descar t es account ,
one must have a r ough sense f or how Descar t es t hi nks
t hat er r or ar i ses i n t he f i r st pl ace. Ther e ar e, f or
Descar t es, t wo f acul t i es at wor k when we make
j udgment s: t he f acul t y of t he i nt el l ect and t he
f acul t y of t he wi l l . J udgment wor ks as f ol l ows ( AT
7: 56- 8) . The i nt el l ect ent er t ai ns a t hought - - e. g. ,
The angl es of a t r i angl e sum t o 180 degr ees. Then
Here is an
instance
of Jane re-
packaging
some of
her pre-
vious
draft for a
better pre-
sentation.
She con-
tinues to
use a
helpful
analogy
of a
teacher
and his
students;
but the
analogy is
rather dif-
ferent and
is doing
different
work. The
way that
Jane ad-
vances her
argument
here ad-
dresses the
worry in
(E).

The set-up
here is
much
better
than that
of Janes
previous
draft. Cf.
(A) and
(B).
3
33
t he subj ect , t hr ough her wi l l , ei t her endor ses or
deni es i t . Er r or ar i ses when somet hi ng goes wr ong
wi t h t hi s pr ocess, t he det ai l s of whi ch I r et ur n t o
shor t l y.
I f God i s r esponsi bl e f or our er r or and i s gui l t y
of decei vi ng us, i t can onl y be, Descar t es t hi nks,
because he desi gned badl y one ( or bot h) of t he
f acul t i es r esponsi bl e f or j udgment . I f God di d do
t hi s, t hen our r el at i onshi p t o God woul d be as t he
f i r st pi ct ur e suggest s, and God woul d be a decei ver .
But Descar t es ar gues t hat nei t her f acul t y cont ai ns
such a f l aw. Not t he i nt el l ect : [ A] l l t hat t he
i nt el l ect does i s t o enabl e me t o per cei ve t he i deas
whi ch ar e subj ect s f or possi bl e j udgement s; and when
r egar ded st r i ct l y i n t hi s l i ght , i t t ur ns out t o
cont ai n no er r or i n t he pr oper sense of t hat t er m ( AT
7: 56) . The i nt el l ect i s j ust our abi l i t y t o ent er t ai n
and i nspect var i ous t hought s. We do not er r when we
si mpl y ent er t ai n or i nspect a t hought , no mat t er how
absur d i t i s. So t he i nt el l ect i s not f l awed. I t i s
onl y f i ni t e, si nce one cannot consi der ever y possi bl e
t hought .
Mor eover , Descar t es t hi nks t hat our wi l l s ar e
pr act i cal l y di vi ne and ar e t hus f ar f r omf l awed:
4
34
I cannot compl ai n t hat t he wi l l or f r eedom of
choi ce whi ch I r ecei ved f r om God i s not
suf f i ci ent l y ext ensi ve or per f ect , si nce I know
by exper i ence t hat i t i s not r est r i ct ed i n any
way. I ndeed, I t hi nk i t i s ver y not ewor t hy t hat
t her e i s not hi ng el se i n me whi ch i s so per f ect
and so gr eat t hat t he possi bi l i t y of a f ur t her
i ncr ease i n i t s per f ect i on or gr eat ness i s beyond
my under st andi ng ( AT 7: 56- 7) .

The wi l l , f or Descar t es, i s t he abi l i t y t o do or not
do somet hi ng ( t hat i s, t o af f i r mor deny, t o pur sue or
avoi d) ( AT 7: 57) . And whi l e our wi l l s ar e not
accompani ed by t he knowl edge and power t hat God
possesses, t hey ar e st i l l per f ect i n t hemsel ves. So
our wi l l s cont ai n no desi gn f l aws, ei t her .
Er r or ar i ses onl y when one endor ses or deni es a
pr oposi t i on ( wi l l ) t hat one i s consi der i ng ( i nt el l ect )
whose t r ut h or f al si t y i s uncl ear ( AT 7: 58) .
4
I n
ot her wor ds, er r or ar i ses onl y when a per son mi suses
her wi l l , whi ch by i t sel f i s wel l - desi gned. Thi s i s
Descar t es case f or t he second pi ct ur e of God s
r el at i onshi p t o us, accor di ng t o whi ch God i s no
decei ver . He has gi ven us f l awl ess f acul t i es f or
j udgment ; we make mi st akes when we mi suse t hem.
But Descar t es ar gument f ai l s. The cr uci al
di f f i cul t y i s t hat Descar t es sear ches f or a desi gn
f l aw onl y i n t he f acul t i es i nvol ved i n j udgment . But

4
Whi ch i s not t o say t hat one cannot get l ucky. We somet i mes
say t r ue t hi ngs about mat t er s t hat we do not under st and. Er r or
i s not i nevi t abl e i n t hese si t uat i ons.
Cf. (C).

2
Whi ch i s not t o say t hat one cannot get l ucky. We somet i mes
say t r ue t hi ngs about mat t er s t hat we do not under st and. Er r or
i s not i nevi t abl e i n t hese si t uat i ons.
2
5
35
t her e i s somet hi ng el se t o consi der : t he per son who
uses t hose f acul t i es! Per sons ar e one and al l God s
cr eat i on; t hei r nat ur es ar e, ul t i mat el y, t he pr oduct
of God s desi gn. I f I mi suse my f acul t i es, t hat i s a
r esul t of how I am. How I am, i t seems, must
ul t i mat el y r esul t f r oma desi gn f l aw.
One mi ght r epl y t hat my pr opensi t y t o er r i s i n
f act no f l aw. Descar t es specul at es t hat our er r i ng
may, f or al l we know, cont r i but e t o t he over al l
per f ect i on of t he uni ver se ( AT 7: 55- 6, 61) . Per haps,
t hen, our pr opensi t y t o er r shoul d not even be cal l ed
a f l aw.
But t hi s r esponse does not hi ng t o absol ve God of
t he char ge t hat he desi gned us t o er r . I n f act , i t
makes mat t er s wor se, si nce i t assumes t hat God
posi t i vel y needs our mi st akes t o mai nt ai n t he
per f ect i on of t he uni ver se. I f God uses our er r or s
f or t he per f ect i on of t he uni ver se, pr esumabl y he di d
not l eave t hi s t o chance but ensur ed i n advance t hat
we woul d make t hem. Thi s i s cl ear l y decept i ve.
Al t er nat i vel y, one mi ght r espond t hat whi l e God
desi gned us t o be able t o er r , he di d not desi gn us to
err, and t hat her e l i es an i mpor t ant di st i nct i on. I t
i s no desi gn f l aw t hat God gave me t he f r eedomt o make
mi st akes. I ndeed, t he abi l i t y t o er r i s needed i n
6
36
or der t o be f r ee, whi ch i s a gr eat good ( Hat f i el d,
187, 191) . Mor eover , Descar t es ar gues t hat God gave
me t he t ool s t o avoi d er r or . I need si mpl y wi t hhol d
j udgment unl ess t he t r ut h or f al si t y of t he t hought
t hat I consi der i s cl ear and di st i nct ( AT 7: 59- 60,
62) .
But t hi s r esponse i s unt enabl e. Fi r st - - and her e I
appr opr i at e a poi nt made by J . L. Macki e- - t o be f r ee
one need not be abl e t o er r ( Macki e, 209) . Even i f I
coul d not make mi st akes about what i s t r ue and f al se,
I coul d st i l l make f r ee choi ces about what act i ons I
wi sh t o t ake: e. g. , bet ween seei ng a movi e and
r eadi ng a book. Per haps I woul d have less f r eedom i f
I coul d not er r ; but t hat does not i mpl y t hat I woul d
have no f r eedom.
Second, i nvoki ng human f r eedom paper s over t he
di f f i cul t y wi t hout r espondi ng t o i t . Thi s can be seen
as f ol l ows. God gave us t he nat ur es wi t h whi ch we
ent er ed t he wor l d. Those nat ur es ei t her di ct at ed t hat
we woul d er r or t hey di d not . I f t hey di d, t hen God
di d not si mpl y gi ve us t he abi l i t y t o er r . He
desi gned us to er r , i n whi ch case he i s a decei ver .
On t he ot her hand, per haps t he nat ur es t hat God gave
us di d not di ct at e t hat we woul d er r . But i n t hi s
case, i t no l onger appear s t hat t her e i s an exer ci se,
Here Jane
goes some
way to res-
ponding to
difficulties
noted in
(D). It
would be
nice if
Jane could
explain
what clar-
ity and
distinct-
ness
amount to.
The trouble
with this
desiderat-
um, how-
ever, is
that it is a
vexed ques-
tion what
clarity
and dis-
tinctness
are. In a
paper
whose
main sub-
ject matter
is Des-
cartes the-
ory of
judgment,
the author
would
probably
be obliged
to say
more here.
Given the
scope of
this paper,
however,
Jane
probably
need not
go into
greater
detail.
In a long-
er paper,
Jane
would
have to
consider
this res-
ponse more
thorough-
ly. After
all, per-
haps she is
right. But
her oppon-
ent might
respond
that the
great
good that
God has
given us is
not any
degree of
freedom
but the
more
significant
degree of
freedom
that results
from being
able to
make mis-
takes.
Cf. (F).

7
37
l et al one a f r ee exer ci se, of our wi l l s i n cases of
er r or . I nst ead, f act or s out si de of our nat ur es f or ce
us t o endor se pr oposi t i ons t hat we do not under st and.
Thi s i s not t he pi ct ur e of human er r or t hat Descar t es
want s us t o accept . He i s commi t t ed t o t he posi t i on
t hat God gave us t he wher ewi t hal t o avoi d er r or . But
i f our er r or s ar e f or ced on us f r omwi t hout t hen er r or
i s unavoi dabl e. Mor e i mpor t ant l y, one must wonder
whet her t hi s pi ct ur e i s any mor e compat i bl e wi t h t he
posi t i on t hat God i s no decei ver . I t seems unl i kel y
t hat a God who pl aced us i nt o a wor l d wher e mi st akes
wer e unavoi dabl e i s any l ess decept i ve t han a God who
desi gned us t o er r .
I t t her ef or e seems t hat our r el at i onshi p t o God i s
mor e or l ess as t he f i r st pi ct ur e suggest s: ei t her
God desi gned us t o er r or he di d not gi ve us t he
r esour ces t o avoi d er r or , whi ch he coul d easi l y have
done. Ei t her way, God i s decept i ve. Descar t es cl ai ms
t hat God may wel l have excel l ent r easons t o per mi t our
mi st akes. But a wel l - i nt ent i oned decei ver i s a
decei ver al l t he same.

Perhaps
there is
some wig-
gle room
here for
Janes op-
ponent.
Jane as-
sumes that
the na-
tures that
God gave
us were
fully de-
signed by
him. But
perhaps
God de-
cided to
leave por-
tions of
our na-
tures up to
chance?
If so, per-
haps these
portions of
our na-
tures are
respons-
ible for
our er-
rors?
8
38
Bi bl i ogr aphy
Descar t es, Ren. Meditations on First Philosophy,
with Selections from the Objections and Replies.
Tr ans. J ohn Cot t i ngham. Cambr i dge: Cambr i dge
Uni ver si t y Pr ess, 1986.

Hat f i el d, Gar y. Descartes and the Medi t at i ons. New
Yor k: Rout l edge, 2003.

Macki e, J . L. Evi l and Omni pot ence. Mind 64, No.
254 ( Apr . 1955) : 200- 12.

9
39
Have you

cut unnecessary observations from your introduction (2.1)?

stated a thesis in your introduction (see 1.3 and 2.1)?

insured that every sentence of your paper contributes to supporting your thesis
(see 1.3)?

written your paper as if you were writing it for a philosophical peer not taking
this course (not for your professor or simply for yourself) (see 2.2)?

considered objections to your argument (see examples from 3)?

edited your paper multiple times and written multiple drafts (see 1.2)?

provided proper credit to those who have in whatever way influenced your
workincluding, especially, page references (see 1.4)?

answered the assigned question (not merely a similar question) (see 2.2)?

40
4. Final Remarks

A terrific text that every undergraduate should read is The Elements of Style, by William Strunk,
J r. and E.B. White. This short book is not specific to philosophy and is very affordable (es-
pecially if purchased used). An on-line edition can be found at http://www.bartleby.com/141/.

Other helpful on-line guides to writing philosophy papers, which I consulted while finishing this
one, include:

A Guide to Philosophical Writing, by Eli Chudnoff
http://www.as.miami.edu/personal/echudnoff/A%20Guide%20to%20Philosophical%20Writing.pdf

Writing Tutor for Introductory Philosophy Courses, by J oe Cruz
http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/jcruz/writingtutor/
Writing Tutor for Introductory Moral Philosophy Courses, also by J oe Cruz
http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/fourth_layer/faculty_pages/jcruz/moraltutor/index.html

Writing a Philosophy Paper, by Peter Horban
http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/writing.htm
The Pink Guide to Taking Philosophy Classes, from the MIT Department of Philosophy
http://web.mit.edu/philos/www/guides/pinkguide.pdf
Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper, by J im Pryor
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html

4.2. Acknowledgments
My thanks to Anthony Coleman, Brian Cooney, and J ohn Partridge for valuable feedback to
earlier drafts of this guide.

andrew.roche@centre.edu

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